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Hi! I need help with my discussion board assignment.

Hegemonic // Toxic Masculinity

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Take a look at Mike Donaldson's article on "Hegemonic Masculinity" found here: Download hegemonic masculinity.pdf

Then view the Ted Talk by Jackson Katz, titled, "Violence Against Women: It's a Men's Issue"

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Answer the following questions by Wednesday; respond to two other posts by Friday.

1. What is hegemonic or toxic masculinity?

2. Why does Jackson Katz consider violence against women a 'man's issue?' How are boys and other men affected by this violence?

3. What kinds of micro efforts (raising our boys) or macro efforts (changing society) would you suggest to address hegemonic masculinity?

Trans Men and Sexism

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What does it mean to be a trans man?

How does that experience translate for those how have grown up as a 'woman'?

After reading the following segment, consider these questions, submitting your answers by Wednesday, then responding to at least two more posts by Friday!

https://time.com/transgender-men-sexism/Links to an external site.

1. Discuss the title of this segment and how it relates to the experience of transgender men.

2. What are some issues that transgender men experience when they transition later in life?

3. What stood out to you most when reading this account of transgender men?

4. Share with the class one article that identifies the current struggles of trans folx. What did you learn?

The Way We Never Were

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Here's a picture of some trends in U.S. households, according to the Pew Research Center.

https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/17/1-the-american-family-today/Links to an external site.

LinkLinks to an external site.

And...

Sociologist Stephanie Coontz discusses "The Way We Never Were," found here: -----> Links to an external site.LinkLinks to an external site.

After taking a careful look at these sources, discuss the following questions with your initial post by Wednesday; after that, respond to at least two more posts by Friday.

1. What does Coontz argue about today's typical family in the U.S.?

2. How might race, social class, gender, or other identities experience family structure in the U.S.?

3. How might this information help us make decisions regarding education on families or inform policies related to families?

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University of Wollongong Research Online Faculty of Arts - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities October 1993 What Is Hegemonic Masculinity? Mike Donaldson University of Wollongong, miked51@bigpond.com Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Donaldson, Mike, What Is Hegemonic Masculinity? 1993. https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/141 Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au Theory and Society, Vol.22, No.5, Special Issue: Masculinities, Oct., 1993, pp.643-657. What Is Hegemonic Masculinity? Mike Donaldson Sociology, University of Wollongong, Australia Structures of oppression, forces for change A developing debate within the growing theoretical literature on men and masculinity concerns the relationship of gender systems to the social formation. Crucially at issue is the question of the autonomy of the gender order. Some, in particular Waters, are of the opinion that change in masculine gender systems historically has been caused exogenously and that, without those external factors, the systems would stably reproduce.(1) For Hochschild, the "motor" of this social change is the economy, particularly and currently, the decline in the purchasing power of the male wage, the decline in the number and proportion of "male" skilled and unskilled jobs, and the rise in "female" jobs in the growing services sector.(2) I have argued that gender relations themselves are bisected by class relations and vice-versa, and that the salient moment for analysis is the relation between the two.(3) On the other side of the argument, others have been trying to establish "the laws of motion" of gender systems. Connell, for instance, has insisted on the independence of their structures, patterns of movement. and determinations, most notably in his devastating critiques of sexrole theory. "Change is always something that happens to sex roles, that impinges on them. It comes from outside, as in discussions of how technological and economic changes demand a shift to a 'modern' male role for men. Or it comes from inside the person, from the 'real self' that protests against the artificial restrictions of constraining roles. Sex role theory has no way of grasping change as a dialectic arising within gender relations themselves." It has no way of grasping social dynamics that can only be seriously considered when the historicity of the structure of gender relations, the gender order of the society, is the point of departure.(4) This concern with broad, historical movement is linked to the question of male sexual politics. Clearly, if men wish to challenge patriarchy and win, the central question must be, who and where are the "army of redressers?" (5) But "the political project of rooting out the sexism in masculinity has proved intensely difficult" because "the difficulty of constructing a movement of men to dismantle hegemonic masculinity is that its logic is not the articulation of collective interest but the attempt to dismantle that interest.(6) It is this concept of "hegemonic masculinity'' on which the argument for autonomy of the gender structures turns, for it is this that links their broader historical sweep to lived experience. Put simply, if the gender system has an independence of structure, movement, and determinations, then we should be able to identify counter-hegemonic forces within it; if these are not identifiable, then we must question the autonomy of the gender system and the existence of hegemonic masculinity as central and specific to it. On the other hand, if gender systems are not autonomous, then the question "why, in specific social formations, do certain ways of being male predominate, and particular sorts of men rule?" remains to be answered and the resistances to that order still remain to be identified. The political implications of the issue are clear. If there is an independent structure of masculinity, then it should produce counter-hegemonic movements of men, and all good blokes should get involved in them. If the structure is not independent, or the movements not counterhegemonic, or the counter-hegemony not moving, then political practice will not be centred on masculinity ... and what do we men do then, about the masculine images in and through which we have shaped a world so cruel to most of its inhabitants? Hegemony and masculinity Twenty years ago, Patricia Sexton suggested that "male norms stress values such as courage, inner direction, certain forms of aggression, autonomy. mastery, technological skill, group solidarity, adventure and considerable amounts of toughness in mind and body." (7) It is only relatively recently that social scientists have sought to link that insight with the concept of hegemony, a notion as slippery and difficult as the idea of masculinity itself. Hegemony, a pivotal concept in Gramsci's Prison Notebooks and his most significant contribution to Marxist thinking, is about the winning and holding of power and the formation (and destruction) of social groups in that process. In this sense, it is importantly about the ways in which the ruling class establishes and maintains its domination. The ability to impose a definition of the situation, to set the terms in which events are understood and issues discussed, to formulate ideals and define morality is an essential part of this process. Hegemony involves persuasion of the greater part of the population, particularly through the media, and the organization of social institutions in ways that appear "natural," "ordinary:' "normal." The state, through punishment for non-conformity, is crucially involved in this negotiation and enforcement.(8) Heterosexuality and homophobia are the bedrock of hegemonic masculinity and any understanding of its nature and meaning is predicated on the feminist insight that in general the relationship of men to women is oppressive. Indeed, the term "hegemonic masculinity" was invented and is used primarily to maintain this central focus in the critique of masculinity. A fundamental element of hegemonic masculinity. then. is that women exist as potential sexual objects for men while men are negated as sexual objects for men. Women provide heterosexual men with sexual validation, and men compete with each other for this. This does not necessarily involve men being particularly nasty to individual women. Women may feel as oppressed by non-hegemonic masculinities, may even find some expressions of the hegemonic pattern more familiar and manageable.(9) More than fifty books have appeared in the English language in the last decade or so on men and masculinity. What is hegemonic masculinity as it is presented in this growing literature? Hegemonic masculinity, particularly as it appears in the works of Carrigan, Connell, and Lee. Chapman, Cockburn, Connell, Lichterman, Messner, and Rutherford, involves a specific strategy for the subordination of women. In their view, hegemonic masculinity concerns the dread of and the flight from women. A culturally idealized form, it is both a personal and a collective project, and is the common sense about breadwinning and manhood. It is exclusive, anxiety-provoking, internally and hierarchically differentiated, brutal, and violent. It is pseudo-natural, tough, contradictory, crisis-prone, rich, and socially sustained. While centrally connected with the institutions of male dominance, not all men practice it. though most benefit from it. Although cross-class. it often excludes workingclass and black men. It is a lived experience, and an economic and cultural force, and dependent on social arrangements. It is constructed through difficult negotiation over a life-time. Fragile it may be, but it constructs the most dangerous things we live with. Resilient, it incorporates its own critiques, but it is, nonetheless, "unravelling." (10) What can men do with it? According to the authors cited above, and others, hegemonic masculinity can be analyzed, distanced from, appropriated, negated, challenged, reproduced, separated from, renounced, given up, chosen, constructed with difficulty, confirmed, imposed, departed from, and modernized. (But not, apparently, enjoyed.) What can it do to men? It can fascinate, undermine, appropriate some men's bodies, organize, impose, pass itself off as natural, deform, harm, and deny. (But not, seemingly, enrich and satisfy.) Which groups are most active in the making of masculinist sexual ideology? It is true that the New Right and fascism are vigorously constructing aggressive, dominant, and violent models of masculinity. But generally, the most influential agents are considered to be: priests, journalists, advertisers, politicians, psychiatrists, designers, playwrights, film makers, actors, novelists, musicians, activists, academics, coaches, and sportsmen. They are the "weavers of the fabric of hegemony" as Gramsci put it, its "organizing intellectuals." These people regulate and manage gender regimes: articulate experiences, fantasies, and perspectives; reflect on and interpret gender relations.(11) The cultural ideals these regulators and managers create and perpetuate. we are told, need not correspond at all closely to the actual personalities of the majority of men (not even to their own!). The ideals may reside in fantasy figures or models remote from the lives of the unheroic majority, but while they are very public, they do not exist only as publicity. The public face of hegemonic masculinity, the argument goes. is not necessarily even what powerful men are, but is what sustains their power, and is what large numbers of men are motivated to support because it benefits them. What most men support is not necessarily what they are. "Hegemonic masculinity is naturalised in the form of the hero and presented through forms that revolve around heroes: sagas, ballads, westerns, thrillers," in books, films, television, and in -sporting events.(12) What in the early literature had been written of as "the male sex role" is best seen as hegemonic masculinity, the "culturally idealised form of masculine character" which, however, may not be "the usual form of masculinity at all.'' To say that a particular form of masculinity is hegemonic means "that its exaltation stabilizes a structure of dominance and oppression in the gender order as a whole. To be culturally exalted, the pattern of masculinity must have exemplars who are celebrated as heroes." (13) But when we examine these bearers of hegemonic masculinity, they seem scarcely up to the task, with more than just feet of clay. A football star is a model of hegemonic masculinity.(14) But is a model? When the handsome Australian Rules football player, Warwick "the tightest shorts in sports" Capper, combined football with modelling, does this confirm or decrease his exemplary status? When Wally ("the King") Lewis explained that the price he will pay for another five years playing in the professional Rugby League is the surgical replacement of both his knees, this is undoubtedly the stuff of good, old, tried and true, tough and stoic, masculinity. But how powerful is a man who mutilates his body, almost as a matter of course, merely because of a job? When Lewis announced that he was quitting the very prestigious "State of Origin" football series because his year-old daughter had been diagnosed as hearing-impaired, is this hegemonic? In Australian surfing champion, iron man Steve Donoghue, Connell has found "an exemplar of masculinity" who lives "an exemplary version of hegemonic masculinity." But, says Donoghue, "I have loved the idea of not having to work ....Five hours a day is still a lot but it is something that I enjoy that people are not telling me what to do." This is not the right stuff. Nor are hegemonic men supposed to admit to strangers that their life is "like being in jail." Connell reveals further contradictions when he explains that "Steve, the exemplar of masculine toughness, finds his own exemplary status prevents him from doing exactly what his peer group defines as thoroughly masculine behaviour: going wild, showing off, drunk driving, getting into fights, defending his own prestige." This is not power. And when we look to see why many young men take up sport we find they are driven by "the hunger for affiliation" in the words of Hammond and Jablow; we see the felt need for "connectedness" and closeness. How hegemonic is this? (15) Homosexuality and counter-hegemony Let us, however, pursue the argument by turning now to examine those purported counter-hegemonic forces that are supposedly generated by the gender system itself. There are three main reasons why male homosexuality is regarded as counter-hegemonic. Firstly, hostility to homo- sexuality is seen as fundamental to male heterosexuality; secondly, homosexuality is associated with effeminacy; and thirdly, the form of homosexual pleasure is itself considered subversive.(16) Antagonism to gay men is a standard feature of hegemonic masculinity in Australia. Such hostility is inherent in the construction of heterosexual masculinity itself. Conformity to the demands of hegemonic masculinity, pushes heterosexual men to homophobia and rewards them for it, in the form of social support and reduced anxiety about their own manliness. In other words, male heterosexual identity is sustained and affirmed by hatred for, and fear of, gay men.(17) Although homosexuality was compatible with hegemonic masculinity in other times and places, this was not true in post-invasion Australia. The most obvious characteristic of Australian male homosexuals, according to Johnston and Johnston, has been a "double deviance." It has been and is a constant struggle to attain the goals set by hegemonic masculinity, and some men challenge this rigidity by acknowledging their own "effeminacy." This rejection and affirmation assisted in changing homosexuality from being an aberrant (and widespread) sexual practice, into an identity when the homosexual and lesbian subcultures reversed the hegemonic gender roles, mirror-like, for each sex. Concomitantly or consequently, homosexual men were socially defined as effeminate and any kind of powerlessness, or a refusal to compete, "readily becomes involved in the imagery of homosexuality" (18) While being subverted in this fashion, hegemonic masculinity is also threatened by the assertion of a homosexual identity confident that homosexuals are able to give each other sexual pleasure. According to Connell, the inherent egalitarianism in gay relationships that exists because of this transitive structure (my lover's lover can also be my lover), challenges the hierarchical and oppressive nature of male heterosexuality.(19) However, over time, the connection between homosexuality and effeminacy has broken. The "flight from masculinity" evident in male homosexuality, noted thirty years ago by Helen Hacker, may be true no longer, as forms of homosexual behaviour seem to require an exaggeration of some aspects of hegemonic masculinity, notably the cult of toughness and physical aggression. If hegemonic masculinity necessarily involves aggression and physical dominance, as has been suggested, then the affirmation of gay sexuality need not imply support for women's liberation at all, as the chequered experience of women in the gay movement attests.(20) More than a decade ago, Australian lesbians had noted, "We make the mistake of assuming that lesbianism, in itself, is a radical position. This had led us, in the past, to support a whole range of events, ventures, political perspectives, etc. just because it is lesbians who hold those beliefs or are doing things. It is as ludicrous as believing that every working class person is a communist." (21) Even though there are many reasons to think that there are important differences in the expression and construction of women's homosexuality and men's homosexuality, perhaps there is something to be learned from this. Finally, it is not "gayness" that is attractive to homosexual men, but "maleness." A man is lusted after not because he is homosexual but because he's a man. How counter-hegemonic can this be? Changing men, gender segmentation and paid and unpaid work Connell notes, "Two possible ways of working for the ending of patriarchy which move beyond guilt, fixing your head and heart, and blaming men, are to challenge gender segmentation in paid work and to work in men's counter-sexist groups. Particularly, though, countersexist politics need to move beyond the small consciousness raising group to operate in the workplace, unions and the state." (22) It is hard to imagine men challenging gender segmentation in paid work by voluntarily dropping a third of their wage packet. But it does happen, although perhaps the increasing trickle of men into women's jobs may have more to do with the prodding of a certain invisible finger. Lichterman has suggested that more political elements of the "men's movement" contain human service workers, students, parttimers. and "odd-jobbers." Those in paid work, work in over-whelmingly female occupations -counselling, nursing, and elementary teaching are mentioned. In this sense, their position in the labour market has made them "predisposed to criticise hegemonic masculinity, the common sense about breadwinning and manhood." It can also be seen as a defence against the loss of these things, as men attempt to colonize women's occupations in a job market that is increasingly competitive, particularly for men's jobs.?(23) If we broaden the focus on the desegmentation of paid work to include unpaid work, more interesting things occur. While Connell has suggested that hegemonic masculinity is confirmed in fatherhood, the practice of parenting by men actually seems to undermine it. Most men have an exceptionally impoverished idea about what fatherhood involves, and indeed, active parenting doesn't even enter into the idea of manhood at all. Notions of fathering that are acceptable to men concern the exercise of impartial discipline, from an emotional distance and removed from favouritism and partiality. In hegemonic masculinity, fathers do not have the capacity or the skill or the need to care for children, especially for babies and infants, while the relationship between female parents and young children is seen as crucial. Nurturant and care-giving behaviour is simply not manly. Children, in turn, tend to have more abstract and impersonal relations with their fathers. The problem is severely compounded for divorced fathers, most of whom have extremely little emotional contact with their children.(24) As Messner has explained, "while the man is 'out there' establishing his .name' in public, the woman is usually home caring for the day-to-day and moment-to-moment needs of her family ....Tragically, only in mid- life, when the children have already 'left the nest' ...do some men discover the importance of connection and intimacy." (25) Nonetheless, of the little time that men spend in unpaid work, proportionally more of it goes now into child care. Russell has begun to explore the possibility that greater participation by men in parenting has led to substantial shifts in their ideas of masculinity. The reverse is probably true too. Hochschild found in her study that men who shared care with their partners rejected their own "detached, absent and overbearing'' fathers. The number of men primarily responsible for parenting has grown dramatically in Australia, increasing five-fold between 1981 and 1990. The number of families with dependent children in which the man was not in paid work but the woman was, rose from 16,200 in 1981 to 88,100 in 1990. Women, however, still outnumber men in this position ten to one.(26) Not only a man's instrumental relations with others are challenged by close parenting, but so are his instrumental relations with himself. Men's sense of themselves is threatened by intimacy. Discovering the affection, autonomy, and agency of babies and children, disconcerted by an unusual inability to cope, men are compelled to re-evaluate their attitude to themselves. In Russell's study, the fathers who provided primary child care "constantly marvelled at and welcomed the changes that had taken place in their relationships with their children."(27) Even Neville Wran, the former premier of the Australian state of New South Wales whose most renowned political activity was "putting the blowtorch to the belly" of political opponents. said of fatherhood, which occurred in his sixties, "It's making me a more patient, tolerant, understanding human being. I'm a real marshmallow." (28) The men who come to full-time fathering do not, however, regard themselves as unmanly, even though their experiences have resulted in major shifts in their ideas about children, child care, and women. In fact, one quarter of them considered these changes a major gain from their parenting work. This was despite the fact that these men's male friends and workmates were highly critical of their abandonment of the breadwinner role, describing them, for instance, as being "bludgers," "a bit funny,'' "a bit of a woman," and "under the thumb." (29) This stigmatism may be receding as the possibility of securing the children's future, once part of the father's responsibility in his relations with the "public sphere," is becoming less and less possible as unemployment bites deeper. (30) Child-minders and day-care workers have confirmed that the children of active fathers were "more secure" and "less anxious" than the children of non-active fathers. Psychological studies have revealed them to be better developed socially and intellectually. Furthermore, the results of active fatherhood seem to last. There is considerable evidence to suggest that greater interaction with fathers is better for children, with the sons and daughters of active fathers displaying lower levels of sex-role stereotyping. (31) Men who share the second shift had a happier family life and more harmonious marriages. In a longitudinal study, Defrain found that parents reported that they were happier and their relationships improved as a result of shared parenting. In an American study, househusbands felt positive about their increased contribution to the family-household, paid work became less central to their definition of themselves, and they noted an improvement in their relationships with their female partners.(32) One of the substantial bases for metamorphosis for Connell's six changing heterosexual men in the environmental movement was the learning of domestic labour, which involves "giving to people, looking after people." In the same sense that feminism "claimed emotional life as a source of dignity and self respect," active fathers are challenging hegemonic masculinity. For hegemonic masculinity, real work is elsewhere, and relationships don't require energy, but provide it.(33) There is also the question of time. The time spent establishing the intimacy that a man may crave is also time away from establishing and maintaining the "competitive edge," or the "public face." There are no prizes for being a good father, not even when being one is defined narrowly in terms of breadwinning. (34) Social struggles over time are intimate with class and gender. It is not only that the rich and powerful are paid handsomely for the time they sell, have more disposable time, more free time, more control over how they use their time, but the gender dimensions of time use within classes are equally compelling. No one performs less unpaid work, and receives greater remuneration for time spent in paid work, than a male of the ruling class. The changes that are occurring remain uncertain, and there is, of course, a sting in the tail. Madison Avenue has found that "emotional lability and soft receptivity to what's new and exciting" are more appropriate to a consumer-orientated society than "hardness and emotional distance." Past television commercials tended to portray men as Marlboro macho or as idiots, but contemporary viewers see men cooking, feeding babies, and shopping. Insiders in the advertising industry say that the quick and easy cooking sections of magazines and newspapers are as much to attract male readers as overworked women. U.S. Sports Illustrated now carries advertisements for coffee, cereal, deodorants, and soup. According to Judith Langer, whose market-research firm services A.T. & T., Gillette. and Pepsico among others, it is now "acceptably masculine to care about one's house. (35) The "new man" that comes at us through the media seems to reinforce the social order without challenging it. And he brings with him, too, a new con for women. In their increasing assumption of breadwinning, femocratic and skilled worker occupations, the line goes, women render themselves incomplete. They must -'give up" their femininity in their appropriation of male jobs and power, but men who embrace the feminine become "more complete." (36) And if that isn't tricky enough, the "new men" that seem to be emerging are simply unattractive. Indeed, they're boring. Connell's six changing heterosexual men in the environmental movement were attracted to women who were "strong, independent, active. (37) Isn't everybody attracted by these qualities? Gay men find "new men" irritating and new men are not too sure how keen they should be on each other, and no feminist worth her salt would be seen dead with one. The ruling class: Really real men? If the significance of the concept of hegemonic masculinity is that it directs us to look for the contradictions within an autonomous gender system that will cause its transformation, then we must conclude it has failed. The challenges to hegemonic masculinity identified by its theorists and outlined above seem either to be complicit with, or broader than, the gender system that has apparently generated them. I can appreciate why Connell is practically interested in and theoretically intrigued by arguing against the notion of the externality of gender change. "Both experience and theory show the impossibility of liberating a dominant group and the difficulty of constructing a movement based not on the shared interest of a group but on the attempt to dismantle that interest." (38) (My emphasis). The key is the phrase "constructing a movement." It is only a system which has its own dynamics that can produce the social forces necessary to change radically that system. But Connell himself has written that gender is part of the relations of production and has always been so. And similarly, that "social science cannot understand the state, the political economy of advanced capitalism. the nature of class, the process of modernisation or the nature of imperialism, the process of socialisation, the structure of consciousness or the politics of knowledge, without a full-blooded analysis of gender." (39) There is nothing outside gender. To be involved in social relations is to be inextricably "inside" gender. If everything, in this sense, is within gender, why should we be worried about the exteriority of the forces for social change? Politics, economics, technology are gendered. "We have seen the invisible hand;' someone wittier than I remarked, "It is white, hairy and manicured.'' Is there, then, some place we can locate exemplars of hegemonic masculinity that are less fractured, more coherent, and thus easier to read? Where its central and defining features can be seen in sharper relief? If the public face of hegemonic masculinity is not necessarily even what powerful men are, then what are they necessarily? Why is it "no mean feat to produce the kind of people who can actually operate a capitalist system?" (40) Even though the concept "hegemony" is rooted in concern with class domination, systematic knowledge of ruling class masculinity is slight as yet, but it is certainly intriguing. One aspect of ruling class hegemonic masculinity is the belief that women don't count in big matters, and that they can be dealt with by jocular patronage in little matters. Another is in defining what "big" and "little" are. Sexual politics are simply not a problem to men of the ruling class. Senior executives couldn't function as bosses without the patriarchal household. The exercise of this form of power requires quite special conditions - conventional femininity and domestic subordination. Two-thirds of male top executives were married to housewives. The qualities of intelligence and the capacity for hard work which these women bring to marriage are matched, as friends of Anita Keating, the wife of the Prime Minister of Australia, remarked, by "intense devotion ...her husband and her children are her life." Colleen Fahey, the wife of the premier of New South Wales, had completed an 18-month part-time horticulture course at her local technical college, and she wanted to continue her studies full-time. "But my husband wouldn't let met,'' she said. "He said that he didn't think it was right for a mother to have a job when she had a 13-year-old child ...I think if I'd put my foot down and said I'd really wanted a career, he'd have said, 'You're a rotten mother leaving those kids." (41) The case for this sort of behaviour is simply not as compelling for working-class men, the mothers and the wives of most of whom undertake paid work as a matter of course. Success itself can amplify this need for total devotion, while lessening the chances of its fulfilment outside of the domestic realm. For the successful are likely to have difficulty establishing intimate and lasting friendships with other males because of low self-disclosure, homophobia, and cut-throat competition. The corporate world expects men to divulge little of their personal lives and to restrain personal feelings, especially affectionate ones, towards their colleagues while cultivating a certain bland affability. Within the corporate structure, "success is achieved through individual competition rather than dyadic or group bonding." The distinction between home and work is crucial and carefully maintained. For men in the corporation, friends have their place outside work. (42) While William Shawcross, the biographer of media mogul Rupert Murdoch, found him "courageous" and "charming," others close to Murdoch described him as "arrogant," "cocky," "insensitive, verging on dangerous," "utterly ruthless," and an "efficient Visigoth." Murdoch himself described his life as "consisting of a series of interlocking wars." Shawcross also found that Murdoch possessed "an instinctive feel for money and power and how to use them both;' had a "relentless, unceasing drive and energy," worked "harder and more determinedly" than anybody else, was "sure that what he was doing was correct", "believed that he had become invincible", and was driven by the desire "to win at all costs." (43) And how must it feel to know that you can have whatever you want, and that throughout your life you will be looked after in every way, even to the point of never having to dress and undress yourself? Thus the view that hegemonic masculinity is hegemonic insofar as it succeeds in relation to women is true, but partial. Competitiveness, a combination of the calculative and the combative, is institutionalised in business and is central to hegemonic masculinity. The enterprise of winning is life-consuming, and this form of competitiveness is "an inward turned competitiveness, focussed on the self," creating, in fact, an instrumentality of the personal. (44) Hegemonic masculinity is "a question of how particular groups of men inhabit positions of power and wealth, and how they legitimate and reproduce the social relationships that generate their dominance." (45) Through hegemonic masculinity most men benefit from the control of women. For a very few men, it delivers control of other men. To put it another way, the crucial difference between hegemonic masculinity and other masculinities is not the control of women, but the control of men and the representation of this as "universal social advancement," to paraphrase Gramsci. Patriarchal capitalism delivers the sense, before a man of whatever masculinity even climbs out of bed in the morning, that he is "better" than half of humankind. But what is the nature of the masculinity confirming not only that, but also delivering power over most men as well? And what are its attractions? A sociology of rulingclass men is long overdue. Footnotes 1. M. Waters. "Patriarchy and Viriarchy: An Exploration and Reconstruction of Concepts of Masculine Domination." Sociology 7 (1989): 143-162. 2. A. Hochschild with A. Machung. The Second Shit: Woking parents and the Revolution at Home (New York: Viking. 1989): 257. 3. M. Donaldson, Time of Our Lives: Labour and Love in the Working Class (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991). 3. R. Connell. "Theorising Gender," Sociology, 19 (1985): 263; R. Connell, "The Wrong Stuff: Reflections on the Place of Gender in American Sociology." in H. J. Gans, editor, Sociology in America (Newbury-Park: Sage Publications 1990), 158; R. Connell, "The State, Gender and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal" , Theory and Society 19/5 (1990): 509-523. 5. Connell. "Theorising Gender," 260. 6. R. Connell, Which Way is Up? Essays on Class, Sex and Culture (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 234-276. 7. T. Carrigan, B. Connell. and J. Lee, "Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity." in H. Brod. editor. The Making of Masculinities: The New Men's Studies (Boston:.Allen and Unwin), 75. 8. R. Connell. Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics (Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 1987), 107; Carrigan. Connell and Lee, 95. 9. Carrigan, Connell. and Lee. "Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity." 86: Connell, Which Way is Up? 185. 10. Connell, Which Way is Up; Connell. Gender and Power; R. Connell, "A Whole New World: Remaking Masculinity in the Context of the Environmental Movement," Gender and Society 4 (1990): 352-378: R. Connell. "An Iron Man: The Body and Some Contradictions of Hegemonic Masculinity," in M. Messner and D. Sabo, editors, Sport, Men and the Gender Order (Champaign. Ill.: Human Kinetics Books, 1990): Connell, "The State, Gender and Sexual Politics"; Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 86; R. Chapman. "The Great Pretender: Variations in the New Man Theme." in R. Chapman and J. Rutherford. editors. .Male Order: Unwrapping Masculinity (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1988) 9-18; C. Cockburn. "Masculinity, the Left and Feminism." in Male Order:103--329; P. Lichterman. "Making a Politics of Masculinity," Comparative Social Research 11 (1989): 185-208; M. Messner "The Meaning of Success: The Athletic Experience and the Development of Male Identity," in The Making of Masculinities:193-2 10; J. Rutherford. "Who's That Man'?" in Male Order, 21-67. I I. Connell, Which Way is Up: 236, 255, 256. 12. Connell, Which Way is Up: 185,186,239. 13. Connell, "Iron Man," 83, 94. 14. Connell, "Whole New World," 459. 15. D. Hammond and A. Jablow, "Gilgamesh and the Sundance Kid: The Myth of Male Friendship," in The Making of Masculinities: 256: Messner. "The Meaning of Success", 198; Connell. "Iron Man." 87, 93: Donoghue in Connell. "Iron Man," 84-85. 16. Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, "Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity": Connell, Gender and Power. 17. G. Herek, "On Heterosexual Masculinity: Some Physical Consequences of the Social Construction of Gender and Sexuality," in M. Kimmel, editor, Changing Men, New Directions on Men and Masculinity (Newbury Park: Sage. 1987): 71-72; Connell. "Whole New World," 369. 18. Carrigan, Connell and Lee, "Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity": 93; C. Johnson and R. Johnston, "The Making of Homosexual Men." in V. Burgmann and J. Lee, editors, Staining the Wattle. A People's History of Australia Since 1788. (Fitzroy: McPhee Gribble/Penguin, 1988): 91; Connell, Gender and Power: 80; Carrigan, Connell and Lee: 86. 19. Carrigan, Connell, and Lee. 85; Connell. Gender and Power : 116. 20. Johnston and Johnston. "Homosexual Men." 94: Carrigan. Connell, and Lee. 74: J. Hearn, The Gender of Oppression: Men, Masculinity and the Critique of Marxism (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987); Connell, , Gender and Power: 60; Connell, Which Way is Up: 234. 177-178. 21. Otto in L. Ross. "Escaping the Well of Loneliness." Staining the Wattle: 107. 22. Connell. "Whole New World," 474-475, 477. 23, Lichterman, "Making a Politics." 187-188, 201, 204. 24. Hochschild, Second Shift, 239: V. Seidler, "Fathering, Authority and Masculinity," Male Order, 276; G. Russell, The Changing Role of Fathers? (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press. 1983), 98. 117; Seidler, "Fathering," 287: Hochschild, Second Shift, 249; Connell, Which Way is Up, 32. 25. Messner. "Meaning of Success,": 201. 26. Russell, Changing Role; Hochschild, Second Shift, 2, 217, 227; C. Armitage, "House Husbands. The Problems They Face," Sydney Morning Herald (4 July 1991): 16. 27. Seidler. "Fathering," 298, 290, 295; Russell, Changing Role, 177. 28. Bicknell, "Neville Wran: A Secret Sadness," New Idea (May 11, 1991): 18. 29. Russell, Changing Role, 128-129, 135-136. 30, Seidler. "Fathering," 283. 31. Hochschild, Second Shift, 218, 237; P. Stein. "Men in Families," Marriage and Family Review 7 (1984): 155. 32. Hochschild, Second Shift, 216; Defrain in Stein, "Men in Families." 156; E. Prescott, "New Men," American Demographics 5 (1983): 19. 33. Connell. "Whole New World." 465; Seidler, "Fathering," 275. 31. Donaldson, Time of Our Lives, 20-29. 35. Chapman, "Great Pretender," 212; Prescott, "New Men." 16, 20, 18. 36. Chapman, "Great Pretender," 213. 37. Connell, "Whole New World," 465. 38. Connell, "Whole New World," 176. 39. Connell, Gender and Power, 15; Connell, "The Wrong Stuff," 161. 40. Connell, Which Way is Up: 71. 41. R. Connell, Teachers' Work (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1985). 187; Connell. Which Way is Up: 71: Hochschild, Second Shift, 255: N. Barrowblough and P. McGeough. "Woman of Mystery. The Trump Card Keating Hasn't Played," Sydney Morning Herald, (8 June 1991): 35. D. Cameron. "Just an Average Mrs. Premier," Sydney Morning Herald, (28 Nov. 1992): 41. 42. M. Barrett, Women's Oppression Today: Problems in .Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980): 187-216; Messner, "Meaning of Success." 201: R. Ochberg, "The Male Career Code and The Ideology of Role," in The Making of Masculinities: 173. 184; Hammond and Jablow, 255-256; Illawarra Mercury, "Family Comments Greeted with Fury." (1 December 1992): 7. 43. W. Shawcross, Rupert Murdoch, Ringmaster of the Information Circus (Sydney: Random House. 1992). 44. Carrigan. Connell. and Lee, 92; Connell, Gender and Power, 156; Connell. "Iron Man." 91; Seidler. "Fathering," 279. 45. Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, 92. Race, Gender & Class: Volume 15, Number 3-4, 2008 (262-282) Race, Gender & Class Website: www.suno.edu/Race_Gender_Class/ INTERPRETING AND EXPERIENCING ANTI-QUEER VIOLENCE: RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER DIFFERENCES AMONG LGBT HATE CRIME VICTIMS Doug Meyer Department of Sociology The City University of New York Abstract: This qualitative research project explores how lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people determine that violence is based on their sexuality or gender identity. Data were collected from semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 44 people who experienced anti-LGBT violence. Findings reveal that their violent experiences differ along the lines of race, class, and gender. In particular, LGBT people of color often found it more difficult than W hite gay men to determine whether violence was based on their sexuality. These findings suggest that hate crime statutes may serve the interests of W hite gay men more than the interests of other LGBT people. Keywords: intersectionality; race; class; gender; sexuality; violence; hate crime Doug M eyer is a doctoral candidate of Sociology at The Graduate Center of the City University of New York. His research interests include hate crime, violence studies, feminist and queer theories, and intersectionality theory. Address: The Graduate Center at the City University of New York, Department of Sociology, 365 5 th Ave., New York, NY 10016. Ph.: (917) 836-3098, Fax: (212) 817-1536, Email: dmeyer07@yahoo.com Experiencing Anti-Queer Violence 263 everal studies of hate crime victims have documented the ways in which lesbian women and gay men determine that violence is based on their sexuality (Herek et al., 1997; Herek et al., 2002). These studies, however, make no reference to race, class, and gender. In this paper, I employ an intersectionality framework to explore how lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people determine that violence is based on their sexuality or gender identity. Employing an intersectionality framework reveals how LGBT people’s violent experiences differ along the lines of race, class, and gender. Furthermore, an intersectionality approach facilitates our understanding of the ways in which LGBT people interpret and experience hate-motivated violence. To accomplish these research goals, I designed a qualitative research project in which I interviewed 44 people who experienced violence because they were perceived to be lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. S E XAM INING THE C A U SE S A N D C O NSEQ UE NC ES O F H ATE -M O T IV A TE D V IO L EN C E In the United States, violence against LGBT people has increasingly become understood as a serious societal problem, worthy of scholarly attention (Berrill, 1992; Comstock, 1991; Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002). At the same time, this form of violence has been viewed as constituting a hate crime (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; Levin & McDevitt, 2003). For instance, in 1996 when Aaron McKinney and Russell Henderson murdered Matthew Shepard because of his sexuality, many anti-violence activists and members of the news media labeled it a hate crime (Loffreda, 2001). As the concept of hate crime has grown in popularity, social scientists have begun to examine its significance. Since the late 1990s, they have examined the development and institutionalization of hate crime legislation (Grattet, Jenness, & Curry, 1998; Jenness & Broad, 1997). They have shown that social movement organizations mobilized to define hate-motivated violence as a social problem and institutional spheres such as law enforcement, legislatures, and the courts have codified the laws (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; McVeigh, W elch, & Bjarnason, 2003; Phillips & Grattet, 2000). Hate crime research has also examined the causes (Gerstenfeld, 2004; McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002) and consequences (Herek et al., 2002; Otis & Skinner, 1996) of hate-motivated violence. It has shown, for example, that macroeconomic conditions have little effect on hate crime rates; in-migration patterns correlate most strongly with racially-motivated hate crime (Green, Strolovitch, & W ong, 1998) and population density correlates most strongly with anti-gay violence (Green, Strolovitch, W ong, & Bailey, 2001). Furthermore, while prejudice contributes to hate-motivated violence, peer dynamics appear to be equally important (Franklin, 2000). Despite the growing body of research on hate-motivated violence, studies Doug Meyer 264 of hate crime victims remain scant (Perry, 2003). The authoritative hate crime texts focus primarily on the causes (Levin & McDevitt, 1993; Perry, 2001) and the legislation (Jacobs & Potter, 1998; Jenness & Grattet, 2001). As a result, we know little about the ways in which victims experience hate-motivated violence. Among the studies that have focused on the victims, most of them have examined the psychological effects of hate-motivated violence. They have shown, for example, that hate-motivated violence contributes to depression (Otis & Skinner, 1996) and psychological distress (Herschberger & D’Augelli, 1995). Subsequent studies have compared victims of hate-motivated violence with victims of other crime. They have found that hate crime victims report higher levels of depression (Herek, Gillis, Cogan, & Glunt, 1997), anxiety (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999), anger (McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, & Gu, 2001), and nervousness (Ehrlich, Larcom, & Purvis, 1994) than victims of non-bias crime and non-victims. They have also found differences among various forms of violence. For instance, they have demonstrated that hatemotivated physical violence correlates with more trauma than hate-motivated verbal violence (Dunbar, 2006; Rose & Mechanic, 2002). Studies of hate crime victims have revealed the degree to which hate motivated violence can have traumatic psychological effects. Unfortunately, the focus on the psychological effects of hate-motivated violence has left other research questions unexplored. In particular, studies of hate crime victims have overlooked important sociological research questions. W e know little, for example, about the ways in which race, class, gender, and sexuality structure victims’ experiences of hate-motivated violence. Intersectionality, a theoretical framework that has been highly influential in other bodies of literature, has remained absent from studies of hate crime victims. T H E I NFLUENCE OF I NTERSECTIO NALITY Intersectionality theory denotes the ways in which institutional power structures such as race, class, gender, and sexuality simultaneously structure social relations (Collins, 2004; Crenshaw, 1991). It conceptualizes these institutional power structures as distinct but mutually reinforcing systems of oppression (Collins, 1990). Conceptualizing systems of oppression as distinct prevents researchers from collapsing one system into another (Risman, 2004). Racism, for example, cannot be reduced to gender oppression (Collins, 1990; Espiritu, 1997) and heterosexism cannot be understood as a product of patriarchy (Calhoun, 2000). Furthermore, because systems of oppression are interlocking, social scientists must account for multiple forms of social inequality to understand patterns of behavior. Thus, they cannot understand gendered patterns of activity without also understanding raced, classed, and sexualized ones (Baca Zinn & Thorton Dill, 1996; Collins, 2004; Giuffre & W illiams, 1994). Over the last several decades, intersectionality has become highly influential in feminist studies. Some feminist theorists have even suggested that it Experiencing Anti-Queer Violence 265 may be the most significant theoretical contribution of women’s studies (M cCall, 2005). This theoretical contribution can be attributed largely to the work of women of color (Davis, 1981; Hull, Bell-Scott, & Smith, 1982; Moraga & Anzaldua, 1983). They have criticized feminist scholarship for reducing the experiences of all women to the experiences of W hite, middle-class women (Davis, 1981; hooks, 1984) and they have established the conceptual framework of intersectionality by arguing that oppression should be understood as multiple and simultaneous rather than additive or aggregate (Collins, 1998; King, 1988; Spelman, 1988). The experiences of Black women, for example, cannot be understood as the cumulative effect of W hite women’s experiences of sexism and Black men’s experiences of racism (Crenshaw, 1991; hooks, 1984). Instead, Black women confront unique forms of oppression. W hen Black women encounter stereotypes of themselves as the Jezebel or the welfare queen, they face forms of oppression that neither W hite women nor Black men must confront (Collins, 1990). Thus, aspects of individuals’ identities cannot be separated from one another (Lorde, 1984). Intersectionality frameworks have been particularly influential in studies of domestic violence victims (Abraham, 2000; Sokoloff & Dupont, 2005). Research has shown that systems of oppression simultaneously structure victims’ experiences of abuse (Menjivar & Salcido, 2002; Rasche, 1995; Richie, 1996). One would expect to find similar results in terms of the ways in which victims experience hate-motivated violence. This research project, then, is an attempt to bring some of the achievements of the domestic violence literature to studies of hate crime victims. By doing so, it facilitates our understanding of how victims’ experiences of hate crime differ along the lines of race, class, and gender. Moreover, it supplements the intersectionality literature by focusing on a form of violence— hate-motivated violence— that has not been previously examined. B R IN G IN G A N I N TE RSE CT IO N A LIT Y A PPRO ACH TO H ATE C RIM E R E SE AR C H Although intersectionality has remained absent from studies of hate crime victims, it has been featured in other areas of the literature. Barbara Perry (2001), an eminent hate crime scholar, incorporates elements of intersectionality into her theoretical account of hate crime. She argues that traditional criminological theory has failed to account for hate-motivated violence. According to traditional criminological theory, hate crime occurs because relatively powerless individuals are unable to achieve society’s goals through socially acceptable means. Hatemotivated violence, in other words, results from anomic social conditions. Perry argues that this theoretical framework cannot fully account for hate crime because perpetrators are often relatively privileged members of society. Instead, she argues that a more satisfying explanation must incorporate power relations: hate crime should be understood as a social control mechanism rooted in institutional power structures. She conceptualizes hate crime as an outgrowth of systems of oppression; it is one of the ways in which perpetrators maintain social hierarchies. For instance, racially-motivated violence affirms W hite privilege, while anti-lesbian Doug Meyer 266 and anti-gay violence reinforces the subordination of women and the cultural devaluation of homosexuality (Perry, 2001). Perry has advanced a persuasive sociological theory of hate crime. She reveals the cultural context in which hate-motivated violence can flourish and she documents the ways in which institutional power structures may lead to hate crime. Similarly, groundbreaking studies of organized hate groups (Blee, 2002) and white supremacist discourse (Daniels, 1997; Ferber, 1998) have contributed to intersectionality scholarship. They have revealed the factors leading to women involvement in racist activism (Blee, 2002) and they have demonstrated how white supremacist discourse reinforces patterns of social inequality (Daniels, 1997; Ferber, 1998). By doing so, they have revealed some of the dynamics that contribute to hate crime. W hile these studies have produced numerous contributions, they have focused on the causes and the perpetrators of hatemotivated violence more than the victims. In this paper, I build on studies that have explored the sociological component of hate crime. Rather than examining the causes or the perpetrators of hate-motivated violence, however, I examine the experiences of victims. Specifically, I use an intersectionality approach to examine a research question that has arisen in the hate crime literature— how lesbian women and gay men determine that violence is based on their sexuality. T H E W A Y S IN W H ICH LGBT P EOPLE DETERM INE THAT V IO LENCE IS BASED O N T H E IR S EXUALITY W hile most studies of hate crime victims have examined the psychological effects of hate-motivated violence, some social scientists have begun to explore other research questions. Several studies, for example, have examined victims’ reasons for not reporting violence to the police (Dunbar, 2006; Herek et al., 2002; Rose & Mechanic, 2002). Other studies have explored how victims determine that violence is rooted in bias or prejudice (Herek et al., 1997; Herek et al., 2002). Examining this research question has the advantage of allowing victims to define hate crime in their own words. Rather than accepting abstract definitions of hate crime as given, this research approach allows victims to explain their understanding of hate-motivated violence. By doing so, it privileges the voice of victims and it constructs their understanding of hate crime as significant. Herek and colleagues (Herek et al., 1997; Herek et al., 2002), focusing on anti-lesbian and anti-gay victimization, have revealed some of the ways in which hate crime victims interpret and understand their violent experiences. They have found that lesbian women and gay men often examine their perpetrators’ statements to determine that violence is based on their sexuality. In these situations, lesbian women and gay men confront explicit, unambiguous homophobic remarks. In other, less common situations they identify incidents as anti-lesbian or anti-gay by Experiencing Anti-Queer Violence 267 relying on contextual cues. For instance, victims perceive violence as rooted in homophobia when it occurs near a gay-identified location or when it occurs after public displays of affection between same-sex couples (Herek et al., 1997; Herek et al., 2002). In this paper, I employ an intersectionality approach to expand upon studies that have examined how lesbian women and gay men determine that violence is based on their sexuality. As I argue throughout this paper, systems of oppression affect how LGBT people make this determination. Thus, employing an intersectionality framework improves our understanding of hate crime by revealing some of the ways in which LGBT people’s violent experiences differ along the lines of race, class, gender, and sexuality. M E TH O D S To examine how victims experience hate-motivated violence, I designed a qualitative research project in which I interviewed 44 people who experienced violence because they were perceived to be lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. I compiled my interview sample through LGBT advocacy and service organizations in New York City. At these organizations, I placed recruitment fliers on a bulletin board or in a waiting room. The flier read: “Have you experienced violence because you are (or were perceived to be) lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender?” I used an open-ended question on the flier because I wanted respondents to define violence on their own. I also believed that this research method would attract participants with a wide range of violent experiences. Respondents contacted me if they wanted to participate in the study. I conducted semi-structured, open-ended interviews. During the interview, I asked participants to describe their violent experiences and their response to the violence. To understand how they perceived the violence, I asked about their perpetrators’ motivations (“As you look back on this incident, why do you think he/she/they used violence?”). I then asked detailed, follow-up questions about their understanding of why the violence had occurred. W hile most studies of hate crime victims have employed a survey method, some social scientists and feminist scholars have argued that an interview method best captures the ways in which participants understand their experiences (Esterberg, 2002; Kvale, 1996; Mishler, 1986). An interview method allows participants to actively create their own narratives and it enables researchers to uncover some of the ways in which participants create meaning (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995; W eiss, 1994). Previous interview studies of LGBT hate crime victims have employed highly structured interviews with a uniform (but small) number of questions asked to every respondent (see Herek et al., 1997; Herek et al., 2002). In contrast, I employed a less structured approach, which allowed participants to guide much of the discussion. Doug Meyer 268 Because I wanted to examine the intersection of multiple systems of oppression, it was important to have a diverse sample of LGBT people. Thus, I recruited participants from a wide range of advocacy and service organizations, many of which provide services for LGBT people of color. I interviewed 17 women, 17 men, and 10 transgender people. All of the men identified as gay and 13 of the women identified as lesbian; two women identified as heterosexual and two as bisexual. Eight of the transgender people identified as male-to-female (MTF), one as female-to-male (FTM), and one as intersexed. Participants ranged from 20 to 62 years old; the median age was 41. 21 participants identified as Black, 13 as W hite, eight as Latino, and two as Asian. In terms of educational background, five participants had dropped out of high school, 14 had a high school diploma, six had taken some college, 16 had a college degree, and three had a postgraduate degree. The interviews lasted from approximately one to three hours; the median interview was 102 minutes. Throughout this paper, I refer to violence against LGBT people as antiqueer or anti-LGBT violence. I use the phrase “queer people” to describe individuals who experience it. W hen referring to a specific population, I sometimes use more precise language: I use “homophobic violence” to describe anti-lesbian and anti-gay violence and I use “transphobic violence” to describe violence against transgender people. Moreover, I use the phrase “queer people of color” to denote LGBT participants belonging to a racial minority group. R ESULTS Determining that Anti-Queer Violence is Rooted in M ultiple Systems of Oppression One of the ways in which queer people determined that violence was based on their sexuality was by examining what their perpetrators said about gender. When examining the intersection of gender and sexuality, queer people often determined that violence directed against their gender identity was rooted in homophobia. W hen doing so, they acknowledged societal processes that conflate gender nonconformity with homosexuality. Dorothy, a 49 year-old W hite lesbian woman, addressed this dynamic when arguing that violence directed against her gender identity was also rooted in homophobia. The violence occurred when she was attacked by three men on the street. One of the men punched her and stole her purse. The men called her a “bitch” and said she had “no business being on the street.” Dorothy believed that her gender nonconformity marked her as visibly “out.” As Dorothy explained, she was dressed “very aggressively— suit and tie.” Although the perpetrators never mentioned homosexuality, she perceived the violence as homophobic: “I wasn’t doing anything, but it was obvious that I was a lesbian. That’s why they attacked me. They hated gay people.” Experiencing Anti-Queer Violence 269 Dorothy’s experience was common among respondents. They were routinely victimized for violating gender norms. In some of these situations, perpetrators referred to the victim’s gender nonconformity but not the victim’s homosexuality; queer people frequently defined such violence as homophobic. W hen queer people made this determination, they perceived attempts to punish their gender performance as attempts to regulate their sexuality. For instance, Paul, a 57 year-old W hite gay man, perceived violence directed against his gender identity as an attempt to punish him for publicly identifying as gay. He was attacked by three strangers on the street. His perpetrators told him “you’re not a woman” after pushing and hitting him. Paul thought that he was targeted because of the way he walks— “very feminine,” as he described it. Moreover, he saw a relationship between how he performed gender and how his sexuality was perceived: “I think it happened because I’m gay.” They didn’t like that I’m feminine because it showed that I’m gay.” The examples above are a few among many. They illustrate that queer people sometimes perceived violence as related to their sexuality even when perpetrators did not explicitly address it. W hen queer people perceived genderbased forms of violence as homophobic, they acknowledged the cultural intersection of gender and sexuality. They recognized that in the United States one’s gender display is often understood as indicative of one’s sexuality— that is, conformist gender displays are associated with heterosexuality and nonconformist ones are associated with homosexuality. As a result, attempts to punish gender nonconformity could be perceived not only as attempts to enforce gender conformity but also as attempts to restrict homosexuality. W hile some queer people highlighted the importance of gender and sexuality in structuring their experiences of violence, others argued that their violent experiences could not be reduced to these two aspects of their identity. These arguments were particularly common among queer people of color. Many queer people of color highlighted the role of racism, as well as homophobia and sexism, in structuring their violent experiences. Kevin, a 62 year-old Black gay man, maintained that his violent experiences could not be separated from his race: “I’ve experienced violence because I’m black and gay. W hen the police beat me up, they called me a fag...I would be surprised if they had done the same thing to a W hite gay guy, though.” Here, Kevin argues that violence directed against his sexual identity was also rooted in racism. He highlights the significance of race in structuring forms of anti-queer violence and he suggests that if he were W hite and queer, he might not experience homophobic violence to the same degree or in the same way. Many queer people of color determined that violence directed against their racial identities was at least partially rooted in homophobia. Andre, a 24 year-old Black gay man, perceived violence directed against his racial identity— a W hite police officer called him the n-word— as a form of homophobic violence. The police officer sodomized Andre with a nightstick after he revealed his sexuality. Doug Meyer 270 During the sexual assault, the police officer called Andre the n-word and told him that he needed to “learn how to keep his mouth shut.” Andre thought that he would not have been victimized had he been heterosexual: “[The police officer] would not have done that if I was straight. He called me that because I’m a gay Black man.” Andre believed that the violence either would not have occurred or would not have occurred in the same way had he been a Black heterosexual person. Although queer people of color frequently determined that their violent experiences were at least partially rooted in homophobia, they usually thought that violence was based on more than their sexuality. W hen doing so, they advanced arguments that seemed to borrow from intersectionality. Page, a 45 year-old Latina woman, argued that her violent experiences could not be explained by only a few factors: “It’s much more complicated politically than ‘I’m a woman so this happened.’ Things are just not necessarily about any one category, misogyny or homophobia or whatever.” Similarly, Aisha, a 53 year-old Black lesbian woman, argued that her violent experiences could not be reduced to a few aspects of her identity: “I’m a Black lesbian woman who works in a job where mostly men work. Change any of those things and [the violence] would not have gone down in the same way.” Highlighting how multiple systems of oppression structured her violent experiences, Aisha argued that homophobic violence can only be fully understood within the context of a racist, male-dominated, and capitalist society. E XPRESSING U NCERTAINTY : D IFFERENCES ALO NG R ACIAL L INES Until this point, I have emphasized situations in which queer people determined that violence was at least partially rooted in homophobia. Many queer people, however, found it impossible to determine whether violence was based on their sexuality. They frequently responded to questions concerning why they thought the violence had occurred with phrases such as “I don’t know or “I’m not sure.” In these situations, they expressed uncertainty as to whether violence was based on their sexuality. Queer people most typically responded with a sense of uncertainty for two reasons: (1) the violence occurred in situations in which the perpetrator insulted many aspects of the victim’s identity; or (2) the violence occurred in situations in which the perpetrator said very little about the victim’s sexuality. These two situations are, in some sense, opposites. The latter occurred when perpetrators said very little; the former occurred when they said a lot. In both of these situations, however, victims struggled to make sense of their violent experiences. Queer people of color were more likely than W hite gay men to express uncertainty as to the cause of their violent experiences. This difference reflects the reasons I have outlined above: queer people of color often faced situations in which many aspects of their identities were attacked and they frequently encountered situations in which their perpetrators did not mention homosexuality. For these Experiencing Anti-Queer Violence 271 reasons, queer people of color often found it more difficult than W hite gay men to determine whether violence was rooted in homophobia. W hen queer people of color experienced violence in which their perpetrators did not mention homosexuality, it was usually intra-racial violence— that is, the victim and the perpetrator were the same race. In contrast, when queer people of color felt as if many aspects of their identity had been attacked, the violence was most typically interracial. Thus, patterns of activity reveal that these two situations were raced— they differed with regard to the racial make-up of the victim and the perpetrator. Queer people of color had the most difficulty determining whether violence was based on their sexuality or gender identity when their perpetrators were W hite. In such situations, they often felt as if multiple aspects of their identity had been attacked. Dominique, a 23 year-old Black transgender woman, described this dynamic rather succinctly: “W hen I’m called a fag or a freak by a W hite person, I have a hard time telling if they hate me because I’m trans or because I’m Black.” W hite perpetrators often mixed homophobic or transphobic insults with racist ones. This blurring of racist and homophobic insults made it difficult for queer people of color to determine whether violence was based on their sexuality. In these situations, they could not be certain that violence was rooted in homophobia because racism may have played an equal or even more significant role. W hite perpetrators often used a wide array of insults when attacking queer people of color. Gideon, a 25 year-old Black gay man, confronted many insults when he was attacked in a group home as a teenager: “They called me so many names that I’m not even sure if it happened because of my sexuality. It could have been because I was Black or how I behaved or any number of things. There’s just no way of saying.” Confronting homophobic and racist insults made it difficult for Gideon to determine the reasons he was attacked. He felt as if many aspects of his identity had been attacked, which made any single explanation of the violence seem implausible. Many lesbian women of color encountered violence that was simultaneously racist, misogynistic, and homophobic. As I outlined previously, they sometimes argued that their violent experiences were structured by multiple systems of oppression. An equally common response, however, was uncertainty. Tina, a 21 year-old Latina lesbian woman, found it difficult to determine the reasons why she was attacked by three W hite men: “Did it occur because I’m a lesbian? W ho knows. They called me so many names. So, it’s really hard to tell [why it happened]. I wonder if they weren’t just calling me any name they thought might hurt me.” Doug Meyer 272 Tina’s experience illustrates the degree to which racist, misogynistic, and homophobic forms of violence can intersect, leaving victims confused as to the reasons they experience violence. It suggests that lesbian women of color may be reluctant to determine whether violence is based on their sexuality when many aspects of their identity have been attacked. W hile queer people of color sometimes found it difficult to determine whether interracial violence was based on their sexuality, W hite gay men almost always argued that their violent experiences were rooted in homophobia. Responses such as “it happened because of my sexuality” or “it happened because I’m gay” were common among W hite gay men. Even when perpetrators mentioned race, W hite gay men usually determined that interracial violence was based on their sexuality. For instance, Greg, a 43 year-old W hite gay man, believed that he was attacked by two Latino men because of his sexuality. His attackers called him a “fag” and told him to “take that W hite shit somewhere else.” He explained his perpetrators’ motivations in a rather matter-of-fact way: “Oh, I think it happened because I’m gay. W hat else could be the reason?” In stark contrast to the uncertainty expressed by some queer people of color, White gay men almost always determined that interracial violence was based on their sexuality. This difference between how queer people of color and White gay men responded to interracial violence can be explained in part by the social construction of W hite privilege (Frankenberg, 1993; McIntosh, 2004). Because social norms construct W hiteness as an invisible social status, W hite gay men could perceive anti-queer violence as rooted entirely in homophobia. W hite privilege, in other words, allowed them to overlook the ways in which they may have been attacked because of their race and it allowed them to view their sexuality as the most salient factor in structuring their violent experiences. Racial differences in terms of uncertainty were the most pronounced in situations in which the violence was interracial. Nevertheless, queer people of color sometimes expressed uncertainty when they were attacked by heterosexual people of the same race. In such situations, queer people of color usually expressed uncertainty because their perpetrators did not explicitly address homosexuality. For instance, Jericho, a 48 year-old Latino gay man, found it difficult to determine the reasons why he was beaten and mugged by three Latino men: “I don’t know. It could have been because I was gay or because they just needed money...I really want to know why they chose me, but they didn’t say anything. I really have no way of knowing.” When perpetrators did not address the victim’s sexuality, queer people had to speculate as to whether the violence was rooted in homophobia. In such situations, they often expressed uncertainty because they were forced to rely on contextual cues. Jericho thought that his violent experience may have been rooted in homophobia because his perpetrators went out of their way to degrade him: they slapped him during the mugging and then spit on him after it. Nevertheless, because they did not mention homosexuality, he could only hypothesize that homophobia was one of many possible reasons for the attack. Experiencing Anti-Queer Violence 273 Queer people of color were more likely than W hite gay men to report violence in which their sexuality was not explicitly addressed. Some queer people of color focused on race when explaining why their perpetrators did not mention homosexuality. For instance, Cole, a 33 year-old Black gay man, explained his perpetrators’ actions in racial terms: Interviewer: So, they didn’t use any homophobic slurs? Cole: Slurs? W ell, you see, in the Black Community, it’s a little different. They don’t always say “faggot.” They’ll say “too sweet mother fucker” or they’ll just call you a sissy...It’s more about you being weak than being gay...For them to call me a “faggot” would have meant that homosexuality exists, so they’d rather just beat me and not say anything. Here, the intersection of race, gender, and sexuality seems particularly stark. Cole’s argument suggests that Black queer people frequently encounter violence in which their perpetrators focus on gender nonconformity rather than homosexuality. As a result, Black queer people may often confront violence in which their perpetrators do not explicitly address homosexuality. D IFFERENCES AM O NG L E SB IA N W O M EN OF C O L O R A ND G A Y M EN OF C O LO R W hile gay men of color sometimes experienced violence in which their perpetrators did not explicitly mention homosexuality, lesbian women of color encountered such situations even more frequently. Gay men of color most typically reported violence in which their perpetrators used homophobic insults such as “homo” or “faggot.” In contrast, lesbian women of color reported more violent incidents in which their perpetrators did not use homophobic insults. In some of these situations, their perpetrators used misogynistic insults rather than homophobic ones. For instance, Leslie, a 50 year-old Black lesbian woman, was spat on and called a “bitch” by a man on the street. She thought that the violence might have been rooted in homophobia because it occurred when she was with her girlfriend. However, she found it difficult to determine whether the violence was based on her sexuality, since it also seemed to be rooted in sexism: “I don’t know if it happened because I’m lesbian...It could have happened just because I’m a woman, but it seems like it happened because I’m gay, too. I don’t know why they chose me and not [my girlfriend], though.” Lesbian women of color sometimes found it difficult to distinguish between misogynistic and homophobic forms of violence. Judy, a 43 year-old Latina lesbian woman, encountered discourse that was simultaneously misogynistic and homophobic when she was sexually assaulted. The sexual assault occurred at a party when she was 20. A man grabbed her breasts and tore open her t-shirt. W hen he could not forcibly remove her pants because Judy was holding onto her Doug Meyer 274 belt, he told her, “All I want to do is fuck you and I bet you’ll come back straight.” As he continually tried to remove her belt, he called her a “bitch” and a “whore.” Before he could remove her belt, another woman entered the room where the sexual assault had occurred. The two women yelled and threw items at him. Shortly thereafter, he left the party. Judy’s experience illustrates the difficulty of unpacking misogynistic and homophobic forms of violence from one another. It’s difficult to determine where the line for one begins and the other ends. W ould Judy have been sexually assaulted had she been a heterosexual woman? W as her attacker trying to punish her for what he saw as a deviant sexuality? Did he actually believe that he could make her “come back straight,” as he stated? Or was her homosexuality merely the most readily available discourse that he could draw upon to justify his own behavior while simultaneously shifting blame onto her? These questions, it seems to me, may be impossible to answer. It seems unlikely that even the attacker could fully explain all of his unconscious thoughts and feelings at the moment. W hile these questions may be unanswerable, my research suggests that lesbian women of color often ask themselves such questions as they struggle to make sense of their violent experiences. Indeed, Judy had asked herself many of these questions following the sexual assault. Examining the violence approximately 23 years later, she concluded: “I can’t be sure if it occurred because of my sexuality or just because I’m a woman. Both probably played a role.” Lesbian women of color most frequently expressed uncertainty because their perpetrators did not use homophobic insults. Gay men of color, in contrast, more frequently encountered violence in which their perpetrators used many homophobic insults. This dynamic can be explained in part by patterns of victimization: heterosexual men perpetrated most of the anti-queer violence reported by respondents. Given this pattern of victimization, one would expect that male perpetrators would use homophobic insults more frequently against gay men than lesbian women. Using homophobic insults against gay men allows male perpetrators to distance themselves from homosexuality. It allows heterosexual men to construct themselves in opposition to the deviant men— the “fags” or “homos”—whom they attack (Kimmel, 1994; Pascoe, 2007). Thus, since heterosexual men appear to perpetrate most anti-queer violence, lesbian women of color might encounter fewer homophobic insults than gay men of color. In other words, the gender of the victim and the perpetrator affect the degree to which victims confront homophobic insults. T H E E FFECTS O F S O CIAL C L ASS O N W H E TH E R Q U EE R P EOPLE E X PR ESSE D U NCERTAINTY Social class also affected how queer people determined that violence was based on their sexuality. Middle- and upper-class queer people usually expressed more willingness than low-income queer people to examine whether their violent Experiencing Anti-Queer Violence 275 experiences were rooted in homophobia. Eva, a 46 year-old Black transgender woman, described herself as middle-class, but also said that she had very little money when she experienced transphobic violence several years prior to the interview. She described the effects of social class on her willingness to determine whether violence was based on her gender identity: “I didn’t want to think if it was a hate crime. I didn’t have heat. I didn’t have heat!...How was I supposed to sit around and spend time thinking about whether I had been bashed? Eva’s experience suggests that working-class and low-income queer people may have more pressing concerns than determining whether violence is rooted in bias. She indicates that poverty hinders the willingness of queer people to determine whether violence is based on their sexuality or gender identity. Indeed, many queer people who were living in poverty began to wonder over the course of the interview whether more of their violent experiences were rooted in homophobia than they had previously thought. Nevada, a 36 year-old W hite person who identified as intersexed and lived in a homeless shelter at the time of the interview, conveyed this feeling: “I had never thought about all of this as related to my sexuality. Maybe it was now that I think about it.” Nevada’s response was common among low-income queer people. They often began the interview by describing a violent incident that they thought was rooted in homophobia or transphobia. As the interview progressed, they frequently described more violent incidents. W hen describing these incidents, they sometimes said that they had not thought about whether their violent experiences were based on their sexuality or gender identity prior to the interview. Conversely, middle- and upper-class queer people seemed to have considered prior to the interview whether their experiences were rooted in homophobia. They frequently responded with phrases such as “I’ve thought about that before” or “I’ve thought about this a lot” when explaining whether they thought their violent experiences were based on their sexuality or gender identity. Thus, social class affects the degree to which queer people are willing to determine whether violence is based on their sexuality or gender identity. D ISCUSSIO N Previous studies that have documented the ways in which lesbian women and gay men determine that violence is based on their sexuality have made no reference to race, class, and gender (Herek et al., 1997; Herek et al., 2002). As I have argued throughout this paper, these systems of oppression affect how queer people determine that violence is based on their sexuality. Previous studies, then, have overlooked some of the ways in which lesbian women and gay men make this determination. For instance, results from this study reveal that queer people often examined what their perpetrators said about gender in order to determine whether violence was rooted in homophobia. Acknowledging the cultural intersection of gender and sexuality, queer people frequently determined that violence directed Doug Meyer 276 against their gender identity was also based on their sexuality. Race also structured how queer people determined that violence was rooted in homophobia. W hite gay men generally expressed certainty as to the cause of their violent experiences—that is, they usually believed that violence had occurred because of homophobia. Conversely, queer people of color sometimes found it difficult to determine whether violence was based on their sexuality. They often felt as if multiple aspects of their identity had been attacked and they frequently encountered violence in which their perpetrators said very little about homosexuality. For these reasons, queer people of color were more likely than W hite gay men to express uncertainty as to the cause of their violent experiences. Thus, the degree to which queer people are willing to determine that violence is based on their sexuality differs along racial lines. If queer people of color find it more difficult than W hite gay men to determine whether violence is based on their sexuality, then hate crime statutes may primarily serve to protect the interests of W hite gay men. Hate crime statutes, which increase criminal sanctions against hate crime perpetrators, benefit victims who are willing to define violence as bias-motivated. Victims who cannot classify violence as bias-motivated will be less likely to report it as a hate crime and, consequently, less likely to have it prosecuted as one. As a result, victims who find it easiest to determine that violence is rooted in bias will benefit disproportionately from hate crime statutes. As my research suggests, W hite gay men had less difficulty determining that violence was based on their sexuality than did queer people of color. Thus, hate crime statutes based on sexual orientation may serve the interests of W hite gay men more than queer people of color. Of course, it is possible that White gay men could determine that violence is based on their sexuality but not pursue hate crime statutes. The relationship between determining that violence is rooted in bias and pursuing hate crime legislation is not a direct one; the latter does not necessarily follow the former. To uncover the ways in which victims may benefit differently from hate crime statutes, further research should explore the processes by which victims pursue hate crime legislation. Considering the experiences of lesbian women of color suggests that they may find it particularly difficult to pursue hate crime legislation. As my results suggest, lesbian women of color often confront violence in which their perpetrators do not use homophobic insults. Because perpetrators’ hate speech is often used to prosecute hate-motivated violence, hate crime statutes may rarely serve the interests of lesbian women of color. In this paper, I have compared queer people of color and White gay men. I would have liked to include W hite lesbian women in these comparisons, but unfortunately only three W hite lesbian women participated in the study. As a result, generalizations concerning their experiences could not be made from the Experiencing Anti-Queer Violence 277 data. Future interview studies of hate crime victims should include more W hite lesbian women in order to explore gender differences among W hite people. Social class further complicates the ways in which victims pursue hate crime statutes. The experiences of working-class and low-income queer people suggest that they may not pursue hate crime statutes because of the financial demands of their lives. Financial anxieties, in other words, make it more difficult for victims to pursue hate crime statutes. As a result, middle- and upper-class victims may benefit disproportionately from hate crime legislation. My research also suggests that hate crime statutes may be employed more often against heterosexual people of color than W hite heterosexual people. Indeed, respondents only reported violence to the police as a hate crime in situations in which heterosexual people of color had attacked W hite queer people. Moreover, while several White queer people pursued hate crime statutes against heterosexual people of color, queer people of color had the most difficulty defining violence as homophobic when their perpetrators were W hite heterosexual people. As a result, queer people of color may pursue hate crime statutes based on sexual orientation relatively infrequently against W hite heterosexual people. Of course, queer people of color may sometimes pursue hate crime statutes based on race rather than sexual orientation. Further research should explore the circumstances under which queer people of color pursue all forms of hate crime legislation. Considering the experiences of queer people of color reveals that racism makes possible certain forms of homophobic violence and homophobia makes possible some forms of racist violence. As a result, queer people of color face situations that neither heterosexual people of color nor W hite LGBT people must confront. Of course, queer people of color are not a monolithic group. In this paper, I have tried to emphasize that they may perceive anti-LGBT violence in different ways. For instance, while some queer people of color argued that both racism and homophobia were implicated in anti-LGBT violence, others expressed uncertainty as to the cause of their violent experiences. Although I have tried not to ignore these differences, my primary focus has been to examine the obstacles confronted by queer people of color and to explore how their experiences may differ from the experiences of W hite gay men. As a result, this paper comes closer to unifying the experiences of queer people of color than it does in exploring their differences. Further research should examine these differences. W e know little, for example, about how racial minority groups differ from one another in terms of how they experience anti-queer violence. The results of this study may be limited in part by its recruitment method. Prior to the interview, participants typically had some contact with LGBT advocacy or service organizations and they usually had determined that at least one of their violent experiences was rooted in homophobia or transphobia. As a result, this research method limited the variation in how victims might interpret their experiences. Thus, future research should explore whether the results of this study Doug Meyer 278 apply to LGBT people who do not have any contact with advocacy or service organizations and to LGBT people who do not interpret their violent experiences as related to their sexuality or gender identity. Because of the exploratory nature of this research project, I have highlighted victims’ voices as much as possible throughout this paper. In order to privilege rather than marginalize the voice of victims, hate crime researchers should continue to examine how victims perceive hate-motivated violence. Hate crime researchers should also continue to explore how victims’ experiences differ along lines of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Indeed, as I have shown throughout this paper, an intersectionality approach can provide a better understanding of the ways in which hate crime statutes concern the lives of all LGBT people. N O TE This project was supported by a research grant from the W illiams Institute for Sexual Orientation Law and Public Policy at the UCLA School of Law. The author would like to thank Victoria Pitts-Taylor, Joshua Freilich, Alberto McKelligan, and the anonymous reviewers of Race, Gender & Class for their invaluable comments on previous drafts of this article. R EFERENCES Abraham, M. (2000). Speaking the unspeakable: Marital violence among South Asian immigrants in the United States. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Ammons, L. (1995). 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Violent betrayal: Partner abuse in lesbian relationships. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Richie, B.E. (1996). Compelled to crime: The gender entrapment of battered Black women. New York: Routledge. Risman, B.J. (2004). Gender as a social structure: Theory wrestling with activism. Gender & Society, 18(4):429-450. Ristock, J. (2002). No more secrets: Violence in lesbian relationships. New York: Routledge. Rose, S. & Mechanic, M .B. (2002). Psychological distress, crime features, and help-seeking behaviors related to homophobic bias incidents. American Behavioral Scientist, 46(1):14-26. Sokoloff, N.J. & Dupont, I. (2005). Domestic violence: Examining the intersections of race, class, and gender - an introduction. In N.J. Sokoloff & C. Pratt (Eds.), Domestic violence at the margins: Readings on race, class, gender, and culture, pp.1-13. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Spelman, E.V. (1988). Inessential woman: Problems of exclusion in feminist thought. Boston: Beacon Press. W aldron, C. (1996). Lesbians of color and the domestic violence movement. In C. Renzetti & H. Miley (Eds.), Violence in gay and lesbian domestic partnerships, pp. 43-52. New York: Haworth. W eiss, R.S. (1994). Learning from strangers: The art and method of qualitative interview studies. New York: Free Press. University of Wollongong Research Online Faculty of Arts - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities October 1993 What Is Hegemonic Masculinity? Mike Donaldson University of Wollongong, miked51@bigpond.com Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Donaldson, Mike, What Is Hegemonic Masculinity? 1993. https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/141 Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au Theory and Society, Vol.22, No.5, Special Issue: Masculinities, Oct., 1993, pp.643-657. What Is Hegemonic Masculinity? Mike Donaldson Sociology, University of Wollongong, Australia Structures of oppression, forces for change A developing debate within the growing theoretical literature on men and masculinity concerns the rela...
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Hegemonic, Trans Men and Sexism and Family Structures Analysis

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Hegemonic, Trans Men and Sexism and Family Structures Analysis
Hegemonic // Toxic Masculinity
1. What is hegemonic or toxic masculinity?
Hegemonic masculinity, also known as toxic masculinity, is a concept that
describes the culturally idealized form of masculine character that is dominant and
oppressive in the gender order. It is exclusive, anxiety-provoking, brutal, and violent and
is constructed through complex negotiation over a lifetime. This form of masculinity is
often associated with aggression, dominance, and violence and is perpetuated through
various cultural ideals and societal norms.
2. Why does Jackson Katz consider violence against women a 'man's issue?' How are
boys and other men affected by this violence?
Jackson Katz considers violence against women a 'man's issue' because it is
primarily perpetrated by men and is deeply rooted in the societal construction of
masculinity. Boys and other men are affected by this violence through various means,
including exposure to harmful gender norms, witnessing or experiencing violence, and
being socialized into accepting or perpetuating violent behaviors.
3. What kinds of micro efforts (raising our boys) or macro efforts (changing society)
would you suggest to address hegemonic masculinity?
To address hegemonic masculinity, both micro and macro efforts are necessary.
Micro efforts could involve raising boys in a way that challenges traditional gender
norms, promotes healthy expressions of masculinity, and teaches respect for all genders
(Tedx, 2013). Macro efforts could include changing societal structures and norms

3
through education, policy changes, an...


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Just what I was looking for! Super helpful.

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