Using Enginius to analysis the case and answer the questions

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Question Description

The Kirin case data analysis can be done using Enginius and answer the following nine questions:

KIRIN CASE BACKGROUND: The case describes the strategic situation facing Kirin brewery in Japan. You are challenged to come up with a product design (beer!) that will deliver the desired incremental volume, net of cannibalization of the current product. Also, because Kirin is a niche product, it probably does not appeal to everyone. Therefore, your analysis should also include consideration of segmentation and targeting issues. The case involves multiple data sets and ME tools: segmentation, targeting and positioning as well as product design/conjoint. A complete analysis of the case will use cluster analysis, discriminant analysis, perceptual mapping and conjoint analysis.

Note: the Kirin case in Enginius provides 9 different data blocs.

FORMAT: Answers should be submitted in a WORD or PDF file that simply states answers to all parts of the questions as asked. I do NOT want to receive Enginius output files, but it may be helpful to insert selected key parts from the output into your written answers, such as a perceptual map, dendrogram, or other parts of the conjoint analysis or segmentation analysis that show how you developed your answers. If you do the correct analysis and answer the questions directly, a complete set of answers should be about 3 pages (single space).

Questions:

1. Briefly describe the strategic situation facing Kirin in Japan and the U.S. market at the time of the case. Why is it important for Kirin to increase its sales and market share in the U.S.? How large of an increase does Kirin need to achieve in order to be successful? Explain.

2. What types of data did Kirin collect to analyze this situation? Who did they collect data from? What decision do they need to make?

3. Conduct a traditional needs-based segmentation analysis (including discriminant analysis) to determine if the U.S. import beer market can be segmented in a useful way. How many segments are there in the market? (Enginius identifies a default of 3 segments, but you should also compare a 2-segment and 4-segment solution to a 3-segment solution – you can easily run these analyses by manually forcing Enginius to identify either 2, 3, or 4 segments). Are there any distinct and targetable segments that emerge from this analysis? Briefly describe the size and characteristics of each segment you found in the 2, 3, and 4 segment solutions. What is similar or different in these three solutions? Which should Kirin use?

4. Create a perceptual map of the import beer market. How many dimensions should you use, and why this number? Describe where Kirin is located on the map. Who are its closest competitors? How does Kirin’s positioning compare to Sapporo?

5. Run a conjoint analysis to identify a product design that will enable Kirin to increase its existing market share in the U.S. and sell enough additional cases of beer to achieve its strategic goals. Which choice rule makes the most sense to use in this analysis, and why? What market share can Kirin achieve with the new product it is planning (Kirin’s “New product profile” compared to Kirin’s “Existing product profile”)? Can Kirin do even better, i.e., achieve an even higher market share, with a more “optimal” product design? Explain.

6. Use the conjoint preference partworths to conduct another segmentation analysis to explore if there are distinct segments (as opposed to the overall market) that would prefer the new Kirin product you designed. [Note: In Enginius, you need to first run the Segmentation tool on the Preference partworths, then send the output to an Excel spreadsheet, then copy the Preference partworths to the “Segment” tab in the Excel file, then sort the table by segment number, then carefully copy/paste the partworths from each segment separately back into Enginius to run a conjoin analysis on each separate segment to identify the best possible product for Kirin to introduce to each segment ]. Should you standardize the data when running this segmentation analysis? [why or why not]. How many segments do you find when you segment the Preference partworths? Which segment do you think would be most promising for Kirin, and what market share could Kirin achieve in this segment? Is it worthwhile for Kirin to design a brand specifically for this segment? Explain.

7. Compare and contrast the results of the two segmentation analyses you conducted in Questions 3 and 6 above (one using traditional needs-based “Segmentation data” versus the other using the “Preference partworths”). How are the results different? What can you conclude from this analysis about the market for beer?

8. BOTTOM LINE: From your combined answers to Questions 3-7 above, do you believe that Kirin can reach its strategic objective by introducing a new product to the U.S. market? If so, which new product would you recommend that Kirin introduce to the market (describe the new product design), and to which segment or segments should Kirin target this product?

9. Briefly describe the logic and sequence of steps you followed in answering Questions 3-8 above. I am looking for a straightforward verbal description of the steps you followed in running these analyses.


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/LFHQVHGWR$ODQ0DOWHU DPDOWHU#XLFHGX 'RQRWFRS\RUGLVWULEXWH CASE STUDY Kirin USA, Inc.: Ichiban Shibori ROBERT J. THOMAS Copyright © 2016 by DecisionPro Inc. This document is primarily intended to be used in conjunction with the Enginius software suite. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, go to http://www.enginius.biz. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means –electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise– without the permission of DecisionPro, Inc. v160404 1 /LFHQVHGWR$ODQ0DOWHU DPDOWHU#XLFHGX 'RQRWFRS\RUGLVWULEXWH Introduction The meeting lasted three hours. Members of the Kirin new product development team, marketing consultants, and two executives from the advertising agency met at the Kirin USA offices in New York City to review marketing research findings and decide next steps for the new product project. The pressure to launch a new product was mounting, although it was not yet a crisis situation. The Kirin team included Mr. Kazuhiro "Zack" Tsukahara, Vice President of Marketing for Kirin USA, Inc. and Mr. Yutaka Ogawa from the Product Management Department of Kirin Brewery Company Limited. Mr. Ogawa led the technical formulation of the new product. The intent was to formulate a new beer product that would be based on Kirin's successful formulation of "Ichiban Shibori," a new beer that had received enthusiastic reception in Japan. The objective was to identify an opportunity in the U.S. import beer market so that the team could design a new product and marketing program around the Ichiban Shibori formulation, including changing product ingredients if necessary. One issue was to identify potential market segments that defined the market for imported beers. The team would then have to decide upon one or more of these segments and build a new product concept to meet the needs of the segment. The discussion surfaced several suggestions, including concentrating on a narrow segment of heavy users, positioning the new product for one or two attractive segments, or positioning it across all segments to reach the broadest possible market and sales response. However no clear consensus appeared to emerge at the meeting. It was February 1991 and there was a sense of urgency about the decision. Tsukahara observed: It seems that we have many different new product concepts floating around the room. We can't afford to launch three different brands—only one. Unlike Heineken or Molson, we have a small marketing budget. We will have to decide on the new concept soon. Competitors will not wait for us when their next new product is ready to launch. Background Kirin Brewery Limited, founded in Yokohama, Japan over 100 years ago was the largest beer firm in Japan, and fourth largest in the world. Although Kirin diversified into food, liquor, and even biotechnology, its performance relied largely on its market position in beer. In 1990 its market share was almost 50% in Japan, nearly twice its nearest competitor, Asahi. Sapporo was the third largest brewer in Japan, followed by Suntory. Kirin's lager beer was the dominant market leader, however the growing importance of draft beers allowed competitors to make substantial inroads into Kirin's market position. Perhaps more importantly, the 1987 market entry of Asahi's Super Dry beer in Japan shook the entire market. Asahi formulated the dry concept as a beer that was less sweet and sharper than traditional beer, with a slightly higher alcoholic content (about 5%). With an uncharacteristically heavy marketing budget targeted to heavy beer drinkers, Asahi launched the new beer and achieved favorable market acceptance and dramatic sales and market share increases. Asahi's success energized Kirin into a broad strategic response. Kirin launched its own dry beer, restructured its product line, increased promotion and advertising (featuring actor Gene Hackman), expanded the sales force, and cut price in an otherwise price-stable beer market. This triggered a dry beer marketing war in Japan. Although Kirin successfully met Asahi's new entry, overall Asahi was able to move from the number three brewer in Japan to number two (surpassing Sapporo) on the basis of its dry beer marketing success. 2 /LFHQVHGWR$ODQ0DOWHU DPDOWHU#XLFHGX 'RQRWFRS\RUGLVWULEXWH In order to counter any continued success of Asahi that would further threaten its market share, Kirin carefully researched and launched in early 1990 a new beer, Ichiban Shibori. Using innovative production technologies (higher temperatures, different yeast formulations, high-quality ingredients), Ichiban Shibori was described by consumer taste panels as a full-bodied beer with no aftertaste. Every sales response in 1990 was tremendous in the Japanese market. Kirin was very proud of this success and immediately began to explore opportunities outside of Japan. Interest in the U.S. market was substantial because of its high proportion of import beer sales and because Kirin was number two behind Sapporo. Kirin USA, Inc. Kirin USA, Inc. began operations in the U.S. in 1983. Although the U.S. beer market consumed some 184 million barrels of beer during 1983, only 3% was imported. Kirin's primary strategy in entering the U.S. market was to meet the demand of a growing number of Japanese business people within the U.S. Initially Kirin USA marketed its Lager to Japanese restaurants, selling some 600,000 cases during 1983. Outside of Japanese restaurants, Kirin had little brand awareness. By 1987, the U.S. beer market had grown little (187 million barrels), but the share of imports grew from 3% to 5%. Sensing a growing opportunity in import sales, Kirin USA signed agreements with Molson USA and Martlet (a beer distributor) to broaden its marketing and distribution into non-Japanese restaurants, bars, night clubs, and through retail grocery and liquor stores. 2 Although it now had distribution in major U.S. markets, the largest proportion of its 1987 sales came from the greater New York metropolitan area and California, especially Los Angeles. Because the total volume of Kirin's U.S. beer sales could not support a major mass media advertising campaign, selected ads were placed in the New York and Los Angeles markets (usually print media with occasional radio spots). Kirin sponsored before and after advertising recall tests in these cities for their 1989 media campaign. It discovered that at the level of advertising that they could afford, they were making little impact on Kirin's brand awareness. Kirin's promotional strategy therefore relied primarily on sales force and promotional efforts to restaurants and retail outlets. The sales force could "merchandise" the print ads to their retail customers, but consumers did not appear to be significantly affected by them. 3 At retail, Kirin's Lager was priced competitively with other imports (about $5.49 per six pack of 12 ounce bottles). As the beer sales leader in Japan, it was important for Kirin USA to be the sales leader among Japanese beers in the U.S. Strategically, it was not pleasant for Kirin to be number two in the U.S. while they were number one in Japan. It allowed Sapporo to claim that they were the number one Japanese beer in the U.S. – a claim communicated to those Japanese consumers who were sensitive to American customs. By 1990, Sapporo sold about 1.2 million cases to Kirin's one million in the U.S. By 1990, the market growth among Japanese business people and Japanese restaurants had slowed, although gains among American beer drinkers were being realized. The successful introduction of Ichiban Shibori to Japan in early 1990 prompted Kirin USA to consider launching it into the U.S. import beer market to gain a competitive advantage over Sapporo. The question was whether a beer that was rated by Japanese consumers as full bodied with no aftertaste would appeal to American beer drinker tastes. 3 /LFHQVHGWR$ODQ0DOWHU DPDOWHU#XLFHGX 'RQRWFRS\RUGLVWULEXWH U.S. Import Beer Market As noted above, the import beer market in the U.S. was growing during the late 1980s. Of the more than 20 brands of imported beer in the U.S., Heineken, Molson, and Corona were the top three imports. Heineken, which claimed just over 20% of the import beer market (about 1% of total beer volume), spent about $10 million in advertising to achieve this share, an amount equivalent to the smallest of domestic brands. To put this amount into perspective, with four six packs to a case, Kirin total sales at retail price in 1990 were $23.56 million ($5.49 x 4 million). With an industry average gross margin of $2 per case, it was easy to see how a small brand like Kirin would have a difficult time competing with a brand like Heineken. In 1990, U.S. import beer drinkers tended to earn more income than domestic beer drinkers do. Some 40% of import beer drinkers earned over $50,000 (compared to about 25% of domestic beer drinkers who earned that much). They were also upscale in education, with 55% of import beer drinkers attending or graduating from college, compared to 40% of domestic drinkers. Although slightly more import beer drinkers were employed full time (70%), almost 30% were employed as managers or professionals compared to fewer than 20% for domestic drinkers. Import beer drinkers were also slightly younger than domestic beer drinkers, with over 75% under the age of 45. As often the case in the beer market, a smaller proportion of buyers (about 20%) consumed a disproportionate share of import beer (about 80%). Similar to domestic beer drinkers, some two-thirds of import drinkers were male and one-third was single. Almost half of all import beer drinkers were located on the West Coast (California) and the East Coast (New York)—about evenly distributed. The significance of the import beer drinker profile was its correspondence demographically to the so-called “baby boomer” generation, born between 1945 and 1970. Analysis of demographics of this age group showed it to be disproportionally larger than any previous and subsequent generational groups. Significantly high family formation after World War II propelled the large size of this group, and other socioeconomic factors (such as enhanced educational opportunities, increasing disposable income, and increased television communication) gave them considerable purchasing power. Increased purchasing power resulted in consumers willing to be more discriminating in their tastes to satisfy more specific needs. Beer Purchase Behavior Why people bought and consumed beer depended on a host of factors. Some bought it to socialize with friends and family, some bought it for its taste as a beverage to complement certain foods, some bought it to mellow out and forget worries after a hard day's work, or some bought it to simply get high and have fun. Or, there could be other personal reasons for consumption (health, family or cultural habits, and so on). On a practical level, many industry analysts believed buyer behavior for beer depended on brand image and price. Although retail prices for import beer tended to be the same, if a drinker found a preferred brand on sales, he or she would respond very favorably. For some consumers, if a comparable quality import brand were put on sale, they might temporarily switch from favorite brands to take advantage of the value. Although taste was considered important by some, others argue that it was really the perception of taste that mattered. Blind taste tests of beer products repeatedly showed that consumers had a difficult time identifying their own brand, not to mention other brands. However, when the brands were identified, consumers imputed taste 4 /LFHQVHGWR$ODQ0DOWHU DPDOWHU#XLFHGX 'RQRWFRS\RUGLVWULEXWH quality differences to the beers. This was largely explained by the fact that for most consumers, taste was among the least discriminatory of physical senses. Sight, sound, smell, and touch were believed to be more sensitive than taste, and therefore often helped to define taste. Thus a brand's imagery may be more important than its physical characteristics (at least within a reasonable taste range). With taste differences hard to discern, and price highly competitive within category (except for promotional deals), beer companies often tried to compete on advertising to create a distinct and favorable brand image to which consumers would positively respond. For example, Miller Lite's early ad campaign – "Great taste, less filling" – positioned the brand as one that offered significantly fewer calories and bloat, with the same level of taste as regular beer, to an increasingly older and girth conscious target market. By using aging professional athletes in the ads, Miller was able to link its target segment's aging sports heroes to the brand and create a favorable association that reinforced the brand image. Because beer sales success depended on repeat purchases, Miller employed a large advertising budget to remind its target consumers of the beer and keep the Miller Lite name and its meaning before them. To the extent that they could afford to do so, import beers followed similar practices. Heineken and Molson spent significant sums on advertising to create and keep their positioning in the mind of their target consumers. Other import beers chanced upon fads and word-of-mouth to establish a reasonable presence in the market. Mexico's Corona beer first became popular with college students in California, then spread to other markets. However, since 1987 sales had leveled. Many imports – St. Pauli Girl, Tecate, Guinness, Moosehead, Dos Equis – appealed to consumers in niche markets who would rather see their brand kept with a low profile and their own special "find." If a small group of consumers had a particular image or appeal for a certain brand, they supported it with fanatical loyalty. However, if the brand seemed to lose its exclusivity through mass advertising, the niche market could abandon it rather quickly. This always proved difficult for import beer marketers who could not afford to lose their loyal following, but desired to grow their business. Consequently, throughout the 1980s, the aging of baby boomers provided a solid social, economic, and demographic base for import beer consumption. As this base grew, so too did the number of import brands entering the U.S. market, each of which tried to garner its own market niche. Kirin USA's New Product Development Launching a new beer into the crowded U.S. import market was not viewed as an easy task by Kirin USA's management. Yet it was seen as the best way to achieve their growth goals without jeopardizing their existing customer base. To surpass Sapporo in the U.S. by 1993 Kirin managers believed they needed to sell an additional 300–400,000 cases of beer each year from their current one million case volume. This also had to factor in any possible losses due to cannibalization of existing Kirin products. Kirin had Lager, Light, Draft, and Dry products on the market. Among its major questions, the new product team was most concerned with identifying the U.S. import beer segments that would respond most favorably to a new Kirin product concept. Because buyer behavior for beer relied on image, they needed to know what product concept or imagery should be developed and, more specifically, what product features defining the concept would obtain a favorable market response. 5 /LFHQVHGWR$ODQ0DOWHU DPDOWHU#XLFHGX 'RQRWFRS\RUGLVWULEXWH The team also wanted to know who the potential consumers in each segment were and what were their needs, lifestyles, attitudes, media usage habits, and demographics. To provide the necessary information and decision support for addressing the major market issues, Mr. Kazuhiro hired your consulting firm to design and conduct a market study. Marketing Research and Analysis for the New Product The first phase of the research process was a series of exploratory focus groups to study in-depth aspects of import beer drinking. The results of the study were used to identify the major attributes of import beer that beer drinkers considered. In addition, the results were used to formulate a comprehensive questionnaire that would be delivered in two phases. The first phase was designed to gather the bulk of the data needed for the segmentation analysis, and the second phase follow-up was designed to more carefully evaluate specific product feature tradeoffs within the segments. After pretesting the questionnaire for the first phase of the study, a data collection agency was retained to complete telephone interviews with a random sample of some 400 drinkers of imported beer. 4 The questionnaire contained questions that provided data on a variety of variables, including the attributes consumers used in deciding on import beers, the importance of these attributes, perceptions of Kirin and its competitors on these attributes, usage occasions, demographics, attitudinal characteristics, and media usage. Twenty-one attributes were selected from the focus group study to represent the criteria that consumers might use to decide on import beer brands. These attributes are listed in Exhibit 1. A comparison of Kirin's ratings on the 21 attributes against more popular and heavily advertised brands (Molson, Heineken, Corona) revealed that the Kirin brand name was not as well perceived as its competitors. This was expected however, since Kirin did very little national advertising compared to these major imports. Survey respondents also rated the importance of each of these attributes on a 0 – 9 scale. The consulting company is considering whether these importance ratings could be used to identify market segments using cluster analysis. To help describe consumers who were classified into each segment, several descriptor variables were included in the survey. Selected variables from this list are provided in Exhibit 2. They included a variety of factors that might help explain import beer consumption: demographics, consumer self-perception, and beer consumption. Conjoint Analysis Study and Choice Simulation The second phase of the study involved a follow-up mail survey of the entire sample. This questionnaire included a conjoint analysis data collection task, with a follow-up telephone call to obtain respondent preferences for various combinations of a new import beer. Traditional data collection for preferences usually involved importance ratings on a number of attributes treated independently. Conjoint analysis was helpful to obtain consumer preferences in terms of tradeoffs among the various attributes of beer, including its price. Exhibit 3 illustrates the kind of choice stimuli that consumers were provided. Over the telephone they were asked to rank order their preferences for the different import beers described on the various cards. The conjoint analysis was based on seven attributes of import beer, each at three levels. The attributes and levels were chosen by the 6 /LFHQVHGWR$ODQ0DOWHU DPDOWHU#XLFHGX 'RQRWFRS\RUGLVWULEXWH managers and consultants with reference to key new product decisions that had to be made, and are summarized in Exhibit 4. Depending on the assumptions about consumer choice processes, conjoint data provided a more realistic interpretation of consumer preferences than traditional attribute ratings. For example, conjoint analysis assumed that consumers could compensate levels on one attribute with levels on another (e.g., a beer's origin can be compensated for with its taste). It also assumed that the total utility for a particular product defined by a combination of attributes was represented by the sum of the utilities (or part-worth utilities) for each attribute. The prefe ...
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EinsteintheProf
School: UC Berkeley

Hello, review the attached document and contact me in case you need any changes. Otherwise, good luck in your study and if you need any further help in your assignments, please let me know. Always invite me to answer your questions.Goodbye.

Running head: USING ENGINIUS TO ANALYSIS

Using Enginius to analysis
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USING ENGINIUS TO ANALYSIS

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Kirin brewery limited is one of the largest beer industry in Japan. Although it has
diversified in other products such as food biotechnology and liquor beer take the largest market
share based on its performance. Due to a recently of Asahi super beer in Japan, the entire market
has changed drastically. Kirin's new beer product Ichiban Shibori launched in 1990 inured to
counter any success of Asahi. Kirin used innovative technologies to outdo the competing beer. It
made a tremendous sale in Japan which made it explore Japan market. Kirin thus strategized
penetration in the U.S market which initially had huge imports of beer sales. This Asahi product
has thrilled Kirin to introduce a new product in the market. In US market the demand for huge
numbers of Japanese people in the U.S is one motivation for Kirin. Kirin should increase its
shares in the U.S since it is an opportunity in a growing firm. In 1987, for example, the shares of
U.S beer market rose from 3% to 5%. Kirin thus detected this growth opportunity in U.S imports.
Kirin believed they ought to sell an additional 300-400000 cases of their new product from the
current one million case volume. By so doing they would surpass other companies producing the
same product such as Sapporo.
Kirin used statistical data to analyze how sales were being made in comparison to other
companies. For instance, in the 1990s the retail price of Kirin's product was $23.56 million while
that of Heineken was higher at the point. This strategy played a crucial role in Kirin discoveries
on how to improve its total sales. Kirin team also used observations and lifestyle analysis. Kirin
has also used descriptive analysis to answer its questions on what happened to the firm's growth
with the introduction of Ichiban Shibori. It also uses predictive analysis to give details on what is
lik...

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Anonymous
Thanks, good work

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