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4765_287483_15.Freire
Chapter 1
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While the problem of humanization has always, from an axiological point of view, been
humankind's central problem, it now takes on the character of an inescapable concern
Concern for humanization leads at once to the recognition of dehumanization, not only as
ontological possibility but as an historical reality And as an individual perceives the extent
dehumanization, he or she may ask if humanization is a viable possibility. Within history
concrete, objective contexts, both humanization and dehumanization are possibilities fo
person as an uncompleted being conscious of their incompletion.
But while both humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives, only the first is t
people's vocation. This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is affirmed by that very negati
It is thwarted by injustice, exploitation, oppression, and the violence of the oppressors; it
affirmed by the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and justice, and by their struggle
recover their lost humanity.
Dehumanization, which marks not only those whose humanity has been stolen, but a
(though in a different way) those who have stolen it, is a distortion of the vocation
becoming more fully human. This distortion occurs within history; but it is not an histori
vocation. Indeed, to admit of dehumanization as an historical vocation would lead either
cynicism or total despair. The struggle for humanization, for the emancipation of labor, for 1
overcoming of alienation, for the affirmation of men and women as persons would
meaningless. This struggle is possible only because dehumanization, although a concre
historical fact, is not a given destiny but the result of an unjust order that engenders violence **
the oppressors, which in turn dehumanizes the oppressed.
Because it is a distortion of being more fully human, sooner or later being less human lea
the oppressed to struggle against those who made them so. In order for this struggle to ha
meaning, the oppressed must not in seeking to regain their humanity (which is a way to create
it), become in turn oppressors of the oppressors, but rather restorers of the humanity of both.
This, then, is the great humanistic and historical task of the oppressed: to liberate themselves
and their oppressors as well. The oppressors, who oppress, exploit, and rape by virtue of their
power; cannot find in this power the strength to liberate either the oppressed or themselves.
Only power that springs from the weakness of the oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free
both. Any attempt to “soften” the power of the oppressor in deference to the weakness of the
oppressed almost always manifests itself in the form of false generosity; indeed, the attempt
never goes beyond this. In order to have the continued opportunity to express their
"generosity,” the oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well. An unjust social order is the
permanent fount of this "generosity” which is nourished by death, despair, and poverty. That is
why the dispensers of false generosity become desperate at the slightest threat to its source.
True generosity consists precisely in fighting to destroy the causes which nourish false
charity. False charity constrains the fearful and subdued, the “rejects of life” to extend their
trembling hands. True generosity lies in striving so that these hands — whether of individuals
or entire peoples need be extended less and less in supplication, so that more and more they
become human hands which work and, working, transform the world.
This lesson and this apprenticeship must come, however, from the oppressed themselves and
from those who are truly in solidarity with them. As individuals or as peoples, by fighting for
the restoration of their humanity they will be attempting the restoration of true generosity. Who
are better prepared than the oppressed to understand the terrible significance of an oppressive
society? Who suffer the effects of oppression more than the oppressed? Who can better
understand the necessity of liberation? They will not gain this liberation by chance but through
the praxis of their quest for it, through their recognition of the necessity to fight for it. And this
fight, because of the purpose given it by the oppressed, will actually constitute an act of love
opposing the lovelessness which lies at the heart of the oppressors' violence, lovelessness even
when clothed in false generosity.
But almost always, during the initial stage of the struggle, the oppressed, instead of striving
for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors, or “sub-oppressors.” The very structure
of their thought has been conditioned by the contradictions of the concrete, existential situation
by which they were shaped. Their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men is to be
oppressors. This is their model of humanity. This phenomenon derives from the fact that the
oppressed, at a certain moment of their existential experience, adopt an attitude of “adhesion
to the oppressor. Under these circumstances they cannot "consider” him sufficiently clearly to
objectivize him to discover him “outside” themselves. This does not necessarily mean that
the oppressed are unaware that they are downtrodden. But their perception of themselves as
oppressed is impaired by their submersion in the reality of oppression. At this level, their
perception of themselves as opposites of the oppressor does not yet signify engagement in a
struggle to overcome the contradiction;21 the one pole aspires not to liberation, but to
identification with its opposite pole.
In this situation the oppressed do not see the “new man as the person to be born from the
resolution of this contradiction, as oppression gives way to liberation. For them, the new man
or woman themselves become oppressors. Their vision of the new man or woman is
individualistic; because of their identification with the oppressor they have no consciousness of
themselves as persons or as members of an oppressed class. It is not to become free that they
want agrarian reform, but in order to acquire land and thus become landowners or; more
precisely, bosses over other workers. It is a rare peasant who, once “promoted” to overseer,
does not become more of a tyrant towards his former comrades than the owner himself. This is
because the context of the peasant's situation, that is, oppression, remains unchanged. In this
example, the overseer, in order to make sure of his job, must be as tough as the owner — and
more so. Thus is illustrated our previous assertion that during the initial stage of their struggle
the oppressed find in the oppressor their model of “manhood.”
Even revolution, which transforms a concrete situation of oppression by establishing the
process of liberation, must confront thus phenomenon. Many of the oppressed who directly or
indirectly participate in revolution intend conditioned by the myths of the old order — to
make it their private revolution. The shadow of their former oppressor is still cast over them.
The “fear of freedom” which afflicts the oppressed, Bla fear which may equally well lead
them to desire the role of oppressor or bind them to the role of oppressed, should be examined.
One of the basic elements of the relationship between oppressor and oppressed is prescription.
Every prescription represents the imposition of one individual's choice upon another,
transforming the consciousness of the person prescribed to into one that conforms with the
prescriber's consciousness. Thus, the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior,
following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor. .
The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his guidelines,
are fearful of freedom. Freedom would require them to eject this image and replace it with
autonomy and responsibility. Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued
constantly and responsibly. Freedom is not an ideal located outside of man; nor is it an idea
which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest for human
completion.
To umount the situation of annraccion meania must first writinulu romaniza ito ou
To surmount the situation of oppression, people must first critically recognize its causes, so
that through transforming action they can create a new situation, one which makes possible the
pursuit of a fuller humanity. But the struggle to be more fully human has already begun in the
authentic struggle to transform the situation. Although the situation of oppression is a
dehumanized and dehumanizing totality affecting both the oppressors and those whom they
oppress, it is the latter who must, from their stifled humanity, wage for both the struggle for a
fuller humanity; the oppressor, who is himself dehumanized because he dehumanizes others, is
unable to lead this struggle.
However, the oppressed, who have adapted to the structure of domination in which they are
immersed, and have become resigned to it, are inhibited from waging the struggle for freedom
so long as they feel incapable of running the risks it requires. Moreover, their struggle for
freedom threatens not only the oppressor, but also their own oppressed comrades who are
fearful of still greater repression. When they discover within themselves the yearning to be
free, they perceive that this yearning can be transformed into reality only when the same
yearning is aroused in their comrades. But while dominated by the fear of freedom they refuse
to appeal to others, or to listen to the appeals of others, or even to the appeals of their own
conscience. They prefer gregariousness to authentic comradeship; they prefer the security of
conformity with their state of unfreedom to the creative communion produced by freedom and
even the very pursuit of freedom.
The oppressed suffer from the duality which has established itself in their innermost being.
They discover that without freedom they cannot exist authentically. Yet, although they desire
authentic existence, they fear it. They are at one and the same time themselves and the
oppressor whose consciousness they have internalized. The conflict lies in the choice between
being wholly themselves or being divided; between ejecting the oppressor within or not
ejecting them; between human solidarity or alienation; between following prescriptions or
having choices; between being spectators or actors; between acting or having the illusion of
acting through the action of the oppressors; between speaking out or being silent, castrated in
their power to create and re-create, in their power to transform the world. This is the tragic
dilemma of the oppressed which their education must take into account.
This book will present some aspects of what the writer has termed the pedagogy of the
oppressed, a pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (whether individuals
or peoples) in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity. This pedagogy makes oppression
and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will come their
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and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will come their
necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation. And in the struggle this pedagogy
will be made and remade.
The central problem is this: How can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic beings,
participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation? Only as they discover themselves to
be “hosts” of the oppressor can they contribute to the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy.
As long as they live in the duality in which to be is to be like, and to be like is to be like
the oppressor, this contribution is impossible. The pedagogy of the oppressed is an instrument
for their critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are manifestations of
dehumanization.
Liberation is thus a childbirth, and a painful one. The man or woman who emerges is a new
person, viable only as the oppressor-oppressed contradiction is superseded by the humanization
of all people. Or to put it another way the solution of this contradiction is born in the labor
which brings into the world this new being: no longer oppressor nor longer oppressed, but
human in the process of achieving freedom.
This solution cannot be achieved in idealistic terms. In order for the oppressed to be able to
wage the struggle for their liberation they must perceive the reality of oppression not as a
closed world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform.
This perception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for liberation; it must become the
motivating force for liberating action. Nor does the discovery by the oppressed that they exist
in dialectical relationship to the oppressor, as his antithesis that without them the oppressor
could not exist 41 in itself constitute liberation. The oppressed can overcome the
contradiction in which they are caught only when this perception enlists them in the struggle to
free themselves.
The same is true with respect to the individual oppressor as person. Discovering himself to
be an oppressor may cause considerable anguish, but it does not necessarily lead to solidarity
with the oppressed. Rationalizing his guilt through paternalistic treatment of the oppressed, all
the while holding them fast in a position of dependence, will not do. Solidarity requires that
one enter into the situation of those with whom one is in solidarity; it is a radical posture. If
what characterizes the oppressed is their subordination to the consciousness of the master, as
Hegel affirms, 61 true solidarity with the oppressed means fighting at their side to transform the
objective reality which has made them these “beings for another”. The oppressor is in solidarity
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