International relationship - Globalization benefit and pitfalls.

User Generated

Urravz

Humanities

Description

1. With Globalization having such a strong impact and importance to the U.S., what have been some of the Benefits and pitfalls of Globalization as seen by the American people? How has it impacted State and Federal policy in governing? How has it affected the Job market and wage amounts?

400-500 words


2. Why do we use theories to study IR?

200 words


Textbook reference: International Politics Enduring concepts and contemporary issues 13th edition.

Unformatted Attachment Preview

Globalization Agenda for today • Globalization (history, definition, pros and cons) • Trade and Comparative Advantage • Complex Interdependence • 5 wars of globalization • Will global capitalism fall again? http://www.gapminder.org/videos/200-yearsthat-changed-the-world/ Introducing Globalization • Worldwide interconnectedness is growing in: – Extensity – Intensity – Velocity – Impact What is globalization? There are many definitions to Globalization, the term usually refers to the opening of international border to flows of: • Goods and services (Free trade) Strongest rise has been in export manufacture goods • People (Immigration) most immigration occurs between developing countries. • Money (Direct investment) • Information • Technology • Ideas How old is Globalization? What has led to increased globalization? What has led to increased globalization? Trade barriers has been gradually reduced • Lower restrictions on the free flow on investment capital between countries • More technology • Improve methods of transportation (easier for people and goods to travel) • Methods of communications has improved and got cheaper (INTERNET) → spread of ideas around the world • Fall of communism (former Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc and China were once isolated due to communist regimes and have now market oriented economies and are doing business with the rest of the world) What are the positive and negative sides of Globalization? What are the + and – of Globalization? Positive Negative * Increased freedom → borders are open, people can migrate, $ can migrate Large demonstrations and protests * More diverse goods and services * Jobs are lost * Business can lower costs by relocating * Environmental damage * Products have lower prices * Open borders to terrorism, illegal drugs, easier spreads of disease * Developing countries can export * Less cultural diversity (Westerinization) * Better access to medicine, information, education & technology * Not lead to elimination of poverty * Not lead to more stability * Increased inequality * Financial crisis What are the 5 wars of Globalization? What are the 5 wars of Globalization? • Drugs • Arms trafficking • Intellectual Property • Alien Smuggling • Money Laundering Why do we trade? Why do we trade? • Comparative advantage (David Ricardo): countries are better off when they trade Countries in Isolation Autarky • Products have high costs • Low efficiency • Countries tend to lag behind • Eg. China/ N. Korea Why do we trade? Complex interdependence = as countries become increasingly reliant on one another for essential goods and services, their ability to engage in conflict and especially war becomes more remote. - either because the desire to fight is decreased by proximity and acquaintance or because the intertwining of economies makes it impractical or impossible to fight. Does Globalization increase poverty and inequality? • 19 What is the future of . Globalization? International Politics Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues Thirteenth Edition Robert J. Art Brandeis University Robert Jervis Columbia University Boston­  Columbus  Indianapolis  New York  San Francisco Amsterdam  Cape Town  Dubai  London  Madrid  Milan   Munich  Paris  Montréal  Toronto Delhi  Mexico City  São Paulo  Sydney  Hong Kong  Seoul  Singapore  Taipei  Tokyo A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 1 08/02/16 8:11 PM Editor in Chief: Dickson Musselwhite Publisher: Charlyce Jones Owen Editorial Assistant: Laura Hernandez Product Marketing Manager: Tricia Murphy Field Marketing Manager: Brittany Pogue-Mohammed Senior Managing Editor: Melissa Feimer Program Manager: Rob DeGeorge Project Manager: Joe Scordato Operations Specialist: Mary Ann Gloriande Developmental Editor: Maggie Barbieri Media Editor: Tina Gagliostro Full-Service Project Management: Chandrasekar Subramanian, SPi Global Composition: SPi Global Printer/Binder: R. R. Donnelley & Sons Cover Printer: Lehigh-Phoenix Color Corp. Cover Design: Maria Lange Cover Art Director: Maria Lange Cover Art: red-feniks/Shutterstock Copyright © 2017, 2015, 2013 by Pearson Education, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. This publication is protected by copyright, and permission should be obtained from the publisher prior to any prohibited reproduction, storage in a retrieval system, or ­transmission in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise. For information regarding permissions, request forms and the appropriate contacts within the Pearson Rights & Permissions Department, please visit www.pearsoned.com/permissions/. Acknowledgments of third party content appear on pages 578–582, which constitute an extension of this copyright page. PEARSON and ALWAYS LEARNING are exclusive trademarks owned by Pearson Education, Inc. or its affiliates in the United States and/or other countries. Unless otherwise indicated herein, any third-party trademarks that may appear in this work are the ­property of their respective owners and any references to third-party trademarks, logos or other trade dress are for demonstrative or descriptive purposes only. Such references are not intended to imply any sponsorship, endorsement, authorization, or promotion of Pearson’s products by the owners of such marks, or any relationship between the owner and Pearson. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Art, Robert J., editor. | Jervis, Robert - author. Title: International politics : enduring concepts and contemporary issues / [edited by] Robert J. Art, Brandeis University; Robert Jervis, Columbia University. Description: Thirteenth edition. | New York : Pearson, 2016. Identifiers: LCCN 2016002773 | ISBN 9780134482019 Subjects: LCSH: World politics—1989- | Globalization. Classification: LCC JZ1242 .I574 2016 | DDC 327--dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016002773 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ISBN 10: 0-13-448201-8 ISBN 13: 978-0-13-448201-9 A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 2 08/02/16 8:11 PM Brief Contents Detailed Contents v Preface ix Part I Anarchy and Its Consequences Part II 1 1 Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft 2 The Meaning of Anarchy 48 3 Strategic Interaction in Anarchy 87 4 The Mitigation of Anarchy 10 125 The Uses of Force 189 5 The Political Uses of Force 195 6 The Utility of Force Today 229 7 The Nuclear Future 259 Part III International Political Economy and Globalization 275 8 Perspectives on Political Economy 282 9 Globalization Today 314 10 Fixing the World Political Economy Part IV 343 Contemporary Issues in World Politics 369 11 Interstate War and Terrorism 376 12  Civil Wars, Human Rights, Regime Change, and Humanitarian Intervention 408 13 Transnational Actors and New Forces 454 14 The Global Commons and Global Governance 480 15 The Shape of the Future 532 Credits 578 iii A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 3 10/02/16 4:06 PM This page intentionally left blank A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 4 3/4/16 8:53 PM Detailed Contents Preface ix Part I Anarchy and Its Consequences 1 1 Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft ■ The Melian Dialogue 10 10 Thucydides ■ Legitimacy in International Politics 16 Ian Hurd ■ Six Principles of Political Realism 19 Hans J. Morgenthau ■ A Critique of Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism 28 J. Ann Tickner ■ What Is Power in Global Affairs? 41 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2 The Meaning of Anarchy ■ 48 The Anarchic Structure of World Politics 48 Kenneth N. Waltz ■ Anarchy and the Struggle for Power 70 John J. Mearsheimer ■ Anarchy Is What States Make of It 78 Alexander Wendt 3 Strategic Interaction in Anarchy 87 ■ Game Theory: A Practitioner’s Approach 87 ■ Rationalist Explanations for War Thomas C. Schelling 95 James D. Fearon ■ Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma 104 Robert Jervis 4 The Mitigation of Anarchy ■ 125 Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma 125 By Robert Jervis ■ Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs 139 Michael W. Doyle v A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 5 08/02/16 8:11 PM vi Detailed Contents ■ Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning 153 ■ Hierarchy and Hegemony in International Politics 161 Stephen M. Walt David C. Kang ■ The Future of Diplomacy 165 Hans J. Morgenthau ■ The Uses and Limits of International Law 176 Stanley Hoffmann ■ International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? 181 Robert O. Keohane Part II The Uses of Force 189 5 The Political Uses of Force 195 ■ The Four Functions of Force 195 Robert J. Art ■ The Diplomacy of Violence 203 Thomas C. Schelling ■ What is Terrorism? 218 Bruce Hoffman 6 The Utility of Force Today 229 ■ The Fungibility of Force 229 Robert J. Art ■ Why Civil Resistance Works 246 Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan ■ Shape of Violence Today 252 The World Bank 7 The Nuclear Future 259 ■ Losing Control in Crises 259 Robert Jervis ■ Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future 264 Henry D. Sokolski ■ A World without Nuclear Weapons? 269 Thomas C. Schelling Part III International Political Economy and Globalization 275 8 Perspectives on Political Economy 282 ■ The Nature of Political Economy 282 Robert Gilpin A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 6 10/02/16 4:06 PM Detailed Contents ■ vii Economic Interdependence and War 299 Dale C. Copeland ■ Why Doesn’t Everyone Get the Case for Free Trade? 307 Dani Rodrik 9 Globalization Today 314 ■ Globalization of the Economy 314 Jeffrey Frankel ■ What Globalization Is and Is Not 330 Moisés Naím ■ Labor, Capital, and Ideas in the Power Law Economy 335 Erik Brynjolfsson, Andrew McAfee, and Michael Spence 10 Fixing the World Political Economy 343 ■ The Status Quo Crisis 343 Eric Helleiner ■ A New Global Reserve System 355 Joseph E. Stiglitz ■ A Sane Globalization 358 Dani Rodrik Part IV Contemporary Issues in World Politics 11 369 Interstate War and Terrorism 376 ■ The Era of Leading Power Peace 376 Robert Jervis ■ The United States and the Rise of China 393 Robert J. Art ■ Ending Terrorism 401 Audrey Kurth Cronin 12 Civil Wars, Human Rights, Regime Change, and Humanitarian Intervention 408 ■ Reflections on Intervention 408 Kofi Annan ■ Human Rights in World Politics 414 Rhoda E. Howard and Jack Donnelly ■ Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age 427 Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein ■ To the Shores of Tripoli? Regime Change and Its Consequences 434 Alexander B. Downes ■ Crafting Peace through Power Sharing 442 Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 7 08/02/16 8:11 PM viii Detailed Contents 13 Transnational Actors and New Forces 454 ■ Transnational Activist Networks 454 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink ■ Cyber Conflict and National Security 461 Herbert Lin ■ International Law: The Trials of Global Norms 474 Steven R. Ratner 14 The Global Commons and Global Governance 480 ■ The Tragedy of the Commons 480 Garrett Hardin ■ The Papal Encyclical on the Environment 486 Pope Francis ■ The U.N. Security Council 491 Adams Roberts and Dominik Zaum ■ Globalization and Governance 500 Kenneth N. Waltz ■ Good Enough Global Governance 512 Stewart Patrick ■ The Future of the Liberal World Order 522 G. John Ikenberry 15 The Shape of the Future 532 ■ Emerging Multipolarity: Why Should We Care? 532 Barry R. Posen ■ The Strategic Implications of Climate Change 541 Alan Dupont ■ Dollar Diminution and U.S. Power 550 ■ Power Shifts, Economic Change, and the Decline of the West? Jonathan Kirshner 560 Michael Cox ■ The Future of the European Union 571 Stephen M. Walt Credits A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 8 578 08/02/16 8:11 PM Preface T he first edition of International Politics appeared in 1973, and now, with the 13th edition, it celebrates its 43rd birthday. We are pleased that this reader has been so well received and so ­long-lived. We hope instructors and students find this edition as useful as they have the ­previous ones. New to This Edition The thirteenth edition retains the four major parts of the previous edition and contains 58 selections, 13 of which are new, making this most recent edition 22% new. The new additions are spread across all four parts of the reader (see below). We also have made two organizational changes. We added a subsection on “Strategic Interaction in Anarchy” in Part I, and consolidated into one subsection the readings on civil wars, human rights, intervention, and international law that appeared in the 12th edition. Finally, appearing in this edition for the first time are two sets of questions. One set contains 58 questions—one for each of the reader’s selections. Each of these questions appears at the end of its corresponding selection. The second set of questions contains only four—one for each of the reader’s four major parts. The purpose of the 58 selection questions is to help the student grasp the central argument of each selection by posing a pointed question or questions about it. The purpose of the four parts questions is to help the student tie together all the readings in each part. These two sets of questions, taken together, should help the student master the materials of this reader. As always, the most important changes in this edition are in the new selections: • In Part I, we have added three new selections: one by Joseph Nye on the nature of power in international relations; one by John Mearsheimer on anarchy and the struggle for power; and one on game theory by Thomas Schelling. • In Part II, we added two new selections: one on losing control in crises involving nuclear armed states by Robert Jervis; and another on various scenarios of what the nuclear future might bring by Henry Sokolski. • Part III contains four new selections: one on the relation between economic interdependence and the likelihood of war by Dale Copeland; one on whether labor or capital does better in the global economy by Erik Brynjolfsson and his associates; another on global financial governance by Erik Heilleiner; and a final one on a new global reserve system to replace the role of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency by Joseph Stiglitz. • Part IV contains four new selections: excerpts from Pope Francis’ “Encyclical on the Environment”; a new and updated selection on the United Nations A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 9 ix 08/02/16 8:11 PM x Preface Security Council by Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum; one on what is often called “mini-multilateralism,” or governance produced by many disparate but interweaving international institutions, by Stewart Patrick; and an essay on the future of the European Union by Stephen Walt. Features Originally, we put this reader together to help give the field of international relations greater focus and to bring to students the best articles we could find on the key theoretical concepts in the field. This accounts for the “enduring concepts” in the book’s subtitle. A few editions after the first, we then added a separate section on contemporary issues because of our view that these enduring concepts have more meaning for students when applied to salient contemporary issues. All subsequent editions have followed this basic philosophy of combining the best scholarship on theoretical perspectives with that on important contemporary problems. In constructing the first edition, and in putting together all subsequent editions, including this one, we have tried to create a reader that embodies four features: • A selection of subjects that, while not exhaustively covering the field of international politics, nevertheless encompasses most of the essential topics that all of us teach in our introductory courses. • Individual readings that are mainly analytical in content, that take issue with one another, and that thereby introduce the student to the fundamental debates and points of view in the field. • Editors’ introductions to each part that summarize the central concepts the student must master, that organize the central themes of each part, and that relate the readings to one another. • A book that can be used either as the core around which to design an introductory course or as the primary supplement to enrich an assigned text. Since the first edition, the field of international relations has experienced a dramatic enrichment in the subjects studied and the quality of works published. Political economy came into its own as an important subfield in the 1970s. New and important works in the field of security studies appeared. The literature on cooperation among states flourished in the early 1980s, and important studies about the environment began to appear in the mid-1980s. Feminist, post-modernist, and constructivist critiques of the mainstream made their appearance also. With the end of the Cold War, these new issues came to the fore: human rights, the tension between state sovereignty and the obligations of the international community, the global environment, civil wars, failed states, nationbuilding, transnational terrorist groups, and, most recently, the search for new modes of global governance to deal with the collective action problems that are increasingly pressing upon states. The growing diversity of the field has closely mirrored the actual developments in international relations. A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 10 08/02/16 8:11 PM Preface xi Consequently, as for the previous editions, in fashioning the 13th, we have kept in mind both the new developments in world politics and the literature that has accompanied them. Central to this edition, though, as for the other 12, is our belief that the realm of international politics differs fundamentally from that of domestic politics. Therefore, we have continued to put both the developments and the literature in the context of the patterns that still remain valid for understanding the differences between politics in an anarchic environment and politics under a government. Revel™ Educational technology designed for the way today’s students read, think, and learn When students are engaged deeply, they learn more effectively and perform better in their courses. This simple fact inspired the creation of REVEL: an immersive learning experience designed for the way today’s students read, think, and learn. Built in collaboration with educators and students nationwide, REVEL is the newest, fully digital way to deliver respected Pearson content. REVEL enlivens course content with media interactives and assessments­ integrated directly within the authors’ narrative-that provide opportunities for students to read about and practice course material in tandem. This ­immersive educational technology boosts student engagement, which leads to better understanding of concepts and improved performance throughout the course. Learn more about REVEL at www.pearsonhighered.com/REVEL. Supplements Pearson is pleased to offer several resources to qualified adopters of International Politics and their students that will make teaching and learning from this book even more effective and enjoyable. Several of the supplements for this book are available at the Instructor Resource Center (IRC), an online hub that allows ­instructors to quickly download book-specific supplements. Please visit the IRC welcome page at www.pearsonhighered.com/irc to register for access. Instructor’s Manual/Test Bank This resource includes learning objectives, reading guides, multiple-choice questions, true/false questions, and essay questions for each chapter. Available exclusively on the IRC. Longman Atlas of World Issues (0-205-78020-2) From population and political systems to energy use and women’s rights, the Longman Atlas of World Issues features full-color thematic maps that examine the forces shaping the world. Featuring maps from the latest edition of The Penguin A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 11 08/02/16 8:11 PM xii Preface State of the World Atlas, this excerpt includes critical thinking exercises to promote a deeper understanding of how geography affects many global issues. Goode’s World Atlas (0-321-65200-2) First published by Rand McNally in 1923, Goode’s World Atlas has set the standard for college reference atlases. It features hundreds of physical, political, and thematic maps as well as graphs, tables, and a pronouncing index. Research and Writing in International Relations (0-205-06065-X) With current and detailed coverage on how to start research in the discipline’s major subfields, this brief and affordable guide offers step-by-step guidance and the essential resources needed to compose political science papers that go beyond description and into systematic and sophisticated inquiry. This text focuses on areas where students often need help—finding a topic, developing a question, reviewing the literature, designing research, and last, writing the paper. Acknowledgments In putting together this and previous editions, we received excellent advice from the following colleagues, whom we would like to thank for the time and care they took: Jonathan Acuff, St. Anselm College; Linda S. Adams, Baylor University; David G. Becker, Dartmouth College; Andrew Bennett, Georgetown University; Patrick Bratton, Hawaii Pacific University; Chelsea Brown, Southern Methodist University; James A. Caporaso, University of Washington; Erica Chenoweth, Wesleyan University; Timothy M. Cole, University of Maine; Jane Cramer, University of Oregon; David Edelstein, Georgetown University; Joseph Foudy, Hunter College; Sonia Gardenas, Trinity College; Robert C. Gray, Franklin & Marshall College; Robert J. Griffiths, University of North Carolina at Greensboro; Maia Hallward, Kennesaw State University; James Hentz, Virginia Military Institute; David Houghton, University of Central Florida; Benjamin Judkins, University of Utah; Sean Kay, Ohio Wesleyan University; Mary McCarthy, Drake University; Timothy McKeown, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; James A. Mitchell, California State University, Northridge; Ronald Mitchell, University of Oregon; Layna Mosley, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Mueni W. Muiu, Winston-Salem State University; Kathy L. Powers, Pennsylvania State University; Philip Schrodt, University of Kansas; Randall Schweller, The Ohio State University; Margaret E. Scranton, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; Roslin Simowitz, University of Texas at Arlington; Veronica Ward, Utah State University; Ken Wise, Creighton University; and Jeremy Youde, University of Minnesota at Duluth. Robert J. Art Robert Jervis A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 12 08/02/16 8:11 PM Part I Anarchy and Its Consequences LEARNING OBJECTIVES I.1 Understand power, principle, and legitimacy in statecraft. I.2 Define anarchy and the anarchic environment of international politics. I.3 Discuss how international politics exemplifies strategic interaction and the role of game theory. I.4 Recognize how state actors cope with anarchy and develop patterns that contain the dangers of aggression. 1 M01A_JERV2019_13_SE_P01.indd 1 08/02/16 8:11 PM 2 Part I Unlike domestic politics, international politics takes place in an arena that has no central governing body. From this central fact flow important consequences for the behavior of states. In Part I, we explore four of them: the role that principles, legitimacy, and morality can and should play in statecraft; the effects that anarchy has on how states view and relate to one another; the types of strategic interactions that occur among states in anarchy; and the ways that the harsher edges of anarchy can be mitigated, even if not wholly removed. Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft I.1 Understand power, principle, and legitimacy in statecraft. Citizens, students, and scholars alike often take up the study of international politics because they want their country to behave in as principled a way as possible. But they soon discover that principle and power, morality and statecraft do not easily mix. Why should this be? Is it inevitable? Can and should states seek to do good in the world? Will they endanger themselves and harm others if they try? These are timeless questions, having been asked by observers of international politics in nearly every previous era. They therefore make a good starting point for thinking about the nature of international politics and the choices states face in our era. In his history of the Peloponnesian War, the Greek historian Thucydides made the first, and perhaps the most famous, statement about the relation between the prerogatives of power and the dictates of morality. In the Melian dialogue, he argued that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (more frequently stated as “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”). For Thucydides considerations of power reigned supreme in international politics and were the key to understanding why the war between Athens and Sparta began in the first place. At root, he argued: “what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” Fearing that Athens’ power was growing more quickly than its own, Sparta launched a preventive war to stop Athens from becoming too powerful. Herein lies the first written insight that changes in relative power positions among states, in this case “city-states,” can be a cause of war. The forcefulness with which he argued for the “power politics” view of international relations makes Thucydides the first “realist” theorist of international politics. But Ian Hurd shows that in some, if not all international systems, legitimacy plays a powerful role in generating and modifying power. Hans J. Morgenthau, a leading twentieth-century theorist of international relations, also takes the “power politics” position. He argues that universal standards of morality cannot be an invariable guide to statecraft because there is M01A_JERV2019_13_SE_P01.indd 2 08/02/16 8:11 PM Anarchy and Its Consequences 3 an “ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action.” Rather than base statecraft on morality, Morgenthau argues that state actors must think and act in terms of power and must do whatever it takes to defend the national interests of their state. J. Ann Tickner, commenting on the primacy of power in Morgenthau’s writings, explains that what he considers to be a realistic description of international politics is only a picture of the past and therefore not a prediction about the future, and proposes what she considers to be a feminist alternative. A world in which state actors think of power in terms of collective empowerment, not in terms of leverage over one another, could produce more cooperative outcomes and pose fewer conflicts between the dictates of morality and the power of self-interest. Joseph Nye sees power as central, but notes that it can take multiple forms, including “soft power” that stems from the appeal of a state’s culture and values and that can influence not only what others do, but also what they want. The Meaning of Anarchy I.2 Define anarchy and the anarchic environment of international politics. Even those who argue that morality should play a large role in statecraft acknowledge that international politics is not like domestic politics. In the latter, there is government; in the former, there is none. As a consequence, no agency exists above the individual states with authority and power to make laws and settle disputes. States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punishes deviations. This—the absence of a supreme power—is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics. Anarchy is therefore said to constitute a state of war: When all else fails, force is the ultima ratio—the final and legitimate arbiter of disputes among states. The state of war does not mean that every nation is constantly at the brink of war or actually at war with other nations. Most countries, though, do feel threatened by some states at some time, and every state has experienced periods of intense insecurity. No two contiguous states, moreover, have had a history of close, friendly relations uninterrupted by severe tension if not outright war. Because a nation cannot look to a supreme body to enforce laws, nor count on other nations for constant aid and support, it must rely on its own efforts, particularly for defense against attack. Coexistence in an anarchic environment thus requires self-help. The psychological outlook that self-help breeds is best described by a saying common among British statesmen since Lord Palmerston: “Great Britain has no permanent enemies or permanent friends, she has only permanent interests.” Although states must provide the wherewithal to achieve their own ends, they do not always reach their foreign policy goals. The goals may be grandiose; the means available, meager. The goals may be attainable; the means selected, M01A_JERV2019_13_SE_P01.indd 3 08/02/16 8:11 PM 4 Part I inappropriate. But even if the goals are realistic and the means both available and appropriate, a state can be frustrated in pursuit of its ends. The reason is simple but fundamental to an understanding of international politics: What one state does will inevitably impinge on some other states—on some beneficially, but on others adversely. What one state desires, another may covet. What one thinks is just due, another may find threatening. Steps that a state takes to achieve its goals may be rendered useless by the countersteps others take. No state, therefore, can afford to disregard the effects its actions will have on other nations’ behavior. In this sense, state behavior is contingent: What one state does is dependent in part upon what others do. Mutual dependence means that each must take the others into account. Mutual dependence affects nothing more powerfully than it does security— the measures states take to protect their territory. Like other foreign policy goals, the security of one state is contingent upon the behavior of other states. Herein lies the security dilemma to which each state is subject: In its efforts to preserve or enhance its own security, one state can take measures that decrease the security of other states and cause them to take countermeasures that neutralize the actions of the first state and that may even menace it. The first state may feel impelled to take further actions, provoking additional countermeasures . . . and so forth. The security dilemma means that an action—reaction spiral can occur between two states or among several of them, forcing each to spend ever larger sums on arms to be no more secure than before. All will run faster merely to stay where they are. At the heart of the security dilemma are these two constraints: the inherent difficulty in distinguishing between offensive and defensive postures, and the inability of one state to believe or trust that another state’s present pacific intentions will remain so. The capability to defend can also provide the capability to attack. In adding to its arms, state A may know that its aim is defensive, that its intentions are peaceful, and therefore that it has no aggressive designs on state B. In a world where states must look to themselves for protection, however, B will examine A’s actions carefully and suspiciously. B may think that A will attack it when A’s arms become powerful enough and that A’s protestations of friendship are designed to lull it into lowering its guard. But even if B believes A’s actions are not directed against it, B cannot assume that A’s intentions will remain peaceful. Anarchy makes it impossible for A to bind itself to continuing to respect B’s interests in the future. B must allow for the possibility that what A can do to it, A sometime might do. The need to assess capabilities along with intentions, or, the equivalent, to allow for a change in intentions, makes state actors profoundly conservative. They prefer to err on the side of safety, to have too much rather than too little. Because security is the basis of existence and the prerequisite for the achievement of all other goals, state actors must be acutely sensitive to the security actions of others. The security dilemma thus means that state actors cannot risk not reacting to the security actions of other states, but that in so reacting they can produce circumstances that leave them worse off than before. The anarchic environment of international politics, then, allows every state to be the final judge of its own interests, but requires that each provide the means M01A_JERV2019_13_SE_P01.indd 4 08/02/16 8:11 PM Anarchy and Its Consequences 5 to attain them. Because the absence of a central authority permits wars to occur, security considerations become paramount. Because of the effects of the security dilemma, efforts of state leaders to protect their peoples can lead to severe tension and war even when all parties sincerely desire peace. Two states, or two groups of states, each satisfied with the status quo and seeking only security, may not be able to achieve it. Conflicts and wars with no economic or ideological basis can occur. The outbreak of war, therefore, does not necessarily mean that some or all states seek expansion, or that humans have an innate drive for power. That states go to war when none of them wants to, however, does not imply that they never seek war. The security dilemma may explain some wars; it does not explain all wars. States often do experience conflicts of interest over trade, real estate, ideology, and prestige. For example, when someone asked Francis I what differences led to his constant wars with Charles V, he replied: “None whatever. We agree perfectly. We both want control of Italy!” (Cited in Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics, 7th ed., New York, 1953, p. 283.) If states cannot obtain what they want by blackmail, bribery, or threats, they may resort to war. Wars can occur when no one wants them; wars usually do occur when someone wants them. Realists argue that even under propitious circumstances, international cooperation is difficult to achieve because in anarchy, states are often more concerned with relative advantages than with absolute gains. That is, because international politics is a self-help system in which each state must be prepared to rely on its own resources and strength to further its interests, national leaders often seek to become more powerful than their potential adversaries. Cooperation is then made difficult not only by the fear that others will cheat and fail to live up to their agreements, but also by the perceived need to gain a superior position. The reason is not that state actors are concerned with status, but that they fear that arrangements that benefit all, but provide greater benefits to others than to them, will render their country vulnerable to pressure and coercion in the future. Kenneth N. Waltz develops the above points more fully by analyzing the differences between hierarchic (domestic) and anarchic (international) political systems. He shows why the distribution of capabilities (the relative power positions of states) in anarchic systems is so important and lays out the ways in which political behavior differs in hierarchic and anarchic systems. Anarchy, the security dilemma, and conflicts of interest make international politics difficult, unpleasant, and dangerous. There is broad agreement among Realists on the consequences of anarchy for states’ behavior, but not total agreement. One brand of Realists, who are called the “offensive Realists,” argue that the consequences of anarchy go far beyond producing security dilemmas and making cooperation hard to come by. They assert that anarchy forces states, and especially the great powers, to become “power maximizers” because the only way to ensure the states’ security is to be the most powerful state in the system. Offensive realism envisions a “dog-eat-dog” world of international politics in which power and fear dominate great power i­ nteractions and in which war, or the threat of war, among the great powers or among their M01A_JERV2019_13_SE_P01.indd 5 08/02/16 8:11 PM 6 Part I proxies is a constant feature of international relations. John J. Mearsheimer lays out the tenets of this brand of realism. In an anarchic condition, however, the question to ask may not be, “Why does war occur?” but rather “Why does war not occur more frequently than it does?” Instead of asking “Why do states not cooperate more to achieve common interests?” we should ask “Given anarchy and the security dilemma, how is it that states are able to cooperate at all?” Anarchy and the security dilemma do not produce their effects automatically, and it is not self-evident that states are power maximizers. Thus, Alexander Wendt argues that Waltz and other realists have missed the extent to which the unpleasant patterns they describe are “socially constructed”—that is, they stem from the actors’ beliefs, perceptions, and interpretations of others’ behavior. If national leaders believe that anarchy requires an assertive stance that endangers others, conflict will be generated. But if they think they have more freedom of action and do not take the hostility of others for granted, they may be able to create more peaceful relationships. In this view, ­structure (anarchy) does not determine state action; agency (human ­decision) does. Strategic Interaction in Anarchy I.3 Discuss how international politics exemplifies strategic interaction and the role of game theory. International politics exemplifies strategic interaction. That is, outcomes are not produced directly by any one state’s foreign policy, but by the interaction of the policies of several of them. Each may seek peace and even act in a way that it thinks will bring it about, and yet war can be the result. Intentions and results can be very different, and interaction is central. Interaction is strategic because leaders understand this and when they act have to anticipate how others will behave. Furthermore, they know that others are similarly trying to anticipate what they will do. For example, even if state A is willing to cooperate if it thinks state B will, and state B has the same preference, cooperation will not ensure if A anticipates that B is in fact not likely to cooperate, in part because it thinks that B doubts that A state will cooperate. (This is a version of Rousseau’s “Stag Hunt.) Strategic interaction is best understood through game theory, which is explained in his selection by Thomas C. Schelling, who won a Nobel Prize for his work in this area. In the same vein James Fearon shows that if states were fully rational and informed, wars should not occur because both sides would prefer a peaceful compromise to the identical settlement that actually was reached after mutually costly fighting. The test of war is necessary not because of the conflict of interest itself, but because in the absence of an international authority states cannot commit themselves to living up to their agreements (a problem of anarchy) and cannot credibly reveal their intentions and capabilities to others (a problem of strategic interaction). M01A_JERV2019_13_SE_P01.indd 6 08/02/16 8:11 PM Anarchy and Its Consequences 7 Robert Jervis shows a different facet of strategic interaction in arguing that the extent to which states can make themselves more secure without menacing others depends in large part on whether offensive postures can be distinguished from defensive ones and whether the offense is believed to be more efficacious than the defense. In a world where defense is thought to be easier than offense, the security dilemma is mitigated and, consequently, states are more secure and the hard edge of anarchy is softened. The reverse is true if offense is thought to be easier: the security dilemma operates powerfully, and, consequently, states are less secure and the effects of anarchy cut deeply. The Mitigation of Anarchy I.4 Recognize how state actors cope with anarchy and develop patterns that contain the dangers of aggression. Even realists note that conflict and warfare are not constant characteristics of international politics. Most states remain at peace with most others most of the time. State actors have developed a number of ways of coping with anarchy; of gaining more than a modicum of security; of regulating their competition with other states; and of developing patterns that contain, but do not eliminate, the dangers of aggression. Robert Jervis shows that the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma on the possibilities for cooperation is not constant but varies with both the circumstances states find themselves in and the strategies they follow. Even when states have benign intentions, cooperation is most difficult when the gains from exploiting the other are high and the costs of being exploited are also great. Here it is very tempting to try to take advantage of the other and symmetrically dangerous to trust the other side, which feels the same incentives. It is also not conducive to cooperation if the outcome of both sides working together is only slightly better than mutual competition. Conversely, a reversal of these incentives makes cooperation under anarchy easier and more likely. These are not only conditions that states can find themselves in; they can guide states that seek to cooperate. For example, to minimize the danger of exploitation states can divide a large transactions into a series of smaller ones in which the gains from cheating and the losses from being cheated on are relatively slight at each state. They can also increase transparency to clarify whether each state has cooperated in its previous moves, stake their reputations on living up to their pledges to cooperate, and small states can seek to have larger ones step in if they break their promises. Efforts to do this also signal a state’s desire to cooperate and can increase trust. None of this is foolproof, of course, but it can reduce the danger that the policies states follow in anarchy and the security dilemma will generate rather than ameliorate conflict. The kind of state we are dealing with may make a big difference. Most ­strikingly, it appears that democracies may never have gone to war against M01A_JERV2019_13_SE_P01.indd 7 08/02/16 8:11 PM 8 Part I each other. This is not to say, as Woodrow Wilson did, that democracies are inherently peaceful. They seem to fight as many wars as do dictatorships. But, as Michael W. Doyle shows, they do not fight each other. If this is correct—and, of course, both the evidence and the reasons are open to dispute—it implies that anarchy and the security dilemma do not prevent peaceful and even harmonious relations among states that share certain common values and beliefs. Democracies are relatively recent developments. For a longer period of time, two specific devices—international law and diplomacy—have proved useful in resolving conflicts among states. Although not enforced by a world government, international law can provide norms for behavior and mechanisms for settling disputes. The effectiveness of international law derives from the willingness of states to observe it. Its power extends no further than the disposition of states “to agree to agree.” Where less than vital interests are at stake, state actors may accept settlements that are not entirely satisfactory because they think the precedents or principles justify the compromises made. Much of international law reflects a consensus among states on what is of equal benefit to all, as, for example, the rules regulating international communications. Diplomacy, too, can facilitate cooperation and resolve disputes. If diplomacy is skillful, and the legitimate interests of the parties in dispute are taken into account, understandings can often be reached on issues that might otherwise lead to war. These points and others are explored more fully by Stanley Hoffmann and Hans J. Morgenthau. National leaders use these two traditional tools within a balance-of-power system. Much maligned by President Wilson and his followers and misunderstood by many others, balance of power refers to the way in which stability is achieved through the conflicting efforts of individual states, whether or not any or all of them deliberately pursue that goal. Just as Adam Smith argued that if every individual pursued his or her own self-interest, the interaction of individual egoisms would enhance national wealth, so international relations theorists have argued that even if every state seeks power at the expense of the others, no one state will likely dominate. In both cases a general good can be the unintended product of selfish individual actions. Moreover, even if most states desire only to keep what they have, their own interests dictate that they band together to resist any state or coalition of states that threatens to dominate them. The balance-of-power system is likely to prevent any one state a­ cquiring hegemony. It will not, however, benefit all states equally nor maintain the peace permanently. Rewards will be unequal because of inequalities in power and expertise. Wars will occur because they are one means by which states can preserve what they have or acquire what they covet. Small states may even be eliminated by their more powerful neighbors. The international system will be unstable, however, only if states flock to what they think is the strongest side. What is called bandwagoning or the domino theory argues that the international system is precarious because successful aggression will attract many followers, either out of fear or out of a desire to share the spoils of victory. Stephen M. Walt disagrees, ­drawing on balance-of-power theory and historical evidence, to argue M01A_JERV2019_13_SE_P01.indd 8 08/02/16 8:11 PM Anarchy and Its Consequences 9 that rather than bandwagoning, under most conditions states balance against emerging threats. They do not throw in their lot with the stronger side. Instead, they join with others to prevent any state from becoming so strong that it could dominate the system. Power balancing is a strategy followed by individual states acting on their own. Other ways of coping with anarchy, which may supplement or exist alongside this impulse, are more explicitly collective. David C. Kang shows that before Western influences impinged, East Asian politics did not conform to either bandwagoning or balancing or indeed to other standard views of how states in anarchy “should” behave. Instead they adopted a hierarchical order under a Chinese leadership that was based as much on cultural legitimacy as on military or economic power. In other circumstances, regimes and institutions can help overcome anarchy and facilitate cooperation. When states agree on the principles, rules, and norms that should govern behavior, they can often ameliorate the security dilemma and increase the scope for cooperation. Institutions may not only embody common understandings but, as Robert O. Keohane argues, they can also help states work toward mutually desired outcomes by providing a framework for long-run agreements, making it easier for each state to see whether others are living up to their promises, and increasing the costs the state will pay if it cheats. In the final section of this reader we will discuss how institutions can contribute to global governance under current conditions. Part I Questions for Review Does a focus on anarchy lead us to exaggerate the role and extent of conflict, especially violent conflict, in international relations? Have some of the ways that states have conceived of anarchy and tried to cope with it inadvertently increased conflict? M01A_JERV2019_13_SE_P01.indd 9 08/02/16 8:11 PM Chapter 1 Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft The Melian Dialogue Thucydides Next summer Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships and seized 300 Argive citizens who were still suspected of being pro-Spartan. These were put by the Athenians into the nearby islands under Athenian control. The Athenians also made an expedition against the island of Melos. They had thirty of their own ships, six from Chios, and two from Lesbos; 1,200 ­hoplites, 300 archers, and twenty mounted archers, all from Athens; and about 1,500 ­hoplites from the allies and the islanders. The Melians are a colony from Sparta. They had refused to join the Athenian empire like the other islanders, and at first had remained neutral without helping either side; but afterwards, when the Athenians had brought force to bear on them by laying waste their land, they had become open enemies of Athens. Now the generals Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, the son of Tisimachus, encamped with the above force in Melian territory and, before doing any harm to the land, first of all sent representatives to negotiate. The Melians did not invite these representatives to speak before the people, but asked them to make the statement for which they had come in front of the governing body and the few. The Athenian representatives then spoke as follows: ‘So we are not to speak before the people, no doubt in case the mass of the people should hear once and for all and without interruption an argument from us which is both persuasive and incontrovertible, and should so be led astray. This, we realize, is your motive in bringing us here to speak before the few. Now suppose that you who sit here should make assurance doubly sure. Suppose that you, too, should refrain from dealing with every point in detail in a set speech, and should instead interrupt us whenever we say something controversial and deal with that before going on to the next point? Tell us first whether you approve of this suggestion of ours.’ 10 M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 10 08/02/16 8:13 PM Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft 11 The Council of the Melians replied as follows: ‘No one can object to each of us putting forward our own views in a calm atmosphere. That is perfectly reasonable. What is scarcely consistent with such a proposal is the present threat, indeed the certainty, of your making war on us. We see that you have come prepared to judge the argument yourselves, and that the likely end of it all will be either war, if we prove that we are in the right, and so refuse to surrender, or else slavery.’ Athenians: If you are going to spend the time in enumerating your suspicions about the future, or if you have met here for any other reason except to look the facts in the face and on the basis of these facts to consider how you can save your city from destruction, there is no point in our going on with this discussion. If, however, you will do as we suggest, then we will speak on. Melians: It is natural and understandable that people who are placed as we are should have recourse to all kinds of arguments and different points of view. However, you are right in saying that we are met together here to discuss the safety of our country and, if you will have it so, the discussion shall proceed on the lines that you have laid down. Athenians: Then we on our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example, that we have a right to our empire because we defeated the Persians, or that we have come against you now because of the injuries you have done us—a great mass of words that nobody would believe. And we ask you on your side not to imagine that you will influence us by saying that you, though a colony of Sparta, have not joined Sparta in the war, or that you have never done us any harm. Instead we recommend that you should try to get what it is possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really do think; since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. Melians: Then in our view (since you force us to leave justice out of account and to confine ourselves to self-interest)—in our view it is at any rate useful that you should not destroy a principle that is to the general good of all men—namely, that in the case of all who fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play and just dealing, and that such people should be allowed to use and to profit by arguments that fall short of a mathematical accuracy. And this is a principle which affects you as much as anybody, since your own fall would be visited by the most terrible vengeance and would be an example to the world. Athenians: As for us, even assuming that our empire does come to an end, we are not despondent about what would happen next. One is not so much frightened of being conquered by a power which rules over others, as Sparta does (not that we are concerned with Sparta now), as of what would happen if a ruling power is attacked and defeated by its own subjects. So far as this point is concerned, you can leave it to us to face the risks involved. What we shall do now is M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 11 08/02/16 8:13 PM 12 Chapter 1 to show you that it is for the good of our own empire that we are here and that it is for the preservation of your city that we shall say what we are going to say. We do not want any trouble in bringing you into our empire, and we want you to be spared for the good both of yourselves and of ourselves. Melians: And how could it be just as good for us to be the slaves as for you to be the masters? Athenians: You, by giving in, would save yourselves from disaster; we, by not destroying you, would be able to profit from you. Melians: So you would not agree to our being neutral, friends instead of ­enemies, but allies of neither side? Athenians: No, because it is not so much your hostility that injures us; it is rather the case that, if we were on friendly terms with you, our subjects would regard that as a sign of weakness in us, whereas your hatred is evidence of our power. Melians: Is that your subjects’ idea of fair play—that no distinction should be made between people who are quite unconnected with you and people who are mostly your own colonists or else rebels whom you have conquered? Athenians: So far as right and wrong are concerned they think that there is no difference between the two, that those who still preserve their independence do so because they are strong, and that if we fail to attack them it is because we are afraid. So that by conquering you we shall increase not only the size but the security of our empire. We rule the sea and you are islanders, and weaker islanders too than the others; it is therefore particularly important that you should not escape. Melians: But do you think there is no security for you in what we suggest? For here again, since you will not let us mention justice, but tell us to give in to your interests, we, too, must tell you what our interests are and, if yours and ours happen to coincide, we must try to persuade you of the fact. Is it not certain that you will make enemies of all states who are at present neutral, when they see what is happening here and naturally conclude that in course of time you will attack them too? Does not this mean that you are strengthening the enemies you have already and are forcing others to become your enemies even against their intentions and their inclinations? Athenians: As a matter of fact we are not so much frightened of states on the continent. They have their liberty, and this means that it will be a long time before they begin to take precautions against us. We are more concerned about islanders like yourselves, who are still unsubdued, or subjects who have already become embittered by the constraint which our empire imposes on them. These are the people who are most likely to act in a reckless manner and to bring themselves and us, too, into the most obvious danger. Melians: Then surely, if such hazards are taken by you to keep your empire and by your subjects to escape from it, we who are still free would show ourselves great cowards and weaklings if we failed to face everything that comes rather than submit to slavery. M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 12 08/02/16 8:13 PM Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft 13 Athenians: No, not if you are sensible. This is no fair fight, with honour on one side and shame on the other. It is rather a question of saving your lives and not resisting those who are far too strong for you. Melians: Yet we know that in war fortune sometimes makes the odds more level than could be expected from the difference in numbers of the two sides. And if we surrender, then all our hope is lost at once, whereas, so long as we remain in action, there is still a hope that we may yet stand upright. Athenians: Hope, that comforter in danger! If one already has solid advantages to fall back upon, one can indulge in hope. It may do harm, but will not destroy one. But hope is by nature an expensive commodity, and those who are risking their all on one cast find out what it means only when they are already ruined; it never fails them in the period when such a knowledge would enable them to take precautions. Do not let this happen to you, you who are weak and whose fate depends on a single movement of the scale. And do not be like those people who, as so commonly happens, miss the chance of saving themselves in a human and practical way, and, when every clear and distinct hope has left them in their adversity, turn to what is blind and vague, to prophecies and oracles and such things which by encouraging hope lead men to ruin. Melians: It is difficult, and you may be sure that we know it, for us to oppose your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. Nevertheless we trust that the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because we are standing for what is right against what is wrong; and as for what we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans, who are bound, if for no other reason, then for honour’s sake, and because we are their kinsmen, to come to our help. Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think. Athenians: So far as the favour of the gods is concerned, we think we have as much right to that as you have. Our aims and our actions are perfectly consistent with the beliefs men hold about the gods and with the principles which govern their own conduct. Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist forever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way. And therefore, so far as the gods are concerned, we see no good reason why we should fear to be at a disadvantage. But with regard to your views about Sparta and your confidence that she, out of a sense of honour, will come to your aid, we must say that we congratulate you on your simplicity but do not envy you your folly. In matters that concern themselves or their own constitution the Spartans are quite remarkably good; as for their relations with others, that is a long story, but it can be expressed shortly and clearly by saying that of all people we know the Spartans are most conspicuous for believing that what they like doing is honourable and what suits their interests is just. And this kind of attitude is not going to be of much help to you in your absurd quest for safety at the moment. M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 13 08/02/16 8:13 PM 14 Chapter 1 Melians: But this is the very point where we can feel most sure. Their own self-interest will make them refuse to betray their own colonists, the Melians, for that would mean losing the confidence of their friends among the Hellenes and doing good to their enemies. Athenians: You seem to forget that if one follows one’s self-interest one wants to be safe, whereas the path of justice and honour involves one in danger. And, where danger is concerned, the Spartans are not, as a rule, very venturesome. Melians: But we think that they would even endanger themselves for our sake and count the risk more worth taking than in the case of others, because we are so close to the Peloponnese that they could operate more easily, and because they can depend on us more than on others, since we are of the same race and share the same feelings. Athenians: Goodwill shown by the party that is asking for help does not mean security for the prospective ally. What is looked for is a positive preponderance of power in action. And the Spartans pay attention to this point even more than others do. Certainly they distrust their own native resources so much that when they attack a neighbour they bring a great army of allies with them. It is hardly likely therefore that, while we are in control of the sea, they will cross over to an island. Melians: But they still might send others. The Cretan sea is a wide one, and it is harder for those who control it to intercept others than for those who want to slip through to do so safely. And even if they were to fail in this, they would turn against your own land and against those of your allies left unvisited by Brasidas. So, instead of troubling about a country which has nothing to do with you, you will find trouble nearer home, among your allies, and in your own country. Athenians: It is a possibility, something that has in fact happened before. It may happen in your case, but you are well aware that the Athenians have never yet relinquished a single siege operation through fear of others. But we are somewhat shocked to find that, though you announced your intention of discussing how you could preserve yourselves, in all this talk you have said absolutely nothing which could justify a man in thinking that he could be preserved. Your chief points are concerned with what you hope may happen in the future, while your actual resources are too scanty to give you a chance of survival against the forces that are opposed to you at this moment. You will therefore be showing an extraordinary lack of common sense if, after you have asked us to retire from this meeting, you still fail to reach a conclusion wiser than anything you have mentioned so far. Do not be led astray by a false sense of honour—a thing which often brings men to ruin when they are faced with an obvious danger that somehow affects their pride. For in many cases men have still been able to see the dangers ahead of them, but this thing called dishonour, this word, by its own force of seduction, has drawn them into a state where they have surrendered to an idea, while in fact they have fallen voluntarily into irrevocable disaster, in dishonour that is all the more dishonourable because it has come to them from their own folly rather than their misfortune. You, if you take the right view, will be careful to avoid this. You will see that there is nothing disgraceful in giving way to the M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 14 08/02/16 8:13 PM Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft 15 greatest city in Hellas when she is offering you such reasonable terms—alliance on a tribute-paying basis and liberty to enjoy your own property. And, when you are allowed to choose between war and safety, you will not be so insensitively arrogant as to make the wrong choice. This is the safe rule—to stand up to one’s equals, to behave with deference towards one’s superiors, and to treat one’s inferiors with moderation. Think it over again, then, when we have withdrawn from the meeting, and let this be a point that constantly recurs to your minds—that you are discussing the fate of your country, that you have only one country, and that its future for good or ill depends on this one single decision which you are going to make. The Athenians then withdrew from the discussion. The Melians, left to themselves, reached a conclusion which was much the same as they had indicated in their previous replies. Their answer was as follows: ‘Our decision, Athenians, is just the same as it was at first. We are not prepared to give up in a short moment the liberty which our city has enjoyed from its foundation for 700 years. We put our trust in the fortune that the gods will send and which has saved us up to now, and in the help of men—that is, of the Spartans; and so we shall try to save ourselves. But we invite you to allow us to be friends of yours and enemies to neither side, to make a treaty which shall be agreeable to both you and us, and so to leave our country.’ The Melians made this reply, and the Athenians, just as they were breaking off the discussion, said: ‘Well, at any rate, judging from this decision of yours, you seem to us quite unique in your ability to consider the future as something more certain than what is before your eyes, and to see uncertainties as realities, simply because you would like them to be so. As you have staked most on and trusted most in Spartans, luck, and hopes, so in all these you will find yourselves most completely deluded.’ The Athenian representatives then went back to the army, and the Athenian generals, finding that the Melians would not submit, immediately commenced hostilities and built a wall completely round the city of Melos, dividing the work out among the various states. Later they left behind a garrison of some of their own and some allied troops to blockade the place by land and sea, and with the greater part of their army returned home. The force left behind stayed on and continued with the siege. About the same time the Argives invaded Phliasia and were ambushed by the Phliasians and the exiles from Argos, losing about eighty men. Then, too, the Athenians at Pylos captured a great quantity of plunder from Spartan territory. Not even after this did the Spartans renounce the treaty and make war, but they issued a proclamation saying that any of their people who wished to do so were free to make raids on the Athenians. The Corinthians also made some attacks on the Athenians because of private quarrels of their own, but the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed quiet. Meanwhile the Melians made a night attack and captured the part of the Athenian lines opposite the market-place. They killed some of the troops, and M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 15 08/02/16 8:13 PM 16 Chapter 1 then, after bringing in corn and everything else useful that they could lay their hands on, retired again and made no further move, while the Athenians took measures to make their blockade more efficient in future. So the summer came to an end. In the following winter the Spartans planned to invade the territory of Argos, but when the sacrifices for crossing the frontier turned out unfavourably, they gave up the expedition. The fact that they had intended to invade made the Argives suspect certain people in their city, some of whom they arrested, though others succeeded in escaping. About this same time the Melians again captured another part of the ­Athenian lines where there were only a few of the garrison on guard. As a result of this, another force came out afterwards from Athens under the command of Philocrates, the son of Demeas. Siege operations were now carried on vigorously and, as there was also some treachery from inside, the Melians surrendered unconditionally to the Athenians, who put to death all the men of military age whom they took, and sold the women and children as slaves. Melos itself they took over for themselves, sending out later a colony of 500 men. Questions for Review The Athenians say that they are acting as powerful states as they always have and as any others would do in their circumstances. Is this an adequate explanation for their behavior? Is it an adequate justification? Legitimacy in International Politics Ian Hurd What motivates states to follow international norms, rules, and commitments? All social systems must confront what we might call the problem of social ­control— that is, how to get actors to comply with society’s rules—but the problem is particularly acute for international relations, because the international social system does not possess an overarching center of political power to enforce rules. . . . Consider three generic reasons why an actor might obey a rule: (1) because the actor fears the punishment of rule enforcers, (2) because the actor sees the rule in its own self-interest, and (3) because the actor feels the rule is legitimate and ought to be obeyed. The trait distinguishing the superior from the subordinate is different in each case. In the first, it is asymmetry of physical capacity; in the second, a particular distribution of incentives; and in the third, a normative structure of status and legitimacy. . . . These devices recur in combination across all social systems where rules exist to influence behavior, ranging from the governing of children in the classroom, to the internal structure of organized M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 16 08/02/16 8:13 PM Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft 17 crime syndicates, to the international system of states. Where rules or norms exist, compliance with them may be achieved by one or a combination of these devices. Studies of domestic political sociology rotate around them, with scholars arguing variously for making one of the three devices foundational or combining them in assorted ways. It is generally seen as natural that a social system may exhibit each at ­different moments or locations. In international relations studies, talking about compliance secured by either coercion or self-interest is uncontroversial, and well-developed bodies of literature—falling roughly into the neorealist and rationalist-neoliberal schools, ­respectively—elaborate each of these notions. However, the idea that states’ compliance with international rules is a function of the legitimacy of the rules or of their source gets less attention; and when it is attended to, scholars generally fail to spell out the process by which it operates. . . . There is no obvious reason, either theoretical or empirical, why the study of the international system should be limited to only two of these three mechanisms and that to do so means missing significant features of the system. This should be a matter of empirical study, not assumption. . . . Legitimacy, as I use it here, refers to the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by the actor’s perception of the institution. The actor’s perception may come from the substance of the rule or from the procedure or source by which it was constituted. Such a perception affects behavior because it is internalized by the actor and helps to define how the actor sees its interests. . . . Seeing the international system as governed by institutions of legitimate authority opens several very interesting avenues for research, three of which I will sketch here. First, what is the process by which a particular norm, rule, or institution comes to be seen as legitimate? States are somewhat discriminating in which rules they accept as legitimate (although they are not completely free agents in this regard), and so not all potential norms are internalized. Much more could be known about how a given norm comes to be accepted or not. For instance, could we say that the international market has recently become legitimate and so authoritative in this sense? This direction is suggested by recent work on how elements of the international economy have become “disembedded” from domestic political control. A related puzzle, much discussed in studies of domestic institutions, particularly courts, is how a political institution might alter its behavior in order to make itself more authoritative (and thus effective). Two international institutions, the International Court of Justice and the UN Security Council, seem quite aware that their present actions have consequences for their future legitimacy and that their legitimacy affects their power and effectiveness. These two areas, international courts and international markets, are fertile ground for the further study of legitimacy and legitimation of international institutions. Moreover, because the process of legitimation is never monolithic, the legitimation M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 17 08/02/16 8:13 PM 18 Chapter 1 of these institutions has generated counteractive delegitimizing efforts. In the case of the Security Council [from 1992 to 2011], Libya . . . pursued a determined strategy to delegitimize the UN sanctions against it by portraying the council as unrepresentative of the will of the wider international community. The legitimacy pull of the UN Security Council can be demonstrated by Japan’s response to sanctions on North Korea in 1994. While the UN Security Council was considering imposing sanctions on North Korea for its surreptitious nuclear program, Japan expressed its opposition to sanctions both publicly and in informal consultations with the Security Council. An essential element in any sanctions program would have been to forbid the remittances of Koreans living in Japan back to North Korea; these remittances accounted for between $600 ­million and $1.8 billion of North Korea’s annual gross national product of $20 billion. For this and other reasons, Japan opposed strong sanctions and worked hard to delay, diminish, or defeat the proposal. Yet at the same time, the Japanese government publicly stated that notwithstanding its opposition, it would abide by the final decision of the council.1 On the one hand, given the legal status of Security Council resolutions one might expect nothing less than full compliance by member states. But on the other, and more realistically, this is a strong sign that Japan accepted the legitimacy of a Security Council decision, even with a medium probability of an adverse outcome, and even without formal Japanese presence in the deliberations of the council.2 This strong, public, and a priori commitment to the rule of law in international affairs may have been motivated by a desire to appear a “good community member” (and so improve Japan’s case for permanent membership in a reformed Security Council) or by an actual normative commitment to the rules as they are. In either case, Japan was conscious that the international community holds Security Council decisions as legitimate and sees compliance with them as the duty of a good international citizen. This has been particularly true since the late 1980s with the increase in consensus and ­consultations in the Security Council. A second area for further research is the role of power (material and ideological) in making an institution legitimate. It is well known that the process of internalizing community norms is rife with considerations of power, both in determining what norms exist in the community and which norms a particular actor might latch on to, but at the same time this process is different from simple coercion. Power is involved in creating the realm of the apparently “normal” as well as in reproducing and challenging its hegemony through ideology and institutions. Here, my only aim has been to make the case that legitimate authority exists in international relations and show what difference this makes, not delve into the process by which an institution became legitimate. This second task is important and requires extending the application of writers like Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu to international relations. Finally, what happens in the international setting to the safeguards we generally expect of our governing institutions, such as representativeness and M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 18 08/02/16 8:13 PM Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft 19 accountability? If international institutions can be authoritative, how do we make them accountable? Certain international institutions, such as the UN, are already recognized as sufficiently governmental that they are expected to be somewhat democratic, but international democracy and accountability will have to be much more widely promoted once we recognize that any institution that is accepted as legitimate stands in a position of authority over states and thus exercises power. Questions for Review How is legitimacy established? Under what circumstances does it override considerations of the sort that Thucydides (in the last reading) and Morgenthau (in the next reading) enumerate? Notes 1 New York Times, 3 June 1994. A1. 2 New York Times, 9 June 1994, A1. Six Principles of Political Realism Hans J. Morgenthau 1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only as the risk of failure. Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking. Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old age a defect. The fact that a theory of politics, if there be such a theory, has never been heard of before tends to create a M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 19 08/02/16 8:13 PM 20 Chapter 1 presumption against, rather than in favor of, its soundness. Conversely, the fact that a theory of politics was developed hundreds or even thousands of years ago—as was the theory of the balance of power—does not create a ­presumption that it must be outmoded and obsolete. . . . For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can surmise what their objectives might have been. Yet examination of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline, a map that suggests to us the possible meanings of foreign policy. In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives theoretical meaning to the facts of international politics. 2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion. Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether impossible, for without it we could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts, nor could we bring at least a measure of systematic order to the political sphere. We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman— past, present, or future—has taken or will take on the political scene. We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps ­better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself. The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 20 08/02/16 8:13 PM Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft 21 politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. On the side of the actor, it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes ­American, ­British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen. A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the c­ oncern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences. To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike. Do we really know what our own motives are? And what do we know of the motives of others? Yet even if we had access to the real motives of statesmen, that k ­ nowledge would help us little in understanding foreign policies, and might well lead us astray. It is true that the knowledge of the statesman’s motives may give us one among many clues as to what the direction of his foreign policy might be. It cannot give us, however, the one clue by which to predict his foreign policies. History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy. This is true in both moral and political terms. We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his foreign policies will be either morally praiseworthy or politically successful. Judging his motives, we can say that he will not intentionally pursue policies that are morally wrong, but we can say nothing about the probability of their success. If we want to know the moral and political qualities of his actions, we must know them, not his motives. How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired? . . . A realist theory of international politics will also avoid the other popular fallacy of equating the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political sympathies, and of deducing the former from the latter. Statesmen, especially under contemporary conditions, may well make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political sympathies in order to gain popular support for them. Yet they will distinguish with Lincoln between their “official duty,” which is to think and act in terms of the national interest, and their “personal wish,” which is to see their own moral values and political principles realized throughout the world. Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ide­ istinction between als and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp d M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 21 08/02/16 8:13 PM 22 Chapter 1 the desirable and the possible—between what is desirable e­ verywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place. It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always followed so rational an objective, and unemotional a course. The contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course. Especially where foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign policy itself. Yet a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality must for the time being, as it were, abstract from these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational essence to be found in experience, without the contingent deviations from rationality which are also found in experience. . . . The difference between international politics as it actually is and a rational theory derived from it is like the difference between a photograph and a painted portrait. The photograph shows everything that can be seen by the naked eye; the painted portrait does not show everything that can be seen by the naked eye, but it shows, or at least seeks to show, one thing that the naked eye cannot see: the human essence of the person portrayed. Political realism contains not only a theoretical but also a normative element. It knows that political reality is replete with contingencies and systemic irrationalities and points to the typical influences they exert upon foreign policy. Yet it shares with all social theory the need, for the sake of theoretical understanding, to stress the rational elements of political reality; for it is these rational elements that make reality intelligible for theory. Political realism presents the theoretical construct of a rational foreign policy which ­experience can never completely achieve. At the same time political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success. Political realism wants the photographic picture of the political world to resemble as much as possible its painted portrait. Aware of the inevitable gap between good—that is, rational—foreign policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political realism maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of political reality, but also that foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes. Hence, it is no argument against the theory here presented that actual foreign policy does not or cannot live up to it. That argument misunderstands the intention of this book, which is to present not an indiscriminate description of political reality, but a rational theory of international politics. Far from M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 22 08/02/16 8:13 PM Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft 23 being invalidated by the fact that, for instance, a perfect balance of power policy will scarcely be found in reality, it assumes that reality, being deficient in this respect, must be understood and evaluated as an approximation to an ideal system of balance of power. 3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an ­objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. Thucydides’ statement, born of the experiences of ancient Greece, that “identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals” was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord S ­ alisbury’s remark that “the only bond of union that endures” among nations is “the absence of all clashing interests.” It was erected into a general principle of government by George Washington: A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost every man is more or less, under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely disinterested; but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce persevering conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or advantage, to the common good. It is vain to exclaim against the depravity of human nature on this account; the fact is so, the experience of every age and nation has proved it and we must in a great measure, change the constitution of man, before we can make it otherwise. No institution, not built on the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed.1 It was echoed and enlarged upon in our century by Max Weber’s observation: Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the “images of the world” created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving.2 Yet the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue. The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 23 08/02/16 8:13 PM 24 Chapter 1 man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement. Political realism does not assume that the contemporary conditions under which foreign policy operates, with their extreme instability and the ever present threat of large-scale violence, cannot be changed. The balance of power, for instance, is indeed a perennial element of all pluralistic societies, as the authors of The Federalist papers well knew; yet it is capable of operating, as it does in the United States, under the conditions of relative stability and peaceful conflict. If the factors that have given rise to these conditions can be duplicated on the international scene, similar conditions of stability and peace will then prevail there, as they have over long stretches of history among certain nations. What is true of the general character of international relations is also true of the nation state as the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy. While the realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is therefore bound to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporary world. The realist parts company with other schools of thought before the allimportant question of how the contemporary world is to be transformed. The realist is persuaded that this transformation can be achieved only through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past as they will the future. The realist cannot be persuaded that we can bring about that transformation by confronting a political reality that has its own laws with an abstract ideal that refuses to take those laws into account. 4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics were morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less exacting than it actually is. M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 24 08/02/16 8:13 PM Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft 25 Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The individual may say for himself: “Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (Let justice be done, even if the world perish),” but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care. Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences. Classical and medieval philosophy knew this, and so did Lincoln when he said: I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won’t amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference. 5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted—and few have been able to resist the temptation for long—to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another. There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgement of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one’s side and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also. The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have warned rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in judgement which, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations—in the name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself. M01B_JERV2019_13_SE_C01.indd 25 08/02/16 8:13 PM 26 Chapter 1 On the other hand, it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them. And we are able to do justice to all of them in a dual sense: We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own. ­Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgment. 6. The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound. However much the theory of political realism may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its ­distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political. Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles. The economist asks, “How does this policy affect the wealth of society, or a segment of it?” The lawyer asks: “Is this policy in accord with the rules of law?” The moralist asks: “Is this policy in accord with moral principles?” And the political realist asks: “How does this policy affect the power of the nation?” (Or of the federal government, of Congress, of the party, of agriculture, as the case may be.) The political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevance of standards of thought other than political ones. As a political realist, he cannot but subordinate these other ...
Purchase answer to see full attachment
User generated content is uploaded by users for the purposes of learning and should be used following Studypool's honor code & terms of service.

Explanation & Answer

Attached.

Running head: EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION

Effects of Globalization
Institutional Affiliation
Date

1

EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION
There are various definitions of the term globalization but the term refers to letting free
or opening of international border to let in; goods as well as services, immigrating people,
money, needed ideas, information and technology as well. Economic globalization is termed as
one of the most strong forces to have molded the world after the post-war (Art, R & Jervis,
2009). There are different benefits as well as pitfalls of globalization as the American people see
it. Globalization should allow free trade and minimize barriers like subsidies, imposed taxes,
tariffs between the two nations involved in business. However, as American people see it, there
are still existing barriers for this free trade. Another benefit is that globalization brings
competition amongst companies as well as reducing prices for consumers. Globalization h...


Anonymous
Great! 10/10 would recommend using Studypool to help you study.

Studypool
4.7
Trustpilot
4.5
Sitejabber
4.4

Similar Content

Related Tags