Globalization
Agenda for today
• Globalization (history, definition, pros and cons)
• Trade and Comparative Advantage
• Complex Interdependence
• 5 wars of globalization
• Will global capitalism fall again?
http://www.gapminder.org/videos/200-yearsthat-changed-the-world/
Introducing Globalization
• Worldwide interconnectedness is
growing in:
– Extensity
– Intensity
– Velocity
– Impact
What is globalization?
There are many definitions to Globalization, the term usually refers
to the opening of international border to flows of:
• Goods and services (Free trade) Strongest rise has been in
export manufacture goods
• People (Immigration) most immigration occurs between
developing countries.
• Money (Direct investment)
• Information
• Technology
• Ideas
How old is Globalization?
What has led to increased
globalization?
What has led to increased
globalization?
Trade barriers has been gradually reduced
• Lower restrictions on the free flow on investment capital
between countries
• More technology
• Improve methods of transportation (easier for people and
goods to travel)
• Methods of communications has improved and got
cheaper (INTERNET) → spread of ideas around the world
• Fall of communism (former Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc
and China were once isolated due to communist regimes
and have now market oriented economies and are doing
business with the rest of the world)
What are the positive and negative
sides of Globalization?
What are the + and – of
Globalization?
Positive
Negative
* Increased freedom → borders are
open, people can migrate, $ can
migrate
Large demonstrations and protests
* More diverse goods and services
* Jobs are lost
* Business can lower costs by
relocating
* Environmental damage
* Products have lower prices
* Open borders to terrorism, illegal
drugs, easier spreads of disease
* Developing countries can export
* Less cultural diversity
(Westerinization)
* Better access to medicine,
information, education & technology
* Not lead to elimination of poverty
* Not lead to more stability
* Increased inequality
* Financial crisis
What are the 5 wars of
Globalization?
What are the 5 wars of
Globalization?
• Drugs
• Arms trafficking
• Intellectual Property
• Alien Smuggling
• Money Laundering
Why do we trade?
Why do we trade?
• Comparative advantage (David Ricardo):
countries are better off when they trade
Countries in Isolation
Autarky
• Products have high costs
• Low efficiency
• Countries tend to lag behind
• Eg. China/ N. Korea
Why do we trade?
Complex interdependence = as countries
become increasingly reliant on one another for
essential goods and services, their ability to
engage in conflict and especially war becomes
more remote. - either because the desire to fight
is decreased by proximity and acquaintance or
because the intertwining of economies makes it
impractical or impossible to fight.
Does Globalization increase poverty
and inequality?
•
19
What is the future of
.
Globalization?
International
Politics
Enduring Concepts
and Contemporary Issues
Thirteenth Edition
Robert J. Art
Brandeis University
Robert Jervis
Columbia University
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Art, Robert J., editor. | Jervis, Robert - author.
Title: International politics : enduring concepts and contemporary issues /
[edited by] Robert J. Art, Brandeis University; Robert Jervis, Columbia
University.
Description: Thirteenth edition. | New York : Pearson, 2016.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016002773 | ISBN 9780134482019
Subjects: LCSH: World politics—1989- | Globalization.
Classification: LCC JZ1242 .I574 2016 | DDC 327--dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016002773
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
ISBN 10: 0-13-448201-8
ISBN 13: 978-0-13-448201-9
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Brief Contents
Detailed Contents v
Preface
ix
Part I Anarchy and Its Consequences
Part II
1
1
Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft
2
The Meaning of Anarchy 48
3
Strategic Interaction in Anarchy 87
4
The Mitigation of Anarchy
10
125
The Uses of Force 189
5
The Political Uses of Force 195
6
The Utility of Force Today 229
7
The Nuclear Future
259
Part III International Political Economy and Globalization 275
8
Perspectives on Political Economy 282
9
Globalization Today
314
10 Fixing the World Political Economy
Part IV
343
Contemporary Issues in World Politics
369
11 Interstate War and Terrorism 376
12
Civil Wars, Human Rights, Regime Change,
and Humanitarian Intervention 408
13 Transnational Actors and New Forces 454
14 The Global Commons and Global Governance 480
15 The Shape of the Future
532
Credits 578
iii
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Detailed Contents
Preface
ix
Part I Anarchy and Its Consequences 1
1
Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft
■
The Melian Dialogue
10
10
Thucydides
■
Legitimacy in International Politics
16
Ian Hurd
■
Six Principles of Political Realism
19
Hans J. Morgenthau
■
A Critique of Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism
28
J. Ann Tickner
■
What Is Power in Global Affairs? 41
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
2
The Meaning of Anarchy
■
48
The Anarchic Structure of World Politics
48
Kenneth N. Waltz
■
Anarchy and the Struggle for Power
70
John J. Mearsheimer
■
Anarchy Is What States Make of It 78
Alexander Wendt
3
Strategic Interaction in Anarchy 87
■
Game Theory: A Practitioner’s Approach 87
■
Rationalist Explanations for War
Thomas C. Schelling
95
James D. Fearon
■
Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma 104
Robert Jervis
4
The Mitigation of Anarchy
■
125
Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma 125
By Robert Jervis
■
Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs 139
Michael W. Doyle
v
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vi Detailed Contents
■
Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning 153
■
Hierarchy and Hegemony in International Politics 161
Stephen M. Walt
David C. Kang
■
The Future of Diplomacy
165
Hans J. Morgenthau
■
The Uses and Limits of International Law 176
Stanley Hoffmann
■
International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?
181
Robert O. Keohane
Part II The Uses of Force 189
5
The Political Uses of Force 195
■
The Four Functions of Force
195
Robert J. Art
■
The Diplomacy of Violence
203
Thomas C. Schelling
■
What is Terrorism?
218
Bruce Hoffman
6
The Utility of Force Today 229
■
The Fungibility of Force 229
Robert J. Art
■
Why Civil Resistance Works
246
Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan
■
Shape of Violence Today
252
The World Bank
7
The Nuclear Future 259
■
Losing Control in Crises
259
Robert Jervis
■
Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future
264
Henry D. Sokolski
■
A World without Nuclear Weapons?
269
Thomas C. Schelling
Part III International Political Economy
and Globalization 275
8
Perspectives on Political Economy 282
■
The Nature of Political Economy
282
Robert Gilpin
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Detailed Contents
■
vii
Economic Interdependence and War 299
Dale C. Copeland
■
Why Doesn’t Everyone Get the Case for Free Trade?
307
Dani Rodrik
9
Globalization Today 314
■
Globalization of the Economy
314
Jeffrey Frankel
■
What Globalization Is and Is Not
330
Moisés Naím
■
Labor, Capital, and Ideas in the Power Law Economy
335
Erik Brynjolfsson, Andrew McAfee, and Michael Spence
10
Fixing the World Political Economy 343
■
The Status Quo Crisis
343
Eric Helleiner
■
A New Global Reserve System
355
Joseph E. Stiglitz
■
A Sane Globalization
358
Dani Rodrik
Part IV Contemporary Issues in World Politics
11
369
Interstate War and Terrorism 376
■
The Era of Leading Power Peace 376
Robert Jervis
■
The United States and the Rise of China
393
Robert J. Art
■
Ending Terrorism
401
Audrey Kurth Cronin
12
Civil Wars, Human Rights, Regime Change,
and Humanitarian Intervention 408
■
Reflections on Intervention
408
Kofi Annan
■
Human Rights in World Politics
414
Rhoda E. Howard and Jack Donnelly
■
Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age
427
Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein
■
To the Shores of Tripoli? Regime Change and Its Consequences
434
Alexander B. Downes
■
Crafting Peace through Power Sharing 442
Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie
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viii Detailed Contents
13
Transnational Actors and New Forces 454
■
Transnational Activist Networks
454
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink
■
Cyber Conflict and National Security 461
Herbert Lin
■
International Law: The Trials of Global Norms
474
Steven R. Ratner
14
The Global Commons and Global Governance 480
■
The Tragedy of the Commons
480
Garrett Hardin
■
The Papal Encyclical on the Environment 486
Pope Francis
■
The U.N. Security Council 491
Adams Roberts and Dominik Zaum
■
Globalization and Governance
500
Kenneth N. Waltz
■
Good Enough Global Governance
512
Stewart Patrick
■
The Future of the Liberal World Order 522
G. John Ikenberry
15
The Shape of the Future 532
■
Emerging Multipolarity: Why Should We Care? 532
Barry R. Posen
■
The Strategic Implications of Climate Change
541
Alan Dupont
■
Dollar Diminution and U.S. Power 550
■
Power Shifts, Economic Change, and the Decline of the West?
Jonathan Kirshner
560
Michael Cox
■
The Future of the European Union 571
Stephen M. Walt
Credits
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Preface
T
he first edition of International Politics appeared in 1973, and now, with
the 13th edition, it celebrates its 43rd birthday. We are pleased that this
reader has been so well received and so long-lived. We hope instructors
and students find this edition as useful as they have the previous ones.
New to This Edition
The thirteenth edition retains the four major parts of the previous edition and
contains 58 selections, 13 of which are new, making this most recent edition 22%
new. The new additions are spread across all four parts of the reader (see below). We also have made two organizational changes. We added a subsection on
“Strategic Interaction in Anarchy” in Part I, and consolidated into one subsection the readings on civil wars, human rights, intervention, and international
law that appeared in the 12th edition.
Finally, appearing in this edition for the first time are two sets of questions. One set contains 58 questions—one for each of the reader’s selections.
Each of these questions appears at the end of its corresponding selection. The
second set of questions contains only four—one for each of the reader’s four
major parts. The purpose of the 58 selection questions is to help the student
grasp the central argument of each selection by posing a pointed question
or questions about it. The purpose of the four parts questions is to help the
student tie together all the readings in each part. These two sets of questions,
taken together, should help the student master the materials of this reader.
As always, the most important changes in this edition are in the new
selections:
• In Part I, we have added three new selections: one by Joseph Nye on the
nature of power in international relations; one by John Mearsheimer on anarchy and the struggle for power; and one on game theory by Thomas Schelling.
• In Part II, we added two new selections: one on losing control in crises involving nuclear armed states by Robert Jervis; and another on various scenarios
of what the nuclear future might bring by Henry Sokolski.
• Part III contains four new selections: one on the relation between economic
interdependence and the likelihood of war by Dale Copeland; one on whether
labor or capital does better in the global economy by Erik Brynjolfsson and
his associates; another on global financial governance by Erik Heilleiner; and
a final one on a new global reserve system to replace the role of the dollar as
the world’s reserve currency by Joseph Stiglitz.
• Part IV contains four new selections: excerpts from Pope Francis’ “Encyclical
on the Environment”; a new and updated selection on the United Nations
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x Preface
Security Council by Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum; one on what is often
called “mini-multilateralism,” or governance produced by many disparate
but interweaving international institutions, by Stewart Patrick; and an essay
on the future of the European Union by Stephen Walt.
Features
Originally, we put this reader together to help give the field of international relations greater focus and to bring to students the best articles we could find on the
key theoretical concepts in the field. This accounts for the “enduring concepts” in
the book’s subtitle. A few editions after the first, we then added a separate section
on contemporary issues because of our view that these enduring concepts have
more meaning for students when applied to salient contemporary issues. All subsequent editions have followed this basic philosophy of combining the best scholarship on theoretical perspectives with that on important contemporary problems.
In constructing the first edition, and in putting together all subsequent editions,
including this one, we have tried to create a reader that embodies four features:
• A selection of subjects that, while not exhaustively covering the field of international politics, nevertheless encompasses most of the essential topics that
all of us teach in our introductory courses.
• Individual readings that are mainly analytical in content, that take issue
with one another, and that thereby introduce the student to the fundamental
debates and points of view in the field.
• Editors’ introductions to each part that summarize the central concepts the
student must master, that organize the central themes of each part, and that
relate the readings to one another.
• A book that can be used either as the core around which to design an introductory course or as the primary supplement to enrich an assigned text.
Since the first edition, the field of international relations has experienced a
dramatic enrichment in the subjects studied and the quality of works published.
Political economy came into its own as an important subfield in the 1970s. New
and important works in the field of security studies appeared. The literature on
cooperation among states flourished in the early 1980s, and important studies
about the environment began to appear in the mid-1980s. Feminist, post-modernist, and constructivist critiques of the mainstream made their appearance
also. With the end of the Cold War, these new issues came to the fore: human
rights, the tension between state sovereignty and the obligations of the international community, the global environment, civil wars, failed states, nationbuilding, transnational terrorist groups, and, most recently, the search for new
modes of global governance to deal with the collective action problems that are
increasingly pressing upon states. The growing diversity of the field has closely
mirrored the actual developments in international relations.
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Preface
xi
Consequently, as for the previous editions, in fashioning the 13th, we have
kept in mind both the new developments in world politics and the literature
that has accompanied them. Central to this edition, though, as for the other 12,
is our belief that the realm of international politics differs fundamentally from
that of domestic politics. Therefore, we have continued to put both the developments and the literature in the context of the patterns that still remain valid for
understanding the differences between politics in an anarchic environment and
politics under a government.
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Supplements
Pearson is pleased to offer several resources to qualified adopters of International
Politics and their students that will make teaching and learning from this book
even more effective and enjoyable. Several of the supplements for this book
are available at the Instructor Resource Center (IRC), an online hub that allows
instructors to quickly download book-specific supplements. Please visit the IRC
welcome page at www.pearsonhighered.com/irc to register for access.
Instructor’s Manual/Test Bank
This resource includes learning objectives, reading guides, multiple-choice questions, true/false questions, and essay questions for each chapter. Available exclusively on the IRC.
Longman Atlas of World Issues (0-205-78020-2)
From population and political systems to energy use and women’s rights, the
Longman Atlas of World Issues features full-color thematic maps that examine the
forces shaping the world. Featuring maps from the latest edition of The Penguin
A01_JERV2019_13_SE_FM.indd 11
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xii Preface
State of the World Atlas, this excerpt includes critical thinking exercises to promote a deeper understanding of how geography affects many global issues.
Goode’s World Atlas (0-321-65200-2)
First published by Rand McNally in 1923, Goode’s World Atlas has set the standard for college reference atlases. It features hundreds of physical, political, and
thematic maps as well as graphs, tables, and a pronouncing index.
Research and Writing in International Relations
(0-205-06065-X)
With current and detailed coverage on how to start research in the discipline’s
major subfields, this brief and affordable guide offers step-by-step guidance and
the essential resources needed to compose political science papers that go beyond description and into systematic and sophisticated inquiry. This text focuses
on areas where students often need help—finding a topic, developing a question, reviewing the literature, designing research, and last, writing the paper.
Acknowledgments
In putting together this and previous editions, we received excellent advice from
the following colleagues, whom we would like to thank for the time and care
they took: Jonathan Acuff, St. Anselm College; Linda S. Adams, Baylor University; David G. Becker, Dartmouth College; Andrew Bennett, Georgetown
University; Patrick Bratton, Hawaii Pacific University; Chelsea Brown, Southern Methodist University; James A. Caporaso, University of Washington; Erica
Chenoweth, Wesleyan University; Timothy M. Cole, University of Maine; Jane
Cramer, University of Oregon; David Edelstein, Georgetown University; Joseph Foudy, Hunter College; Sonia Gardenas, Trinity College; Robert C. Gray,
Franklin & Marshall College; Robert J. Griffiths, University of North Carolina at
Greensboro; Maia Hallward, Kennesaw State University; James Hentz, Virginia
Military Institute; David Houghton, University of Central Florida; Benjamin
Judkins, University of Utah; Sean Kay, Ohio Wesleyan University; Mary McCarthy, Drake University; Timothy McKeown, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill; James A. Mitchell, California State University, Northridge; Ronald
Mitchell, University of Oregon; Layna Mosley, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill; Mueni W. Muiu, Winston-Salem State University; Kathy L. Powers, Pennsylvania State University; Philip Schrodt, University of Kansas; Randall Schweller, The Ohio State University; Margaret E. Scranton, University of
Arkansas at Little Rock; Roslin Simowitz, University of Texas at Arlington; Veronica Ward, Utah State University; Ken Wise, Creighton University; and Jeremy
Youde, University of Minnesota at Duluth.
Robert J. Art
Robert Jervis
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Part I
Anarchy and Its
Consequences
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
I.1 Understand power, principle, and legitimacy in statecraft.
I.2 Define anarchy and the anarchic environment of international
politics.
I.3 Discuss how international politics exemplifies strategic interaction
and the role of game theory.
I.4 Recognize how state actors cope with anarchy and develop patterns
that contain the dangers of aggression.
1
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2 Part I
Unlike domestic politics, international politics takes place in an arena that has no
central governing body. From this central fact flow important consequences for
the behavior of states. In Part I, we explore four of them: the role that principles,
legitimacy, and morality can and should play in statecraft; the effects that anarchy
has on how states view and relate to one another; the types of strategic interactions that occur among states in anarchy; and the ways that the harsher edges of
anarchy can be mitigated, even if not wholly removed.
Power, Principle, and Legitimacy
in Statecraft
I.1
Understand power, principle, and legitimacy in statecraft.
Citizens, students, and scholars alike often take up the study of international
politics because they want their country to behave in as principled a way as possible. But they soon discover that principle and power, morality and statecraft do
not easily mix. Why should this be? Is it inevitable? Can and should states seek
to do good in the world? Will they endanger themselves and harm others if they
try? These are timeless questions, having been asked by observers of international
politics in nearly every previous era. They therefore make a good starting point
for thinking about the nature of international politics and the choices states face
in our era.
In his history of the Peloponnesian War, the Greek historian Thucydides made
the first, and perhaps the most famous, statement about the relation between the
prerogatives of power and the dictates of morality. In the Melian dialogue, he
argued that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept
what they have to accept” (more frequently stated as “the strong do what they can
and the weak suffer what they must”). For Thucydides considerations of power
reigned supreme in international politics and were the key to understanding why
the war between Athens and Sparta began in the first place. At root, he argued:
“what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which
this caused in Sparta.” Fearing that Athens’ power was growing more quickly
than its own, Sparta launched a preventive war to stop Athens from becoming
too powerful. Herein lies the first written insight that changes in relative power
positions among states, in this case “city-states,” can be a cause of war. The forcefulness with which he argued for the “power politics” view of international relations makes Thucydides the first “realist” theorist of international politics. But
Ian Hurd shows that in some, if not all international systems, legitimacy plays a
powerful role in generating and modifying power.
Hans J. Morgenthau, a leading twentieth-century theorist of international
relations, also takes the “power politics” position. He argues that universal standards of morality cannot be an invariable guide to statecraft because there is
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Anarchy and Its Consequences
3
an “ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of
successful political action.” Rather than base statecraft on morality, Morgenthau
argues that state actors must think and act in terms of power and must do whatever it takes to defend the national interests of their state. J. Ann Tickner, commenting on the primacy of power in Morgenthau’s writings, explains that what
he considers to be a realistic description of international politics is only a picture
of the past and therefore not a prediction about the future, and proposes what she
considers to be a feminist alternative. A world in which state actors think of power
in terms of collective empowerment, not in terms of leverage over one another,
could produce more cooperative outcomes and pose fewer conflicts between the
dictates of morality and the power of self-interest. Joseph Nye sees power as central, but notes that it can take multiple forms, including “soft power” that stems
from the appeal of a state’s culture and values and that can influence not only
what others do, but also what they want.
The Meaning of Anarchy
I.2
Define anarchy and the anarchic environment of international politics.
Even those who argue that morality should play a large role in statecraft acknowledge that international politics is not like domestic politics. In the latter, there
is government; in the former, there is none. As a consequence, no agency exists
above the individual states with authority and power to make laws and settle disputes. States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures
compliance and punishes deviations. This—the absence of a supreme power—is
what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics. Anarchy is
therefore said to constitute a state of war: When all else fails, force is the ultima
ratio—the final and legitimate arbiter of disputes among states.
The state of war does not mean that every nation is constantly at the brink
of war or actually at war with other nations. Most countries, though, do feel
threatened by some states at some time, and every state has experienced periods of intense insecurity. No two contiguous states, moreover, have had a history of close, friendly relations uninterrupted by severe tension if not outright
war. Because a nation cannot look to a supreme body to enforce laws, nor count
on other nations for constant aid and support, it must rely on its own efforts,
particularly for defense against attack. Coexistence in an anarchic environment
thus requires self-help. The psychological outlook that self-help breeds is best
described by a saying common among British statesmen since Lord Palmerston:
“Great Britain has no permanent enemies or permanent friends, she has only
permanent interests.”
Although states must provide the wherewithal to achieve their own ends,
they do not always reach their foreign policy goals. The goals may be grandiose;
the means available, meager. The goals may be attainable; the means selected,
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4 Part I
inappropriate. But even if the goals are realistic and the means both available and
appropriate, a state can be frustrated in pursuit of its ends. The reason is simple
but fundamental to an understanding of international politics: What one state does
will inevitably impinge on some other states—on some beneficially, but on others
adversely. What one state desires, another may covet. What one thinks is just due,
another may find threatening. Steps that a state takes to achieve its goals may be
rendered useless by the countersteps others take. No state, therefore, can afford to
disregard the effects its actions will have on other nations’ behavior. In this sense,
state behavior is contingent: What one state does is dependent in part upon what
others do. Mutual dependence means that each must take the others into account.
Mutual dependence affects nothing more powerfully than it does security—
the measures states take to protect their territory. Like other foreign policy goals,
the security of one state is contingent upon the behavior of other states. Herein
lies the security dilemma to which each state is subject: In its efforts to preserve or
enhance its own security, one state can take measures that decrease the security
of other states and cause them to take countermeasures that neutralize the actions
of the first state and that may even menace it. The first state may feel impelled to
take further actions, provoking additional countermeasures . . . and so forth. The
security dilemma means that an action—reaction spiral can occur between two
states or among several of them, forcing each to spend ever larger sums on arms
to be no more secure than before. All will run faster merely to stay where they are.
At the heart of the security dilemma are these two constraints: the inherent
difficulty in distinguishing between offensive and defensive postures, and the
inability of one state to believe or trust that another state’s present pacific intentions will remain so. The capability to defend can also provide the capability to
attack. In adding to its arms, state A may know that its aim is defensive, that its
intentions are peaceful, and therefore that it has no aggressive designs on state B.
In a world where states must look to themselves for protection, however, B will
examine A’s actions carefully and suspiciously. B may think that A will attack it
when A’s arms become powerful enough and that A’s protestations of friendship
are designed to lull it into lowering its guard. But even if B believes A’s actions
are not directed against it, B cannot assume that A’s intentions will remain peaceful. Anarchy makes it impossible for A to bind itself to continuing to respect B’s
interests in the future. B must allow for the possibility that what A can do to it,
A sometime might do. The need to assess capabilities along with intentions, or,
the equivalent, to allow for a change in intentions, makes state actors profoundly
conservative. They prefer to err on the side of safety, to have too much rather
than too little. Because security is the basis of existence and the prerequisite for
the achievement of all other goals, state actors must be acutely sensitive to the
security actions of others. The security dilemma thus means that state actors cannot risk not reacting to the security actions of other states, but that in so reacting
they can produce circumstances that leave them worse off than before.
The anarchic environment of international politics, then, allows every state
to be the final judge of its own interests, but requires that each provide the means
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Anarchy and Its Consequences
5
to attain them. Because the absence of a central authority permits wars to occur,
security considerations become paramount. Because of the effects of the security
dilemma, efforts of state leaders to protect their peoples can lead to severe tension
and war even when all parties sincerely desire peace. Two states, or two groups
of states, each satisfied with the status quo and seeking only security, may not be
able to achieve it. Conflicts and wars with no economic or ideological basis can
occur. The outbreak of war, therefore, does not necessarily mean that some or all
states seek expansion, or that humans have an innate drive for power. That states
go to war when none of them wants to, however, does not imply that they never
seek war. The security dilemma may explain some wars; it does not explain all
wars. States often do experience conflicts of interest over trade, real estate, ideology, and prestige. For example, when someone asked Francis I what differences
led to his constant wars with Charles V, he replied: “None whatever. We agree perfectly. We both want control of Italy!” (Cited in Frederick L. Schuman, International
Politics, 7th ed., New York, 1953, p. 283.) If states cannot obtain what they want
by blackmail, bribery, or threats, they may resort to war. Wars can occur when no
one wants them; wars usually do occur when someone wants them.
Realists argue that even under propitious circumstances, international cooperation is difficult to achieve because in anarchy, states are often more concerned
with relative advantages than with absolute gains. That is, because international
politics is a self-help system in which each state must be prepared to rely on its
own resources and strength to further its interests, national leaders often seek to
become more powerful than their potential adversaries. Cooperation is then made
difficult not only by the fear that others will cheat and fail to live up to their agreements, but also by the perceived need to gain a superior position. The reason is not
that state actors are concerned with status, but that they fear that arrangements
that benefit all, but provide greater benefits to others than to them, will render
their country vulnerable to pressure and coercion in the future.
Kenneth N. Waltz develops the above points more fully by analyzing the
differences between hierarchic (domestic) and anarchic (international) political
systems. He shows why the distribution of capabilities (the relative power positions of states) in anarchic systems is so important and lays out the ways in which
political behavior differs in hierarchic and anarchic systems. Anarchy, the security
dilemma, and conflicts of interest make international politics difficult, unpleasant,
and dangerous.
There is broad agreement among Realists on the consequences of anarchy for
states’ behavior, but not total agreement. One brand of Realists, who are called the
“offensive Realists,” argue that the consequences of anarchy go far beyond producing security dilemmas and making cooperation hard to come by. They assert
that anarchy forces states, and especially the great powers, to become “power
maximizers” because the only way to ensure the states’ security is to be the most
powerful state in the system. Offensive realism envisions a “dog-eat-dog” world of
international politics in which power and fear dominate great power i nteractions
and in which war, or the threat of war, among the great powers or among their
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6 Part I
proxies is a constant feature of international relations. John J. Mearsheimer lays
out the tenets of this brand of realism.
In an anarchic condition, however, the question to ask may not be, “Why
does war occur?” but rather “Why does war not occur more frequently than it
does?” Instead of asking “Why do states not cooperate more to achieve common
interests?” we should ask “Given anarchy and the security dilemma, how is it
that states are able to cooperate at all?” Anarchy and the security dilemma do not
produce their effects automatically, and it is not self-evident that states are power
maximizers. Thus, Alexander Wendt argues that Waltz and other realists have
missed the extent to which the unpleasant patterns they describe are “socially
constructed”—that is, they stem from the actors’ beliefs, perceptions, and interpretations of others’ behavior. If national leaders believe that anarchy requires
an assertive stance that endangers others, conflict will be generated. But if they
think they have more freedom of action and do not take the hostility of others
for granted, they may be able to create more peaceful relationships. In this view,
structure (anarchy) does not determine state action; agency (human decision) does.
Strategic Interaction in Anarchy
I.3
Discuss how international politics exemplifies strategic interaction
and the role of game theory.
International politics exemplifies strategic interaction. That is, outcomes are not
produced directly by any one state’s foreign policy, but by the interaction of the
policies of several of them. Each may seek peace and even act in a way that it
thinks will bring it about, and yet war can be the result. Intentions and results can
be very different, and interaction is central. Interaction is strategic because leaders understand this and when they act have to anticipate how others will behave.
Furthermore, they know that others are similarly trying to anticipate what they
will do. For example, even if state A is willing to cooperate if it thinks state B will,
and state B has the same preference, cooperation will not ensure if A anticipates
that B is in fact not likely to cooperate, in part because it thinks that B doubts that
A state will cooperate. (This is a version of Rousseau’s “Stag Hunt.)
Strategic interaction is best understood through game theory, which is
explained in his selection by Thomas C. Schelling, who won a Nobel Prize for his
work in this area. In the same vein James Fearon shows that if states were fully
rational and informed, wars should not occur because both sides would prefer a
peaceful compromise to the identical settlement that actually was reached after
mutually costly fighting. The test of war is necessary not because of the conflict
of interest itself, but because in the absence of an international authority states
cannot commit themselves to living up to their agreements (a problem of anarchy)
and cannot credibly reveal their intentions and capabilities to others (a problem
of strategic interaction).
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Anarchy and Its Consequences
7
Robert Jervis shows a different facet of strategic interaction in arguing that
the extent to which states can make themselves more secure without menacing
others depends in large part on whether offensive postures can be distinguished
from defensive ones and whether the offense is believed to be more efficacious
than the defense. In a world where defense is thought to be easier than offense,
the security dilemma is mitigated and, consequently, states are more secure and
the hard edge of anarchy is softened. The reverse is true if offense is thought to
be easier: the security dilemma operates powerfully, and, consequently, states are
less secure and the effects of anarchy cut deeply.
The Mitigation of Anarchy
I.4
Recognize how state actors cope with anarchy and develop patterns
that contain the dangers of aggression.
Even realists note that conflict and warfare are not constant characteristics of
international politics. Most states remain at peace with most others most of the
time. State actors have developed a number of ways of coping with anarchy; of
gaining more than a modicum of security; of regulating their competition with
other states; and of developing patterns that contain, but do not eliminate, the
dangers of aggression.
Robert Jervis shows that the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma on
the possibilities for cooperation is not constant but varies with both the circumstances states find themselves in and the strategies they follow. Even when states
have benign intentions, cooperation is most difficult when the gains from exploiting the other are high and the costs of being exploited are also great. Here it is
very tempting to try to take advantage of the other and symmetrically dangerous
to trust the other side, which feels the same incentives. It is also not conducive to
cooperation if the outcome of both sides working together is only slightly better
than mutual competition. Conversely, a reversal of these incentives makes cooperation under anarchy easier and more likely. These are not only conditions that
states can find themselves in; they can guide states that seek to cooperate. For
example, to minimize the danger of exploitation states can divide a large transactions into a series of smaller ones in which the gains from cheating and the losses
from being cheated on are relatively slight at each state. They can also increase
transparency to clarify whether each state has cooperated in its previous moves,
stake their reputations on living up to their pledges to cooperate, and small states
can seek to have larger ones step in if they break their promises. Efforts to do this
also signal a state’s desire to cooperate and can increase trust. None of this is
foolproof, of course, but it can reduce the danger that the policies states follow in
anarchy and the security dilemma will generate rather than ameliorate conflict.
The kind of state we are dealing with may make a big difference. Most
strikingly, it appears that democracies may never have gone to war against
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8 Part I
each other. This is not to say, as Woodrow Wilson did, that democracies are
inherently peaceful. They seem to fight as many wars as do dictatorships. But,
as Michael W. Doyle shows, they do not fight each other. If this is correct—and,
of course, both the evidence and the reasons are open to dispute—it implies that
anarchy and the security dilemma do not prevent peaceful and even harmonious
relations among states that share certain common values and beliefs.
Democracies are relatively recent developments. For a longer period of time,
two specific devices—international law and diplomacy—have proved useful in
resolving conflicts among states. Although not enforced by a world government,
international law can provide norms for behavior and mechanisms for settling
disputes. The effectiveness of international law derives from the willingness of
states to observe it. Its power extends no further than the disposition of states “to
agree to agree.” Where less than vital interests are at stake, state actors may accept
settlements that are not entirely satisfactory because they think the precedents
or principles justify the compromises made. Much of international law reflects a
consensus among states on what is of equal benefit to all, as, for example, the rules
regulating international communications. Diplomacy, too, can facilitate cooperation and resolve disputes. If diplomacy is skillful, and the legitimate interests of
the parties in dispute are taken into account, understandings can often be reached
on issues that might otherwise lead to war. These points and others are explored
more fully by Stanley Hoffmann and Hans J. Morgenthau.
National leaders use these two traditional tools within a balance-of-power
system. Much maligned by President Wilson and his followers and misunderstood by many others, balance of power refers to the way in which stability is
achieved through the conflicting efforts of individual states, whether or not any
or all of them deliberately pursue that goal. Just as Adam Smith argued that if
every individual pursued his or her own self-interest, the interaction of individual
egoisms would enhance national wealth, so international relations theorists have
argued that even if every state seeks power at the expense of the others, no one
state will likely dominate. In both cases a general good can be the unintended
product of selfish individual actions. Moreover, even if most states desire only to
keep what they have, their own interests dictate that they band together to resist
any state or coalition of states that threatens to dominate them.
The balance-of-power system is likely to prevent any one state a cquiring
hegemony. It will not, however, benefit all states equally nor maintain the
peace permanently. Rewards will be unequal because of inequalities in power
and expertise. Wars will occur because they are one means by which states can
preserve what they have or acquire what they covet. Small states may even be
eliminated by their more powerful neighbors. The international system will be
unstable, however, only if states flock to what they think is the strongest side.
What is called bandwagoning or the domino theory argues that the international
system is precarious because successful aggression will attract many followers,
either out of fear or out of a desire to share the spoils of victory. Stephen M. Walt
disagrees, drawing on balance-of-power theory and historical evidence, to argue
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Anarchy and Its Consequences
9
that rather than bandwagoning, under most conditions states balance against
emerging threats. They do not throw in their lot with the stronger side. Instead,
they join with others to prevent any state from becoming so strong that it could
dominate the system.
Power balancing is a strategy followed by individual states acting on their
own. Other ways of coping with anarchy, which may supplement or exist alongside this impulse, are more explicitly collective. David C. Kang shows that before
Western influences impinged, East Asian politics did not conform to either
bandwagoning or balancing or indeed to other standard views of how states
in anarchy “should” behave. Instead they adopted a hierarchical order under a
Chinese leadership that was based as much on cultural legitimacy as on military
or economic power. In other circumstances, regimes and institutions can help
overcome anarchy and facilitate cooperation. When states agree on the principles,
rules, and norms that should govern behavior, they can often ameliorate the security dilemma and increase the scope for cooperation. Institutions may not only
embody common understandings but, as Robert O. Keohane argues, they can also
help states work toward mutually desired outcomes by providing a framework
for long-run agreements, making it easier for each state to see whether others are
living up to their promises, and increasing the costs the state will pay if it cheats.
In the final section of this reader we will discuss how institutions can contribute
to global governance under current conditions.
Part I Questions for Review
Does a focus on anarchy lead us to exaggerate the role and extent of conflict,
especially violent conflict, in international relations? Have some of the ways that
states have conceived of anarchy and tried to cope with it inadvertently increased
conflict?
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Chapter 1
Power, Principle,
and Legitimacy
in Statecraft
The Melian Dialogue
Thucydides
Next summer Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships and seized 300 Argive
citizens who were still suspected of being pro-Spartan. These were put by the
Athenians into the nearby islands under Athenian control.
The Athenians also made an expedition against the island of Melos. They had
thirty of their own ships, six from Chios, and two from Lesbos; 1,200 hoplites,
300 archers, and twenty mounted archers, all from Athens; and about 1,500 hoplites
from the allies and the islanders.
The Melians are a colony from Sparta. They had refused to join the Athenian
empire like the other islanders, and at first had remained neutral without helping
either side; but afterwards, when the Athenians had brought force to bear on them
by laying waste their land, they had become open enemies of Athens.
Now the generals Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, the son of
Tisimachus, encamped with the above force in Melian territory and, before doing
any harm to the land, first of all sent representatives to negotiate. The Melians
did not invite these representatives to speak before the people, but asked them to
make the statement for which they had come in front of the governing body and
the few. The Athenian representatives then spoke as follows:
‘So we are not to speak before the people, no doubt in case the mass of the
people should hear once and for all and without interruption an argument from
us which is both persuasive and incontrovertible, and should so be led astray.
This, we realize, is your motive in bringing us here to speak before the few. Now
suppose that you who sit here should make assurance doubly sure. Suppose that
you, too, should refrain from dealing with every point in detail in a set speech,
and should instead interrupt us whenever we say something controversial and
deal with that before going on to the next point? Tell us first whether you approve
of this suggestion of ours.’
10
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Power, Principle, and Legitimacy in Statecraft
11
The Council of the Melians replied as follows:
‘No one can object to each of us putting forward our own views in a calm
atmosphere. That is perfectly reasonable. What is scarcely consistent with such
a proposal is the present threat, indeed the certainty, of your making war on us.
We see that you have come prepared to judge the argument yourselves, and that
the likely end of it all will be either war, if we prove that we are in the right, and
so refuse to surrender, or else slavery.’
Athenians: If you are going to spend the time in enumerating your suspicions
about the future, or if you have met here for any other reason except to look the
facts in the face and on the basis of these facts to consider how you can save
your city from destruction, there is no point in our going on with this discussion.
If, however, you will do as we suggest, then we will speak on.
Melians: It is natural and understandable that people who are placed as we
are should have recourse to all kinds of arguments and different points of view.
However, you are right in saying that we are met together here to discuss the
safety of our country and, if you will have it so, the discussion shall proceed on
the lines that you have laid down.
Athenians: Then we on our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example,
that we have a right to our empire because we defeated the Persians, or that we
have come against you now because of the injuries you have done us—a great
mass of words that nobody would believe. And we ask you on your side not to
imagine that you will influence us by saying that you, though a colony of Sparta,
have not joined Sparta in the war, or that you have never done us any harm.
Instead we recommend that you should try to get what it is possible for you to
get, taking into consideration what we both really do think; since you know as
well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the
standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact
the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they
have to accept.
Melians: Then in our view (since you force us to leave justice out of account
and to confine ourselves to self-interest)—in our view it is at any rate useful that
you should not destroy a principle that is to the general good of all men—namely,
that in the case of all who fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play
and just dealing, and that such people should be allowed to use and to profit by
arguments that fall short of a mathematical accuracy. And this is a principle which
affects you as much as anybody, since your own fall would be visited by the most
terrible vengeance and would be an example to the world.
Athenians: As for us, even assuming that our empire does come to an end, we
are not despondent about what would happen next. One is not so much frightened of being conquered by a power which rules over others, as Sparta does (not
that we are concerned with Sparta now), as of what would happen if a ruling
power is attacked and defeated by its own subjects. So far as this point is concerned, you can leave it to us to face the risks involved. What we shall do now is
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12 Chapter 1
to show you that it is for the good of our own empire that we are here and that it
is for the preservation of your city that we shall say what we are going to say. We
do not want any trouble in bringing you into our empire, and we want you to be
spared for the good both of yourselves and of ourselves.
Melians: And how could it be just as good for us to be the slaves as for you
to be the masters?
Athenians: You, by giving in, would save yourselves from disaster; we, by not
destroying you, would be able to profit from you.
Melians: So you would not agree to our being neutral, friends instead of
enemies, but allies of neither side?
Athenians: No, because it is not so much your hostility that injures us; it is
rather the case that, if we were on friendly terms with you, our subjects would
regard that as a sign of weakness in us, whereas your hatred is evidence of our
power.
Melians: Is that your subjects’ idea of fair play—that no distinction should be
made between people who are quite unconnected with you and people who are
mostly your own colonists or else rebels whom you have conquered?
Athenians: So far as right and wrong are concerned they think that there is
no difference between the two, that those who still preserve their independence
do so because they are strong, and that if we fail to attack them it is because we
are afraid. So that by conquering you we shall increase not only the size but the
security of our empire. We rule the sea and you are islanders, and weaker islanders too than the others; it is therefore particularly important that you should
not escape.
Melians: But do you think there is no security for you in what we suggest?
For here again, since you will not let us mention justice, but tell us to give in to
your interests, we, too, must tell you what our interests are and, if yours and ours
happen to coincide, we must try to persuade you of the fact. Is it not certain that
you will make enemies of all states who are at present neutral, when they see
what is happening here and naturally conclude that in course of time you will
attack them too? Does not this mean that you are strengthening the enemies you
have already and are forcing others to become your enemies even against their
intentions and their inclinations?
Athenians: As a matter of fact we are not so much frightened of states on the
continent. They have their liberty, and this means that it will be a long time before
they begin to take precautions against us. We are more concerned about islanders
like yourselves, who are still unsubdued, or subjects who have already become
embittered by the constraint which our empire imposes on them. These are the
people who are most likely to act in a reckless manner and to bring themselves
and us, too, into the most obvious danger.
Melians: Then surely, if such hazards are taken by you to keep your empire
and by your subjects to escape from it, we who are still free would show ourselves
great cowards and weaklings if we failed to face everything that comes rather
than submit to slavery.
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13
Athenians: No, not if you are sensible. This is no fair fight, with honour on
one side and shame on the other. It is rather a question of saving your lives and
not resisting those who are far too strong for you.
Melians: Yet we know that in war fortune sometimes makes the odds more
level than could be expected from the difference in numbers of the two sides. And
if we surrender, then all our hope is lost at once, whereas, so long as we remain
in action, there is still a hope that we may yet stand upright.
Athenians: Hope, that comforter in danger! If one already has solid advantages to fall back upon, one can indulge in hope. It may do harm, but will not
destroy one. But hope is by nature an expensive commodity, and those who are
risking their all on one cast find out what it means only when they are already
ruined; it never fails them in the period when such a knowledge would enable
them to take precautions. Do not let this happen to you, you who are weak and
whose fate depends on a single movement of the scale. And do not be like those
people who, as so commonly happens, miss the chance of saving themselves in a
human and practical way, and, when every clear and distinct hope has left them
in their adversity, turn to what is blind and vague, to prophecies and oracles and
such things which by encouraging hope lead men to ruin.
Melians: It is difficult, and you may be sure that we know it, for us to oppose
your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. Nevertheless we trust that
the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because we are standing for what
is right against what is wrong; and as for what we lack in power, we trust that it
will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans, who are bound, if for no
other reason, then for honour’s sake, and because we are their kinsmen, to come
to our help. Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think.
Athenians: So far as the favour of the gods is concerned, we think we have as
much right to that as you have. Our aims and our actions are perfectly consistent
with the beliefs men hold about the gods and with the principles which govern
their own conduct. Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to
conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can.
This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when
it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist forever
among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it, and
we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in
precisely the same way. And therefore, so far as the gods are concerned, we see no
good reason why we should fear to be at a disadvantage. But with regard to your
views about Sparta and your confidence that she, out of a sense of honour, will
come to your aid, we must say that we congratulate you on your simplicity but do
not envy you your folly. In matters that concern themselves or their own constitution the Spartans are quite remarkably good; as for their relations with others, that
is a long story, but it can be expressed shortly and clearly by saying that of all people
we know the Spartans are most conspicuous for believing that what they like doing
is honourable and what suits their interests is just. And this kind of attitude is not
going to be of much help to you in your absurd quest for safety at the moment.
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14 Chapter 1
Melians: But this is the very point where we can feel most sure. Their own
self-interest will make them refuse to betray their own colonists, the Melians, for
that would mean losing the confidence of their friends among the Hellenes and
doing good to their enemies.
Athenians: You seem to forget that if one follows one’s self-interest one wants
to be safe, whereas the path of justice and honour involves one in danger. And,
where danger is concerned, the Spartans are not, as a rule, very venturesome.
Melians: But we think that they would even endanger themselves for our sake
and count the risk more worth taking than in the case of others, because we are
so close to the Peloponnese that they could operate more easily, and because they
can depend on us more than on others, since we are of the same race and share
the same feelings.
Athenians: Goodwill shown by the party that is asking for help does not mean
security for the prospective ally. What is looked for is a positive preponderance of
power in action. And the Spartans pay attention to this point even more than others do. Certainly they distrust their own native resources so much that when they
attack a neighbour they bring a great army of allies with them. It is hardly likely
therefore that, while we are in control of the sea, they will cross over to an island.
Melians: But they still might send others. The Cretan sea is a wide one, and it
is harder for those who control it to intercept others than for those who want to
slip through to do so safely. And even if they were to fail in this, they would turn
against your own land and against those of your allies left unvisited by Brasidas.
So, instead of troubling about a country which has nothing to do with you, you
will find trouble nearer home, among your allies, and in your own country.
Athenians: It is a possibility, something that has in fact happened before. It
may happen in your case, but you are well aware that the Athenians have never
yet relinquished a single siege operation through fear of others. But we are somewhat shocked to find that, though you announced your intention of discussing
how you could preserve yourselves, in all this talk you have said absolutely
nothing which could justify a man in thinking that he could be preserved. Your
chief points are concerned with what you hope may happen in the future, while
your actual resources are too scanty to give you a chance of survival against the
forces that are opposed to you at this moment. You will therefore be showing an
extraordinary lack of common sense if, after you have asked us to retire from this
meeting, you still fail to reach a conclusion wiser than anything you have mentioned so far. Do not be led astray by a false sense of honour—a thing which often
brings men to ruin when they are faced with an obvious danger that somehow
affects their pride. For in many cases men have still been able to see the dangers
ahead of them, but this thing called dishonour, this word, by its own force of
seduction, has drawn them into a state where they have surrendered to an idea,
while in fact they have fallen voluntarily into irrevocable disaster, in dishonour
that is all the more dishonourable because it has come to them from their own
folly rather than their misfortune. You, if you take the right view, will be careful
to avoid this. You will see that there is nothing disgraceful in giving way to the
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15
greatest city in Hellas when she is offering you such reasonable terms—alliance
on a tribute-paying basis and liberty to enjoy your own property. And, when you
are allowed to choose between war and safety, you will not be so insensitively
arrogant as to make the wrong choice. This is the safe rule—to stand up to one’s
equals, to behave with deference towards one’s superiors, and to treat one’s inferiors with moderation. Think it over again, then, when we have withdrawn from
the meeting, and let this be a point that constantly recurs to your minds—that
you are discussing the fate of your country, that you have only one country, and
that its future for good or ill depends on this one single decision which you are
going to make.
The Athenians then withdrew from the discussion. The Melians, left to themselves, reached a conclusion which was much the same as they had indicated in
their previous replies. Their answer was as follows:
‘Our decision, Athenians, is just the same as it was at first. We are not prepared to give up in a short moment the liberty which our city has enjoyed from
its foundation for 700 years. We put our trust in the fortune that the gods will
send and which has saved us up to now, and in the help of men—that is, of the
Spartans; and so we shall try to save ourselves. But we invite you to allow us to
be friends of yours and enemies to neither side, to make a treaty which shall be
agreeable to both you and us, and so to leave our country.’
The Melians made this reply, and the Athenians, just as they were breaking
off the discussion, said:
‘Well, at any rate, judging from this decision of yours, you seem to us quite
unique in your ability to consider the future as something more certain than what
is before your eyes, and to see uncertainties as realities, simply because you would
like them to be so. As you have staked most on and trusted most in Spartans, luck,
and hopes, so in all these you will find yourselves most completely deluded.’
The Athenian representatives then went back to the army, and the Athenian
generals, finding that the Melians would not submit, immediately commenced
hostilities and built a wall completely round the city of Melos, dividing the work
out among the various states. Later they left behind a garrison of some of their
own and some allied troops to blockade the place by land and sea, and with the
greater part of their army returned home. The force left behind stayed on and
continued with the siege.
About the same time the Argives invaded Phliasia and were ambushed by
the Phliasians and the exiles from Argos, losing about eighty men.
Then, too, the Athenians at Pylos captured a great quantity of plunder from
Spartan territory. Not even after this did the Spartans renounce the treaty and
make war, but they issued a proclamation saying that any of their people who
wished to do so were free to make raids on the Athenians. The Corinthians also
made some attacks on the Athenians because of private quarrels of their own, but
the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed quiet.
Meanwhile the Melians made a night attack and captured the part of the
Athenian lines opposite the market-place. They killed some of the troops, and
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then, after bringing in corn and everything else useful that they could lay their
hands on, retired again and made no further move, while the Athenians took
measures to make their blockade more efficient in future. So the summer came
to an end.
In the following winter the Spartans planned to invade the territory of Argos,
but when the sacrifices for crossing the frontier turned out unfavourably, they
gave up the expedition. The fact that they had intended to invade made the
Argives suspect certain people in their city, some of whom they arrested, though
others succeeded in escaping.
About this same time the Melians again captured another part of the Athenian
lines where there were only a few of the garrison on guard. As a result of this,
another force came out afterwards from Athens under the command of Philocrates,
the son of Demeas. Siege operations were now carried on vigorously and, as there
was also some treachery from inside, the Melians surrendered unconditionally to
the Athenians, who put to death all the men of military age whom they took, and
sold the women and children as slaves. Melos itself they took over for themselves,
sending out later a colony of 500 men.
Questions for Review
The Athenians say that they are acting as powerful states as they always have and
as any others would do in their circumstances. Is this an adequate explanation for
their behavior? Is it an adequate justification?
Legitimacy in International Politics
Ian Hurd
What motivates states to follow international norms, rules, and commitments? All
social systems must confront what we might call the problem of social control—
that is, how to get actors to comply with society’s rules—but the problem is particularly acute for international relations, because the international social system
does not possess an overarching center of political power to enforce rules. . . .
Consider three generic reasons why an actor might obey a rule: (1) because
the actor fears the punishment of rule enforcers, (2) because the actor sees the
rule in its own self-interest, and (3) because the actor feels the rule is legitimate
and ought to be obeyed. The trait distinguishing the superior from the subordinate is different in each case. In the first, it is asymmetry of physical capacity;
in the second, a particular distribution of incentives; and in the third, a normative structure of status and legitimacy. . . . These devices recur in combination
across all social systems where rules exist to influence behavior, ranging from
the governing of children in the classroom, to the internal structure of organized
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17
crime syndicates, to the international system of states. Where rules or norms exist,
compliance with them may be achieved by one or a combination of these devices.
Studies of domestic political sociology rotate around them, with scholars arguing
variously for making one of the three devices foundational or combining them
in assorted ways. It is generally seen as natural that a social system may exhibit
each at different moments or locations.
In international relations studies, talking about compliance secured by
either coercion or self-interest is uncontroversial, and well-developed bodies of
literature—falling roughly into the neorealist and rationalist-neoliberal schools,
respectively—elaborate each of these notions. However, the idea that states’ compliance with international rules is a function of the legitimacy of the rules or of
their source gets less attention; and when it is attended to, scholars generally fail
to spell out the process by which it operates. . . .
There is no obvious reason, either theoretical or empirical, why the study of
the international system should be limited to only two of these three mechanisms
and that to do so means missing significant features of the system. This should be
a matter of empirical study, not assumption. . . .
Legitimacy, as I use it here, refers to the normative belief by an actor that
a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational
between actor and institution, and defined by the actor’s perception of the institution. The actor’s perception may come from the substance of the rule or from
the procedure or source by which it was constituted. Such a perception affects
behavior because it is internalized by the actor and helps to define how the actor
sees its interests. . . .
Seeing the international system as governed by institutions of legitimate
authority opens several very interesting avenues for research, three of which I will
sketch here. First, what is the process by which a particular norm, rule, or institution comes to be seen as legitimate? States are somewhat discriminating in which
rules they accept as legitimate (although they are not completely free agents in
this regard), and so not all potential norms are internalized. Much more could
be known about how a given norm comes to be accepted or not. For instance,
could we say that the international market has recently become legitimate and so
authoritative in this sense? This direction is suggested by recent work on how elements of the international economy have become “disembedded” from domestic
political control. A related puzzle, much discussed in studies of domestic institutions, particularly courts, is how a political institution might alter its behavior
in order to make itself more authoritative (and thus effective). Two international
institutions, the International Court of Justice and the UN Security Council, seem
quite aware that their present actions have consequences for their future legitimacy and that their legitimacy affects their power and effectiveness. These two
areas, international courts and international markets, are fertile ground for the
further study of legitimacy and legitimation of international institutions. Moreover, because the process of legitimation is never monolithic, the legitimation
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of these institutions has generated counteractive delegitimizing efforts. In the
case of the Security Council [from 1992 to 2011], Libya . . . pursued a determined
strategy to delegitimize the UN sanctions against it by portraying the council as
unrepresentative of the will of the wider international community.
The legitimacy pull of the UN Security Council can be demonstrated by
Japan’s response to sanctions on North Korea in 1994. While the UN Security
Council was considering imposing sanctions on North Korea for its surreptitious
nuclear program, Japan expressed its opposition to sanctions both publicly and
in informal consultations with the Security Council. An essential element in any
sanctions program would have been to forbid the remittances of Koreans living in
Japan back to North Korea; these remittances accounted for between $600 million
and $1.8 billion of North Korea’s annual gross national product of $20 billion.
For this and other reasons, Japan opposed strong sanctions and worked hard to
delay, diminish, or defeat the proposal. Yet at the same time, the Japanese government publicly stated that notwithstanding its opposition, it would abide by the
final decision of the council.1 On the one hand, given the legal status of Security
Council resolutions one might expect nothing less than full compliance by member states. But on the other, and more realistically, this is a strong sign that Japan
accepted the legitimacy of a Security Council decision, even with a medium probability of an adverse outcome, and even without formal Japanese presence in the
deliberations of the council.2 This strong, public, and a priori commitment to the
rule of law in international affairs may have been motivated by a desire to appear
a “good community member” (and so improve Japan’s case for permanent membership in a reformed Security Council) or by an actual normative commitment
to the rules as they are. In either case, Japan was conscious that the international
community holds Security Council decisions as legitimate and sees compliance
with them as the duty of a good international citizen. This has been particularly
true since the late 1980s with the increase in consensus and consultations in the
Security Council.
A second area for further research is the role of power (material and ideological) in making an institution legitimate. It is well known that the process
of internalizing community norms is rife with considerations of power, both in
determining what norms exist in the community and which norms a particular
actor might latch on to, but at the same time this process is different from simple
coercion. Power is involved in creating the realm of the apparently “normal” as
well as in reproducing and challenging its hegemony through ideology and institutions. Here, my only aim has been to make the case that legitimate authority
exists in international relations and show what difference this makes, not delve
into the process by which an institution became legitimate. This second task is
important and requires extending the application of writers like Antonio Gramsci,
Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu to international relations.
Finally, what happens in the international setting to the safeguards we
generally expect of our governing institutions, such as representativeness and
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19
accountability? If international institutions can be authoritative, how do we
make them accountable? Certain international institutions, such as the UN, are
already recognized as sufficiently governmental that they are expected to be
somewhat democratic, but international democracy and accountability will have
to be much more widely promoted once we recognize that any institution that
is accepted as legitimate stands in a position of authority over states and thus
exercises power.
Questions for Review
How is legitimacy established? Under what circumstances does it override considerations of the sort that Thucydides (in the last reading) and Morgenthau (in
the next reading) enumerate?
Notes
1 New York Times, 3 June 1994. A1.
2 New York Times, 9 June 1994, A1.
Six Principles of Political Realism
Hans J. Morgenthau
1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by
objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve
society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives.
The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will
challenge them only as the risk of failure.
Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics,
must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that
reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It
believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between
truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective
judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice
and wishful thinking.
Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not
changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in
political theory, nor is old age a defect. The fact that a theory of politics,
if there be such a theory, has never been heard of before tends to create a
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presumption against, rather than in favor of, its soundness. Conversely, the
fact that a theory of politics was developed hundreds or even thousands of
years ago—as was the theory of the balance of power—does not create a
presumption that it must be outmoded and obsolete. . . .
For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be
ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and
of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus we can find out what
statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their
acts we can surmise what their objectives might have been.
Yet examination of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual
raw material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a kind
of rational outline, a map that suggests to us the possible meanings of foreign
policy. In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who
must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances,
and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances
(presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these
rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against
the actual facts and their consequences that gives theoretical meaning to the
facts of international politics.
2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms
of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand
international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an
autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres,
such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics,
aesthetics, or religion. Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether impossible, for without it we could
not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts, nor could we bring
at least a measure of systematic order to the political sphere.
We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as
power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman—
past, present, or future—has taken or will take on the political scene. We
look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his
conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts.
Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and
as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps
better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself.
The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of
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21
politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. On the side of the actor, it provides for rational discipline in action
and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes
American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible,
rational continuum, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of the
different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen. A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard
against two popular fallacies: the c oncern with motives and the concern
with ideological preferences.
To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of
statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the
most illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond
recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike. Do
we really know what our own motives are? And what do we know of the
motives of others?
Yet even if we had access to the real motives of statesmen, that k
nowledge
would help us little in understanding foreign policies, and might well lead us
astray. It is true that the knowledge of the statesman’s motives may give us
one among many clues as to what the direction of his foreign policy might
be. It cannot give us, however, the one clue by which to predict his foreign
policies. History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy. This is true in both moral and
political terms.
We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his
foreign policies will be either morally praiseworthy or politically successful.
Judging his motives, we can say that he will not intentionally pursue policies
that are morally wrong, but we can say nothing about the probability of their
success. If we want to know the moral and political qualities of his actions, we
must know them, not his motives. How often have statesmen been motivated
by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how
often have they sought one goal and ended by achieving something they
neither expected nor desired? . . .
A realist theory of international politics will also avoid the other popular
fallacy of equating the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or
political sympathies, and of deducing the former from the latter. Statesmen,
especially under contemporary conditions, may well make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political sympathies in order to gain popular support for them. Yet they will distinguish
with Lincoln between their “official duty,” which is to think and act in terms
of the national interest, and their “personal wish,” which is to see their own
moral values and political principles realized throughout the world. Political
realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ide istinction between
als and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp d
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the desirable and the possible—between what is desirable e verywhere and
at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time
and place.
It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always followed so
rational an objective, and unemotional a course. The contingent elements of
personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of
intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies
from their rational course. Especially where foreign policy is conducted under
the conditions of democratic control, the need to marshal popular emotions
to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign
policy itself. Yet a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality must for
the time being, as it were, abstract from these irrational elements and seek
to paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational essence to
be found in experience, without the contingent deviations from rationality
which are also found in experience. . . .
The difference between international politics as it actually is and a
rational theory derived from it is like the difference between a photograph
and a painted portrait. The photograph shows everything that can be seen
by the naked eye; the painted portrait does not show everything that can be
seen by the naked eye, but it shows, or at least seeks to show, one thing that
the naked eye cannot see: the human essence of the person portrayed.
Political realism contains not only a theoretical but also a normative element. It knows that political reality is replete with contingencies and systemic
irrationalities and points to the typical influences they exert upon foreign
policy. Yet it shares with all social theory the need, for the sake of theoretical understanding, to stress the rational elements of political reality; for it
is these rational elements that make reality intelligible for theory. Political
realism presents the theoretical construct of a rational foreign policy which
experience can never completely achieve.
At the same time political realism considers a rational foreign policy
to be good foreign policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks
and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept
of prudence and the political requirement of success. Political realism wants
the photographic picture of the political world to resemble as much as possible its painted portrait. Aware of the inevitable gap between good—that
is, rational—foreign policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political realism maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of
political reality, but also that foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its
own moral and practical purposes.
Hence, it is no argument against the theory here presented that actual
foreign policy does not or cannot live up to it. That argument misunderstands
the intention of this book, which is to present not an indiscriminate description of political reality, but a rational theory of international politics. Far from
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23
being invalidated by the fact that, for instance, a perfect balance of power
policy will scarcely be found in reality, it assumes that reality, being deficient
in this respect, must be understood and evaluated as an approximation to an
ideal system of balance of power.
3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an
objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed
of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and
place. Thucydides’ statement, born of the experiences of ancient Greece, that
“identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals” was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord S
alisbury’s remark
that “the only bond of union that endures” among nations is “the absence of
all clashing interests.” It was erected into a general principle of government
by George Washington:
A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far
the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and
that almost every man is more or less, under its influence. Motives
of public virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate
men to the observance of a conduct purely disinterested; but they
are not of themselves sufficient to produce persevering conformity
to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are
capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or advantage, to the common good. It is vain to exclaim against
the depravity of human nature on this account; the fact is so, the
experience of every age and nation has proved it and we must in a
great measure, change the constitution of man, before we can make it
otherwise. No institution, not built on the presumptive truth of these
maxims can succeed.1
It was echoed and enlarged upon in our century by Max Weber’s
observation:
Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions
of men. Yet the “images of the world” created by these ideas have
very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the
dynamism of interests kept actions moving.2
Yet the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period
of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. The goals that might be pursued by nations in their
foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever
pursued or might possibly pursue.
The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and the
manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment.
Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of
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man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that
end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which
one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man,
both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional
safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole
justification in its aggrandizement.
Political realism does not assume that the contemporary conditions
under which foreign policy operates, with their extreme instability and the
ever present threat of large-scale violence, cannot be changed. The balance of
power, for instance, is indeed a perennial element of all pluralistic societies,
as the authors of The Federalist papers well knew; yet it is capable of operating, as it does in the United States, under the conditions of relative stability
and peaceful conflict. If the factors that have given rise to these conditions
can be duplicated on the international scene, similar conditions of stability
and peace will then prevail there, as they have over long stretches of history
among certain nations.
What is true of the general character of international relations is also true
of the nation state as the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign
policy. While the realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard
by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary
connection between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and
is therefore bound to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the
political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite
different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the
moral requirements of the contemporary world.
The realist parts company with other schools of thought before the allimportant question of how the contemporary world is to be transformed.
The realist is persuaded that this transformation can be achieved only
through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have
shaped the past as they will the future. The realist cannot be persuaded that
we can bring about that transformation by confronting a political reality
that has its own laws with an abstract ideal that refuses to take those laws
into account.
4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is
also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the
requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over
and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics were morally
more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less exacting than
it actually is.
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Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied
to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they
must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The
individual may say for himself: “Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (Let justice be
done, even if the world perish),” but the state has no right to say so in the
name of those who are in its care. Both individual and state must judge
political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet
while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of
such a moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation
of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action,
itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. There can be no
political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the
political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political
actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges
action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by
its political consequences. Classical and medieval philosophy knew this, and
so did Lincoln when he said:
I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep
doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is
said against me won’t amount to anything. If the end brings me out
wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference.
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular
nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes
between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry.
All nations are tempted—and few have been able to resist the temptation
for long—to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral
purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law
is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil
in the relations among nations is quite another. There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgement of God,
inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is
always on one’s side and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed
by God also.
The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the
counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride
against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have warned
rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to
engender the distortion in judgement which, in the blindness of crusading
frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations—in the name of moral principle,
ideal, or God himself.
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On the other hand, it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms
of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly.
For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing
their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice
to all of them. And we are able to do justice to all of them in a dual sense:
We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged
them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the
interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own.
Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgment.
6. The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought
is real, and it is profound. However much the theory of political realism
may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its
distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political.
Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere,
as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of
interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as
wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of the
conformity of action with moral principles. The economist asks, “How does this
policy affect the wealth of society, or a segment of it?” The lawyer asks: “Is this
policy in accord with the rules of law?” The moralist asks: “Is this policy in accord
with moral principles?” And the political realist asks: “How does this policy affect
the power of the nation?” (Or of the federal government, of Congress, of the party,
of agriculture, as the case may be.)
The political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevance of standards
of thought other than political ones. As a political realist, he cannot but subordinate these other ...
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