Karishanie week 7 How would you deal with a difficult prosecutor? The key in any difficult situation is to always remain calm, collected and professional. As criminal justice professionals our main goal should always be to preserve and provide justice. Therefore, the best way to deal with a difficult prosecutor is to fully collaborate by providing all necessary evidence, remain professional and do not let personal feelings interfere with the investigation. Moreover, whereas prosecutors do have a lot of power they are not invincible and they do have supervisors who can be informed of any unprofessional behavior. However this should be taken into consideration as a last resort How would you deal with a supervisor who was reluctant to give you the resources necessary to complete your investigation? Supervisors have more experience and knowledge in the criminological field that a regular employee does. Therefore, when reluctance is present it is important to as an investigator take a step back, think carefully about the case and why the resources are needed, consider alternatives and the pros and cons of these alternatives. Moreover, if the investigator considers the resources to be extremely necessary and no alternatives are present a presentation of the whys, how, when, pros, and cons should be provided to the supervisor in order to try to achieve such means. INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES CJI 550 LECTURE Putting It All Together and Conclusion Introduction During this final week of the course, we will look at several case examples in the readings to illustrate the flow of entire investigations. The first one concerns the assassination of Martin Luther King and the second concerns the Lindbergh kidnapping case. This week’s readings also touch on raids and their management. This final lecture will focus on the importance of perception as it relates to dealing with conflict between (inter-organizationally) and within (intra-organizationally) law enforcement agencies. Inter-Organizational Conflict, Intra-Organizational Conflict, and Perception The job of investigators is rife with conflict, both within and outside their agencies. Investigators are constantly trying to meet the needs of the investigation and when someone or something blocks those needs, conflict ensues. Many of the most noticeable investigative conflicts occur inter-organizationally with entities outside of the investigator’s parent agency. For example, an investigator who needs a certain witnesses’ testimony would experience conflict if that witness refused to testify. Likewise, conflict would occur if, at the last minute, a prosecutor unilaterally decides to plea a defendant to a lesser charge against the wishes of the investigator, causing the investigator to lose credibility with his or her agency because the bigger crime was not charged as promised. Intra-organizational conflict occurs when an investigator’s needs are blocked by someone within the parent agency. For example, an investigator who believes that an undercover buywalk purchase of drugs from a suspect would be the best way to prove the case is prevented from doing so from the supervisor who believes that a buy-bust scenario would be better. In this example, differences in perception are at the root of the conflict. The investigator is focused on the buy-walk scenario because he or she perceives that this will lead to a better case, as this will allow multiple drug purchases from the suspect (thus more charges) and better the odds of the undercover officer being able to penetrate deeper into the criminal organization and eventually arresting more people. Contrarily, the supervisor is focused on the buy-bust scenario because this will ensure an arrest and likely conviction (stats!) and allow the recovery of the buy money for other operations. Waco: An Example of Perceptual Intra-Organizational Conflict One of the most vivid examples of how differences in perception can underpin deadly conflict occurred in 1993 during the siege at Waco, Texas. On February 28, 1993, ATF agents raided the Mount Carmel Center with a search warrant for illegal weapons. Upon attempting to serve the warrant, four ATF agents were killed and 16 others were wounded. Additionally, an undetermined number of Branch Davidians were killed or injured. Among the Branch Davidians injured was David Koresh, who was their leader. Following the botched raid, the Copyright 2017 Gregory M. Vecchi INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES CJI 550 ATF agents withdrew and the FBI deployed their elite tactical and non-tactical teams from Quantico, Virginia: the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and the Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU). Negotiators began negotiating with Koresh and some of his followers, while the HRT set up a perimeter around the compound and deployed armored vehicles. The CNU advised against using harassment and favored establishing rapport and trust with Koresh and his followers. Nevertheless, the electricity to the Mount Carmel Center was cut off and the compound was illuminated with bright lights at night to increase the pressure on the Branch Davidians to surrender. These actions by the HRT occurred despite objections from the CNU, which caused Koresh and his followers to perceive this action as a “huge setback.” The HRT wanted to show force, but the CNU believed that force would break the fragile trust between Koresh and the negotiators. Negotiations continued and Koresh allowed several of his followers to leave the compound. Despite this success, the HRT responded by playing loud music causing Koresh to respond by saying that no others would come out. The conflict between the HRT and the CNU intensified, as the CNU tried to influence the FBI commanders to use non-lethal tear gas to evict the Branch Davidians from the compound while the HRT continued to increase their tactical posturing. The tear gas plan was ultimately accepted. The HRT subsequently cleared away Koresh’s cars and other vehicles. In response, some Davidians held children up in tower windows and a sign reading “Flames Await” was posted. On April 19, 1993, a FBI negotiator telephoned the Branch Davidians and announced the siege. The HRT then began inserting tear gas into the compound using armored vehicles and the Davidians opened fire on them. The HRT continued the application of tear gas, breaching several areas of the building, causing a portion of the roof and the right-rear wall to collapse. Thereafter, fires started in at least three locations within the compound. The CNU telephoned Koresh and implored him to lead his followers out safely. Nine Davidians fled Mount Carmel and were arrested. Several FBI agents then heard “systematic gunfire,” which convinced them that the Davidians were killing themselves or each other. After the fire was squelched, 80 Branch Davidians, including 22 children, were found dead. Differences of Perception By instinct and training, the HRT was inclined to action. One member of the HRT stated: “A crime’s been committed. I’m talking the murder charges and you’ve got to do something about it. You CAN NOT [emphasis added] just let these people sit.” An HRT sniper stated: “The more uncomfortable we make them inside, the more apt they are to try and negotiate better.” The negotiations coordinator at Waco, exhibited a different perspective: “You can’t deal with a cohesive group like it’s a group of bank robbers because the things you can do to bank robbers to make them come out simply drives the Davidians together. If you look at the core of a nuclear bomb, it’s this tightly packed ball of uranium, and what makes that so powerful is it’s so tightly packed. The Davidians were tightly packed and all we did was compress it even more and make it more volatile.” 2 Copyright 2017 Gregory M. Vecchi INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES CJI 550 The conflict between the HRT was more than just a difference of perspectives; it was also played out physically. For example, during a negotiation between the FBI chief negotiator and Steve Schneider (an assistant to Koresh), Schneider informed the negotiator that the HRT was running over their [Davidians’] guard shacks. The negotiator, surprised and upset about not knowing about this, tells Schneider: “You’re kidding, I know they’ve [HRT] been ordered NOT [emphasis added] to go in there!” Conclusion During Waco, conflict developed over the perceived differences in perspectives and worldviews between the tactical and non-tactical teams. This conflict occurred as a result of the individual organizational culture of each team, which separated them from each other based on their differing perspectives, worldviews, beliefs and philosophies. Similarly, on an individual level, investigators also experience intra-organizational conflict as a result of differences of opinions and perceptions on how best to handle investigations. To reduce this conflict, the investigator must be aware of these other opinions and perceptions and take them into account when presenting alternatives that strive to meet the needs of all stakeholders of the investigation. Bibliography Boyer, P. J., & Kirk, M. (1995). Waco: The inside story (M. Kirk, Director). In M. Kirk, M. McLeod, & K. Levis (Producers), Frontline. Boston: WGBH Educational Foundation. Dennis, E.S.G., Jr. (1993). Evaluation of the handling of the Branch Davidian stand-off in Waco, Texas: February 28 to April 19, 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Vecchi, G. M. (2002). Hostage/barricade management: A hidden conflict within law enforcement. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 71(5), 1-7. 3 Copyright 2017 Gregory M. Vecchi 
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