final project (( democracy in usa ))

Anonymous
timer Asked: Jul 3rd, 2018
account_balance_wallet $10

Question description

Create a project of your choosing exploring a topic or topics we have learned about in class related

to media and democracy. You must cite at least 3 things we have used in the course, and you are

encouraged to use any number of outside sources that you need.

This could be a 5+ page paper

i put 3 cites

110TH CONGRESS " HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session ! DOCUMENT 110–49 HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE Revised and Updated By John V. Sullivan, Parliamentarian, U.S. House of Representatives Presented by Mr. Brady of Pennsylvania July 24, 2007.—Ordered to be printed U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON 36–931 : 2007 VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 6011 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C E:\Seals\Congress.#13 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 H. Con. Res. 190 Agreed to July 25, 2007 One Hundred Tenth Congress of the United States of America AT THE FIRST SESSION Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday, the fourth day of January, two thousand and seven Concurrent Resolution Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), SECTION 1. HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE. (a) IN GENERAL.—An edition of the brochure entitled ‘‘How Our Laws Are Made’’, as revised under the direction of the Parliamentarian of the House of Representatives in consultation with the Parliamentarian of the Senate, shall be printed as a House document under the direction of the Joint Committee on Printing. (b) ADDITIONAL COPIES.—In addition to the usual number, there shall be printed the lesser of— (1) 550,000 copies of the document, of which 440,000 copies shall be for the use of the House of Representatives, 100,000 copies shall be for the use of the Senate, and 10,000 copies shall be for the use of the Joint Committee on Printing; or (2) such number of copies of the document as does not exceed a total production and printing cost of $479,247, with distribution to be allocated in the same proportion as described in paragraph (1), except that in no case shall the number of copies be less than 1 per Member of Congress. Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, Clerk of the House of Representatives. Attest: NANCY ERICKSON Secretary of the Senate. bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING (II) VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 7633 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C EARLIER PRINTINGS Number of copies Document 1953, H. Doc. 210, 83d Cong. (H. Res. 251 by Mr. Reed) 1953, H. Doc. 210, 83d Cong. (H. Res. 251 by Mr. Reed) 1955, H. Doc. 210, 83d Cong. (H. Con. Res. 93 by Mr. Willis) ............................................................................... 1956, H. Doc. 451, 84th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 251 by Mr. Willis) ............................................................................... 1956, S. Doc. 152, 84th Cong. (S. Res. 293 by Senator Kennedy) .......................................................................... 1959, H. Doc. 156, 86th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 95 by Mr. Lesinski) ........................................................................... 1961, H. Doc. 136, 87th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 81 by Mr. Willis) ............................................................................... 1963, H. Doc. 103, 88th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 108 by Mr. Willis) ............................................................................... 1965, H. Doc. 103, 88th Cong. (S. Res. 9 by Senator Mansfield) ......................................................................... 1965, H. Doc. 164, 89th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 165 by Mr. Willis) ............................................................................... 1967, H. Doc. 125, 90th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 221 by Mr. Willis) ............................................................................... 1969, H. Doc. 127, 91st Cong. (H. Con. Res. 192 by Mr. Celler) ............................................................................... 1971, H. Doc. 144, 92d Cong. (H. Con. Res. 206 by Mr. Celler) ............................................................................... 1972, H. Doc. 323, 92d Cong. (H. Con. Res. 530 by Mr. Celler) ............................................................................... 1974, H. Doc. 377, 93d Cong. (H. Con. Res. 201 by Mr. Rodino) .............................................................................. 1976, H. Doc. 509, 94th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 540 by Mr. Rodino) .............................................................................. 1978, H. Doc. 259, 95th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 190 by Mr. Rodino) .............................................................................. 1980, H. Doc. 352, 96th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 95 by Mr. Rodino) .............................................................................. 1981, H. Doc. 120, 97th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 106 by Mr. Rodino) .............................................................................. 1985, H. Doc. 158, 99th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 203 by Mr. Rodino) .............................................................................. 36,771 122,732 167,728 30,385 182,358 228,591 211,797 14,000 196,414 319,766 324,821 174,500 292,000 292,500 246,000 282,400 298,000 298,000 298,000 298,000 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING (III) VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 6664 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C IV Number of copies Document bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING 1989, H. Doc. 139, 101st Cong. (H. Con. Res. 193 by Mr. Brooks) .............................................................................. 1997, H. Doc. 14, 105th Cong. (S. Con. Res. 62 by Senator Warner) .................................................................... 2000, H. Doc. 197, 106th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 221 by Mr. Thomas) ............................................................................ 2003, H. Doc. 93, 108th Cong. (H. Con. Res. 139 by Mr. Ney) ................................................................................... VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 6664 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX 323,000 387,000 550,000 550,000 PRFM99 PsN: HD049C FOREWORD First published in 1953 by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, this 24th edition of ‘‘How Our Laws Are Made’’ reflects changes in congressional procedures since the 23rd edition, which was revised and updated in 2003. This edition was prepared by the Office of the Parliamentarian of the U.S. House of Representatives in consultation with the Office of the Parliamentarian of the U.S. Senate. The framers of our Constitution created a strong federal government resting on the concept of ‘‘separation of powers.’’ In Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution, the Legislative Branch is created by the following language: ‘‘All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.’’ Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution provides that: ‘‘Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, . . .’’. Upon this elegant, yet simple, grant of legislative powers and rulemaking authority has grown an exceedingly complex and evolving legislative process—much of it unique to each House of Congress. To aid the public’s understanding of the legislative process, we have revised this popular brochure. For more detailed information on how our laws are made and for the text of the laws themselves, the reader should refer to government internet sites or pertinent House and Senate publications available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. JOHN V. SULLIVAN. bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING (V) VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING X. Introduction .................................................................... The Congress .................................................................. Sources of Legislation .................................................... Forms of Congressional Action ...................................... Bills ............................................................................ Joint Resolutions ....................................................... Concurrent Resolutions ............................................ Simple Resolutions .................................................... Introduction and Referral to Committee ...................... Consideration by Committee ......................................... Committee Meetings ................................................. Public Hearings ......................................................... Markup ....................................................................... Final Committee Action ............................................ Points of Order With Respect to Committee Hearing Procedure ..................................................... Reported Bills ................................................................. Contents of Reports ................................................... Filing of Reports ........................................................ Availability of Reports and Hearings ...................... Legislative Oversight by Standing Committees ........... Calendars ........................................................................ Union Calendar ......................................................... House Calendar ......................................................... Private Calendar ....................................................... Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees ...... Obtaining Consideration of Measures .......................... Unanimous Consent .................................................. Special Resolution or ‘‘Rule’’ ..................................... Consideration of Measures Made in Order by Rule Reported From the Committee on Rules .......... Motion to Discharge Committee .............................. Motion to Suspend the Rules ................................... Calendar Wednesday ................................................ District of Columbia Business .................................. Questions of Privilege ............................................... 1 1 4 5 5 6 7 8 8 11 11 12 14 14 15 15 16 18 18 18 19 19 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 24 24 (VII) VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 0581 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C VIII Page bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Privileged Matters ..................................................... XI. Consideration and Debate ............................................. Committee of the Whole ........................................... Second Reading ......................................................... Amendments and the Germaneness Rule ............... Congressional Earmarks .......................................... The Committee ‘‘Rises’’ ............................................. House Action .............................................................. Motion to Recommit .................................................. Quorum Calls and Rollcalls ...................................... Voting ......................................................................... Electronic Voting ....................................................... Pairing of Members ................................................... System of Lights and Bells ....................................... Recess Authority ....................................................... Live Coverage of Floor Proceedings ......................... XII. Congressional Budget Process ....................................... XIII. Engrossment and Message to Senate ........................... XIV. Senate Action .................................................................. Committee Consideration ......................................... Chamber Procedure .................................................. XV. Final Action on Amended Bill ....................................... Request for a Conference .......................................... Authority of Conferees .............................................. Meetings and Action of Conferees ........................... Conference Reports ................................................... Custody of Papers ..................................................... XVI. Bill Originating in Senate .............................................. XVII. Enrollment ...................................................................... XVIII. Presidential Action ......................................................... Veto Message ............................................................. Line Item Veto ........................................................... XIX. Publication ...................................................................... Slip Laws ................................................................... Statutes at Large ...................................................... United States Code ................................................... Appendix ...................................................................................... VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 0581 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 25 25 26 27 28 28 28 29 29 30 31 33 33 33 34 34 35 36 37 37 38 41 42 43 44 46 48 49 49 50 51 52 52 53 53 54 55 PsN: HD049C HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE I. INTRODUCTION This brochure is intended to provide a basic outline of the numerous steps of our federal lawmaking process from the source of an idea for a legislative proposal through its publication as a statute. The legislative process is a matter about which every person should be well informed in order to understand and appreciate the work of Congress. It is hoped that this guide will enable readers to gain a greater understanding of the federal legislative process and its role as one of the foundations of our representative system. One of the most practical safeguards of the American democratic way of life is this legislative process with its emphasis on the protection of the minority, allowing ample opportunity to all sides to be heard and make their views known. The fact that a proposal cannot become a law without consideration and approval by both Houses of Congress is an outstanding virtue of our bicameral legislative system. The open and full discussion provided under the Constitution often results in the notable improvement of a bill by amendment before it becomes law or in the eventual defeat of an inadvisable proposal. As the majority of laws originate in the House of Representatives, this discussion will focus principally on the procedure in that body. II. THE CONGRESS Article I, Section 1, of the United States Constitution, provides that: All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. The Senate is composed of 100 Members—two from each state, regardless of population or area—elected by the people in accordance with the 17th Amendment to the Constitution. The 17th Amendment changed the former constitutional method under which Senators were chosen by the respective state legislatures. A Senator must be at least 30 years of age, have been a citizen of the United States for nine years, and, when elected, be an inhabitant of the state for which the Senator is chosen. The term of office is six years and one-third of the total membership of the Senate is bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING (1) VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 2 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING elected every second year. The terms of both Senators from a particular state are arranged so that they do not terminate at the same time. Of the two Senators from a state serving at the same time the one who was elected first—or if both were elected at the same time, the one elected for a full term—is referred to as the ‘‘senior’’ Senator from that state. The other is referred to as the ‘‘junior’’ Senator. If a Senator dies or resigns during the term, the governor of the state must call a special election unless the state legislature has authorized the governor to appoint a successor until the next election, at which time a successor is elected for the balance of the term. Most of the state legislatures have granted their governors the power of appointment. Each Senator has one vote. As constituted in the 110th Congress, the House of Representatives is composed of 435 Members elected every two years from among the 50 states, apportioned to their total populations. The permanent number of 435 was established by federal law following the Thirteenth Decennial Census in 1910, in accordance with Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution. This number was increased temporarily to 437 for the 87th Congress to provide for one Representative each for Alaska and Hawaii. The Constitution limits the number of Representatives to not more than one for every 30,000 of population. Under a former apportionment in one state, a particular Representative represented more than 900,000 constituents, while another in the same state was elected from a district having a population of only 175,000. The Supreme Court has since held unconstitutional a Missouri statute permitting a maximum population variance of 3.1 percent from mathematical equality. The Court ruled in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), that the variances among the districts were not unavoidable and, therefore, were invalid. That decision was an interpretation of the Court’s earlier ruling in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), that the Constitution requires that ‘‘as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.’’ A law enacted in 1967 abolished all ‘‘at-large’’ elections except in those less populous states entitled to only one Representative. An ‘‘at-large’’ election is one in which a Representative is elected by the voters of the entire state rather than by the voters in a congressional district within the state. A Representative must be at least 25 years of age, have been a citizen of the United States for seven years, and, when elected, be an inhabitant of the state in which the Representative is chosen. Unlike the Senate where a successor may be appointed by a governor when a vacancy occurs during a term, if a Representative VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 3 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING dies or resigns during the term, the executive authority of the state must call a special election pursuant to state law for the choosing of a successor to serve for the unexpired portion of the term. Each Representative has one vote. In addition to the Representatives from each of the States, a Resident Commissioner from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Delegates from the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands are elected pursuant to federal law. The Resident Commissioner, elected for a four-year term, and the Delegates, elected for two-year terms, have most of the prerogatives of Representatives including the right to vote in committees to which they are elected, the right to vote in the Committee of the Whole (subject to an automatic revote in the House whenever a recorded vote has been decided by a margin within which the votes cast by the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner have been decisive), and the right to preside over the Committee of the Whole. However, the Resident Commissioner and the Delegates do not have the right to vote on matters before the House. Under the provisions of Section 2 of the 20th Amendment to the Constitution, Congress must assemble at least once every year, at noon on the third day of January, unless by law they appoint a different day. A Congress lasts for two years, commencing in January of the year following the biennial election of Members. A Congress is divided into two regular sessions. The Constitution authorizes each House to determine the rules of its proceedings. Pursuant to that authority, the House of Representatives adopts its rules anew each Congress, ordinarily on the opening day of the first session. The Senate considers itself a continuing body and operates under continuous standing rules that it amends from time to time. Unlike some other parliamentary bodies, both the Senate and the House of Representatives have equal legislative functions and powers with certain exceptions. For example, the Constitution provides that only the House of Representatives may originate revenue bills. By tradition, the House also originates appropriation bills. As both bodies have equal legislative powers, the designation of one as the ‘‘upper’’ House and the other as the ‘‘lower’’ House is not applicable. The chief function of Congress is the making of laws. In addition, the Senate has the function of advising and consenting to treaties and to certain nominations by the President. Under the 25th Amendment to the Constitution, a vote in each House is required to confirm the President’s nomination for Vice-President when there is a vacancy in that office. In the matter of impeachments, the House of Representatives presents the charges—a function VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 4 similar to that of a grand jury—and the Senate sits as a court to try the impeachment. No impeached person may be removed without a two-thirds vote of those Senators voting, a quorum being present. The Congress under the Constitution and by statute also plays a role in presidential elections. Both Houses meet in joint session on the sixth day of January following a presidential election, unless by law they appoint a different day, to count the electoral votes. If no candidate receives a majority of the total electoral votes, the House of Representatives, each state delegation having one vote, chooses the President from among the three candidates having the largest number of electoral votes. The Senate, each Senator having one vote, chooses the Vice President from the two candidates having the largest number of votes for that office. III. SOURCES OF LEGISLATION bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Sources of ideas for legislation are unlimited and proposed drafts of bills originate in many diverse quarters. Primary among these is the idea and draft conceived by a Member. This may emanate from the election campaign during which the Member had promised, if elected, to introduce legislation on a particular subject. The Member may have also become aware after taking office of the need for amendment to or repeal of an existing law or the enactment of a statute in an entirely new field. In addition, the Member’s constituents, either as individuals or through citizen groups, may avail themselves of the right to petition and transmit their proposals to the Member. The right to petition is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution. Similarly, state legislatures may ‘‘memorialize’’ Congress to enact specified federal laws by passing resolutions to be transmitted to the House and Senate as memorials. If favorably impressed by the idea, a Member may introduce the proposal in the form in which it has been submitted or may redraft it. In any event, a Member may consult with the Legislative Counsel of the House or the Senate to frame the ideas in suitable legislative language and form. In modern times, the ‘‘executive communication’’ has become a prolific source of legislative proposals. The communication is usually in the form of a message or letter from a member of the President’s Cabinet, the head of an independent agency, or the President himself, transmitting a draft of a proposed bill to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate. Despite the structure of separation of powers, Article II, Section 3, of the Constitution imposes an obligation on the President to report to Congress from time to time on the ‘‘State of the Union’’ and to recommend for consideration such measures as the President considers necessary and expedient. Many of these executive commu- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 5 nications follow on the President’s message to Congress on the state of the Union. The communication is then referred to the standing committee or committees having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the proposal. The chairman or the ranking minority member of the relevant committee often introduces the bill, either in the form in which it was received or with desired changes. This practice is usually followed even when the majority of the House and the President are not of the same political party, although there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that a bill be introduced to effectuate the recommendations. The most important of the regular executive communications is the annual message from the President transmitting the proposed budget to Congress. The President’s budget proposal, together with testimony by officials of the various branches of the government before the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate, is the basis of the several appropriation bills that are drafted by the Committees on Appropriations of the House and Senate. The drafting of statutes is an art that requires great skill, knowledge, and experience. In some instances, a draft is the result of a study covering a period of a year or more by a commission or committee designated by the President or a member of the Cabinet. The Administrative Procedure Act and the Uniform Code of Military Justice are two examples of enactments resulting from such studies. In addition, congressional committees sometimes draft bills after studies and hearings covering periods of a year or more. IV. FORMS OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION The work of Congress is initiated by the introduction of a proposal in one of four forms: the bill, the joint resolution, the concurrent resolution, and the simple resolution. The most customary form used in both Houses is the bill. During the 109th Congress (2005–2006), 10,558 bills and 143 joint resolutions were introduced in both Houses. Of the total number introduced, 6,436 bills and 102 joint resolutions originated in the House of Representatives. For the purpose of simplicity, this discussion will be confined generally to the procedure on a measure of the House of Representatives, with brief comment on each of the forms. BILLS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING A bill is the form used for most legislation, whether permanent or temporary, general or special, public or private. The form of a House bill is as follows: VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 6 A BILL For the establishment, etc. [as the title may be]. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, etc. The enacting clause was prescribed by law in 1871 and is identical in all bills, whether they originate in the House of Representatives or in the Senate. Bills may originate in either the House of Representatives or the Senate with one notable exception. Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution provides that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives but that the Senate may propose, or concur with, amendments. By tradition, general appropriation bills also originate in the House of Representatives. There are two types of bills—public and private. A public bill is one that affects the public generally. A bill that affects a specified individual or a private entity rather than the population at large is called a private bill. A typical private bill is used for relief in matters such as immigration and naturalization and claims against the United States. A bill originating in the House of Representatives is designated by ‘‘H.R.’’ followed by a number that it retains throughout all its parliamentary stages. The letters signify ‘‘House of Representatives’’ and not, as is sometimes incorrectly assumed, ‘‘House resolution.’’ A Senate bill is designated by ‘‘S.’’ followed by its number. The term ‘‘companion bill’’ is used to describe a bill introduced in one House of Congress that is similar or identical to a bill introduced in the other House of Congress. A bill that has been agreed to in identical form by both bodies becomes the law of the land only after— (1) Presidential approval; or (2) failure by the President to return it with objections to the House in which it originated within 10 days (Sundays excepted) while Congress is in session; or (3) the overriding of a presidential veto by a two-thirds vote in each House. Such a bill does not become law without the President’s signature if Congress by their final adjournment prevent its return with objections. This is known as a ‘‘pocket veto.’’ For a discussion of presidential action on legislation, see Part XVIII. JOINT RESOLUTIONS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Joint resolutions may originate either in the House of Representatives or in the Senate—not, as is sometimes incorrectly assumed, jointly in both Houses. There is little practical difference between VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 7 a bill and a joint resolution and the two forms are sometimes used interchangeably. One difference in form is that a joint resolution may include a preamble preceding the resolving clause. Statutes that have been initiated as bills may be amended by a joint resolution and vice versa. Both are subject to the same procedure except for a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. When a joint resolution amending the Constitution is approved by two-thirds of both Houses, it is not presented to the President for approval. Rather, such a joint resolution is sent directly to the Archivist of the United States for submission to the several states where ratification by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states within the period of time prescribed in the joint resolution is necessary for the amendment to become part of the Constitution. The form of a House joint resolution is as follows: JOINT RESOLUTION Authorizing, etc. [as the title may be]. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, etc. The resolving clause is identical in both House and Senate joint resolutions as has been prescribed by statute since 1871. It is frequently preceded by a preamble consisting of one or more ‘‘whereas’’ clauses indicating the necessity for or the desirability of the joint resolution. A joint resolution originating in the House of Representatives is designated ‘‘H.J. Res.’’ followed by its individual number which it retains throughout all its parliamentary stages. One originating in the Senate is designated ‘‘S.J. Res.’’ followed by its number. Joint resolutions, with the exception of proposed amendments to the Constitution, become law in the same manner as bills. CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING A matter affecting the operations of both Houses is usually initiated by a concurrent resolution. In modern practice, and as determined by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), concurrent and simple resolutions normally are not legislative in character since not ‘‘presented’’ to the President for approval, but are used merely for expressing facts, principles, opinions, and purposes of the two Houses. A concurrent resolution is not equivalent to a bill and its use is narrowly limited within these bounds. The term ‘‘concurrent’’, like ‘‘joint’’, does not signify simultaneous introduction and consideration in both Houses. A concurrent resolution originating in the House of Representatives is designated ‘‘H. Con. Res.’’ followed by its individual number, while a Senate concurrent resolution is designated ‘‘S. Con. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 8 Res.’’ together with its number. On approval by both Houses, they are signed by the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate and transmitted to the Archivist of the United States for publication in a special part of the Statutes at Large volume covering that session of Congress. SIMPLE RESOLUTIONS A matter concerning the rules, the operation, or the opinion of either House alone is initiated by a simple resolution. A resolution affecting the House of Representatives is designated ‘‘H. Res.’’ followed by its number, while a Senate resolution is designated ‘‘S. Res.’’ together with its number. Simple resolutions are considered only by the body in which they were introduced. Upon adoption, simple resolutions are attested to by the Clerk of the House of Representatives or the Secretary of the Senate and are published in the Congressional Record. V. INTRODUCTION AND REFERRAL TO COMMITTEE bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Any Member, Delegate or the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico in the House of Representatives may introduce a bill at any time while the House is in session by simply placing it in the ‘‘hopper,’’ a wooden box provided for that purpose located on the side of the rostrum in the House Chamber. Permission is not required to introduce the measure. The Member introducing the bill is known as the primary sponsor. Except in the case of private bills, an unlimited number of Members may cosponsor a bill. To prevent the possibility that a bill might be introduced in the House on behalf of a Member without that Member’s prior approval, the primary sponsor’s signature must appear on the bill before it is accepted for introduction. Members who cosponsor a bill upon its date of introduction are original cosponsors. Members who cosponsor a bill after its introduction are additional cosponsors. Cosponsors are not required to sign the bill. A Member may not be added or deleted as a cosponsor after the bill has been reported by, or discharged from, the last committee authorized to consider it, and the Speaker may not entertain a request to delete the name of the primary sponsor at any time. Cosponsors’ names may be deleted by their own unanimous-consent request or that of the primary sponsor. In the Senate, unlimited multiple sponsorship of a bill is permitted. A Member may insert the words ‘‘by request’’ after the Member’s name to indicate that the introduction of the measure is at the suggestion of some other person or group—usually the President or a member of his Cabinet. In the Senate, a Senator usually introduces a bill or resolution by presenting it to one of the clerks at the Presiding Officer’s desk, VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 9 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING without commenting on it from the floor of the Senate. However, a Senator may use a more formal procedure by rising and introducing the bill or resolution from the floor, usually accompanied by a statement about the measure. Frequently, Senators obtain consent to have the bill or resolution printed in the Congressional Record following their formal statement. In the House of Representatives, it is no longer the custom to read bills—even by title—at the time of introduction. The title is entered in the Journal and printed in the Congressional Record, thus preserving the purpose of the custom. The bill is assigned its legislative number by the Clerk. The bill is then referred as required by the rules of the House to the appropriate committee or committees by the Speaker, with the assistance of the Parliamentarian. The bill number and committee referral appear in the next issue of the Congressional Record. It is then sent to the Government Printing Office where it is printed and copies are made available in the document rooms of both Houses. Printed and electronic versions of the bill are also made available to the public. Copies of the bill are sent to the office of the chairman of each committee to which it has been referred. The clerk of the committee enters it on the committee’s Legislative Calendar. Perhaps the most important phase of the legislative process is the action by committees. The committees provide the most intensive consideration to a proposed measure as well as the forum where the public is given their opportunity to be heard. A tremendous volume of work, often overlooked by the public, is done by the Members in this phase. There are, at present, 20 standing committees in the House and 16 in the Senate as well as several select committees. In addition, there are four standing joint committees of the two Houses, with oversight responsibilities but no legislative jurisdiction. The House may also create select committees or task forces to study specific issues and report on them to the House. A task force may be established formally through a resolution passed by the House or informally through organization of interested Members by the House leadership. Each committee’s jurisdiction is defined by certain subject matter under the rules of each House and all measures are referred accordingly. For example, the Committee on the Judiciary in the House has jurisdiction over measures relating to judicial proceedings and 18 other categories, including constitutional amendments, immigration policy, bankruptcy, patents, copyrights, and trademarks. In total, the rules of the House and of the Senate each provide for over 200 different classifications of measures to be referred to committees. Until 1975, the Speaker of the House could refer a bill to only one committee. In modern practice, the Speaker VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 10 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING may refer an introduced bill to multiple committees for consideration of those provisions of the bill within the jurisdiction of each committee concerned. Except in extraordinary circumstances, the Speaker must designate a primary committee of jurisdiction on bills referred to multiple committees. The Speaker may place time limits on the consideration of bills by all committees, but usually time limits are placed only on additional committees to which a bill has been referred following the report of the primary committee. In the Senate, introduced measures and House-passed measures are referred to the one committee of preponderant jurisdiction by the Parliamentarian on behalf of the Presiding Officer. By special or standing order, a measure may be referred to more than one committee in the Senate. Membership on the various committees is divided between the two major political parties. The proportion of the Members of the minority party to the Members of the majority party is determined by the majority party, except that half of the members on the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct are from the majority party and half from the minority party. The respective party caucuses nominate Members of the caucus to be elected to each standing committee at the beginning of each Congress. Membership on a standing committee during the course of a Congress is contingent on continuing membership in the party caucus that nominated a Member for election to the committee. If a Member ceases to be a Member of the party caucus, a Member automatically ceases to be a member of the standing committee. Members of the House may serve on only two committees and four subcommittees with certain exceptions. However, the rules of the caucus of the majority party in the House provide that a Member may be chairman of only one subcommittee of a committee or select committee with legislative jurisdiction, except for certain committees performing housekeeping functions and joint committees. A Member usually seeks election to the committee that has jurisdiction over a field in which the Member is most qualified and interested. For example, the Committee on the Judiciary traditionally is populated with numerous lawyers. Members rank in seniority in accordance with the order of their appointment to the full committee and the ranking majority member with the most continuous service is often elected chairman. The rules of the House require that committee chairmen be elected from nominations submitted by the majority party caucus at the commencement of each Congress. No Member of the House may serve as chairman of the same standing committee or of the same VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 11 subcommittee thereof for more than three consecutive Congresses, except in the case of the Committee on Rules. The rules of the House provide that a committee may maintain no more than five committees, but may have an oversight committee as a sixth. The standing rules allow a greater number of subcommittees for the Committees on Appropriations and Oversight and Government Reform. In addition, the House may grant leave to certain committeess to establish additional subcommittees during a given Congress. Each committee is provided with a professional staff to assist it in the innumerable administrative details involved in the consideration of bills and its oversight responsibilities. For standing committees, the professional staff is limited to 30 persons appointed by a vote of the committee. Two-thirds of the committee staff are selected by a majority vote of the majority committee members and one-third of the committee staff are selected by a majority vote of minority committee members. All staff appointments are made without regard to race, creed, sex, or age. Minority staff requirements do not apply to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct because of its bipartisan nature. The Committee on Appropriations has special authority under the rules of the House for appointment of staff for the minority. VI. CONSIDERATION BY COMMITTEE One of the first actions taken by a committee is to seek the input of the relevant departments and agencies about a bill. Frequently, the bill is also submitted to the Government Accountability Office with a request for an official report of views on the necessity or desirability of enacting the bill into law. Normally, ample time is given for the submission of the reports and they are accorded serious consideration. However, these reports are not binding on the committee in determining whether or not to act favorably on the bill. Reports of the departments and agencies in the executive branch are submitted first to the Office of Management and Budget to determine whether they are consistent with the program of the President. Many committees adopt rules requiring referral of measures to the appropriate subcommittee unless the full committee votes to retain the measure at the full committee. COMMITTEE MEETINGS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Standing committees are required to have regular meeting days at least once a month. The chairman of the committee may also call and convene additional meetings. Three or more members of a standing committee may file with the committee a written request that the chairman call a special meeting. The request must specify VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 12 the measure or matter to be considered. If the chairman does not schedule the requested special meeting within three calendar days after the filing of the request, to be held within seven calendar days after the filing of the request, a majority of the members of the committee may call the special meeting by filing with the committee written notice specifying the date, hour, and the measure or matter to be considered at the meeting. In the Senate, the Chair may still control the agenda of the special meeting through the power of recognition. Committee meetings may be held for various purposes including the ‘‘markup’’ of legislation, authorizing subpoenas, or internal budget and personnel matters. A subpoena may be authorized and issued at a meeting by a vote of a committee or subcommittee with a majority of members present. The power to authorize and issue subpoenas also may be delegated to the chairman of the committee. A subpoena may require both testimonial and documentary evidence to be furnished to the committee. A subpoena is signed by the chairman of the committee or by a member designated by the committee. All meetings for the transaction of business of standing committees or subcommittees, except the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, must be open to the public, except when the committee or subcommittee, in open session with a majority present, determines by record vote that all or part of the remainder of the meeting on that day shall be closed to the public. Members of the committee may authorize congressional staff and departmental representatives to be present at any meeting that has been closed to the public. Open committee meetings may be covered by the media. Permission to cover hearings and meetings is granted under detailed conditions as provided in the rules of the House. The rules of the House provide that House committees may not meet during a joint session of the House and Senate or during a recess when a joint meeting of the House and Senate is in progress. Committees may meet at other times during an adjournment or recess up to the expiration of the constitutional term. The rules of the Senate provide that Senate committees may not meet after two hours after the meeting of the Senate commenced, and in no case after 2 p.m. when the Senate is in session. Special leave for this purpose may be granted by the Majority and Minority leaders. PUBLIC HEARINGS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING If the bill is of sufficient importance, the committee may set a date for public hearings. The chairman of each committee, except for the Committee on Rules, is required to make public announcement of the date, place, and subject matter of any hearing at least one week before the commencement of that hearing, unless the VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 13 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING committee chairman with the concurrence of the ranking minority member or the committee by majority vote determines that there is good cause to begin the hearing at an earlier date. If that determination is made, the chairman must make a public announcement to that effect at the earliest possible date. Public announcements are published in the Daily Digest portion of the Congressional Record as soon as possible after an announcement is made and are often noted by the media. Personal notice of the hearing, usually in the form of a letter, is sometimes sent to relevant individuals, organizations, and government departments and agencies. Each hearing by a committee or subcommittee, except the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, is required to be open to the public except when the committee or subcommittee, in open session and with a majority present, determines by record vote that all or part of the remainder of the hearing on that day shall be closed to the public because disclosure of testimony, evidence, or other matters to be considered would endanger national security, would compromise sensitive law enforcement information, or would violate a law or a rule of the House. The committee or subcommittee may by the same procedure vote to close one subsequent day of hearing, except that the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and subcommittees thereof, may vote to close up to five additional, consecutive days of hearings. When a quorum for taking testimony is present, a majority of the members present may close a hearing to discuss whether the evidence or testimony to be received would endanger national security or would tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person. A committee or subcommittee may vote to release or make public matters originally received in a closed hearing or meeting. Open committee hearings may be covered by the media. Permission to cover hearings and meetings is granted under detailed conditions as provided in the rules of the House. Hearings on the President’s Budget are required to be held by the Committee on Appropriations in open session within 30 days after its transmittal to Congress, except when the committee, in open session and with a quorum present, determines by record vote that the testimony to be taken at that hearing on that day may be related to a matter of national security. The committee may by the same procedure close one subsequent day of hearing. On the day set for a public hearing in a committee or subcommittee, an official reporter is present to record the testimony. After a brief introductory statement by the chairman and often by the ranking minority member or other committee member, the first witness is called. Cabinet officers and high-ranking government of- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 14 ficials, as well as interested private individuals, testify either voluntarily or by subpoena. So far as practicable, committees require that witnesses who appear before it file a written statement of their proposed testimony in advance of their appearance and limit their oral presentations to a brief summary thereof. In the case of a witness appearing in a nongovernmental capacity, a written statement of proposed testimony shall include a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of certain federal grants and contracts. Upon request by a majority of them, minority party members of the committee are entitled to call witnesses of their own to testify on a measure during at least one additional day of a hearing. Each member of the committee is provided five minutes in the interrogation of each witness until each member of the committee who desires to question a witness has had an opportunity to do so. In addition, a committee may adopt a rule or motion to permit committee members to question a witness for a specified period not longer than one hour. Committee staff may also be permitted to question a witness for a specified period not longer than one hour. A transcript of the testimony taken at a public hearing is made available for inspection in the office of the clerk of the committee. Frequently, the complete transcript is printed and distributed widely by the committee. MARKUP After hearings are completed, the subcommittee usually will consider the bill in a session that is popularly known as the ‘‘markup’’ session. The views of both sides are studied in detail and at the conclusion of deliberation a vote is taken to determine the action of the subcommittee. It may decide to report the bill favorably to the full committee, with or without amendment, or unfavorably, or without recommendation. The subcommittee may also suggest that the committee ‘‘table’’ it or postpone action indefinitely. Each member of the subcommittee, regardless of party affiliation, has one vote. Proxy voting is no longer permitted in House committees. FINAL COMMITTEE ACTION bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING At full committee meetings, reports on bills may be made by subcommittees. Bills are read for amendment in committees by section and members may offer germane amendments. Committee amendments are only proposals to change the bill as introduced and are subject to acceptance or rejection by the House itself. A vote of committee members is taken to determine whether the full committee will report the bill favorably, adversely, or without recommendation. If the committee votes to report the bill favorably to the VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 15 House, it may report the bill with or without amendments. If the committee has approved extensive amendments, the committee may decide to report the original bill with one ‘‘amendment in the nature of a substitute’’ consisting of all the amendments previously adopted, or may introduce and report a new bill incorporating those amendments, commonly known as a ‘‘clean’’ bill. The new bill is introduced (usually by the chairman of the committee), and, after referral back to the committee, is reported favorably to the House by the committee. A committee may table a bill or fail to take action on it, thereby preventing its report to the House. This makes adverse reports or reports without recommendation to the House by a committee unusual. The House also has the ability to discharge a bill from committee. For a discussion of the motion to discharge, see Part X. Generally, a majority of the committee or subcommittee constitutes a quorum. A quorum is the number of members who must be present in order for the committee to report. However, a committee may vary the number of members necessary for a quorum for certain actions. For example, a committee may fix the number of its members, but not less than two, necessary for a quorum for taking testimony and receiving evidence. Except for the Committees on Appropriations, the Budget, and Ways and Means, a committee may fix the number of its members, but not less than onethird, necessary for a quorum for taking certain other actions. The absence of a quorum is subject to a point of order, an objection that the proceedings are in violation of a rule of the committee or of the House. Committees may authorize the chairman to postpone votes in certain circumstances. POINTS OF ORDER WITH RESPECT TO COMMITTEE HEARING PROCEDURE A point of order in the House does not lie with respect to a measure reported by a committee on the ground that hearings on the measure were not conducted in accordance with required committee procedure. However, certain points of order may be made by a member of the committee that reported the measure if, in the committee hearing on that measure, that point of order was (1) timely made and (2) improperly disposed of. VII. REPORTED BILLS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING If the committee votes to report the bill to the House, the committee staff writes a committee report. The report describes the purpose and scope of the bill and the reasons for its recommended approval. Generally, a section-by-section analysis sets forth precisely what each section is intended to accomplish. All changes in VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 16 existing law must be indicated in the report and the text of laws being repealed must be set out. This requirement is known as the ‘‘Ramseyer’’ rule. A similar rule in the Senate is known as the ‘‘Cordon’’ rule. Committee amendments also must be set out at the beginning of the report and explanations of them are included. Executive communications regarding the bill may be referenced in the report. If at the time of approval of a bill by a committee other than the Committee on Rules a member of the committee gives notice of an intention to file supplemental, minority, or additional views, all members are entitled to not less than two additional calendar days after the day of such notice (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays unless the House is in session on those days) in which to file those views with the clerk of the committee. Those views that are timely filed must be included in the report on the bill. Committee reports must be filed while the House is in session unless unanimous consent is obtained from the House to file at a later time or the committee is entitled to an automatic filing window by virtue of a request for views. The report is assigned a report number upon its filing and is sent to the Government Printing Office for printing. House reports are given a prefix-designator that indicates the number of the Congress. For example, the first House report filed during the 110th Congress was numbered 110–1. In the printed report, committee amendments are indicated by showing new matter in italics and deleted matter in line-through type. The report number is printed on the bill and the calendar number is shown on both the first and back pages of the bill. However, in the case of a bill that was referred to two or more committees for consideration in sequence, the calendar number is printed only on the bill as reported by the last committee to consider it. For a discussion of House calendars, see Part IX. Committee reports are perhaps the most valuable single element of the legislative history of a law. They are used by the courts, executive departments, and the public as a source of information regarding the purpose and meaning of the law. CONTENTS OF REPORTS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The report of a committee on a measure must include: (1) the committee’s oversight findings and recommendations; (2) a statement required by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, if the measure is a bill or joint resolution providing new budget authority (other than continuing appropriations) or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures; (3) a cost estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office; and VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 17 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING (4) a statement of general performance goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and objectives, for which the measure authorizes funding. Each report accompanying a bill or joint resolution relating to employment or access to public services or accommodations must describe the manner in which the provisions apply to the legislative branch. Each of these items is set out separately and clearly identified in the report. With respect to each record vote by a committee, the total number of votes cast for, and the total number of votes cast against any public measure or matter or amendment thereto and the names of those voting for and against, must be included in the committee report. This requirement does not apply to certain votes taken in the Committees on Rules and Standards of Official Conduct. In addition, each report of a committee on a public bill or public joint resolution must contain a statement citing the specific powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the law proposed by the bill or joint resolution. Committee reports that accompany bills or resolutions that contain federal unfunded mandates are also required to include an estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office on the cost of the mandates on state, local, and tribal governments. If an estimate is not available at the time a report is filed, committees are required to publish the estimate in the Congressional Record. Each report also must contain an estimate, made by the committee, of the costs which would be incurred in carrying out that bill or joint resolution in the fiscal year reported and in each of the five fiscal years thereafter or for the duration of the program authorized if less than five years. The report must include a comparison of the estimates of those costs with any estimate made by any Government agency and submitted to that committee. The Committees on Appropriations, House Administration, Rules, and Standards of Official Conduct are not required to include cost estimates in their reports. In addition, the committee’s own cost estimates are not required to be included in reports when a cost estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office has been submitted prior to the filing of the report and included in the report. It is not in order to consider bills and joint resolutions reported from committee unless the report includes a list of congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits and limited tariff benefits in the bill or in the report (including the name of any Member, Delegate or Resident Commissioner who submitted a request to the committee for each respective item included in such list) or a statement that the proposition contains no such congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 18 FILING OF REPORTS Measures approved by a committee are to be reported by the chairman promptly after approval. If not, a majority of the members of the committee may file a written request with the clerk of the committee for the reporting of the measure. When the request is filed, the clerk must immediately notify the chairman of the committee of the filing of the request, and the report on the measure must be filed within seven calendar days (excluding days on which the House is not in session) after the day on which the request is filed. This does not apply to a report of the Committee on Rules with respect to a rule, joint rule, or order of business of the House or to the reporting of a resolution of inquiry addressed to the head of an executive department. AVAILABILITY OF REPORTS AND HEARINGS A measure or matter reported by a committee (except the Committee on Rules in the case of a resolution providing a rule, joint rule, or order of business) may not be considered in the House until the third calendar day (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays unless the House is in session on those days) on which the report of that committee on that measure has been available to the Members of the House. This rule is subject to certain exceptions including resolutions providing for certain privileged matters and measures declaring war or other national emergency. A report of the Committee on Rules on a rule, joint rule, or order of business must lay over for one legislative day prior to consideration. However, it is in order to consider a report from the Committee on Rules on the same day it is reported that proposes only to waive the availability requirement. If hearings were held on a measure or matter so reported, the committee is required to make every reasonable effort to have those hearings printed and available for distribution to the Members of the House prior to the consideration of the measure in the House. Committees are also required, to the maximum extent feasible, to make their publications available in electronic form. A general appropriation bill reported by the Committee on Appropriations may not be considered until printed transcripts of committee hearings and a committee report thereon have been available to the Members of the House for at least three calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays unless the House is in session on those days). VIII. LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Each standing committee, other than the Committee on Appropriations, is required to review and study, on a continuing basis, VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 19 the application, administration, execution, and effectiveness of the laws dealing with the subject matter over which the committee has jurisdiction and the organization and operation of federal agencies and entities having responsibility for the administration and evaluation of those laws. The purpose of the review and study is to determine whether laws and the programs created by Congress are being implemented and carried out in accordance with the intent of Congress and whether those programs should be continued, curtailed, or eliminated. In addition, each committee having oversight responsibility is required to review and study any conditions or circumstances that may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional legislation within the jurisdiction of that committee, and must undertake, on a continuing basis, future research and forecasting on matters within the jurisdiction of that committee. Each standing committee also has the function of reviewing and studying, on a continuing basis, the impact or probable impact of tax policies on subjects within its jurisdiction. The rules of the House provide for special treatment of an investigative or oversight report of a committee. Committees are allowed to file joint investigative reports and to file investigative and activities reports after the House has completed its final session of a Congress. In addition, several of the standing committees have special oversight responsibilities. The details of those responsibilities are set forth in the rules of the House. IX. CALENDARS The House of Representatives has four calendars of business: the Union Calendar, the House Calendar, the Private Calendar, and the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees. The calendars are compiled in one publication printed each day the House is in session. This publication also contains a history of Senate-passed bills, House bills reported out of committee, bills on which the House has acted, and other useful information. When a public bill is favorably reported by all committees to which referred, it is assigned a calendar number on either the Union Calendar or the House Calendar, the two principal calendars of business. The calendar number is printed on the first page of the bill and, in certain instances, is printed also on the back page. In the case of a bill that was referred to multiple committees, the calendar number is printed only on the bill as reported by the last committee to consider it. UNION CALENDAR bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The rules of the House provide that there shall be: VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 20 A Calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, to which shall be referred public bills and public resolutions raising revenue, involving a tax or charge on the people, directly or indirectly making appropriations of money or property or requiring such appropriations to be made, authorizing payments out of appropriations already made, releasing any liability to the United States for money or property, or referring a claim to the Court of Claims. The large majority of public bills and resolutions reported to the House are placed on the Union Calendar. For a discussion of the Committee of the Whole House, see Part XI. HOUSE CALENDAR The rules further provide that there shall be: A House Calendar, to which shall be referred all public bills and public resolutions not requiring referral to the Calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union. Bills not involving a cost to the government and resolutions providing special orders of business are examples of bills and resolutions placed on the House Calendar. PRIVATE CALENDAR The rules also provide that there shall be: A Private Calendar, . . . to which shall be referred all private bills and private resolutions. All private bills reported to the House are placed on the Private Calendar. The Private Calendar is called on the first and third Tuesdays of each month. If two or more Members object to the consideration of any measure called, it is recommitted to the committee that reported it. By tradition, there are six official objectors, three on the majority side and three on the minority side, who make a careful study of each bill or resolution on the Private Calendar. The official objectors’ role is to object to a measure that does not conform to the requirements for that calendar and prevent the passage without debate of nonmeritorious bills and resolutions. Alternative procedures reserved for public bills are not applicable to reported private bills. CALENDAR OF MOTIONS TO DISCHARGE COMMITTEES When a majority of the Members of the House sign a motion to discharge a committee from consideration of a public bill or resolution, that motion is referred to the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees. For a discussion of the motion to discharge, see Part X. X. OBTAINING CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Certain measures, either pending on the House and Union Calendars or unreported and pending in committee, are more impor- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 21 tant and urgent than others and a system permitting their consideration ahead of those that do not require immediate action is necessary. If the calendar numbers alone were the determining factor, the bill reported most recently would be the last to be taken up as all measures are placed on the House and Union Calendars in the order reported. UNANIMOUS CONSENT The House occasionally employs the practice of allowing reported or unreported measures to be considered by the unanimous agreement of all Members in the House Chamber. The power to recognize Members for a unanimous-consent request is ultimately in the discretion of the Chair, and recent Speakers have issued strict guidelines on when such a request is to be entertained. Most unanimous-consent requests for consideration of measures may only be entertained by the Chair when assured that the majority and minority floor and committee leaderships have no objection. SPECIAL RESOLUTION OR ‘‘RULE’’ To avoid delays and to allow selectivity in the consideration of public measures, it is possible to have them taken up out of their order on their respective calendar or to have them discharged from the committee or committees to which referred by obtaining from the Committee on Rules a special resolution or ‘‘rule’’ for their consideration. The Committee on Rules, which is composed of majority and minority members but with a larger proportion of majority members than other committees, is specifically granted jurisdiction over resolutions relating to the order of business of the House. Typically, the chairman of the committee that has favorably reported the bill requests the Committee on Rules to originate a resolution that will provide for its immediate or subsequent consideration. If the Committee on Rules has determined that the measure should be taken up, it may report a resolution reading substantially as follows with respect to a bill on the Union Calendar or an unreported bill: bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to rule XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R.lll) entitled, etc. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall not to exceed lll hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on lll, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 22 If the measure is on the House Calendar or the recommendation is to avoid consideration in the Committee of the Whole, the resolution might read as follows: Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider the bill (H.R. lll) entitled, etc., in the House, etc. The resolution may waive points of order against the bill. A point of order is an objection that a pending matter or proceeding is in violation of a rule of the House. The bill may be susceptible to various points of order that may be made against its consideration, including an assertion that the bill carries a retroactive federal income tax increase, contains a federal unfunded mandate, or has not been reported from committee properly. At times, the rule may ‘‘self-execute’’ changes to the bill, that is, incorporate the changes in the bill upon adoption of the rule. The rule may also make a specified ‘‘manager’s amendment’’ in order prior to any other amendment or may make a ‘‘compromise substitute’’ amendment in order as original text to replace the version reported from committee. When a rule limits or prevents floor amendments, it is popularly known as a ‘‘closed rule’’ or ‘‘modified closed rule.’’ However, a rule may not deny the minority party the right to offer a motion to recommit the bill with proper amendatory or general instructions. For a discussion of the motion to recommit, see Part XI. CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES MADE IN ORDER BY RULE REPORTED FROM THE COMMITTEE ON RULES When a rule has been reported to the House, it is referred to the House Calendar and if it is to be considered on the same legislative day reported, it requires a two-thirds vote for its consideration. Normally, however, the rule is on the calendar for at least one legislative day, and if not called up for consideration by the Member who filed the report within seven legislative days thereafter, any member of the Committee on Rules may call it up as a privileged matter, after having given one calendar day notice of the Member’s intention to do so. The Speaker will recognize any member of the committee seeking recognition for that purpose. If the House has adopted a resolution making in order a motion to consider a bill, and such a motion has not been offered within seven calendar days thereafter, such a motion shall be privileged if offered by direction of all reporting committees having initial jurisdiction of the bill. MOTION TO DISCHARGE COMMITTEE bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING A Member may present to the Clerk a motion in writing to discharge a committee from the consideration of a public bill or resolution that has been referred to it 30 legislative days prior thereto. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 23 A Member also may file a motion to discharge the Committee on Rules from further consideration of a resolution providing a special rule for the consideration of a public bill or resolution reported by a standing committee, or a special rule for the consideration of a public bill or resolution that has been referred to a standing committee for 30 legislative days. This motion to discharge the Committee on Rules may be made only when the resolution has been referred to that committee at least seven legislative days prior to the filing of the motion to discharge. The motion may not permit consideration of nongermane amendments. The motion is placed in the custody of the Journal Clerk, where Members may sign it at the House rostrum when the House is in session. The names of Members who have signed a discharge motion are made available electronically and published in the Congressional Record on a weekly basis. When 218 Members have signed the motion, it is entered in the Journal, printed with all the signatures thereto in the Congressional Record, and referred to the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees. On the second and fourth Mondays of each month, except during the last six days of a session, a Member who has signed a motion to discharge that has been on the calendar at least seven legislative days may call up the motion. The motion to discharge is debated for 20 minutes, one-half in favor of the proposition and onehalf in opposition. If the motion to discharge a standing committee of the House from a public bill or resolution pending before the committee prevails, a Member who signed the motion may move that the House proceed to the immediate consideration of the bill or resolution. If the motion is agreed to, the bill or resolution is considered immediately under the general rules of the House. If the House votes against the motion for immediate consideration, the bill or resolution is referred to its proper calendar with the same status as if reported by a standing committee. If the motion to discharge the Committee on Rules from a resolution prevails, the House shall immediately consider such resolution. If the resolution is adopted, the House proceeds to its execution. This is the modern practice for utilization of the discharge rule. MOTION TO SUSPEND THE RULES bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING On Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of each week and during the last six days of a session, the Speaker may entertain a motion to suspend the rules of the House and pass a public bill or resolution. Sometimes the motion is allowed on other days by unanimous consent or a rule from the Committee on Rules. For example, the House by rule from the Committee on Rules provided for the mo- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 24 tion on a Sunday when the House was in session. Members need to arrange in advance with the Speaker to be recognized to offer such a motion. The Speaker usually recognizes only a majority member of the committee that has reported or has primary jurisdiction over the bill. The motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill is debatable for 40 minutes, half of the time in favor of the proposition and half in opposition. The motion may not be separately amended but may be amended in the form of a manager’s amendment included in the motion when it is offered. Because the rules may be suspended and the bill passed only by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present, this procedure is usually used only for expedited consideration of relatively noncontroversial measures. CALENDAR WEDNESDAY On Wednesday of each week, unless dispensed with by unanimous consent or by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present, the standing committees are called in alphabetical order. A committee when named may call up for consideration any bill reported by it and pending on either the House or Union Calendar. The report on the bill must have been available for three days and must not be privileged under the rules of the House. General debate is limited to two hours and must be confined to the subject matter of the measure, the time being equally divided between those for and those against. An affirmative vote of a simple majority of the Members present is sufficient to pass the measure. The purpose of this rarely utilized procedure is to provide an alternative method of consideration when the Committee on Rules has not reported a rule for a specific bill. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BUSINESS On the second and fourth Mondays of each month, after the disposition of motions to discharge committees and after the disposal of business on the Speaker’s table requiring only referral to committee, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform may call up for consideration any District of Columbia business reported from that committee. This procedure is rarely utilized in the modern House. QUESTIONS OF PRIVILEGE bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING House rules provide special treatment for questions of privilege. Questions of privilege are classified as those questions: (1) affecting the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity, and the integrity of its proceedings; or (2) affecting the rights, reputations, and conduct of Members, individually, in their representative capacity. A question of privilege has been held to take precedence VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 25 over all questions except the motion to adjourn. Questions of the privileges of the House, those concerning the rights of the House collectively, take the form of a resolution which may be called up by any Member after proper notice. A question of personal privilege, affecting the rights, reputation, and conduct of individual Members, may be raised from the floor without formal notice and does not result in a vote. Debate on a question of privilege proceeds under the hour rule, with debate on a question of the privileges of the House divided between the proponent and the leader of the opposing party or a designee. PRIVILEGED MATTERS Under the rules of the House, certain matters are regarded as privileged matters and may interrupt the order of business. Conference reports, veto messages from the President, and certain amendments to measures by the Senate after the stage of disagreement between the two Houses are examples of privileged matters. Certain reports from House committees are also privileged, including reports from the Committee on Rules, reports from the Committee on Appropriations on general appropriation bills, printing and committee funding resolutions reported from the Committee on House Administration, and reports on Member’s conduct from the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. Bills, joint resolutions, and motions may also take on privileged status as a result of special procedures written into statute. The Member in charge of such a matter may call it up at practically any time for immediate consideration when no other business is pending. Usually, this is done after consultation with both the majority and minority floor leaders so that the Members of both parties will have advance notice. At any time after the reading of the Journal, a Member, by direction of the Committee on Appropriations, may move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the purpose of considering a general appropriation bill. A general appropriation bill may not be considered in the House until three calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays unless the House is in session on those days) after printed committee reports and hearing transcripts on the bill have been available to the Members. XI. CONSIDERATION AND DEBATE bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Consideration of measures may involve several stages, the most pertinent of which are discussed below. Also discussed are various restrictions on House consideration, as well as voting methods and mechanisms. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 26 COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING In order to expedite the consideration of bills and resolutions, the rules of the House provide for a parliamentary mechanism, known as the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, that enables the House to act with a quorum of less than the requisite majority of the entire House. A quorum in the Committee of the Whole is 100 members. All measures on the Union Calendar— those involving a tax, making appropriations, authorizing payments out of appropriations already made, or disposing of property—must be first considered in the Committee of the Whole. The Committee on Rules reports a rule allowing for immediate consideration of a measure by the Committee of the Whole. After adoption of the rule by the House, the Speaker may declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole. When the House resolves into the Committee of the Whole, the Speaker leaves the chair after appointing a Chairman to preside. The rule referred to in the preceding paragraph also fixes the length of the debate in the Committee of the Whole. This may vary according to the importance of the measure. As provided in the rule, the control of the time is usually divided equally between the chairman and the ranking minority member of the relevant committee. Members seeking to speak for or against the measure may arrange in advance with the Member in control of the time on their respective side to be allowed a certain amount of time in the debate. Members may also ask the Member speaking at the time to yield to them for a question or a brief statement. A transcript of the proceedings in the House and the Senate is printed daily in the Congressional Record. Frequently, permission is granted a Member by unanimous consent to revise and extend his remarks in the Congressional Record if sufficient time to make a lengthy oral statement is not available during actual debate. These revisions and extensions are printed in a distinctive type and cannot substantively alter the verbatim transcript. The conduct of the debate is governed principally by the rules of the House that are adopted at the opening of each Congress. In the 106th Congress, the rules were recodified for simplification and clarity. Jefferson’s Manual, prepared by Thomas Jefferson for his own guidance as President of the Senate from 1797 to 1801, is another recognized authority. The House has a long-standing rule that the provisions of Jefferson’s Manual should govern the House in all applicable cases and where they are not inconsistent with the rules of the House. Most parliamentary questions arising during the course of debate are responded to by a ruling based on a precedent in a similar situation. The Parliamentarian of the House is VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 27 present in the House Chamber in order to assist the Speaker or the Chairman in making a correct ruling on parliamentary questions. SECOND READING bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING During general debate on a bill, an accurate account of the time used on both sides is kept and the Chairman terminates the debate when all the time allowed under the rule has been consumed. After general debate, the second reading of the bill begins. The second reading is a section-by-section reading during which amendments may be offered to a section when it is read. Under many special ‘‘modified closed’’ rules adopted by the House, certain bills are considered as read and open only to prescribed amendments under limited time allocations. Under an ‘‘open’’ amendment process, a Member is permitted five minutes to explain the proposed amendment, after which the Member who is first recognized by the Chair is allowed to speak for five minutes in opposition to it. There is technically no further debate on that amendment, thereby effectively preventing filibuster-like tactics. This is known as the ‘‘fiveminute rule.’’ However, Members may offer an amendment to the amendment, for separate five-minute debate, or may offer a pro forma amendment—‘‘to strike the last word’’—which does not change the language of the amendment but allows the Member five minutes for debate. Each substantive amendment and amendment thereto is put to the Committee of the Whole for adoption unless the House has adopted a special rule ‘‘self-executing’’ the adoption of certain amendments in the Committee of the Whole. The House may, after initially adopting an open rule, later alter that rule by unanimous consent to establish a ‘‘universe’’ or list of amendments to a bill. This procedure is most commonly used on general appropriation bills because of the volume of amendments. At any time after debate has begun on proposed amendments to a section or paragraph of a bill under the five-minute rule, the Committee of the Whole may by majority vote of the Members present close debate on the amendment or the pending section or paragraph. However, if debate is closed on a section or paragraph before there has been debate on an amendment that a Member has caused to be printed in the Congressional Record at least one day prior to floor consideration of the amendment, the Member who caused the amendment to be printed in the Record is given five minutes in which to explain the amendment. Five minutes is also given to speak in opposition to the amendment but no further debate on the amendment is allowed. Amendments placed in the Congressional Record must indicate the full text of the proposed amendment, the name of the Member proposing it, the number of the bill or amendment to which it will be offered, and the point in VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 28 the bill or amendment thereto where the amendment is intended to be offered. These amendments appear in the portion of the Record designated for that purpose. AMENDMENTS AND THE GERMANENESS RULE The rules of the House prohibit amendments of a subject matter different from the text under consideration. This rule, commonly known as the germaneness rule, is one of the most important rules of the House of Representatives because of the obvious need to keep the focus of a body the size of the House on a predictable subject matter. The germaneness rule applies to the proceedings in the House, the Committee of the Whole, and the standing committees. There are hundreds of prior rulings or ‘‘precedents’’ on germaneness available to guide the Chair. CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS A House rule provides that it is not in order to consider bills and joint resolutions reported from a committee unless the committee report includes a list of congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits and limited tariff benefits in the bill or in the report, or a statement that the measure contains none of these items. The report must include the name of any Member, Delegate or Resident Commissioner who submitted a request to the committee for each respective item included in the list. This rule also applies to conference reports, unreported bills and joint resolutions, and to a socalled ‘‘manager’s amendment’’ offered at the outset of the amendment process by a member of the committee of initial referral under the terms of a special rule. With respect to unreported bills, unreported joint resolutions and managers’ amendments, the rule requires the list or statement to be printed in the Congressional Record prior to consideration. In the case of a conference report, the list or statement must be included in the joint explanatory statement prepared by the managers of the House and the managers of the Senate. A special rule from the Committee on Rules that waives the requirements of this rule is subject to a special point of order and vote. THE COMMITTEE ‘‘RISES’’ bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING At the conclusion of the consideration of a bill for amendment, the Committee of the Whole ‘‘rises’’ and reports the bill to the House with any amendments that have been adopted. In rising, the Committee of the Whole reverts back to the House and the Chairman of the Committee is replaced by the Speaker of the House. The House then acts on the bill and any amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole. If the Committee of the Whole rises on motion prior to the conclusion of consideration of amendments, VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 29 the bill must return to the Committee of the Whole for subsequent consideration. Thus, the simple motion to rise may be used to immediately halt consideration of a bill similar to a motion to adjourn in the House. HOUSE ACTION Debate on a bill in the House is cut off by moving and ordering ‘‘the previous question.’’ All debate is cut off on the bill if this motion is carried by a majority of the Members voting, a quorum being present, or by a special rule ordering the previous question upon the rising of the Committee of the Whole. The Speaker then puts the question: ‘‘Shall the bill be engrossed and read a third time?’’ If this question is decided in the affirmative, the bill is read a third time by title only and voted on for passage. If the previous question has been ordered by the terms of the rule on a bill reported by the Committee of the Whole, the House immediately votes on whatever amendments have been reported by the Committee in the order in which they appear in the bill unless voted on en bloc. After completion of voting on the amendments, the House immediately votes on the passage of the bill with the amendments it has adopted. However, a motion to recommit, as described in the next section, may be offered and voted on prior to the vote on passage. The Speaker may postpone a recorded vote on final passage of a bill or resolution, as well as other matters, for up to two legislative days. Measures that do not have to be considered in the Committee of the Whole are considered in the House in accordance with the terms of the rule limiting debate on the measure or under the ‘‘hour rule.’’ The hour rule limits the amount of time that a Member may occupy in debate on a pending question to 60 minutes. Generally, the opportunity for debate may also be curtailed if the Speaker makes the rare determination that a motion is dilatory. After passage or rejection of the bill by the House, a motion to reconsider it is automatically laid on the table by unanimous consent. The motion to reconsider is tabled to prohibit this motion from being made at a later date because the vote of the House on a proposition is not final and conclusive until there has been an opportunity to reconsider it. MOTION TO RECOMMIT bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING After the previous question has been ordered on a bill or joint resolution, it is in order to offer one motion to recommit the bill or joint resolution to a committee, and the Speaker gives preference in recognition for that purpose to a minority party Member who is VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 30 opposed to the bill or joint resolution. This motion is not subject to debate. However, a motion to recommit with instructions offered after the previous question has been ordered is debatable for 10 minutes, except that the majority floor manager may demand that the debate be extended to one hour. Whatever time is allotted for debate is divided equally between the proponent and an opponent of the motion. Instructions in the motion to recommit normally take the form of germane amendments proposed by the minority to immediately change the final form of the bill prior to passage. Instructions may also be ‘‘general,’’ consisting of nonbinding instructions to the committee to take specified actions such as to ‘‘promptly’’ review the bill with a particular political viewpoint or to hold further hearings. Such general instructions may not contain argument. QUORUM CALLS AND ROLLCALLS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House constitutes a quorum to do business and authorizes a smaller number than a quorum to compel the attendance of absent Members. In order to fulfill this constitutional responsibility, the rules of the House provide alternative procedures for quorum calls in the House and the Committee of the Whole. In the absence of a quorum, 15 Members may initiate a call of the House to compel the attendance of absent Members. Such a call of the House must be ordered by a majority vote. A call of the House is then ordered and the call is taken by electronic device or by response to the alphabetical call of the roll of Members. Absent Members have a minimum of 15 minutes from the ordering of the call of the House by electronic device to have their presence recorded. If sufficient excuse is not offered for their absence, they may be sent for by the Sergeant-at-Arms and their attendance secured and retained. The House then determines the conditions on which they may be discharged. Members who voluntarily appear are, unless the House otherwise directs, immediately admitted to the Hall of the House and must report their names to the Clerk to be entered on the Journal as present. Compulsory attendance or arrest of Members has been rare in modern practice. The rules of the House provide special authority for the Speaker to recognize a Member of the Speaker’s choice to move a call of the House at any time. When a question is put to a vote by the Speaker and a quorum fails to vote on such question, if a quorum is not present and objection is made for that reason, there is a call of the House unless the House adjourns. The call is taken by electronic device and the Sergeant-at-Arms may bring in absent Members. The yeas and nays VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 31 on the pending question are at the same time considered as ordered and an ‘‘automatic’’ recorded vote is taken. The Clerk utilizes the electronic system or calls the roll and each Member who is present may vote on the pending question. If those voting on the question and those who are present and decline to vote together make a majority of the House, the Speaker declares that a quorum is constituted and the pending question is decided as the majority of those voting have determined. The rules of the House prohibit points of order of no quorum unless the Speaker has put a question to a vote. If the House should be without a quorum due to catastrophic circumstances, the rules of the House establish procedures by which a provisional number of the House may operate until a sufficient number of Members to constitute a quorum appears. The rules for quorum calls are different in some respects in the Committee of the Whole. The first time the Committee of the Whole finds itself without a quorum during a day the Chairman is required to order the roll to be called by electronic device, unless the Chairman orders a call of the Committee. However, the Chairman may refuse to entertain a point of order of no quorum during general debate. If on a call, a quorum (100 Members) appears, the Committee continues its business. If a quorum does not appear, the Committee rises and the Chairman reports the names of the absentees to the House. The rules provide for the expeditious conduct of quorum calls in the Committee of the Whole. The Chairman may suspend a quorum call after 100 Members have recorded their presence. Under such a short quorum call, the Committee will not rise and proceedings under the quorum call are vacated. In that case, a recorded vote, if ordered immediately following the termination of the short quorum call, is a minimum of 15 minutes. In the alternative, the Chair may choose to permit a full 15-minute quorum call, wherein all Members are recorded as present or absent, to be followed by a five-minute record vote on the pending question. Once a quorum of the Committee of the Whole has been established for a day, a quorum call in the Committee is only in order when the Committee is operating under the five-minute rule and the Chairman has put the pending question to a vote. The rules prohibit a point of order of no quorum against a vote in which the Committee of the Whole agrees to rise. However, an appropriate point of no quorum would be permitted against a vote defeating a motion to rise. VOTING bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING There are three methods of voting in the Committee of the Whole that are also employed in the House. These are the voice vote, the VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 32 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING division, and the recorded vote. The yea-and-nay vote is a method used only in the House, and it may be automatic if a Member objects to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present. To conduct a voice vote the Chair puts the question: ‘‘As many as are in favor say ‘Aye’. As many as are opposed, say ‘No’. ’’ The Chair determines the result on a comparison of the volume of ayes and noes. This is the form in which the vote is ordinarily taken in the first instance. If it is difficult to determine the result of a voice vote, a division may be demanded by a Member or initiated by the Chair. The Chair then states: ‘‘As many as are in favor will rise and stand until counted.’’ After counting those in favor he calls on those opposed to stand and be counted, thereby determining the number in favor of and those opposed to the question. If any Member requests a recorded vote and that request is supported by at least one-fifth of a quorum of the House (44 Members), or 25 Members in the Committee of the Whole, the vote is taken by electronic device. After the recorded vote is concluded, the names of those voting and those not voting are entered in the Journal. Members have a minimum of 15 minutes to be counted from the time the record vote is ordered. The Speaker may reduce the period for voting to five minutes on subsequent votes in certain situations where there has been no intervening debate or business. The Speaker is not required to vote unless the Speaker’s vote would be decisive. The modern practice in the Committee of the Whole postpones and clusters votes on amendments to maximize efficient scheduling of voting. The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole has discretionary authority to postpone votes on amendments and to reduce the time for voting on amendments to five minutes following a 15minute vote on the first amendment in a series. The Chairman is not allowed to postpone votes on matters other than amendments and is mindful not to postpone votes where the outcome could be prejudicial to the offering of another amendment. In the House, the support of one-fifth of the Members present is necessary under the Constitution for ordering the yeas and nays. When the yeas and nays are ordered, a recorded vote is ordered, or a point of order is made that a quorum is not present, the Clerk activates the electronic system or calls the roll and reports the result to the Speaker, who announces it to the House. Many legislative questions may be postponed to a time selected by the Speaker within two legislative days. The rules of the House require a three-fifths vote to pass a bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report that contains a specified type of federal income tax rate increase. The rules of the VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 33 House also provide for automatic yeas and nays on votes on passage of certain fiscal measures including a concurrent resolution on the budget or a general appropriation bill. The Constitution requires the yeas and nays on a vote overriding a Presidential veto. The rules prohibit a Member from: (1) casting another Member’s vote or recording another Member’s presence in the House or the Committee of the Whole; or (2) authorizing another individual to cast a vote or record the Member’s presence in the House or the Committee of the Whole. ELECTRONIC VOTING Recorded votes are usually taken by electronic device, except when the Speaker orders the vote to be recorded by other methods prescribed by the rules of the House. In addition, quorum calls are generally taken by electronic device. The electronic system works as follows: A number of vote stations are attached to selected chairs in the Chamber. Each station is equipped with a vote card slot and four indicators, marked ‘‘yea’’, ‘‘nay’’, ‘‘present’’, and ‘‘open’’ that are lit when a vote is in progress and the system is ready to accept votes. Each Member is provided with an encyrpted Vote-ID Card. A Member votes by inserting the voting card into any one of the vote stations and pressing the appropriate button to indicate the Member’s choice. If a Member is without a Vote-ID Card or wishes to change his vote during the last five minutes of a vote, the Member may be recorded by handing a paper ballot to the Tally Clerk, who then records the vote electronically according to the indicated preference of the Member. The paper ballots are green for ‘‘yea,’’ red for ‘‘nay,’’ and orange for ‘‘present.’’ PAIRING OF MEMBERS The former system of pairing of Members, where a Member could arrange in advance to be recorded as being either in favor of or opposed to the question by being ‘‘paired’’ with another absent Member who holds contrary views on the question, has largely been eliminated. The rules still allow for ‘‘live pairs.’’ A live pair is where a Member votes as if not paired, subsequently withdraws that vote, and then asks to be marked ‘‘present’’ to protect the other Member. The most common practice is for absent Members to submit statements for the Record stating how they would have voted if present on specific votes. SYSTEM OF LIGHTS AND BELLS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Due to the diverse nature of daily tasks that they have to perform, it is not practicable for Members to be present in the House or Senate Chamber at every minute that the body is in session. Furthermore, many of the routine matters do not require the per- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 34 sonal attendance of all the Members. A system consisting of electric lights and bells or buzzers located in various parts of the Capitol Building and House and Senate Office Buildings alerts Members to certain occurrences in the House and Senate Chambers. In the House, the Speaker has ordered that the bells and lights comprising the system be utilized as follows: 1 long bell followed by a pause and then 3 bells and 3 lights on the left— Start or continuation of a notice or short quorum call in the Committee of the Whole that will be vacated if and when 100 Members appear on the floor. Bells are repeated every five minutes unless the call is vacated or the call is converted into a regular quorum call. 1 long bell and extinguishing of 3 lights on the left—Short or notice quorum call vacated. 2 bells and 2 lights on the left—15 minute recorded vote, yea-and-nay vote or automatic rollcall vote by electronic device. The bells are repeated five minutes after the first bell. 2 bells and 2 lights on the left followed by a pause and then 2 more bells— 15 minute vote taken by a call of the roll. The bells are repeated when the Clerk reaches the R’s in the first call of the roll. 2 bells followed by a pause and then 5 bells—First vote on clustered votes. Two bells are repeated five minutes after the first bell. The first vote will be not less than 15 minutes with successive votes being not less than five minutes. Each successive vote is signaled by five bells. 3 bells and 3 lights on the left—15 minute quorum call in either the House or in the Committee of the Whole by electronic device. The bells are repeated five minutes after the first bell. 3 bells followed by a pause and then 3 more bells—15 minute quorum call by a call of the roll. The bells are repeated when the Clerk reaches the R’s in the first call of the roll. 3 bells followed by a pause and then 5 more bells—Quorum call in the Committee of the Whole that may be followed immediately by a five-minute recorded vote. 4 bells and 4 lights on the left—Adjournment of the House. 5 bells and 5 lights on the left—Any five-minute vote. 6 bells and 6 lights on the left—Recess of the House. 12 bells at 2-second intervals with 6 lights on the left—Civil Defense Warning. The 7th light indicates that the House is in session. RECESS AUTHORITY The House may by vote authorize the Speaker to declare a recess under the rules of the House. The Speaker also has the authority to declare the House in recess for a short time when no question is pending before the House or in the case of an emergency. LIVE COVERAGE OF FLOOR PROCEEDINGS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The rules of the House provide for unedited radio and television broadcasting and recording of proceedings on the floor of the House. However, the rules prohibit the use of these broadcasts and recordings for any political purpose or in any commercial advertisement. The rules of the Senate also provide for broadcasting and recording of proceedings in the Senate Chamber with similar restrictions. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 35 XII. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, as amended, provides Congress with a procedure to establish appropriate spending and revenue levels for each year. The congressional budget process, as set out in that Act, is designed to coordinate decisions on sources and levels of revenues and on objects and levels of expenditures. Its basic method is to prescribe the overall size of the fiscal pie and the particular sizes of its various pieces. Each year the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution imposing overall constraints on revenues and spending and distributing the overall constraint on spending among groups of programs and activities. Congress aims to complete action on a concurrent resolution on the budget for the next fiscal year by April 15. Congress may adopt a later budget resolution that revises the most recently adopted budget resolution. One of the mechanisms Congress uses to implement the constraints on revenue and spending is called the reconciliation process. Reconciliation is a multiple-step process designed to bring existing law in conformity with the most recently adopted concurrent resolution on the budget. The first step in the reconciliation process is the language found in a concurrent resolution on the budget instructing House and Senate committees to determine and recommend changes in laws that will achieve the constraints established in the concurrent resolution on the budget. The instructions to a committee specify the amount of spending reductions or revenue changes a committee must attain and leave to the discretion of the committee the specific changes to laws or bills that must be made. The subsequent steps involve the combination of the various instructed committees’ recommendations into an omnibus reconciliation bill or bills which are reported by the Committee on the Budget or by the one committee instructed, if only one committee has been instructed, and considered by the House. In the Senate, reconciliation bills reported from committee are entitled to expedited consideration, permitting a majority of Senators, rather than sixty, to ensure consideration of the bill with limited time for amendments. Congress aims to complete action on reconciliation measures by a specified date each year. The Budget Act maintains that reconciliation provisions must be related to reconciling the budget. This principle is codified in section 313 of the Budget Act, the so-called Byrd Rule, named after Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia. Section 313 provides a point of order in the Senate against extraneous matter in reconciliation bills. Determining what is extraneous is a difficult task for the Senate’s Presiding Officer. The Byrd Rule may only be waived VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 36 in the Senate by a three-fifths vote and sixty votes are required to overturn the presiding officer’s ruling. After Congress has completed action on a concurrent resolution on the budget for a fiscal year, the Budget Act provides a point of order against legislation that does not conform to the constraints on spending and revenue set out in the resolution. Both the House and Senate have in place a budget enforcement mechanism informally known as ‘‘pay-as-you-go,’’ or ‘‘Paygo.’’ Under this system, it is not in order to consider legislation that increases the deficit or reduces the surplus over a given period of fiscal years. It is also not in order to consider a concurrent resolution on the budget, or an amendment thereto, or a conference report thereon, that contains reconciliation directives if the effect of such measures would be to increase the deficit or reduce the surplus over a given period of fiscal years. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, through an amendment to the Congressional Budget Act, established requirements on committees with respect to measures containing unfunded intergovernmental mandates. An unfunded intergovernmental mandate is the imposition of a substantial financial requirement or obligation on a state, local, or tribal government. The Act also established a unique point of order to enforce the requirements of the Act with respect to intergovernmental mandates in excess of a given threshold. In the House, an unfunded mandate point of order is not disposed of by a ruling of the Chair but by the Chair putting the question of consideration to the body. The House or the Committee of the Whole then decides by vote whether or not to proceed with the measure with the alleged mandate contained therein. XIII. ENGROSSMENT AND MESSAGE TO SENATE bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The preparation of a copy of the bill in the form in which it has passed the House can be a detailed and complicated process because of the large number and complexity of amendments to some bills adopted by the House. These amendments may be offered during a spirited debate with little or no prior formal preparation. The amendment may be for the purpose of inserting new language, substituting different words for those set out in the bill, or deleting portions of the bill. In some cases, amendments offered from the floor are written in longhand. Each amendment must be inserted in precisely the proper place in the bill, with the spelling and punctuation exactly as it was adopted by the House. It is extremely important that the Senate receive a copy of the bill in the precise form in which it has passed the House. The preparation of such a copy is the function of the Enrolling Clerk. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 37 In the House, the Enrolling Clerk is under the Clerk of the House. In the Senate, the Enrolling Clerk is under the Secretary of the Senate. The Enrolling Clerk receives all the papers relating to the bill, including the official Clerk’s copy of the bill as reported by the standing committee and each amendment adopted by the House. From this material, the Enrolling Clerk prepares the engrossed copy of the bill as passed, containing all the amendments agreed to by the House. At this point, the measure ceases technically to be called a bill and is termed ‘‘An Act’’ signifying that it is the act of one body of the Congress, although it is still popularly referred to as a bill. The engrossed bill is printed on blue paper and is signed by the Clerk of the House. Bills may also originate in the Senate with certain exceptions. For a discussion of bills originating in the Senate, see Part XVI. XIV. SENATE ACTION The Parliamentarian, in the name of the Vice President, as the President of the Senate, refers the engrossed bill to the appropriate standing committee of the Senate in conformity with the rules of the Senate. The bill is reprinted immediately and copies are made available in the document rooms of both Houses. This printing is known as the ‘‘Act print’’ or the ‘‘Senate referred print.’’ COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Senate committees give the bill the same detailed consideration as it received in the House and may report it with or without amendment. A committee member who wishes to express an individual view or a group of Members who wish to file a minority report may do so by giving notice, at the time of the approval of a report on the measure, of an intention to file supplemental, minority, or additional views. These views may be filed within three days with the clerk of the committee and become a part of the report. When a committee reports a bill, it is reprinted with the committee amendments indicated by showing new matter in italics and deleted matter in line-through type. The calendar number and report number are indicated on the first and back pages, together with the name of the Senator making the report. If the committee chooses to file a report to accompany the bill, it is printed at this time, along with any minority or individual views. All committee meetings, including those to conduct hearings, must be open to the public. However, a majority of the members of a committee or subcommittee may, after discussion in closed session, vote in open session to close a meeting or series of meetings on the same subject for no longer than 14 days if it is determined that the matters to be discussed or testimony to be taken will dis- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 38 close matters necessary to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or the confidential conduct of the foreign relations of the United States; will relate solely to internal committee staff management or procedure; will tend to charge an individual with a crime or misconduct, to disgrace or injure the professional standing of an individual, or otherwise to expose an individual to public contempt, or will represent a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an individual; will disclose law enforcement information that is required to be kept secret; will disclose certain information regarding certain trade secrets; or may disclose matters required to be kept confidential under other provisions of law or government regulation. CHAMBER PROCEDURE bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The rules of procedure in the Senate differ to a large extent from those in the House. The Senate relies heavily on the practice of obtaining unanimous consent for actions to be taken. For example, at the time that a bill is reported, the Majority Leader may ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the bill. If the bill is of a noncontroversial nature and there is no objection, the Senate may pass the bill with little or no debate and with only a brief explanation of its purpose and effect. If there is any objection, the report must lie over one legislative day and the bill is placed on the calendar. Measures reported by standing committees of the Senate may not be considered unless the report of that committee has been available to Senate Members for at least two days (excluding Sundays and legal holidays) prior to consideration of the measure in the Senate. This requirement may be waived by agreement of the Majority and Minority leaders and does not apply in certain emergency situations or where no report has been submitted on the measure. In the Senate, measures are brought up for consideration by a simple unanimous consent request, by a complex unanimous consent agreement, or by a motion to proceed to the consideration of a measure on the calendar. A unanimous consent agreement, sometimes referred to as a ‘‘time agreement’’, makes the consideration of a measure in order and often limits the amount of debate that will take place on the measure and lists the amendments that will be considered. The offering of a unanimous consent request to consider a measure or the offering of a motion to proceed to the consideration of a measure is reserved, by tradition, to the Majority Leader. Usually, a motion to consider a measure on the calendar is made only when unanimous consent to consider the measure cannot be obtained. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 39 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING There are two calendars in the Senate, the Calendar of Business and the Executive Calendar. All legislation is placed on the Calendar of Business and treaties and nominations are placed on the Executive Calendar. Unlike the House, there is no differentiation on the Calendar of Business between the treatment of: (1) bills raising revenue, general appropriation bills, and bills of a public character appropriating money or property; and (2) other bills of a public character not appropriating money or property. The rules of the Senate provide that at the conclusion of the morning business for each ‘‘legislative day’’ the Senate proceeds to the consideration of the calendar. In the Senate, the term ‘‘legislative day’’ means the period of time from when the Senate adjourns until the next time the Senate adjourns. Because the Senate often ‘‘recesses’’ rather than ‘‘adjourns’’ at the end of a daily session, the legislative day usually does not correspond to the 24-hour period comprising a calendar day. Thus, a legislative day may cover a long period of time—from days to weeks, or even months. Because of this and the modern practice of waiving the call of the calendar by unanimous consent at the start of a new legislative day, it is rare to have a call of the calendar. When the calendar is called, bills that are not objected to are taken up in their order, and each Senator is entitled to speak once and for five minutes only on any question. Objection may be interposed at any stage of the proceedings, but on motion the Senate may continue consideration after the call of the calendar is completed, and the limitations on debate then do not apply. On any day (other than a Monday that begins a new legislative day), following the announcement of the close of morning business, any Senator, usually the Majority Leader, obtaining recognition may move to take up any bill out of its regular order on the calendar. The five-minute limitation on debate does not apply to the consideration of a bill taken up in this manner, and debate may continue until the hour when the Presiding Officer of the Senate ‘‘lays down’’ the unfinished business of the day. At that point consideration of the bill is discontinued and the measure reverts back to the Calendar of Business and may again be called up at another time under the same conditions. When a bill has been objected to and passed over on the call of the calendar it is not necessarily lost. The Majority Leader, after consulting the Minority Leader, determines the time at which the bill will be considered. At that time, a motion is made to consider the bill. The motion is debatable if made after the morning hour. When a Senator is recognized by the Presiding Officer, the Senator may speak for as long as the Senator wishes and loses the floor only when the Senator yields it or takes certain parliamentary VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 40 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING actions that forfeit the Senator’s right to the floor. However, a Senator may not speak more than twice on any one question in debate on the same legislative day without leave of the Senate. Debate ends when a Senator yields the floor and no other Senator seeks recognition, or when a unanimous consent agreement limiting the time of debate dictates that debate is concluded. On occasion, Senators opposed to a measure may extend debate by making lengthy speeches or a number of speeches at various stages of consideration intended to prevent or defeat action on the measure. This is the tactic known as ‘‘filibustering.’’ Debate may be closed, however, if 16 Senators sign a motion to that effect and the motion is carried by three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn. Such a motion is voted on one hour after the Senate convenes, following a quorum call on the next day after a day of session has intervened. This procedure is called ‘‘invoking cloture.’’ In 1986, the Senate amended its rules to limit ‘‘post-cloture’’ consideration to 30 hours. ‘‘Post-cloture,’’ a Senator may speak for not more than one hour and may yield all or a part of that time to the majority or minority floor managers of the bill under consideration or to the Majority or Minority leader. The Senate may increase the time for ‘‘post-cloture’’ debate by a vote of three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn. After the time for debate has expired, the Senate may consider only amendments actually pending before voting on the bill. While a measure is being considered it is subject to amendment and each amendment, including those proposed by the committee that reported the bill, is considered separately. Generally, there is no requirement that proposed amendments be germane to the subject matter of the bill except in the case of general appropriation bills or where ‘‘cloture’’ has been invoked. Under the rules, a ‘‘rider’’, an amendment proposing substantive legislation to an appropriation bill, is prohibited. However, this prohibition may be suspended by two-thirds vote on a motion to permit consideration of such an amendment on one day’s notice in writing. Debate must be germane during the first three hours after business is laid down unless determined to the contrary by unanimous consent or on motion without debate. After final action on the amendments the bill is ready for engrossment and the third reading, which is by title only. The Presiding Officer then puts the question on the passage and a voice vote is usually taken although a yea-and-nay vote is in order if demanded by one-fifth of the Senators present. A simple majority is necessary for passage. Before an amended measure is cleared for its return to the House of Representatives, or an unamended measure is cleared for enrollment, a Senator who voted with the pre- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 41 vailing side, or who abstained from voting, may make a motion within the next two days to reconsider the action. If the measure was passed without a recorded vote, any Senator may make the motion to reconsider. That motion is usually tabled and its tabling constitutes a final determination. If, however, the motion is granted, the Senate by majority vote may either affirm its action, which then becomes final, or reverse it. The original engrossed House bill, together with the engrossed Senate amendments, if any, or the original engrossed Senate bill, as the case may be, is then returned to the House with a message stating the action taken by the Senate. Where the Senate has adopted amendments, the message requests that the House concur in them. For a more detailed discussion of Senate procedure, see Enactment of a Law, by Robert B. Dove, former Parliamentarian of the Senate. XV. FINAL ACTION ON AMENDED BILL bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING On their return to the House, the official papers relating to the amended measure are placed on the Speaker’s table to await House action on the Senate amendments. Although rarely exercised, the Speaker has the authority to refer Senate amendments to the appropriate committee or committees with or without time limits on their consideration. If the amendments are of a minor or noncontroversial nature, any Member, usually the chairman of a committee that reported the bill, may, at the direction of the committee, ask unanimous consent to take the bill with the amendments from the Speaker’s table and agree to the Senate amendments. At this point, the Clerk reads the title of the bill and the Senate amendments. If there is no objection, the amendments are then declared to be agreed to, and the bill is ready to be enrolled for presentation to the President. If unanimous consent is not obtainable, the few bills that do not require consideration in the Committee of the Whole are privileged and may be called up from the Speaker’s table by motion for immediate consideration of the amendments. A simple majority is necessary to carry the motion and thereby complete floor action on the measure. A Senate amendment to a House bill is subject to a point of order that it must first be considered in the Committee of the Whole, if, originating in the House, it would be subject to that point of order. Most Senate amendments require consideration in the Committee of the Whole and this procedure by privileged motion is seldom utilized. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 42 REQUEST FOR A CONFERENCE bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The mere fact that each House may have separately passed its own bill on a subject is not sufficient to make either bill eligible for conference. One House must first take the additional step of amending and then passing the bill of the other House to form the basis for a conference. A Member, usually the chairman of the committee of jurisdiction, may request unanimous consent to take the House bill with the Senate amendments from the Speaker’s table, disagree to the amendments and request or agree to a conference with the Senate to resolve the disagreeing votes of the two Houses. In the case of a Senate bill with House amendments, the House may insist on the House amendments and request a conference. For a discussion of bills originating in the Senate, see Part XVI. If there is objection, the Speaker may recognize a Member for a motion, if offered by the direction of the primary committee and of all reporting committees that had initial referral of the bill, to: (1) disagree to the Senate amendments and ask for or agree to a conference; or (2) insist on the House amendments to a Senate bill and request or agree to a conference. This may also be accomplished by a motion to suspend the rules with a two-thirds vote or by a rule from the Committee on Rules. If there is no objection to the request, or if the motion is carried, a motion to instruct the managers of the conference would be in order. This initial motion to instruct is the prerogative of the minority party. The instructions to conferees usually urge the managers to accept or reject a particular Senate or House provision or to take a more generally described political position to the extent possible within the scope of the conference. However, such instructions may not contain argument and are not binding on House or Senate conferees. After the motion to instruct is disposed of, the Speaker then appoints the managers, informally known as conferees, on the part of the House and a message is sent to the Senate advising it of the House action. A majority of the Members appointed to be conferees must have been supporters of the House position, as determined by the Speaker. The Speaker must appoint Members primarily responsible for the legislation and must include, to the fullest extent feasible, the principal proponents of the major provisions of the bill as it passed the House. The Speaker may appoint conferees from more than one committee and may specify the portions of the House and Senate versions to which they are assigned. The number is fixed by the Speaker and majority party representation generally reflects the ratio for the full House committee, but may be greater on important bills. The Speaker also has the authority to name substitute conferees on specific provisions and add or remove conferees after the original appointment. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 43 If the Senate agrees to the request for a conference, a similar committee is appointed by the Presiding Officer of the Senate. Both political parties may be represented on the Senate conference committee. The Senate and House committees need not be the same size but each House has one vote in conference as determined by a majority within each set or subset of conferees. The request for a conference may only be made by the body in possession of the official papers. Occasionally, the Senate, anticipating that the House will not concur in its amendments, votes to insist on its amendments and requests a conference on passage of the bill prior to returning the bill to the House. This practice serves to expedite the matter because time may be saved by the designation of the Senate conferees before returning the bill to the House. The body asking for the conference normally acts last on the report to be submitted by the conferees and a motion to recommit the conference report is not available to the body that acts last. AUTHORITY OF CONFEREES bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Although the managers on the part of each House meet together as one committee they are in effect two separate committees, each of which votes separately and acts by a majority vote. For this reason, variances in the number of managers from each House are largely immaterial. The House conferees are strictly limited in their consideration to matters in disagreement between the two Houses. Consequently, they may not strike or amend any portion of the bill that was not amended by the other House. Furthermore, they may not insert new matter that is not germane to or that is beyond the scope of the differences between the two Houses. Where the Senate amendment revises a figure or an amount contained in the bill, the conferees are limited to the difference between the two numbers and may neither increase the greater nor decrease the smaller figure. Neither House may alone, by instructions, empower its managers to make a change in the text to which both Houses have agreed. When a disagreement to an amendment in the nature of a substitute is committed to a conference committee, managers on the part of the House may propose a substitute that is a germane modification of the matter in disagreement, but the introduction of any language in that substitute presenting specific additional matter not committed to the conference committee by either House is not in order. Moreover, their report may not include matter not committed to the conference committee by either House. The report may not include a modification of any specific matter committed to the conference committee by either or both Houses if that modifica- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 44 tion is beyond the scope of that specific matter as committed to the conference committee. The managers on the part of the House are under specific guidelines when in conference on general appropriation bills. An amendment by the Senate to a general appropriation bill which would be in violation of the rules of the House, if such amendment had originated in the House, including an amendment changing existing law, providing appropriations not authorized by law, or providing reappropriations of unexpended balances, or an amendment by the Senate providing for an appropriation on a bill other than a general appropriation bill, may not be agreed to by the managers on the part of the House. However, the House may grant specific authority to agree to such an amendment by a separate vote on a motion to instruct on each specific amendment. MEETINGS AND ACTION OF CONFEREES bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The rules of the House require that one conference meeting be open to the public, unless the House, in open session, authorizes the managers to close the meeting. When the report of the conference committee is read in the House, a point of order may be made that the conferees failed to comply with the House rule requiring an open conference meeting. If the point of order is sustained, the conference report is considered rejected by the House and a new conference is deemed to have been requested. The rules of the House provide that, in conducting conferences with the Senate, the managers on the part of the House should endeavor to ensure that meetings for the resolution of differences between the two Houses occur only under circumstances in which every manager on the part of the House has notice of the meeting and a reasonable opportunity to attend, that all provisions on which the two Houses disagree are considered as open to discussion at any meeting of a conference committee, and that papers reflecting a conference agreement are held inviolate to change without renewal of the opportunity of all managers on the part of the House to reconsider their decisions to sign or not to sign the agreement. The rules of the House also require that managers on the part of the House be provided a unitary time and place at which to sign or not sign the conference report and joint explanatory statement, and that they have access to at least one complete copy of the final conference agreement for the purpose of recording or not recording their approval of the agreement. There are generally three forms of recommendations available to the conferees when reporting back to their bodies: (1) That one House recede from all (or certain of) its amendments. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 45 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING (2) That one House recede from its disagreement to all (or certain of) the other House’s amendments and agree thereto. (3) That one House recede from its disagreement to all (or certain of) the other House’s amendments and agree thereto with amendments. In most instances, the result of the conference is a compromise growing out of the third type of recommendation available to the conferees because one House has originally substituted its own bill to be considered as a single amendment. The complete report may be composed of any one or more of these recommendations with respect to the various amendments where there are numbered amendments. In earlier practice, on general appropriation bills with numbered Senate amendments, because of the special rules preventing House conferees from agreeing to Senate amendments changing existing law or appropriations not authorized by law, the conferees often found themselves, under the rules or in fact, unable to reach an agreement with respect to one or more amendments and reported back a statement of their inability to agree on those particular amendments. These amendments were acted upon separately. This partial disagreement is not practicable where, as in current practice, the Senate strikes out all after the enacting clause and substitutes its own bill that must be considered as a single amendment. If they are unable to reach any agreement whatsoever, the conferees report that fact to their respective bodies and the amendments may be disposed of by motion. New conferees may be appointed in either or both Houses. In addition, the Houses may provide a new nonbinding instruction to the conferees as to the position they are to take. After House conferees on any bill or resolution in conference between the two bodies have been appointed for 20 calendar days and 10 legislative days and have failed to make a report, a motion to instruct the House conferees, or discharge them and appoint new conferees, is privileged. The motion can be made only after the Member announces his intention to offer the motion and only at a time designated by the Speaker in the legislative schedule of the following day. Like the initial motion to instruct, the 20-day motion may not contain argument and must remain within the scope of conference. In addition, during the last six days of a session, it is a privileged motion to move to discharge, appoint, or instruct House conferees after House conferees have been appointed 36 hours without having made a report. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 46 CONFERENCE REPORTS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING When the conferees, by majority vote of each group, have reached complete agreement or find that they are able to agree with respect to some but not all separately numbered amendments, they make their recommendations in a report made in duplicate that must be signed by a majority of the conferees appointed by each body on each provision to which they are appointed. The minority of the managers have no authority to file a statement of minority views in connection with the conference report. The report is required to be printed in both Houses and must be accompanied by an explanatory statement prepared jointly by the conferees on the part of the House and the conferees on the part of the Senate. The statement must be sufficiently detailed and explicit to inform Congress of the effects of the report on the matters committed to conference. In the Senate, the presentation of a conference report always is in order except when the Journal is being read, a point of order or motion to adjourn is pending, or while the Senate is voting or ascertaining the presence of a quorum. When the report is received, the question of proceeding to the consideration of the report, if raised, is immediately voted on without debate. The report is not subject to amendment in either body and must be accepted or rejected as an entirety. If the time for debate on the adoption of the report is limited, the time allotted must be equally divided between the majority and minority party. The Senate, acting first, prior to voting on agreeing to the report may by majority vote order it recommitted to the conferees. When the Senate agrees to the report, its managers are thereby discharged and it then delivers the original papers to the House with a message advising that body of its action. A report that contains any recommendations which extend beyond the scope of differences between the two Houses is subject to a point of order in its entirety unless that point of order is waived in the House by unanimous consent, adoption of a rule reported from the Committee on Rules, or the suspension of the rules by a two-thirds vote. In the Senate, a report exceeding the scope of conference is likewise subject to a point of order. It is not in order in the House to consider a conference report that differs in any way (other than clerical) from the text agreed to by the conferees, as recorded by their placement of their signatures (or not) on the sheets prepared to accompany the conference report and joint explanatory statement. Furthermore, as described earlier, it is not in order to consider a conference report unless the joint explanatory statement includes a list of congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits and limited tariff benefits in the con- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 47 bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING ference report and joint explanatory statement, or a statement that the measure contains none of these items. The presentation of a conference report in the House is in order at any time, except during a reading of the Journal or the conduct of a record vote, a vote by division, or a quorum call. The report is considered in the House and may not be sent to the Committee of the Whole on the suggestion that it contains matters ordinarily requiring consideration in that Committee. The report may not be received by the House if the required joint statement does not accompany it. However, it is not in order to consider either: (1) a conference report; or (2) a motion to dispose of a Senate amendment reported in disagreement by a conference committee, until the third calendar day (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays unless the House is in session on those days) after the report and accompanying statement have been filed in the House and made available to the Members in the Congressional Record. However, these provisions do not apply during the last six days of the session. It is also not in order to consider a conference report or a motion to dispose of a Senate amendment reported in disagreement unless copies of the report and accompanying statement, together with the text of the amendment, have been available to Members for at least two hours before their consideration. By contrast, it is always in order to call up for consideration a report from the Committee on Rules on the same day reported that proposes only to waive the availability requirements for a conference report or a Senate amendment reported in disagreement. The time allotted for debate on a conference report or motion is one hour, equally divided between the majority party and the minority party. However, if the majority and minority floor managers both support the conference report or motion, one-third of the debate time must be allotted to a Member who is opposed, if claimed. If the House does not agree to a conference report that the Senate has already agreed to, the report may not be recommitted to conference. In that situation, the Senate conferees are discharged when the Senate agrees to the report. The House may then request a new conference with the Senate and conferees must be reappointed. If a conference report is called up in the House containing matter which would be in violation of the rules of the House with respect to germaneness if the matter had been offered as an amendment in the House, and which is contained either: (1) in the Senate bill or Senate amendment to the House measure and accepted by the House conferees or agreed to by the conference committee with modification; or (2) in a substitute amendment agreed to by the conference committee, a point of order may be made at the begin- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 48 ning of consideration that nongermane matter is contained in the report. The point of order may be waived by a special rule. If the point of order is sustained, a motion to reject the nongermane matter identified by the point of order is privileged. The motion is debatable for 40 minutes, half of the time in favor of, and half in opposition to, the motion. Notwithstanding the final disposition of a point of order made with respect to the report, or of a motion to reject nongermane matter, further points of order may be made with respect to the report, and further motions may be made to reject other nongermane matter in the conference report not covered by any previous point of order which has been sustained. If a motion to reject has been adopted, after final disposition of all points of order and motions to reject, the conference report is considered rejected and the question then pending before the House is whether: (1) to recede and concur with an amendment that consists of that portion of the conference report not rejected; or (2) to insist on the House amendment. If all motions to reject are defeated and the House thereby decides to permit the inclusion of the nongermane Senate matter in the conference report, then, after the allocation of time for debate on the conference report, it is in order to move the previous question on the adoption of the conference report. Similar procedures are available in the House when the Senate proposes an amendment to a measure that would be in violation of the rule against nongermane amendments, and thereafter it is (1) reported in disagreement by a committee of conference or (2) before the House and the stage of disagreement is reached. The numbered amendments of the Senate reported in disagreement may be voted on separately and may be adopted by a majority vote after the adoption of the conference report itself as though no conference had been had with respect to those amendments. The Senate may recede from all amendments, or from certain of its amendments, insisting on the others with or without a request for a further conference with respect to them. If the House does not accept the amendments insisted on by the Senate, the entire conference process may begin again with respect to them. One House may also further amend an amendment of the other House until the third degree of amendment within that House is reached. CUSTODY OF PAPERS bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The custody of the official papers is important in conference procedure because either body may act on a conference report only when in possession of the papers. Traditionally, the papers are transmitted to the body agreeing to the conference and from that body to the managers of the House that asked for the conference. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 49 The latter in turn carry the papers with them to the conference and at its conclusion turn them over to the managers of the House that agreed to the conference. The managers of the House that agreed to the conference deliver them to their own House, which acts first on the report, and then delivers the papers to the other House for final action on the report. However, if the managers on the part of the House agreeing to the conference surrender the papers to the House asking for the conference, the report may be acted on first by the House asking for the conference. At the conclusion of the conference, each group of conferees retains one copy of the report that has been made in duplicate and signed by a majority of the managers of each body. The House copy is signed first by the House managers and the Senate copy is signed first by its managers. A bill cannot become law until it has been approved in identical form by both Houses of Congress. When the bill has finally been approved by both Houses, all the original papers are transmitted to the Enrolling Clerk of the body in which the bill originated. XVI. BILL ORIGINATING IN SENATE The preceding discussion has described the legislative process for bills originating in the House. When a bill originates in the Senate, this process is reversed. When the Senate passes a bill that originated in the Senate, it is sent to the House for consideration unless it is held to become a vehicle for a similar House bill if and when passed by the House. The Senate bill is referred to the appropriate House committee for consideration or held at the Speaker’s table at the Speaker’s discretion. If the committee reports the bill to the full House and if the bill is passed by the House without amendment, it is enrolled. If the House passes an amended version of the Senate bill, the bill is returned to the Senate for action on the House amendments. The Senate may agree to the amendments or request a conference to resolve the disagreement over the House amendments or may further amend the House amendments. In accordance with the Constitution, the Senate cannot originate evenue measures. By tradition, the House also originates general appropriation bills. If the Senate does originate a revenue measure either as a Senate bill or an amendment to a non-revenue House bill, it can be returned to the Senate by a vote of the House as an infringement of the constitutional prerogative of the House. XVII. ENROLLMENT bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING When a bill has been agreed to in identical form by both bodies— either: (1) without amendment by the second House to consider it; (2) by the first House’s concurrence in the second House’s amend- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 50 ments; or (3) by agreement in both bodies to the conference report—a copy of the bill is enrolled for presentation to the President. The preparation of the enrolled bill is a painstaking and important task because it must reflect precisely the effect of all amendments, either by way of deletion, substitution, or addition, agreed to by both bodies. The Enrolling Clerk of the House, with respect to bills originating in the House, receives the original engrossed bill, the engrossed Senate amendments, the signed conference report, all messages from the Senate, and a notation of the final action by the House, for the purpose of preparing the enrolled copy. From these documents, the Enrolling Clerk must meticulously prepare for presentation to the President the final form of the bill as it was agreed to by both Houses. On occasion, as many as 500 amendments have been adopted, each of which must be set out in the enrollment exactly as agreed to, and all punctuation must be in accord with the action taken. The enrolled bill is printed on parchment paper and certified by the Clerk of the House stating that the bill originated in the House of Representatives. A bill originating in the Senate is examined and certified by the Secretary of the Senate. A House bill is then examined for accuracy by the Clerk. When satisfied with the accuracy of the bill, the Clerk attaches a slip stating that the bill is truly enrolled and sends it to the Speaker of the House for signature. By tradition, all bills, regardless of the body in which they originated, are signed first by the Speaker and then by the Vice President of the United States, who, under the Constitution, serves as the President of the Senate, or by the elected President pro tempore of the Senate. The Speaker of the House may sign enrolled bills whether or not the House is in session. The President of the Senate may sign bills only while the Senate is actually sitting but advance permission is normally granted to sign during a recess or after adjournment. If the Speaker or the President of the Senate is unable to sign the bill, it may be signed by an authorized Member of the respective House. After both signatures are affixed, a House bill is returned to the Clerk for presentation to the President for action under the Constitution. A Senate bill is presented to the President by the Secretary of the Senate. XVIII. PRESIDENTIAL ACTION Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution provides in part that— Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States. bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING In actual practice, the Clerk, or the Secretary of the Senate when the bill originated in that body, delivers the original enrolled bill to a clerk at the White House and obtains a receipt. The fact of the VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 51 delivery is then reported to the House by the Clerk. Delivery to a White House clerk has customarily been regarded as presentation to the President and as commencing the constitutional period for presidential action. Copies of the enrolled bill usually are transmitted by the White House to the various departments interested in the subject matter so that they may advise the President on the issues surrounding the bill. If the President approves the bill, he signs it and usually writes the word ‘‘approved’’ and the date. However, the Constitution requires only that the President sign it. The bill may become law without the President’s signature by virtue of the constitutional provision that if the President does not return a bill with objections within 10 days (excluding Sundays) after it has been presented to the President, it becomes law as if the President had signed it. However, if Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, it does not become law. This is known as a ‘‘pocket veto;’’ that is, the bill does not become law even though the President has not sent his objections to the Congress. The Congress has interpreted the President’s ability to pocket veto a bill to be limited to adjournment ‘‘sine die’’ of a Congress and not to interim adjournments or first session adjournments where the originating House of Congress through its agents is able to receive a veto message for subsequent reconsideration by that same Congress when it reconvenes. The extent of pocket veto authority has not been definitively decided by the courts. Notice of the signing of a bill by the President is sent by message to the House in which it originated and that House informs the other, although this action is not necessary for the act to be valid. The action is also noted in the Congressional Record. A bill becomes law on the date of approval or passage over the President’s veto, unless it expressly provides a different effective date. VETO MESSAGE bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING By the terms of the Constitution, if the President does not approve the bill ‘‘he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.’’ A bill returned with the President’s objections need not be voted on at once when laid before the House since the vetoed bill can be postponed, referred to committee, or tabled before the question on passage is pending. A vetoed bill is always privileged until directly voted upon, and a motion to take it from the table or from committee is in order at any time. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 52 The question of override is put by the Speaker as follows: ‘‘Will the House, on reconsideration, pass the bill, the objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding?’’ Under the Constitution, a vote by the yeas and nays is required to pass a bill over the President’s veto. The Clerk activates the electronic system or calls the roll with those in favor of passing the bill answering ‘‘Aye,’’ and those opposed ‘‘No.’’ If fewer than two-thirds of the Members present vote in the affirmative, a quorum being present, the bill is rejected, and a message is sent to the Senate advising that body of the House action. However, if two-thirds vote in the affirmative, the bill is sent with the President’s objections to the Senate, unless that body has acted first, together with a message advising it of the action in the House. If the Senate joins the House and votes two-thirds in the affirmative to pass the bill, the measure becomes the law of the land notwithstanding the objections of the President, and it is ready for publication as a binding statute. LINE ITEM VETO From 1997 until it was declared unconstitutional in 1998, the Line Item Veto Act provided the President authority to cancel certain individual items contained in a bill or joint resolution that he had signed into law. The law allowed the President to cancel only three types of fiscal items: a dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, an item of new direct spending, or a tax change benefiting a class of 100 or fewer. While the Act has not been repealed, the Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York, 24 U.S. 417 (1998), struck down the Line Item Veto Act as unconstitutional. XIX. PUBLICATION bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING One of the important steps in the enactment of a valid law is the requirement that it shall be made known to the people who are to be bound by it. There would be no justice if the state were to hold its people responsible for their conduct before it made known to them the unlawfulness of such behavior. In practice, our laws are published immediately upon their enactment so that the public will be aware of them. If the President approves a bill, or allows it to become law without signing it, the original enrolled bill is sent from the White House to the Archivist of the United States for publication. If a bill is passed by both Houses over the objections of the President, the body that last overrides the veto transmits it. It is then assigned a public law number, and paginated for the Statutes at Large volume covering that session of Congress. The public and private law numbers run in sequence starting anew at the beginning of each VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 53 Congress and are prefixed for ready identification by the number of the Congress. For example, the first public law of the 110th Congress is designated Public Law 110–1 and the first private law of the 110th Congress is designated Private Law 110–1. SLIP LAWS The first official publication of the statute is in the form generally known as the ‘‘slip law.’’ In this form, each law is published separately as an unbound pamphlet. The heading indicates the public or private law number, the date of approval, and the bill number. The heading of a slip law for a public law also indicates the United States Statutes at Large citation. If the statute has been passed over the veto of the President, or has become law without the President’s signature because he did not return it with objections, an appropriate statement is inserted instead of the usual notation of approval. The Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, prepares the slip laws and provides marginal editorial notes giving the citations to laws mentioned in the text and other explanatory details. The marginal notes also give the United States Code classifications, enabling the reader immediately to determine where the statute will appear in the Code. Each slip law also includes an informative guide to the legislative history of the law consisting of the committee report number, the name of the committee in each House, as well as the date of consideration and passage in each House, with a reference to the Congressional Record by volume, year, and date. A reference to presidential statements relating to the approval of a bill or the veto of a bill when the veto was overridden and the bill becomes law is included in the legislative history as a citation to the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. Copies of the slip laws are delivered to the document rooms of both Houses where they are available to officials and the public. They may also be obtained by annual subscription or individual purchase from the Government Printing Office and are available in electronic form. Section 113 of title 1 of the United States Code provides that slip laws are competent evidence in all the federal and state courts, tribunals, and public offices. STATUTES AT LARGE bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The United States Statutes at Large, prepared by the Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, provide a permanent collection of the laws of each session of Congress in bound volumes. The latest volume containing the laws of the first session of the 109th Congress is number 119 in the se- VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 54 ries. Each volume contains a complete index and a table of contents. A legislative history appears at the end of each law. There are also marginal notes referring to laws in earlier volumes and to earlier and later matters in the same volume. Under the provisions of a statute enacted in 1895, these volumes are legal evidence of the laws contained in them and will be accepted as proof of those laws in any court in the United States. The Statutes at Large are a chronological arrangement of the laws exactly as they have been enacted. The laws are not arranged according to subject matter and do not reflect the present status of an earlier law that has been amended. UNITED STATES CODE bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The United States Code contains a consolidation and codification of the general and permanent laws of the United States arranged according to subject matter under 50 title headings, largely in alphabetical order. It sets out the current status of the laws, as amended, without repeating all the language of the amendatory acts except where necessary. The Code is declared to be prima facie evidence of those laws. Its purpose is to present the laws in a concise and usable form without requiring recourse to the many volumes of the Statutes at Large containing the individual amendments. The Code is prepared by the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives. New editions are published every six years and cumulative supplements are published after the conclusion of each regular session of the Congress. The Code is also available in electronic format. Twenty-four of the 50 titles have been revised and enacted into positive law, and one title has been eliminated by consolidation with another title. Titles that have been revised and enacted into positive law are legal evidence of the law and may be updated by direct amendment. Eventually all the titles will be revised and enacted into positive law. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 0191 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C APPENDIX SELECT LIST OF GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS Constitution of the United States of America Analysis and Interpretation, with annotations of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 28, 2002; prepared by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Johnny H. Killian, George A. Costello, Kenneth R. Thomas, co-editors: Senate Document 103–6 (1996); updated Senate Document 107– 27 (2002). House Rules and Manual Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States, prepared by John V. Sullivan, Parliamentarian of the House, House Document 109–157 (2007). New editions are published each Congress. Senate Manual Containing the rules, orders, laws, and resolutions affecting the business of the United States Senate; Jefferson’s Manual, Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation, Constitution of the United States, etc., prepared under the direction of Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. New editions are published each Congress. Hinds’ and Cannon’s Precedents of the House of Representatives Including references to provisions of the Constitution, laws, and decisions of the Senate, by Asher C. Hinds. Vols. 1–5 (1907). Vols. 6–8 (1935), as compiled by Clarence Cannon, are supplementary to vols. 1– 5 and cover the 28-year period from 1907 to 1935, revised up to and including the 73d Congress. Vols. 9–11 (1941) are index-digest to vols. 1–8. Deschler-Brown Precedents of the United States House of Representatives Including references to provisions of the Constitution and laws, and to decisions of the courts, covering the period from 1928 to date, by Lewis Deschler, J.D., D.J., M.P.L., LL.D., Parliamentarian of the House (1928–1974), Wm. Holmes Brown, Parliamentarian of the House (1974–1994). Vols. 1–16 have been published, additional volumes in preparation. Cannon’s Procedure in the House of Representatives By Clarence Cannon, A.M., LL.B., LL.D., Member of Congress, sometime Parliamentarian of the House, Speaker pro tempore, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, etc. House Practice, A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House By Wm. Holmes Brown, Parliamentarian of the House (1974–1994); updated 2003 by Charles W. Johnson, Parliamentarian of the House (1994-2004). bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING (55) VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 56 Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives, Fourth Edition (1982) (1987 Supp.) By Lewis Deschler, J.D., D.J., M.P.L., LL.D., Parliamentarian of the House (1928– 1974), and Wm. Holmes Brown, Parliamentarian of the House (1974–1994). Senate Procedure By Floyd M. Riddick, Parliamentarian Emeritus of the Senate, Alan S. Frumin, Parliamentarian of the Senate: Senate Document No. 101–28 (1992). Calendars of the House of Representatives and History of Legislation Published each day the House is in session; prepared under the direction of the Clerk of the House of Representatives. Committee Calendars Published periodically by most of the standing committees of the House of Representatives and Senate, containing the history of bills and resolutions referred to the particular committee. Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions A brief synopsis of public bills and resolutions, and changes made therein during the legislative process; prepared by American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Congressional Record Proceedings and debates of the House and Senate, published daily, and bound with an index and history of bills and resolutions at the conclusion of each session of the Congress. The record of debates prior to 1874 was published in the Annals of Congress (1789–1824), The Register of Debates (1824–1837), and the Congressional Globe (1833–1873). Debates from 1774–1873 are available electronically from a website maintained by the Library of Congress. Journal of the House of Representatives Official record of the proceedings of the House, published at the conclusion of each session under the direction of the Clerk of the House. Journal of the United States Senate Official record of the proceedings of the Senate, published at the conclusion of each session under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate. United States Statutes at Large Containing the laws and concurrent resolutions enacted, and reorganization plans and proclamations promulgated during each session of the Congress, published annually under the direction of the Archivist of the United States by the Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 20408. Supplemental volumes: Tables of Laws Affected, Volumes 70–84 (1956–1970), Volumes 85–89 (1971–1975), containing tables of prior laws amended, repealed, or patently affected by provisions of public laws enacted during that period. Additional parts, containing treaties and international agreements other than treaties, published annually under the direction of the Secretary of State until 1950. United States Code bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING The general and permanent laws of the United States in force on the day preceding the commencement of the session following the last session the legislation of which is included: arranged in 50 titles; prepared under the direction and supervision of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives. New editions are published every six years and cumulative supplements are published annually. VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C 57 Federal Register Presidential Proclamations, Executive Orders, and federal agency orders, regulations, and notices, and general documents of public applicability and legal effect, published daily. The regulations therein amend the Code of Federal Regulations. Published by the Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 20408. Code of Federal Regulations Cumulates in bound volumes the general and permanent rules and regulations of Federal agencies published in the Federal Register, including Presidential documents. Each volume of the Code is revised at least once each calendar year and issued on a quarterly basis. Published by the Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 20408. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Containing statements, messages, and other presidential materials released by the White House during the preceding week, published every Monday by the Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 20408. History of the United States House of Representatives Prepared by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, House Document 103–324. The Senate, 1789–1989, Addresses on the History of the United States Senate, Vol. 1 By Senator Robert C. Byrd, Senate Document No. 100–20 (1988). Historical Almanac of the United States Senate By Senator Bob Dole, Senate Document No. 100–35 (1989). bjneal on GSDDPC74 with HEARING Æ VerDate Aug 31 2005 07:44 Mar 19, 2008 Jkt 036931 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6611 E:\TEMP\HD049C.XXX PRFM99 PsN: HD049C
The Rise of Illiberal Democracy Author(s): Fareed Zakaria Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1997), pp. 22-43 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20048274 . Accessed: 05/06/2013 00:37 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign Affairs. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The of Rise Illiberal Democracy FareedZakaria THE NEXT WAVE a The American diplomat Richard Holbrooke pondered problem on the eve of the were meant in elections which Bosnia, September 1996 was to restore civic life to that ravaged country. "Suppose the election declared free and fair," he said, and those elected are "racists, fascists, separatists, who are publicly opposed to [peace and r?int?gration]. That is the dilemma." Indeed it is, not just in the formerYugoslavia, but elected regimes, increasingly around the world. Democratically often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, are limits on their power and depriving routinely ignoring constitutional their citizens of basic rights and freedoms. From Peru to the Palestinian from Sierra Leone to Slovakia, from Pakistan to the Philip Authority, we see the rise of a in international life? pines, disturbing phenomenon illiberal democracy. It has been difficult a century in theWest, to recognize this problem because for almost liberal democracy?a has meant democracy system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also political a of powers, and the protection of by the rule of law, separation In fact, basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property. this latter bundle of freedoms?what be termed constitu might tional liberalism?is Fareed Zakaria tributing Editor theoretically isManaging for Newsweek. different Editor and historically of Foreign Affairs distinct and a Con Ua] This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Rise of Illiberal Democracy from democracy. As the political scientist Philippe Schmitter has of political lib either as a conception out, "Liberalism, pointed about economic erty, or as a doctrine policy, may have coincided or But it has never been immutably with the rise of democracy. the two strands of linked to its practice." Today unambiguously in theWestern interwoven liberal democracy, fabric, are political is flourishing; apart in the rest of the world. Democracy coming is not. liberalism constitutional are democratic, encom 118 of the world's 193 countries Today, a to be exact), a vast of its people (54.8 percent, majority passing increase from even a decade ago. In this season of victory, one to go one statesmen and intellectuals might have expected Western further than E. M. Forster and give a rousing three cheers for a unease at the Instead there is growing democracy. rapid spread of across elections south-central Asia, Africa, multiparty Europe, and Latin America, of what happens perhaps because after the Popular leaders like Russia's Boris Yeltsin and Argentina's and rule by presidential Carlos Menem bypass their parliaments decree, eroding basic constitutional practices. The Iranian parlia more most in theMiddle ment?elected freely than East?imposes on even dress, harsh restrictions and speech, assembly, diminishing that country's already meager of elected liberty. Ethiopia's supply turns its security forces on and political government journalists as to human opponents, doing permanent damage rights (as well human beings). of illiberal democracy, there is a spectrum Naturally ranging to near-tyrannies from modest offenders like Argentina like elections. Kazakst?n and with countries like Romania and Belarus, in between. Along much of the spectrum, elections are Bangladesh as free and fair as in theWest rarely today, but they do reflect the in politics and support for those reality of popular participation are not isolated or elected. And the examples atypical. Freedom House's 1996-97 survey, Freedom in the World, has separate rankings for political liberties and civil liberties, which correspond roughly with and constitutional liberalism, democracy respectively. Of the countries that lie between confirmed dictatorship and consolidated on liberties than on civil 50 percent do better democracy, political FOREIGN AFFAIRS- November/December 1997 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions [23] Fareed Zakaria ones. in the countries In other words, half of the "democratizing" are illiberal democracies.1 world today is a growth industry. Seven years ago only 22 Illiberal democracy countries could have been so categorized; percent of democratizing five years ago that figure had risen to 35 percent.2 And to date few if any into liberal democracies; have matured illiberal democracies are illiberalism. Far from toward heightened moving a temporary or transitional stage, it appears that many coun being that mixes a substantial tries are settling into a form of government a substantial degree of illiberalism. Just degree of democracy with across the world have become as nations comfortable with many sustain well and varied could of capitalism, variations they adopt liberal democracy might prove to be forms of democracy. Western on the democratic not the final destination road, but just one of many possible exits. they thing, AND DEMOCRACY the time LIBERTY democracy has meant, first and fore as a process of the rule of the people. This view of democracy most, articulated by scholars ranging from Alexis de selecting governments, From of Herodotus now widely used by Tocqueville toJoseph Schumpeter toRobert Dahl, is social scientists. In The Third Wave, Samuel P. Huntington Elections, escapable free and fair, are open, sine qua non. Governments aRoger Kaplan, 1997, PP- 21-22. The the essence explains why: of democracy, by elections produced the in may be ed., Freedom Around the World, 1997, New York: Freedom House, survey rates countries on two 7-point scales, for political rights and civil liberties (lower is better). I have considered all countries with a combined score of between 5 and 10 to be democratizing. The percentage figures are based on Freedom House's numbers, but in the case of individual countries I have not adhered stricdy to and intelligent? the Survey is an extraordinary feat?comprehensive its ratings.While conflates certain constitutional rights with democratic procedures, its methodology which confuses matters. In addition, I use as examples (though not as part of the data set) countries like Iran, Kazakst?n, and Belarus, which even in procedural terms are semi-democracies at best. But they areworth highlighting as interesting problem cases since most of their leaders were elected, reelected, and remain popular. 2 in theWorld: The Annual Survey ofPolitical Rights and Civil Liberties, 1992 Freedom 199J, pp. [24] 620-26; Freedom in the World, FOREIGN 1989-1990, AFFAIRS pp. 312-19. Volume76No.6 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities make such but undesirable governments they do democratic. one not make public one, them Democracy not virtue, and the un is the relation only to other of democracy pub and vices can only lic virtues be understood if democracy is clearly distinguished from the other political characteristics of systems. This definition also accords with commonsense view of the term. the If a country holds multiparty competitive, we When it democratic. call elections, in politics is increased, public participation for example through the enfranchisement it is seen as more democratic. Of of women, course elections must be open and fair, and this some for freedom of speech protections requires this minimalist and assembly. But to go beyond and label a country democratic definition only if a it guarantees catalog of social, comprehensive and religious rights turns the economic, political, into a badge of honor rather than word democracy a all, Sweden has an economic system category. After descriptive until France that many argue curtails individual property rights, on television, a state has an and England monopoly recently had are all clearly and identifiably But established they religion. "a good gov To have democracy mean, democracies. subjectively, useless. ernment" renders it analytically Constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, is not about the proce dures for selecting government, FOREIGN but rather government's AFFAIRS- November/December goals. 1997 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions It refers [25] Fareed Zakaria to the tradition, deep inWestern history, that seeks to protect an indi vidual's autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source? state, church, or society. The term marries two closely connected ideas. It is liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with the Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberty.3 It is constitutionalbccause it rests on the tradition, beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law. Constitutional liberalismdeveloped inWestern Europe and theUnited States as a defense of the individual's right to life and property, and free dom of religion and speech. To secure these rights, it emphasized checks on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law, courts and tribunals, and impartial separation of church and state. Its canonicalfigures include the poet JohnMilton, the jurist William Black such as Thomas and Jefferson and James Madison, asThomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Baron such philosophers deMontesquieu, John Stuart Mill, and Isaiah Berlin. In almost all of its stone, statesmen liberalism argues that human beings have certain variants, constitutional natural (or "inalienable") rights and that governments must accept a basic law, limiting its own powers, that secures them. Thus in 1215 at Runnymede, England's barons forced the king to abide by the settled and customary law of the land. In the American colonies these laws were explicit, and in 1638 the town of Hartford adopted the firstwritten in modern history. In the 1970s,Western constitution nations codified standards ofbehavior for regimes across the globe. The Magna Carta, the made Fundamental the Helsinki of Connecticut, the American Constitution, and Final Act are all expressions of constitutional liberalism. Orders THE Since 1945Western TO ROAD LIBERAL governments DEMOCRACY have, for the most both democracy and constitutional part, embodied it is difficult liberalism. Thus to imagine the two apart, in the form of either illiberal democracy or liberal autocracy. In fact both have existed in the past and per in sist in the present. Until the twentieth century, most countries 3The term "liberal" is used here in its older, European sense, today the word has come to mean namely policies upholding the modern welfare state. liberalism. In America [26] FOREIGN AFFAIRS-Volume now often called classical something quite different, 76No. 6 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Rise of Illiberal Democracy were liberal autocracies or, at best, semi-democ Europe racies. The franchise was tightly restricted, and elected legislatures in some ways the most had little power. In 1830 Great Britain, 2 democratic nation, allowed barely percent of its pop European one to vote for house of Parlia_ ulation rose to after that figure ment; 7 percent Western in the 1867 and reached around 40 percent 1880s. Only in the late 1940s did most countries become Western full-fledged adult suffrage. democracies, But one hundred years earlier, by the late 1840s, most of them had adopted impor with tant aspects Democracy does not necessarily bring about constitutional universal liberalism. rule of law, private property rights, and increasingly, separated powers and free speech characterized of modern and assembly. For much history, what in Europe and North America, and differentiated governments was not but consti them from those around the world, democracy not is best symbolized "Western model" tutional liberalism. The mass but the impartial judge. by the plebiscite recent history of East Asia follows the Western The itinerary. most afterWorld War East After brief flirtations with democracy II, time they moved Over from Asian regimes turned authoritarian. autocracy to liberalizing autocracy, and, in some cases, toward liber Most of the regimes in East Asia remain alizing semi-democracy.4 or one-party with patriarchs systems that only semi-democratic, make their elections ratifications of power rather than genuine con a tests. But these regimes have accorded their citizens widening of constitutional liberalism?the civil, religious, and limited political rights. As in sphere of economic, in East Asia has included economic liber theWest, liberalization is crucial in promoting both growth and liberal alization, which the factors most closely associated with full democracy. Historically, are a and a high fledged liberal democracies capitalism, bourgeoisie, are and Malaysia of while autocracies, Singapore, examples liberalizing are and Thailand liberal semi-democracies. Both Korea, Taiwan, however, groups, are more are democratic, liberal than is also true of the which liberal they region's only Indonesia, South democracy, Japan; Papua New Guinea, and to a lesser extent the Philippines, only examples of illiberal democracy in East Asia. FOREIGN AFFAIRS- November/December 1997 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions are the [27] Fareed Zakaria are amix of per capita gnp. Today sEast Asian governments democracy, likeWestern liberalism, capitalism, oligarchy, and corruption?much circa governments Constitutional does not seem to 1900. bring and East Asian Western led to democracy, but democracy constitutional liberalism. In contrast to the paths, during the last two decades in Latin liberalism has and parts of Asia, dictatorships with little back Africa, in constitutional liberalism have given way to democracy. ground The results are not encouraging. In the western with hemisphere, a 1993 elections having been held in every country except Cuba, determined that 10 of the 22 study by the scholar Larry Diamond America, countries "have levels of human principal Latin American rights are abuse that with the of consolidation [liberal] incompatible In democratization has been Africa, democracy."5 extraordinarily six in Within months much of Africa lifted 1990 rapid. Francophone its ban on multiparty Yet politics. although elections have been held states since 1991 (18 in 1996 alone), in most of the 45 sub-Saharan there have been setbacks for freedom Africa smost careful observers, Michael in many countries. One the wave of of surveyed Chege, and drew the lesson that the continent had "overem democratization . . . and elections the neglected phasized multiparty correspondingly even In Central Asia, elections, basic tenets of liberal governance." when reasonably free, as in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakst?n, have resulted in strong executives, weak legislatures and few civil and judiciaries, and economic liberties. In the Islamic world, from the Palestinian to Iran to Pakistan, democratization has led to an increasing Authority role for theocratic politics, eroding long-standing traditions of secu larism and tolerance. In many parts of that world, such as Tunisia, to be and some of the Gulf States, were elections Morocco, Egypt, held tomorrow, the resulting regimes would almost certainly be more illiberal than the ones now in place. on the other hand, of the countries of Central Many Europe, to liberal from communism have moved democracy, successfully 5 Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America," in Tom Farer, ed., Beyond Sover a eignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in World of Sovereign States, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 73. [28] FOREIGN AFFAIRS-Volume 76No. 6 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Rise of Illiberal Democracy having gone the same phase through as other countries European of liberalization without did during the nineteenth democracy to which most the Austro-Hungarian Indeed, century. empire, was a classic liberal autocracy. Even outside the Europe, belonged, a scientist Myron Weiner detected striking connection political a a liberal democratic between constitutional present. He past and out that, as of 1983, in the Third "every single country pointed that emerged from colonial rule since the Second World World of at least one million War with a population (and almost all the smaller colonies as well) with a continuous democratic experience meant not is a former British British rule colony."6 democracy? is by definition colonialism undemocratic?but constitutional lib eralism. Britain's legacy of law and administration more beneficial than France's policy of enfranchising colonial populations. has proved some of its existed in the past, can one a small but powerful imagine them today? Until recently, example flourished off the Asian mainland?Hong For until 156 years, Kong. was ruled by the British Crown through an July 1,1997, Hong Kong never held a appointed governor general. Until 1991 it had meaningful constitutional election, but its government liberalism, pro epitomized a fair court system tecting its citizens' basic rights and administering While liberal autocracies may have and bureaucracy. A September 8,1997, editorial on the island s future in The Post was titled ominously, "Undoing Hong Kong's Washington to has Democracy." Actually, Hong Kong precious little democracy undo; what it has is a framework of rights and laws. Small islands may not hold much in today s world, but they do practical significance one lib help weigh the relative value of democracy and constitutional eralism. Consider, for example, the question of where you would an illiberal or a liberal semi rather live, Haiti, democracy, Antigua, relate not to the weather, democracy. Your choice would probably which is pleasant in both, but to the political climate, which is not. and Ergun 6MyronWeiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," inMyron Weiner Ozbudun, eds., Competitive Elections inDeveloping Countries, Durham: Duke Univer sity Press, 1987, p. 20. Today there are functioning democracies in the Third World that are not former British colonies, FOREIGN but the majority AFFAIRS- of the former are the November/December latter. 1997 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions [2 9 ] Fareed Zakaria ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY Stuart Mill John as countries became opened his classic On Liberty by noting that to believe that "too democratic, people tended much importance had been attached to the limitation of power itself. . was . a response interests were opposed That. against rulers whose to those of the the people were themselves in charge, people." Once caution was unnecessary. "The nation did not need to be protected own will." As if against its confirming Mill's fears, consider the words of Alexandr Lukashenko after being elected president of Belarus with an in a free election in 1994, when asked majority overwhelming no am I about limiting his powers: "There will be of the dictatorship. am to be for the people." people, and I going The tension between constitutional liberalism and democracy cen ters on the scope of liberalism is authority. Constitutional governmental and about the limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation use. For this reason, many and nineteenth-century liberals eighteenthsaw in a force that could undermine liberty. James Madison democracy a explained in The Federalist that "the danger of oppression" in democ racy came from "the majority of the community." Tocqueville warned of the "tyranny of the majority," writing, "The very essence of democratic consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority." government to believe it has absolute The tendency for a democratic government of author (that is, power) can result in the centralization sovereignty means and with results. Over the often extraconstitutional grim ity, by to represent the last decade, elected governments claiming people have steadily encroached on the powers and rights of other elements in society, a usurpation that is both horizontal (from other branches and vertical of the national government) (from regional and local as well as and other nongovernmental authorities private businesses and Peru's Alberto Fujimori are only the worst groups). Lukashenko the examples of this practice. (While Fujimori's actions?disbanding it the constitution, among others?make legislature and suspending won it isworth noting that he difficult to call his regime democratic, two elections and was extremely popular until recently.) Even a bona has passed close to 300 presidential fide reformer like Carlos Menem decrees in his eight years in office, about three times as many as all [30] FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Volume 6No. 6 j This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions to presidents put previous Argentinean to 1853. Kyrgyzstan's gether, going back elected with 60 percent Askar Akayev, his the vote, proposed enhancing a in that passed referendum powers new His in powers include 1996. easily all top officials except the appointing can dis although he prime minister, if it turns down three solve parliament of his nominees for the latter post. Horizontal usually by usurpation, more obvious, but ver is presidents, common. is more tical usurpation Over the last three decades, the Indian has routinely disbanded government on state legislatures flimsy grounds, New Delhi's under regions placing the elected govern direct rule. In a less dramatic but typical move, ment of the Central African recently ended the long Republic it part of of its university system, making independence standing the central state apparatus. in Latin America and the is particularly widespread Usurpation states of the former Soviet Union, perhaps because both regions tend to produce strong leaders mostly have presidencies. These systems when who believe that they speak for the people?even they have been elected by no more than a plurality. (As Juan Linz points out, in 1970 with Salvador Allende was elected to the Chilean presidency a vote. In similar circumstances, prime minister only 36 percent of the a Presidents would have had to share power in coalition government.) senior party figures, main appoint cabinets of cronies, rather than on their power. And when their views taining few internal checks conflict with those of the legislature, or even the courts, presidents the dreary tasks of bargaining tend to "go to the nation," bypassing scholars debate the merits of presidential and coalition-building. While can occur versus forms of government, usurpation parliamentary alternate centers of power such as under either, absent well-developed and strong legislatures, courts, political parties, regional governments, of FOREIGN AFFAIRS- November/December 1997 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions [ 31 ] Fareed Zakaria independent universities and media. Latin America actually combines systems with representation, presidential proportional producing and leaders unstable combination. multiple parties?an populist and scholars have encouraged the cre Western governments Many states in the Third World. ation of strong and centralized in Leaders to break down these countries have argued that they need the authority override vested entrenched coalitions, interests, and feudalism, split to chaotic societies. But this confuses the need for a bring order legiti mate government with that for a powerful one. Governments that are can seen as usually maintain order and pursue tough policies, legitimate albeit slowly, by building coalitions. After all, few claim that govern ments in countries should not have adequate police powers; developing the trouble comes from all the other political, social, and economic In crises like civil wars, constitutional powers that they accumulate. governments might not be able to rule effectively, but the alternative? vast security apparatuses states with constitutional that suspend nor neither order good government. usually produced rights?has some states become such have More often, predatory, maintaining order but also arresting opponents, muzzling dissent, nationalizing industries, and confiscating property. While anarchy has its dangers, in this century have the greatest threats to human liberty and happiness been caused not by disorder but by brutally strong, centralized states, and Maoist Soviet Russia, China. The Third like Nazi Germany, is littered with the bloody handiwork of strong states. World unchecked centralization has been the enemy of liberal Historically, over the increased in Europe democracy. As political participation nineteenth century, itwas accommodated smoothly in countries such as local govern and Sweden, where medieval assemblies, England like and regional councils had remained ments, strong. Countries France and Prussia, on the other hand, where the monarchy had effec and vertically), often ended tively centralized power (both horizontally a not that in twentieth is It coincidence up illiberal and undemocratic. century Spain, the beachhead of liberalism lay inCatalonia, for centuries a the and autonomous region. In America, independent doggedly local, and private?made presence of a rich variety of institutions?state, the rapid and large extensions in suffrage itmuch easier to accommodate that took place [32] in the early nineteenth FOREIGN AFFAIRS century. Arthur -Volume 76No. Schlesinger 6 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Sr. how, during Amer ica's first 50 years, virtually every state, interest group and faction tried toweaken and even break up has documented the federal recently, government.7 More semi-liberal India's has survived because democracy of, not despite, its strong regions and varied cultures, languages, and even castes. The point is log ical, even tautological: pluralism in the past helps ensure political pluralism in the present. in ago, politicians ex world wanted to implement traordinary powers economic doc then-fashionable Fifty years the developing of in trines, like nationalization successors their dustries. Today want similar powers to privatize those very industries. Menem's is for his methods justification that they are desperately needed to enact Similar Abdal? tough economic reforms. arguments are made by of Ecuador Bucarem I in and by Fujimori. Lending as Fund and theWorld the International Monetary such stitutions, to these pleas, and the bond market Bank, have been sympathetic like war, has been positively exuberant. But except in emergencies run are in the liberal ends. illiberal means long incompatible with is in fact the key to a successful economic Constitutional government reform policy. The experience of East Asia and Central Europe sug as in East Asia, or authoritarian, gests that when regimes?whether 7Arthur Schlesinger, Sr.,New lan, 1922, pp. Viewpoints inAmerican History, New York: Macmil 220-40. FOREIGN AFFAIRS November/December 1997 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions [33] Fareed Zakaria as in Poland, liberal democratic, and the Czech Republic? Hungary, those of property and contract, protect individual rights, including a create and framework of law and administration, and capitalism a recent at theWoodrow Wilson Inter growth will follow. In speech national Center inWashington, explaining what it takes for capitalism to flourish, Federal Reserve chairman Alan concluded that, Greenspan "The The democratic economy. peace is actually the liberal peace. p-nidinp- mechanism a free market .. is a bill of rights, enforced impartial judiciary" and perhaps Finally, power of accumulated more an important, can be used to do good subsequently to do ill.When by Fujimori dis his approval banded parliament, ratings ever. But recent shot up to their highest opinion polls suggest that now wish he were once most of those who approved of his actions more In 1993 Boris Yeltsin constrained. (and literally) famously own attacked the Russian parliament, prompted by parliament's acts. He then the constitutional unconstitutional court, suspended and fired several the system of local governments, dismantled to his economic From the war in Chechnya provincial governors. programs, Yeltsin has displayed a routine lack of concern for consti tutional procedures and limits. He may well be a liberal democrat at heart, but Yeltsin's actions have created a Russian super-presidency. can successor will not abuse it. his We only hope to view For centuries Western intellectuals have had a tendency constitutional liberalism as a quaint exercise in rule-making, mere for malism that should take a back seat to battling larger evils in society. to this view remains an exchange in eloquent counterpoint Robert Bolt's play A Man For All Seasons. The fiery young William to battle evil, is exasperated by Sir Thomas Mores Roper, who yearns to the law.More gently defends himself. devotion The most More: What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? Roper: I'd cut every law in England to do that! More: And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned on you?where would you hide Roper, the laws all being flat? [34] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume76No.6 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Rise of Illiberal Democracy ETHNIC CONFLICT AND WAR a dramatic dash to Belgrade. The French celebrity politician, formerly minister of culture, had been tens of thousands involving inspired by the student demonstrations aman intellec Lang and many Western against Slobodan Milosevic, to lend tuals held responsible for the war in the Balkans. Lang wanted his moral support to the Yugoslav opposition. The leaders of the move ment received him in their offices?the philosophy department?only On December 8,1996, Jack Lang made to boot him out, declare him "an enemy of the Serbs," and order him to leave the country. It turned out that the students opposed Milosevic not for starting the war, but for failing to win it. two common, and often mistaken, Lang's embarrassment highlights are the forces of ethnic the forces of democracy assumptions?that true. Mature is necessarily and of peace. Neither liberal harmony can ethnic divisions without violence democracies usually accommodate or terror and live in peace with other liberal democracies. But without a liberalism, the introduction of democracy background in constitutional in divided societies has actually fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict, and even war. The spate of elections held immediately after the col were won in the Soviet Union and lapse of communism Yugoslavia by in and the nationalist resulted of countries. those separatists breakup This was not in and of itself bad, since those countries had been bound insti together by force. But the rapid secessions, without guarantees, or the tutions, living within political power for the many minorities new countries, have caused and, in spirals of rebellion, repression, and Georgia, war. places like Bosnia, Azerbaijan, so Elections require that politicians compete for peoples' votes. In cieties without groups or assimilation, strong traditions of multiethnic support along racial, ethnic, or religious lines. is in power, it tends to exclude other ethnic seems one can on material groups. Compromise impossible; bargain issues like housing, hospitals, and handouts, but how does one split on a the difference national religion? Political competition that is so can move divisive into violence. Opposition rapidly degenerate ments, armed rebellions, and coups inAfrica have often been directed came to power based regimes, many of which against ethnically it is easiest to organize an ethnic group Once FOREIGN AFFAIRS- November/December 1997 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions [35] Fareed Zakaria the breakdown of African and Asian through elections. Surveying in the 1960s, two scholars concluded democracies that democracy "is an environment of intense ethnic simply not viable in preferences." Re cent studies, particularly of Africa and Central Asia, have confirmed this pessimism. A distinguished expert on ethnic conflict, Donald . . "In the face of this rather dismal account. Horowitz, concluded, of the concrete failures of democracy in divided societies . . . one is to throw up one's hands. What is the point of holding elec tempted tions if all they do in the end is to substitute a Bemba-dominated a the two equally narrow, or a regime for Nyanja regime in Zambia, southern regime for a northern one in Benin, neither incorporating the other half of the state?"8 Over the past decade, one of the most spirited debates among schol ars of international relations concerns the "democratic as peace"?the sertion that no two modern democracies have gone to war with each other. The debate raises interesting substantive questions (does the count? do nuclear weapons American Civil War better explain the even the statistical findings have raised interesting dissents. peace?) and (As the scholar David Spiro points out, given the small number of both and wars over the last two hundred years, sheer chance democracies war between democracies. No member of might explain the absence of his family has ever won the lottery, yet few offer explanations for this even if the statistics are correct, what impressive correlation.) But explains them? Kant, the original proponent of the democratic peace, contended those who pay for wars?that that in democracies, is, the public?make so are cautious. But that claim sug the decisions, they understandably more are states. gests that democracies Actually they pacific than other aremore warlike, towar more often and with greater intensity than going most states. It is only with other democracies that the peace holds. cause behind this correlation, one When thing becomes divining the in the clear: the democratic peace is actually the liberal peace. Writing 8Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, Politics inPlural Societies:A Theory ofDemo craticInstability, Columbus: Charles E. Merill, pp. 62-92; Donald Horowitz, "Democ racy inDivided Societies," in Larry Diamond andMark F. Plattner, eds., Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict andDemocracy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 35-55 [36] FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Volume 76No. 6 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions century, Kant believed that democracies were tyrannical, eighteenth and he specifically excluded them from his conception of "republican" for Kant, governments, which lived in a zone of peace. Republicanism, a meant of checks and the rule of law, balances, powers, separation of individual rights, and some level of representation in protection to universal government (though nothing close suffrage). Kant's other explanations for the "perpetual peace" between republics are all closely linked to their constitutional and liberal character: amutual respect for the rights of each other's citizens, a system of checks and balances no can assuring that single leader drag his country into war, and classical create liberal economic policies?most importantly, free trade?which an that makes war costly and cooperation useful. interdependence Michael Doyle, the leading scholar on the subject, confirms in his 1997 book Ways of War and Peace that without constitutional liberalism, no itself has democracy peace-inducing qualities: Kant distrusted democratic unfettered, majoritarianism, and his argu ment offers no support for a claim that all participatory polities? democracies?should be peaceful, either in general or between fellow democracies. Many participatory polities have been non-liberal. For two thousand years before the modern associated with aggressiveness FOREIGN age, (byThucydides) AFFAIRS- popular rule was widely or imperial success (by November/December 1997 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions [37] Fareed Zakaria . . . The decisive preference of [the] median voter might Machiavelli) well include "ethnic cleansing" against other democratic polities. The distinction between liberaland illiberaldemocracies sheds light on another striking statistical correlation. Political scientists Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield contend, using an impressive data set, that over more states went to war the last 200 years democratizing significantly In countries often than either stable autocracies or liberal democracies. not in constitutional liberalism, the rise of democracy often grounded and war-mongering. When the politi brings with it hyper-nationalism cal system is opened up, diverse groups with incompatible interests gain access to power and press their demands. Political and military leaders, who are often embattled remnants of the old authoritarian order, realize masses behind a national cause. rally the The result is invariably aggressive rhetoric and policies, which often drag countries into confrontation and war. Noteworthy examples range from to those and Taisho Ill's Wilhelmine France, Germany, Japan Napoleon andMilosevic's in today's newspapers, likeArmenia and Azerbaijan Ser bia. The democratic peace, it turns out, has little to do with democracy. that to succeed that they must THE AMERICAN PATH a recently traveled to Kazakst?n on U.S. to help the new mission parliament draft its government-sponsored a senior member of the Kazak parlia electoral laws. His counterpart, ment, brushed aside the many options the American expert was outlin "We want our parliament to be just like your ing, saying emphatically, was horrified, to say some recalling, "I tried Congress." The American come screaming thing other than the three words that had immediately in into my mind: 'No you don't!'" This view is not unusual. Americans the democracy business tend to see their own system as an unwieldy con no other country should put up with. In fact, the adoption traption that constitutional framework could ame of some aspects of the American An American scholar of the problems associated with illiberal democracy. The a fear of accumulated power, philosophy behind the U.S. Constitution, as it is as relevant today as itwas in 1789. Kazakst?n, happens, would be a strong the American by parliament?like particularly well-served check the insatiable appetite of its president. Congress?to liorate many [38] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volume 76No. 6 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Rise of Illiberal Democracy It is odd that the United States is so often the advocate of elections is distinctive abroad. What about the and plebiscitary democracy it is but rather how unde American system is not how democratic as it is, placing mocratic it does multiple constraints on electoral ma para jorities. Of its three branches of government, one?arguably mount?is headed by nine unelected men and women with life tenure. Its Senate is the most in house the upper unrepresentative of Lords, which is pow world, with the lone exception of the House erless. (Every state sends two senators toWashington regardless of its population?California's 30 million people have as many votes in means the Senate as Arizona's that senators rep 3.7 million?which can block any resenting about 16 percent of the country proposed is strik what law.) Similarly, in legislatures all over the United States, not the power of but that of minorities. To further ing is majorities are strong and check national power, state and local governments fiercely battle every federal intrusion onto their turf. Private busi nesses and other called groups, what Tocqueville nongovernmental stratum intermediate make within associations, up another society. an on The American is based system avowedly pessimistic concep tion of human nature, assuming that people cannot be trusted with power. "Ifmen were angels," Madison famously wrote, "no government would be necessary." The other model for democratic governance in on the French Revolution. The French model Western history is based places its faith in the goodness of human beings. Once the people are the source of power, it should be unlimited so that they can create a just society. (The French revolution, as Lord Acton observed, is not about the limitation of sovereign power but the abrogation of all intermediate countries have embraced powers that get in itsway.) Most non-Western the French model?not least because political elites like the prospect of the state, since that means empowering themselves?and empowering most have descended into bouts of chaos, tyranny, or both. This should have come as no surprise. After all, since its revolution France itself has run two empires, one dictator through two monarchies, proto-fascist ship, and five republics.9 9Bernard Lewis, "Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy," Middle East Quar terly, March 1994, pp. 47-48. FOREIGN AFFAIRS- November/December1997 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions [3 9 ] Fareed Zakaria course Of cultures and societies will require a not different frameworks of government. This is the for whole plea sale adoption of the American way but rather for a more variegated one that of liberal democracy, both parts of conception emphasizes that phrase. Before new policies can be adopted, there lies an intel vary, different lectual task of recovering the constitutional liberal tradition, central to theWestern and to the development of good govern experience ment the world. Political progress inWestern throughout history has been the result of a growing recognition over the centuries that, as the of Independence Declaration puts it, human beings have "certain in alienable rights" and that "it is to secure these rights that governments are instituted." If a not preserve democracy does liberty and law, that a a it is democracy is small consolation. LIBERALIZING FOREIGN POLICY liberalism has a variety of of constitutional appreciation a certain for American implications foreign policy. First, it suggests it is easy to impose elections on a country, it ismore humility. While liberalism on a society. The process of difficult to push constitutional A proper is gradual and long-term, and democratization is only one step.Without appropriate prepara even and be a false step. Recognizing tion, itmight this, governments are a wide organizations nongovernmental increasingly promoting to bolster constitutional liberalism in de array of measures designed Endowment countries. The National for Democracy pro veloping motes free markets, labor and movements, political independent for International funds inde The U.S. Development parties. Agency genuine in which liberalization an election In the end, however, elections trump everything. pendent judiciaries. and the world will tolerate a If a country holds elections, Washington as great deal from the resulting government, they have with Yeltsin, In an age of images and symbols, elections are and Menem. Akayev, easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the rule of law?) But there is life after elections, especially for the people who live there. the absence of free and fair elections should be viewed Conversely, are an as one flaw, not the definition of tyranny. Elections important but they are not the only virtue. Governments virtue of governance, [40] FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Volume 76No. 6 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Rise of Illiberal Democracy liberalism as should be judged by yardsticks related to constitutional well. Economic, civil, and religious liberties are at the core of human If a government with limited democracy and dignity. autonomy it should not be branded a dictator steadily expands these freedoms, like they offer, countries a better environment for Singapore, Malaysia, provide of their citizens than do either dicta the life, liberty, and happiness or illiberal democracies like and like Slovakia or Iraq Libya torships Ghana. And the pressures of global capitalism can push the process can work forward. Markets and morals of liberalization together. Even China, which remains a deeply repressive regime, has given its citizens more autonomy and economic liberty than they have had in more needs to can even be generations. Much change before China called a liberalizing autocracy, but that should not mask the fact that much has changed. we need to revive constitutionalism. One effect of the Finally, on pure is that little effort is given to cre overemphasis democracy constitutions countries. Consti for transitional ating imaginative as was it understood tutionalism, century by its greatest eighteenth as a and is such Madison, exponents, Montesquieu complicated to prevent the accumula of checks and balances system designed tion of power and the abuse of office. This is done not by simply a system in which up a list of rights but by constructing writing will not violate those rights. Various groups must be government asMadison included and empowered "ambi because, explained, to counteract were tion must be made ambition." Constitutions ship. Despite also meant democratic the limited political and Thailand to tame the passions but also deliberative rich variety of unelected bodies, and checks and balances ments, formal and informal constitutions choice of the public, creating not simply the government. Unfortunately, indirect voting, federal arrange so many of the that characterized are now of Europe regarded with What could be called the Weimar suspicion. syndrome? named after interwar Germany's constructed constitu beautifully failed to avert fascism?has made people regard con tion, which as stitutions that cannot make much difference. simply paperwork would have easily weath (As if any political system in Germany ered military social revolution, the Great Depression, and defeat, FOREIGN AFFAIRS- November/December 1997 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions [ 41 ] Fareed Zakaria are seen that inhibit direct democracy Procedures hyperinflation.) as inauthentic, the voice of the people. Today around the muzzling on the same world we see variations theme. But the majoritarian trouble with ratizing these winner-take-all countries, the winner democracy's We live systems is that, in most really does take all. democ discontents in a democratic age. Through much of human history the to an individual's life, came from the ab danger liberty and happiness solutism of monarchies, the dogma of churches, the terror of dicta Dictators and a few torships, and the iron grip of totalitarianism. are regimes still persist, but increasingly straggling totalitarian they in aworld of global markets, anachronisms and media. information, to democracy; There are no longer respectable alternatives it is part of the fashionable attire of modernity. Thus the problems of gover nance in the 21st century will likely be problems within democracy. as are in the This makes them more difficult to handle, wrapped they mantle of legitimacy. and thus strength, from Illiberal democracies gain legitimacy, the fact that they are reasonably democratic. the Conversely, than to its greatest danger that illiberal democracy poses?other own that itwill discredit liberal democracy itself, cast people?is a shadow on democratic not This would be un governance. ing wave of has been followed Every precedented. democracy by set seen as in which backs the system was and new inadequate leaders and restless masses. alternatives were sought by ambitious in Europe during the in The last such period of disenchantment, terwar years, was of whom seized upon by demagogues, many were in the face of a and even elected. Today, initially popular the most useful role that the inter spreading virus of illiberalism, the United and most national States, can community, importantly new lands to democratize and for of searching play is?instead new to hold elections?to it consolidate democracy where places con to root of the gradual development and has taken encourage con across the without stitutional liberalism globe. Democracy but dangerous, is not simply liberalism stitutional inadequate, [42] FOREIGN AFFAIRS-Volume 76No. 6 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Rise of Illiberal Democracy it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic bringing with took Wilson and even war. Eighty years ago, Woodrow divisions, a to make the into the twentieth America century with challenge, we next the world safe for democracy. As century, our approach safe for the world.? task is to make democracy Theories Regimes Andreas Hasenclever, Peter A. Miranda and Mayer, Volker Rittberger Elizabeth the three and critically examines describes theories of international regimes. important These theories each stress a particular explanatory state power; neo variable: realist theories emphasize Seven This book most focus on constellations liberal theories theories cognitivist and ideas. The prospects combining Cambridge 59145-7 authors Studies approaches. Relations Hardback about Paperback about I* ? Ayf V^^VIVID UNIVERSITY interests; and knowledge the by exploring this dynamic field by in International in bookstores of with conclude for progress within theoretical different 59849-4 Available are concerned of The Internationalization Protection Environmental International of 55 $59.95 $18.95 zation Schreurs Economy, and Editors case studies show how the internationali original is altering efforts of environmental protection and the processes, policy outcomes, At the same of policy implementation. the authors argue, the vital role of sub-state policy-making effectiveness time, continues politics to influence the nature of national to international environmental responses problems. Miranda Schreurs, Elizabeth Economy, Kal Contributors: Raustiala, Joanne M. Kauffman, Robert G. Darst, Phyllis Mofson, Angela Libera tore Studies in International Relations Cambridge 58499-X Hardback $59.95 58536-8 Paperback $18.95 54 or from _ TT^r^TT TIT?JVL?7ljJj/ PRESS FOREIGN 40 West 20th street' New York, NY 10011-4211. Web site: http://www.cup.org Ca|| toll-free 800-872-7423. Prices subject to change. MasterCard/VISA accepted. AFFAIRS- November/December 1997 This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 00:37:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions [43] Facing Up to the Democratic Recession Larry Diamond Journal of Democracy, Volume 26, Number 1, January 2015, pp. 141-155 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jod.2015.0009 For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v026/26.1.diamond.html Access provided by KOC University (15 Jul 2015 15:51 GMT) Facing Up to the Democratic Recession Larry Diamond Larry Diamond is founding coeditor of the Journal of Democracy, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, and director of Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. The year 2014 marked the fortieth anniversary of Portugal’s Revolu- tion of the Carnations, which inaugurated what Samuel P. Huntington dubbed the “third wave” of global democratization. Any assessment of the state of global democracy today must begin by recognizing—even marveling at—the durability of this historic transformation. When the third wave began in 1974, only about 30 percent of the world’s independent states met the criteria of electoral democracy—a system in which citizens, through universal suffrage, can choose and replace their leaders in regular, free, fair, and meaningful elections.1 At that time, there were only about 46 democracies in the world. Most of those were the liberal democracies of the rich West, along with a number of small island states that had been British colonies. Only a few other developing democracies existed—principally, India, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, Israel, and Turkey. In the subsequent three decades, democracy had a remarkable global run, as the number of democracies essentially held steady or expanded every year from 1975 until 2007. Nothing like this continous growth in democracy had ever been seen before in the history of the world. While a number of these new “democracies” were quite illiberal—in some cases, so much so that Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way regard them as “competitive authoritarian” regimes2—the positive three-decade trend was paralleled by a similarly steady and significant expansion in levels of freedom (political rights and civil liberties, as measured annually by Freedom House). In 1974, the average level of freedom in the world stood at 4.38 (on the two seven-point scales, where 1 is most free and 7 is most repressive). It then gradually improved during the 1970s and Journal of Democracy Volume 26, Number 1 January 2015 © 2015 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press 142 Journal of Democracy 1980s, though it did not cross below the 4.0 midpoint until the fall of the Berlin Wall, after which it improved to 3.85 in 1990. In 25 of the 32 years between 1974 and 2005, average freedom levels improved in the world, peaking at 3.22 in 2005. And then, around 2006, the expansion of freedom and democracy in the world came to a prolonged halt. Since 2006, there has been no net expansion in the number of electoral democracies, which has oscillated between 114 and 119 (about 60 percent of the world’s states). As we see in Figure 1, the number of both electoral and liberal democracies began to decline after 2006 and then flattened out.3 Since 2006, the average level of freedom in the world has also deteriorated slightly, leveling off at about 3.30. There are two ways to view these empirical trends. One is to see them as constituting a period of equilibrium—freedom and democracy have not continued gaining, but neither have they experienced net declines. One could even celebrate this as an expression of the remarkable and unexpected durability of the democratic wave. Given that democracy expanded to a number of countries where the objective conditions for sustaining it are unfavorable, due either to poverty (for example, in Liberia, Malawi, and Sierra Leone) or to strategic pressures (for example, in Georgia and Mongolia), it is impressive that reasonably open and competitive political systems have survived (or revived) in so many places. As a variant of this more benign interpretation, Levitsky and Way argue in this issue of the Journal that democracy never actually expanded as widely as Freedom House perceived in the first place. Thus, they contend, many of the seeming failures of democracy in the last ten to fifteen years were really deteriorations or hardenings of what had been from the beginning authoritarian regimes, however competitive. Alternatively, one can view the last decade as a period of at least incipient decline in democracy. To make this case, we need to examine not only the instability and stagnation of democracies, but also the incremental decline of democracy in what Thomas Carothers has termed the “gray zone” countries (which defy easy classification as to whether or not they are democracies),4 the deepening authoritarianism in the nondemocracies, and the decline in the functioning and self-confidence of the world’s established, rich democracies. This will be my approach in what follows. The debate about whether there has been a decline in democracy turns to some extent on how we count it. It is one of the great and probably inescapable ironies of scholarly research that the boom in comparative democratic studies has been accompanied by significant disagreement over how to define and measure democracy. I have never felt that there was—or could be—one right and consensual answer to this eternal conceptual challenge. Most scholars of democracy have agreed that it Larry Diamond 143 Figure 1—The Growth of Democracies in the World, 1974–2013 70% 57% 60% 50% 61% 59% 45% 40% 30% 58% 34% 37% 41% 29% 30% 20% 21% 24% 33% 40% 35% 26% 10% 0% Liberal Democracies Electoral Democracies makes sense to classify regimes categorically—and thus to determine which regimes are democracies and which are not. But democracy is in many ways a continuous variable. Its key components—such as freedom of multiple parties and candidates to campaign and contest; opposition access to mass media and campaign finance; inclusiveness of suffrage; fairness and neutrality of electoral administration; and the extent to which electoral victors have meaningful power to rule—vary on a continuum (as do other dimensions of the quality of democracy, such as civil liberties, rule of law, control of corruption, vigor of civil society, and so on). This continuous variation forces coders to make difficult judgments about how to classify regimes that fall into the gray zone of ambiguity, where multiparty electoral competition is genuine and vigorous but flawed in some notable ways. No system of multiparty competition is perfectly fair and open. Some multiparty electoral systems clearly do not meet the test of democracy. Others have serious defects that nevertheless do not negate their overall democratic character. Thus hard decisions must often be made about how to weight imperfections and where to draw the line. Most approaches to classifying regimes (as democracies or not) rely on continuous measurement of key variables (such as political rights, in the case of the Polity scale, or both political rights and civil liberties, in the case of Freedom House), along with a somewhat arbitrary cutoff point for separating democracies from nondemocracies. 5 My own method has been to accept the Freedom House coding decisions except where I find persuasive contradictory evidence. This has led to my counting two to five fewer democracies than Freedom House does 144 Journal of Democracy for most years since 1989; for some years, the discrepancy is much larger.6 The Democratic Recession: Breakdowns and Erosions The world has been in a mild but protracted democratic recession since about 2006. Beyond the lack of improvement or modest erosion of global levels of democracy and freedom, there have been several other causes for concern. First, there has been a significant and, in fact, accelerating rate of democratic breakdown. Second, the quality or stability of democracy has been declining in a number of large and strategically important emerging-market countries, which I call “swing states.” Third, authoritarianism has been deepening, including in big and strategically important countries. And fourth, the established democracies, beginning with the United States, increasingly seem to be performing poorly and to lack the will and self-confidence to promote democracy effectively abroad. I explore each of these in turn. First, let us look at rates of democratic breakdown. Between 1974 and the end of 2014, 29 percent of all the democracies in the world broke down (among non-Western democracies, the rate was 35 percent). In the first decade and a half of this new century, the failure rate (17.6 percent) has been substantially higher than in the preceding fifteen-year period (12.7 percent). Alternatively, if we break the third wave up into its four component decades, we see a rising incidence of democratic failure per decade since the mid-1980s. The rate of democratic failure, which had been 16 percent in the first decade of the third wave (1974–83), fell to 8 percent in the second decade (1984–93), but then climbed to 11 percent in the third decade (1994–2003), and most recently to 14 percent (2004–13). (If we include the three failures of 2014, the rate rises to over 16 percent.) Since 2000, I count 25 breakdowns of democracy in the world—not only through blatant military or executive coups, but also through subtle and incremental degradations of democratic rights and procedures that finally push a democratic system over the threshold into competitive authoritarianism (see Table). Some of these breakdowns occurred in quite low-quality democracies; yet in each case, a system of reasonably free and fair multiparty electoral competition was either displaced or degraded to a point well below the minimal standards of democracy. One methodological challenge in tracking democratic breakdowns is to determine a precise date or year for a democratic failure that results from a long secular process of systemic deterioration and executive strangulation of political rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law. No serious scholar would consider Russia today a democracy. But many believe that it was an electoral democracy (however rough and illiberal) under Boris Yeltsin. If we score 1993 as the year when democ- Larry Diamond 145 Table—Breakdowns of Democracy, 2000–2014 Year of Breakdown Country Year of Return Type of Breakdown 2000 2000 2001 Fiji Russia Central Af. Rep. – – – Military coup Executive degradation, violation of opposition rights Military rebellion, violence, human rights abuses 2002 Guinea-Bissau 2005 Executive degradation, violation of opposition rights (military coup the following year) 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2007 2007 2008 2009 Nepal Venezuela Thailand Solomon Islands Bangladesh Philippines Kenya Georgia Honduras 2013 – 2011 – 2008 2010 – 2012 2013 Rising political instability, monarchical coup Executive degradation, violation of opposition rights Military coup, then military constraint Decline of democratic process Military “soft coup” Executive degradation Electoral fraud and executive abuse Electoral fraud and executive abuse Military intervention 2009 Madagascar – Unconstitutional assumption of power by opposition; suspension of elected parliament 2009 Niger 2010 2010 2011 Presidential dissolution of Constitutional Court and National Assembly to extend presidential rule Burundi Sri Lanka – – Electoral fraud, opposition boycott, political closure Executive degradation 2010 Guinea-Bissau – Military intervention, weakening civilian control, deteriorating rule of law 2012 2012 2011 Maldives Mali Nicaragua – 2014 – Forcible removal of democratically elected president Military coup Executive degradation 2012 Ukraine 2014 Electoral fraud (parliamentary elections), executive abuse 2014 2014 2014 Turkey Bangladesh Thailand – – – Executive degradation, violation of opposition rights Breakdown of electoral process Military coup racy emerged in Russia (as Freedom House does), then what year do we identify as marking the end of democracy? In this case (and many others), there is no single obvious event—like Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori’s 1992 autogolpe, dissolving Congress and seizing unconstitutional powers—to guide the scoring decision. I postulate that Russia’s political system fell below the minimum conditions of electoral democracy during the year 2000, as signaled by the electoral fraud that gave Vladimir Putin a dubious first-ballot victory and the executive degradation of political and civic pluralism that quickly followed. (Freedom House dates the failure to 2005.) The problem has continuing and quite contemporary relevance. For a number of years now, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been gradually eroding democratic pluralism and freedom in the country. The overall political trends have been hard to characterize, because some of the AKP’s changes have made Turkey more democratic by removing the military as an autonomous veto player in politics, ex- 146 Journal of Democracy tending civilian control over the military, and making it harder to ban political parties that offend the “deep state” structures associated with the intensely secularist legacy of Kemal Atatürk. But the AKP has gradually entrenched its own political hegemony, extending partisan control over the judiciary and the bureaucracy, arresting journalists and intimidating dissenters in the press and academia, threatening businesses with retaliation if they fund opposition parties, and using arrests and prosecutions in cases connected to alleged coup plots to jail and remove from public life an implausibly large number of accused plotters. This has coincided with a stunning and increasingly audacious concentration of personal power by Turkey’s longtime prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdo¢gan, who was elected president in August 2014. The abuse and personalization of power and the constriction of competitive space and freedom in Turkey have been subtle and incremental, moving with nothing like the speed of Putin in the early 2000s. But by now, these trends appear to have crossed a threshold, pushing the country below the minimum standards of democracy. If this has happened, when did it happen? Was it in 2014, when the AKP further consolidated its hegemonic grip on power in the March local-government elections and the August presidential election? Or was it, as some liberal Turks insist, several years before, as media freedoms were visibly diminishing and an ever-wider circle of alleged coup plotters was being targeted in the highly politicized Ergenekon trials? A similar problem exists for Botswana, where a president (Ian Khama) with a career military background evinces an intolerance of opposition and distaste for civil society beyond anything seen previously from the long-ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Increasing political violence and intimidation—including assaults on opposition politicians, the possible murder of a leading opposition candidate three months before the October 2014 parliamentary elections, and the apparent involvement of the intelligence apparatus in the bullying and coercion of the political opposition—have been moving the political system in a more authoritarian direction. Escalating pressure on the independent media, the brazen misuse of state television by the BDP, and the growing personalization and centralization of power by President Khama (as he advances his own narrow circle of family and friends while splitting the ruling party) are further signs of the deterioration, if not crisis, of democracy in Botswana.7 Again, Levitsky and Way had argued a number of years ago that Botswana was not a genuine democracy in the first place.8 Nevertheless, whatever kind of system it has been in recent decades, “respect for the rule of law and for established institutions and processes” began to diminish in 1998, when Khama ascended to the vice-presidency, and it has continued to decline since 2008, when the former military commander “automatically succeeded to the presidency.”9 There are no easy and obvious answers to the conundrum of how to Larry Diamond 147 classify regimes in the gray zone. One can argue about whether these ambiguous regimes are still democracies—or even if they ever really were. Those who accept that a democratic breakdown has occurred can argue about when it took place. But what is beyond argument is that there is a class of regimes that in the last decade or so have experienced significant erosion in electoral fairness, political pluralism, and civic space for opposition and dissent, typically as a result of abusive executives intent upon concentrating their personal power and entrenching ruling-party hegemony. The best-known cases of this since 1999 have been Russia and Venezuela, where populist former military officer Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) gradually suffocated democratic pluralism during the first decade of this century. After Daniel Ortega returned to the presidency in Nicaragua in 2007, he borrowed many pages from Chávez’s authoritarian playbook, and left-populist authoritarian presidents Evo Morales of Bolivia and Rafael Correa of Ecuador have been moving in a similar direction. In their contribution to this issue, Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Li~nán assert that democratic erosion has occurred since 2000 in all four of these Latin American countries (Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador) as well as in Honduras, with Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras now limping along as “semidemocracies.” Of the 25 breakdowns since 2000 listed in the Table, eighteen have occurred after 2005. Only eight of these 25 breakdowns came as a result of military intervention (and of those eight, only four took the form of a conventional, blatant military coup, as happened twice in Thailand). Two other cases (Nepal and Madagascar) saw democratically elected rulers pushed out of power by other nondemocratic forces (the monarch and the political opposition, respectively). The majority of the breakdowns—thirteen—resulted from the abuse of power and the desecration of democratic institutions and practices by democratically elected rulers. Four of these took the form of widespread electoral fraud or, in the recent case of Bangladesh, a unilateral change in the rules of electoral administration (the elimination of the practice of a caretaker government before the election) that tilted the electoral playing field and triggered an opposition boycott. The other nine failures by executive abuse involved the more gradual suffocation of democracy by democratically elected executives (though that too was occurring in several of the instances of electoral fraud, such as Ukraine under President Viktor Yanukovych [2010–14]). Overall, nearly one in every five democracies since the turn of this century has failed. The Decline of Freedom and the Rule of Law Separate and apart from democratic failure, there has also been a trend of declining freedom in a number of countries and regions since 2005. The most often cited statistic in this regard is the Freedom House 148 Journal of Democracy finding that in each of the eight consecutive years from 2006 through 2013 more countries declined in freedom than improved. In fact, after a post–Cold War period in which the balance was almost always highly favorable—with improvers outstripping the decliners by a ratio of two to one (or greater)—the balance simply inverted beginning in 2006. But this does not tell the whole story. Two important elements are noteworthy, and they are both especially visible in Africa. First, the declines have tended to crystallize over time. Thus, if we compare freedom scores at the end of 2005 and the end of 2013, we see that 29 of the 49 sub-Saharan African states (almost 60 percent) declined in freedom, while only fifteen (30 percent) improved and five remained unchanged. Moreover, twenty states in the region saw a decline in political rights, civil liberties, or both that was substantial enough to register a change on the seven-point scales (while only eleven states saw such a visible improvement). The larger states in sub-Saharan Africa (those with a population of more than ten million) did a bit better, but not much: Freedom deteriorated in thirteen of the 25 of them, and improved in only eight. Another problem is that the pace of decay in democratic institutions is not always evident to outside observers. In a number of countries where we take democracy for granted, such as South Africa, we should not. In fact, there is not a single country on the African continent where democracy is firmly consolidated and secure—the way it is, for example, in such third-wave democracies as South Korea, Poland, and Chile. In the global democracy-promotion community, few actors are paying attention to the growing signs of fragility in the more liberal developing democracies, not to mention the more illiberal ones. Why have freedom and democracy been regressing in many countries? The most important and pervasive answer is, in brief, bad governance. The Freedom House measures of political rights and civil liberties both include subcategories that directly relate to the rule of law and transparency (including corruption). If we remove these subcategories from the Freedom House political-rights and civil-liberties scores and create a third distinct scale with the rule-of-law and transparency scores, the problems become more apparent. African states (like most others in the world) perform considerably worse on the rule of law and transparency than on political rights and civil liberties.10 Moreover, rule of law and political rights have both declined perceptibly across sub-Saharan Africa since 2005, while civil liberties have oscillated somewhat more. These empirical trends are shown in Figure 2, which presents the Freedom House data for these three reconfigured scales as standardized scores, ranging from 0 to 1.11 The biggest problem for democracy in Africa is controlling corruption and abuse of power. The decay in governance has been visible even in the best-governed African countries, such as South Africa, which suf- Larry Diamond 149 Figure 2—Freedom and Governance Trends in Africa, 2005–13 Political Rights Civil Liberties Transparency and Rule of Law fered a steady decline in its score on rule of law and transparency (from .79 to .63) between 2005 and 2013. And as more and more African states become resource-rich with the onset of a second African oil boom, the quality of governance will deteriorate further. This has already begun to happen in one of Africa’s most liberal and important democracies, Ghana. The problem is not unique to Africa. Every region of the world scores worse on the standardized scale of transparency and the rule of law than it does on either political rights or civil liberties. In fact, transparency and the rule of law trail the other two scales even more dramatically in Latin America, postcommunist Europe, and Asia than they do in Africa (Figure 3). Many democracies in lower-income and even middle- or upper-middle-income countries (notably, Argentina) struggle with the resurgence of what Francis Fukuyama calls “neo-patrimonial” tendencies.12 Leaders who think that they can get away with it are eroding democratic checks and balances, hollowing out institutions of accountability, overriding term limits and normative restraints, and accumulating power and wealth for themselves and their families, cronies, clients, and parties. In the process, they demonize, intimidate, and victimize (and occasionally even jail or murder) opponents who get in their way. Space for opposition parties, civil society, and the media is shrinking, and international support for them is drying up. Ethnic, religious, and other identity cleavages polarize many societies that lack well-designed democratic institutions to manage those cleavages. State structures are too often weak and porous—unable to secure order, protect rights, meet the most basic social needs, or rise above corrupt, clientelistic, and predatory im- 150 1 0.9 Journal of Democracy Figure 3—Political Rights, Civil Liberties, and Transparency/Rule of Law, 2013 0.86 0.83 0.8 0.7 0.73 0.72 0.66 0.6 0.50 0.5 0.52 0.52 0.46 0.39 0.4 0.49 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.30 0.3 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.2 0.1 0 CEE+Baltics CEE ( + Baltics) LAC LAC Political Rights Political Rights Asia Asia Civil Civil Liberties Liberties Africa Africa FSU-Baltics FSU ( - Baltics) Arab ArabStates States Transparency & RoL Transparency and Rule of Law Source: Freedom House raw data for Freedom in the World, 2013. pulses. Democratic institutions such as parties and parliaments are often poorly developed, and the bureaucracy lacks the policy expertise and, even more so, the independence, neutrality, and authority to effectively manage the economy. Weak economic performance and rising inequality exacerbate the problems of abuse of power, rigging of elections, and violation of the democratic rules of the game. The Strategic Swing States A different perspective on the global state of democracy can be gleaned from a focus not on regional or global trends, but on the weightiest emerging-market countries. These are the ones with large populations (say, more than fifty million) or large economies (more than US$200 billion). I count 27 of these (including Ukraine, which does not quite reach either measure, but is of immense strategic importance). Twelve of these 27 swing states had worse average freedom scores at the end of 2013 than they did at the end of 2005. These declines took place across the board: in fairly liberal democracies (South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa); in less liberal democracies (Colombia, Ukraine, Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico, and Thailand before the 2014 military coup); and in authoritarian regimes (Ethiopia, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia). In addition, I think three other countries are also less free today than they were in 2005: Russia, where the noose of repressive authoritarianism has clearly been tightening since Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in early 2012; Egypt, where the new military-dominated gov- Larry Diamond 151 ernment under former general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is more murderous, controlling, and intolerant than even the Mubarak regime (1981–2011); and Bangladesh, where (as noted above) democracy broke down early in 2014. Only two countries (Singapore and Pakistan) are freer today (and only modestly so) than in 2005. Some other countries have at least remained stable. Chile continues to be a liberal-democratic success story; the Philippines has returned to robust democracy after an authoritarian interlude under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–10); and Brazil and India have preserved robust democracy, albeit with continuing challenges. But overall, among the 27 (which also include China, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Emirates) there has been scant evidence of democratic progress. In terms of democracy, the most important countries outside the stable democratic West have been either stagnating or slipping backward. The Authoritarian Resurgence An important part of the story of global democratic recession has been the deepening of authoritarianism. This has taken a number of forms. In Russia, space for political opposition, principled dissent, and civil society activity outside the control of the ruling authorities has been shrinking.13 In China, human-rights defenders and civil society activists have faced increasing harassment and victimization. The (mainly) postcommunist autocracies of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, centered on the axis of cynical cooperation between Russia and China, have become much more coordinated and assertive. Both countries have both been aggressively flexing their muscles in dealing with their neighbors on territorial questions. And increasingly they are pushing back against democratic norms by also using instruments of soft power—international media (such as RT, Russia’s slick 24/7 global television “news” channel), China’ssConfucius Institutes, lavish conferences, and exchange programs—to try to discredit Western democracies and democracy in general, while promoting their own models and norms.14 This is part of a broader trend of renewed authoritarian skill and energy in using state-run media (both traditional and digital) to air an eclectic mix of proregime narratives, demonized images of dissenters, and illiberal, nationalist, and anti-American diatribes.15 African autocrats have increasingly used China’s booming aid and investment (and the new regional war on Islamist terrorism) as a counterweight to Western pressure for democracy and good governance. And they have been only too happy to point to China’s formula of rapid state-led development without democracy to justify their own deepening authoritarianism. In Venezuela, the vise of authoritarian populism has tightened and the government’s toleration (or even organization) of criminal violence to demobilize middle-class opposition has risen. The 152 Journal of Democracy “Arab Spring” has imploded in almost every country that it touched save Tunisia, leaving in most cases even more repressive states or, as in the case of Libya, hardly a state at all. The resurgence of authoritarianism over the past eight years has been quickened by the diffusion of common tools and approaches. Prominent among these have been laws to criminalize international flows of financial and technical assistance from democracies to democratic parties, movements, media, election monitors, and civil society organizations in authoritarian regimes, as well as broader restrictions on the ability of NGOs to form and operate and the creation of pseudoNGOs to do the bidding (domestically and internationally) of autocrats.16 One recent study of 98 countries outside the West found that 51 of them either prohibit or restrict foreign funding of civil society, with a clear global trend toward tightening control; as a result, international democracy-assistance flows are dropping precipitously where they are needed most.17 In addition, authoritarian (and even some democratic) states are becoming more resourceful, sophisticated, and unapologetic in suppressing Internet freedom and using cyberspace to frustrate, subvert, and control civil society. 18 Western Democracy in Retreat Perhaps the most worrisome dimension of the democratic recession has been the decline of democratic efficacy, energy, and self-confidence in the West, including the United States. There is a growing sense, both domestically and internationally, that democracy in the United States has not been functioning effectively enough to address the major challenges of governance. The diminished pace of legislation, the vanishing ability of Congress to pass a budget, and the 2013 shutdown of the federal government are only some of the indications of a political system (and a broader body politic) that appears increasingly polarized and deadlocked. As a result, both public approval of Congress and public trust in government are at historic lows. The ever-mounting cost of election campaigns, the surging role of nontransparent money in politics, and low rates of voter participation are additional signs of democratic ill health. Internationally, promoting democracy abroad scores close to the bottom of the public’s foreign-policy priorities. And the international perception is that democracy promotion has already receded as an actual priority of U.S. foreign policy. The world takes note of all this. Authoritarian state media gleefully publicize these travails of American democracy in order to discredit democracy in general and immunize authoritarian rule against U.S. pressure. Even in weak states, autocrats perceive that the pressure is now off: They can pretty much do whatever they want to censor the media, crush the opposition, and perpetuate their rule, and Europe and the Unit- Larry Diamond 153 ed States will swallow it. Meek verbal protests may ensue, but the aid will still flow and the dictators will still be welcome at the White House and the Elysée Palace. It is hard to overstate how important the vitality and self-confidence of U.S. democracy has been to the global expansion of democracy during the third wave. While each democratizing country made its own transition, pressure and solidarity from the United State and Europe often generated a significant and even crucial enabling environment that helped to tip finely balanced situations toward democratic change, and then in some cases gradually toward democratic consolidation. If this solidarity is now greatly diminished, so will be the near-term global prospects for reviving and sustaining democratic progress. A Brighter Horizon? Democracy has been in a global recession for most of the last decade, and there is a growing danger that the recession could deepen and tip over into something much worse. Many more democracies could fail, not only in poor countries of marginal strategic significance, but also in big swing states such as Indonesia and Ukraine (again). There is little external recognition yet of the grim state of democracy in Turkey, and there is no guarantee that democracy will return any time soon to Thailand or Bangladesh. Apathy and inertia in Europe and the United States could significantly lower the barriers to new democratic reversals and to authoritarian entrenchments in many more states. Yet the picture is not entirely bleak. We have not seen “a third reverse wave.” Globally, average levels of freedom have ebbed a little bit, but not calamitously. Most important, there has not been significant erosion in public support for democracy. In fact, what the Afrobarometer has consistently shown is a gap—in some African countries, a chasm—between the popular demand for democracy and the supply of it provided by the regime. This is not based just on some shallow, vague notion that democracy is a good thing. Many Africans understand the importance of political accountability, transparency, the rule of law, and restraint of power, and they would like to see their governments manifest these virtues. While the performance of democracy is failing to inspire, authoritarianism faces its own steep challenges. There is hardly a dictatorship in the world that looks stable for the long run. The only truly reliable source of regime stability is legitimacy, and the number of people in the world who believe in the intrinsic legitimacy of any form of authoritarianism is rapidly diminishing. Economic development, globalization, and the information revolution are undermining all forms of authority and empowering individuals. Values are changing, and while we should not assume any teleological path toward a global “enlightenment,” generally the movement is toward greater distrust of authority and more 154 Journal of Democracy desire for accountability, freedom, and political choice. In the coming two decades, these trends will challenge the nature of rule in China, Vietnam, Iran, and the Arab states much more than they will in India, not to mention Europe and the United States. Already, democratization is visible on the horizon of Malaysia’s increasingly competitive electoral politics, and it will come in the next generation to Singapore as well. The key imperative in the near term is to work to reform and consolidate the democracies that have emerged during the third wave—the majority of which remain illiberal and unstable, if they remain democratic at all. With more focused, committed, and resourceful international engagement, it should be possible to help democracy sink deeper and more enduring roots in countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, and Ghana. It is possible and urgently important to help stabilize the new democracies in Ukraine and Tunisia (whose success could gradually generate significant diffusion effects throughout the Arab world). It might be possible to nudge Thailand and Bangladesh back toward electoral democracy, though ways must be found to temper the awful levels of party polarization in each country. With time, the electoral authoritarian project in Turkey will discredit itself in the face of mounting corruption and abuse of power, which are already growing quite serious. And the oil-based autocracies in Iran and Venezuela will face increasingly severe crises of economic performance and political legitimacy. It is vital that democrats in the established democracies not lose faith. Democrats have the better set of ideas. Democracy may be receding somewhat in practice, but it is still globally ascendant in peoples’ values and aspirations. This creates significant new opportunities for democratic growth. If the current modest recession of democracy spirals into a depression, it will be because those of us in the established democracies were our own worst enemies. NOTES I would like to thank Erin Connors, Emmanuel Ferrario, and Lukas Friedemann for their excellent research assistance on this article. 1. For an elaboration of this definition, see Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World (New York: Times Books, 2008), 20–26. 2. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); see also their essay in this issue. 3. I count as liberal democracies all those regimes that receive a score of 1 or 2 (out of 7) on both political rights and civil liberties. 4. Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13 (January 2002): 5–21. Larry Diamond 155 5. Freedom House classifies all the world’s regimes as democracies or not from 1989 to the present based on whether a) they score at least 7 out of 12 on the “electoral process” dimension of political rights; b) they score at least 20 out of 40 overall on the raw point scale for political rights; c) their most recent parliamentary and presidential elections were reasonably free and fair; d) there are no significant hidden sources of power overriding the elected authorities; and e) there are no recent legal changes abridging future electoral freedom. In practice, this has led to a somewhat expansive list of democracies—rather too generous in my view, but at least a plausible “upper limit” of the number of democracies every year. Levitsky and Way suggest in this issue that a better standard for democracy would be the Freedom House classification of Free, which requires a minimum average score of 2.5 on the combined scales of political rights and civil liberties. But I think this standard excludes many genuine but illiberal democracies. 6. My count of electoral democracies for 1998–2002 was lower than that of Freedom House by 8 to 9 countries, and in 1999, by 11 countries. For example, I dropped from this category Georgia in 1992–2002, Ukraine in 1994–2004, Mozambique in 1994–2008, Nigeria in 1999–2003, Russia in 2001–2004, and Venezuela in 2004–2008. 7. Amy R. Poteete, “Democracy Derailed? Botswana’s Fading Halo,” AfricaPlus, 20 October 2014, http://africaplus.wordpress.com/2014/10/20/democracy-derailed-botswanas-fading-halo/. 8. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 20. 9. Kenneth Good, “The Illusion of Democracy in Botswana,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 281. 10. The comparisons here and in Figure 2 are with the reconfigured political-rights and civil-liberties scales, after the subscales for transparency and rule of law have been removed (see endnote 11 below). 11. I created the scale of transparency and rule of law by drawing subscales C2 (control of corruption) and C3 (accountability and transparency) from the political-rights scale and the four subscales of F (rule of law) from the civil-liberties scale. For the specific items in these subscales, see the Freedom in the World methodology, www.freedomhouse.org/ report/freedom-world-2014/methodology#.VGww5vR4qcI. 12. Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014). See also his essay in this issue of the Journal of Democracy. 13. On Russia, see Miriam Lanskoy and Elspeth Suthers, “Putin versus Civil Society: Outlawing the Opposition,” Journal of Democracy 24 (July 2013): 74–87. 14. See Andrew Nathan’s essay “China’s Challenge” on pp. 156–70 of this issue. 15. Christopher Walker and Robert W. Orttung, “Breaking the News: The Role of State-Run Media,” Journal of Democracy 25 (January 2014): 71–85. 16. Carl Gershman and Michael Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance,” Journal of Democracy 17 (April 2006): 36–51; William J. Dobson, The Dictator’s Learning Curve: Inside the Global Battle for Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 2012). 17. Darin Christensen and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to NGOs,” Journal of Democracy 24 (April 2013): 77–91. 18. See the essays in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2012) and the ongoing trailblazing work of the Citizen Lab, https://citizenlab.org/. A Return to the Iron Fist Arch Puddington Journal of Democracy, Volume 26, Number 2, April 2015, pp. 122-138 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jod.2015.0033 For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v026/26.2.puddington.html Access provided by KOC University (15 Jul 2015 15:48 GMT) on 1/30/15. 5,826 words on 2/3/15. Changes accepted per AP email of 2/6/15. PGS created by BK on 2/20/15. The Freedom House Survey for 2014 A Return to the Iron Fist Arch Puddington Arch Puddington is vice-president for research at Freedom House. For more information on the survey, see the box on p. 124. For the rankings of individual countries in 2014, see the Table on pp. 126–27. In a year marked by an explosion of terrorist violence, autocrats’ use of more brutal tactics, and Russia’s invasion and annexation of a neighboring country’s territory, the state of freedom in 2014 worsened significantly in nearly every part of the world. For the ninth consecutive year, Freedom in the World, Freedom House’s annual report on the condition of global political rights and civil liberties, showed an overall decline. Indeed, acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years. Even after such a long period of mounting pressure on democracy, developments in 2014 were exceptionally grim. The report’s findings show that nearly twice as many countries suffered setbacks as registered gains, 61 to 33, with the number of gains hitting its lowest point since the nine-year erosion began. This pattern held true across geographical regions, with more declines than gains in the Middle East and North Africa, Eurasia, subSaharan Africa, Europe, and the Americas, and an even split in AsiaPacific. Syria, a dictatorship mired in civil war and ethnic division and facing uncontrolled terrorism, received its worst Freedom in the World country score in more than a decade. The lack of democratic gains around the world was conspicuous. The one notable exception was Tunisia, which became the first Arab country to achieve the status of Free since Lebanon was gripped by civil war forty years ago. By contrast, a troubling number of large, economically powerful, or regionally influential countries moved backward: Russia, Venezuela, Egypt, Turkey, Thailand, Nigeria, Kenya, and Azerbaijan. There were also net declines across five of the seven categories of demJournal of Democracy Volume 26, Number 2 April 2015 © 2015 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press on Arch Puddington 123 ocratic indicators assessed by the report. Continuing a recent trend, the worst reversals affected freedom of expression, civil society, and the rule of law. In a new and disquieting development, a number of countries lost ground due to state surveillance, restrictions on Internet communications, and curbs on personal autonomy. Explicit Rejection of Democratic Standards Just as disturbing as the statistical decline was the open disdain for democratic standards that colored the words and actions of autocratic governments during the year. Until recently, most authoritarian regimes claimed to respect international agreements and paid lip service to the norms of competitive elections and human rights. They now increasingly flout democratic values, argue for the superiority of what amounts to one-party rule, and seek to throw off the constraints of fundamental diplomatic principles. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including the outright seizure and formal annexation of Crimea, is the prime example of this phenomenon. The Russian intervention was in direct violation of an international agreement that had guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity. President Vladimir Putin made his contempt for the values of liberal democracy unmistakably clear. He and his aides equated raw propaganda with legitimate journalism, and treated human-rights activists as enemies of the state. In Egypt, the rise of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has been accompanied by a relentless campaign to roll back the gains of the Arab Spring. In an unprecedented trampling of the rule of law, Egyptian courts sentenced 1,300 political detainees to death in a series of drumhead trials that lacked the most basic elements of due process. Under Sisi, a once-vibrant media sector has been bent into submission, human-rights organizations suppressed to the point where they can no longer operate, foreign scholars barred, and domestic critics (both secular and Islamist) arrested or forced into exile. In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdo¢gan consolidated power during the year and waged an increasingly aggressive campaign against democratic pluralism. He openly demanded that media owners censor coverage or fire critical journalists, told the Constitutional Court that he does not respect its rulings, threatened reporters (and rebuked women journalists), and ordered radical changes to the school curriculum. Having risen from the premiership to the presidency in August, he formed a “shadow cabinet” that allows him to run the country from the presidential palace, circumventing constitutional rules and the ministries of his own party’s government. In China, President Xi Jinping continued to centralize authority and maintain hands-on involvement in policy areas ranging from domes- 124 Journal of Democracy Freedom in the World Freedom in the World is an evaluation of political rights and civil liberties in the world that Freedom House has provided on an annual basis for more than forty years. (Established in New York in 1941, Freedom House is a nonprofit organization that monitors political rights and civil liberties around the world.) The survey assesses a country’s freedom by examining its record in two areas: A country grants its citizens Political Rights when it permits them to form political parties that represent a significant range of voter choice and whose leaders can openly compete for and be elected to positions of power in government. A country upholds its citizens’ Civil Liberties when it respects and protects their religious, ethnic, economic, linguistic, and other rights, including gender and family rights, personal freedoms, and freedoms of the press, belief, and association. The survey rates each country on a seven-point scale for both political rights and civil liberties (1 representing the most free and 7 the least free) and then divides the world into three broad categories: Free (countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5); Partly Free (countries whose ratings average 3.0 to 5.0); and Not Free (countries whose ratings average 5.5 to 7.0). Freedom House also assigns upward or downward “trend arrows” to countries which saw general positive or negative trends during the year that were not significant enough to result in a ratings change for Political Rights or Civil Liberties from the previous year. The ratings, which are the product of a process that includes a team of in-house and consultant writers along with senior scholars, are not merely assessments of the conduct of governments. Rather, they are intended to reflect the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals as the result of actions by both state and nonstate actors. Thus a country with a benign government facing violent forces (such as terrorist movements or insurgencies) hostile to an open society will be graded on the basis of the on-the-ground conditions that determine whether the population is able to exercise its freedoms. The survey enables scholars and policy makers both to assess the direction of global change annually and to examine trends in freedom over time and on a comparative basis across regions with different political and economic systems. The electoral-democracy designation reflects a judgment about the last major national election or elections. For more information about Freedom House’s programs and publications, please visit www.freedomhouse.org. Note: The findings in this essay and the accompanying Table reflect global events from 1 January 2014 through 31 December 2014. Arch Puddington 125 tic security to Internet management to ethnic relations, emerging as the most powerful Chinese Communist Party leader since Deng Xiaoping. He continued to bolster China’s sweeping maritime territorial claims with armed force and personnel, and while his aggressive anticorruption campaign reached the highest echelons of the party, culminating in the arrest of former security czar Zhou Yongkang, it remained selective and ignored the principles of due process. Moreover, the campaign has been compromised by an intensified crackdown on grassroots anticorruption activists and other elements of civil society, including a series of politically motivated convictions. The government also intensified its persecution of the Uighur community, vastly restricting Uighurs’ ability to observe their Muslim faith and sentencing activists and journalists to long prison terms. The Effects and Causes of Terrorism In a variety of ways, lack of democratic governance creates an enabling environment for terrorism, and the problem rapidly metastasized as a threat to human life and human freedom during 2014. In a wide swath of the globe stretching from West Africa through the Middle East to South Asia, radical jihadist forces plagued local governments and populations. Their impact on countries such as Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and Nigeria was devastating, as they massacred security forces and civilians alike, took foreigners hostage, and killed or enslaved religious minorities, including Muslims whom they did not recognize as such. Women were particular targets: Young women and teenage girls were seized as war prizes; schoolgirls were kidnapped and raped; women educators and health workers were assassinated; and women suffered disproportionately in refugee camps. As horror followed horror, the year ended with a slaughter of more than 130 schoolchildren by the Pakistani Taliban. The spike in terrorist violence laid bare widespread corruption, poor governance, and counterproductive security strategies in a number of countries with weak or nonexistent democratic institutions. The Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad had opened the door to the growth of the Islamic State and other extremist movements by brutally repressing first peaceful protesters and the political opposition, then the various rebel groups that rose up to defend them. The Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki also smoothed the militants’ path by persecuting opposition leaders, rebuking peaceful Sunni protests, and fostering corruption and cronyism in the security forces. More recently, the Sisi government in Egypt has made the same mistake in its remorseless drive to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood, indirectly fueling an armed insurgency and contributing to the formation of an Islamic State affiliate in the country. In Nigeria, neither the government nor the military has proved capable of dealing effectively with Boko Haram, which operates with impunity in 126 Journal of Democracy Table—Freedom in the World 2014: Independent Countries Country Afghanistan  Albania* Algeria Andorra* Angola Antigua and Barbuda* Argentina* Armenia Australia* Austria* Azerbaijan  Bahamas* Bahrain Bangladesh* Barbados* Belarus Belgium* Belize* Benin* Bhutan* Bolivia* Bosnia-Herzegovina* Botswana* Brazil* Brunei Bulgaria* Burkina Faso Burma Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada* Cape Verde* Central African Rep. Chad Chile* China Colombia* Comoros* Congo (Brazzaville) Congo (Kinshasa) Costa Rica* Côte d’Ivoire Croatia* Cuba Cyprus* Czech Republic* Denmark* Djibouti Dominica* Dominican Republic* Ecuador*  PR CL 6 3 6 1 6 2 2 5 1 1 6 1 7 4 1 7 1 1 2 3 3 4 3 2 6 2 6 6 6 6 6 1 1 7 7 1 7 3 3 6 6 1 5 1 7 1 1 1 6 1 2 3 6 3 5 1 5 2 2 4 1 1 6 1 6 4 1 6 1 2 2 4 3 3 2 2 5 2 3 6 5 5 6 1 1 7 6 1 6 4 4 5 6 1 4 2 6 1 1 1 5 1 3 3 Freedom Rating Not Free Partly Free Not Free Free Not Free Free Free Partly Free Free Free Not Free Free Not Free Partly Free Free Not Free Free Free Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Free Free Not Free Free Partly Free Not Free Not Free  Not Free Not Free Free Free Not Free Not Free Free Not Free Partly Free Partly Free Not Free Not Free Free Partly Free Free Not Free Free Free Free Not Free Free Free Partly Free Country Egypt  El Salvador* Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia* Ethiopia Fiji* Finland* France* Gabon The Gambia  Georgia* Germany* Ghana* Greece* Grenada* Guatemala* Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana* Haiti Honduras* Hungary* Iceland* India* Indonesia* Iran Iraq Ireland* Israel* Italy* Jamaica* Japan* Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya* Kiribati* Kosovo* Kuwait Kyrgyzstan  Laos Latvia* Lebanon  Lesotho*  Liberia*  Libya Liechtenstein* Lithuania* Luxembourg* Macedonia* Madagascar* Malawi* PR CL 6 2 7 7 1 6 3 1 1 6 6 3 1 1 2 1 3 5 5 2 5 4 2 1 2 2 6 6 1 1 1 2 1 6 6 4 1 4 5 5 7 2 5 2 3 6 1 1 1 4 4 3 5 3 7 7 1 6 4 1 1 5 6 3 1 2 2 2 4 5 5 3 5 4 2 1 3 4 6 6 1 2 1 3 1 5 5 4 1 4 5 5 6 2 4 3 4 6 1 1 1 3 4 4 Freedom Rating Not Free Free Not Free Not Free Free Not Free Partly Free Free Free Not Free Not Free Partly Free Free Free Free Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free  Free Partly Free Partly Free Free Free Free Partly Free Not Free Not Free Free Free Free Free Free Not Free Not Free Partly Free Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Not Free Free Partly Free Free Partly Free Not Free  Free Free Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Arch Puddington Country Malaysia  Maldives* Mali Malta* Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius* Mexico*  Micronesia* Moldova* Monaco* Mongolia* Montenegro* Morocco Mozambique Namibia* Nauru* Nepal* Netherlands* New Zealand* Nicaragua Niger* Nigeria North Korea Norway* Oman Pakistan* Palau* Panama* Papua New Guinea* Paraguay* Peru* Philippines* Poland* Portugal* Qatar Romania* Russia Rwanda Saint Kitts & Nevis* Saint Lucia* Saint Vincent* Samoa* San Marino* S~ao Tomé & Príncipe* Saudi Arabia Senegal* Serbia* Seychelles* Sierra Leone* Singapore Slovakia* 127 PR CL 4 4 5 1 1 6 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 5 4 2 1 4 1 1 4 3 4 7 1 6 4 1 2 4 3 2 3 1 1 6 2 6 6 1 1 1 2 1 2 7 2 2 3 3 4 1 4 4 4 1 1 5 2 3 1 3 1 2 2 4 3 2 2 4 1 1 3 4 5 7 1 5 5 1 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 5 2 6 6 1 1 1 2 1 2 7 2 2 3 3 4 1 Freedom Rating Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Free Free Not Free Free Partly Free Free Partly Free Free Free Free Partly Free Partly Free Free Free Partly Free Free Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Not Free Free Not Free Partly Free Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Free Partly Free Free Free Not Free Free Not Free Not Free Free Free Free Free Free Free Not Free Free Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Free Country Slovenia* Solomon Islands* Somalia South Africa* South Korea*  South Sudan Spain* Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname* Swaziland  Sweden* Switzerland* Syria  Taiwan* Tajikistan  Tanzania* Thailand Timor-Leste Togo Tonga* Trinidad & Tobago* Tunisia* Turkey*  Turkmenistan Tuvalu* Uganda Ukraine* U.A.E. United Kingdom* United States* Uruguay* Uzbekistan Vanuatu* Venezuela  Vietnam Yemen  Zambia* Zimbabwe PR CL 1 3 7 2 2 7 1 5 7 2 7 1 1 7 1 6 3 6 3 4 2 2 1 3 7 1 6 3 6 1 1 1 7 2 5 7 6 3 5 1 3 7 2 2 6 1 5 7 2 5 1 1 7 2 6 3 5 3 4 2 2 3 4 7 1 5 3 6 1 1 1 7 2 5 5 6 4 6 Freedom Rating Free Partly Free Not Free Free Free Not Free Free Partly Free Not Free Free Not Free Free Free Not Free Free Not Free Partly Free Not Free  Partly Free Partly Free Free Free Free  Partly Free Not Free Free Not Free  Partly Free Not Free Free Free Free Not Free Free Partly Free Not Free Not Free Partly Free Not Free PR and CL stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most-free and 7 the least-free rating.   indicate a change in Political-Rights or Civil-Liberties ratings since the last survey.   (trend arrows) denote a positive or negative movement without a change in rating. * indicates countries that are electoral democracies. The Freedom Rating is an overall judgment based on survey results. See the box on p. 123 for more details on the survey. The ratings in this table reflect global events from 1 January 2014 through 31 December 2014. 128 Journal of Democracy parts of the country’s north. While the military has for decades played a large role in Nigerian political life, it has proved poorly equipped, badly trained, hollowed out by graft, and prone to scattershot tactics that fail to distinguish between terrorists and civilians. In Pakistan, the military and intelligence services have a long history of colluding with certain extremist groups, including some that are responsible for mass killings of civilians. When they do move against militant bastions, they too often resort to indiscriminate violence and fail to follow up with improved governance. Many governments have exploited the escalation of terrorism as a justification for new and essentially unrelated repressive measures. While a vigorous debate over how democracies should respond to terrorism at home and abroad is under way in Europe, Australia, and North America, leaders elsewhere are citing the threat as they silence dissidents, shutter critical media, and eliminate civil society groups. Thus the regime of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro has imprisoned opposition political figures as terrorists; Kenyan authorities have deregistered hundreds of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and unleashed security agencies while pursuing links to Somali militants; and China has invoked terrorism to support harsh prison sentences against nonviolent Uighur activists and Internet users, including a life sentence for well-known Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti. A Return to Cruder Authoritarian Methods The exploitation of the terrorism threat is just one aspect of a general trend in which repressive regimes are returning to blunt, retrograde tactics in their ongoing effort to preserve political control. In recent decades, autocrats had favored more “modern,” nuanced methods that aimed to protect de facto monopolies on power while maintaining a veneer of democratic pluralism and avoiding practices associated with twentieth-century totalitarian regimes and military dictatorships. Over the past year, however, there were signs that authoritarian regimes were beginning to abandon the quasi-democratic camouflage that allowed them to survive and prosper in the post–Cold War world. Again, the most blatant example is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, whose official justifications included ethnic-nationalist, irredentist claims and which quickly drew comparisons to the land grabs of Hitler or Stalin. The move exposed Moscow as a committed enemy of European peace and democratization rather than a would-be strategic partner. China’s government responded to public discontent with campaigns reminiscent of the Mao era, including televised confessions that have gained prominence under Xi Jinping. The Chinese authorities are also resorting to criminal and administrative detention to restrict activists instead of softer tactics such as house arrest or informal interrogations. Both China and Russia have Arch Puddington 129 made use of one of the Cold War’s most chilling instruments, the placement of dissidents in psychiatric hospitals. In Venezuela and Azerbaijan, the ranks of political prisoners steadily increased in 2014, as leading officials railed against foreign conspiracies aimed at fomenting revolution. Meanwhile, rulers in Egypt, Bahrain, and other Middle Eastern countries, who just a decade ago felt obliged to move toward competitive elections, now resort to violent police tactics, sham trials, and severe sentences as they seek to annihilate political opposition. And whereas the most successful authoritarian regimes previously tolerated a modest opposition press, some civil society activity, and a comparatively vibrant Internet environment, they are now reducing or closing these remaining spaces for dissent and debate. The return to older authoritarian practices has included increased military involvement in governance and political affairs. In Thailand, the military leaders responsible for the removal of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and her elected government made clear that a return to democratic rule will not take place in the foreseeable future. The military commandeered the political transition after the ouster of Burkina Faso’s president, and armed forces continued to play a major role in a number of other African states, including Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In Egypt, the Sisi government has cemented the military’s position as the leading force in society. A similar phenomenon has emerged in Venezuela, where the armed forces are involved in the economy, social programs, and internal security, and are thought to play a critical part in drug trafficking and other criminal ventures. Other notable developments in 2014 included: • Humanitarian crises rooted in undemocratic governance: In Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia, millions of refugees were forced into squalid camps, risked their lives in overcrowded boats, or found tenuous shelter on the margins of foreign societies. Authoritarian misrule was a primary cause of these humanitarian crises. In Syria, the civil war was originally sparked by the regime’s attacks on demonstrators who were protesting the torture of students accused of antigovernment graffiti. In South Sudan, a political dispute between the president and his former vice-president—in the context of an interim constitution that gives sweeping powers to the executive—led to fighting within the army that developed into full-scale civil war. The combatants have targeted civilians, who are also facing acute food shortages and massive internal displacement. While the conflict in Ukraine has not reached the same level, Russia’s invasion has created a crisis like none seen in Europe since the Balkan wars of the 1990s. The aggression was precipitated in part by a confrontation between the Ukrainian people and their increasingly authoritarian president, following decades of corrupt Ukrainian administrations. 130 Journal of Democracy • Tunisia’s exceptional success story: In 2014, Tunisia took its place among the Free countries of the world. This is remarkable not just because it was ranked Not Free only five years ago, with scores that placed it among some of the most repressive regimes in the world, but also because Tunisia is so far the only successful case among the many Arab countries that exhibited some political opening in the 2011 Arab Spring. The improvements that pushed it into the Free category included a progressive constitution adopted in January 2014 and well-regarded parliamentary and presidential elections later in the year. As the only full-fledged Arab democracy, Tunisia can set a strong positive example for the region and for all countries that still struggle under authoritarian rule. • The decline of Internet freedom: Restrictions on Internet freedom have long been less severe than those imposed on traditional media, but the gap is closing as governments crack down on online activity. Censorship and surveillance, repressive new laws, criminal penalties, and arrests of users have been on the rise in numerous settings. For example, officials in Ecuador increased online monitoring in 2014, hiring firms to remove content deemed unfavorable to the government from sites such as YouTube and invoking the 2013 communications law to prosecute social-media users who were critical of the president. The Rwandan government stepped up use of a new law that allows security officials to monitor online communications, and surveillance appears to have increased in practice. Such restrictions affect Free countries as well. After the Sewol ferry accident in South Korea in April and related criticism and rumors surrounding the president, the government began routine monitoring and censorship of online discussions. Israel also featured a stricter environment for discussion on social media this year, especially regarding controversial views on the situation in the Gaza Strip. • Overlooked autocrats: While some of the world’s worst dictatorships regularly made headlines, others continued to fly below the radar. Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev won a landslide reelection victory against an opposition that was crippled by arrests and legal constraints, and the regime stepped up its jailing of human-rights activists, journalists, and other perceived enemies. Despite years of backsliding in political rights and civil liberties, however, Azerbaijan has avoided the democratic world’s opprobrium due to its energy wealth and cooperation on security matters. Vietnam is also an attractive destination for foreign investment, and the United States and its allies gave the country special attention in 2014 as the underdog facing Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. But like China, Vietnam remains an entrenched one-party state, and the regime im- Arch Puddington 131 posed harsher penalties for free speech online, arrested protesters, and continued to ban work by human-rights organizations. Ethiopia is held up as a model for development in Africa, and is one of the world’s largest recipients of foreign assistance. But in 2014, its security forces opened fire on protesters, carried out large-scale arrests of bloggers and other journalists as well as members of the political opposition, and evicted communities from their land to make way for opaque development projects. Finally, while several countries in the Middle East—most notably oil-rich Saudi Arabia—receive special treatment from the United States and others, the United Arab Emirates stands out for how little international attention is paid to its systematic denial of rights for foreign workers, who make up the vast majority of the population; its enforcement of one of the most restrictive press laws in the Arab world; and its dynastic political system, which leaves no space for opposition. Global Findings and Regional Trends The number of countries designated by Freedom in the World as Free in 2014 stood at 89, representing 46 percent of the world’s 195 polities and nearly 2.9 billion people—or 40 percent of the global population. The number of Free countries increased by one from the previous year’s report. The number of countries qualifying as Partly Free stood at 55, or 28 percent of all countries assessed, and they were home to just over 1.7 billion people, or 24 percent of the world’s total. The number of Partly Free countries decreased by four from the previous year. A total of 51 countries were deemed Not Free, representing 26 percent of the world’s polities. The number of people living under Not Free conditions stood at 2.6 billion people, or 36 percent of the global population, though it is important to note that more than half of this number lives in just one country: China. The number of Not Free countries increased by three from 2013. The number of electoral democracies stood at 125, three more than in 2013. Five countries achieved electoral-democracy status: Fiji, Kosovo, Madagascar, the Maldives, and the Solomon Islands. Two countries, Libya and Thailand, lost their designation as electoral democracies. Tunisia rose from Partly Free to Free, while Guinea-Bissau improved from Not Free to Partly Free. Four countries fell from Partly Free to Not Free: Burundi, Libya, Thailand, and Uganda. Middle East and North Africa. Although Tunisia became the Arab world’s only Free country after holding democratic elections under a new constitution, the rest of the Middle East and North Africa was racked by negative and often tragic events. The Syrian civil war ground on, the Islamic State and other extremist militant factions dramatically 132 Journal of Democracy extended their reach, and Libya’s tentative improvements following the downfall of Muammar Qadhafi rapidly disintegrated as the country fell into a new internal conflict. Rival armed groups also overran a fragile political process in Yemen, and the effects of the Syrian war paralyzed elected institutions in Lebanon. Egypt continued its rollback of postMubarak reforms and solidified its return to autocracy with sham elections and a crackdown on all forms of dissent. Tunisia’s political-rights rating improved from 3 to 1, and its status improved from Partly Free to Free due to the adoption of a progressive constitution, governance improvements under a consensus-based caretaker administration, and the holding of free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections, all with a high degree of transparency. Bahrain’s political-rights rating declined from 6 to 7 due to grave flaws in the 2014 legislative elections and the government’s unwillingness to address longstanding grievances among the majority Shia community about the drawing of electoral districts and the possibility of fair representation. Iraq’s political-rights rating declined from 5 to 6 due to the Islamic State’s attempts to destroy Christian, Shia, Yazidi, and other communities under its control, as well as attacks on Sunnis by state-sponsored Shia militias. Libya’s political-rights rating declined from 4 to 6, its civil-liberties rating declined from 5 to 6, and its status declined from Partly Free to Not Free due to the country’s descent into a civil war, which contributed to a humanitarian crisis as citizens fled embattled cities, and led to pressure on civil society and media outlets amid the increased political polarization. Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria all received a downward trend arrows. In Egypt, this was due to the complete marginalization of the opposition, state surveillance of electronic communications, public exhortations to report critics of the government to the authorities, and the mass trials and unjustified imprisonment of members of the Muslim Brotherhood; in Lebanon, to the parliament’s repeated failure to elect a president and its postponement of overdue legislative elections for another two and a half years, leaving the country with a presidential void and a National Assembly whose mandate expired in 2013; and in Syria, to worsening religious persecution, the weakening of civil society groups and the rule of law, and the large-scale starvation and torture of civilians and detainees. Eurasia. Events in Eurasia in 2014 were dominated by the upheaval in Ukraine. Gains related to the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych through the EuroMaidan protests in February, which led to the election of a new president and parliament later in the year, were offset by Russia’s seizure of Crimea in March and ongoing battles with pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. The Russian government coupled its rejection of international pressure over Ukraine with intensified domestic controls on dissent, tightening its grip on the media sector and NGOs. Arch Puddington 133 The government of Azerbaijan renewed its assault on dissent in 2014, targeting traditional media and civil society organizations for legal harassment, arbitrary detention, and physical abuse. Ratings for the region as a whole are the second worst in the world after the Middle East. Ukraine’s political-rights rating rose from 4 to 3 due to improvements in political pluralism, parliamentary elections, and government transparency following the departure of President Viktor Yanukovych. Russia’s civil-liberties rating declined from 5 to 6 due to expanded media controls, a dramatically increased level of propaganda on statecontrolled television, and new restrictions on the ability of some citizens to travel abroad. Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all received downward trend arrows. Azerbaijan’s was due to an intensified crackdown on dissent, including the imprisonment and abuse of human-rights advocates and journalists. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, it was due to a government crackdown on freedom of assembly and the ability of NGOs to operate. And in the case of Tajikistan, it resulted from the constant abuse of opposition parties at the local level in the run-up to parliamentary elections, the designation of the political-reform and opposition movement Group 24 as an extremist entity in October, and the arrest and temporary detention of academic researcher Alexander Sodiqov on treason charges. Asia-Pacific. Citizens of three major Asian states—India, Japan, and Indonesia—went to the polls in 2014, handing their leaders strong mandates in what were largely open and fair electoral processes. These positive achievements contrasted sharply with the coup d’état in Thailand, in which the military ousted an elected government, suspended the constitution, and implemented martial-law restrictions that drastically rolled back political rights and civil liberties. Burma, which has only partly abandoned military rule, began to veer from the path to democracy: Journalists and demonstrators faced greater restrictions; the Rohingya minority continued to suffer from violence and official discrimination; and proposed laws that would ban religious conversions and interfaith marriages threatened to legitimize anti-Muslim extremism. Fiji’s political-rights rating improved from 6 to 3 as a result of September general elections—the first since a 2006 coup—that were deemed free and fair. Nepal’s political-rights rating improved from 4 to 3 due to the functioning of a stable government for the first time in more than five years following 2013 elections, and significant progress by the main political parties toward the completion of a draft constitution. Bangladesh’s political-rights rating declined from 3 to 4 due to national elections that were marred by an opposition boycott, as well as widespread violence and intimidation by a range of political parties. Burma’s civil-liberties rating worsened from 5 to 6 due to restrictions on media freedom, including the arrest and imprisonment of a number 134 Journal of Democracy of journalists. Sri Lanka’s civil-liberties rating declined from 4 to 5 due to increased pressure on freedom of expression and association, including curbs on traditional media and Internet-based news and opinion, and surveillance and harassment of civil society activists. Thailand’s political-rights rating declined from 4 to 6, its civil-liberties rating declined from 4 to 5, and its status declined from Partly Free to Not Free due to the May military coup, whose leaders abolished the 2007 constitution and imposed severe restrictions on speech and assembly. Afghanistan received a downward trend arrow due to increased violence against journalists and civilians amid the withdrawal of international combat troops. Malaysia received a downward trend arrow due to the government’s use of the Sedition Act to intimidate political opponents, an increase in arrests and harassment of Shia Muslims and transgender Malaysians, and more extensive use of defamation laws to silence independent or critical voices. Europe. In Hungary, parliamentary and local elections revealed the extent to which recent legislative and other changes have tilted the playing field in favor of the ruling Fidesz party. Observers noted slanted media coverage, the misuse of state resources, gerrymandering, and campaign-spending problems. Turkey drifted much further from democratic norms, with Erdo¢gan rising to the presidency and overseeing government attempts to quash corruption cases against his allies and associates. The media and judiciary both faced greater interference by the executive and legislative branches, including a series of raids and arrests targeting media outlets affiliated with Erdo¢gan’s political enemies. Kosovo’s political-rights rating improved from 5 to 4 due to the comparatively successful conduct of June elections and a subsequent agreement by rival parties to form a coalition government. Hungary’s political-rights rating worsened from 1 to 2 due to an election campaign that demonstrated the diminished space for fair competition given legislative and other advantages accrued by the ruling party. Macedonia’s political-rights rating worsened from 3 to 4 due to serious shortcomings in the April general elections and a related legislative boycott by the opposition. Turkey received a downward trend arrow due to increased political interference in anticorruption mechanisms and judicial processes, and greater tensions between majority Sunni Muslims and minority Alevis. Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa again experienced extreme volatility in 2014. News from the continent was dominated by the Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and a sharp rise in violence by Islamist militants from Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Kenya. Several other countries, particularly in East Africa, suffered democratic setbacks during the year, as repressive governments further Arch Puddington 135 limited the space for critical views. In Uganda, a series of recent laws targeting the opposition, civil society, the LGBT community, and women led to serious rights abuses and increased suppression of dissent. Burundi’s government cracked down further on the already restricted opposition in advance of 2015 elections, and critics of the authorities in Rwanda faced increased surveillance and harassment online. Guinea-Bissau’s political-rights rating improved from 6 to 5, and its status improved from Not Free to Partly Free, because the 2014 elections—the first since a 2012 coup—were deemed free and fair by international and national observers, and the opposition was able to compete and increase its participation in government. Madagascar’s politicalrights rating improved from 5 to 4 due to a peaceful transition after recovery from an earlier coup and the seating of a new parliament that included significant opposition representation. Burkina Faso’s political-rights rating worsened from 5 to 6 as a result of the dissolution of the government and parliament by the military, which took charge of the country after President Blaise Compaoré was forced to resign amid popular protests over his attempt to run for reelection in 2015. Burundi’s political-rights rating deteriorated from 5 to 6, and its status declined from Partly Free to Not Free, due to a coordinated government crackdown on opposition-party members and critics, with dozens of arrests and harsh sentences imposed on political activists and human-rights defenders. Nigeria’s civil-liberties rating went from 4 to 5 due a sharp deterioration in conditions for residents of areas affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, including mass displacement and a dramatic increase in violence perpetrated by both the militants and security forces. Rwanda’s civil-liberties rating worsened from 5 to 6 due to the narrowing space for expression and discussion of views that are critical of the government, particularly online, amid increased suspicions of government surveillance of private communications. South Sudan’s political-rights rating declined from 6 to 7 due to the intensification of the civil war, which derailed the electoral timetable and featured serious human-rights abuses by the combatants, including deliberate attacks on rival ethnic groups for political reasons. Uganda’s civil-liberties rating worsened from 4 to 5, and its status declined from Partly Free to Not Free, due to increased violations of individual rights and the freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, particularly for opposition supporters, civil society groups, women, and the LGBT community. Liberia received a downward trend arrow due to the government’s imposition of ill-advised quarantines that restricted freedom of movement and employment in some of the country’s most destitute areas, as well as several new or revived restrictions on freedoms of the press and assembly. Americas. In Mexico, public outrage at the authorities’ failure to stem criminal violence and corruption reached a boiling point after the disap- 136 Journal of Democracy pearance of 43 politically active students in Guerrero State. Protests initially led by the families of the students, who were killed by a criminal gang linked to local officials, grew into mass demonstrations across the country that challenged the administration of President Enrique Pe~na Nieto. Organized crime and gang violence also continued to rise in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, leading thousands of citizens to flee to the United States during the year. The governments of Venezuela and Ecuador, meanwhile, continued their pattern of cracking down on the political opposition and other critical voices. A major development in the region was the announcement that the United States and Cuba had agreed to the normalization of relations after a rupture of more than fifty years. Although Cuba is the Americas’ worst-rated country in Freedom in the World, it has shown modest progress over the past several years, with Cubans gaining more rights to establish private businesses and travel abroad. Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela all received downward trend arrows. In the case of Ecuador, it was due to increased limits on freedom of expression, including the monitoring of online content and harassment of bloggers and social-media users. In the case of Mexico, it was because of the forced disappearance of 43 students who were engaging in political activities that reportedly angered local authorities in the town of Iguala, Guerrero—an atrocity that highlighted the extent of corruption among local authorities and the environment of impunity in the country. And in Venezuela’s case, it was due to the government’s repressive response to antigovernment demonstrations, including violence by security forces, the politicized arrests of opposition supporters, and the legal system’s failure to protect basic due process rights for all detained Venezuelans. Still the System of Choice For some time now, the momentum of world politics has favored democracy’s adversaries. While the dramatic gains of the late twentieth century have not been erased, the institutions meant to ensure fair elections, a combative press, checks on state power, and probity in government and commerce are showing wear and tear in the new or revived democracies of Central Europe, Latin America, and Asia. In the Middle East, the potential of the Arab Spring has given way to the chaos and carnage that prevail in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, and to a ruthless dictatorship in Egypt. In Africa, the promise of freedom survives, but the dominant trend is one of corruption, internal conflict, terrorism, and ugly campaigns against the LGBT community. Some might say there are few compelling advertisements today for the benefits of democratic government, and few signs that the retreat of open political systems can be reversed. Yet several major events during 2014 suggest that this gloomy assessment is off the mark. In Ukraine, Arch Puddington 137 hundreds of thousands of people rose up to defy a kleptocratic leadership that offered the country a political and economic dead end. Given the choice between a future course patterned on Russian authoritarianism and a path toward Europe and its democratic standards, the majority did not hesitate in choosing the option of Democracies face many freedom, even with its uncertainties. problems of their own, In Hong Kong, the student-led Umbut their biggest mistake brella Movement emerged after the would be to accept the Communist leadership in Beijing anproposition that they nounced that, contrary to previous are impotent in the face commitments and public expectations, of strongmen for whom elections for the chief executive would bullying and lies are the require candidates to be nominated by fundamental currencies a pro-Beijing committee, making uniof political exchange. versal suffrage a hollow exercise. The controversy epitomized both Beijing’s refusal to countenance the basic tenets of democracy and the ultimate weakness of its legitimacy among the public. It also stood as a powerful reminder that while China’s model of state-driven growth combined with strict political control is attractive to elites in authoritarian settings (and to some in democracies as well), ordinary people, and especially the young, find China’s rejection of freedom profoundly unappealing. Notably, the people of Taiwan, through student protests and local-election results during the year, strongly voiced their preference for a future in which popular sovereignty prevails. Along with the emergence of popular movements for democratic change, the past year brought clear evidence of crisis in major undemocratic states. In Venezuela, a toxic mixture of corruption, misrule, and oil-price declines brought shortages, rampant inflation, and enhanced repression. Once touted as a possible template for left-populist governments across Latin America, the system set in place by the late Hugo Chávez now stands as a textbook case of political and economic dysfunction. Plummeting oil prices also revealed the weaknesses of Vladimir Putin’s dictatorship. But Russia’s problems run deeper than a vulnerability to the energy market. Corruption, cronyism, and the absence of the rule of law have discouraged investment and economic diversification. Pervasive propaganda has virtually eliminated critical voices from policy debates. And the absence of checks on presidential power has led to disastrous foreign adventures and diplomatic blunders. These and other examples from the year should remind the world how much democracy matters. Antidemocratic practices lead to civil war and humanitarian crisis. They facilitate the growth of terrorist movements, whose effects inevitably spread beyond national borders. Corruption 138 Journal of Democracy and poor governance fuel economic instability, which can also have regional or even global consequences. Will the world’s established democracies come to recognize that the global assault on free institutions poses a threat to their own national interests? The sanctions placed on Russia by the United States, Europe, and others are a welcome development. They send a message that invading one’s neighbor will have repercussions. The same might be said for the coalition against the Islamic State. But such firm messages have been lacking when despotic regimes intimidate, jail, or kill their own people. President Sisi is treated as a strong ruler and a partner in the fight against terrorism despite his enforcement of a level of repression not seen in Egypt in decades. The leaders of democracies compete for China’s favor even as Beijing steps up internal controls and pushes its expansive territorial claims. In Latin America, Brazil and other democracies respond to Venezuela’s deterioration with silence. In Asia, major democracies such as India and Indonesia have declined to use their influence to encourage a return to civilian rule in Thailand. In short, democracies often seem determined to wait for authoritarian misrule to blossom into international catastrophe before taking remedial action. This is unfortunate, as even the most powerful repressive regimes have shown that they are susceptible to pressures from their own people and from the outside as well. And ordinary citizens have exhibited a willingness to challenge even rulers with established histories of bloodletting in the service of political control. Democracies face many problems of their own, but their biggest mistake would be to accept the proposition that they are impotent in the face of strongmen for whom bullying and lies are the fundamental currencies of political exchange. This is clearly not the case, even in today’s difficult times.
4/17/2018 What is Democracy? What is Democracy? Lecture at Hilla University for Humanistic Studies January 21, 2004 Democracy consists of four basic elements: I want to begin with an overview of what democracy is. We can think of democracy as a system of government with four key elements: 1. A political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections. 2. The active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life. 3. Protection of the human rights of all citizens. 4. A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens. I want to talk about each of these four elements of what democracy is. Then I will talk about the obligations and requirements of citizens in a democracy. Then I will conclude by talking about the obligations that we, the international community, have to the people of Iraq as you seek to build the first true democracy in the Arab world. I. Democracy as a Political System of Competition for Power Democracy is a means for the people to choose their leaders and to hold their leaders accountable for their policies and their conduct in office. The people decide who will represent them in parliament, and who will head the government at the national and local levels. They do so by choosing between competing parties in regular, free and fair elections. Government is based on the consent of the governed. In a democracy, the people are sovereign—they are the highest form of political authority. Power flows from the people to the leaders of government, who hold power only temporarily. Laws and policies require majority support in parliament, but the rights of minorities are protected in various ways. The people are free to criticize their elected leaders and representatives, and to observe how they conduct the business of government. Elected representatives at the national and local levels should listen to the people and respond to their needs and suggestions. Elections have to occur at regular intervals, as prescribed by law. Those in power cannot extend their terms in office without asking for the consent of the people again in an election. http://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm 1/6 4/17/2018 What is Democracy? For elections to be free and fair, they have to be administered by a neutral, fair, and professional body that treats all political parties and candidates equally. All parties and candidates must have the right to campaign freely, to present their proposals to the voters both directly and through the mass media. Voters must be able to vote in secret, free of intimidation and violence. Independent observers must be able to observe the voting and the vote counting to ensure that the process is free of corruption, intimidation, and fraud. There needs to be some impartial and independent tribunal to resolve any disputes about the election results. This is why it takes a lot of time to organize a good, democratic election. Any country can hold an election, but for an election to be free and fair requires a lot of organization, preparation, and training of political parties, electoral officials, and civil society organizations who monitor the process. II. Participation: The Role of the Citizen in A Democracy The key role of citizens in a democracy is to participate in public life. Citizens have an obligation to become informed about public issues, to watch carefully how their political leaders and representatives use their powers, and to express their own opinions and interests. Voting in elections is another important civic duty of all citizens. But to vote wisely, each citizen should listen to the views of the different parties and candidates, and then make his or her own decision on whom to support. Participation can also involve campaigning for a political party or candidate, standing as a candidate for political office, debating public issues, attending community meetings, petitioning the government, and even protesting. A vital form of participation comes through active membership in independent, non­governmental organizations, what we call “civil society.” These organizations represent a variety of interests and beliefs: farmers, workers, doctors, teachers, business owners, religious believers, women, students, human rights activists. It is important that women participate fully both in politics and in civil society. This requires efforts by civil society organizations to educate women about their democratic rights and responsibilities, improve their political skills, represent their common interests, and involve them in political life. In a democracy, participation in civic groups should be voluntary. No one should be forced to join an organization against their will. Political parties are vital organizations in a democracy, and democracy is stronger when citizens become active members of political parties. http://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm 2/6 4/17/2018 What is Democracy? However, no one should support a political party because he is pressured or threatened by others. In a democracy, citizens are free to choose which party to support. Democracy depends on citizen participation in all these ways. But participation must be peaceful, respectful of the law, and tolerant of the different views of other groups and individuals. III. The Rights of Citizens in a Democracy In a democracy, every citizen has certain basic rights that the state cannot take away from them. These rights are guaranteed under international law. You have the right to have your own beliefs, and to say and write what you think. No one can tell you what you must think, believe, and say or not say. There is freedom of religion. Everyone is free to choose their own religion and to worship and practice their religion as they see fit. Every individual has the right to enjoy their own culture, along with other members of their group, even if their group is a minority. There is freedom and pluralism in the mass media. You can choose between different sources of news and opinion to read in the newspapers, to hear on the radio, and to watch on television. You have the right to associate with other people, and to form and join organizations of your own choice, including trade unions. You are free to move about the country, and if you wish, to leave the country. You have the right to assemble freely, and to protest government actions. However, everyone has an obligation to exercise these rights peacefully, with respect for the law and for the rights of others. IV. The Rule of Law Democracy is a system of rule by laws, not by individuals. In a democracy, the rule of law protects the rights of citizens, maintains order, and limits the power of government. All citizens are equal under the law. No one may be discriminated against on the basis of their race, religion, ethnic group, or gender. No one may be arrested, imprisoned, or exiled arbitrarily. http://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm 3/6 4/17/2018 What is Democracy? If you are detained, you have the right to know the charges against you, and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to the law. Anyone charged with a crime has the right to a fair, speedy, and public trial by an impartial court. No one may be taxed or prosecuted except by a law established in advance. No one is above the law, not even a king or an elected president. The law is fairly, impartially, and consistently enforced, by courts that are independent of the other branches of government. Torture and cruel and inhumane treatment are absolutely forbidden. The rule of law places limits on the power of government. No government official may violate these limits. No ruler, minister, or political party can tell a judge how to decide a case. Office holders cannot use their power to enrich themselves. Independent courts and commissions punish corruption, no matter who is guilty. V. The Limits and Requirements for Democracy If democracy is to work, citizens must not only participate and exercise their rights. They must also observe certain principles and rules of democratic conduct. People must respect the law and reject violence. Nothing ever justifies using violence against your political opponents, just because you disagree with them. Every citizen must respect the rights of his or her fellow citizens, and their dignity as human beings. No one should denounce a political opponent as evil and illegitimate, just because they have different views. People should question the decisions of the government, but not reject the government’s authority. Every group has the right to practice its culture and to have some control over its own affairs, but each group should accept that it is a part of a democratic state. When you express your opinions, you should also listen to the views of other people, even people you disagree with. Everyone has a right to be heard. Don’t be so convinced of the rightness of your views that you refuse to see any merit in another position. Consider different interests and points of view. When you make demands, you should understand that in a democracy, it is impossible for everyone to achieve everything they want. Democracy requires compromise. Groups with different interests and opinions must be willing to sit down with one another and negotiate. In a democracy, one group does not always win everything it wants. Different combinations of groups win on different issues. Over time, everyone wins something. http://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm 4/6 4/17/2018 What is Democracy? If one group is always excluded and fails to be heard, it may turn against democracy in anger and frustration. Everyone who is willing to participate peacefully and respect the rights of others should have some say in the way the country is governed. VI. What the International Community Owes Iraqi Democracy I want to conclude with a few words about what we in the United States and other democracies around the world owe the Iraqi people, as you seek to build the first true Arab democracy. I know some of you fear that we will abandon Iraq, and your effort to build democracy, when Iraqis regain their sovereignty on July 1. I want to tell you from my deepest conviction, this will not happen. We have all sacrificed together to give the people of Iraq this opportunity to live in freedom. For this just cause, the blood of many nations has been spilled on this soil. People in the United States are still divided about whether we should have gone to war in Iraq. But the overwhelming majority of Americans support what we are trying to do here now to assist the emergence of a new Iraq. We in the United States, and in the international community, are going to spend more money and energy to help you build a democracy and rebuild your economy than we have spent to help any other country in the last fifty years. Over the coming months and years, this assistance will help you develop your political parties and civic organizations, your legislatures and local governments, your elections and your courts. It will go to rebuild your schools and your mass media, your electricity grids and roads, and all the different foundations of your economy and infrastructure as well. Most Americans support this work—whether they are Republicans or Democrats, whether they will vote to reelect George Bush as president this year or vote for his opponent. Building a democracy out of the ruins of a brutal dictatorship requires great courage, effort, and patience on the part of ordinary people. It takes a long time. We understand how difficult it is. We know how important it is—not only to the future of Iraq, but to the whole Arab world. We do not wish to dictate who will rule you. That is for Iraqis to decide. Our desire is to see that Iraqis be free to choose their leaders and speak their minds, while living at peace with themselves and their neighbors. If you choose this path of democracy, freedom, and peace, the democratic peoples of the world—not only the US, but the European Union, Japan, Canada, and so on—will all be with you. http://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm 5/6 4/17/2018 What is Democracy? We will be your partners for many years to come. http://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm 6/6
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Dmitry
School: UIUC

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Democracy: Media and the Political Parties
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Democracy: Media and the Political Parties
Democracy is a human kind social system that is changed by rulers and expert to become
a contemporary system (Raveloson, 2008). Democracy is believed to be a comprehensive
political and government system that provides defense against manipulation of individual rights
and freedom (Raveloson, 2008). It is based on the principles of equality and liberty. The media
plays an important role in politics to revolutionize democracy. Globally, the media plays a very
significant role in politics in the united states than any other state worldwide (Mervin, 1998). The
media follows up generally on the legal and the judicial expansion of the country and any
injustice done to the citizens and display it through various media houses as well as the social
network for justice to have prevailed (Mervin, 1998). The media is on the front line to make sure
that each citizen realizes their rights and fight for them to ensure equality for all (Cuilenburg &
Wurff, 2000). For instance, the liberal democracy will allow diverse citizens to realize their
rights and their role to play in the country. Liberal democracy commonly recognized as
representative democracy has the central system of democracy in the United States (Raveloson,
2008). Being a self-governing system of régime, liberal democracy identifies and guard
individual rights and freedom. Liberal democracies allow an adult citizen to vote irrespective of
gender, ethnicity or possession (Raveloson, 2008). A liberal democracy involves different legal
societies such as the constitutional republic, constitutional monarchy, the presidential system,
and parliament system among others. Historically, modern liberal democracy can either be
classified as contemporary liberal democratic, liberal democracy of the eighteenth and nineteenth
century and liberal democracy in the twentieth and twenty-first century (Kankindi, 2017). In the
United States, the two political parties; the democra...

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