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Instructions: Initial Response must be minimum 600 words. To demonstrate knowledge of the readings, students must use citations in parenthetical reference format and a reference list in the initial post and in the two additional required responses to classmates’ initial posts.A minimum of three sources in initial posts

All assignments for the School of Security and Global Studies (papers, essays, exams, and Forums) must follow the Chicago Style Manual guidelines. Refer to Kate Turabian,A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 7th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Instructions: Initial Response must be minimum 600 words. To demonstrate knowledge of the readings, students must use citations in parenthetical reference format and a reference list in the initial post and in the two additional required responses to classmates’ initial posts. A minimum of three sources in initial posts All assignments for the School of Security and Global Studies (papers, essays, exams, and Forums) must follow the Chicago Style Manual guidelines. Refer to Kate Turabian, A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 7th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Question: Based on the readings for this week, When can violence be categorized as terrorism? What are the differences between legitimate and illegitimate violence? Is terrorism a form of warfare (1-2 paragraphs of synthesized readings, and 1 paragraph of your opinion)?
Walter Laqueur, Terrorism: A Brief History, Countering the Terrorist Mentality, eJournal ... Page 1 of 6 TERRORISM: A BRIEF HISTORY Walter Laqueur CONTENTS About This Issue Terrorism and Children A Form of Psychological Warfare Collective Identity: Hatred Bred in the Bone Women as Victims and Victimizers Terrorism: A Brief History From Profiles to Pathways: The Road to Recruitment Mass-Media Theater A Case Study: The Mythology of Martyrdom in Iraq New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict A Strategic Assessment of Progress Against the Terrorist Threat Video Feature Terrorism: A War Without Borders Bibliography Internet Resources Download Adobe Acrobat (PDF) version Walter Laqueur, PhD, now retired from his many academic postings, is most recently associated with the International Research Council at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., as its former director and, currently, a distinguished scholar. What is terrorism? There are more than a hundred definitions. The Department of State has one, Title 22 of the U.S. Code Section 2656: "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." The Department of Defense has another, and also the Federal Bureau of Investigation, while the present writer has contributed two or three definitions of his own. But none is wholly satisfactory. Too much has been made, in my opinion, of the element of "noncombatant targets" in order to define terrorism; there has not been a terrorist group in history that has attacked only soldiers or policemen. And what if a group of gunmen attack soldiers in the morning and civilians at night: Are they terrorists, do they belong to a different category, or do they change their character in the course of a day? No all-embracing definition will ever be found for the simple reason that there is not one terrorism, but there have been many terrorisms, greatly differing in time and space, in motivation, and in manifestations and aims. Initial Studies When the systematic study of terrorism began in the 1970s, it was— mistakenly—believed by some that terrorism was more or less a monopoly of extreme left-wing groups, such as the Italian Red Brigades or the German Red Army or various Latin American groups. (There was also ethnic-nationalist terrorism, such as in Northern Ireland, but it figured less prominently.) Hence the conclusion: Terrorism comes into being wherever people are most exploited and most cruelly oppressed. Terrorism, therefore, could easily be ended by removing exploitation and oppression. However, it should have been clear even then that this could not 5/31/2007 Walter Laqueur, Terrorism: A Brief History, Countering the Terrorist Mentality, eJournal ... Page 2 of 6 possibly be a correct explanation because terrorism had been altogether absent precisely in the most oppressive regimes of the 20th century—Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. True, there was virtually no terrorism in the very richest societies and the most egalitarian—but nor was there terrorism in the very poorest. A decade passed and most of the terrorist groups of the Far Left disappeared. If there was terrorism during the 1980s, it came to large extent from small cells of the Extreme Right. There were some instances of aircraft hijackings and bombings (such as over Lockerbie, Scotland), and a few embassies were attacked or even seized (such as in Tehran), but these operations were not carried out by Investigators examine the remains of Pan Am flight 103, which exploded over groups of the Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 22, 1988. All 259 persons on board and 11 Extreme Left. people on the ground died. The victims and debris were strewn over an area of 2,189 square kilometers. ©AP Images The most deadly terrorist act in the United States prior to September 11, 2001, was the 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, carried out by right-wing extremist sectarians. Nationalist terrorism continued (in Ulster, the Basque region of Spain, Sri Lanka, Israel, and some other places), but the Islamist terrorism that figures so prominently today was, as yet, hardly in appearance except, sporadically, in some Middle Eastern countries. Today, terrorism and al-Qaida, and similar groups motivated by religious fanaticism, have virtually become synonyms, inevitably, perhaps, because most contemporary terrorism is carried out by their adherents. But the temptation to equate terrorism with these groups should be resisted for the simple reason that terrorism antedates militant Islamism by a very long time and, for all one knows, will continue to exist well after the present protagonists of jihadism have disappeared. Terrorism is not a political doctrine, even though some have attempted to transform it into an ideology; it is, instead, one of the oldest forms of violence—even though it goes without saying that not all violence is terrorism. It probably antedates regular warfare because the fighting of armies involves a certain amount of organization and sophisticated logistics that primitive man did not have. Historical Background Terrorism appears in the Bible's Old Testament, and there were frequent incidents of political murder, even systematic assassination, in Greek and Roman history. The murder of Julius Caesar, to give but one example, preoccupied writers and artists for the next two millennia. The question of whether tyrannicide (such as undertaken by 5/31/2007 Walter Laqueur, Terrorism: A Brief History, Countering the Terrorist Mentality, eJournal ... Page 3 of 6 William Tell, the national hero of Swiss sagas) was permissible kept generations of theologians and philosophers busy. There was no total unanimity, but the majority opinion was that terrorism was permissible in certain conditions. When a cruel oppressor—a tyrant—being an enemy of all mankind, in violation of the law of God and human justice, left his victims no other way out of intolerable oppression, commission of a terrorist act was ultima ratio, the last refuge of the oppressed, all other means having been exhausted. But philosophers and theologians were aware even then that there was a grave danger of misusing the doctrine of justifiable tyrannicide, claiming ultima ratio when, in fact, there was no justifiable reason for killing (such as in the case of the murder of the good King Henri IV of France) or when there existed other ways to express protest and resistance. In the meantime, small groups engaging in systematic terrorism over long periods had arisen, such as the secret sect of the Assassins, an offshoot of the Muslim Ismailis, which operated from the 8th into the 14th century from what is now Iraq and Iran, killing governors, prefects, caliphs, and a crusader king of Jerusalem. They pioneered suicide terrorism—their weapon was always the dagger, and since their victims were usually well guarded, the chances of escaping were virtually nil. Even the language they used has survived—a fighter was a fida'i, a term used to this day. Terrorism continued to be active through the end of the Middle Ages into Modern Times, though on a somewhat reduced scale. This was the age of great wars such as the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and the Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815). And in such periods, when a great many people were killed and wounded on the battlefields, no one would pay much attention if terrorist violence occurred here and there on a small scale. The High Tide of Terrorism The high tide of terrorism rose toward the end of the 19th century. Among the main active groups were the Irish rebels, the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, and assorted anarchists all over Europe and North America. But secret societies were also actively engaging in terrorism outside Europe—in Egypt, for instance, as well as in India and China—aiming at national liberation. Some of these attacks had tragic consequences; others were more successful in the long, rather than the short, run. The violence of the 19th century terrorists was notable—they killed a Russian tsar (Alexander II), as well as many ministers, archdukes, and generals; American presidents (William McKinley in 1901 and, before him in 1881, James Garfield); King Umberto of Italy; an empress (Zita) of the Austro- 5/31/2007 Walter Laqueur, Terrorism: A Brief History, Countering the Terrorist Mentality, eJournal ... Page 4 of 6 Hungarian monarchy; Sadi Carnot, president of France; Antonio Canovas, the Spanish prime minister—to mention only some of the most prominent victims. The First World War, of course, was triggered by the murder of Franz Ferdinand, the Austrian heir to the throne, in Sarajevo in 1914. Rereading the press of that period (and also novels by leading writers from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Henry James and Joseph Conrad), one The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his could easily gain the wife by a Pan-Slavism nationalist group during the royals' visit to impression that terrorism Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, precipitated World War I. ©AP Images was the greatest danger facing mankind and that the end of civilized life was at hand. But as so often before and after, the terrorist danger passed, and, as the Russian Bolshevik revolutionary Leon Trotsky noted on one occasion, one minister was killed, but several others were only too eager to replace him. Contemporary Terrorism Terrorism reappeared after World War I in various countries, such as Germany and the Balkan nations. Before coming to power, both Fascists and Communists believed in mass violence rather than individual terrorist acts—with some occasional exceptions, such as the assassination of the Italian Socialist leader Giacomo Matteoti. There was little terrorism during World War II and during the two decades thereafter. This explains, perhaps, why the renewal of terrorist operations in the 1970s and, a fortiori, the appearance of Islamist terrorism were interpreted by many, oblivious of the long, earlier history of terrorism, as something wholly new and unprecedented. This was particularly striking with regard to suicide terrorism. As noted earlier, most terrorism up to the late 19th century had been suicide missions, simply because the only available weapons were daggers, shortrange pistols, or highly unstable bombs likely to explode in the Three unidentified people wearing Basque berets and hands of the attackers. It is true, however, that seated in front of an ETA flag appeared on a 2006 television video. ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or Basque Homeland and Freedom), which seeks a 5/31/2007 Walter Laqueur, Terrorism: A Brief History, Countering the Terrorist Mentality, eJournal ... Page 5 of 6 state independent from Spain, is a designated contemporary terrorism differs in Basque terrorist group. ©AP Images some essential respects from that perpetrated in the 19th century and earlier on. Traditional terrorism had its "code of honor": It targeted kings, military leaders, ministers, and other leading public figures, but if there were a danger that the wife or the children of the target would be killed in an attack, terrorists would refrain from striking, even if doing so endangered their own lives. Today, indiscriminate terrorism has become the rule; very few leading politicians or generals have been killed, but very many wholly innocent people have. The term terrorism has, therefore, very negative connotations, and terrorists now insist on being called by another name. When Boris Savinkov, who headed the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries before World War I, published his autobiography, he had no hesitation in giving it the title Memoirs of a Terrorist. Today this would be unthinkable—the modern terrorist wants to be known as a freedom fighter, a guerrilla, a militant, an insurgent, a rebel, a revolutionary—anything but a terrorist, a killer of random innocents. If there is no agreement concerning a definition of terrorism, does it mean that total confusion and relativism prevail, that one view is as good as another? It is perfectly true that, as an often quoted saying goes, one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. But since even the greatest mass murderers in history had their admirers, from Hitler to Pol Pot, such wisdom does not take us very far. Most of those who have studied terrorism and are reasonably free from bias will agree much of the time in their judgment of an action, even if perfect definitions of terrorism do not exist. Someone has compared it with pornography or obscenity, which is also difficult to define, but an observer with some experience will know it when he sees it. There are no shortcuts to explain why people choose to be terrorists, no magic formulas or laws similar to Newton's and Einstein's in the physical world. From time to time, new insights are offered that do not, however, usually survive critical examination. Recently, for instance, it has been suggested that terrorism occurs only (or mainly) where there has been a foreign invasion of a country. This proposition is true in some cases, Former hostage Victor Amburgy hugs an such as Napoleon's occupation of Spain unidentified child after his arrival back in the or the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq. United States on July 2, 1985. Amburgy was among the 153 international passengers and But a look at the geopolitical map of crew of TWA flight 847, hijacked by Lebanese terrorists shortly after its June 14 takeoff from contemporary terrorism shows that, in Greece and held for two weeks. © AP most cases, from Sri Lanka to Images/Dennis Cook Bangladesh to Algeria to Europe, foreign invasion is not the decisive factor. And even in Iraq, the great majority of terrorist victims occur not among the occupying forces but as the result of attacks of Sunnis against Shiites, and vice versa. A Generational Phenomenon 5/31/2007 Walter Laqueur, Terrorism: A Brief History, Countering the Terrorist Mentality, eJournal ... Page 6 of 6 Does history offer any lessons? Again, there are no clear-cut answers except in a very general way. Terrorism has seldom, if ever, occurred in effective dictatorships. In the modern world, it appears, ironically, that terrorists take advantage of the freedoms of thought, speech, religion, movement, and assembly offered by democracies. Terrorism is also a problem of failed states in which central power is weak or nonexistent. There was, for example, virtually no terrorism from the street in Franco's Spain, but as his dictatorship was dismantled, it appeared on the political scene. In the Middle East, even mildly authoritarian regimes have put down terrorism without great difficulty—Turkey and Syria in the 1980s, Algeria and Egypt in the decade thereafter. Terrorism has sometimes succeeded but, at least equally and probably more often, has failed to attain its aims. And in some cases, it has resulted in the opposite of what its perpetrators wanted to achieve. But terrorism is largely a generational phenomenon, and even if defeated, it may recur at a later date. There is no good reason to expect the disappearance of terrorism in our time. In an age in which large-scale wars have become too dangerous and expensive, terrorism is the prevailing form of violent conflict. As long as there are conflicts on Earth, there will be terrorism. The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government. BACK TO TOP | EJOURNAL USA, MAY 2007 | IIP E-JOURNALS | IIP HOME 5/31/2007
ISSN # 1934-9742 THE JEBSEN CENTER FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM STUDIES RESEARCH BRIEFING SERIES VOL. 2, NO. 2 (NOVEMBER 2007) Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism Part II: The Ideological Response Dr. Rohan Gunaratna Senior Fellow The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Introduction Six years after 9/11, the U.S.-led “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) has been a disappointment. The class of terrorist groups the U.S. military and intelligence services planned to target and dismantle have not only survived—some have expanded and others have multiplied. Osama bin Laden, the leader of the group responsible for attacking America’s most iconic targets on 9/11, and his deputy and designated successor, Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri, are still alive and active. They continue to target the U.S., its allies, and its friends. Among jihadist groups, al Qaeda is leading the fight both operationally and ideologically. Despite being the world’s most hunted terrorist group, al Qaeda has successfully disseminated its pernicious ideology of global jihad, enlisting millions of followers and sharing its operational practice of suicide or “martyrdom” with like-minded groups. In addition to “al Qaeda classic,” counter-terrorist forces now face several al Qaedas from Iraq to Indonesia. After Iraq, the U.S.-led GWOT has suffered a loss of both credibility and momentum. As a concept for working with partners, including Muslim nations, the GWOT is a spent force today. In at least some corners of the Muslim world, the U.S. is branded as anti-Islam and anti-Muslim. To prevent further escalation in threat, the U.S. must rethink its future counterterrorism strategies—to include combating terrorism on an ideological basis. The Context The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies The Fletcher School Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue Cabot 505 Medford, MA 02155 USA Phone: 617-627-4740 Fax: 617-627-5436 Ideology is the center of gravity of the contemporary wave of extremism and terrorism. Ideology can be ethno-nationalist, politico-religious, or left- or right-wing. In the post-9/11 environment, the centrality of ideology in political violence, especially terrorism, has become increasingly evident both to analysts and to policy and decision makers.1 Ideology is a powerful message that motivates and propels ordinary human beings into action. A dynamic and evolving belief system, it is created by the interpretation of events by ideologues. Ideology frames organizational structure, leadership, and membership and shapes the strategies and tactics adopted by a group. Jihadi ideologues and group leaders craft their ideology by interpreting, reinterpreting, or misinterpreting religion and politics. Ideology is used to attract and retain recruits as members, supporters, and sympathizers. An individual’s personal history and worldview may make him or her more or less susceptible to a particular terrorist or extremist ideology. Using ideology, contemporary jihadist groups recruit followers from a cross-section of society—the rich, the poor, the well educated, and the less educated. To generate both recruits and support, they indoctrinate their potential and existing support base. Ideology is inculcated by dissemination in the form of information or propaganda using lectures, speeches, pronouncements, writings, and similar methods. To counter the threat posed by a group, its operational infrastructure must be dismantled and its conceptual infrastructure eroded. 1 ISSN # 1934-9742 As terrorism is a vicious by-product of ideological extremism, government and society must develop an ideological response to make it difficult for terrorist groups to replenish their human losses and material wastage. To counter terrorist ideology and to provide an alternative ideology, it is necessary to know its key ideologues, organizational structures, evolving ideology, and target audience: the community. Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt Consisting of al Qaeda, associated groups, and homegrown cells, the global jihad movement presents a pernicious politico-religious ideology that must be relentless countered and fully discredited. Neither poverty nor lack of education,2 but ideological indoctrination, spawns and sustains extremism and terrorism today. We can successfully counter the constructed beliefs of those advocating, supporting, and conducting acts of violence by drawing from values and traditions within the religion of Islam. This approach works only when those challenging a radical worldview are themselves deeply steeped in Muslim doctrines and can argue on the basis of the texts so frequently cited by the ideologues of hate and preachers of violence. The Islamic belief system is built upon pillars of guidance (hidayah), not compulsion; moderateness (wasta), not extremism; peace (amn), not war; gentleness (rifq), not harshness; love (mahabbah), not hate; ease (yusr), not hardship; harmonious cooperation (ta’awun), not disassociation; and brotherhood (ukhuwwah), not enmity. These principles embody the legal maxims of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), the faith ordinances of Islamic theology (aqidah), and moral virtues of Islamic ethics (akhlaq).3 The misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the Islamic belief system has become an important root cause of violence. A warped Islamist ideology drives and justifies acts of violence. Terrorism is committed when intention (motivation), capability (human expertise and material resources), and opportunity meet. Although ideology motivates and shapes intention, acts of terror are not born out of ideology alone; ideology is but one of the important elements that influence worldview and spur acts of terror. Undeniably, the role of ideology is significant for al Qaeda and its associated groups. Prevention of terrorism requires the elimination of at least one of the three elements mentioned above—one of which is intention to attack, which is mostly driven by ideology. A proactive strategy to counter radical ideology would prevent further radicalization of Muslim communities. It would immunize potential recruits—Muslim youth in particular— from being indoctrinated into a culture of violence. In the longer term, this would prevent new generations of extremists from being recruited as sympathizers, supporters, and members of terrorist groups. Countering the deviant ideology would provide an alternative to advocacy of violent extremism. Given the alienated and uncompromising worldview of terrorist and extremist ideologues, it might be difficult to reduce their influence through the provision of political concessions, amnesties, or other personal incentives. The best chance for success is to engage mainstream Muslims in dialogue, show them how some Muslims are being or may be manipulated by perverted and corrupt interpretation of religious texts, and convince potential extremist sympathizers that there could be better alternatives to acts of violence. To build an ideological counterweight, the first step is to develop correct understanding of concepts such as jihad, fatwa, sharia, and ijtihad; issues involving the basis of relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims; and the establishment of an Islamic state. The second step in ideological response involves mapping the pernicious ideology of both extremist and terrorist groups. The third step is to engage religious scholars and clerics to provide counterpoints to virulent propaganda using the same texts which the extremists and terrorists misuse, and to disseminate these counterpoints among the wider community through appropriate channels. Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 2 ISSN # 1934-9742 Al Qaeda as the Vanguard of Jihadist Ideology Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt In the pantheon of jihadist groups, al Qaeda enjoys a vanguard status. The genesis, formation, and development of al Qaeda provide insight into the ideological framework of the global jihad movement. At its origins in 1988, al Qaeda aimed to preserve and consolidate the modest Arab force that fought against the Soviets, inheriting a global infrastructure from the anti-Soviet multinational Afghan mujahideen.4 During the last two decades, al Qaeda has emerge as the chief proponent and practitioner of global jihad. After establishing a worldwide network, its leaders sought to influence like-minded groups into adopting its vision of creating Islamic states wherever Muslims live. In addition to fighting the “near enemy” (local Muslim and other governments), al Qaeda leadership argued that the “far enemy” (the U.S. and its allies) must also be attacked. Some groups, emboldened by al Qaeda’s appeal and success after 9/11, even adopted the name al Qaeda for their own independent organizations.5 Al Qaeda was of the belief that a weakened U.S. would not support “false Muslim rulers” and “corrupt Muslim regimes” in foreign lands. As such, wherever it operated, al Qaeda and its affiliates placed a premium on striking the United States as its main enemy. Although al Qaeda in Iraq, a subsidiary organization, has mostly operated within Iraq, it has largely targeted the U.S. and its allies present in the country, as well as the Shi’a. Likewise, the al Qaeda organization of the Islamic Maghreb attacked targets in Algeria but also dispatched members to Iraq and elsewhere to fight the global jihad. Similarly, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is still a regional group within Southeast Asia, but its focus is identical to al Qaeda’s: attacking the “far enemy.” The transformation of local and regional jihad groups to emulate al Qaeda’s vision and mission of a global jihad is the most significant ideological development of the post-9/11 environment. After al Qaeda’s attacks on America’s most iconic landmarks on 9/11, many jihadists increasingly view al Qaeda as a pathfinder, model for emulation, and the vanguard of the Islamic movement. Although al Qaeda’s operational capability has been severely weakened during the past four years, the ideology of global jihad articulated by Osama bin Laden and his group serves as an inspiration for more than thirty Asian, Middle Eastern, and African jihadist groups and for numerous “homegrown” cells in the West. Increasingly seen as the ideal model by existing and emerging local jihad groups, al Qaeda’s unchecked ideology poses a strategic threat. Al Qaeda is a jihadist organization with a global reach. Its original mandate was to inspire and incite Islamic movements and the Muslim masses worldwide to attack those who threaten Islam and Muslims. Although al Qaeda does not enjoy widespread support among the Muslim masses worldwide, it seeks to exploit the anger, suffering, and resentment of Muslims against the United States. America’s lack of understanding of the Muslim world— for instance, its invasion of Iraq—has given terrorism and extremism a renewed appeal. Considering the support for the global jihad movement in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere, al Qaeda’s ideological campaign has been a partial success. The real strength of al Qaeda is not its membership per se but in its overarching, highly appealing ideology. Instead of building support for al Qaeda the group, its leadership reinvigorated the global jihad movement.6 In addition to training its own members—3,000- 4,000 according to an October 2001 estimate by the Western intelligence community—al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other groups trained several tens of thousands of members in its camps in Afghanistan from 1989 to 2001. Most of the mujahideen who fought against the Soviets disagree with the ideology of al Qaeda and its associated groups, but a small number today form the core of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda Ideologues The founding charter of al Qaeda, formulated by Abdullah Azzam, was published in Al Jihad, the principal journal of the Arab mujahideen, in April 1988.7 He envisaged al Qaeda as Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 3 ISSN # 1934-9742 an organization that would channel the energies of the mujahideen into fighting on behalf of oppressed Muslims worldwide—an Islamic “rapid reaction force” ready to spring to the defense of their fellow believers at short notice. Azzam described his original concept: Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt “Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while focusing its way into society, puts up with heavy task and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require such a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for this ideology. It carries the flag all along the sheer, endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in the reality of life, since Allah has destined that it should make it and manifests itself. This vanguard constitutes AlQa’idah al-Sulbah for the expected society.”8 These forceful words articulated to shape the organization did not include terrorism as a tactic. Azzam was a firm believer that “the end does not justify the means.” Jihad, as he saw it, was invoked as a religious obligation in defense of Islam and Muslims against a defined enemy, not a speculative one. This is best demonstrated in the Afghan-Soviet war, to which he dedicated his life immediately before his death. Azzam rejected a proposal by Egyptian jihadists—Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri, Abu Hafs alias Muhammed Atef, and subsequently al Zawahiri—to utilize jihadi funds to train mujahideen in terrorist techniques and tactics. He went so far as to issue a religious decree (fatwa) ruling this use of funds as a violation of Islamic law. Azzam was against the killing of non-combatants and would never endorse the organization’s current use of terrorist tactics. The same, however, cannot be said of al Zawahiri. He is the person largely responsible for the al Qaeda’s mutation into what it is today. He not only filled the vacuum left by Azzam, but transformed bin Laden from a guerrilla who killed soldiers to a terrorist who killed civilians. Before al Zawahiri joined al Qaeda, he was already a practicing terrorist—in fact, he was the mastermind of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, one of the most deadly organizations in the Middle East. Al Zawahiri’s experience against oppressive and repressive political regimes in Egypt made him “battle hardened,” compelled to continue the struggle at all costs.9 With the mobility of al Qaeda leaders confined to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Abu Musab al Zarkawi in Iraq has emerged as al Qaeda’s de facto operational commander. Al Qaeda’s Worldview Al Qaeda’s worldview has changed over time. It perceives the U.S. and Israel leading a global conspiracy against Islam and the Muslims, and perceives American hegemony as affecting the realization of a Muslim nation. Al Qaeda detests America’s presence in the Arabian Peninsula, especially in Saudi Arabia; derides U.S. support for the Israel state; condemns U.S. assistance to pro-Western dictatorships around the Middle East; and, since the first Intifada in 1987, highlights the neglected future of the Palestinians. Al Qaeda blames the U.S. for virtually everything and holds the U.S. government, American people, and U.S. foreign policy establishment responsible for bringing chaos to the Muslim world. According to al Qaeda ideologues, the Muslim community must be united and work towards the establishment—by force if necessary—of an Islamic nation adhering to the rule of the Caliphs. Al Qaeda targets both non-Muslims and Muslims who do not share al Qaeda’s worldview. To bin Laden and al Qaeda, it is the religious duty of Muslims around the world to wage jihad on the American land, U.S. citizens, Israel, and Jews. After 9/11, al Qaeda’s targets include U.S. allies—namely Europe, Canada, and Australia—and friends, primarily Muslim countries that support the West. Those Muslims who do not heed this call are declared apostates—people who have forsaken their faith. Al Qaeda’s main aim is to establish Islamic states wherever Muslims live. The methodology for achieving this is jihad. Al Qaeda’s ideology, often referred to as “jihadism,” is marked by a willingness to carry out armed struggle against those who in their view try to prevent the establishment of an Islamic state. “Jihadism” is at odds with nearly all Islamic religious Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 4 ISSN # 1934-9742 thought. “Jihadism” as practiced by al Qaeda has its origins in the Middle East. As a concept, it is often associated with the work of two modern Sunni Islamic thinkers: Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and Syed Qutb. Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab was an 18th century reformer who claimed that Islam had been corrupted a generation or so after the death of the Prophet Mohammad.10 He denounced any theology or customs developed after that as non-Islamic, and in doing so tried to reform more than 1,000 years of religious scholarship. He and his supporters took over what is now Saudi Arabia, where Wahhabism remains the dominant school of religious thought. Syed Qutb is an Egyptian scholar of the mid-20th century. He declared Western civilization an enemy of Islam and denounced leaders of Muslim nations for not following Islam closely enough. He preached that jihad should be undertaken not just to defend Islam, but to purify Islam. Other contemporary ideologues—Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman alias Blind Sheikh, Abu Mohamed al Maqdisi, Abu Qatada al Filastini and Abu Hamza al Masri— also contributed significantly to al Qaeda’s worldview. As an extension of these ideologies, al Qaeda often couches its grievances in “Third Worldist” terms familiar to any contemporary anti-globalization activist, often framing modern political concerns, including social justice, within a divine and religious narrative. Jihad in the form of armed struggle in the name of God then becomes the means to attain freedom and rid the ummah, or global Muslim community, of injustice. It is a way to punish those who have inflicted cruelty upon the ummah.11 The jihad they wage is a “defensive jihad” in the face of perceived aggression by the enemies of Islam and the Muslims. The presence of U.S. and other non-Muslim troops in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War was a turning point in the life of bin Laden. Although U.S. troops established a presence at the invitation of the Saudi royal family, bin Laden justified his fight by renewing his commitment to “defensive jihad.” He publicly criticized the Saudi royal family and alleged that their invitation of foreign troops to the Arabian Peninsula constituted an affront to the sanctity of the birthplace of Islam and a betrayal of the global Islamic community.12 As the Saudi government rendered him stateless, bin Laden advocated violence against it and the U.S. As it was difficult to strike targets inside Saudi Arabia, bin Laden’s ire increasingly focused on the United States. Following a period of exile in Sudan and Afghanistan, his radical views sharpened. Jihad to al Qaeda followers was deemed justifiable in order to defend the dignity and pride of the nation, a noble duty which had been neglected by the Muslim leaders. Al Qaeda’s conviction to political ideology couched in religious terms is therefore not easily swayed by cheap promises and materialistic gains. So long as there is no sincere attempt to meet its demands, al Qaeda will have sufficient support for the continuity of the jihad. In May 1996, after bin Laden moved from Sudan to Afghanistan, he became more violent. He issued a declaration of war against the United States in August 1996. By moving to Afghanistan, he became an internationally recognizable figure with the opportunity to openly present his views. As the leader of al Qaeda, he underlined its resentment towards the U.S., described as the “alliance of Jews, Christians, and their agents.”13 Even though he did not possess Islamic religious credentials or authority, bin Laden issued a fatwa in 1998. He claimed that the United States had made “a clear declaration of war on God, His messenger, and Muslims” through its policies in the Islamic world.14 This is another example of al Qaeda’s jihadist ideology, which set the organization in motion. With jihad comes the belief in martyrdom. Al Qaeda’s operatives firmly believe that a higher power guides and rewards those who sacrifice themselves for a noble cause, and are ever willing to sacrifice themselves without hesitation. The notion of a noble and blessed death achieved through martyrdom has been firmly embedded in their collective psyche. They view their acts as a sacrifice which is needed in order to achieve the goal of establishing the religion of Allah on earth. Their struggle yields one of the two things: victory or martyrdom. The baiah, or the pledge of allegiance, serves as an assurance that those affiliating themselves Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 5 ISSN # 1934-9742 to al Qaeda are committed to the organization’s ideology. By instituting it, the organization is freed from conceptual problems arising from differences in opinion. Through the baiah, an acceptable level of uniformity is maintained, which contributes to the organization’s stability and ease of management and administration. Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt Al Qaeda’s ideology also posits that “true Islam” or “pure Islam” can only be established if the essence of Islamic society and its fundamentals are instituted. This requires the establishment of an Islamic state. Of course, to achieve this end, Muslim society needs an Islamic movement which will provide leadership and spiritual guidance.15 As a result, a pan-Islamic ideology developed. The jihadist ideology perceives a prevalent animosity and prejudice against Islam, and posits that Islamic governments can never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. The battle concept was total war, “by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth.”16 Re-creating the Caliphate, thereby uniting the whole Muslim world into a single entity, is al Qaeda’s solution to help bring the Muslim communities out of this dilemma.17 The Global Jihad Movement After its loss of Afghanistan as a sanctuary, al Qaeda’s real power lies in the disparate groups it had trained, financed, armed, and, most importantly, ideologized. The al Qaeda network (“al Qaeda central” plus its associated groups) and ideologically-affiliated homegrown cells comprise the al Qaeda movement. In recent years, the threat posed by al Qaeda has been surpassed by the emergence of a global jihad movement. An alliance of loosely connected, disparate groups, the global jihad movement is not monolithic. Rather, global jihadists present a multidimensional threat to the U.S., its allies, and its friends. The global jihad movement has four overlapping components: 1. Al Qaeda: Also known as “al Qaeda core,” “al Qaeda central,” or “al Qaeda classic,” post-9/11 al Qaeda is operationally weak but ideologically potent. The group’s global jihad ideology has great appeal to both associated groups waging the local jihad in conflict zones and radicalized Muslim cells in the migrant and diaspora communities of the West. 2. Operationally associated groups: Also known as the “al Qaeda network,” this group includes thirty to forty Asian, African, and Middle Eastern organizations. Al Qaeda has provided these groups with training, weapons, finance, and ideology in Pakistan, Sudan, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Minadano (the Philippines), as well as through the Internet. They hold declared or undeclared membership of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders, formed in February 1998. 3. Ideologically-affiliated homegrown cells: These cells are operationally unconnected to al Qaeda but are driven by an ideology of global jihad articulated by it. For example, both “The Supporters al Qaeda” (the cell responsible for the bombing of the trains in Madrid on March 11, 2001) and the disrupted British cell led by Omar Khayam were self-financed and independent of al Qaeda’s operational control.18 Nonetheless, al Qaeda influenced and instigated them with its messages and, in some cases,provided limited training assistance. The post-Iraq robust Islamist milieu in North America, Europe, and Australasia has spawned more violent forms of these groups. 4. Operationally unconnected Sunni groups: This category of organizations that are operationally unconnected to al Qaeda could be violent or non-violent; for instance, it includes extremist groups such as Hezb-ut-Tehrir and al Mahajaroon in the UK and violent groups like Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam in Indonesia. Some of these groups have publicly criticized bin Laden and al Qaeda, but they believe in global jihad. Today’s global jihad movement is increasingly robust. Although al Qaeda central as led by bin Laden has severely weakened, the jihad movement has grown after the high-impact 9/11 attack. The U.S.-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan, the U.S. invasion and occupation Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 6 ISSN # 1934-9742 Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt of Iraq, and the media’s coverage of incidents at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have all strengthened support for associated groups and cells as well as Islamist groups unconnected to al Qaeda. Exploiting the suffering, resentment, and anger of Muslims, terrorist and extremist groups are now able to replenish their human losses and material wastage and continue the fight. Al Qaeda has morphed from a group of 3,000 to 4,000 members in October 2001 to a movement of several tens of thousands today, with untold numbers involved with other groups in the global jihad movement. The dynamic threat is both kinetic and ideological. The Impact of Ideology: The Driving Force What actually motivates al Qaeda is not power, wealth, or fame, but an ideological belief in its struggles.19 The trap that must be avoided by Western scholars is the common assumption that al Qaeda and other jihad groups are driven by publicity in pursuit of their broader goal.20 These groups fight existing governments they perceive as hostile to Islam and governments that have departed from the course of God and refused to apply Shari’ah law. They feel that their mission is legitimate and embark on actions which reflect the bitter historical and practical experience of those involved in the struggle. Drawing lessons from the worldwide Muslim response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, al Qaeda ideologues now seek to unite the Muslims in a jihad against the West. In the last century, many mujahideen factions allied together to face the Soviets, a common enemy. They put aside their differences; Muslims could, regardless of nationality, fight side by side and attain victory for all. During this war, the individuals that filled the ranks of the mujahideen came from all strata of society, proving that greater achievements could be attained through unity based on common objectives. Momentous events such as the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the defeat of the Soviet army in Afghanistan, the collapse of communism, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War precipitated the creation of contemporary Islamist movements in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Many governments imprisoned the Afghan veterans, and others were denied entry, expelled, and made stateless.21 They formed the core of these groups. Although demonized in the Western media, bin Laden is seen by his followers and those who fought with him in the Afghan war in a radically different light: “He not only gave us his money, but he also gave himself. He came down from his palace to live with the Afghan peasants and the Arab fighters. He cooked with them, ate with them, dug trenches with them. This is bin Laden’s way. His credentials include fighting in the famous battles of the whole Afghan war. In these battles the mujahidin came out victorious convincing them how the Soviet’s huge military machine could be defeated by unconventional methods.”22 The victory is often interpreted by al Qaeda ideologues as the will of men being singlehandedly defeated by the will of God. The internalization of the victory brought about a feeling of power derived from the belief that their effort had received divine legitimacy and a clear indication that the path they had taken was guided. Bin Laden’s followers believe that the actions of the mujahideen as primarily supported by the Muslim world directly led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. They also believe that the U.S. had achieved its goal of becoming the sole global superpower through what bin Laden and his fellow mujahideen had achieved in Afghanistan. Bin Laden later justified his actions by stating that the mujahideen were being persecuted by “an ungrateful U.S.” which had also taken credit for the defeat of the Soviets.23 The presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s during the height of the Gulf War and the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were perceived by al Qaeda as acts of aggression.24 Such perceptions generated widespread support and propelled al Qaeda forward, and helped it transform into its present state. The U.S.-led coalition intervention in Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 7 ISSN # 1934-9742 Afghanistan has been instrumental in decentralizing al Qaeda’s members, dispersing them across the globe. The resulting fragmentation and difficulty in communication with the central command forced al Qaeda members to reorganize into small, manageable, and fluid groups that focused on retaliatory attacks against American interests worldwide. Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq has widened the theatre of conflict. Today, there is unprecedented support for jihadist groups, including al Qaeda. The deteriorating situation in Iraq is producing greater unity among disparate groups and galvanizing greater support for extremism and terrorism.25 Working with local jihadist groups worldwide, al Qaeda has convinced them that the enemy is not only domestic governments but also Western interests— particularly U.S. interests. Homegrown Jihadism Al Qaeda’s ideology seeks to move, incite, and mobilize the Muslim “nation” until it reaches a revolutionary ignition point. Although even 9/11 failed to effectively mobilize Muslim support, there exists a significant dissatisfaction with the United States and its foreign policy among the many Muslim societies in the Middle East and Islamic world. The trend is rising and will be used to further the cause. Al Qaeda’s ideology has created multiple networks of autonomous cells both in the territorial and diaspora and migrant communities. To circumvent technical means of intelligencegathering, they cleverly reverted to one-to-one contact, primarily via couriers. This explains why the coordinated actions of al Qaeda’s German, British, Spanish, Dutch, and Belgian cells were discovered only during post-facto investigations into the background of Muhammad Atta and the other 9/11 conspirators. Even after 7/7, there remain unknown independent cells in the UK. Al Qaeda has a unique structure, combining highly centralized ideological indoctrination and coordination on one hand with highly decentralized and self-sustaining practical activity on the other. In addition to mounting its own operations, al Qaeda operates as a franchise by providing financial and logistical support, as well as name recognition, to terrorist groups operating in such diverse places as the Philippines, Algeria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, Kashmir, and Iraq. Local groups may act in the name of al Qaeda in order to bolster their own reputations—even if they are not receiving overt support from the organization. Cooperation among groups has been known to exist. Today, the physical al Qaeda infrastructure that existed in Afghanistan has been destroyed. Nonetheless, its conceptual infrastructure is intact. Though bin Laden and his associates are scattered or have been arrested and killed in great numbers, the organization has survived as the ideology is intact.26 Al Qaeda’s concept of global jihad to gain support from politicized and radicalized Muslims has worked to an extent sufficient to sustain a terrorist campaign. This radical internationalist ideology—sustained by anti-Western, anti-Zionist, and antiSemitic rhetoric—appeals to many individuals and groups, few of whom are currently linked in any substantial way to bin Laden or those around him. They merely follow his percepts, models, and methods. They act in style of al Qaeda, but they are only part of al Qaeda in the very loosest sense. With the diffusion of al Qaeda ideology, especially after 9/11, the threat has moved beyond the group and the individual. Israeli intelligence services now prefer the term “jihadi international” instead of “al Qaeda,” and the British Special Branch refers to al Qaeda and its associated groups as “international terrorism.”27 Although al Qaeda and its associated groups have been virtually destroyed in Europe and North America, an al Qaeda movement of networked individuals has survived. These individuals, when mobilized by committed and experienced individuals, ensure periodic attacks. Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 8 ISSN # 1934-9742 The Response Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt Al Qaeda’s ideology poses an unprecedented threat—more so than that of the group itself. Thus far, Western counter-terrorism strategy has entailed targeting al Qaeda leadership, crippling its command and control, and disrupting its current and future support bases—mainly kinetic responses. Six years after 9/11, however, the West has had very limited success. Al Qaeda must be tackled in an unconventional way—through a blend of hard and soft power. Only by using military force coupled with ideological appeal can a wedge be driven between the terrorists and the potential followers. It is essential for the counter-terrorism community understand that without marrying hard power with soft power, the al Qaedaled jihad movement cannot be defeated. America’s war against terrorism—especially following the March 2003 invasion of Iraq—is perceived by Muslims all over the world as unprecedented assault on Islam. The American military response has failed to account for historical, ideological, and social dimensions. There is no doubt America has the material resources to extend its influence everywhere, but it lacks the ideological and moral grounds to sustain this kind of domination. Therefore, it is not surprising that al Qaeda almost always challenges Western secularism and capitalism (represented by America) with Islam’s basic body of literature: the Quran and the Sunnah. For Muslims worldwide, these are both extremely rich and powerful texts. In the ongoing battle against Islamist terrorism, there is a pressing need to appreciate the full strategic significance of the Islamic worldview and spirituality. In a campaign against global jihad, U.S.-led Western governments should think strategically. Most jihadist organizations have modest resources, and it is often the over-reaction of states that has empowered them to evolve into formidable foes. The invasion of Iraq, though entirely justifiable from a humanitarian perspective, has made this task more difficult. Several new groups have spawned and existing groups have strengthened themselves. The unintended consequences of U.S. actions, such as the mistakes in Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay,28 have increased the ideological power of the violent Islamists. If countries are to win the war on terror, the U.S.-led coalition must eradicate existing enemies without creating new adversaries. While counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency campaigns must be conducted with the end objective of victory, retaining public support at all times is central. It helps to remember that bin Laden, al Qaeda’s protagonist and the overseer of 9/11, is still alive and is directing his efforts at attracting those Muslims who have thus far shunned his extremist message. As a master propagandist, he attempts to take the moral high ground. He knows that mass participation is essential to his success. Mistakes made in the “war on terror” could very well contribute to increased support for bin Laden worldwide—more so than when he campaigned for his cause on his own. If those directly responsible for conducting the campaign are hasty in their decisions, actions, and reactions, bin Laden will continue to achieve his goals of further politicizing and radicalizing Muslims. Jihadi ideologues and bin Laden believe that time is in their favor. Although the threat has moved beyond bin Laden, the fact that he is still alive and pontificating is a reminder that the Western strategy to fight al Qaeda is flawed. The success of the war on Islamist terrorism depends heavily on how the threat is perceived and the campaign is managed at the policy, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. As a start, the West in general and the U.S. specifically must reflect upon their current and past policies towards the Muslim world, in particular the Middle East. More equitable policies and treatment will preserve collective well-being and interests instead of pursuing selfish gains at the expense of others. In effect, the U.S. should seek to change the reality in the Middle East and beyond. It is the only country that has the military, diplomatic, political, and economic power to do so. Mainstream Muslims should be encouraged to fight the Muslim leaders who use and misuse religion for their political ends. The Islamic world must be allowed to decide whether or not to emulate successful Western secular models, but they will never (nor should they) do so Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 9 ISSN # 1934-9742 Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt lock, stock, and barrel. Rather, these models must be adopted in a conscious manner, making adjustments where necessary in an attempt to apply them to local conditions. Mutual respect must always be present, and a gradual change must be insisted upon. Learning to respect and safeguard each other’s dignity applies in this case. Outward differentiation in the form of moral preferences must not diminish the global mutual desire to create a better world for all. Without a better understanding of the threat, the West cannot effectively sustain the campaign against the multiple jihad and Islamist movements. Most government leaders think that military force is the answer to extremism and terrorism. Instead of building numerically large military or law enforcement capabilities, what is needed is well-integrated combined force structures that think and act strategically and, most importantly, work together with locals. More than catching or killing terrorists, combating terrorism is about fighting re-generation. While targeting terrorist operational cells is essential to reduce the immediate threat, fighting terrorism is more about fighting extremism that provides the recruits, funds, and justification. Because of this focus on military force, most Western nations unfortunately neglect the ideological dimension of countering terrorism. They turn a blind eye to the political grievances and aspirations—both actual and perceived—that drive the terrorist. With technological superiority, Western nations are naturally oriented toward kinetic and lethal operations. In the targeted strategy of “find, fix, and finish,” they have developed mastery. Nonetheless, tactical success will not guarantee strategic victory. It is the ultimate loss of public support for terrorism that will make terrorist groups perish. Conclusion There are many pathways out of violence; however, understanding the mindset of an ideologically motivated adversary is essential before developing a strategy of approach. In fact, success and failure of ending violence very much depends on whether a government has or has not understood the adversary. Prior to his resignation, the final words of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were that the U.S. had failed to understand the adversary. He was right. Though a courageous Cold War warrior, Rumsfeld himself had failed to understand the post-Cold War adversary. The common thinking globally is that terrorists are criminals; but to think that they are devoid of political and ideological content is wrong. Terrorist ideologies and motivations are markedly different from criminals. Terrorists use criminal means but their goals are—just like those of politicians—related to power and political gain. The fundamental distinction is that terrorists are ideologically driven (politicoreligious, ethno-nationalist, and left/ right wing) and criminals are economically driven (by need and greed). For their beliefs, terrorists are willing to break contact with their loved ones. After sacrificing their families and friends, they eventually sacrifice themselves. Unlike criminals, who chase wealth and personal gain, terrorists are ready to sacrifice everything earthly and die for their beliefs. Instead of fighting terrorists and extremists through kinetic military action, the U.S. should build capacity in the Muslim countries. To fight the threat both operationally and ideologically, the U.S. must develop multiple small footprints rather than large footprints, as it has in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. can deliver a strategic blow to terrorism and extremism by building capacity in the Muslim world to engage in ideological response. There must be greater international and domestic cooperation within and between government and agencies engaged in fighting terrorism and extremism. If ideological extremism is not targeted, terrorism will continue. The link between ideological extremism and terrorist action should be understood. It is a cycle: extremism breeds violence. Without controlling extremism, the threat of terrorism cannot be managed. Extremism fuels terrorism, and in turn, terrorism fuels extremism. Each attack, successful or not, breeds support among the extremists for greater violence. To combat extremism, a robust ideological response must be developed. Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 10 ISSN # 1934-9742 Until now, the ideological or intellectual battle has been overlooked. There has been no effort to ideologically target al Qaeda, JI, or other comparable groups that apply religious justification to legitimize and authenticate their terrorist activities. No effort can be spared in bridging the gaps arising from different worldviews and their implementation. Programs exploring and encouraging efforts to diminish the sources of mistrust and misunderstanding that harm relations between Muslims and non-Muslims must be carried out. Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt Empowering mainstream progressive Muslim leaders and moderate intellectuals will be a crucial way of countering the growing influence of extremists and negating the appeal of a misinterpreted version of Islam. At present, moderate and mainstream Muslims are unwilling to proactively confront extremists and terrorists. They are wary about the consequences of challenging these deviants. It is therefore necessary to create an international network of moderate scholars and mainstream clerics and to provide platforms to amplify their message. Moderate Muslims who advocate cooperation and non-violent solutions to conflict must also be empowered. The aim is to marginalize the militants and extremists who advocate intolerance. The stress must always be on the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict in the form of a conversation—not a monologue—where clear and truthful messages can be exchanged and examined with sincerity. Importantly, the renewed vigor shown by the Muslim community in seeking to deepen its understanding and practice of Islam must not be equated with extremism. This internal effort is an attempt to find answers, within Islam, to the many challenges of the rapidly changing world. Muslims need to update their understanding of Islam within today’s context, while preserving the five essential values of religion, lives, intellect, progeny, and property. Educating the public on the ideologies, organizations, and tactics of terrorism without blaming Islam and Muslims must be done both formally and informally, so that all are prepared to be a part of a collective force against terror. The public, and the majority of Muslims in particular, are strategic partners in counter-terrorism efforts and recognize that they have more to lose than gain if the political and economic stability is upset. While law enforcement and intelligence services can help, only communities can defeat terrorism. As such, governments must facilitate, support, or develop robust community engagement programs. To prevent the politicization and radicalization of communities exposed to extremist and terrorist propaganda, the communities need to be “inoculated.” Such a program should focus on informing the public that: (a) al Qaeda and its family of groups are not Koranic, but merely act under the guise of defending Islam and the Muslim community to advance a narrow political agenda; (b) bin Laden and al Zawahiri are neither Islamic clerics nor Islamic scholars, and their issuance of religious opinions (fatawa) bears no legal authority; and (c) concepts of Islam such as jihad (to strive), bai’ah (allegiance), al wala wal bara (loyalty), and takfir (excommunication) are being misinterpret to spread hatred. Individuals are swayed by ideology because of peripheral factors, not necessarily due to the inherent appeal of the ideology itself. As such, political violence, including terrorism, is often a product of prolonged social, economic, and political conflict. In the case of al Qaeda, its terrorist inclination can be attributed not only to its ideology, but also to the global political context. Al Qaeda strives to position itself as the champion of Muslim grievances. It narrative speaks of Kashmir under the rule of the predominantly Hindu India, the long oppression of Muslims in Chechnya by the atheist Russians, the suffering of the Palestinians at the hands of the Jews, the civilian Iraqi deaths due to the international community’s economic blockade, and the U.S. invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. This global political context is presented through a religious framework, which contributes to motivating Muslims to embrace the ideology. Therefore, a comprehensive approach, one that encompasses Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 11 ISSN # 1934-9742 ideological response, is necessary to combat terrorism. Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt At a global level, counter-ideology initiatives will only be effective if they are supported with parallel efforts that address global Muslim grievances and aspirations. These grievances result from uneven exertion of foreign policy by major powers in the Middle East, especially U.S. policy vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine, the presence of foreign forces in Muslim countries, and the continued support for undemocratic regimes in Muslim countries. People who join terrorist organizations may adopt its belief system for a variety of reasons. Some do so only after careful study and analysis, while a few adopt it as a powerful tool for organizing and manipulating other people. But some are filled with so much anger and frustration that they jump on the first bandwagon that comes along. The problem lies in: (a) the opportunity; (b) the misinterpretation of religious texts; and (c) the political context. As such, a far-reaching counter terrorism strategy should seek to address all three. First, create international awareness to build the political will needed to address the genuine political grievances and aspirations. Second, deny public contact with terrorist ideologues, operatives, and supporters by persecuting them. Third, expose how terrorist groups seize recruits, raise funds, and kill in the name of avenging Islam and Muslim blood. The author wishes to thank Brigadier General Russ Howard, Director of the Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University for creating a knowledge bridge from the Global South to the Global North to transfer the concept of ideological response to terrorism and extremism; Stacy Reiter Neal at the Jebsen Center for editing this paper; and Ustaz Mahfuh Halimi, Ustaz Mohamed bin Ali, and Ustaz Muhammed Haniff Hassan of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore for reviewing this paper. ENDNOTES After the U.S. strategy on “Global War On Terrorism” began to fault, the U.S. government is now seeking craft its campaign as “a struggle against violent extremism.” 1 Many academics attributed terrorism to poverty and lack of education. Bin Laden comes from the richest non-royal Saudi family and al Zawahiri, his deputy, comes from one of the most educated families in Egypt. 2 3 Ustaz Haji Ali Haji Mohamed, “The Peaceful Message of Islam,” in Fighting Terrorism: Preventing the Radicalisation of Youth in a Secular and Globalised World, Abdul Halim Bin Kader, ed. (Singapore: Taman Bacaan Permuda Pemudi Melayu Singapura, 2007), 87. “Al-Qaeda,” from Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, January 9, 2004. Available at . 4 For instance, Tawhid Wal Jihad renamed itself “al Qaeda in Iraq,” Jemmah Islamiyah (Noordin Mohammed faction) renamed itself “al Qaeda organization of the Malay Archipelago,” and the Salafi Group for Call and Combat renamed itself the “al Qaeda organization of the Islamic Maghreb.” 5 Bin Laden kept the name of al Qaeda a public secret until the U.S. attacked Afghanistan in October 2001. As such, he did not focus on building support for al Qaeda as a single group, but for the wider jihad movement throughout the 1990s and beyond. 6 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst & Company, 2002) and The 9/11 Commission Report provide insight into the origins of the group. 7 Abdullah Azzam, “Al-Qa’idah al-Sulbah,” Al-Jihad, 41 (April 1988), 46. The original Arabic text was translated into English by Reuven Paz, then Academic Director, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Israel. See also Abdullah Azzam, Iklan al-Jihad (Peshawar, Pakistan: Maktab Khidmat alMujahidin), 95-131. 8 Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 12 ISSN # 1934-9742 9 See published extracts from Ayman al-Zawahiri’s book in “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,” Al- Sharq al-Awsat, (London), December 2-10, 2001. “Syeikh Muhammad bin ‘Abdul Wahab (1115-1206H/1701-1790M)’,” available at . Accessed December 6, 2004. 10 Praevenis—Praepedis—Anticipas Predict—Prevent—Preempt 11 “Translation of Osama’s videotape,” Al Jazeera Television, October 30, 2004. 12 Robert Fisk, “Interview With Saudi Dissident Bin Laden,” Independent (London), July 10, 1996. 13 “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques,” Al Islah (London), September 2, 1996. “Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans,” Al Quds Al Arabi (London), February 23, 1998. The fatwa argued that defensive jihad was necessary “in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca} from their grip [the U.S. and Israel].” 14 15 “Al-Qa’idah al-Sulbah,” translated by Reuven Paz from Al-Jihad No. 41 (April 1988), 46. 16 Al Qaeda Training manual recovered by the British Police in Manchester, n.d. n.p. p. 2. 17 Gunaratna., 21. Briefings by CNI, the Spanish Intelligence Service, Madrid and on Operation Crevice, SO 13, New Scotland Yard, London, December 2004. 18 19 Bouchaib Slim, “Osama and Azzarqawi: Rivals or Allies,” IDSS Commentaries (55/2004), 2. 20 Gunaratna, 3. 21 Ibid, 5. 22 Ibid, 21. 23 Interviews with al Qaeda members, 1999. 24 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology,” CRS Report for Con- gress, November 16, 2004, 5-6. Al Zawahiri videotape broadcasted by Al Jazeera, available at . 25 26 Of the original 3,000-4000 members in 2001, under 500 are still alive or active. See Global Pathfinder ICPVTR database, Singapore, August 2005. 27 Burke, 1. See also author’s interview with Keith Weston, Director, Police International Counter Terrorism Unit, Thames House, London, November 2004. 28 Nat Hentoff, “Kangaroo court in Guantanamo Bay,” Chicago Sun-Times, December 5, 2004. ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Dr. Rohan Gunaratna is Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and Senior Fellow at the Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies. He is the author of eight books, including Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia University Press, New York), an international bestseller, and the lead author of Jane’s Counter Terrorism. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts in 2002. ABOUT THE JEBSEN CENTER FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM STUDIES: The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies was established at The Fletcher School, Tufts University in September 2005 with a mission to increase the understanding and competency of counterterrorism professionals at the local, national, and international levels. Rather than developing policies that react to events as they occur, the Jebsen Center takes a proactive approach to fighting modern terrorist threats, aiming to develop practical and lasting counter-terrorism strategies. Its innovative and proactive method examines issues and develops alternatives through three areas of focus: prediction, prevention, and preemption. To view Jebsen Center publications, research topics, news, and events, please visit our website at Rohan Gunaratna, “Strategic Counter-Terrorism: Getting Ahead of Terrorism; Part 2: The Ideological Response” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2007) 13
Published on Friday, September 20, 2002 by Full Text: Bush's National Security Strategy Following is the full text of President Bush's new national security strategy. The document, entitled "The National Security Strategy of the United States," will soon be transmitted to Congress as a declaration of the Administration's policy. INTRODUCTION THE great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom -- and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity. People everywhere want to say what they think; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children -- male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society -- and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages. Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. By making the world safer, we allow the people of the world to make their own lives better. We will defend this just peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent. Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us. To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal -- from better homeland defenses and law enforcement to intelligence and cutting off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror -- because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn. The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. As we defend the peace, we will also take advantage of an historic opportunity to preserve the peace. Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world's great powers find ourselves on the same side -united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. The United States will build on these common interests to promote global security. We are also increasingly united by common values. Russia is in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror. Chinese leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only source of national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political freedom is the only source of national greatness. America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic openness in both nations, because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order. We will strongly resist aggression from other great powers -- even as we welcome their peaceful pursuit of prosperity, trade, and cultural advancement. Finally, the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders. The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people. Free trade and free markets have proven their ability to lift whole societies out of poverty -- so the United States will work with individual nations, entire regions, and the entire global trading community to build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity. The United States will deliver greater development assistance through the New Millennium Challenge Account to nations that govern justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom. We will also continue to lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of AIDS and other infectious diseases. In building a balance of power that favors freedom, the United States is guided by the conviction that all nations have important responsibilities. Nations that enjoy freedom must actively fight terror. Nations that depend on international stability must help prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Nations that seek international aid must govern themselves wisely, so that aid is well spent. For freedom to thrive, accountability must be expected and required. We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions. In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment. Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person -- in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom's triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission. I. Overview of America's International Strategy "Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace -- a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent." President Bush West Point, New York June 1, 2002 The United States possesses unprecedented -- and unequaled -- strength and influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom. For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and equality. That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends. This is also a time of opportunity for America. We will work to translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty. The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. And this path is not America's alone. It is open to all. To achieve these goals, the United States will: • champion aspirations for human dignity; • strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; • work with others to defuse regional conflicts; • prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction; • ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; • expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; • develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and • transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century. II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity "Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities." President Bush West Point, New York June 1, 2002 In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. Fathers and mothers in all societies want their children to be educated and to live free from poverty and violence. No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police. America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property. These demands can be met in many ways. America's constitution has served us well. Many other nations, with different histories and cultures, facing different circumstances, have successfully incorporated these core principles into their own systems of governance. History has not been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people. Our own history is a long struggle to live up to our ideals. But even in our worst moments, the principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence were there to guide us. As a result, America is not just a stronger, but is a freer and more just society. Today, these ideals are a lifeline to lonely defenders of liberty. And when openings arrive, we can encourage change -- as we did in central and eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991, or in Belgrade in 2000. When we see democratic processes take hold among our friends in Taiwan or in the Republic of Korea, and see elected leaders replace generals in Latin America and Africa, we see examples of how authoritarian systems can evolve, marrying local history and traditions with the principles we all cherish. Embodying lessons from our past and using the opportunity we have today, the national security strategy of the United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty. Our principles will guide our government's decisions about international cooperation, the character of our foreign assistance, and the allocation of resources. They will guide our actions and our words in international bodies. We will: • speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions to advance freedom; • use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take; • make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future; and • take special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments. We will champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist it. III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends "Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing." President Bush Washington, D.C. (The National Cathedral) September 14, 2001 The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism -- premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents. In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror. The United States will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals with them. We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them. The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes -- some seen, some unseen. Today our enemies have seen the results of what civilized nations can, and will, do against regimes that harbor, support, and use terrorism to achieve their political goals. Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not only this battlefield on which we will engage terrorists. Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia. Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorists' ability to plan and operate. We will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists. Once the regional campaign localizes the threat to a particular state, we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task. The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism. We will identify and block the sources of funding for terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who support them, deny terrorists access to the international financial system, protect legitimate charities from being abused by terrorists, and prevent the movement of terrorists' assets through alternative financial networks. However, this campaign need not be sequential to be effective, the cumulative effect across all regions will help achieve the results we seek. We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: • direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors; • defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country; and • denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities. We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism. This includes: • using the full influence of the United States, and working closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose; • supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation; • diminishing the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on areas most at risk; and • using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism. While we recognize that our best defense is a good offense we are also strengthening America's homeland security to protect against and deter attack. This Administration has proposed the largest government reorganization since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. Centered on a new Department of Homeland Security and including a new unified military command and a fundamental reordering of the FBI, our comprehensive plan to secure the homeland encompasses every level of government and the cooperation of the public and the private sector. This strategy will turn adversity into opportunity. For example, emergency management systems will be better able to cope not just with terrorism but with all hazards. Our medical system will be strengthened to manage not just bioterror, but all infectious diseases and mass-casualty dangers. Our border controls will not just stop terrorists, but improve the efficient movement of legitimate traffic. While our focus is protecting America, we know that to defeat terrorism in today's globalized world we need support from our allies and friends. Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism. Where governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and our allies can provide. As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are ultimately fighting for our democratic values and way of life. Freedom and fear are at war, and there will be no quick or easy end to this conflict. In leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new, productive international relationships and redefining existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. IV. Work with Others To Defuse Regional Conflicts "We build a world of justice, or we will live in a world of coercion. The magnitude of our shared responsibilities makes our disagreements look so small." President Bush Berlin, Germany May 23, 2002 Concerned nations must remain actively engaged in critical regional disputes to avoid explosive escalation and minimize human suffering. In an increasingly interconnected world, regional crisis can strain our alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create horrifying affronts to human dignity. When violence erupts and states falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to alleviate suffering and restore stability. No doctrine can anticipate every circumstance in which U.S. action -- direct or indirect -- is warranted. We have finite political, economic, and military resources to meet our global priorities. The United States will approach each case with these strategic principles in mind: • The United States should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge. • The United States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively. Policies in several key regions offer some illustrations of how we will apply these principles: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical because of the toll of human suffering, because of America's close relationship with the state of Israel and key Arab states, and because of that region's importance to other global priorities of the United States. There can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living beside Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests, and listens to their voices, and counts their votes. The United States will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict. The United States, the international donor community, and the World Bank stand ready to work with a reformed Palestinian government on economic development, increased humanitarian assistance and a program to establish, finance, and monitor a truly independent judiciary. If Palestinians embrace democracy, and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state. Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy. So the United States continues to challenge Israeli leaders to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state. As there is progress towards security, Israel forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000. And consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop. As violence subsides, freedom of movement should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians to resume work and normal life. The United States can play a crucial role but, ultimately, lasting peace can only come when Israelis and Palestinians resolve the issues and end the conflict between them. In South Asia, the United States has also emphasized the need for India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes. This administration invested time and resources building strong bilateral relations with India and Pakistan. These strong relations then gave us leverage to play a constructive role when tensions in the region became acute. With Pakistan, our bilateral relations have been bolstered by Pakistan's choice to join the war against terror and move toward building a more open and tolerant society. The Administration sees India's potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century and has worked hard to transform our relationship accordingly. Our involvement in this regional dispute, building on earlier investments in bilateral relations, looks first to concrete steps by India and Pakistan that can help defuse military confrontation. Indonesia took courageous steps to create a working democracy and respect for the rule of law. By tolerating ethnic minorities, respecting the rule of law, and accepting open markets, Indonesia may be able to employ the engine of opportunity that has helped lift some of its neighbors out of poverty and desperation. It is the initiative by Indonesia that allows U.S. assistance to make a difference. In the Western Hemisphere we have formed flexible coalitions with countries that share our priorities, particularly Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Chile, and Colombia. Together we will promote a truly democratic hemisphere where our integration advances security, prosperity, opportunity, and hope. We will work with regional institutions, such as the Summit of the Americas process, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Defense Ministerial of the Americas for the benefit of the entire hemisphere. Parts of Latin America confront regional conflict, especially arising from the violence of drug cartels and their accomplices. This conflict and unrestrained narcotics trafficking could imperil the health and security of the United States. Therefore we have developed an active strategy to help the Andean nations adjust their economies, enforce their laws, defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply of drugs, while -- as important -- we work to reduce the demand for drugs in our own country. In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat illegal armed groups of both the left and right by extending effective sovereignty over the entire national territory and provide basic security to the Colombian people. In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States -- preserving human dignity -- and our strategic priority -- combating global terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity. Together with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa's fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists. An ever more lethal environment exists in Africa as local civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones. Forming coalitions of the willing and cooperative security arrangements are key to confronting these emerging transnational threats. Africa's great size and diversity requires a security strategy that focuses bilateral engagement, and builds coalitions of the willing. This administration will focus on three interlocking strategies for the region: • countries with major impact on their neighborhood such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia are anchors for regional engagement and require focused attention; • coordination with European allies and international institutions is essential for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations; and • Africa's capable reforming states and sub-regional organizations must be strengthened as the primary means to address transnational threats on a sustained basis. Ultimately the path of political and economic freedom presents the surest route to progress in sub-Saharan Africa, where most wars are conflicts over material resources and political access often tragically waged on the basis of ethnic and religious difference. The transition to the African Union with its stated commitment to good governance and a common responsibility for democratic political systems offers opportunities to strengthen democracy on the continent. V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology -- when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends -- and we will oppose them with all our power." President Bush West Point, New York June 1, 2002 The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States -- with our allies and friends -- to emphasize deterrence of the enemy's use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation. Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defense that until recently were inconceivable. But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous. In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that, while different in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states: • brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; • display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; • are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; • sponsor terrorism around the globe; and • reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands. At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations. We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis. Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes: • Proactive counterproliferation efforts. We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities -- detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities -- are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries. • Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction. We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to $20 billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step forward. • Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states. Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked. It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first. • In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is far less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations. • In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States. • Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action. For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat -- most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terrorism and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction -- weapons that can be easily concealed and delivered covertly and without warning. The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction. The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction -- and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will: • build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge; • coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and • continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results. The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just. VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade. "When nations close their markets and opportunity is hoarded by a privileged few, no amount -- no amount -- of development aid is ever enough. When nations respect their people, open markets, invest in better health and education, every dollar of aid, every dollar of trade revenue and domestic capital is used more effectively." President Bush Monterrey, Mexico March 22, 2002 A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of liberty. We will promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond America's shores. All governments are responsible for creating their own economic policies and responding to their own economic challenge. We will use our economic engagement with other countries to underscore the benefits of policies that generate higher productivity and sustained economic growth, including: • pro-growth legal and regulatory policies to encourage business investment, innovation, and entrepreneurial activity; • tax policies -- particularly lower marginal tax rates -- that improve incentives for work and investment; • rule of law and intolerance of corruption so that people are confident that they will be able to enjoy the fruits of their economic endeavors; • strong financial systems that allow capital to be put to its most efficient use; • sound fiscal policies to support business activity; • investments in health and education that improve the well-being and skills of the labor force and population as a whole; and • free trade that provides new avenues for growth and fosters the diffusion of technologies and ideas that increase productivity and opportunity. The lessons of history are clear: market economies, not command-and-control economies with the heavy hand of government, are the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty. Policies that further strengthen market incentives and market institutions are relevant for all economies -- industrialized countries, emerging markets, and the developing world. A return to strong economic growth in Europe and Japan is vital to U.S. national security interests. We want our allies to have strong economies for their own sake, for the sake of the global economy, and for the sake of global security. European efforts to remove structural barriers in their economies are particularly important in this regard, as are Japan's efforts to end deflation and address the problems of non-performing loans in the Japanese banking system. We will continue to use our regular consultations with Japan and our European partners -- including through the Group of Seven (G-7) -- to discuss policies they are adopting to promote growth in their economies and support higher global economic growth. Improving stability in emerging markets is also key to global economic growth. International flows of investment capital are needed to expand the productive potential of these economies. These flows allow emerging markets and developing countries to make the investments that raise living standards and reduce poverty. Our long-term objective should be a world in which all countries have investment-grade credit ratings that allow them access to international capital markets and to invest in their future. We are committed to policies that will help emerging markets achieve access to larger capital flows at lower cost. To this end, we will continue to pursue reforms aimed at reducing uncertainty in financial markets. We will work actively with other countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the private sector to implement the G-7 Action Plan negotiated earlier this year for preventing financial crises and more effectively resolving them when they occur. The best way to deal with financial crises is to prevent them from occurring, and we have encouraged the IMF to improve its efforts doing so. We will continue to work with the IMF to streamline the policy conditions for its lending and to focus its lending strategy on achieving economic growth through sound fiscal and monetary policy, exchange rate policy, and financial sector policy. The concept of "free trade" arose as a moral principle even before it became a pillar of economics. If you can make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person -- or a nation -- to make a living. To promote free trade, the Unites States has developed a comprehensive strategy: • Seize the global initiative. The new global trade negotiations we helped launch at Doha in November 2001 will have an ambitious agenda, especially in agriculture, manufacturing, and services, targeted for completion in 2005. The United States has led the way in completing the accession of China and a democratic Taiwan to the World Trade Organization. We will assist Russia's preparations to join the WTO. • Press regional initiatives. The United States and other democracies in the Western Hemisphere have agreed to create the Free Trade Area of the Americas, targeted for completion in 2005. This year the United States will advocate market-access negotiations with its partners, targeted on agriculture, industrial goods, services, investment, and government procurement. We will also offer more opportunity to the poorest continent, Africa, starting with full use of the preferences allowed in the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and leading to free trade. • Move ahead with bilateral free trade agreements. Building on the free trade agreement with Jordan enacted in 2001, the Administration will work this year to complete free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore. Our aim is to achieve free trade agreements with a mix of developed and developing countries in all regions of the world. Initially, Central America, Southern Africa, Morocco, and Australia will be our principal focal points. • Renew the executive-congressional partnership. Every administration's trade strategy depends on a productive partnership with Congress. After a gap of 8 years, the Administration reestablished majority support in the Congress for trade liberalization by passing Trade Promotion Authority and the other market opening measures for developing countries in the Trade Act of 2002. This Administration will work with Congress to enact new bilateral, regional, and global trade agreements that will be concluded under the recently passed Trade Promotion Authority. • Promote the connection between trade and development. Trade policies can help developing countries strengthen property rights, competition, the rule of law, investment, the spread of knowledge, open societies, the efficient allocation of resources, and regional integration -- all leading to growth, opportunity, and confidence in developing countries. The United States is implementing The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act to provide market-access for nearly all goods produced in the 35 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. We will make more use of this act and its equivalent for the Caribbean Basin and continue to work with multilateral and regional institutions to help poorer countries take advantage of these opportunities. Beyond market access, the most important area where trade intersects with poverty is in public health. We will ensure that the WTO intellectual property rules are flexible enough to allow developing nations to gain access to critical medicines for extraordinary dangers like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. • Enforce trade agreements and laws against unfair practices. Commerce depends on the rule of law; international trade depends on enforceable agreements. Our top priorities are to resolve ongoing disputes with the European Union, Canada, and Mexico and to make a global effort to address new technology, science, and health regulations that needlessly impede farm exports and improved agriculture. Laws against unfair trade practices are often abused, but the international community must be able to address genuine concerns about government subsidies and dumping. International industrial espionage which undermines fair competition must be detected and deterred. • Help domestic industries and workers adjust. There is a sound statutory framework for these transitional safeguards which we have used in the agricultural sector and which we are using this year to help the American steel industry. The benefits of free trade depend upon the enforcement of fair trading practices. These safeguards help ensure that the benefits of free trade do not come at the expense of American workers. Trade adjustment assistance will help workers adapt to the change and dynamism of open markets. • Protect the environment and workers. The United States must foster economic growth in ways that will provide a better life along with widening prosperity. We will incorporate labor and environmental concerns into U.S. trade negotiations, creating a healthy "network" between multilateral environmental agreements with the WTO, and use the International Labor Organization, trade preference programs, and trade talks to improve working conditions in conjunction with freer trade. • Enhance energy security. We will strengthen our own energy security and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working with our allies, trading partners, and energy producers to expand the sources and types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. We will also continue to work with our partners to develop cleaner and more energy efficient technologies. Economic growth should be accompanied by global efforts to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations associated with this growth, containing them at a level that prevents dangerous human interference with the global climate. Our overall objective is to reduce America's greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our economy, cutting such emissions per unit of economic activity by 18 percent over the next 10 years, by the year 2012. Our strategies for attaining this goal will be to: • remain committed to the basic U.N. Framework Convention for international cooperation; • obtain agreements with key industries to cut emissions of some of the most potent greenhouse gases and give transferable credits to companies that can show real cuts; • develop improved standards for measuring and registering emission reductions; • promote renewable energy production and clean coal technology, as well as nuclear power -which produces no greenhouse gas emissions, while also improving fuel economy for U.S. cars and trucks; • increase spending on research and new conservation technologies, to a total of $4.5 billion -the largest sum being spent on climate change by any country in the world and a $700 million increase over last year's budget; and • assist developing countries, especially the major greenhouse gas emitters such as China and India, so that they will have the tools and resources to join this effort and be able to grow along a cleaner and better path. VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy "In World War II we fought to make the world safer, then worked to rebuild it. As we wage war today to keep the world safe from terror, we must also work to make the world a better place for all its citizens." President Bush Washington, D.C. (Inter-American Development Bank) March 14, 2002 A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable. Including all of the world's poor in an expanding circle of development -- and opportunity -- is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of U.S. international policy. Decades of massive development assistance have failed to spur economic growth in the poorest countries. Worse, development aid has often served to prop up failed policies, relieving the pressure for reform and perpetuating misery. Results of aid are typically measured in dollars spent by donors, not in the rates of growth and poverty reduction achieved by recipients. These are the indicators of a failed strategy. Working with other nations, the United States is confronting this failure. We forged a new consensus at the U.N. Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey that the objectives of assistance -- and the strategies to achieve those objectives -- must change. This Administration's goal is to help unleash the productive potential of individuals in all nations. Sustained growth and poverty reduction is impossible without the right national policies. Where governments have implemented real policy changes we will provide significant new levels of assistance. The United States and other developed countries should set an ambitious and specific target: to double the size of the world's poorest economies within a decade. The United States Government will pursue these major strategies to achieve this goal: • Provide resources to aid countries that have met the challenge of national reform. We propose a 50 percent increase in the core development assistance given by the United States. While continuing our present programs, including humanitarian assistance based on need alone, these billions of new dollars will form a new Millennium Challenge Account for projects in countries whose governments rule justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom. Governments must fight corruption, respect basic human rights, embrace the rule of law, invest in health care and education, follow responsible economic policies, and enable entrepreneurship. The Millennium Challenge Account will reward countries that have demonstrated real policy change and challenge those that have not to implement reforms. • Improve the effectiveness of the World Bank and other development banks in raising living standards. The United States is committed to a comprehensive reform agenda for making the World Bank and the other multilateral development banks more effective in improving the lives of the world's poor. We have reversed the downward trend in U.S. contributions and proposed an 18 percent increase in the U.S. contributions to the International Development Association (IDA) -the World Bank's fund for the poorest countries -- and the African Development Fund. The key to raising living standards and reducing poverty around the world is increasing productivity growth, especially in the poorest countries. We will continue to press the multilateral development banks to focus on activities that increase economic productivity, such as improvements in education, health, rule of law, and private sector development. Every project, every loan, every grant must be judged by how much it will increase productivity growth in developing countries. • Insist upon measurable results to ensure that development assistance is actually making a difference in the lives of the world's poor. When it comes to economic development, what really matters is that more children are getting a better education, more people have access to health care and clean water, or more workers can find jobs to make a better future for their families. We have a moral obligation to measure the success of our development assistance by whether it is delivering results. For this reason, we will continue to demand that our own development assistance as well as assistance from the multilateral development banks has measurable goals and concrete benchmarks for achieving those goals. Thanks to U.S. leadership, the recent IDA replenishment agreement will establish a monitoring and evaluation system that measures recipient countries' progress. For the first time, donors can link a portion of their contributions to IDA to the achievement of actual development results, and part of the U.S. contribution is linked in this way. We will strive to make sure that the World Bank and other multilateral development banks build on this progress so that a focus on results is an integral part of everything that these institutions do. • Increase the amount of development assistance that is provided in the form of grants instead of loans. Greater use of results-based grants is the best way to help poor countries make productive investments, particularly in the social sectors, without saddling them with ever-larger debt burdens. As a result of U.S. leadership, the recent IDA agreement provided for significant increases in grant funding for the poorest countries for education, HIV/AIDS, health, nutrition, water, sanitation, and other human needs. Our goal is to build on that progress by increasing the use of grants at the other multilateral development banks. We will also challenge universities, nonprofits, and the private sector to match government efforts by using grants to support development projects that show results. • Open societies to commerce and investment. Trade and investment are the real engines of economic growth. Even if government aid increases, most money for development must come from trade, domestic capital, and foreign investment. An effective strategy must try to expand these flows as well. Free markets and free trade are key priorities of our national security strategy. • Secure public health. The scale of the public health crisis in poor countries is enormous. In countries afflicted by epidemics and pandemics like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, growth and development will be threatened until these scourges can be contained. Resources from the developed world are necessary but will be effective only with honest governance, which supports prevention programs and provides effective local infrastructure. The United States has strongly backed the new global fund for HIV/AIDS organized by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and its focus on combining prevention with a broad strategy for treatment and care. The United States already contributes more than twice as much money to such efforts as the next largest donor. If the global fund demonstrates its promise, we will be ready to give even more. • Emphasize education. Literacy and learning are the foundation of democracy and development. Only about 7 percent of World Bank resources are devoted to education. This proportion should grow. The United States will increase its own funding for education assistance by at least 20 percent with an emphasis on improving basic education and teacher training in Africa. The United States can also bring information technology to these societies, many of whose education systems have been devastated by AIDS. • Continue to aid agricultural development. New technologies, including biotechnology, have enormous potential to improve crop yields in developing countries while using fewer pesticides and less water. Using sound science, the United States should help bring these benefits to the 800 million people, including 300 million children, who still suffer from hunger and malnutrition. VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power "We have our best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war." President Bush West Point, New York June 1, 2002 America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions -- as broad as practicable -- of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom. Effective coalition leadership requires clear priorities, an appreciation of others' interests, and consistent consultations among partners with a spirit of humility. There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe. Europe is also the seat of two of the strongest and most able international institutions in the world: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has, since its inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security, and the European Union (EU), our partner in opening world trade. The attacks of September 11 were also an attack on NATO, as NATO itself recognized when it invoked its Article V self-defense clause for the first time. NATO's core mission -- collective defense of the transatlantic alliance of democracies -- remains, but NATO must develop new structures and capabilities to carry out that mission under new circumstances. NATO must build a capability to field, at short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed to respond to a threat against any member of the alliance. The alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO's own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions. To achieve this, we must: • expand NATO's membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests; • ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have appropriate combat contributions to make in coalition warfare; • develop planning processes to enable those contributions to become effective multinational fighting forces; • take advantage of the technological opportunities and economies of scale in our defense spending to transform NATO military forces so that they dominate potential aggressors and diminish our vulnerabilities; • streamline and increase the flexibility of command structures to meet new operational demands and the associated requirements of training, integrating, and experimenting with new force configurations; and • maintain the ability to work and fight together as allies even as we take the necessary steps to transform and modernize our forces. If NATO succeeds in enacting these changes, the rewards will be a partnership as central to the security and interests of its member states as was the case during the Cold War. We will sustain a common perspective on the threats to our societies and improve our ability to take common action in defense of our nations and their interests. At the same time, we welcome our European allies' efforts to forge a greater foreign policy and defense identity with the EU, and commit ourselves to close consultations to ensure that these developments work with NATO. We cannot afford to lose this opportunity to better prepare the family of transatlantic democracies for the challenges to come. The attacks of September 11 energized America's Asian alliances. Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty to declare the September 11 was an attack on Australia itself, following that historic decision with the dispatch of some of the world's finest combat forces for Operation Enduring Freedom. Japan and the Republic of Korea provided unprecedented levels of military logistical support within weeks of the terrorist attack. We have deepened cooperation on counter-terrorism with our alliance partners in Thailand and the Philippines and received invaluable assistance from close friends like Singapore and New Zealand. The war against terrorism has proven that America's alliances in Asia not only underpin regional peace and stability, but are flexible and ready to deal with new challenges. To enhance our Asian alliances and friendships, we will: • look to Japan to continue forging a leading role in regional and global affairs based on our common interests, our common values, and our close defense and diplomatic cooperation; • work with South Korea to maintain vigilance towards the North while preparing our alliance to make contributions to the broader stability of the region over the longer-term; • build on 50 years of U.S.-Australian alliance cooperation as we continue working together to resolve regional and global problems -- as we have so many times from the Battle of Leyte Gulf to Tora Bora; • maintain forces in the region that reflect our commitments to our allies, our requirements, our technological advances, and the strategic environment; and • build on stability provided by these alliances, as well as with institutions such as ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, to develop a mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage change in this dynamic region. We are attentive to the possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition. Several potential great powers are now in the midst of internal transition -- most importantly Russia, India, and China. In all three cases, recent developments have encouraged our hope that a truly global consensus about basic principles is slowly taking shape. With Russia, we are already building a new strategic relationship based on a central reality of the twenty-first century: the United States and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions is emblematic of this new reality and reflects a critical change in Russian thinking that promises to lead to productive, long-term relations with the EuroAtlantic community and the United States. Russia's top leaders have a realistic assessment of their country's current weakness and the policies -- internal and external -- needed to reverse those weaknesses. They understand, increasingly, that Cold War approaches do not serve their national interests and that Russian and American strategic interests overlap in many areas. United States policy seeks to use this turn in Russian thinking to refocus our relationship on emerging and potential common interests and challenges. We are broadening our already extensive cooperation in the global war on terrorism. We are facilitating Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization, without lowering standards for accession, to promote beneficial bilateral trade and investment relations. We have created the NATO-Russia Council with the goal of deepening security cooperation among Russia, our European allies, and ourselves. We will continue to bolster the independence and stability of the states of the former Soviet Union in the belief that a prosperous and stable neighborhood will reinforce Russia's growing commitment to integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, we are realistic about the differences that still divide us from Russia and about the time and effort it will take to build an enduring strategic partnership. Lingering distrust of our motives and policies by key Russian elites slows improvement in our relations. Russia's uneven commitment to the basic values of free-market democracy and dubious record in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remain matters of great concern. Russia's very weakness limits the opportunities for cooperation. Nevertheless, those opportunities are vastly greater now than in recent years -- or even decades. The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia. Differences remain, including over the development of India's nuclear and missile programs, and the pace of India's economic reforms. But while in the past these concerns may have dominated our thinking about India, today we start with a view of India as a growing world power with which we have common strategic interests. Through a strong partnership with India, we can best address any differences and shape a dynamic future. The United States relationship with China is an important part of our strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China. The democratic development of China is crucial to that future. Yet, a quarter century after beginning the process of shedding the worst features of the Communist legacy, China's leaders have not yet made the next series of fundamental choices about the character of their state. In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness. In time, China will find that social and political freedom is the only source of that greatness. The United States seeks a constructive relationship with a changing China. We already cooperate well where our interests overlap, including the current war on terrorism and in promoting stability on the Korean peninsula. Likewise, we have coordinated on the future of Afghanistan and have initiated a comprehensive dialogue on counter-terrorism and similar transitional concerns. Shared health and environmental threats, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, challenge us to promote jointly the welfare of our citizens. Addressing these transnational threats will challenge China to become more open with information, promote the development of civil society, and enhance individual human rights. China has begun to take the road to political openness, permitting many personal freedoms and conducting village-level elections, yet remains strongly committed to national one-party rule by the Communist Party. To make that nation truly accountable to its citizen's needs and aspirations, however, much work remains to be done. Only by allowing the Chinese people to think, assemble, and worship freely can China reach its full potential. Our important trade relationship will benefit from China's entry into the World Trade Organization, which will create more export opportunities and ultimately more jobs for American farmers, workers, and companies. China is our fourth largest trading partner, with over $100 billion in annual two-way trade. The power of market principles and the WTO's requirements for transparency and accountability will advance openness and the rule of law in China to help establish basic protections for commerce and for citizens. There are, however, other areas in which we have profound disagreements. Our commitment to the self-defense of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act is one. Human rights is another. We expect China to adhere to its nonproliferation commitments. We will work to narrow differences where they exist, but not allow them to preclude cooperation where we agree. The events of September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the context for relations between the United States and other main centers of global power, and opened vast, new opportunities. With our long-standing allies in Europe and Asia, and with leaders in Russia, India, and China, we must develop active agendas of cooperation lest these relationships become routine and unproductive. Every agency of the United States Government shares the challenge. We can build fruitful habits of consultation, quiet argument, sober analysis, and common action. In the long-term, these are the practices that will sustain the supremacy of our common principles and keep open the path of progress. IX. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century "Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work, creativity, and enterprise of our people." President Bush Washington, D.C. (Joint Session of Congress) September 20, 2001 The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed. It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our military's highest priority is to defend the United States. To do so effectively, our military must: • • • • assure our allies and friends; dissuade future military competition; deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of the world's most strategically vital regions. However, the threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces. A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur. We will channel our energies to overcome a host of operational challenges. The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends. Through our willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces. Before the war in Afghanistan, that area was low on the list of major planning contingencies. Yet, in a very short time, we had to operate across the length and breadth of that remote nation, using every branch of the armed forces. We must prepare for more such deployments by developing assets such as advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike capabilities, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces. This broad portfolio of military capabilities must also include the ability to defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure U.S. access to distant theaters, and protect critical U.S. infrastructure and assets in outer space. Innovation within the armed forces will rest on experimentation with new approaches to warfare, strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages, and taking full advantage of science and technology. We must also transform the way the Department of Defense is run, especially in financial management and recruitment and retention. Finally, while maintaining nearterm readiness and the ability to fight the war on terrorism, the goal must be to provide the President with a wider range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion against the United States, our allies, and our friends. We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from experience that some enemies cannot be deterred. The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy -- whether a state or non-state actor -- to impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces sufficient to support our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States. Intelligence -- and how we use it -- is our first line of defense against terrorists and the threat posed by hostile states. Designed around the priority of gathering enormous information about a massive, fixed object -- the Soviet bloc -- the intelligence community is coping with the challenge of following a far more complex and elusive set of targets. We must transform our intelligence capabilities and build new ones to keep pace with the nature of these threats. Intelligence must be appropriately integrated with our defense and law enforcement systems and coordinated with our allies and friends. We need to protect the capabilities we have so that we do not arm our enemies with the knowledge of how best to surprise us. Those who would harm us also seek the benefit of surprise to limit our prevention and response options and to maximize injury. We must strengthen intelligence warning and analysis to provide integrated threat assessments for national and homeland security. Since the threats inspired by foreign governments and groups may be conducted inside the United States, we must also ensure the proper fusion of information between intelligence and law enforcement. Initiatives in this area will include: • strengthening the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to lead the development and actions of the Nation's foreign intelligence capabilities; • establishing a new framework for intelligence warning that provides seamless and integrated warning across the spectrum of threats facing the nation and our allies; • continuing to develop new methods of collecting information to sustain our intelligence advantage; • investing in future capabilities while working to protect them through a more vigorous effort to prevent the compromise of intelligence capabilities; and • collecting intelligence against the terrorist danger across the government with all-source analysis. As the United States Government relies on the armed forces to defend America's interests, it must rely on diplomacy to interact with other nations. We will ensure that the Department of State receives funding sufficient to ensure the success of American diplomacy. The State Department takes the lead in managing our bilateral relationships with other governments. And in this new era, its people and institutions must be able to interact equally adroitly with non-governmental organizations and international institutions. Officials trained mainly in international politics must also extend their reach to understand complex issues of domestic governance around the world, including public health, education, law enforcement, the judiciary, and public diplomacy. Our diplomats serve at the front line of complex negotiations, civil wars, and other humanitarian catastrophes. As humanitarian relief requirements are better understood, we must also be able to help build police forces, court systems, and legal codes, local and provincial government institutions, and electoral systems. Effective international cooperation is needed to accomplish these goals, backed by American readiness to play our part. Just as our diplomatic institutions must adapt so that we can reach out to others, we also need a different and more comprehensive approach to public information efforts that can help people around the world learn about and understand America. The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an area where America must excel. We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept. We will work together with other nations to avoid complications in our military operations and cooperation, through such mechanisms as multilateral and bilateral agreements that will protect U.S. nationals from the ICC. We will implement fully the American Servicemembers Protection Act, whose provisions are intended to ensure and enhance the protection of U.S. personnel and officials. We will make hard choices in the coming year and beyond to ensure the right level and allocation of government spending on national security. The United States Government must strengthen its defenses to win this war. At home, our most important priority is to protect the homeland for the American people. Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalized world, events beyond America's borders have a greater impact inside them. Our society must be open to people, ideas, and goods from across the globe. The characteristics we most cherish -- our freedom, our cities, our systems of movement, and modern life -- are vulnerable to terrorism. This vulnerability will persist long after we bring to justice those responsible for the September eleventh attacks. As time passes, individuals may gain access to means of destruction that until now could be wielded only by armies, fleets, and squadrons. This is a new condition of life. We will adjust to it and thrive -- in spite of it. In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and interests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require. When we disagree on particulars, we will explain forthrightly the grounds for our concerns and strive to forge viable alternatives. We will not allow such disagreements to obscure our determination to secure together, with our allies and our friends, our shared fundamental interests and values. Ultimately, the foundation of American strength is at home. It is in the skills of our people, the dynamism of our economy, and the resilience of our institutions. A diverse, modern society has inherent, ambitious, entrepreneurial energy. Our strength comes from what we do with that energy. That is where our national security begins.

Tutor Answer

School: New York University

hey here you go buddy




Terrorism is a word that is usually put in the wrong contexts where there is involvement
of violence, Acts of war, terror, and crime pretty much look the same on a surface level.
However, this is not the case as each holds a different and specific motive from the other. People
tend to get confused by this concept since the end result of the acts is usually the same; death,
physical injuries, and destruction of properties. Political scientists define terrorism as an attack or
violence against a target which is non-combatant for political motives. This attack is meant to
have an effect on an audience that is larger than the immediate victims. In this case, two terms
are important to focus on while defining terrorism in general. These are “non-combatant groups”
and “political reasons”. An example of a terrorist attack was the 9/11 which was meant to pass a
political message to the Un...

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