Pretend You Are the Instructor

Anonymous
timer Asked: Jul 5th, 2018
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Question description

Two of the competencies you must develop in order to become an independent scholar include writing in a scholarly voice and tone and following an appropriate academic style. In your quest to become a scholarly writer, you must follow the rules meticulously detailed in the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA). Initially, recalling each rule will be difficult, but over time it will become second nature. Knowing where to look to determine if the manuscript you are reading or writing is in accordance with APA standards is critically important. Following a standard writing format increases the probability of others being able to easily comprehend your manuscript.

As you develop your scholarly writing prose in this program and beyond, there are two things to keep in mind: Adhering to APA writing format is required for your Discussions and Assignments, and others will read your manuscripts for comprehension. Occasionally, new writers forget they have a scholarly audience who will read their papers. It is important that the writer understand the significance of placing him or herself in the position of the reader. To that end, you will assume the role of an Instructor and will review an anonymous college paper to provide APA feedback to a student writer. During this exercise, you will practice recognizing APA errors and locating within the APA textbook the appropriate APA rules and formatting solutions.

To prepare for this Discussion, do the following:

  • Read and view the materials in your Learning Resources, including the Walden University academic guide pages on common reference list examples and using the Microsoft Word track changes feature. Review your APA manual for use in your assessment of the sample paper. Note: To assist you in your assessment, you may use any supplemental scholarly APA resources of your choosing.
  • Assess Michael’s Writing Style Prose Paper to identify any APA writing errors, and use the track changes comment feature to propose corrections. As you make suggestions or corrections, be sure to include the source name and page number(s) so the author can locate the correction rule. For example, if you find text that reads, “This study will provide…” your comment may contain the following comment: “This is anthropomorphism. To correct it, please refer to the APA manual, 6th edition, pp. 68–69 for details.” Do this throughout the entire sample college paper.

Pretend You Are the Instructor
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Pretend You Are the Instructor
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1 Title of the Paper in Full Goes Here Student Name Here Walden University 2 Abstract Abstracts are not required for all course papers. Please ask your instructor if you have questions regarding whether an abstract is required for a particular assignment. 3 Title of the Paper in Full Goes Here AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Level 1 Heading AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Level 2 Heading AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt 4 uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Another Level 2 Heading AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Level 3 heading. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Level 4 heading. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. 5 Level 4 heading. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Level 3 heading. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Level 1 Heading AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. 6 References (Please note that the following references are intended as examples only.) Alexander, G., & Bonaparte, N. (2008). My way or the highway that I built. Ancient Dictators, 25(7), 14-31. doi:10.8220/CTCE.52.1.23-91 Babar, E. (2007). The art of being a French elephant. Adventurous Cartoon Animals, 19, 43194392. Retrieved from http://www.elephants104.ace.org Bumstead, D. (2009). The essentials: Sandwiches and sleep. Journals of Famous Loafers, 5, 565582. doi:12.2847/CEDG.39.2.51-71 Hansel, G., & Gretel, D. (1973). Candied houses and unfriendly occupants. Thousand Oaks, CA: Fairy Tale Publishing. Hera, J. (2008). Why Paris was wrong. Journal of Greek Goddess Sore Spots, 20(4), 19-21. doi: 15.555/GGE.64.1.76-82 Laureate Education, Inc. (Producer). (2007). How to cite a video: The city is always Baltimore [DVD]. Baltimore, MD: Author. Laureate Education, Inc. (Producer). (2010). Name of program [Video webcast]. Retrieved from http://www.courseurl.com Sinatra, F. (2008). Zing! Went the strings of my heart. Making Good Songs Great, 18(3), 31-22. Retrieved from http://articlesextollingrecordingsofyore.192/fs.com Smasfaldi, H., Wareumph, I., Aeoli, Q., Rickies, F., Furoush, P., Aaegrade, V., … Fiiel, B. (2005). The art of correcting surname mispronunciation. New York, NY: Supportive Publisher Press. Retrieved from http://www.onewaytociteelectronicbooksperAPA7.02.com 7 White, S., & Red, R. (2001). Stop and smell the what now? Floral arranging for beginners (Research Report No. 40-921). Retrieved from University of Wooded Glen, Center for Aesthetic Improvements in Fairy Tales website: http://www.uwg.caift/~40_921.pdf
娀 Academy of Management Journal 2012, Vol. 55, No. 2, 381–398. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.0891 CHANGE AGENTS, NETWORKS, AND INSTITUTIONS: A CONTINGENCY THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE JULIE BATTILANA Harvard University TIZIANA CASCIARO University of Toronto We develop a contingency theory for how structural closure in a network, defined as terms of the extent to which an actor’s network contacts are connected to one another, affects the initiation and adoption of change in organizations. Using longitudinal survey data supplemented with eight in-depth case studies, we analyze 68 organizational change initiatives undertaken in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service. We show that low levels of structural closure (i.e., “structural holes”) in a change agent’s network aid the initiation and adoption of changes that diverge from the institutional status quo but hinder the adoption of less divergent changes. organizational changes are equivalent, however. One important dimension along which they vary is the extent to which they break with existing institutions in a field of activity (Battilana, 2006; Greenwood & Hinings, 2006). Existing institutions are defined as patterns that are so taken-for-granted that actors perceive them as the only possible ways of acting and organizing (Douglas, 1986). Consider the example of medical professionalism, the institutionalized template for organizing in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS) in the early 2000s. According to this template, physicians are the key decision makers in both the administrative and clinical domains. In this context, centralizing information to enable physicians to better control patient discharge decisions would be aligned with the institutionalized template. By contrast, implementing nurse-led discharge or preadmission clinics would diverge from the institutional status quo by transferring clinical tasks and decision-making authority from physicians to nurses. Organizational changes may thus converge with or diverge from an institutional status quo (Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2004; D’Aunno, Succi, & Alexander, 2000; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Changes that diverge from the status quo, hereafter referred to as divergent organizational changes, are particularly challenging to implement. They require change agents to distance themselves from their existing institutions and persuade other organization members to adopt practices that not only are new, but also break with the norms of their institutional environment (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Kellogg, 2011). Scholars have long recognized the political nature of change in organizations (Frost & Egri, 1991; Pettigrew, 1973; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). To implement planned organizational changes—that is, premeditated interventions intended to modify the functioning of an organization (Lippitt, 1958)— change agents may need to overcome resistance from other members of their organization and encourage them to adopt new practices (Kanter, 1983; Van de Ven, 1986). Change implementation within an organization can thus be conceptualized as an exercise in social influence, defined as the alteration of an attitude or behavior by one actor in response to another actor’s actions (Marsden & Friedkin, 1993). Research on organizational change has improved understanding of the challenges inherent in change implementation, but it has not accounted systematically for how characteristics of a change initiative affect its adoption in organizations. Not all We would like to thank Wenpin Tsai and three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. We also wish to acknowledge the helpful comments we received from Jeffrey Alexander, Michel Anteby, Joel Baum, Peter Bracken, Thomas d’Aunno, Stefan Dimitriadis, Martin Gargiulo, Mattia Gilmartin, Ranjay Gulati, Morten Hansen, Herminia Ibarra, Sarah Kaplan, Otto Koppius, Tal Levy, Christopher Marquis, Bill McEvily, Jacob Model, Lakshmi Ramarajan, Metin Sengul, Bill Simpson, Michael Tushman, and seminar participants at INSEAD, McGill, Harvard, Bocconi, and HEC Paris. Both authors contributed equally to this article. Editor’s note: The manuscript for this article was accepted for publication during the term of AMJ’s previous editor-in-chief, R. Duane Ireland. 381 Copyright of the Academy of Management, all rights reserved. Contents may not be copied, emailed, posted to a listserv, or otherwise transmitted without the copyright holder’s express written permission. Users may print, download, or email articles for individual use only. 382 Academy of Management Journal In this article, we examine the conditions under which change agents are able to influence other organization members to adopt changes with different degrees of divergence from the institutional status quo. Because informal networks have been identified as key sources of influence in organizations (Brass, 1984; Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Gargiulo, 1993; Ibarra, 1993; Ibarra, 1993; Krackhardt, 1990) and policy systems (Laumann, Knoke, & Kim, 1985; Padgett & Ansell, 1993; Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000), we focus on how change agents’ positions in such networks affect their success in initiating and implementing organizational change. Network research has shown that the degree of structural closure in a network, defined as the extent to which an actor’s network contacts are connected to one another, has important implications for generating novel ideas and exercising social influence. A high degree of structural closure creates a cohesive network of tightly linked social actors, and a low degree of structural closure creates a network with “structural holes” and brokerage potential (Burt, 2005; Coleman, 1988). The existing evidence suggests that actors with networks rich in structural holes are more likely to generate novel ideas (e.g., Burt, 2004; Fleming, Mingo, & Chen, 2007; Rodan & Galunic, 2004). Studies that have examined the effect of network closure on actors’ ability to implement innovative ideas, however, have yielded contradictory findings, some showing that high levels of network closure facilitate change adoption (Fleming et al., 2007; Obstfeld, 2005), others showing that low levels of network closure do so (Burt, 2005). In this study, we aim to reconcile these findings by developing a contingency theory of the role of network closure in the initiation and adoption of organizational change. We posit that the information and control benefits of structural holes (Burt, 1992) take different forms in change initiation than in change adoption, and these benefits are strictly contingent on the degree to which a change diverges from the institutional status quo in the organization’s field of activity. Accordingly, structural holes in a change agent’s network aid the initiation and adoption of changes that diverge from the institutional status quo but hinder the adoption of less divergent changes. In developing a contingency theory of the hitherto underspecified relationship between network closure and organizational change, we draw a theoretical link between individual-level analyses of network bases for social influence in organizations and field-level analyses of institutional pressures on organizational action. We thus aim to demonstrate the explanatory power that derives from rec- April ognizing the complementary roles of institutional and social network theory in a model of organizational change. To test our theory, we collected data on 68 organizational changes initiated by clinical managers in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS) from 2004 to 2005 through longitudinal surveys and eight in-depth case studies. NETWORK CLOSURE AND DIVERGENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE In order to survive, organizations must convince the public of their legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) by conforming, at least in appearance, to the prevailing institutions that define how things are done in their environment. This emphasis on legitimacy constrains change by exerting pressure to adopt particular managerial practices and organizational forms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983); therefore, organizations embedded in the same environment, and thus subject to the same institutional pressures, tend to adopt similar practices. Organization members are thus motivated to initiate and implement changes that do not affect their organizations’ alignment with existing institutions (for a review, see Heugens and Lander [2009]). Nevertheless, not all organizational changes will be convergent with the institutional status quo. Indeed, within the NHS, although many of the changes enacted have been convergent with the institutionalized template of medical professionalism, a few have diverged from it. The variability in the degree of divergence of organizational changes poses two questions: (1) what accounts for the likelihood that an organization member will initiate a change that diverges from the institutional status quo and (2) what explains the ability of a change agent to persuade other organization members to adopt such a change. Research into the enabling role of actors’ social positions in implementing divergent change (Greenwood & Hinings, 2006; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Sherer & Lee, 2002) has tended to focus on the position of the organization within its field of activity, eschewing the intraorganizational level of analysis. The few studies that have accounted for intraorganizational factors have focused on the influence of change agents’ formal position on the initiation of divergent change and largely overlooked the influence of their informal position in organizational networks (Battilana, 2011). This is surprising in light of well-established theory and evidence concerning informal networks as sources of influence in organizations (Brass, 1984; Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Gargiulo, 1993; Ibarra & Andrews, 2012 Battilana and Casciaro 1993; Ibarra, 1993; Krackhardt, 1990). To the extent that the ability to implement change hinges on social influence, network position should significantly affect actors’ ability to initiate divergent changes and persuade other organization members to adopt them. A network-level structural feature with theoretical relevance to generating new ideas and social influence is the degree of network closure. A continuum of configurations exists: cohesive networks of dense, tightly knit relationships among actors’ contacts are at one end, and networks of contacts separated by structural holes that provide actors with brokerage opportunities are at the other. A number of studies have documented the negative relationship between network closure and the generation of new ideas (Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 2004; Fleming et al., 2007; Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010; McFadyen, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2009). Two mechanisms account for this negative association: redundancy of information and normative pressures (Ruef, 2002). With regard to the former, occupying a network position rich in structural holes exposes an actor to nonredundant information (Burt, 1992). To the extent that it reflects originality and newness, creativity is more likely to be engendered by exposure to nonredundant than to repetitious information. As for normative pressure, network cohesion not only limits the amount of novel information that reaches actors, but also pressures them to conform to the modus operandi and norms of the social groups in which they are embedded (Coleman, 1990; Krackhardt, 1999; Simmel, 1950), which reduces the extent to which available information can be deployed. Thus far, no study has directly investigated the relationship between network closure and the characteristics of change initiatives in organizations. We propose that the informational and normative mechanisms that underlie the negative association between network cohesion and the generation of new ideas imply that organizational actors embedded in networks rich in structural holes are more likely to initiate changes that diverge from the institutional status quo. Bridging structural holes exposes change agents to novel information that might suggest opportunities for change not evident to others, and it reduces normative constraints on how agents can use information to initiate changes that do not conform to prevailing institutional pressures. Hypothesis 1. The richer in structural holes a change agent’s network, the more likely the agent is to initiate a change that diverges from the institutional status quo. 383 With respect to the probability that a change initiative will actually modify organizational functioning, few studies have explored how the degree of closure in change agents’ networks affects the adoption of organizational changes. This dearth of empirical evidence notwithstanding, Burt (2005: 86 – 87) suggested several ways in which brokerage opportunities provided by structural holes in an actor’s network may aid adaptive implementation, which he defined as the ability to carry out projects that take advantage of opportunities—as distinct from the ability to detect opportunities. Structural holes may equip a potential broker with a broad base of referrals and knowledge of how to pitch a project so as to appeal to different constituencies, as well as the ability to anticipate problems and adapt the project to changing circumstances (Burt, 1992). These potential advantages suggest that structural holes may aid change initiation differently from how they aid change adoption. In change initiation, the information and control benefits of structural holes give a change agent greater exposure to opportunities for change, and creative freedom from taken-for-granted institutional norms. These are, therefore, mainly incoming benefits that flow in the direction of the change agent. By contrast, in change adoption, the information and control benefits of structural holes are primarily outgoing, in that they are directed to the organizational constituencies the change agent is aiming to persuade. These benefits can be characterized as structural reach and tailoring. Reach concerns a change agent’s social contact with the constituencies that a change project would affect, information about the needs and wants of these constituencies, and information about how best to communicate how the project will benefit them. Tailoring refers to a change agent’s control over when and how to use available information to persuade diverse audiences to mobilize their resources in support of a change project. Being the only connection among otherwise disconnected others, brokers can tailor their use of information and their image in accordance with each network contact’s preferences and requirements. Brokers can do this with minimal risk that potential inconsistencies in the presentation of the change will become apparent (Padgett & Ansell, 1993) and possibly delegitimize them. The argument that structural holes may facilitate change adoption stands in contrast to the argument that network cohesion enhances the adoption of innovation (Fleming et al., 2007; Obstfeld, 2005). Proponents of network cohesion maintain that people and resources are more readily mobilized in a cohesive network because multiple connections 384 Academy of Management Journal April among members facilitate the sharing of knowledge and meanings and generate normative pressures for collaboration (Coleman, 1988; Gargiulo, Ertug, & Galunic, 2009; Granovetter, 1985; Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010). Supporting evidence is provided by Obstfeld (2005), who found cohesive network positions to be positively correlated with involvement in successful product development, and by Fleming and colleagues (2007), who found collaborative brokerage to aid in the generation of innovative ideas but maintained that it is network cohesion that facilitates the ideas’ diffusion and use by others. These seemingly discrepant results are resolved when organizational change is recognized to be a political process that unfolds over time and takes on various forms. The form taken by a change initiative is contingent on the extent to which it diverges from the institutional status quo. Obstfeld described innovation as FIGURE 1 Predicted Interactive Effects of Network Closure and Divergence from Institutional Status Quo on Change Adoption an active political process at the microsocial level. . . . To be successful, the tertius needs to identify the parties to be joined and establish a basis on which each alter would participate in the joining effort. The logic for joining might be presented to both parties simultaneously or might involve appeals tailored to each alter before the introduction or on an ongoing basis as the project unfolds. (2005: 188) over time. Less divergent change, because it is less likely to elicit resistance and related attempts at coalition building, renders the tactical flexibility afforded by structural holes unnecessary. Under these circumstances, the advantages of the cooperative norms fostered in a cohesive network are more desirable for the change agent. Consequently, we do not posit a main effect for network closure on change implementation, but only predict an interaction effect, the direction of which depends on a change’s degree of divergence. Figure 1 graphically summarizes the predicted moderation pattern. Change implementation, according to this account, involves decisions concerning not only which network contacts should be involved, but also the timing and sequencing of appeals directed to different constituencies. A network rich in structural holes affords change agents more freedom in deciding when and how to approach these constituencies and facilitate connections among them. Building on this argument, we predict that in the domain of organizational change the respective advantages of cohesion and structural holes are strictly contingent on whether a change diverges from the institutional status quo, thereby disrupting extant organizational equilibria and creating the potential for significant opposition. Such divergent changes are likely to engender greater resistance from organization members, who are in turn likely to attempt building coalitions with organizational constituencies to mobilize them against the change initiative. In this case, a high level of network cohesion among a change agent’s contacts makes it easy for them to mobilize and form a coalition against the change. By contrast, a network rich in structural holes affords change agents flexibility in tailoring arguments to different constituencies and deciding when to connect to them, whether separately or jointly, simultaneously or High + – Low – + Network Closure Low High Change Divergence Hypothesis 2. The more a change diverges from the institutional status quo, the more closure in a change agent’s network of contacts diminishes the likelihood of change adoption. METHODS Site We tested our model using quantitative and qualitative data on 68 change initiatives undertaken in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service, a government-funded health care system consisting of more than 600 organizations that fall into three broad categories: administrative units, primary care service providers, and secondary care service providers. In 2004, when the present study was conducted, the NHS had a budget of more than £60 billion and employed more than one million people, including health care professionals and managers specializing in the delivery of guaranteed universal health care free at the point of service. 2012 Battilana and Casciaro The NHS, being highly institutionalized, was a particularly appropriate context in which to test our hypotheses. Like other health care systems throughout the Western world (e.g., Kitchener, 2002; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000), the NHS is organized according to the model of medical professionalism (Giaimo, 2002), which prescribes specific role divisions among professionals and organizations.1 The model of professional groups’ role division is predicated on physicians’ dominance over all other categories of health care professionals. Physicians are the key decision makers, controlling not only the delivery of services, but also, in collaboration with successive governments, the organization of the NHS (for a review, see Harrison, Hunter, Marnoch, and Pollitt [1992]). The model of role division among organizations places hospitals at the heart of the health care system (Peckham, 2003). Often enjoying a monopoly position as providers of secondary care services in their health communities (Le Grand, 1999), hospitals ultimately receive the most resources. The emphasis on treating acute episodes of disease in a hospital over providing follow-up and preventive care in home or community settings under the responsibility of primary care organizations is characteristic of an acute episodic health system. In 1997, under the leadership of the Labour Government, the NHS embarked on a ten-year modernization effort aimed at improving the quality, reliability, effectiveness, and value of its health care services (Department of Health, 1999). The initiative was intended to imbue the NHS with a new model for organizing that challenged the institutionalized model of medical professionalism. Despite the attempt to shift from an acute episodic health care system to one focused on providing continuing care by integrating services and increasing cooperation among professional groups, at the time of the study, a distinct dominance order persisted across NHS organizations, with physicians (Ferlie, Fitzgerald, Wood, & Hawkins, 2005; Harrison et al., 1992; Richter, West, Van Dick, & Dawson, 2006) and hospitals (Peckham, 2003) at the apex. This context— wherein the extant model of medical professionalism continued to define the institutional status quo in these organizations—afforded a unique opportunity to study organizational change in an entrenched 1 This characterization of the NHS’s dominant template for organizing is based on a comprehensive review of NHS archival data and the literature on the NHS, as well as on 46 semistructured interviews with NHS professionals and 3 interviews with academic experts on the NHS analyzed with the methodology developed by Scott and colleagues (2000). 385 system in which enhancing the capacity for innovation and adaptation had potentially vast societal implications. Sample The focus of the study being on variability in divergence and adoption of organizational change initiatives, the population germane to our model was that of self-appointed change agents, actors who voluntarily initiate planned organizational changes. Our sample is comprised of 68 clinical managers (i.e., actors with both clinical and managerial responsibilities) responsible for initiating and attempting to implement change initiatives. All had worked in different organizations in the NHS and participated in the Clinical Strategists Programme, a two-week residential learning experience conducted by a European business school. The first week focused on cultivating skills and awareness to improve participants’ effectiveness in their immediate spheres of influence and leadership ability within the clinical bureaucracies, the second week on developing participants’ strategic change capabilities at the levels of the organization and the community health system. Applicants were asked to provide a description of a change project they would begin to implement within their organization upon completing the program. Project implementation was a required part of the program, which was open to all clinical managers in the NHS and advertised both online and in NHS brochures. There was no mention of divergent organizational change in either the title of the executive program or its presentation. Participation was voluntary. All 95 applicants were selected and chose to attend and complete the program. The final sample of 68 observations, which corresponds to 68 change projects, reflects the omission of 27 program participants who did not respond to a social network survey administered in the first week of the program. Participants ranged in age from 35 to 56 years (average age, 44). All had clinical backgrounds as well as managerial responsibilities. Levels of responsibility varied from midto top-level management. The participants also represented a variety of NHS organizations (54 percent primary care organizations, 26 percent hospitals or other secondary care organizations, and 19 percent administrative units) and professions (25 percent physicians and 75 percent nurses and allied health professionals). To control for potential nonresponse bias, we compared the full sample for which descriptive data were available with the final sample. Unpaired t-tests showed no statistically 386 Academy of Management Journal significant differences for individual characteristics recorded in both samples. Procedures and Data Data on the demographic characteristics, formal positions, professional trajectories, and social networks of the change agents, together with detailed information on the proposed changes, were collected over a period of 12 months. The demographic and professional trajectories data were obtained from participants’ curricula vitae, and data on their formal positions were gathered from the NHS’s human resource records. Data on social networks were collected during the first week of the executive program, during which participants completed an extensive survey detailing their social network ties both in their organizations and in the NHS more broadly. Participants were assured that data on the content of the change projects, collected at different points during their design and implementation, would remain confidential. They submitted descriptions of their intended change projects upon applying to the program and were asked to write a refined project description three months after implementation. The two descriptions were very similar; the latter were generally an expansion of the former. One-on-one (10 –15 minute) telephone interviews conducted with the participants and members of their organizations four months after implementation of the change projects enabled us to ascertain whether they had been implemented— all had been—and whether the changes being implemented corresponded to those described in the project descriptions, which all did. During two additional (20 – 40 minute) telephone interviews conducted six and nine months after project implementation, participants were asked to (1) describe the main actions taken in relation to implementing their changes, (2) identify the main obstacles (if any) to implementation, (3) assess their progress, and (4) describe their next steps in implementing the changes. We took extensive notes during the interviews, which were not recorded for reasons of confidentiality. The change agents also gave us access to all organizational documents and NHS official records related to the change initiatives generated during the first year of implementation. We created longitudinal case studies of each of the 68 change initiatives by aggregating the data collected throughout the year from change agents and other organization members and relevant organizational and NHS documents. After 12 months of implementation, we conducted another telephone survey to collect infor- April mation about the outcomes of the change projects with an emphasis on the degree to which the changes had been adopted. We corroborated the information provided by each change agent by conducting telephone interviews with two informants who worked in the same organization. In most cases, one informant was directly involved in the change effort, and the other was either a peer or superior of the agent who knew about, but was not directly involved in, the change effort. These informants’ assessments of the adoption of the change projects were, again for reasons of confidentiality, not recorded; as during the six- and nine-month interviews, we took extensive notes. At the beginning of the study, we randomly selected eight change projects to be the subjects of in-depth case studies. Data on these projects were collected over a year via both telephone and inperson interviews. One year after implementation, at each of the eight organizations, we conducted between 12 and 20 interviews of 45 minutes to two hours in duration. On the basis of these interviews, all of which were transcribed, we wrote eight indepth case studies about the selected change initiatives. The qualitative data used to verify the consistency of change agents’ reports with the reports made by other organization members provided broad validation for the survey data. Dependent and Independent Variables Divergence from the institutional status quo. The institutional status quo for organizing within the NHS is defined by the model of medical professionalism that prescribes specific role divisions among professionals and organizations (Peckham, 2003). To measure each change project’s degree of divergence from the institutionalized model of professionals’ and organizations’ role division, we used two scales developed by Battilana (2011). The first scale measures the degree to which change projects diverged from the institutionalized model of role division among professionals using four items aimed at capturing the extent to which the change challenged the dominance of doctors over other health care professionals in both the clinical and administrative domains. The second scale measures the degree to which change projects diverged from the institutionalized model of role division among organizations using six items aimed at capturing the extent to which the change challenged the dominance of hospitals over other types of organizations in both the clinical and administrative domains. Each of the ten items in the ques- 2012 Battilana and Casciaro tionnaire was assessed using a three-point rankordered scale.2 Two independent raters blind to the study’s hypotheses used the two scales to code the change project descriptions written by the participants after three months’ of implementation. The descriptions averaged three pages and followed the same template: presentation of project goals, resources required to implement the project, people involved, key success factors, and measurement of outcomes. Interrater reliability, as assessed by the kappa correlation coefficient, was .90. The raters resolved coding discrepancies identifying and discussing passages in the change project descriptions deemed relevant to the codes until they reached consensus. Scores for the change projects on each of the two scales corresponded to the average of the items included in each scale. To account for change projects that diverged from the institutionalized models of both professionals’ and organizations’ role division, and thereby assess each project’s overall degree of divergence, we measured change divergence as the unweighted average of the scores received on both scales. Table 1 provides examples of change initiatives characterized by varying degrees of divergence from the institutionalized models of role division among organizations or professionals or both. Change adoption. We measured level of adoption using the following three-item scale from the telephone survey administered one year after implementation: (1) “On a scale of 1–5, how far did you progress toward completing the change project, where 1 is defining the project for the clinical strategists program and 5 is institutionalizing the implemented change as part of standard practice in your organization.” (2) “In my view, the change is now part of the standard operating practice of the organization.” (3) “In my view, the change was not adopted in the organization.” The third item was reverse-coded. The last two items were assessed using a five-point scale that ranged from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .60, which is the acceptable threshold value for exploratory studies such as ours (Nunnally, 1978). Before gathering the change agents’ responses, the research team that had followed the evolution of the change projects and collected all survey and interview data 2 Research on radical organizational change typically measures the extent to which organizational transformations diverge from previous organizational arrangements (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). By contrast, we measured the extent to which the changes in our sample diverged from the institutional status quo in the field of the NHS. 387 throughout the year produced a joint assessment of the projects’ level of adoption using the same threeitem scale later presented to the change agents. The correlation between the responses produced by the research team and those generated by the telephone survey administered to the change agents was .98. To further validate the measure of change adoption, two additional raters independently coded the notes taken during the interviews using the same three-item scale as was used in the telephone survey. They based their coding on the entire set of qualitative data collected from organizational informants on each change project’s level of adoption. Interrater reliability, as assessed by the kappa correlation coefficient, was .88, suggesting a high level of agreement among the raters (Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch, 1977). We then asked the two raters to reconcile the differences in their respective assessments and produce a consensual evaluation (Larsson, 1993). The resulting measures were virtually identical to the self-reported measures collected from the change agents. We also leveraged the case studies developed for each change initiative from the participant interviews and relevant sets of organizational documents and NHS official records collected throughout the year. Eight of these were in-depth case studies for which extensive qualitative data were collected. Two additional independent raters, for whom a high level of interrater reliability was obtained (␬ ⫽ .90), coded all case studies to assess the level of adoption of the changes, and reconciled the differences in their assessments to produce a consensual evaluation. The final results of this coding were nearly indistinguishable from the self-reported measures of level of change adoption, further alleviating concerns about potential self-report biases. Network closure. We measured network closure using ego network data collected via a name generator survey approach commonly used in studies of organizational networks (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 1992; Podolny & Baron, 1997; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). In name generator surveys, respondents are asked to list contacts (i.e., alters) with whom they have one or more criterion relationships and specify the nature of the relationships that link contacts to one another. As detailed below, we corroborated our ego network data with qualitative evidence from the eight in-depth case studies. To measure the degree of closure in a change agent’s network, we followed the seminal approach developed by Burt (1992), who measured the continuum of configurations between structural holes 388 Academy of Management Journal April TABLE 1 Examples of Change Initiatives with High, Medium, and Low Divergence from the Institutional Status Quoa High Divergence Medium Divergence Low Divergence Example 1. Initiative to transfer stroke rehabilitation services, such as language retraining, from a hospitalbased unit to a PCT (i.e., from the secondary to the primary care sector). Prior to the change, stroke patients were stabilized and rehabilitated in the acute ward of the hospital. This resulted in long hospital stays and occupied resources that were more appropriate for the acute treatment than for the rehabilitation phase. As a result, there was often not enough room to admit all stroke patients to the acute ward, as many beds were used for patients undergoing rehabilitation. With the transfer of service, postacute patients, once they were medically stable and ready for rehabilitation, were relocated to a unit operated by the PCT, ensuring that the acute unit would be dealing only with patients who were truly in need of acute care. This transfer of the delivery of rehabilitation services from the secondary to the primary care sector greatly diverged from the institutionalized model of role division among organizations. Example 2. Initiative to develop nurseled discharge that would transfer clinical tasks and decision-making authority from physicians to nurses. Traditionally, discharge decisions were under the exclusive control of physicians. With the new nurse-led initiatives, nurses would take over responsibility from specialist physicians and make the final decision to discharge patients, thus assuming more responsibility as well as accountability and risk for clinical decisions. Physicians ceded control over some aspects of decisionmaking, freeing them to focus on more complex patients and tasks. Example 3. Initiative involving primary and secondary care service providers aimed at developing a day hospital for elderly patients. The day hospital was to facilitate continued care, reduce hospital stays, and decrease hospital readmission for frail elderly patients too ill to be cared for at home but not sufficiently ill to justify full admission to the hospital. Patients would check into the hospital-operated day unit for a few hours and receive services from both primary and secondary care professionals. Because the primary care service providers were engaged in the provision of services formerly provided only by secondary care service providers, there was increased collaboration between the primary and secondary care service providers involved in this project. Even so, the project diverged from the institutionalized model of role division among organizations only to some extent because the new service was still operated by the hospital. Example 4. Initiative to have ultrasound examinations performed by nurses rather than by physicians. Although this project enabled nurses to perform medical examinations they usually did not perform, the nurses gained no decision-making power in either the clinical or administrative domain. Consequently, this project diverged from the institutionalized model of role division among professionals only to some extent. Example 5. Initiative to transfer a ward specializing in the treatment of elderly patients from a PCT to a hospital. Prior to the change, both the PCT and hospitals provided services for the elderly, who make up the bulk of patients receiving care in the hospital setting. Rather than diverging from the institutionalized model of role division among organizations, the transfer of responsibility for all elderly care services to the hospital reinforced the centralization of health care services around the hospital, strengthening the dominant role of the hospital over the PCT in the institutionalized delivery model. Example 6. Initiative of a general practice to hire an administrative assistant to implement and manage a computerized appointment booking system. The addition of this assistant to the workforce changed neither the division of labor nor the balance of power between health care professionals within the general practice. a A PCT is a primary care trust. At the time this study was conducted, all NHS professionals who provided primary care services (services provided to patients when they first report health problems) were managed by primary care trusts (PCTs) serving populations of 250,000 or more. General practices were required to join PCTs when they were created in 1988. PCTs were thus local health organizations responsible for managing health services in a given area. They provided primary care services and commissioned secondary care services from hospitals. and cohesion in terms of the absence or presence of constraint, defined as: ci ⫽ 冘 冉p ⫹ 冘 j⫽i ij k⫽i,k⫽j 冊 2 pikpkj , where pij is the proportion of time and effort invested by i in contact j. Contact j constrains i to the extent that i has focused a large proportion of time and effort to reach j and j is surrounded by few structural holes that i can leverage to influence j. Unlike other measures of structural holes and cohesion, such as effective size or density, constraint captures not only redundancy in a network, but also an actor’s dependence on network 2012 Battilana and Casciaro contacts. This is a more pertinent measure of the potential for tailoring because it assesses not only whether two contacts are simply linked, but also the extent to which social activity in the network revolves around a given contact, making a link to that actor more difficult to circumvent in presenting tailored arguments for change to different contacts. We measured alter-to-alter connections in a respondent’s ego network using a survey item that asked respondents to indicate, on a three-point scale (1, “not at all”; 2, “somewhat”; and 3, “very well”), how well two contacts knew each other. We included relevant network contacts in the calculation of constraint based on two survey items that measured the frequency and closeness of contact between an actor and each network contact. The first item (“How frequently have you interacted with this person over the last year?”) used an eightpoint scale with point anchors ranging from “not at all” to “twice a week or more.” The second item (“How close would you say you are with this person?”) used a seven-point scale that ranged from “especially close” to “very distant,” with 4, “neither close nor distant,” as the neutral point and was accompanied by the following explanation: “(Note that ‘Especially close’ refers to one of your closest personal contacts and that ‘Very distant’ refers to the contacts with whom you do not enjoy spending time, that is, the contacts with whom you spend time only when it is absolutely necessary).” From these survey items, we constructed four measures of constraint to test the sensitivity of our prediction to more or less inclusive specifications of agents’ networks. The first measure included alters with whom ego was at least somewhat close. The second measure, based on frequency of interaction, included only alters with whom ego interacted at least twice a month. The third measure combined the first two by calculating constraint on the basis of alters with whom ego either interacted at least twice monthly or to whom ego was at least somewhat close. The fourth measure included every actor nominated by ego in the network survey. We used the eight in-depth case studies to assess convergence between the change agents’ and interviewees’ perceptions of the relationships among the people in the change agents’ networks. Two external coders identified all the information in the interviews that pertained to the extent to which the people in change agents’ networks knew each other and coded this information using the same scale used in the social network survey. The interviews provided data on the relationships among more than 75 percent of the change agents’ contacts. For all these relation- 389 ships, the coders’ assessments of alter-to-alter ties based on the interview data were consistent with each other and with the measures reported by change agents, thereby increasing our confidence in the validity of the survey reports. Control variables. We used five characteristics of the change agents (hierarchical level, tenure in current position, tenure in management role, professional status, and prominence in the task-advice network), two characteristics of the change agents’ organizations (size and status), and one characteristic of the change (creation of new service) as controls. We measured actors’ hierarchical position with a rank-ordered categorical variable based on formal job titles;3 tenure in current position was the number of years change agents had spent in their current formal roles, and tenure in management position was the number of years they had spent in a management role. As for the status of the professional group to which actors belonged, in the NHS, as in most health care systems, physicians’ status is superior to that of other health care professionals (Harrison et al., 1992). Accordingly, we measured professional status with a dummy variable coded 0 for low-status professionals (i.e., nurses and allied health professionals) and 1 for high-status professionals (i.e., physicians). To account for change agents’ informal status in their organizations, we constructed a measure of the structural prominence that accrues to asymmetrical advice-giving ties (Jones, 1964; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). To that end, we used two network survey items: (1) “During the past year, are there any individuals in your Primary Care Trust/Hospital Trust/Organization (delete as appropriate) from whom you regularly sought information and advice to accomplish your work? (Name up to 5 individuals),” and (2) “During the past year, are there any individuals in your Primary Care Trust/Hospital Trust/Organization (delete as appropriate) who regularly came to you for information and advice to accomplish their work? (Name up to 5 individuals. Some of these may be the same as those named before).” We measured actors’ prominence in the task-advice network as the difference between the number of “received” advice ties and number of “sent” advice ties. We also controlled for organization-level factors including organizational size, which we measured in units of total full-time equivalents, and organi- 3 The NHS, being a government-run set of organizations, has standardized definitions and pay scales for all positions that assure uniformity of roles, responsibilities, and hierarchical positions across organizational sites, according to the Department of Health (2006). 390 Academy of Management Journal April TABLE 2 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1. Change adoption 2. Change divergence 3. Senior management 4. Seniority in role 5. Hierarchical level 6. Professional status (doctor) 7. Organizational status (PCT) 8. Organizational size 9. Prominence in task advice network 10. Ego network constraint 11. Constraint ⫻ divergence 3.91 1.14 10.37 2.32 3.85 0.25 0.52 22.70 0.03 0.82 0.38 5.94 2.05 0.95 0.43 0.50 21.20 1.09 .09 ⫺.05 ⫺.03 ⫺.07 .03 .09 ⫺.13 .25 .18 .05 ⫺.11 ⫺.09 .35 ⫺.04 .08 .11 ⫺.02 ⫺.41 ⫺.12 .04 .22 ⫺.03 .02 ⫺.06 .06 ⫺.02 .33 .10 ⫺.20 .18 .06 ⫺.20 ⫺.10 –.59 –.11 .08 0.34 ⫺0.01 0.12 0.04 .14 ⫺.27 ⫺.23 ⫺.38 ⫺.05 .01 ⫺.01 .00 .03 .01 .13 ⫺.14 –.07 –.19 –.05 .09 a 9 10 .09 .12 –.11 Correlation coefficients greater than .30 are statistically significant at p ⬍ .01. zational status. Of the three types of organizations that compose the NHS, primary care organizations were considered to be of lower status than hospitals and administrative units (Peckham, 2003), but there was no clear status hierarchy between the latter (Peckham, 2003). Accordingly, we measured organizational status with a dummy variable coded 1 for low-status organizations (i.e., primary care trusts) and 0 for high-status organizations (i.e., hospitals and administrative organizations). Finally, although we theorize that a change’s degree of divergence from the institutional status quo operates as the key contingency in our model, other change characteristics may affect adoption. In particular, whether a change involves the redesign of an existing service or creation of a new one may play an important role (Van de Ven, Angle, & Poole, 1989). Our models therefore included a dummy variable for creation of a new service. and increases model fit significantly (␹1 ⫽ 3.85, p ⬍ .05), which implies a positive association between structural holes in a change agent’s network and the agent’s change initiative’s degree of divergence.4 Our qualitative data provided several illustrations of this effect. A case in point is a change initiative aimed at replacing the head of the rehabilitation unit for stroke patients— historically a 4 Supplemental regression models incorporated a host of additional control variables including gender, age, educational background, and organizational budget. Whether added separately or in clusters, none of these variables had statistically significant effects in any model, nor did they affect the sign or significance of any variables of interest. Consequently, we have excluded them from the final set of regression models reported here, mindful that our sample size constrains the model’s degrees of freedom. RESULTS Table 2 includes the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all variables. Correlation coefficients greater than .30 are statistically significant (p ⬍ .01). Most of the correlation coefficients are modest in size and not statistically significant. Table 3 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that predict change initiatives’ degree of divergence from the institutional status quo. Model 1 includes control variables likely to influence change initiatives’ degree of divergence. The positive and significant effects of tenure in a management role and of organizational status and size are consistent with existing research (Battilana, 2011). Model 2 introduces ego network constraint, which measures the degree of structural closure in a network. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, the effect is negative and statistically significant TABLE 3 Results of OLS Regression Analyses Predicting Degree of Change Divergencea Variable Model 1 Tenure in management role 0.02* Tenure in current role 0.01 Hierarchical level ⫺0.07 Professional status (doctor) 0.08 Organizational status (PCT) 0.42*** Organizational size 0.04* Prominence in task advice 0.03 network Ego network constraint R2 0.24 Model 2 (0.01) 0.02* (0.02) 0.01 (0.05) ⫺0.08 (0.09) 0.11 (0.09) 0.40*** (0.02) 0.04 (0.04) 0.04 ⫺0.68* 0.28 Standard errors are in parentheses; n ⫽ 68. * p ⬍ .05 *** p ⬍ .001 Two-tailed tests. a (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.05) (0.34) 2012 Battilana and Casciaro medical consultant—with a physiotherapist. This change initiative diverged from the institutional status quo in transferring decision-making power from a doctor to a nondoctor. The change agent responsible for the initiative described her motivation as follows: In my role as head of physiotherapy for this health community, I have had the opportunity to work with doctors, nurses, allied health professionals, managers and representatives of social services. . . . Although I was aware of the challenges of coordinating all the different players involved in stroke care, I was also aware that it was key if we wanted to improve our services. . . . I recommended the appointment of a non-medical consultant to lead the rehabilitation unit because, based on my experience working with the different players involved in stroke services, I thought that it would be the best way to insure effective coordination. Table 4 presents the results of OLS regressions that predict the likelihood of change adoption. Model 3 includes the control variables, none of which was significant except prominence in the task advice network. This result suggests that change agents’ informal status in their organizations is a critical source of social influence.5 Model 4 introduces the measure of constraint in change agents’ networks. The coefficient is not statistically significant, providing no evidence of a main effect of structural holes on change implementation. The coefficient for the multiplicative term for ego network constraint and change divergence (model 5) is negative and significant, supporting Hypothesis 2. A postestimation test of joint significance of the main effect and interaction term for constraint was statistically significant (F[2, 52] ⫽ 4.87, p ⬍ .05), offering further evidence of the robustness of this moderation effect. The multiplicative term for constraint and divergence from the institutional status quo increased model fit significantly (␹1 ⫽ 6.40, p ⬍ .05). These findings, being robust to all four specifications of the measure of constraint, indicate a strong boundary condition on the effect of network closure on change adoption, with the degree of divergence from the institutional 5 We also ran supplemental analyses that including the control variables listed in footnote 4 as well as a squared term for hierarchical level to account for the possibility that middle managers may be particularly well positioned in their organizations to implement change. As with Hypothesis 1, none of the variables had statistically significant effects in any model, nor did they affect the sign or significance of any variables of interest. 391 status quo intrinsic to a change initiative operating as a strict contingency.6, 7 Our qualitative data offered numerous illustrations of this finding. For example, a change agent with a network rich in structural holes who was attempting to transfer a medical unit from the hospital to the primary care trust (PCT; see Table 1) in his health community (a change that diverged from the institutionalized model of role division between organizations) explained the following: Because of my role, I worked both in the hospital and in the PCT. I also was part of the steering group that looked at how the new national guidelines would be implemented across our health community. . . . Having the responsibility to work in more than one organization gives you many advantages. . . . I knew all the stakeholders and what to expect from them. . . . It helped me figure out what I should tell to each of these different stakeholders to convince them that the project was worth their time and energy. The people we interviewed in both the hospital and the PCT confirmed that they knew the change agent well. Stated a hospital employee: He is one of us, but he also knows the PCT environment well. His experience has helped him identify opportunities for us to cooperate with the PCT. If it was not for him, I do not think that we would have launched this project. . . . He was able to bring us on board as well as the PCT staff. Similarly, a nurse trying to implement nurse-led discharge in her hospital explained how her connections to managers, nurses, and doctors helped her to tailor and time her appeals to each constituency relevant to her endeavor: I first met with the management of the hospital to secure their support. . . . I insisted that nurse-led discharge would help us reduce waiting times for patients, which was one of the key targets that the government had set. . . . I then focused on nurses. I wanted them to understand how important it was to increase the nursing voice in the hospital and to demonstrate how nursing could contribute to the organizational agenda. . . . Once I had the full support of nurses, I turned to doctors. . . . I expected that they would stamp their feet and dig their heels 6 Testing Hypothesis 2 using effective size and density as alternative measures of closure yields findings consistent with, albeit less robust than, those obtained using constraint, as we expected, given the conceptual differences between these measures. 7 We tested the effects of several additional interaction terms including one for divergence and prominence in the task advice network. None of these moderations were significant. 392 Academy of Management Journal April TABLE 4 Results of OLS Regression Analyses Predicting Degree of Change Adoptiona Variable Tenure in management role Tenure in current role Hierarchical level Professional status (doctor) Change divergence Creation of new service Organizational status (PCT) Organizational size Prominence in task advice network Ego network constraint Constraint ⫻ divergence R2 Model 3 ⫺0.02 0.02 ⫺0.14 0.18 0.09 ⫺0.31 0.04 ⫺0.01 0.30*** .21 (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.26) (0.33) (0.23) (0.33) (0.01) (0.07) Model 4 ⫺0.02 0.02 ⫺0.13 0.14 0.14 ⫺0.30 0.04 ⫺0.01 0.29*** 0.69 .22 (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.24) (0.34) (0.25) (0.33) (0.01) (0.08) (1.33) Model 5 –0.02 0.02 –0.13 0.07 –0.11 –0.28 0.03 –0.01 0.33** 0.30 –5.83** .29 (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.24) (0.30) (0.23) (0.32) (0.01) (0.10) (1.28) (2.04) Standard errors are in parentheses; n ⫽ 68. ** p ⬍ .01 *** p ⬍ .001 Two-tailed tests. a in and say “no we’re not doing this.” . . . To overcome their resistance, I insisted that the new discharge process would reduce their workload, thereby enabling them to focus on complex cases and ensure quicker patient turnover, which, for specialists with long waiting lists of patients, had an obvious benefit. These quotes illustrate the positive association between structural holes and the adoption of divergent change. Our qualitative evidence also offers examples of the flip side of this association, the negative relationship between network cohesion and the adoption of changes that diverge from the institutional status quo. For instance, a nurse who tried to establish nurse-led discharge in her hospital, a change that would have diverged from the institutionalized model of role division between professionals, explained how lack of connection to some key stakeholders in the organization (in particular, doctors) handicapped her. I actually know many of the nurses working in this hospital and I get on well with them, but I do not know all the doctors and the administrative staff. . . . When I launched this change initiative, I was convinced that it would be good for the hospital, but maybe I rushed too much. I should have taken more time to get to know the consultants, and to convince them of the importance of nurse-led discharge for them and for the hospital. A doctor we interviewed confirmed the change agent’s assessment of the situation: I made it clear to the CEO of this hospital that I would not do it. This whole initiative will increase my workload. I feel it is a waste of time. Nurses should not be the ones making discharge deci- sions. . . . The person in charge of this initiative doesn’t know how we work here. The foregoing examples illustrate the utility of structural holes in a change agent’s network when it comes to persuading other organization members to adopt a change that diverges from the institutional status quo. However, networks rich in structural holes are not always an asset. When it comes to the adoption of changes that do not diverge from the institutional status quo, change agents with relatively closed networks fared better. The cases of two change agents involved in similar change initiatives in their respective primary care organizations are a telling example. Both were trying to convince other organization members of the merits of a new computerized booking system, the adoption of which would not involve a divergence from the institutional status quo, affecting neither the division of labor nor the balance of power among the health care professionals in the respective organizations. Moreover, other primary care organizations had already adopted the system. The network of one of the change agents was highly cohesive, that of the other rich in structural holes. Whereas the former was able to implement the new booking system, the latter encountered issues. A receptionist explained what happened in the case of the former organization: I trust [name of the change agent]. Everyone does here. . . . We all know each other and we all care about what is best for our patients. . . It was clear when [name of the change agent] told us about the new booking system that we would all be better off using it. 2012 Battilana and Casciaro FIGURE 2 Observed Interactive Effect of Ego Network Constraint and Divergence from Institutional Status Quo on Change Adoption 5 4.5 Change Adoption 4 3.5 393 theory of organizational change and network structure. Structural holes in change agents’ networks increase the likelihood that these actors will initiate organizational changes with a higher degree of divergence from the institutional status quo. The effects of structural holes on a change agent’s ability to persuade organizational constituencies to adopt a change, however, are strictly contingent on the change’s degree of divergence from the institutional status quo. Structural holes in a change agent’s network aid the adoption of changes that diverge from the institutional status quo, but they hinder the adoption of less divergent changes. 3 .1 .5 .2 .4 .6 .3 Ego Network Constraint Low divergence High divergence A receptionist in the latter organization described her relationship with the change agent who was struggling with the implementation of the system: I do not know (name of the change agent) well. . . . One of my colleagues knows her. . . . One of the doctors and some nurses seem to like her, but I think that others in the organization feel just like me that they do not know her. Figure 2 graphs the moderation between divergence and constraint observed in our data, using the median split of the distribution of change divergence. The crossover interaction is explained by the influence mechanisms available to change agents at opposite ends of the distribution of closure, with both cohesion and structural holes conferring potential advantages. The graph also shows that, in spite of the tendency of change agents with networks rich in structural holes to initiate more divergent changes, our sample included a sizable number of observations in all four cells of the 2⫻2 in Figure 1. The matching of type of change to the network structure most conducive to its adoption was therefore highly imperfect in our sample. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The notion that change agents’ structural positions affect their ability to introduce change in organizations is well established, but because research on organizational change has thus far not systematically accounted for the fact that all changes are not equivalent, we have not known whether the effects of structural position might vary with the nature of change initiatives. The present study provides clear support for a contingency Contributions These findings and the underlying contingency theory that explains them advance current research on organizational change and social networks in several ways. First, we contribute to the organizational change literature by showing that the degree to which organizational changes diverge from the institutional status quo may have important implications for the factors that enable adoption. In doing so, our study bridges the organizational change and institutional change literatures that have tended to evolve on separate tracks (Greenwood & Hinings, 2006). The literature on organizational change has not systematically accounted for the institutional environment in which organizations are embedded, and the institutional change literature has tended to neglect intraorganizational dynamics in favor of field dynamics. By demonstrating that the effect of network closure on change initiation and adoption is contingent on the degree to which an organizational change initiative diverges from the institutional status quo, this study paves the way for a new direction in research on organizational change that accounts for whether a change breaks with practices so taken-for-granted in a field of activity as to have become institutionalized (Battilana et al., 2009). Second, research on organizational change has focused on the influence of change agents’ positions in their organizations’ formal structures over their informal positions in organizational networks. Ibarra (1993) began to address this gap by suggesting that actors’ network centrality might affect the likelihood of their innovating successfully. Our study complements her work by highlighting the influence of structural closure in change agents’ networks on their ability to initiate and implement change. Third, our study advances the body of work on social networks in organizations. Network scholars have contributed greatly to understanding organi- 394 Academy of Management Journal zational phenomena associated with change, including knowledge search and transfer (Hansen, 1999; Levin & Cross, 2004; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Tsai, 2002) and creativity and innovation (Burt, 2004; Fleming et al., 2007; Obstfeld, 2005; Tsai, 2001). We extend this literature with insights into the structural mechanism for social influence through which network closure aids or impedes change agents’ attempts to initiate and implement organizational change. We thus build on the longstanding tradition of scholarship on the relationship between network position and social influence (Brass, 1984; Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Gargiulo, 1993; Ibarra, 1993; Krackhardt, 1990). Finally, despite its remarkable impact on network research, structural holes theory remains underspecified with regard to boundary conditions. By documenting that the benefits of structural holes are strictly contingent on an organizational change initiative’s degree of divergence from an institutional status quo, we join other scholars in highlighting the need to specify the contextual boundaries of brokerage and closure in organizations (Fleming et al., 2007; Gargiulo et al., 2009; Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000; Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). As for the phenomenological boundaries, scholars have thus far focused primarily on the notion that the nonredundant information generated by bridging structural holes is germane to idea generation (Burt, 2004) and identifying opportunities for change, and they have attended less to the role of structural holes in capitalizing on opportunities for change once they are identified. Yet gains from new ideas are realized only when an organization adopts them (Klein & Sorra, 1996; Meyer & Goes, 1988). Our findings move beyond anecdotal evidence (Burt, 2005) to show the relevance of structural holes in the domain of change implementation. In addition to these theoretical contributions, our findings can advance public policy and managerial practice by informing the development and selection of change agents in organizations. The question of how to reform existing institutions, such as financial and health care systems, has taken on great urgency all over the world. A better understanding of the factors that facilitate the initiation and adoption of change that diverges from an institutional status quo is crucial to ensuring successful institutional reforms. A key question policy makers face when executing major public sector reforms, such as the NHS reforms that the Labour government attempted to implement at the turn of this century, is how to identify champions who will become local change agents in their organizations. Our study suggests that one important dimension April in selecting local champions is the pattern of their connections with others in their organizations. Change agents can be unaware that their social networks in their organizations may be ill suited to the type of change they wish to introduce. In our sample, although change agents with networks rich in structural holes were more likely to initiate divergent changes, mismatches between the degree of divergence of a change initiative and the network structure most conducive to its adoption were common (see Figure 2). Because managers can be taught how to identify structural hole positions and modify their networks to occupy brokerage roles in them (Burt & Ronchi, 2007), organizations can improve the matching of change agents to change type by educating aspiring change agents to recognize structural holes in organizational networks. Organizations can also leverage change agents who already operate as informal brokers by becoming aware of predictors of structural holes, such as actors’ personality traits (Burt, Jannotta, & Mahoney, 1998) and characteristics of the structural positions they have occupied in their organizations over time (Zaheer & Soda, 2009). Limitations and Future Research Directions Our study can be extended in several directions. With regard to research design, because collecting data on multiple change initiatives over time is arduous (Pettigrew, Woodman, & Cameron, 2001), constructing a sizable sample of observations in the domain of change implementation constitutes an empirical challenge. Despite the limited statistical power afforded by the phenomenon we studied, the data confirmed our predictions, increasing our confidence in the robustness of our findings. But these reassuring findings notwithstanding, future research would benefit from investigating these research questions with larger samples of observations, laborious as they may be to assemble. Our sample was also nonprobabilistic in that we purposefully selected self-appointed change agents. This is a population of interest in its own right, because the change initiatives embarked upon by change agents can vary considerably in type and the degree to which they are adopted. Although pursuing an understanding of the determinants of change agents’ performance is a worthy endeavor even when the process of self-selection into the role is not analyzed, why and how organizational actors become change agents are as important questions as why and how they succeed. Our use of ego network data might also be viewed as a limitation. In-depth interviews with a substantial number of organizational actors in a subsample 2012 Battilana and Casciaro of eight change projects enabled us to corroborate change agents’ self-reports and reduce perceptual bias concerns. This validation notwithstanding, ego network data remain an oft-used but suboptimal alternative to whole network data. Although ego network data correlate well with dyadic data based on information gathered from both members of each pair (Bondonio, 1998; McEvily, 1997), and measures from ego network data correlate highly with measures from whole-network data (Everett & Borgatti, 2005), several studies have documented inaccuracies in how respondents perceive their social networks (for a review, see Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld, and Sailer [1984]). Future research can productively complement our analysis with fully validated ego-network data or whole-network data. The time structure of our data can also be further enriched. Collecting data on adoption 12 months after the initiation of a change enabled us to separate the outcome of the change initiative from its inception, and the qualitative evidence provided by our case studies suggested intervening mechanisms that might affect the change process. Our data do not, however, support a systematic study of the process through which change unfolds over time and change agents’ networks evolve. Future studies can extend work in this direction. With regard to context, although we were able to control for the influence of organizational size and status on the initiation and adoption of divergent change, studies are needed that will provide a finer-grained account of the possible influence of the organizational contexts in which change agents operate. The NHS is a highly institutionalized environment in which the dominant template of medical professionalism contributed to making the culture of NHS organizations highly homogenous (Giaimo, 2002). In environments characterized by greater cultural heterogeneity, organizational differences may influence the relationship between change agents’ network features and the ability to initiate and implement more or less divergent change. Future research should explore the influence of other germane organizational characteristics, such as the organizational climate for implementing innovations (Klein & Sorra, 1996). Because our analysis concerned a sample of planned organizational change projects initiated by clinical managers in the NHS, the external validity of our findings is also open to question. The hierarchical nature of this large public sector organization can increase both the constraints faced by change agents and the importance of informal channels of influence for overcoming resistance in the entrenched organizational culture. These idiosyncratic features that make the NHS an ideal set- 395 ting for the present study call for comparative studies conducted in different settings that better account for the potentially interactive effects of actors’ positions in organizational networks and contextual factors on the adoption of planned changes. 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RESOURCES Designing fo r Change M a ry A n n e M . G o b b le As the articles in this special issue illus­ trate, successful culture change can re­ make a company's fortunes. It's often easy to determine that cultural change is needed. A platform is burning, a market is shrinking, customers are disappearing, the R&D pipeline is withering—clearly, something needs to change if the organization is to survive. Sometimes, there's a more positive driver: a radical innovation demands a new business model, a different market, an entirely original approach. Occasionally, a portfolio analysis like the one described by Smith and Sonnenblick in a 2013 RTM article sug­ gests that, while the company is fine at the moment, a new outlook is needed to meet coming challenges. Or a futures exercise helps the company see that it needs to prepare for a very different fu­ ture from the one it has assumed is coming. Indeed, as Carleton, Cockayne, and Tahvanainen argue in their Playbook for Strategic Foresight and Innovation, developing such a program can help an organization to maintain a future orien­ tation and avoid becoming mired in what Christian Crews calls, in his inaugural column in this issue, an In this space, we offer a series o f summaries on key topics, with pointers to important resources, to keep you informed o f new developments and help you expand your repertoire of tools and ideas. We welcome your contributions, in the form o f suggestions for topics and of column submissions. DOI: 10.5437/08956308X5803005 64 | "official future" that blinds the organi­ zation to unexpected shifts in the envi­ ronment. Shell's longstanding scenarios program, described by Wilkinson and Kupers in their HBR article "Living in the Futures," is an example of how an ongoing futures effort can help a com­ pany envision, and prepare for, chal­ lenges just over the horizon. What's hard is asking the second set of questions. You know you need to be more agile, more innovative, more forward-looking—but what does that look like? How do you design the orga­ nization you need to support the change you need? Plenty of books and articles provide high-level models for the kinds of organizations that excel. Tushman and O'Reilly's thinking about the of am­ bidextrous organizations to balance breakthrough innovation with sustain­ ing work; Reis's ideas about how his lean management model, adapted from the startup world, can help big compa­ nies be more agile; and Kim and Mauborgne's focus on creating new markets through increased differentia­ tion and value innovation all offer keen insight, and solid foundations for driv­ ing organizational change. But those high-level views need to be supported by concrete, street-level structures that integrate the various components of the organization and harness the energy for change in a way that matches outputs to strategy—and creates value. Creating those structures and determining how they relate to Research-Technology Management • May—June 2015 each other is the role of organizational design. Unfortunately, for many managers, organizational design begins and ends with the "org chart"—that construction of boxes and lines that defines who re­ ports to whom, and about what. The org chart is a useful map of the lines of authority and responsibility in a con­ ventional hierarchical organization; it emanates from the same source as the assembly line and is designed to ac­ complish much the same thing—to modularize and systematize work for maximum efficiency. Of course, much like the assembly line, it assumes that little changes; the line produces the same product over and over again, the organization follows the same processes to manufacture its products, respond to its customers, and sustain itself. Designing to support change, or even just to survive in an increasingly dy­ namic and complex competitive envi­ ronment, means more than moving around the boxes on the org chart. In­ deed, some of the flatter, more collab­ orative models that have emerged render the traditional org chart largely meaningless. Rather, the manager faced with designing for change must rethink all of the elements of the organizational structure and how they interact. A structure that is misaligned to strategy, or aligned to an old strategy, will fail. A structure that doesn't balance auton­ omy and control in a way that aligns with the company's strategy and values will produce frustration and unhappi­ ness, and likely fail. One way to avoid such mismatches is to involve every stakeholder—from the front-line clerk to the C-suite—in the design process. Participatory design, also known as cooperative design, offers one method for allowing the members of an organization to structure their work and their workspace. Marvin Weisbord's Productive Workplaces de­ scribes how "getting everybody improv­ ing the whole system" can produce more open, agile organizations that, not coincidentally, respect the autonomy and dignity of workers. Nadler and Tushman argue in in Competing by Design that organizational design can itself be a source of competi­ tive advantage, if it works to maximize a company's capabilities and exploit its strengths. Given its power, the authors argue, organizational design should be an integral, and ongoing, process in ev­ ery forward-looking organization. There are a number of frameworks available for thinking about organi­ zational structure and design. Jay Galbraith, a leader in the field of orga­ nizational design, proposes a Star Model that maps the interactions among five factors: • Strategy, which provides direction for the other elements. • Structure policies, which determine where power and authority lie as well as the degree of specialization and centralization. • Process definitions, which map how information and decisions flow. • Reward systems, which are designed to motivate people to act in ways that further the strategic direction. • People policies, which govern re­ cruitment, training and other HR functions. The Bridgespan Group, which provides management advice to nonprofits, of­ fers a slightly different framework, adapted from a Bain & Company tool­ kit, that breaks organizational design into four elements—leadership, deci­ sion making and structure, people, and work processes and systems—interacting around culture in a wheel. The wheel­ shaped presentation emphasizes the de­ gree to which all of the elements must Resources IN PRINT Richard M. Burton, Borge Obel, and Gerardine DeSanctis. 2011. Organizational Design: A Step-by-Step Approach. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Christian Crews. 2015. Killing the official future. Future Praxis. Research-Technology Management 58(3): 59-60. Jay Galbraith. 2014. Designing Organizations: Strategy, Structure, and Process at the Business Unit and Enterprise Levels. New York: Jossey-Bass. Gregory Kesler and Amy Kates. 2010. Leading Organization Design: How to Make Organization Design Decisions to Drive the Results You Want. New York: Josse-Bass. W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne. 2015. Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant. Expanded Edi­ tion. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press. David Nadler and Michael Tushman. 1997. Competing by Design: The Power o f Organizational Architecture. New York: Oxford University Press. Eric Ries. 2011. The Lean Startup: How Today's Entrepreneurs Use Continu­ ous Innovation to Create Radically Successful Businesses. New York: Crown Business. Dan Smith and Richard Sonnenblick. 2013. From budget-based to strategy-based portfolio management: A six-year case study. Research-Technology Management 56(5): 45-51. Naomi Stanford. 2007. Guide to Organisation Design: Creating High-Performing and Adaptable Enterprises. An Economist Guide. London, UK: Profile Books. Michael Tushman and Charles O'Reilly III. 2002. Winning through Innovation: A Practical Guide to Leading Organizational Change and Renewal. Revised Edition. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press. Marvin Weisbord. 2012. Productive Workplaces: Dignity, Meaning, and Commu­ nity in the 21st Century. 3rd ed. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. ONLINE John Beeson. 2014. Five questions every leader should ask about organiza­ tional design. Harvard Business Review, January 23. https://hbr.org/2014/01/ five-questions-every-leader-should-ask-about-organizational-design Bridgespan Group. 2009. Designing an Effective Organization Structure. Pre­ sentation, January, http://www.bridgespan.org/getmedia/b1139597-adfe-4dd7bbb2-ac8c67883020/effective-organizations„-structural-design.pdf.aspx Tamara Carleton, William Cockayne, and Antti-Jussi Tahvanainen. 2013. Playbook for Strategic Foresight and Innovation: A Hands-On Guide for Modeling, De­ signing, and Leading Your Company's Next Radical Innovation. Helsinki, Finland: Tekes. https://www.box.eom/s/59y1940p88y0srvroiid Jay R. Galbraith, n.d. The Star Model, http://www.jaygalbraith.com/images/pdfs/ StarModel.pdf Mind Tools. 2015. Organization design: Aligning organizational structure with business goals. http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newPPM_95.htm Charles A. O'Reilly and Michael L. Tushman. 2004. The ambidextrous organiza­ tion. Harvard Business Review 82(4). https://hbr.org/2004/04/the-ambidextrousorganization Lex Sisney. 2012. The 5 classic mistakes in organizational structure: Or, how to design your organization the right way. Organizational Physics, January 9. http:// organizationalphysics.com/2012/01/09/the-5-classic-mistakes-in-organizationalstructure-or-how-to-design-your-organization-the-right-way/ Angela Wilkinson and Roland Kupers. 2013. Living in the futures. Harvard Busi­ ness Review 91 (5). https://hbr.org/2013/05/living-in-the-futures May— June 2015 | 65 fit together to keep the organization running. Lex Sisney, author of Organizational Physics, lays out three highly abbreviated steps for building an organization design: • Identify the core functions needed to support the strategy. • Define what each function is account­ able for and how it will be measured. • Place the functions in a structure. The result is a structural diagram that may look like a traditional org chart, but has a different intent. Where the org chart maps reporting lines between people, the structural diagram maps w hat functions need to be performed and where responsibility for those func­ tions lie. The org chart emerges from the structural diagram. There's a lot implied in that high-level process, but Sisney's very comprehensive blog post offers a well-explained before-and-after example illustrating his points. As John Beeson notes in a 2014 HBR article, organizational design is fre­ quently the province of consultants, and every consultant has his or her own model or framework. But, Beeson ar­ gues, organizational design has evolved from a "big bang event," most often as­ sociated with significant downsizing, to an ongoing process of continual adjust­ ments to improve efficiency and spur growth. That means every manager has to deal with, and every manager should have a model for approaching it. For Beeson, it doesn't much matter what model, as long as it helps you to address five key questions: • W hat is the business's value propo­ sition and sources of competitive advantage? • Which activities directly deliver on that value proposition? • Which structure should we choose and how do we overcome its inher­ ent downsides? • What type of leadership and culture are required to deliver the value proposition? • What organizational practices are required to reinforce the organiza­ tional intent? There are, of course, some more-or-less standard structures used by many 66 | Research-Technology Management organizations, including traditional hi­ erarchical structures, as well as more organic variations such as matrix and network structures; each varies in terms of the level of complexity, formality, and inclusiveness it allows and in how communication occurs. A Mind Tools survey article on organization design of­ fers a useful summary and comparison of each of these models (as well as a good introduction to the basic principles of organizational design). For those seeking a more systematic introduction to the discipline of organi­ zational design, along with frameworks, tools, and processes for undertaking a structural redesign process, there are several options. Burton, Obel, and DeSandis offer a primer on the basics of organizational design and a step-by-step process for structural design. Stanford offers an overview of the field and an approach structured around five core principles in the Economist's Guide to Or­ ganisation Design. Kesler and Kates offer their own "scalable, five-step process" for organization design, directed specifi­ cally at business leaders. Any of these will provide a solid overview of the field along with some tools for engaging with it. Organizational design may seem mundane, but it is every bit as critical as the big work of culture change. As Lex Sisney, author of Organizational Physics, put it in a blog post, "how your organi­ zation is designed determines how it performs." How an organization is structured will determine how it re­ sponds to changes in its environment. An organization's structure may nur­ ture or inhibit innovation. Where the structure runs counter to the strategy, people will become frustrated and aban­ don change in favor of the path of least resistance. Reviews The Big Data-Driven Business: How to Use Big Data to Win Customers, Beat Competitors, and Boost Profits Russell Glass and Sean Callahan (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2014) Although big data has become a perva­ sive buzzword, few businesses fully u n ­ derstand what exactly big data is or how it can be leveraged to support growth and innovation. Russell Glass and Sean Callahan attempt to address these issues and deconstruct the dauntingly com­ plex notion of harnessing big data for business applications. Glass and Callahan are pioneers in this field, having de­ ployed big data strategies to grow Bizo, a business-to-business marketing com­ pany, until its acquisition by Linkedln for $175 million. Both are now at Linkedln; Glass is the head of marketing products and Callahan is a senior m an­ ager of content marketing. The authors give readers an insider's look at how big data can be used by laying out the avail­ able technologies and their implemen­ tation and showing how a newcomer can deploy big data tools for business goals. Beginning with a simple idea—that "the companies that most effectively use big data to gain insight into their customers and act on that data will win"—the authors conclude that m od­ ern businesses should "be data-driven and customer focused." The notion that a business should be customer focused is hardly novel, but historically it has been difficult and expensive merely to collect and store the data needed to glean transformative insights—let alone perform the analyses that lead to these insights. The advent of inexpensive large-scale data storage and advanced analytics capabilities is quickly eroding this barrier, making it possible for busi­ nesses to implement a data-driven ap­ proach across the organization. Big data analytics can provide new insights in the form of more focused information about what customers like and what makes them buy—leading to moreinformed decisions about, for instance, what could be optimized in the pipeline. Coupled with existing data and re­ sources, big data can be used to gener­ ate and score new leads for sales, inform product development, and provide a hyper-focus on customers—potentially all in real time. These benefits are not restricted to business-to-consumer companies; the authors provide several examples of business-to-business applications. For instance, they describe how DocuSign, which provides solutions to manage Resources Copyright of Research Technology Management is the property of Industrial Research Institute, Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
Journal of Change Management Vol. 10, No. 2, 135– 154, June 2010 Managing Organizational Change: A Philosophies of Change Approach FIONA GRAETZ∗ & AARON C.T. SMITH∗∗ ∗ Graduate School of Management, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Australia, University, Melbourne, Australia ∗∗ RMIT Business, RMIT ABSTRACT The underlying assumption of the classical, linear approach to organizational change is that it involves a series of predictable, reducible steps that enable senior management to establish a new work order and routines. This article confronts the conventional assumption that change is a finite, one-off phenomenon, representing the exception rather than the rule. Beginning with the rational change model as an exemplar, and subsequently by examining 10 organizational change philosophies, this article reviews the fundamental assumptions governing different change management approaches. In revealing the biases and uni-dimensional nature of theoretical philosophies of organizational change, this article argues for a multi-philosophy approach that applies an interactive mix of continuity and change. Managing the continuity-change continuum helps to guard against complacency and inertia, and underpins an organization’s capacity both to exploit and explore. KEY WORDS : Continuity-change dilemma, complementary-competing, paradox, ambiguity, duality Introduction Traditional approaches to organizational change generally follow a linear, rational model in which the focus is on controllability under the stewardship of a strong leader or ‘guiding coalition’. The underlying assumption of this classical approach, ever popular among change consultants, is that organizational change involves a series of predictable, reducible steps that can be planned and managed (Collins, 1998). The evidence from case studies of failed change implementations indicates, however, that this uni-dimensional, rational focus is Correspondence Address: Fiona Graetz, Graduate School of Management, La Trobe University, Bundoora, VIC 3086 Australia. Tel.: + 61 3 9479 3109; Email: f.graetz@latrobe.edu.au 1469-7017 Print/1479-1811 Online/10/020135–20 # 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14697011003795602 136 F. Graetz & A.C.T. Smith limited because it treats change as a single, momentary disturbance that must be stabilized and controlled. Such a view fails not only to appreciate that change is a natural phenomenon which is intimately entwined with continuity but, also, that the change-continuity continuum is what defines organizations and their ability both to exploit and explore. Change and continuity represent competing but complementary narratives, bringing in ambiguity and novelty to destabilize as well as validate existing organizational routines. Our argument is that understanding change as part of a continuing work in progress calls for a much broader canvas that seeks out competing voices, and works with the resulting ambiguities, contradictions and tensions of messy reality. We advocate a multi-philosophy approach because continuity depends on change as much as change depends on continuity. They are both essential for organizational growth and survival. Continuity underpins the search for new meaning and new understandings. As Evans (1992: 256– 257) argued, ‘almost all qualities of an organization have a complementary opposite quality, and excessive focus on one pole of a duality ultimately leads an organization into stagnation and decline (undue continuity), while the corrective swing to the opposite pole leads to disruptive and discontinuous crisis (excessive change)’. As an exemplar, this article looks firstly at the context for the traditional, rational approach to organizational change. It subsequently illustrates how rational change is depicted and deployed with reference to three different organizational cases on leadership and change. The following section explores a range of organizational change philosophies and considers how these might provide a broader frame of reference in understanding the change process and its undeniable, though sometimes tense, partnership with continuity. Based on this discussion, the conclusion considers how an appreciation of the philosophies of change may help to turn around the way organizations and, in particular, senior management, view the process of change. It, therefore, puts forward the case for a multiperspectives approach in managing the continuity-change dilemma and offers advice for practitioners attempting to navigate the turbulent waters of organizational change. The Traditional Change Agenda Recognizing changing forms of organizing as a ‘fuzzy, deeply ambiguous process’ (Collins, 2003: v) with no obvious ending calls into question the snake oil sales pitch used to promote popular change models. Consider, for example, Grundy’s (1992) ‘power tools for change’, Kanter et al.’s (1992) ‘Ten commandments’, Kotter’s (1995) ‘Eight steps to transforming your organization’, and Hammer and Champy’s (1993) ‘Business process re-engineering’. The nomenclature assigned to these popular 1990s offerings typifies a formulaic approach which presupposes that organizational change can and should be a controlled and orderly affair, a simple case of ‘unfreezing’, ‘moving’ and ‘refreezing’. Central to successful implementation is the key role the ‘magic’ leader plays (Nadler and Tushman, 1989; Kotter, 1990). The implication is that his or her charismatic qualities in communicating the new vision are all it takes to inspire and win over the masses. These factors expose a number of critical flaws in the purely A Philosophies of Change Approach 137 rational perspective. Firstly, it begs the question as to whether organizations are ‘as amenable to control as a block of ice’ (Grey, 2003). Secondly, it ignores the not-so rational wild card – the human factor – treating individuals as automatons rather than active agents (Giddens, 1981: 224) in the change process. An inherent assumption in rational models is that organizational actors will respond enthusiastically and uniformly to their leader’s call to arms. With stability and control the end goals, rational models represent a singular, partial story told by senior management and consequently ignore the many other distinctive stories unfolding around them in the organizational narrative (Buchanan, 2003). As a result, the principal response is not to listen to, but to silence, dissident voices. Despite the limitations of n-step (Collins, 1998), goal-directed models of change, the management penchant for these types of tools continues unsated. They are, of course, seductively simple and the labels attached (power tools, transforming, commandments, magic) imply that success is guaranteed if they are followed to the letter. In addition, n-step models ensure that the change process is controlled ‘from the top’. Management texts and business magazine ‘case studies’ tend to perpetuate and legitimize a rational, leader-centered model of organizational change. Take, for example, the report in AFRBoss (Hughes, 2008) on ‘turnaround’ change at the Reader’s Digest Association, instigated by incoming CEO, Mary Berner. Berner is variously referred to as the new ‘chief’, ‘straight shooting’, and, more significantly, ‘Cyclone Mary’. Propounding the notion that ‘turnover is actually good for an organization’, Berner undertook a massive cost-cutting exercise with the aim of creating ‘a new “FACE” (fast, accountable, candid and engaged)’. In presenting Berner’s story and her prescription for change, the article pays homage to the key elements of a rational perspective: the magic leader principle, the focus on accountability and control, and the need to eliminate contradiction, dissent and uncertainty in order to move forward and ‘grow the business’. Other change management cases in business magazines paint a more humanistic picture. Here, one sees the new twenty first century leader as a people person, adopting a more participatory, inclusive style. This observes a shift from autocrat to democrat, the leader who recognizes that organizational knowledge and expertise does not reside solely within the senior management cadre. The role of the twenty first century leader is to energize and revive the creativity lying dormant at all levels of the organization. The emphasis here is on teamwork, as highlighted in articles on Marius Kloppers, the head of BHP Billiton (Gray, 2008; Williams, 2008). Kloppers is described as a ‘detail person’ who actively seeks out information from people ‘conducting the nuts and bolts operations’. During an interview, Kloppers himself draws a parallel between organizational strategy-making and test cricket. What he likes about the game of cricket is the power of the captain and the team. It is not about an omniscient coach but about ‘11 men planning, performing and enduring as best they can themselves.’ Similarly, discussion of turnaround change at the Melbourne arm of advertising agency, Clemenger BBDO, under the direction of new chief, Peter Biggs, highlights his team-centric leadership style (Gettler, 2008). Through his open door, hands-on approach, Biggs sought to unlock creativity by ‘opening up’ the agency and encouraging people ‘to interact and show their personality.’ He wanted to transform the self-focused, individualistic culture into one which prized generosity and collegiality. 138 F. Graetz & A.C.T. Smith These expressed aims are laudable and undoubtedly sincere. They demonstrate a clear desire among organizational leaders to challenge the status quo, increase risk-taking and creativity, and open up organizational boundaries through information sharing and collaborative teamwork. Yet the methods adopted to achieve these new ways of working and organizing remain, by and large, embedded in rational, analytical orthodoxy about organizational change and change leadership. And, the problem with rational orthodoxy is its inability to understand, let alone cope with, the centrality of paradox in organizations; that is, the ‘simultaneous existence of two inconsistent states’ (Eisenhardt, 2000: 703). Rational orthodoxy in contrast presupposes the importance of discipline, order and control. The possibility of implementing change by simultaneously maintaining divergent dual states does not enter the frame. Managerial decision-making is therefore based on either – or choices, or some sort of bland compromise between assumed opposites that define change and continuity, such as innovation and efficiency, collaboration and competition, freedom and accountability, empowerment and leadership, or economic and social goals. Both Kloppers (BHP Billiton) and Biggs (Clemenger) appear to have some sense of these continuity-change tensions. In Kloppers case, he combines an analytical mind and an eye for detail with the need for adaptive strategymaking to cope with sudden, unforeseen circumstances. He also looks to key players for information and ideas. Representing a blend of economic and social goals, the focus for Biggs is on increasing competition through a collaborative, collegial and ‘generous’ workplace. There is a clear leadership –commander ‘presence’ bound up with the aim to empower and foster creativity through the rank and file. Biggs’ advocacy of a ‘culture of discontent’ also implies a view of change as having no finite end, thereby rejecting the classical ‘unfreezemove-refreeze’ model. In the end, however, the indelible impression from all of these change cases is the classic model of top-down, change in the hands of a strong, forceful and charismatic leader. Kloppers is ‘the big South African’, and Clemenger BBDO is ‘born again’ under the guidance of Biggs. The predominant focus is on increasing competition through economic discipline and accountability under strong ‘takeno-prisoners’ leadership. While input and involvement are actively sought and encouraged, the underlying message is not about managing paradox but about maintaining control. There is an assumption that the leader’s vision is the right one or that everyone is on the same wavelength. Leana and Barry (2000) noted that while new forms of organizing are seen as less hierarchical and centralized, these new forms in fact enable senior managers to ‘consolidate power and control’ without the need for centralization. It is control by stealth as managers ‘set performance targets rather than impose direction’ (Leana and Barry, 2000: 754). In this environment there is little tolerance for ambiguity or dissent. At Clemenger, for example, Biggs recruited ‘six or seven core people that make the soul of the agency and keep it true to what its purpose is.’ The implication from Biggs’ statement is that existing employees were not appreciative of his vision for a new soul and it was necessary to bring in some proselytizing muscle to ‘guide’ employees to the light. At Readers Digest, Berner declared ‘It matters that people are aligned with what we are trying to do and people are A Philosophies of Change Approach 139 paid for performance. There’s no more paying for trying’ (author emphasis in italics). Lewin and Volberda (1999) counseled that progress requires combining and recombining multiple theoretical lenses to improve the integration of theories and avoid increasing fragmentation. They argued that change is neither an outcome of managerial adaptation nor of environmental selection, but rather is a co-evolutionary outcome of strategic intentionality and environmental imperatives. For Lewin and Volberda, the management of change means accepting that adaptation and selection are interrelated rather than opposing forces. In practice, their position emphasizes that a single, linear commitment to change theory will fail to account for the non-linear, recursive and multi-level nature of change reality. As Morgan (1997: 350) advised, ‘reality has a tendency to reveal itself in accordance with the perspectives through which it is engaged’. Therefore, tapping into a range of different perspectives provides the scope to understand a situation from many angles and create different modes of engagement (Morgan, 1997). The following section of this article explores a range of organizational change philosophies and comments upon their impact on the tools and techniques typically employed in change interventions. The complementary and competing insights they offer also demonstrate that complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty are part of the organizational dynamic and do not respond well to a rational, leader-centric approach bent on establishing certainty and control. Change Philosophies We note that a philosophy of change is a general way of looking at organizational change, or what might be considered a paradigm: a structured set of assumptions, premises and beliefs about the way change works in organizations. Philosophies of change are important because they reveal the deep suppositions that are being made about organizations and the ways that change operates within and around them. In the forthcoming section we take an in depth look at 10 philosophies, summarizing their methods and approach to change. A philosophy’s method for change is expressed in terms of its inferences about the mechanisms through which a change intervention can be brought about. Typically, these are expressed as theories, which in turn generate hypotheses and predictions about organizational change. Any given philosophy may have generated numerous theories, but it is not always clear what they have to do with each other, and in some cases, what they have to do with theories emanating from other philosophies. Nevertheless, philosophies are advantageous because they offer both description and prescription. Regarding the former, philosophies provide a metaphorical and theoretical explanation of assumptions and, therefore, of methods for change. While the usefulness of metaphors for explaining change is well supported (Palmer and Dunford, 1996; Oztel and Hinz, 2001; Wood, 2002), the way metaphors can offer prescriptive guidance is less well articulated. However, a general consensus would suggest that they are effective as change management heuristics under certain conditions because they liberate observers from entrenched thinking, encourage creativity by suggesting new interpretations of old circumstances, stimulate emotional engagement, and fuel action by probing 140 F. Graetz & A.C.T. Smith the unconscious mind (Green and Ruhleder, 1995; Palmer and Dunford, 1996; Wood, 2002). As with many complex aspects of organizational life, metaphors are useful in conveying the range of paradigms from which change can be viewed. Paradigms describe the fundamentally different event sequences and generative mechanisms, or what can be thought of as motors of change (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). While it is not possible to consider every metaphor or paradigm conceived, we have re-conceptualized a range of divergent approaches for change into 10 thematic philosophies. Each of the philosophies is explained in turn, with emphasis on their respective interpretations of change. We also comment on the influence each has upon the tools and techniques typically employed for change interventions. The aim is to show that the underpinning philosophical assumptions associated with various change interventions not only help to map the terrain of change options, but also reveal why change is so difficult to introduce successfully when a single approach is overlaid upon a complex and ambiguous organizational scenario. The Biological Philosophy The most long held change philosophy has been commandeered from biology. In fact, biology has been used in several different ways as a metaphor for organizational change (Witt, 2004). The first is appropriated from evolution itself. It refers to the adaptations experienced by a species – or in this case, a population of organizations – during its evolution. This application of biology, pioneered by Hannan and Freeman (1977) under the terminology of population ecology, focuses on incremental change within industries rather than individual organizations. Population ecologists (McKelvey and Aldrich, 1983) subsequently began to take a biological view of industrial behavior. They suggested that change comes about as a consequence of Darwinian-like natural selection where industries gradually evolve to match the constraints of their environmental context. Ultimately, population ecologists seek to determine why there are so many different kinds of organizations within a population when the biological imperative for efficiency and a best fit would suggest that there should be an ideal configuration that has evolved into dominance (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). The second biological sub-philosophy refers to the individual experiences of members of a species (organizations within an industry) and is summarized by reference to its life cycle. The contrast is, therefore, between the Darwinian concept of natural selection and the developmental life cycle of individual organizations. Life cycle theory (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Kezar, 2000) explains change in organizations from start-up to divestment. Birth, growth, maturity, decline and death are all natural parts of an organization’s development (Levy and Merry, 1986). The philosophy is developmental in nature, comparing the ongoing stages of progress and change in organizations to organic processes of growth and reproduction. These can be analogous to child, human, organic, moral, or even financial development. The life cycle philosophy implicitly assumes that change is imminent and progressive. The biological philosophy can get confusing because it is not uncommon for theorists to write about A Philosophies of Change Approach 141 organizations seeking to adapt to their respective environments (Chakravarthy, 1982). While correct in practical application, this is a technically inaccurate view of evolution which is concerned with species (industries), not individual organisms (organizations). Change from a biological perspective must be viewed as dynamic. In addition, the evolutionary and life cycle sub-philosophies, as opposed to punctuatedequilibrium, reflect a slow and incremental pace of change, moderately affected by the environment, moderately controllable, and tending toward certainty. The Rational Philosophy The rational philosophy (also referred to as strategic) concerns the alignment between an organization’s composition, competencies and state over time, and its environmental context (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Sometimes also known as teleological theories (because the final destination of the organization is its guiding logic) or planned change, the rational philosophy assumes that organizations are purposeful and adaptive (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Kezar, 2000). As highlighted in an earlier discussion of the rational perspective, change occurs simply because senior managers and other change agents deem it necessary. The process for change is rational and linear, like in evolutionary and life cycle approaches, but with managers as the pivotal instigators of change (Carnall, 1995; Carr et al., 1996). Strategic choice theorists (Child, 1972; Smith and Berg, 1987) belong to the rational philosophy and maintain that leaders and managers have ultimate control of their organizations. The proliferation of management ‘gurus’ such as Kotter (1995), Huber and Glick (1995) and Kanter et al. (1992), who each propose their own ‘holy grail’ of change interventions, fit into this conceptual classification. They argue that any events outside the organization are exogenous; successful change is firmly in the hands of managers. The corollary of this argument, of course, is that unsuccessful change is also the responsibility of managers, although sometimes there is the acceptance that the actors cannot override the environment and resource limitations. In other words, when change goes well it is because leaders and managers were insightful and prescient, but when change goes badly it is because something happened that could never have been foreseen. The rational philosophy assumes that change can be brought about at any pace and on any scale deemed suitable. Similarly, change is internally directed, controlled and certain. Approaches consistent with the rational philosophy give precedence to strategic decision-making and careful planning towards organizational goals. It is therefore the most popular philosophy for leaders seeking to impose a direction upon an organization. The Institutional Philosophy The institutional philosophy makes some fundamentally evolutionary assumptions, but does so in the context of a strong belief in the sensitivity of organizations to the external environments in which they are placed. Like population ecologists, institutionalists expect organizations to increase homogeneity within their 142 F. Graetz & A.C.T. Smith industrial sector over time, but view the shaping mechanism to be the pressure of the institutional environment rather than competition for resources. It is less the strategy in place or even the competition for scarce resources that stimulates organizational change, but rather the pressures in the wider institutional context. These might come in the form of new regulatory, financial or legal conditions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991). Irrespective of the specific forces, change is largely a function of a shifting industrial landscape. The implication is that successful organizations are successful because their set-up neatly accommodates the industrial pressures to which they are obligated to respond. The key to this philosophical standpoint is that organizations are coerced into change by pressures from within their institutional environment. Clever strategy cannot out-manoeuvre the rules set by an institutional context. Since organizational form is instrumental to the institutional philosophy, it remains essential to study how similarities are driven by external forces that coerce companies into set patterns and structures (Meyer and Rowan, 2006). One of the strengths of the institutional philosophy is that it explains similarities between organizations and stability of organizational arrangements within an industry. For example, institutional advocates would point to legal firms as an exemplar of institutional compliance where most are configured in the same way simply because they have hit on the best approach for success. Institutional theory is, therefore, valuable in explaining the way in which social, economic and legal pressures influence organizational structures and practices, and how an organization’s ability to adapt to these play a part in determining organizational survival and prosperity. On the other hand, the institutional philosophy tends to downplay internal forces and the impact that organizational actors can have on their own predicament. The institutional philosophy tends to view change as slow and small in scale, although institutional pressures can encourage a more rapid pace and magnitude of change. The stimulus for change is external, control is mostly undirected, and certainty is moderate. The Resource Philosophy An instructive starting point is to contrast the resource philosophy with the institutional philosophy. Where the latter explains the industry-specific pressures encouraging organizations to conform, or at least move toward some greater organizing homogeneity, the resource philosophy helps to explain deviance. According to what is typically called the resource-dependence theory, any given organization does not possess all the resources it needs in a competitive environment. Acquisition of these resources is therefore the critical activity for both survival and prosperity (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Thus, successful organizations over time are the ones which are the best at acquiring, developing and deploying scarce resources and skills. Moreover, the most valuable resources to acquire are either unique in themselves or in the ways in which they can be combined with other assets (Connor, 2002). From a resource philosophy standpoint, organizational change begins by identifying needed resources, which can be traced back to sources of availability and A Philosophies of Change Approach 143 evaluated in terms of criticality and scarcity. Understanding that a dependence on resources increases uncertainty for organizations, is particularly useful to change attempts because it encourages an awareness of critical threats and obstacles to performance. While resource dependency creates uncertainty, theorists note that the direction of uncertainty is generally predictable even if its magnitude is not. As core competencies are seen as assets that will generate an ongoing set of new products and services, the focus of organizational change from a resource perspective is on the strategic capabilities of the organization, rather than on its fit with the environment. In this sense, the only limitation to an organization’s success is its management of resources. Change can, therefore, be fast or slow as well as small or large. The stimulus for change comes principally from within – as organizations seek the resources they require – while control is directed and comparatively certain. The Contingency Perspective The contingency philosophy is based on the proposition that organizational performance is a consequence of the fit between two or more factors, such as an organization’s environment, use of technology, strategy, structure, systems, style or culture (Pfeffer, 1982). However, variables such as inertia, inflexibility, resource immobility and industry pressure make the fit between factors difficult to predict. This fact explains why researchers have noted different levels of organizational performance, with performance reflecting degree of fit (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985). Contingency philosophy advocates suggest that over the long-term, managers in competitive markets are forced to adjust their practices and their organization’s configurations so that they are consistent with efficiency demands (McLoughlin and Clark, 1988; Alder, 1992). However, the search for best fit is limited by the impossibility of modeling all the contingent variables and the difficulty of predicting their connections and causal relations. The strength of the contingency philosophy is that it explains organizational change from a behavioral viewpoint where managers should make decisions that account for specific circumstances, focusing on those which are the most directly relevant, and intervening with the most appropriate actions. The best actions to initiate change come back to two words: ‘it depends’. In fact, the best course of action is one that is fundamentally situational, matched to the needs of the circumstances. For example, although introducing change in the military might typically be autocratic, whereas change in a small business might typically be consultative, there could be times when the reverse is the most effective solution. There are no formulas or guiding principles to organizational change. The focus of management in organizational change is on achieving alignment and ‘good fits’ to ensure stability and control. The flexible nature of the contingency perspective means that change can be fast or slow, small or large, loosely or tightly controlled, be driven by internal or external stimuli, and deal with varying levels of certainty. It just depends on the situation. 144 F. Graetz & A.C.T. Smith The Psychological Philosophy The psychological philosophy is based on the assumption that the most important dimension of change is found in personal and individual experience. In the tradition of applied social psychology pioneered by Lewin (1947), the psychological perspective focuses on the experiences that individuals have within organizations. It is concerned with the human side of change (Iacavini, 1993; Stuart, 1995) and has clear links with human relations, human development and organizational development approaches, which emerged in response to the overly mechanistic methods of scientific management. Since the psychological philosophy assumes that individuals are the most important unit in organizational change, it also has strong links with behavioral science as well. Two of the most prominent approaches to change that are based on assumptions implicit to the psychological philosophy are known as ‘organizational development’ and ‘change transitions’. Organizational development is an approach to change based on applied behavioral science, and founded on the action research approach (Burke, 2002). Data are collected about problems and then actions taken accordingly. Change management is, therefore, the process of collecting the right information about the impediments to change and removing them by assuaging organizational members’ fears and uncertainties. Change transitions, as a sub-philosophy of the psychological model, is even more focused on the psychological status of organizational members. Like Kubler-Ross’ (1973) stages of death and dying, from denial to acceptance, the process of organizational change is primarily about how people cope with the often traumatic psychological transitions that accompany change (Bridges, 1980, 1992; Jick, 1990). Accordingly, personal feelings, emotions and learning are seen as amongst the most important contributors to the management of change transitions. These assumptions all imply that emotions are learned aspects of behavior, are culturally mediated, and can be managed. By its nature, psychological change is slow and undertaken on a small scale. That is not to say that organizational change itself is necessarily slow and small, but it does imply that individuals cannot accommodate fast and large-scale change without discomfort. Personal psychological adjustment to change is also an internal process, rather than one imposed by the environment, and it is undirected and uncertain, at least partly because every individual is different. The Political Philosophy Originating from the sociological work of Marx and Hegel, the political philosophy explains change as the result of clashing ideology or belief systems (Morgan, 1986). Conflict is seen as not only an inherent attribute of human interaction, but also as the most important one driving change. As a result, the political philosophy assumes that it is the clashing of opposing political forces that produce change. When one group with a political agenda gradually gains power, they challenge the status quo in the hope of shifting the organization toward their own interests. This conflict approach means that change processes inevitably revolve A Philosophies of Change Approach 145 around activities such as bargaining, consciousness-raising, persuasion, influence and power, and social movements (Bolman and Deal, 1991). Organizations are viewed as political systems which employ a system of rules, and where day-to-day activity is filled with ‘wheeling and dealing’, or finding ways to make the system work to one’s advantage. Given the political nature of organizations, it may be assumed that they are composed of numerous coalitions and alliances which work together both overtly and covertly to secure power and influence. In this respect, change is a function of the movement of power from one coalition to another because each seeks the introduction of new philosophies, approaches or ideas. The political philosophy focuses attention on how things get done through political activity and because coalitions have competing agendas and each are seeking to acquire more power, conflict lies at the heart of the political philosophy. Change managers would be advised to focus on cultivating the political support of strong coalitions, as well as securing the resources that confer power, such as leadership positions and financial support. The strength of the political philosophy is that it reveals the importance of clashing ideological imperatives in organizations, as well as the inescapable axiom that without power change is futile. However, the political philosophy also has the tendency to overlook the impetus for change that comes from the environment or from power bases external to the organization. It is dangerous to get distracted by internal political adversaries when in reality the real competition lies outside an organization. As ideology is the catalyst for dissatisfaction with the status quo, the stages leading up to change can be lengthy in order to cultivate a group of sufficient power to take overt steps and risk censure. However, although the development process can be slow, actual change can spring quickly, on a large scale, and sometimes quite unexpectedly. The stimuli for change (conflict) can come from an external or internal party or parties. In addition, control is largely undirected and the change process is uncertain. The Cultural Philosophy The cultural philosophy owes its emergence to the field of anthropology where the concept of organizational culture emerged, first translated to an organizational setting by Pettigrew (1979). In the cultural philosophy, change is normal in that it is a response to changes in the human environment (Morgan, 1986). The difficulty is that this process is natural, leading to the construction of firm ways of thinking about how things should be done. As a result, imposing change means fighting entrenched sets of values and beliefs shared by organizational members. Culture, like many of the philosophies addressed in this section, is fragmented and subject to controversy and inconsistency. The most cited cultural researcher, Schein (1979, 1984, 1993, 1997), takes a psycho-dynamic view in which culture is seen as an unconscious phenomenon, and the source of the most basic human assumptions and beliefs shared by organization members. Schein considers organizational members’ behaviors and spoken attitudes to be the artifacts and symbolic representations of these deeper unconscious assumptions. While there are similarities between the cultural and psychological philosophies, a key difference between the two can be found in their assumptions about the most important 146 F. Graetz & A.C.T. Smith unit of change to manage. The psychological philosophy is concerned with individual experiences of change (which is both individually and socially determined), whereas the cultural perspective is exclusively concerned with collective experiences of change, and the shared values that guide them. The cultural philosophy assumes that the change process will be long-term, slow and small-scale (Schein, 1985). Unlike natural cultural change, which is an ongoing reflection of incremental adjustments to the environment, imposed cultural change is internally-driven. However, cultural change can be brought about through radical environmental change as well. If internal in stimulus, control of cultural change can be directed with some certainty, although the process is troublesome. The Systems Philosophy Encouraged by Kuhn (1974), the systems philosophy emerged from ‘systems thinking’ and general systems theory developed originally from viewing organizations as complex machines, later as open systems, and most recently as entities capable of self-organization (Gharajedaghi, 1999). The systems philosophy looks beyond simplistic causal views of management and the constituent parts of organizations. It developed with the intention of acknowledging the importance of holistic analysis rather than focusing on compartments of organizations. Thus, organizations were seen as the sum of their parts rather than as a collection of reduced units. The key to change for systems theorists is to first appreciate that any imposed change has numerous and sometimes multiplied effects across an organization, and consequently, in order for change management to be successful, it must be introduced across the range of organizational units and sub-systems. Systems are typically considered to be sets of objects or entities that interrelate with each other to form a whole. These can be physical, mental or natural (Laszlo, 1972). In looking at change with a systems view, it is typically assumed that organizations are rational and non-political entities. It is generally the systemic approaches which take best-practice viewpoints by prescribing steps and linear solutions. It is a holistic, integrated approach to the continuous improvement of all aspects of an organization’s operations, which when effectively linked together can be expected to lead to high performance (Australian Manufacturing Council, 1994; Rimmer et al., 1996). The claim that a set of best practices is universally applicable may, however, unrealistically lead us to ignore the powerful and highly significant changes occurring outside an organization, such as those in technology, employment and society. Critics argue that the search for sets of best practices may be important, but so is the search for where and when they might be best applied, like the contingency philosophy advocates. If organizations are perceived to be systems – interrelated parts that affect each other and depend upon the whole to function properly (Hatch, 1997) – then organizational change is effective only when interventions are leveled throughout the entire system. In fact, the presumption of critical interrelationships between parts is the unique contribution of the systems philosophy. Every system may be characterized by two diverse forces: differentiation and integration. Organizational systems are differentiated into specialist functions (in the human body, A Philosophies of Change Approach 147 for example, the lungs, heart and liver are all distinct functions), like divisions and departments for human resources, finance, operations and marketing. At the same time, in order to maintain unity amongst the differentiated parts and to form a complete whole, every system has a process of integration. In organizations, integration is typically achieved through coordinating devices such as levels of hierarchy, direct supervision, and rules, procedures and policies. Every system therefore requires differentiation to identify its sub-parts and integration to ensure that the system does not break down into separate elements. The systems philosophy assumes that change can be relatively fast and large scale. This is because it implicitly requires all sub-systems in an organization to be changed at once. Of course, this means that change is internally driven, controllable and certain. The Postmodern Philosophy The postmodern philosophy challenges singular or grand theories about organizational change, instead insisting that change is a function of socially constructed views of reality contributed by multiple players (Buchanan, 2003). The postmodern change philosophy is probably best described as one which is comfortable with ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity and chaos, but also seeks to take action rationally toward ongoing improvement (White and Jacques, 1995). The notion of postmodernism accompanied the transition from industrial to post-industrial society; from manufacturing and materials to knowledge and information. The postmodern analysis of change finds that words, symbols and signs are increasingly divorced from direct, real-world experience (Fox, 1996). It is a juxtaposition of the old and new, characterized by a change management approach that emphasizes diffusion, empowerment, flexibility, trust and market responsiveness (Clegg, 1992). The postmodern philosophy views reality as multiplicitous, fragmented and contradictory. The rational philosophy approach to change will be restricted in its success because no one unified view of an organization’s future reality can be communicated. Postmodernism is also deeply suspicious of the rational imposition of change because it holds a particular sensitivity to power and its application. Power is typically viewed as a mechanism for exploitation rather than a reasonable means to achieve common goals. Embedded in the postmodern philosophy is the idea that power and knowledge are intrinsically connected. This has led to a more textured presentation of the postmodern philosophy known as discourse analysis, heavily influenced by the work of Foucault (1980). Change is seen as a product of ‘discourse’ within organizations and its application is the subject of significant debate and contention (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000; Hardy et al., 2000). Discursive analysis is concerned with the way in which language helps to reveal social phenomena (Grant et al., 2004; Clegg et al., 2006). Discursive analysis recognizes that language (what is written, spoken, heard and read) plays an active role in creating our social worlds. Discourse analysis suggests that our systems of representation help to create our social worlds where ‘reality’ itself is a social construction. This means that the world appears different to everyone. There is no universal way to see things, or one universal reality that all people 148 F. Graetz & A.C.T. Smith subscribe to. For most practically-minded managers, however, the postmodern philosophy ventures too far into the abstract and is difficult to wield without relinquishing the very power needed to instantiate change. Unlike the systems perspective that encourages best practice thinking, a postmodern analysis precludes the use of an overarching theoretical approach. As a result, change can occur at any pace, scale, stimulus, control and level of certainty. In fact, since there is no universal ‘truth’ or reality about anything, the mere attempt to categorize the postmodern philosophy is inappropriate and flawed. Dualities: Competing and Complementary Insights The first part of this article highlighted the limitations of adopting a singular, rational philosophy when managing the process of change, while the previous section demonstrated that the other prominent philosophies about how change works in organizations are similarly rigid or subject to the limitations of their principle assumptions. At one end of the spectrum, formal, rational logic may be valuable in articulating a clear course of action, and in providing structure and process to the complex task of strategy making, yet its scope is limited because inconsistency and ambiguity are beyond its repertoire. At the other end, postmodern, discursive philosophies preference individual experience and power, but are more ambiguous when it comes to specifying practical change interventions without falling into the power trap it eschews or encouraging anarchy. Somewhere in the middle, the contingency philosophy has a bet each way, while on either side theorists are inclined either towards systemic views or speak of culture as the key. Others still suggest that acquiring resources is the crucial step for successful change, and at the same time further commentators declare that acquiring power is the most critical success factor to change. How then do we turn around the way organizations, and in particular senior management, view the process of change? Given that change is neither simple nor straightforward, and unlikely to conform to an n-step formula, this article has argued that a paradigmatically different sort of philosophy is needed that captures the complexities and dynamics of organizations and actively seeks out the accumulated knowledge, skills, experience and learning of the different communities interacting in them. While reason and logic have their place, without any counter-weight, the tendency from such a limited perspective is to pursue change with a scientific, clinical resolve that overrides the ‘complex, emotive and fluid character of changing’ (Badham, 2003). The latter point underlines the true nature of organizations as dynamic, evolving entities that must be continually changing, organizing, strategizing. This perspective is reflective of the wider strategy-as-practice trend in strategic management, which is concerned with how managers ‘do strategy’, or strategize (Whittington, 1996, 2003; Hendry, 2000; Johnson et al., 2003). The view that organization or structure is subservient to agency or strategy may be considered an artifact of Chandlerian (Chandler, 1962) thinking, which demanded a sharp distinction between the two as different properties and processes (Whittington and Melin, 2003). However, Whittington and Melin (2003) concluded that strategy and organization are not distinct states. They underlined the importance of A Philosophies of Change Approach 149 considering the two as a single merged duality. The assumption is that a change to organizing is a strategic change (Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2005). In addition, the use of the terms ‘organizing’ and ‘strategizing’ is central to this proposition. As verbs, the terms impart the importance of continuous rather than static change processes. Organization and strategy therefore become organizing and strategizing, wherein the former is a type of the latter and change in both is ongoing. Strategizing and organizing are neither linear nor sequential activities, but are actually iterative and reciprocal in action (Dijksterhuis et al., 2003). The challenge for future research is to understand and explain how organizations manage the dynamic relationship between competing philosophies of change. Modular and ambidextrous forms of organization, which embrace heterogeneity, for example, might provide a sound theoretical platform. Modularity theorists would propose adding to or reconfiguring strategic components (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001; Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Pil and Cohen, 2006;). Pil and Cohen define modular systems as ‘elements or, “modules”, that independently perform distinctive functions’ (Pil and Cohen, 2006: 997). As these are able to evolve autonomously, they do not impinge on the system’s overall structure. Modular systems are, therefore, more resilient and better able to manage environmental flux and uncertainty than their more tightly coupled counterparts (Pil and Cohen, 2006). Modularity thus confers flexibility as organizing components can be reconfigured, such as the selective replacement of hierarchical structures with more loosely coupled forms, using tactics such as sub-contracting, alternative work arrangements or alliances. The important strategic decisions come in the choice of which aspect of structure should be reconfigured and, with greater heterogeneity within the firm, more options become available (Smith and Graetz, 2006). Innovating organizations have also adopted ‘ambidextrous’ (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004) strategies where networks have been developed alongside hierarchies, horizontal integration has been supported while promoting upwards performance accountability, and central control of strategy-making has been maintained during decentralized operations (Sanchez-Runde and Pettigrew, 2003). Similarly, Stark (2001), proposed that adaptability is enhanced by the organization of diversity within an enterprise. That is, diversity is organized into an enterprise, creating a strategic orientation that is characterized by minimal hierarchy and maximum heterogeneity. Naming this mixture a heterarchy, Stark considered it a response to complexity in an organization’s environment. Although institutional homogeneity can lead to adaptation in the short-term, it can stifle diversity inside a firm, diminishing its adaptability in the longer term (Smith and Graetz, 2006). Kraatz and Zajac’s (2001)) data indicated that firms possessing high levels of historically valuable resources were less likely to undertake adaptive strategic change. Thus, ostensibly efficient strategies that copy institutional norms may restrict options for change in the medium- to long-term (March, 1991). For example, diversity can lead to innovation while also offering greater scope for re-deploying firm capabilities toward new targets (Teece et al., 2004). As Cameron and Quinn (1988: 14) argued over 20 years ago, traditional models and theories of organization assume consistency and symmetry, yet studies 150 F. Graetz & A.C.T. Smith suggest that ‘disconfirmation, contradiction and nonlinearity are inherent in all organizations.’ Traditional frameworks represent change as a programmatic, step-by-step process with a clear beginning, middle and end, largely choreographed and controlled by a transformational leader. Change within this context is about establishing a new order. It is about setting new boundaries and putting in place new structures, systems, processes, and often new people who personify the new ideology. This focus on re-establishing order and stability therefore sidesteps the concept of change as a naturally occurring, ongoing phenomenon which serves to nourish and affirm continuity. Traditional frameworks thus ignore the complexities and contradictory nature of organizations, as well as the diverse range of people working in them. Such a linear, simplistic approach inevitably leads to one-dimensional thinking and, as Eisenhardt pointed out, ‘simplicity is elegant but often untrue’ (Eisenhardt, 2000: 704). From this standpoint, ambiguity and uncertainty are anathema. Rather than attempting to recognize and understand the nexus between the dual perspectives as encapsulated in the change dilemmas, traditional models concentrate on one perspective at the expense of the competing perspective (accountability versus freedom, leadership versus empowerment, economic versus social goals, or vice versa). Davis and Lawrence (1977: xi) highlighted this in their study of the centralization –decentralization debate, noting that ‘the more you realized the benefits of the one, the less you got the benefits of the other. The dilemma of organization was the dilemma of an either-or world.’ Conclusion By outlining the 10 philosophies, we have attempted to illustrate the distinctive assumptions each makes into a particular situation or set of events. As Morgan (1997) argued, this has important implications for managing organizations because it creates different modes of engagement and provides a richer understanding of situations that need to be addressed, suggesting actions that otherwise might not be considered. These different philosophies also bring into focus the complementary and competing forces that organizations face in managing the tension between continuity and change and how to deal with perennial issues such as certainty/uncertainty, tight/loose control, large-/small-scale change, slow/fast change, and external/internal stimuli. Perhaps organizations may best be described in Swanson’s (1991) language, as based on complementary but disjoint structures. A multi-philosophy approach therefore recognizes the centrality of paradox in organizations, and that it is not only possible but also desirable for two ‘inconsistent states’ to exist simultaneously (Eisenhardt, 2000: 703). Our argument is that rather than concentrating on one theoretical or philosophical perspective at the expense of competing perspectives, the value to practice is in developing an understanding of the nexus between multiple philosophical perspectives, their differences and commonalities. As Hedberg et al. (1976) argued over 30 years ago, a degree of ambiguity, contradiction, and incoherence provides the catalyst for organizational learning, diversity and renewal. The plea here, therefore, is for organizations to put in place systems that can cope with ambiguity, ambivalence and contradiction. This suggests that organizations must learn to manage the paradoxical tensions A Philosophies of Change Approach 151 between continuity and change. For example, nurturing innovation alongside rigorous financial and operational systems; fostering empowerment through strong and supportive leadership; considering the impact of economic realities on social goals; and balancing formalized, central controls and policies with decentralized decision-making that would support more flexible forms of organizing. As Lewis (2000: 760) argued, paradox offers a ‘powerful framework for examining the impacts of plurality and change’, because paradox assists ‘understandings of divergent perspectives and disruptive experiences.’ Managers cannot control organizations the same way that an operator can control a machine made of moving, but inanimate parts. The multi-philosophy approach reinforces the need to discard assumptions about opposing values, instead replacing them with an appreciation of complementary concepts. The change-stability and order-flexibility paradoxes do not need to be interpreted as uni-dimensional choices. 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(1987) Paradoxes of Group Life (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass). Stark, D. (2001) Ambiguous assets for uncertain environments: heterarchy in postsocialist firms, in: P. Dimaggio (ed) The Twenty-first Century Firm, pp. 69–104 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Stuart, R. (1995) The research context and change triggers, Personnel Review, 24(2), pp. 3–88. Swanson, D. (1991) Complementary structures in disjoint science literatures. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 14th Annual International ACM/SIGIR Conference, New York. Teece, D.J., Pisano, G. and Shuen, A. (2004) Dynamic capabilities and strategic management, in: M.L. Tushman and P. Anderson (eds) Managing Strategic Innovation and Change, 2nd edn, pp. 308–332 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Van de Ven, A. and Drazin, R (1985) The concept of fit in contingency theory, in: L. Cummings and B. Staw (eds) Research in Organizational Behavior, 7, pp. 333–365 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press). Van de Ven, A. and Poole, M. (1995) Explaining development and change in organizations, The Academy of Management Review, 20(3), pp. 510–540. White, R.F. and Jacques, R. (1995) Operationalising the postmodernity construct for efficient organizational change management, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 8, pp. 45–71. Whittington, R. (1996) Strategy as practice, Long Range Planning, 29(5), pp. 731–735. Whittington, R. (2003) The work of strategizing and organizing: for a practice perspective, Strategic Organization, 1(1), pp. 119–127. Whittington, R. and Melin, L. (2003) The challenge of organizing/strategizing, in: A.M. Pettigrew, R. Whittington, L. Melin, C. Sanchez-Runde, F.A.J. Van Den Bosch, W. Ruigrok and T. Numagami (eds) Innovative Forms of Organizing, pp. 35–48 (London: Sage Publications). Williams, R. (2008) The big South African, Good Weekend, July 26, pp. 18–24. Witt, U. (2004) The evolutionary perspective on organizational change and the theory of the firm, 3rd ETE workshop, Sophia-Antipolis, January 29– 30, pp. 1–23. Wood, T. (2002) Spectacular metaphors: from theatre to cinema, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 15(1), pp. 11–20. Copyright of Journal of Change Management is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
Writing Style Prose Michael Anonymous Walden University 2 This paper contains improper writing formats. As I pretend I am an instructor, I will use the Track Changes feature of my Word document tool, and I will use my Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA) text as my guide to identify the errors within this paper. Some of the common things I should look for include: (a) anthropomorphisms, (b) improper citation formats, (c) passive voice, (d) improperly formatted reference list, (e) improperly APA formatted paper, and (f) seriation issues, among other errors. 3 Pursuing a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) Degree is a journey that provides an opportunity for both personal and professional growth. The writing of this paper is occurring during a time when the United States is in an economic crisis. Research studies (Curtis, 2014; Williams, 2014Schildkraut, 2014, , Zack, 2015, Adelino, 2014) regarding foreclosures; other research studies (Jurinski, 2016; Ryan, 2014) concerning the decline in small business startups, and scholarly dialogue (Atkinson, 2012; crossley, 2014; Jin, 2014; Jolly, 2015; McGuinness, 2014) regarding job loss and its effects on various aspects of life are affecting the economy. In fact, the state of the economy has therefore caused many individuals to return to higher educational institutions for the purpose of enhancing their professional skills and expanding their horizons. For some who have taken on the challenge of completing a doctoral degree, they struggle to understand the appropriate scholarly writing prose expected by their selected educational institution academicians. In fact, writing at the doctoral level presents a unique set of challenges. Much has been written about research methods and designs (Moustakas, 1994; Yin, 2014; Zikmund, 2013) and how to structure dissertations and research studies. Laboratories for practicing scholarly writing prose are nonexistent and doctoral students practice in the natural classroom setting. I realize like some doctoral students I may struggle to understand the appropriate steps to take when developing my scholarly writing prose. In fact, the anxiety of beginning the DBA journey, focusing on my writing prose, and understanding the various phases of the doctoral program are a bit overwhelming. However, I will overcome my anxiety as I must prioritize those things I find require strengthening, and my scholarly writing prose is primary. I began perusing the Walden University Writing Center and I found common APA nuances that, if understood and applied, will enhance my scholarly writing prose. Below are those APA nuances. 4 1. Use the proper basic document template thus resulting in correct (e.g. fonts, line spacing, margins, and punctuation) formatting. 2. Apply properly formatted citations. 3. Properly format my reference list. 4. Minimize the use of passive voice. 5. Apply capitalizations properly. 6. Use non-biased language. Having taking this initial step will help minimize my anxiety and prepare me for this exciting doctoral journey. 5 References A. Jolly, N. (2015). Geographic Mobility and the Costs of Job Loss. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 15(4), 1793–1829. doi:10.1515/bejeap-2014-0131 Atkinson, R. D. (2012). u.s. manufacturing: DECLINE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS. Economic Development Journal, 11(3), 5–11. Adelino, M., Gerardi, K., & Willen, P. (2014). Identifying the Effect of Securitization on Foreclosure and Modification Rates Using Early Payment Defaults. Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics, 49(3), 352–378. doi:10.1007/s11146-013-9433-0 Crossley, T. F., & Low, H. W. (2014). Job loss, credit constraints, and consumption growth. Review of Economics & Statistics, 96(5), 876–884. doi:10.1162/REST_a_00417 Curtis, Q. (2014). State foreclosure laws and mortgage origination in the subprime. Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics, 49(3), 303–328. doi:10.1007/s11146-013-9437-9 Jin, H., Birkenmaier, J., & Youngmi, K. (2014). Job loss and unmet health care needs in the economic recession: Different associations by family income. American Journal of Public Health, 104(11), e178–e183. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2014.301998 Jurinski, J. J., Down, J., & Kolay, M. (2016). Helping older, encore entrepreneurs anticipate financial risks. Journal of Financial Service Professionals, 70(1), 81–90. McGuinness, S., Wooden, M., & Hahn, M. (2014). The perceived probability of job loss and future labour market outcomes. Industrial Relations Journal, 45(4), 329–347. doi:10.1111/irj.12061 Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 6 Ryan, B. (2014). Starved of financing, new businesses are in decline. Gallup Business Journal, 1. Schildkraut, J., & Mustaine, E. E. (2014). Movin', but not up to the east side: Foreclosures and social disorganization in Orange County, Florida. Housing Studies, 29(2), 177–197. doi:10.1080/02673037.2014.848263 Williams, S., Galster, G., & Verma, N. (2014). Home foreclosures and neighborhood crime dynamics. Housing Studies, 29(3), 380–406. doi:10.1080/02673037.2013.803041 Zacks, E. A., & Zacks, D. A. (2015). A standing question: mortgages, assignment, and foreclosure. Journal of Corporation Law, 40(3), 705–737s. Zikmund, W.G., Babin, B.J., Carr, J.C. & Griffin, M. (2013). Business research methods. Mason, Ohio: South-Western, Cengage Learning.
Writing Style Prose Michael Anonymous Walden University 2 This paper contains improper writing formats. As I pretend I am an instructor, I will use the Track Changes feature of my Word document tool, and I will use my Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA) text as my guide to identify the errors within this paper. Some of the common things I should look for include: (a) anthropomorphisms, (b) improper citation formats, (c) passive voice, (d) improperly formatted reference list, (e) improperly APA formatted paper, and (f) seriation issues, among other errors. 3 Pursuing a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) Degree is a journey that provides an opportunity for both personal and professional growth. The writing of this paper is occurring during a time when the United States is in an economic crisis. Research studies (Curtis, 2014; Williams, 2014Schildkraut, 2014, , Zack, 2015, Adelino, 2014) regarding foreclosures; other research studies (Jurinski, 2016; Ryan, 2014) concerning the decline in small business startups, and scholarly dialogue (Atkinson, 2012; crossley, 2014; Jin, 2014; Jolly, 2015; McGuinness, 2014) regarding job loss and its effects on various aspects of life are affecting the economy. In fact, the state of the economy has therefore caused many individuals to return to higher educational institutions for the purpose of enhancing their professional skills and expanding their horizons. For some who have taken on the challenge of completing a doctoral degree, they struggle to understand the appropriate scholarly writing prose expected by their selected educational institution academicians. In fact, writing at the doctoral level presents a unique set of challenges. Much has been written about research methods and designs (Moustakas, 1994; Yin, 2014; Zikmund, 2013) and how to structure dissertations and research studies. Laboratories for practicing scholarly writing prose are nonexistent and doctoral students practice in the natural classroom setting. I realize like some doctoral students I may struggle to understand the appropriate steps to take when developing my scholarly writing prose. In fact, the anxiety of beginning the DBA journey, focusing on my writing prose, and understanding the various phases of the doctoral program are a bit overwhelming. However, I will overcome my anxiety as I must prioritize those things I find require strengthening, and my scholarly writing prose is primary. I began perusing the Walden University Writing Center and I found common APA nuances that, if understood and applied, will enhance my scholarly writing prose. Below are those APA nuances. 4 1. Use the proper basic document template thus resulting in correct (e.g. fonts, line spacing, margins, and punctuation) formatting. 2. Apply properly formatted citations. 3. Properly format my reference list. 4. Minimize the use of passive voice. 5. Apply capitalizations properly. 6. Use non-biased language. Having taking this initial step will help minimize my anxiety and prepare me for this exciting doctoral journey. 5 References A. Jolly, N. (2015). Geographic Mobility and the Costs of Job Loss. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 15(4), 1793–1829. doi:10.1515/bejeap-2014-0131 Atkinson, R. D. (2012). u.s. manufacturing: DECLINE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS. Economic Development Journal, 11(3), 5–11. Adelino, M., Gerardi, K., & Willen, P. (2014). Identifying the Effect of Securitization on Foreclosure and Modification Rates Using Early Payment Defaults. Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics, 49(3), 352–378. doi:10.1007/s11146-013-9433-0 Crossley, T. F., & Low, H. W. (2014). Job loss, credit constraints, and consumption growth. Review of Economics & Statistics, 96(5), 876–884. doi:10.1162/REST_a_00417 Curtis, Q. (2014). State foreclosure laws and mortgage origination in the subprime. Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics, 49(3), 303–328. doi:10.1007/s11146-013-9437-9 Jin, H., Birkenmaier, J., & Youngmi, K. (2014). Job loss and unmet health care needs in the economic recession: Different associations by family income. American Journal of Public Health, 104(11), e178–e183. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2014.301998 Jurinski, J. J., Down, J., & Kolay, M. (2016). Helping older, encore entrepreneurs anticipate financial risks. Journal of Financial Service Professionals, 70(1), 81–90. McGuinness, S., Wooden, M., & Hahn, M. (2014). The perceived probability of job loss and future labour market outcomes. Industrial Relations Journal, 45(4), 329–347. doi:10.1111/irj.12061 Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 6 Ryan, B. (2014). Starved of financing, new businesses are in decline. Gallup Business Journal, 1. Schildkraut, J., & Mustaine, E. E. (2014). Movin', but not up to the east side: Foreclosures and social disorganization in Orange County, Florida. Housing Studies, 29(2), 177–197. doi:10.1080/02673037.2014.848263 Williams, S., Galster, G., & Verma, N. (2014). Home foreclosures and neighborhood crime dynamics. Housing Studies, 29(3), 380–406. doi:10.1080/02673037.2013.803041 Zacks, E. A., & Zacks, D. A. (2015). A standing question: mortgages, assignment, and foreclosure. Journal of Corporation Law, 40(3), 705–737s. Zikmund, W.G., Babin, B.J., Carr, J.C. & Griffin, M. (2013). Business research methods. Mason, Ohio: South-Western, Cengage Learning.
1 Title of the Paper in Full Goes Here Student Name Here Walden University 2 Abstract Abstracts are not required for all course papers. Please ask your instructor if you have questions regarding whether an abstract is required for a particular assignment. 3 Title of the Paper in Full Goes Here AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. 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AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt 4 uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Another Level 2 Heading AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Level 3 heading. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Level 4 heading. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. 5 Level 4 heading. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Level 3 heading. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. Level 1 Heading AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. AAA bbb cccc dddd eeee ffff gggg hhhh iiii jjjj kkkk llll mmmm nnnn oooo pppp qqqq rrrr sssss tttt uuuu vvvv wwww xxxx yyyy zzzz. 6 References (Please note that the following references are intended as examples only.) Alexander, G., & Bonaparte, N. (2008). My way or the highway that I built. Ancient Dictators, 25(7), 14-31. doi:10.8220/CTCE.52.1.23-91 Babar, E. (2007). The art of being a French elephant. Adventurous Cartoon Animals, 19, 43194392. Retrieved from http://www.elephants104.ace.org Bumstead, D. (2009). The essentials: Sandwiches and sleep. Journals of Famous Loafers, 5, 565582. doi:12.2847/CEDG.39.2.51-71 Hansel, G., & Gretel, D. (1973). Candied houses and unfriendly occupants. Thousand Oaks, CA: Fairy Tale Publishing. Hera, J. (2008). Why Paris was wrong. Journal of Greek Goddess Sore Spots, 20(4), 19-21. doi: 15.555/GGE.64.1.76-82 Laureate Education, Inc. (Producer). (2007). How to cite a video: The city is always Baltimore [DVD]. Baltimore, MD: Author. Laureate Education, Inc. (Producer). (2010). Name of program [Video webcast]. Retrieved from http://www.courseurl.com Sinatra, F. (2008). Zing! Went the strings of my heart. Making Good Songs Great, 18(3), 31-22. Retrieved from http://articlesextollingrecordingsofyore.192/fs.com Smasfaldi, H., Wareumph, I., Aeoli, Q., Rickies, F., Furoush, P., Aaegrade, V., … Fiiel, B. (2005). The art of correcting surname mispronunciation. New York, NY: Supportive Publisher Press. Retrieved from http://www.onewaytociteelectronicbooksperAPA7.02.com 7 White, S., & Red, R. (2001). Stop and smell the what now? Floral arranging for beginners (Research Report No. 40-921). Retrieved from University of Wooded Glen, Center for Aesthetic Improvements in Fairy Tales website: http://www.uwg.caift/~40_921.pdf
娀 Academy of Management Journal 2012, Vol. 55, No. 2, 381–398. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.0891 CHANGE AGENTS, NETWORKS, AND INSTITUTIONS: A CONTINGENCY THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE JULIE BATTILANA Harvard University TIZIANA CASCIARO University of Toronto We develop a contingency theory for how structural closure in a network, defined as terms of the extent to which an actor’s network contacts are connected to one another, affects the initiation and adoption of change in organizations. Using longitudinal survey data supplemented with eight in-depth case studies, we analyze 68 organizational change initiatives undertaken in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service. We show that low levels of structural closure (i.e., “structural holes”) in a change agent’s network aid the initiation and adoption of changes that diverge from the institutional status quo but hinder the adoption of less divergent changes. organizational changes are equivalent, however. One important dimension along which they vary is the extent to which they break with existing institutions in a field of activity (Battilana, 2006; Greenwood & Hinings, 2006). Existing institutions are defined as patterns that are so taken-for-granted that actors perceive them as the only possible ways of acting and organizing (Douglas, 1986). Consider the example of medical professionalism, the institutionalized template for organizing in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS) in the early 2000s. According to this template, physicians are the key decision makers in both the administrative and clinical domains. In this context, centralizing information to enable physicians to better control patient discharge decisions would be aligned with the institutionalized template. By contrast, implementing nurse-led discharge or preadmission clinics would diverge from the institutional status quo by transferring clinical tasks and decision-making authority from physicians to nurses. Organizational changes may thus converge with or diverge from an institutional status quo (Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2004; D’Aunno, Succi, & Alexander, 2000; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Changes that diverge from the status quo, hereafter referred to as divergent organizational changes, are particularly challenging to implement. They require change agents to distance themselves from their existing institutions and persuade other organization members to adopt practices that not only are new, but also break with the norms of their institutional environment (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Kellogg, 2011). Scholars have long recognized the political nature of change in organizations (Frost & Egri, 1991; Pettigrew, 1973; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). To implement planned organizational changes—that is, premeditated interventions intended to modify the functioning of an organization (Lippitt, 1958)— change agents may need to overcome resistance from other members of their organization and encourage them to adopt new practices (Kanter, 1983; Van de Ven, 1986). Change implementation within an organization can thus be conceptualized as an exercise in social influence, defined as the alteration of an attitude or behavior by one actor in response to another actor’s actions (Marsden & Friedkin, 1993). Research on organizational change has improved understanding of the challenges inherent in change implementation, but it has not accounted systematically for how characteristics of a change initiative affect its adoption in organizations. Not all We would like to thank Wenpin Tsai and three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. We also wish to acknowledge the helpful comments we received from Jeffrey Alexander, Michel Anteby, Joel Baum, Peter Bracken, Thomas d’Aunno, Stefan Dimitriadis, Martin Gargiulo, Mattia Gilmartin, Ranjay Gulati, Morten Hansen, Herminia Ibarra, Sarah Kaplan, Otto Koppius, Tal Levy, Christopher Marquis, Bill McEvily, Jacob Model, Lakshmi Ramarajan, Metin Sengul, Bill Simpson, Michael Tushman, and seminar participants at INSEAD, McGill, Harvard, Bocconi, and HEC Paris. Both authors contributed equally to this article. Editor’s note: The manuscript for this article was accepted for publication during the term of AMJ’s previous editor-in-chief, R. Duane Ireland. 381 Copyright of the Academy of Management, all rights reserved. Contents may not be copied, emailed, posted to a listserv, or otherwise transmitted without the copyright holder’s express written permission. Users may print, download, or email articles for individual use only. 382 Academy of Management Journal In this article, we examine the conditions under which change agents are able to influence other organization members to adopt changes with different degrees of divergence from the institutional status quo. Because informal networks have been identified as key sources of influence in organizations (Brass, 1984; Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Gargiulo, 1993; Ibarra, 1993; Ibarra, 1993; Krackhardt, 1990) and policy systems (Laumann, Knoke, & Kim, 1985; Padgett & Ansell, 1993; Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000), we focus on how change agents’ positions in such networks affect their success in initiating and implementing organizational change. Network research has shown that the degree of structural closure in a network, defined as the extent to which an actor’s network contacts are connected to one another, has important implications for generating novel ideas and exercising social influence. A high degree of structural closure creates a cohesive network of tightly linked social actors, and a low degree of structural closure creates a network with “structural holes” and brokerage potential (Burt, 2005; Coleman, 1988). The existing evidence suggests that actors with networks rich in structural holes are more likely to generate novel ideas (e.g., Burt, 2004; Fleming, Mingo, & Chen, 2007; Rodan & Galunic, 2004). Studies that have examined the effect of network closure on actors’ ability to implement innovative ideas, however, have yielded contradictory findings, some showing that high levels of network closure facilitate change adoption (Fleming et al., 2007; Obstfeld, 2005), others showing that low levels of network closure do so (Burt, 2005). In this study, we aim to reconcile these findings by developing a contingency theory of the role of network closure in the initiation and adoption of organizational change. We posit that the information and control benefits of structural holes (Burt, 1992) take different forms in change initiation than in change adoption, and these benefits are strictly contingent on the degree to which a change diverges from the institutional status quo in the organization’s field of activity. Accordingly, structural holes in a change agent’s network aid the initiation and adoption of changes that diverge from the institutional status quo but hinder the adoption of less divergent changes. In developing a contingency theory of the hitherto underspecified relationship between network closure and organizational change, we draw a theoretical link between individual-level analyses of network bases for social influence in organizations and field-level analyses of institutional pressures on organizational action. We thus aim to demonstrate the explanatory power that derives from rec- April ognizing the complementary roles of institutional and social network theory in a model of organizational change. To test our theory, we collected data on 68 organizational changes initiated by clinical managers in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS) from 2004 to 2005 through longitudinal surveys and eight in-depth case studies. NETWORK CLOSURE AND DIVERGENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE In order to survive, organizations must convince the public of their legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) by conforming, at least in appearance, to the prevailing institutions that define how things are done in their environment. This emphasis on legitimacy constrains change by exerting pressure to adopt particular managerial practices and organizational forms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983); therefore, organizations embedded in the same environment, and thus subject to the same institutional pressures, tend to adopt similar practices. Organization members are thus motivated to initiate and implement changes that do not affect their organizations’ alignment with existing institutions (for a review, see Heugens and Lander [2009]). Nevertheless, not all organizational changes will be convergent with the institutional status quo. Indeed, within the NHS, although many of the changes enacted have been convergent with the institutionalized template of medical professionalism, a few have diverged from it. The variability in the degree of divergence of organizational changes poses two questions: (1) what accounts for the likelihood that an organization member will initiate a change that diverges from the institutional status quo and (2) what explains the ability of a change agent to persuade other organization members to adopt such a change. Research into the enabling role of actors’ social positions in implementing divergent change (Greenwood & Hinings, 2006; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Sherer & Lee, 2002) has tended to focus on the position of the organization within its field of activity, eschewing the intraorganizational level of analysis. The few studies that have accounted for intraorganizational factors have focused on the influence of change agents’ formal position on the initiation of divergent change and largely overlooked the influence of their informal position in organizational networks (Battilana, 2011). This is surprising in light of well-established theory and evidence concerning informal networks as sources of influence in organizations (Brass, 1984; Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Gargiulo, 1993; Ibarra & Andrews, 2012 Battilana and Casciaro 1993; Ibarra, 1993; Krackhardt, 1990). To the extent that the ability to implement change hinges on social influence, network position should significantly affect actors’ ability to initiate divergent changes and persuade other organization members to adopt them. A network-level structural feature with theoretical relevance to generating new ideas and social influence is the degree of network closure. A continuum of configurations exists: cohesive networks of dense, tightly knit relationships among actors’ contacts are at one end, and networks of contacts separated by structural holes that provide actors with brokerage opportunities are at the other. A number of studies have documented the negative relationship between network closure and the generation of new ideas (Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 2004; Fleming et al., 2007; Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010; McFadyen, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2009). Two mechanisms account for this negative association: redundancy of information and normative pressures (Ruef, 2002). With regard to the former, occupying a network position rich in structural holes exposes an actor to nonredundant information (Burt, 1992). To the extent that it reflects originality and newness, creativity is more likely to be engendered by exposure to nonredundant than to repetitious information. As for normative pressure, network cohesion not only limits the amount of novel information that reaches actors, but also pressures them to conform to the modus operandi and norms of the social groups in which they are embedded (Coleman, 1990; Krackhardt, 1999; Simmel, 1950), which reduces the extent to which available information can be deployed. Thus far, no study has directly investigated the relationship between network closure and the characteristics of change initiatives in organizations. We propose that the informational and normative mechanisms that underlie the negative association between network cohesion and the generation of new ideas imply that organizational actors embedded in networks rich in structural holes are more likely to initiate changes that diverge from the institutional status quo. Bridging structural holes exposes change agents to novel information that might suggest opportunities for change not evident to others, and it reduces normative constraints on how agents can use information to initiate changes that do not conform to prevailing institutional pressures. Hypothesis 1. The richer in structural holes a change agent’s network, the more likely the agent is to initiate a change that diverges from the institutional status quo. 383 With respect to the probability that a change initiative will actually modify organizational functioning, few studies have explored how the degree of closure in change agents’ networks affects the adoption of organizational changes. This dearth of empirical evidence notwithstanding, Burt (2005: 86 – 87) suggested several ways in which brokerage opportunities provided by structural holes in an actor’s network may aid adaptive implementation, which he defined as the ability to carry out projects that take advantage of opportunities—as distinct from the ability to detect opportunities. Structural holes may equip a potential broker with a broad base of referrals and knowledge of how to pitch a project so as to appeal to different constituencies, as well as the ability to anticipate problems and adapt the project to changing circumstances (Burt, 1992). These potential advantages suggest that structural holes may aid change initiation differently from how they aid change adoption. In change initiation, the information and control benefits of structural holes give a change agent greater exposure to opportunities for change, and creative freedom from taken-for-granted institutional norms. These are, therefore, mainly incoming benefits that flow in the direction of the change agent. By contrast, in change adoption, the information and control benefits of structural holes are primarily outgoing, in that they are directed to the organizational constituencies the change agent is aiming to persuade. These benefits can be characterized as structural reach and tailoring. Reach concerns a change agent’s social contact with the constituencies that a change project would affect, information about the needs and wants of these constituencies, and information about how best to communicate how the project will benefit them. Tailoring refers to a change agent’s control over when and how to use available information to persuade diverse audiences to mobilize their resources in support of a change project. Being the only connection among otherwise disconnected others, brokers can tailor their use of information and their image in accordance with each network contact’s preferences and requirements. Brokers can do this with minimal risk that potential inconsistencies in the presentation of the change will become apparent (Padgett & Ansell, 1993) and possibly delegitimize them. The argument that structural holes may facilitate change adoption stands in contrast to the argument that network cohesion enhances the adoption of innovation (Fleming et al., 2007; Obstfeld, 2005). Proponents of network cohesion maintain that people and resources are more readily mobilized in a cohesive network because multiple connections 384 Academy of Management Journal April among members facilitate the sharing of knowledge and meanings and generate normative pressures for collaboration (Coleman, 1988; Gargiulo, Ertug, & Galunic, 2009; Granovetter, 1985; Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010). Supporting evidence is provided by Obstfeld (2005), who found cohesive network positions to be positively correlated with involvement in successful product development, and by Fleming and colleagues (2007), who found collaborative brokerage to aid in the generation of innovative ideas but maintained that it is network cohesion that facilitates the ideas’ diffusion and use by others. These seemingly discrepant results are resolved when organizational change is recognized to be a political process that unfolds over time and takes on various forms. The form taken by a change initiative is contingent on the extent to which it diverges from the institutional status quo. Obstfeld described innovation as FIGURE 1 Predicted Interactive Effects of Network Closure and Divergence from Institutional Status Quo on Change Adoption an active political process at the microsocial level. . . . To be successful, the tertius needs to identify the parties to be joined and establish a basis on which each alter would participate in the joining effort. The logic for joining might be presented to both parties simultaneously or might involve appeals tailored to each alter before the introduction or on an ongoing basis as the project unfolds. (2005: 188) over time. Less divergent change, because it is less likely to elicit resistance and related attempts at coalition building, renders the tactical flexibility afforded by structural holes unnecessary. Under these circumstances, the advantages of the cooperative norms fostered in a cohesive network are more desirable for the change agent. Consequently, we do not posit a main effect for network closure on change implementation, but only predict an interaction effect, the direction of which depends on a change’s degree of divergence. Figure 1 graphically summarizes the predicted moderation pattern. Change implementation, according to this account, involves decisions concerning not only which network contacts should be involved, but also the timing and sequencing of appeals directed to different constituencies. A network rich in structural holes affords change agents more freedom in deciding when and how to approach these constituencies and facilitate connections among them. Building on this argument, we predict that in the domain of organizational change the respective advantages of cohesion and structural holes are strictly contingent on whether a change diverges from the institutional status quo, thereby disrupting extant organizational equilibria and creating the potential for significant opposition. Such divergent changes are likely to engender greater resistance from organization members, who are in turn likely to attempt building coalitions with organizational constituencies to mobilize them against the change initiative. In this case, a high level of network cohesion among a change agent’s contacts makes it easy for them to mobilize and form a coalition against the change. By contrast, a network rich in structural holes affords change agents flexibility in tailoring arguments to different constituencies and deciding when to connect to them, whether separately or jointly, simultaneously or High + – Low – + Network Closure Low High Change Divergence Hypothesis 2. The more a change diverges from the institutional status quo, the more closure in a change agent’s network of contacts diminishes the likelihood of change adoption. METHODS Site We tested our model using quantitative and qualitative data on 68 change initiatives undertaken in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service, a government-funded health care system consisting of more than 600 organizations that fall into three broad categories: administrative units, primary care service providers, and secondary care service providers. In 2004, when the present study was conducted, the NHS had a budget of more than £60 billion and employed more than one million people, including health care professionals and managers specializing in the delivery of guaranteed universal health care free at the point of service. 2012 Battilana and Casciaro The NHS, being highly institutionalized, was a particularly appropriate context in which to test our hypotheses. Like other health care systems throughout the Western world (e.g., Kitchener, 2002; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000), the NHS is organized according to the model of medical professionalism (Giaimo, 2002), which prescribes specific role divisions among professionals and organizations.1 The model of professional groups’ role division is predicated on physicians’ dominance over all other categories of health care professionals. Physicians are the key decision makers, controlling not only the delivery of services, but also, in collaboration with successive governments, the organization of the NHS (for a review, see Harrison, Hunter, Marnoch, and Pollitt [1992]). The model of role division among organizations places hospitals at the heart of the health care system (Peckham, 2003). Often enjoying a monopoly position as providers of secondary care services in their health communities (Le Grand, 1999), hospitals ultimately receive the most resources. The emphasis on treating acute episodes of disease in a hospital over providing follow-up and preventive care in home or community settings under the responsibility of primary care organizations is characteristic of an acute episodic health system. In 1997, under the leadership of the Labour Government, the NHS embarked on a ten-year modernization effort aimed at improving the quality, reliability, effectiveness, and value of its health care services (Department of Health, 1999). The initiative was intended to imbue the NHS with a new model for organizing that challenged the institutionalized model of medical professionalism. Despite the attempt to shift from an acute episodic health care system to one focused on providing continuing care by integrating services and increasing cooperation among professional groups, at the time of the study, a distinct dominance order persisted across NHS organizations, with physicians (Ferlie, Fitzgerald, Wood, & Hawkins, 2005; Harrison et al., 1992; Richter, West, Van Dick, & Dawson, 2006) and hospitals (Peckham, 2003) at the apex. This context— wherein the extant model of medical professionalism continued to define the institutional status quo in these organizations—afforded a unique opportunity to study organizational change in an entrenched 1 This characterization of the NHS’s dominant template for organizing is based on a comprehensive review of NHS archival data and the literature on the NHS, as well as on 46 semistructured interviews with NHS professionals and 3 interviews with academic experts on the NHS analyzed with the methodology developed by Scott and colleagues (2000). 385 system in which enhancing the capacity for innovation and adaptation had potentially vast societal implications. Sample The focus of the study being on variability in divergence and adoption of organizational change initiatives, the population germane to our model was that of self-appointed change agents, actors who voluntarily initiate planned organizational changes. Our sample is comprised of 68 clinical managers (i.e., actors with both clinical and managerial responsibilities) responsible for initiating and attempting to implement change initiatives. All had worked in different organizations in the NHS and participated in the Clinical Strategists Programme, a two-week residential learning experience conducted by a European business school. The first week focused on cultivating skills and awareness to improve participants’ effectiveness in their immediate spheres of influence and leadership ability within the clinical bureaucracies, the second week on developing participants’ strategic change capabilities at the levels of the organization and the community health system. Applicants were asked to provide a description of a change project they would begin to implement within their organization upon completing the program. Project implementation was a required part of the program, which was open to all clinical managers in the NHS and advertised both online and in NHS brochures. There was no mention of divergent organizational change in either the title of the executive program or its presentation. Participation was voluntary. All 95 applicants were selected and chose to attend and complete the program. The final sample of 68 observations, which corresponds to 68 change projects, reflects the omission of 27 program participants who did not respond to a social network survey administered in the first week of the program. Participants ranged in age from 35 to 56 years (average age, 44). All had clinical backgrounds as well as managerial responsibilities. Levels of responsibility varied from midto top-level management. The participants also represented a variety of NHS organizations (54 percent primary care organizations, 26 percent hospitals or other secondary care organizations, and 19 percent administrative units) and professions (25 percent physicians and 75 percent nurses and allied health professionals). To control for potential nonresponse bias, we compared the full sample for which descriptive data were available with the final sample. Unpaired t-tests showed no statistically 386 Academy of Management Journal significant differences for individual characteristics recorded in both samples. Procedures and Data Data on the demographic characteristics, formal positions, professional trajectories, and social networks of the change agents, together with detailed information on the proposed changes, were collected over a period of 12 months. The demographic and professional trajectories data were obtained from participants’ curricula vitae, and data on their formal positions were gathered from the NHS’s human resource records. Data on social networks were collected during the first week of the executive program, during which participants completed an extensive survey detailing their social network ties both in their organizations and in the NHS more broadly. Participants were assured that data on the content of the change projects, collected at different points during their design and implementation, would remain confidential. They submitted descriptions of their intended change projects upon applying to the program and were asked to write a refined project description three months after implementation. The two descriptions were very similar; the latter were generally an expansion of the former. One-on-one (10 –15 minute) telephone interviews conducted with the participants and members of their organizations four months after implementation of the change projects enabled us to ascertain whether they had been implemented— all had been—and whether the changes being implemented corresponded to those described in the project descriptions, which all did. During two additional (20 – 40 minute) telephone interviews conducted six and nine months after project implementation, participants were asked to (1) describe the main actions taken in relation to implementing their changes, (2) identify the main obstacles (if any) to implementation, (3) assess their progress, and (4) describe their next steps in implementing the changes. We took extensive notes during the interviews, which were not recorded for reasons of confidentiality. The change agents also gave us access to all organizational documents and NHS official records related to the change initiatives generated during the first year of implementation. We created longitudinal case studies of each of the 68 change initiatives by aggregating the data collected throughout the year from change agents and other organization members and relevant organizational and NHS documents. After 12 months of implementation, we conducted another telephone survey to collect infor- April mation about the outcomes of the change projects with an emphasis on the degree to which the changes had been adopted. We corroborated the information provided by each change agent by conducting telephone interviews with two informants who worked in the same organization. In most cases, one informant was directly involved in the change effort, and the other was either a peer or superior of the agent who knew about, but was not directly involved in, the change effort. These informants’ assessments of the adoption of the change projects were, again for reasons of confidentiality, not recorded; as during the six- and nine-month interviews, we took extensive notes. At the beginning of the study, we randomly selected eight change projects to be the subjects of in-depth case studies. Data on these projects were collected over a year via both telephone and inperson interviews. One year after implementation, at each of the eight organizations, we conducted between 12 and 20 interviews of 45 minutes to two hours in duration. On the basis of these interviews, all of which were transcribed, we wrote eight indepth case studies about the selected change initiatives. The qualitative data used to verify the consistency of change agents’ reports with the reports made by other organization members provided broad validation for the survey data. Dependent and Independent Variables Divergence from the institutional status quo. The institutional status quo for organizing within the NHS is defined by the model of medical professionalism that prescribes specific role divisions among professionals and organizations (Peckham, 2003). To measure each change project’s degree of divergence from the institutionalized model of professionals’ and organizations’ role division, we used two scales developed by Battilana (2011). The first scale measures the degree to which change projects diverged from the institutionalized model of role division among professionals using four items aimed at capturing the extent to which the change challenged the dominance of doctors over other health care professionals in both the clinical and administrative domains. The second scale measures the degree to which change projects diverged from the institutionalized model of role division among organizations using six items aimed at capturing the extent to which the change challenged the dominance of hospitals over other types of organizations in both the clinical and administrative domains. Each of the ten items in the ques- 2012 Battilana and Casciaro tionnaire was assessed using a three-point rankordered scale.2 Two independent raters blind to the study’s hypotheses used the two scales to code the change project descriptions written by the participants after three months’ of implementation. The descriptions averaged three pages and followed the same template: presentation of project goals, resources required to implement the project, people involved, key success factors, and measurement of outcomes. Interrater reliability, as assessed by the kappa correlation coefficient, was .90. The raters resolved coding discrepancies identifying and discussing passages in the change project descriptions deemed relevant to the codes until they reached consensus. Scores for the change projects on each of the two scales corresponded to the average of the items included in each scale. To account for change projects that diverged from the institutionalized models of both professionals’ and organizations’ role division, and thereby assess each project’s overall degree of divergence, we measured change divergence as the unweighted average of the scores received on both scales. Table 1 provides examples of change initiatives characterized by varying degrees of divergence from the institutionalized models of role division among organizations or professionals or both. Change adoption. We measured level of adoption using the following three-item scale from the telephone survey administered one year after implementation: (1) “On a scale of 1–5, how far did you progress toward completing the change project, where 1 is defining the project for the clinical strategists program and 5 is institutionalizing the implemented change as part of standard practice in your organization.” (2) “In my view, the change is now part of the standard operating practice of the organization.” (3) “In my view, the change was not adopted in the organization.” The third item was reverse-coded. The last two items were assessed using a five-point scale that ranged from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .60, which is the acceptable threshold value for exploratory studies such as ours (Nunnally, 1978). Before gathering the change agents’ responses, the research team that had followed the evolution of the change projects and collected all survey and interview data 2 Research on radical organizational change typically measures the extent to which organizational transformations diverge from previous organizational arrangements (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). By contrast, we measured the extent to which the changes in our sample diverged from the institutional status quo in the field of the NHS. 387 throughout the year produced a joint assessment of the projects’ level of adoption using the same threeitem scale later presented to the change agents. The correlation between the responses produced by the research team and those generated by the telephone survey administered to the change agents was .98. To further validate the measure of change adoption, two additional raters independently coded the notes taken during the interviews using the same three-item scale as was used in the telephone survey. They based their coding on the entire set of qualitative data collected from organizational informants on each change project’s level of adoption. Interrater reliability, as assessed by the kappa correlation coefficient, was .88, suggesting a high level of agreement among the raters (Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch, 1977). We then asked the two raters to reconcile the differences in their respective assessments and produce a consensual evaluation (Larsson, 1993). The resulting measures were virtually identical to the self-reported measures collected from the change agents. We also leveraged the case studies developed for each change initiative from the participant interviews and relevant sets of organizational documents and NHS official records collected throughout the year. Eight of these were in-depth case studies for which extensive qualitative data were collected. Two additional independent raters, for whom a high level of interrater reliability was obtained (␬ ⫽ .90), coded all case studies to assess the level of adoption of the changes, and reconciled the differences in their assessments to produce a consensual evaluation. The final results of this coding were nearly indistinguishable from the self-reported measures of level of change adoption, further alleviating concerns about potential self-report biases. Network closure. We measured network closure using ego network data collected via a name generator survey approach commonly used in studies of organizational networks (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 1992; Podolny & Baron, 1997; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). In name generator surveys, respondents are asked to list contacts (i.e., alters) with whom they have one or more criterion relationships and specify the nature of the relationships that link contacts to one another. As detailed below, we corroborated our ego network data with qualitative evidence from the eight in-depth case studies. To measure the degree of closure in a change agent’s network, we followed the seminal approach developed by Burt (1992), who measured the continuum of configurations between structural holes 388 Academy of Management Journal April TABLE 1 Examples of Change Initiatives with High, Medium, and Low Divergence from the Institutional Status Quoa High Divergence Medium Divergence Low Divergence Example 1. Initiative to transfer stroke rehabilitation services, such as language retraining, from a hospitalbased unit to a PCT (i.e., from the secondary to the primary care sector). Prior to the change, stroke patients were stabilized and rehabilitated in the acute ward of the hospital. This resulted in long hospital stays and occupied resources that were more appropriate for the acute treatment than for the rehabilitation phase. As a result, there was often not enough room to admit all stroke patients to the acute ward, as many beds were used for patients undergoing rehabilitation. With the transfer of service, postacute patients, once they were medically stable and ready for rehabilitation, were relocated to a unit operated by the PCT, ensuring that the acute unit would be dealing only with patients who were truly in need of acute care. This transfer of the delivery of rehabilitation services from the secondary to the primary care sector greatly diverged from the institutionalized model of role division among organizations. Example 2. Initiative to develop nurseled discharge that would transfer clinical tasks and decision-making authority from physicians to nurses. Traditionally, discharge decisions were under the exclusive control of physicians. With the new nurse-led initiatives, nurses would take over responsibility from specialist physicians and make the final decision to discharge patients, thus assuming more responsibility as well as accountability and risk for clinical decisions. Physicians ceded control over some aspects of decisionmaking, freeing them to focus on more complex patients and tasks. Example 3. Initiative involving primary and secondary care service providers aimed at developing a day hospital for elderly patients. The day hospital was to facilitate continued care, reduce hospital stays, and decrease hospital readmission for frail elderly patients too ill to be cared for at home but not sufficiently ill to justify full admission to the hospital. Patients would check into the hospital-operated day unit for a few hours and receive services from both primary and secondary care professionals. Because the primary care service providers were engaged in the provision of services formerly provided only by secondary care service providers, there was increased collaboration between the primary and secondary care service providers involved in this project. Even so, the project diverged from the institutionalized model of role division among organizations only to some extent because the new service was still operated by the hospital. Example 4. Initiative to have ultrasound examinations performed by nurses rather than by physicians. Although this project enabled nurses to perform medical examinations they usually did not perform, the nurses gained no decision-making power in either the clinical or administrative domain. Consequently, this project diverged from the institutionalized model of role division among professionals only to some extent. Example 5. Initiative to transfer a ward specializing in the treatment of elderly patients from a PCT to a hospital. Prior to the change, both the PCT and hospitals provided services for the elderly, who make up the bulk of patients receiving care in the hospital setting. Rather than diverging from the institutionalized model of role division among organizations, the transfer of responsibility for all elderly care services to the hospital reinforced the centralization of health care services around the hospital, strengthening the dominant role of the hospital over the PCT in the institutionalized delivery model. Example 6. Initiative of a general practice to hire an administrative assistant to implement and manage a computerized appointment booking system. The addition of this assistant to the workforce changed neither the division of labor nor the balance of power between health care professionals within the general practice. a A PCT is a primary care trust. At the time this study was conducted, all NHS professionals who provided primary care services (services provided to patients when they first report health problems) were managed by primary care trusts (PCTs) serving populations of 250,000 or more. General practices were required to join PCTs when they were created in 1988. PCTs were thus local health organizations responsible for managing health services in a given area. They provided primary care services and commissioned secondary care services from hospitals. and cohesion in terms of the absence or presence of constraint, defined as: ci ⫽ 冘 冉p ⫹ 冘 j⫽i ij k⫽i,k⫽j 冊 2 pikpkj , where pij is the proportion of time and effort invested by i in contact j. Contact j constrains i to the extent that i has focused a large proportion of time and effort to reach j and j is surrounded by few structural holes that i can leverage to influence j. Unlike other measures of structural holes and cohesion, such as effective size or density, constraint captures not only redundancy in a network, but also an actor’s dependence on network 2012 Battilana and Casciaro contacts. This is a more pertinent measure of the potential for tailoring because it assesses not only whether two contacts are simply linked, but also the extent to which social activity in the network revolves around a given contact, making a link to that actor more difficult to circumvent in presenting tailored arguments for change to different contacts. We measured alter-to-alter connections in a respondent’s ego network using a survey item that asked respondents to indicate, on a three-point scale (1, “not at all”; 2, “somewhat”; and 3, “very well”), how well two contacts knew each other. We included relevant network contacts in the calculation of constraint based on two survey items that measured the frequency and closeness of contact between an actor and each network contact. The first item (“How frequently have you interacted with this person over the last year?”) used an eightpoint scale with point anchors ranging from “not at all” to “twice a week or more.” The second item (“How close would you say you are with this person?”) used a seven-point scale that ranged from “especially close” to “very distant,” with 4, “neither close nor distant,” as the neutral point and was accompanied by the following explanation: “(Note that ‘Especially close’ refers to one of your closest personal contacts and that ‘Very distant’ refers to the contacts with whom you do not enjoy spending time, that is, the contacts with whom you spend time only when it is absolutely necessary).” From these survey items, we constructed four measures of constraint to test the sensitivity of our prediction to more or less inclusive specifications of agents’ networks. The first measure included alters with whom ego was at least somewhat close. The second measure, based on frequency of interaction, included only alters with whom ego interacted at least twice a month. The third measure combined the first two by calculating constraint on the basis of alters with whom ego either interacted at least twice monthly or to whom ego was at least somewhat close. The fourth measure included every actor nominated by ego in the network survey. We used the eight in-depth case studies to assess convergence between the change agents’ and interviewees’ perceptions of the relationships among the people in the change agents’ networks. Two external coders identified all the information in the interviews that pertained to the extent to which the people in change agents’ networks knew each other and coded this information using the same scale used in the social network survey. The interviews provided data on the relationships among more than 75 percent of the change agents’ contacts. For all these relation- 389 ships, the coders’ assessments of alter-to-alter ties based on the interview data were consistent with each other and with the measures reported by change agents, thereby increasing our confidence in the validity of the survey reports. Control variables. We used five characteristics of the change agents (hierarchical level, tenure in current position, tenure in management role, professional status, and prominence in the task-advice network), two characteristics of the change agents’ organizations (size and status), and one characteristic of the change (creation of new service) as controls. We measured actors’ hierarchical position with a rank-ordered categorical variable based on formal job titles;3 tenure in current position was the number of years change agents had spent in their current formal roles, and tenure in management position was the number of years they had spent in a management role. As for the status of the professional group to which actors belonged, in the NHS, as in most health care systems, physicians’ status is superior to that of other health care professionals (Harrison et al., 1992). Accordingly, we measured professional status with a dummy variable coded 0 for low-status professionals (i.e., nurses and allied health professionals) and 1 for high-status professionals (i.e., physicians). To account for change agents’ informal status in their organizations, we constructed a measure of the structural prominence that accrues to asymmetrical advice-giving ties (Jones, 1964; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). To that end, we used two network survey items: (1) “During the past year, are there any individuals in your Primary Care Trust/Hospital Trust/Organization (delete as appropriate) from whom you regularly sought information and advice to accomplish your work? (Name up to 5 individuals),” and (2) “During the past year, are there any individuals in your Primary Care Trust/Hospital Trust/Organization (delete as appropriate) who regularly came to you for information and advice to accomplish their work? (Name up to 5 individuals. Some of these may be the same as those named before).” We measured actors’ prominence in the task-advice network as the difference between the number of “received” advice ties and number of “sent” advice ties. We also controlled for organization-level factors including organizational size, which we measured in units of total full-time equivalents, and organi- 3 The NHS, being a government-run set of organizations, has standardized definitions and pay scales for all positions that assure uniformity of roles, responsibilities, and hierarchical positions across organizational sites, according to the Department of Health (2006). 390 Academy of Management Journal April TABLE 2 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1. Change adoption 2. Change divergence 3. Senior management 4. Seniority in role 5. Hierarchical level 6. Professional status (doctor) 7. Organizational status (PCT) 8. Organizational size 9. Prominence in task advice network 10. Ego network constraint 11. Constraint ⫻ divergence 3.91 1.14 10.37 2.32 3.85 0.25 0.52 22.70 0.03 0.82 0.38 5.94 2.05 0.95 0.43 0.50 21.20 1.09 .09 ⫺.05 ⫺.03 ⫺.07 .03 .09 ⫺.13 .25 .18 .05 ⫺.11 ⫺.09 .35 ⫺.04 .08 .11 ⫺.02 ⫺.41 ⫺.12 .04 .22 ⫺.03 .02 ⫺.06 .06 ⫺.02 .33 .10 ⫺.20 .18 .06 ⫺.20 ⫺.10 –.59 –.11 .08 0.34 ⫺0.01 0.12 0.04 .14 ⫺.27 ⫺.23 ⫺.38 ⫺.05 .01 ⫺.01 .00 .03 .01 .13 ⫺.14 –.07 –.19 –.05 .09 a 9 10 .09 .12 –.11 Correlation coefficients greater than .30 are statistically significant at p ⬍ .01. zational status. Of the three types of organizations that compose the NHS, primary care organizations were considered to be of lower status than hospitals and administrative units (Peckham, 2003), but there was no clear status hierarchy between the latter (Peckham, 2003). Accordingly, we measured organizational status with a dummy variable coded 1 for low-status organizations (i.e., primary care trusts) and 0 for high-status organizations (i.e., hospitals and administrative organizations). Finally, although we theorize that a change’s degree of divergence from the institutional status quo operates as the key contingency in our model, other change characteristics may affect adoption. In particular, whether a change involves the redesign of an existing service or creation of a new one may play an important role (Van de Ven, Angle, & Poole, 1989). Our models therefore included a dummy variable for creation of a new service. and increases model fit significantly (␹1 ⫽ 3.85, p ⬍ .05), which implies a positive association between structural holes in a change agent’s network and the agent’s change initiative’s degree of divergence.4 Our qualitative data provided several illustrations of this effect. A case in point is a change initiative aimed at replacing the head of the rehabilitation unit for stroke patients— historically a 4 Supplemental regression models incorporated a host of additional control variables including gender, age, educational background, and organizational budget. Whether added separately or in clusters, none of these variables had statistically significant effects in any model, nor did they affect the sign or significance of any variables of interest. Consequently, we have excluded them from the final set of regression models reported here, mindful that our sample size constrains the model’s degrees of freedom. RESULTS Table 2 includes the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all variables. Correlation coefficients greater than .30 are statistically significant (p ⬍ .01). Most of the correlation coefficients are modest in size and not statistically significant. Table 3 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that predict change initiatives’ degree of divergence from the institutional status quo. Model 1 includes control variables likely to influence change initiatives’ degree of divergence. The positive and significant effects of tenure in a management role and of organizational status and size are consistent with existing research (Battilana, 2011). Model 2 introduces ego network constraint, which measures the degree of structural closure in a network. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, the effect is negative and statistically significant TABLE 3 Results of OLS Regression Analyses Predicting Degree of Change Divergencea Variable Model 1 Tenure in management role 0.02* Tenure in current role 0.01 Hierarchical level ⫺0.07 Professional status (doctor) 0.08 Organizational status (PCT) 0.42*** Organizational size 0.04* Prominence in task advice 0.03 network Ego network constraint R2 0.24 Model 2 (0.01) 0.02* (0.02) 0.01 (0.05) ⫺0.08 (0.09) 0.11 (0.09) 0.40*** (0.02) 0.04 (0.04) 0.04 ⫺0.68* 0.28 Standard errors are in parentheses; n ⫽ 68. * p ⬍ .05 *** p ⬍ .001 Two-tailed tests. a (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.05) (0.34) 2012 Battilana and Casciaro medical consultant—with a physiotherapist. This change initiative diverged from the institutional status quo in transferring decision-making power from a doctor to a nondoctor. The change agent responsible for the initiative described her motivation as follows: In my role as head of physiotherapy for this health community, I have had the opportunity to work with doctors, nurses, allied health professionals, managers and representatives of social services. . . . Although I was aware of the challenges of coordinating all the different players involved in stroke care, I was also aware that it was key if we wanted to improve our services. . . . I recommended the appointment of a non-medical consultant to lead the rehabilitation unit because, based on my experience working with the different players involved in stroke services, I thought that it would be the best way to insure effective coordination. Table 4 presents the results of OLS regressions that predict the likelihood of change adoption. Model 3 includes the control variables, none of which was significant except prominence in the task advice network. This result suggests that change agents’ informal status in their organizations is a critical source of social influence.5 Model 4 introduces the measure of constraint in change agents’ networks. The coefficient is not statistically significant, providing no evidence of a main effect of structural holes on change implementation. The coefficient for the multiplicative term for ego network constraint and change divergence (model 5) is negative and significant, supporting Hypothesis 2. A postestimation test of joint significance of the main effect and interaction term for constraint was statistically significant (F[2, 52] ⫽ 4.87, p ⬍ .05), offering further evidence of the robustness of this moderation effect. The multiplicative term for constraint and divergence from the institutional status quo increased model fit significantly (␹1 ⫽ 6.40, p ⬍ .05). These findings, being robust to all four specifications of the measure of constraint, indicate a strong boundary condition on the effect of network closure on change adoption, with the degree of divergence from the institutional 5 We also ran supplemental analyses that including the control variables listed in footnote 4 as well as a squared term for hierarchical level to account for the possibility that middle managers may be particularly well positioned in their organizations to implement change. As with Hypothesis 1, none of the variables had statistically significant effects in any model, nor did they affect the sign or significance of any variables of interest. 391 status quo intrinsic to a change initiative operating as a strict contingency.6, 7 Our qualitative data offered numerous illustrations of this finding. For example, a change agent with a network rich in structural holes who was attempting to transfer a medical unit from the hospital to the primary care trust (PCT; see Table 1) in his health community (a change that diverged from the institutionalized model of role division between organizations) explained the following: Because of my role, I worked both in the hospital and in the PCT. I also was part of the steering group that looked at how the new national guidelines would be implemented across our health community. . . . Having the responsibility to work in more than one organization gives you many advantages. . . . I knew all the stakeholders and what to expect from them. . . . It helped me figure out what I should tell to each of these different stakeholders to convince them that the project was worth their time and energy. The people we interviewed in both the hospital and the PCT confirmed that they knew the change agent well. Stated a hospital employee: He is one of us, but he also knows the PCT environment well. His experience has helped him identify opportunities for us to cooperate with the PCT. If it was not for him, I do not think that we would have launched this project. . . . He was able to bring us on board as well as the PCT staff. Similarly, a nurse trying to implement nurse-led discharge in her hospital explained how her connections to managers, nurses, and doctors helped her to tailor and time her appeals to each constituency relevant to her endeavor: I first met with the management of the hospital to secure their support. . . . I insisted that nurse-led discharge would help us reduce waiting times for patients, which was one of the key targets that the government had set. . . . I then focused on nurses. I wanted them to understand how important it was to increase the nursing voice in the hospital and to demonstrate how nursing could contribute to the organizational agenda. . . . Once I had the full support of nurses, I turned to doctors. . . . I expected that they would stamp their feet and dig their heels 6 Testing Hypothesis 2 using effective size and density as alternative measures of closure yields findings consistent with, albeit less robust than, those obtained using constraint, as we expected, given the conceptual differences between these measures. 7 We tested the effects of several additional interaction terms including one for divergence and prominence in the task advice network. None of these moderations were significant. 392 Academy of Management Journal April TABLE 4 Results of OLS Regression Analyses Predicting Degree of Change Adoptiona Variable Tenure in management role Tenure in current role Hierarchical level Professional status (doctor) Change divergence Creation of new service Organizational status (PCT) Organizational size Prominence in task advice network Ego network constraint Constraint ⫻ divergence R2 Model 3 ⫺0.02 0.02 ⫺0.14 0.18 0.09 ⫺0.31 0.04 ⫺0.01 0.30*** .21 (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.26) (0.33) (0.23) (0.33) (0.01) (0.07) Model 4 ⫺0.02 0.02 ⫺0.13 0.14 0.14 ⫺0.30 0.04 ⫺0.01 0.29*** 0.69 .22 (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.24) (0.34) (0.25) (0.33) (0.01) (0.08) (1.33) Model 5 –0.02 0.02 –0.13 0.07 –0.11 –0.28 0.03 –0.01 0.33** 0.30 –5.83** .29 (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.24) (0.30) (0.23) (0.32) (0.01) (0.10) (1.28) (2.04) Standard errors are in parentheses; n ⫽ 68. ** p ⬍ .01 *** p ⬍ .001 Two-tailed tests. a in and say “no we’re not doing this.” . . . To overcome their resistance, I insisted that the new discharge process would reduce their workload, thereby enabling them to focus on complex cases and ensure quicker patient turnover, which, for specialists with long waiting lists of patients, had an obvious benefit. These quotes illustrate the positive association between structural holes and the adoption of divergent change. Our qualitative evidence also offers examples of the flip side of this association, the negative relationship between network cohesion and the adoption of changes that diverge from the institutional status quo. For instance, a nurse who tried to establish nurse-led discharge in her hospital, a change that would have diverged from the institutionalized model of role division between professionals, explained how lack of connection to some key stakeholders in the organization (in particular, doctors) handicapped her. I actually know many of the nurses working in this hospital and I get on well with them, but I do not know all the doctors and the administrative staff. . . . When I launched this change initiative, I was convinced that it would be good for the hospital, but maybe I rushed too much. I should have taken more time to get to know the consultants, and to convince them of the importance of nurse-led discharge for them and for the hospital. A doctor we interviewed confirmed the change agent’s assessment of the situation: I made it clear to the CEO of this hospital that I would not do it. This whole initiative will increase my workload. I feel it is a waste of time. Nurses should not be the ones making discharge deci- sions. . . . The person in charge of this initiative doesn’t know how we work here. The foregoing examples illustrate the utility of structural holes in a change agent’s network when it comes to persuading other organization members to adopt a change that diverges from the institutional status quo. However, networks rich in structural holes are not always an asset. When it comes to the adoption of changes that do not diverge from the institutional status quo, change agents with relatively closed networks fared better. The cases of two change agents involved in similar change initiatives in their respective primary care organizations are a telling example. Both were trying to convince other organization members of the merits of a new computerized booking system, the adoption of which would not involve a divergence from the institutional status quo, affecting neither the division of labor nor the balance of power among the health care professionals in the respective organizations. Moreover, other primary care organizations had already adopted the system. The network of one of the change agents was highly cohesive, that of the other rich in structural holes. Whereas the former was able to implement the new booking system, the latter encountered issues. A receptionist explained what happened in the case of the former organization: I trust [name of the change agent]. Everyone does here. . . . We all know each other and we all care about what is best for our patients. . . It was clear when [name of the change agent] told us about the new booking system that we would all be better off using it. 2012 Battilana and Casciaro FIGURE 2 Observed Interactive Effect of Ego Network Constraint and Divergence from Institutional Status Quo on Change Adoption 5 4.5 Change Adoption 4 3.5 393 theory of organizational change and network structure. Structural holes in change agents’ networks increase the likelihood that these actors will initiate organizational changes with a higher degree of divergence from the institutional status quo. The effects of structural holes on a change agent’s ability to persuade organizational constituencies to adopt a change, however, are strictly contingent on the change’s degree of divergence from the institutional status quo. Structural holes in a change agent’s network aid the adoption of changes that diverge from the institutional status quo, but they hinder the adoption of less divergent changes. 3 .1 .5 .2 .4 .6 .3 Ego Network Constraint Low divergence High divergence A receptionist in the latter organization described her relationship with the change agent who was struggling with the implementation of the system: I do not know (name of the change agent) well. . . . One of my colleagues knows her. . . . One of the doctors and some nurses seem to like her, but I think that others in the organization feel just like me that they do not know her. Figure 2 graphs the moderation between divergence and constraint observed in our data, using the median split of the distribution of change divergence. The crossover interaction is explained by the influence mechanisms available to change agents at opposite ends of the distribution of closure, with both cohesion and structural holes conferring potential advantages. The graph also shows that, in spite of the tendency of change agents with networks rich in structural holes to initiate more divergent changes, our sample included a sizable number of observations in all four cells of the 2⫻2 in Figure 1. The matching of type of change to the network structure most conducive to its adoption was therefore highly imperfect in our sample. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The notion that change agents’ structural positions affect their ability to introduce change in organizations is well established, but because research on organizational change has thus far not systematically accounted for the fact that all changes are not equivalent, we have not known whether the effects of structural position might vary with the nature of change initiatives. The present study provides clear support for a contingency Contributions These findings and the underlying contingency theory that explains them advance current research on organizational change and social networks in several ways. First, we contribute to the organizational change literature by showing that the degree to which organizational changes diverge from the institutional status quo may have important implications for the factors that enable adoption. In doing so, our study bridges the organizational change and institutional change literatures that have tended to evolve on separate tracks (Greenwood & Hinings, 2006). The literature on organizational change has not systematically accounted for the institutional environment in which organizations are embedded, and the institutional change literature has tended to neglect intraorganizational dynamics in favor of field dynamics. By demonstrating that the effect of network closure on change initiation and adoption is contingent on the degree to which an organizational change initiative diverges from the institutional status quo, this study paves the way for a new direction in research on organizational change that accounts for whether a change breaks with practices so taken-for-granted in a field of activity as to have become institutionalized (Battilana et al., 2009). Second, research on organizational change has focused on the influence of change agents’ positions in their organizations’ formal structures over their informal positions in organizational networks. Ibarra (1993) began to address this gap by suggesting that actors’ network centrality might affect the likelihood of their innovating successfully. Our study complements her work by highlighting the influence of structural closure in change agents’ networks on their ability to initiate and implement change. Third, our study advances the body of work on social networks in organizations. Network scholars have contributed greatly to understanding organi- 394 Academy of Management Journal zational phenomena associated with change, including knowledge search and transfer (Hansen, 1999; Levin & Cross, 2004; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Tsai, 2002) and creativity and innovation (Burt, 2004; Fleming et al., 2007; Obstfeld, 2005; Tsai, 2001). We extend this literature with insights into the structural mechanism for social influence through which network closure aids or impedes change agents’ attempts to initiate and implement organizational change. We thus build on the longstanding tradition of scholarship on the relationship between network position and social influence (Brass, 1984; Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Gargiulo, 1993; Ibarra, 1993; Krackhardt, 1990). Finally, despite its remarkable impact on network research, structural holes theory remains underspecified with regard to boundary conditions. By documenting that the benefits of structural holes are strictly contingent on an organizational change initiative’s degree of divergence from an institutional status quo, we join other scholars in highlighting the need to specify the contextual boundaries of brokerage and closure in organizations (Fleming et al., 2007; Gargiulo et al., 2009; Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000; Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). As for the phenomenological boundaries, scholars have thus far focused primarily on the notion that the nonredundant information generated by bridging structural holes is germane to idea generation (Burt, 2004) and identifying opportunities for change, and they have attended less to the role of structural holes in capitalizing on opportunities for change once they are identified. Yet gains from new ideas are realized only when an organization adopts them (Klein & Sorra, 1996; Meyer & Goes, 1988). Our findings move beyond anecdotal evidence (Burt, 2005) to show the relevance of structural holes in the domain of change implementation. In addition to these theoretical contributions, our findings can advance public policy and managerial practice by informing the development and selection of change agents in organizations. The question of how to reform existing institutions, such as financial and health care systems, has taken on great urgency all over the world. A better understanding of the factors that facilitate the initiation and adoption of change that diverges from an institutional status quo is crucial to ensuring successful institutional reforms. A key question policy makers face when executing major public sector reforms, such as the NHS reforms that the Labour government attempted to implement at the turn of this century, is how to identify champions who will become local change agents in their organizations. Our study suggests that one important dimension April in selecting local champions is the pattern of their connections with others in their organizations. Change agents can be unaware that their social networks in their organizations may be ill suited to the type of change they wish to introduce. In our sample, although change agents with networks rich in structural holes were more likely to initiate divergent changes, mismatches between the degree of divergence of a change initiative and the network structure most conducive to its adoption were common (see Figure 2). Because managers can be taught how to identify structural hole positions and modify their networks to occupy brokerage roles in them (Burt & Ronchi, 2007), organizations can improve the matching of change agents to change type by educating aspiring change agents to recognize structural holes in organizational networks. Organizations can also leverage change agents who already operate as informal brokers by becoming aware of predictors of structural holes, such as actors’ personality traits (Burt, Jannotta, & Mahoney, 1998) and characteristics of the structural positions they have occupied in their organizations over time (Zaheer & Soda, 2009). Limitations and Future Research Directions Our study can be extended in several directions. With regard to research design, because collecting data on multiple change initiatives over time is arduous (Pettigrew, Woodman, & Cameron, 2001), constructing a sizable sample of observations in the domain of change implementation constitutes an empirical challenge. Despite the limited statistical power afforded by the phenomenon we studied, the data confirmed our predictions, increasing our confidence in the robustness of our findings. But these reassuring findings notwithstanding, future research would benefit from investigating these research questions with larger samples of observations, laborious as they may be to assemble. Our sample was also nonprobabilistic in that we purposefully selected self-appointed change agents. This is a population of interest in its own right, because the change initiatives embarked upon by change agents can vary considerably in type and the degree to which they are adopted. Although pursuing an understanding of the determinants of change agents’ performance is a worthy endeavor even when the process of self-selection into the role is not analyzed, why and how organizational actors become change agents are as important questions as why and how they succeed. Our use of ego network data might also be viewed as a limitation. In-depth interviews with a substantial number of organizational actors in a subsample 2012 Battilana and Casciaro of eight change projects enabled us to corroborate change agents’ self-reports and reduce perceptual bias concerns. This validation notwithstanding, ego network data remain an oft-used but suboptimal alternative to whole network data. Although ego network data correlate well with dyadic data based on information gathered from both members of each pair (Bondonio, 1998; McEvily, 1997), and measures from ego network data correlate highly with measures from whole-network data (Everett & Borgatti, 2005), several studies have documented inaccuracies in how respondents perceive their social networks (for a review, see Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld, and Sailer [1984]). Future research can productively complement our analysis with fully validated ego-network data or whole-network data. The time structure of our data can also be further enriched. Collecting data on adoption 12 months after the initiation of a change enabled us to separate the outcome of the change initiative from its inception, and the qualitative evidence provided by our case studies suggested intervening mechanisms that might affect the change process. Our data do not, however, support a systematic study of the process through which change unfolds over time and change agents’ networks evolve. Future studies can extend work in this direction. With regard to context, although we were able to control for the influence of organizational size and status on the initiation and adoption of divergent change, studies are needed that will provide a finer-grained account of the possible influence of the organizational contexts in which change agents operate. The NHS is a highly institutionalized environment in which the dominant template of medical professionalism contributed to making the culture of NHS organizations highly homogenous (Giaimo, 2002). In environments characterized by greater cultural heterogeneity, organizational differences may influence the relationship between change agents’ network features and the ability to initiate and implement more or less divergent change. Future research should explore the influence of other germane organizational characteristics, such as the organizational climate for implementing innovations (Klein & Sorra, 1996). Because our analysis concerned a sample of planned organizational change projects initiated by clinical managers in the NHS, the external validity of our findings is also open to question. The hierarchical nature of this large public sector organization can increase both the constraints faced by change agents and the importance of informal channels of influence for overcoming resistance in the entrenched organizational culture. These idiosyncratic features that make the NHS an ideal set- 395 ting for the present study call for comparative studies conducted in different settings that better account for the potentially interactive effects of actors’ positions in organizational networks and contextual factors on the adoption of planned changes. 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Her research examines the process by which organizations or individuals initiate and implement changes that diverge from the taken-for-granted practices in a field of activity. Tiziana Casciaro (tiziana.casciaro@rotman.utoronto.ca) is an assistant professor of organizational behavior at the Rotman School of Management of the University of Toronto. She received her Ph.D. in organizational theory and sociology from the Department of Social and Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University. Her research focuses on organizational networks, with particular emphasis on affect and cognition in interpersonal networks and the power structure of interorganizational relations. Copyright of Academy of Management Journal is the property of Academy of Management and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

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