International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 94–118. History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches: Thinking about Greater Interdisciplinarity Steve Yetiv Old Dominion University This essay starts by exploring how history can contribute to the discipline of international relations (IR). It then moves beyond this question to explore a broader question, beyond IR and history, with which this symposium is concerned: how can we enhance interdisciplinary analysis in international studies? With regard to the first question, this essay advances several themes. First, while history can serve IR in several ways, it is especially salient to the study of change in IR. Second, the study of history can help us connect the dots across time in ways that can complement IR. Stringing detailed cases together or examining the broader sweep of a longer time period may help us discern causal connections that would have been buried in more streamlined and short-term analyses. Third, history can aid in theory-building, modeling, and testing in the study of IR. Quantitative approaches can also benefit from in-depth historical studies. In assessing the value of history to IR, however, it is critical to ask what type of historians and IR scholars we are considering and to be aware of the differences among them. Fourth, while it is useful to draw on history for IR, history also has its limits and may be misused. At the core, this essay examines how history can contribute to IR, but that analysis raises a broader question: how can we integrate notions and insights from various disciplines in international studies, including history and IR? This essay advances one schema for doing so, which it calls ‘‘integrated approaches.’’ It demonstrates one type of integrated approach for the study of foreign policy behavior. The approach systematically draws on multiple disciplines to explain behaviors such as decisions to make treaties, go to war, or ally with other countries. Keywords: international relations, history, interdisciplinary, integrated approach, foreign policy How can history contribute to international relations (IR)? This question is long standing and has been addressed by various scholars. In fact, the question of how to incorporate history has been salient in various fields including ‘‘historical sociology’’ (see Clemens 2007; Hobson and Lawson 2008), ‘‘historical anthropology,’’ ‘‘historical geography,’’ and ‘‘historical economics.’’1 This essay starts by exploring how history can contribute to IR. It then examines a larger question: how can we enhance interdisciplinary work in international studies (IS)? 1 The last of these is perhaps most prominently on display in recent times by Ferguson (2003) who, to illustrate the point, is both a professor of history and business, and uses history to inform modern world politics. doi: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00422.x  2011 International Studies Association Steve Yetiv 95 This article advances several themes. First, while history can serve IR in several ways, I argue that history is especially important for understanding change. It seeks to show where the work of historians and others conducting historical work can further benefit the field of IR in its efforts to understand and theorize about change. History is useful for exploring change across shorter or longer time periods and can complement comparative work, especially in terms of comparison across time. Second, history can help reveal possible causal links across time in ways that can complement IR. Stringing detailed cases together or examining the broader sweep of a longer time period may help us discern causal connections that otherwise would have been buried in more streamlined and short-term analyses. Third, as a partial result of the foregoing points, history can aid in theorybuilding, modeling, and testing in IR. We need IR theorists who privilege abstraction in the purist sense of the term, but we also need to encourage more work in IR that is both theory- and historically oriented. Those who do both history and IR in the field of IR are sometimes caught in the ‘‘under-privileged’’ center, but they play an important bridging role between the ‘‘pure’’ theorists and the ‘‘pure’’ empiricists. The value of history is not limited to the work of IR positivists. History can also benefit non-positivist work in the field of international relations, such as in some areas of constructivism and postmodernism. In assessing the value of history to IR, however, we need to inquire about the type of historians and IR scholars to whom we refer and to be aware of the differences among them. Fourth, while it is useful to draw on history for IR, history also has some limits and can be misused. In some cases, political scientists may find it hard to draw on focused historical studies that may not be intended to connect with key debates or theoretical notions in IR. When they do draw on history, IR scholars and decision makers may draw the wrong lessons or inferences, while policymakers may manipulate history for partisan or policy objectives. We can ask how history can contribute to IR, but that begs a broader question: how can we integrate notions and insights from various disciplines in international studies, including but beyond history and IR? Exploring the connections between history and IR naturally leads us to this larger question, because that exploration takes us across other disciplinary boundaries as well, a not uncommon journey in modern world affairs, as McDermott Wernimont, and Koopman (2011) demonstrate effectively with regard to psychology. This essay advances what it calls an ‘‘integrated approach,’’ which can help enhance interdisciplinarity. Working Definitions Since this essay is tasked in part with exploring how history can contribute to IR, it would be useful to define both history and IR for present purposes. Much discussion exists among historians about how to define history and the discipline is marked by a diversity of analyses and schools of thought. In this essay, I use the word ‘‘history’’ to refer to the work of historians and to non-historians conducting work on history. For purposes of this essay, I will adopt a definition of history gleaned from the work of several historians. Ernst Breisach has asserted that historians aim to demonstrate ‘‘the existence of a necessary link between history, as reflection on the past, and human life’’ (Breisach 2007:2); the task of historians then is to ‘‘design the great reconciliations between past, present, and future, always cognizant of both change and continuity’’ (Breisach 2007:3). Put another way, we can say that historians are trained to interpret past realities and to seek ‘‘significance, explanation, and meaning’’ (Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob 1994:275) in a field that sometimes aims to understand the causes and effects of 96 History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches events. As Robert Berkhofer suggests, historians wrestle with a key question of how and what we can know of the past given that ‘‘so much of it is gone by definition and experience’’ (Berkhofer 2008:2), and they aim to understand history even if they know that ‘‘no two accounts of the past are the same’’ (See Anderson, Hey, Allen Peterson, Toops, and Stevens 2008:3). As E. H. Carr famously noted, history is much more than digging up facts—facts that in and of themselves raise the question of what is a historical fact (Carr 1964:7; also see Appleby et al. 1994:241–270). Later in this essay, I will touch on different branches within the study of history. This will provide a better sense of the diversity of thought within the discipline. Since I will be trying to discuss what history can offer IR in the first part of this essay, it is important to define IR as well. IR also defies easy definition and categorization. Postmodernists, for instance, might well define IR differently than realist theorists who focus on the recurrent phenomena in world politics and embrace the scientific method; and scholars of decision making who draw on psychology, sociology, and other disciplines would favor a more expansive definition of IR. Nonetheless, for the present purposes, I borrow a definition of IR as the study of both power and conflict at the international level; power is critical because it shapes who ‘‘wins or loses’’ in political issues, while conflict generates disputes in the first place (Anderson et al. 2008:12–13). In this definition, IR is chiefly about international politics at the intersection of power and conflict, and the variables that shape power and conflict. IR should be distinguished from IS. If IR and history are not easily circumscribed, that problem is magnified with regard to IS. As Meredith Reid Sarkees and Marie T. Henehan point out, political science has deep roots in the United States, but IS remains relatively young, emerging within the United States only after World War II, and it is still evolving with competing views of its key goals and how it should be defined (Sarkees and Henehan 2010). Debate exists on whether to define IS as a discipline or as a multidisciplinary field (Harvey and Brecher 2002:2). IS can be defined as an interdisciplinary field that is influenced by a variety of disciplines; that draws on diverse methodologies, frameworks of analysis, and theories from multiple disciplines in the effort to explain chiefly international phenomena; and that offers an ‘‘integrative, comprehensive, and interdisciplinary approach to issues of global importance’’ (Anderson et al. 2008:2; also, see Denemark 2010). Herein, interdisciplinary work refers to that which draws on multiple disciplines to understand and explain phenomena. This can be done in many ways. Thus, for example, a book on the subject of terrorism could offer different chapters on terrorism written by historians, psychologists, and economists.2 Or concepts from different disciplines can be applied and ⁄ or be cross-fertilized in order to create new hybrid ideas, hypotheses, theories, and approaches.3 The Study of History and IR Prior to exploring how history can contribute to IR, it is useful to understand how these two disciplines differ. Varying interpretations exist about how the 2 Such an approach is presented in a prominent book on interdisciplinary studies (see Anderson et al. 2008)—also on how various disciplines approach the interdisciplinary issue of international migration, see Bommes and Morawska (2005). 3 On different kinds of interdisciplinary research and how they can enhance peace and security studies, see Lebow (1988). On the nature of and manner by which international law and IR theory can be cross-fertilized in an interdisciplinary manner, see Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood (1998). Also, for one manifestation of interdisciplinarity, see Klabbers (2009). On the history of interdisciplinarity in general and in specific disciplines, and in particular on its manifestation in cultural studies, see Thompson (2005). Steve Yetiv 97 study of history and IR differ, both in the field of history and IR. Some scholars argue that an ignorance of historiographical controversies presents a much more serious challenge to IR scholars who venture into history than the lack of engagement of the latter with IR controversies (Lustick 1996; Little 1999; MacDonald 2009). Whatever the case, we should take care, as historian Paul Schroeder suggests, not to distort and exaggerate the differences between political scientists and historians (Schroeder 1997:65–67; also Schroeder 2004). Yet, it is fair to discern several rough differences that should be viewed as falling on a continuum rather than representing stark polar opposites. Historians are more likely to focus on and elaborate upon single events or more limited time periods than are IR scholars. Of course, there are many IR scholars, as well as historians of different stripes such as Taylor (1954), Hobsbawm (1962), Kennedy (1987), Gaddis (1982), Ferguson (2003), and Herring (2008), who do not fit this description at all. But it is fair to describe this as a tendency. Moreover, historians will be more satisfied with providing a good history of a historical period, while IR scholars will not often be satisfied with providing a historical account in and of itself. IR scholars also often seek generalizations, while many historians are more likely to see events as sui generis, even though neither historians nor political scientists can really avoid simplification given the great complexity of what they study. Generalization and specification are different undertakings, but they are neither necessarily dichotomous nor separate on the path toward discovery. It may be true, as Isaiah Berlin suggests in his study of Tolstoy, that some thinkers are like ‘‘foxes’’ in that they seek to explain and see events through multiple lenses, while others are like ‘‘hedgehogs’’ who see the world through the focus upon a central idea (Berlin 1953). But overall, we need both types of thinkers for knowledge to be advanced over a long period of time. If IR scholars are more likely to seek generalizations, they are also more likely to see events in terms of existing generalizations. In one symposium chiefly involving diplomatic historians and IR scholars, contributors tended to find that ‘‘unlike international historians, who did not expect explanations for a particular historical episode to be consistent with arguments for other events, political scientists assumed that particular historical outcomes and processes could be treated as examples of a larger phenomenon’’ (Elman and Elman 2008:358).4 While some historians, as historian Stephen Pelz observes, do use generalizations and theories to explain events, ‘‘even if they are reluctant to admit to the practice’’ (Pelz in Elman 2008:87), IR scholars are far more conscious of theory and see it as an endpoint. One might say that historians reveal pieces of a puzzle. They know that they have limited meaning in themselves, but they believe that others will use them to construct the larger picture in longer-range, broader, or comparative studies. Political science, on the other hand, prioritizes the essential in an attempt at parsimony which is often believed to be where one will end one’s investigation. For IR scholars, generalization is used for prediction, whereas historians generalize to streamline history so that it can be explained. Otherwise, they could write a million volumes on any period of history. IR scholars are also more likely to interpret great powers as pursuing grand strategies. As with the aforementioned symposium, several contributors involved in a 2008 symposium agreed that ‘‘much of mainstream IR is fixed on the notion that international relations are repetitive, timeless, and cyclical’’ (Elman and Elman 2008:359). A particular branch of foreign policy studies claims that states pursue coherent, consistent strategies over extended periods of time—that 4 On this symposium, see Elman and Elman (2001). 98 History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches their behavior conforms with a grand strategy such as balance of power or hegemonic grand strategy (see, for example, Art 2003). By contrast, historians are less likely to see world affairs in terms of a grand narrative (see Reus-Smit 2008:400–402). Another difference is that IR scholars sometimes seek to make predictions, while historians are loathe to do so. This does not diminish the value of their work for IR scholars, but it creates a separate, disconnected space of inquiry and analysis. The same can be said of policy. Many IR scholars seek to make policy recommendations, while this would be far more rare among historians, with some notable exceptions (for instance, Neustadt and May 1986). Whatever the exact differences between the disciplines, some scholars see an increasing convergence between them. They identify a so-called historical turn in IR in which history is being brought back increasingly into IR analysis; in which qualitative research is gaining ground, thus putting some IR scholars in a better position to draw on the work of historians (see Elman and Elman 2008:361–64). For his part, Keene goes so far as to argue that the ‘‘new history’’ has moved beyond chronological description and narrative into greater analysis that resembles political science (Keene 2008:381–389). But What History and What IR? Such a historical turn may be in the making for what history can offer IR, but I argue that understanding what history can offer IR depends on asking to which historians and political scientists do we refer? Different schools in both disciplines bring varying ontologies to bear in their work; different core assumptions about the nature of interaction in the human condition and world politics; and about the critical actors, processes, and interactions that produce outcomes. Thus, for neorealists, anarchy socializes states, and variations in state capabilities are central. In contrast, constructivists privilege ideas and socially constructed norms in shaping outcomes over material structures and capabilities. These ontological differences fundamentally affect which IR scholars can learn best from which historians. At the most basic level, I argue that qualitative IR scholars can benefit more from the work of historians than can quantitative IR scholars, although both can certainly benefit. Qualitative scholars can benefit more because the quantitative scholars are more likely to embrace abstraction and to detach from historical analyses. Game theorists can certainly benefit from a better understanding of the context that they model, as can agent-based modelers and other types of simulation modelers. Such knowledge can generate more useful assumptions about how actors and systems behave and can also help calibrate models. However, they can also model without great knowledge of any event or context. In fact, some modelers would argue strongly in the area of game theory, or for instance, simulation modeling, that abstraction is a much better approach toward analysis—even a sine qua non for efficacy. Partly due to this view of the role of empirics, and partly because assumptions need not be realistic to be useful if they help illuminate realities, it is fair to argue that game theorists can benefit less from historians than can, for instance, neoclassical realists whose approaches invite and require good historical analysis. By this, I mean that the central thrust of neoclassical realism is that balance of power dynamics cannot in and of themselves explain key outcomes such as balancing and bandwagoning; rather, it is also vital to incorporate micro-level variables such as perception, ideology, and domestic-society relations to explain these outcomes. In turn, it is difficult to understand micro-level variables, which are not as easily amenable to abstraction as are balance of power dynamics, with slender historical analysis. In fact, the main methodological approach of Steve Yetiv 99 neoclassical realists is to test hypotheses and theories using the process-tracing of case studies (see Christensen 1997; Rose 1998; Schweller 2003). Within both fields, there are more particular genres to consider for a sensible rendering of what history can offer IR. Hobson and Lawson identify several schools of thought among historians, which, while hardly exhaustive, underscore the diversity of thought in the discipline. The school of Radical Historicism, insofar as it can be discerned, assumes that good history must consider the realities of a given time and place, which shape events; postcolonial studies provide an example of such an approach, which brings it closer to constructivist IR, albeit bereft of the grand scope analysis of Wendt (1999). By contrast, traditional historians aim to capture truth through archival work ⁄ primary documents. Such approaches are averse to the work of Radical Historicism (Hobson and Lawson 2008:426). While traditional historians produce work that differs from that of IR theorists, IR positivists may well see the work of traditional historians as most useful out of the different approaches in history. They can draw upon it to test their theories in a positivist manner. Meanwhile, in contrast to scholars from the other two schools, historical sociologists are not focused on a ‘‘random series of isolated movements,’’ but rather on the broader sweep of events, employing more generality.5 Big picture historians seek to examine large-scale change, but that is also the central province of historical sociologists who have interacted profitably with some branches of history and IR (Lawson 2006: especially 408–409). As Lawson (2007:344) describes it, historical sociology, which can be viewed as at least two centuries old, involves efforts by economists, philosophers, and sociologists to reveal, through the study of history, a generally applicable analysis of how core features of the modern world evolved, including capitalism, democracy, and industrialization. Thus, the study of history is combined with sociology’s effort to reveal why historical work is significant in terms of the social world. Because of its scope and goals, Hobson and Lawson suggest that a historical sociological approach offers a better chance of dialogue with IR theorists than the traditional historical approach (Hobson and Lawson 2008). And these historians are well suited to the task of advancing the study of change in IR, due to their scope of study and orientation. I would argue that, in contrast, IR constructivists are far less likely to learn from traditional historians than from social or cultural historians. Reus-Smit, for instance, sees constructivist IR as more compatible with social and cultural history, because the latter tend to reject the notion that historical work can reveal one truth as opposed to multiple truths. Likewise, in a similar vein, postmodern historians largely reject the notion of objective histories and instead see history as a function of how we perceive it, making it important to consider events from different perspectives. Such an approach makes their work more valuable to postmodern IR scholars than to positivists. In this case, it is not just a question of ontological congruence but also of epistemology; about the central question of what we can know and of how we know what we think we know. If two scholars differ on these central questions, they will likely find it harder to benefit from each other’s work. Meanwhile, on the perennial question of theory, some scholars draw a distinction among schools of history. Historian John Lynn, for example, distinguishes between traditional and so called ‘‘avant-garde’’ historians. The latter embrace theory, even with ‘‘passion,’’ albeit such theory ‘‘is not the type that international relations specialists would feel comfortable with…;’’ that being theory imported mainly from ‘‘philosophy, literary criticism, and anthropology’’ (Lynn 5 On the nature of this school and on the three waves of historical sociology, see Hobson and Lawson (2008:427–435). 100 History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches 2001:360–361). One obvious exception is the increasingly prominent alternative schools, anchored by postmodernism and parts of the constructivist literature. To be sure, much overlap exists within the divisions discussed above. Thus, cultural ⁄ constructivist approaches are also normally archivally based. And ‘‘traditional history’’ involving detailed archival work can be complimentary to the broad qualitative, sociological, constructivist, postmodern categories sometimes typologized under ‘‘Radical Historicism.’’ Even so, the question of what historians and what IR scholars we are discussing remains salient. Methodological, theoretical, and empirical differences certainly exist in both fields. Exploring Change: History and IR This essay advances the notion that history can offer IR much in the study of change. To be sure, IR scholars have explored change in important ways (such as Biersteker and Weber 1996; Blyth 2002; Clark 2007; Crawford 2002; Gilpin 1981; Goldstein 1988; Holsti 2004; Hui 2005; Ikenberry 2001; Kugler and Organski 1989; Legro 2007; MacDonald 2009; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Nexon 2009; and Philpott 2001). However, the work of IR scholars could be enhanced with a better understanding of short- and longer-run change. Exploring Short-Run Change: The Comparative Method Historical study can be of great value to IR in diachronic comparisons aimed at revealing causality, and, in turn, changes over a relatively shorter period of time. A sophisticated literature exists regarding debates about the implications of temporality for social-scientific inquiry (see, for example, Abbott 2001; Bartleson 1995; Bearman, Moody, and Faris 2002; Crouch and Farrell 2004; Mahoney and Rueschmeyer 2003; and Tilly 1995). The debates touch on critical areas including how to view historical processes themselves—a question that could define what the analyst considers to be germane in the first place (see Abbott 2001: especially chapter 5). Space prevents exploring these works in further detail, but it is fair to say that some of the most salient contributions in IR and other disciplines hinge on discovering, or theorizing about, correlations between or among variables or, at a higher level, cause-effect links. It seems, then, that we should be interested in understanding what best enables this enterprise. There are many paths to discovery and understanding, but the study of history and IR, separately and together, is important to this enterprise in central ways. Historical study can be of use to IR in diachronic comparisons by helping illuminate what has changed out of a broader context of interacting and evolving variables. Originally associated with John Stuart Mill, the diachronic comparative method of difference can advance the study of IR across a range of critical issue areas and is seriously under-utilized by students and scholars. The comparative method is used to compare cases that in theory differ in only one significant respect. This would approximate an experiment in which one group receives a stimulus while another does not. Any changes in the experimental group might then be attributed to the stimulus. Nothing in world politics really resembles such a controlled experiment. However, the diachronic approach addresses the problem of controlling variables better than do crossnational studies because it involves more constants and fewer variables (Lijphart 1971:689). That is, fewer variables change over just time than over both time and area. While in statistics one variable can be held constant while others fluctuate, that is not possible with history. One cannot change history to eliminate and then to recreate an event or action, be it a peace treaty, trade agreement, or change of regime, thus controlling for it and revealing correlation. Steve Yetiv 101 Consequently, it is necessary to improvise methodologically. Such an effort involves many considerations, but at the core, it is vital to grapple with two basic threats to valid inference. The first refers to specific events other than the action under study that might account for observed effects. The second threat is called maturation. It refers to regular changes correlated with the passage of time and is distinguished from history in that it refers to processes rather than to discrete events (Campbell 1988:226–227). Addressing threats to valid inference helps separate the effects of the action in question from those of other variables. A before ⁄ after comparison of the effects of such actions helps assess these effects. Historical study, be it by historians or others, can be vital to such before ⁄ after comparisons. This is because it adds context and depth to the analysis which can help address threats to valid inference. This is true even if the before ⁄ after comparison is based on data analysis. That can be supplemented by examining the context in which it has meaning. Work by historians on how minor events can alter history may be of particular use to IR scholars that seek before ⁄ after diachronic comparisons. This is because the minor event is circumscribed enough to lend itself to such analysis. Historian A.J.P. Taylor, for instance, is famous for showing how minor events can have major unintended consequences (1954, 1965). Long-Run Change and IR Theory History not only aids in understanding short-term change, but also in grasping long-term dynamics. History is vital for judging change in the first place. As Ferguson and Mansbach put it (2009:366), ‘‘To know if and how change has taken place, it is necessary to have a baseline—the past—against which to compare and contrast the present.’’ As scholars, we sometimes make claims or assumptions about how much things have changed or not changed over time. Take the related but different issues of American empire and decline. Some thinkers assert that the United States is an empire like those of the past (O’Reilly 2008), while others contest this point in part by arguing that it is not an empire because, unlike great powers of the past, it does not aggrandize territory (Nye 1990). These types of works are very interesting and important and could be further developed or explored with comparative historical work that analyzes the great empires of the past, such as that of Burbank and Cooper which argues, in surveying key empires in history, that their decline was triggered in large part by virtue of the challenges they faced in controlling their outer boundaries (2010). Historians have engaged these questions of empire for some time. The literature by historians is full of such work, dating back to Thucydides, but in more modern times to Gibbon and his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire through the seminal and acclaimed work of Fernand Braudel (1972), who investigated the clash of empires and cultures in the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century by looking broadly at contexts (agricultural, financial, economic, demographic, technological, etc.) and back through historical development over a millennium. In more recent times, historians of various stripes have addressed questions of empire (for example, Kennedy 1987; Maier 2006; Porter 2006). As MacDonald (2009) points out, the historiography of British and American political expansion can inform contemporary debates on empire and change in important ways. For instance, some argue that historiography reveals the limitations of commonly cited arguments that the United States is an empire simply because it is powerful or that it is anti-imperial simply because it disavows conquest (MacDonald 2009:65). Another prominent area of inquiry serves as a further example. At the empirical level, scholars have produced useful work on whether the United States is in decline, but this analysis could be further developed with systematic comparison 102 History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches across time. The question of American decline is not new. In more recent times—the 1980s—Japan was viewed by some thinkers (for example, Kennedy 1987) as in a position to supplant American domination, while others disputed that notion (for example, Nye 1990). However, the question of American decline has risen anew at the turn of the twenty-first century. Even President Barack Obama stressed in his inaugural speech that the country has a ‘‘nagging fear that America’s decline is inevitable.’’ This was not hyperbole, given the collapse of Wall Street icons like Bear Stearns; the credit and auto industry crises; falling economic output; exploding national debt; seemingly endless war in Afghanistan and Iraq; global image problems; and the rise of potential contenders, namely China. The question of the extent to which, if any, the United States is in serious decline begs a method. It can be judged with a systematic comparison to previous periods and to other actors. Preferably, it would involve comparing US capability over time and its power relative to that of other actors. To do so, we could start by operationalizing American capability in basic ways (GDP; percentage of companies in the Fortune 500; B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees; percentage of global regimes that are democratic, etc.). We then could develop more sophisticated measures from them and compare these indicators across time. However, such analysis also could benefit from more in-depth history, not just in the sense that the indicators would be compared across successive historical periods, but also in that history could offer context within which to better enable the interpretation of our data and possibly point to indicators that deserve to be included in the first place. As Gaddis argues, historians ‘‘know that every concept is embedded in a context, and that the only things permanent about contexts is that they shift’’ (Gaddis 2001:321). But it is not just this propensity that can inform the study of change, but also the work itself or of others conducting historical work. Thus, it might be sensible to examine America’s role in international economic institutions or to examine a central issue area over time in order to see whether Washington achieved its goals in that issue area, more or less over time. It might be that it had capability on paper,6 but that for reasons that historical analysis might inform, its capability was not very fungible or translatable into influence. It might be useful to examine its position and disposition relative to that of other great powers that declined in order to assess whether the US has unique characteristics that can allow it to escape what befell them. Perhaps we would discover that America’s management or domination of technological change had diminished or increased over time, making it all the more critical to understand the link between technology and world politics. Anticipating the contribution of Fritsch (2001), this is a natural point at which to note the absence of technology studies from the dialogue. Revolution and even evolution in technology presents a challenge to causal inference across the board, because increasingly observed effects in world politics can be traced back to the technological revolution. As Fritsch underscores, the global diffusion of technology has accelerated across all areas of human endeavour. This has generated serious consequences for global prosperity and for human welfare—consequences that have been understudied empirically and neglected in the study of IR and in IS more broadly. Social scientists sometimes make claims about long-range change, but infrequently they focus on the near-term. As Pierson (2003) puts it, in looking for contiguous causes and outcomes, they can sometimes miss important factors. This is because some processes take a very long time to unfold and often fall 6 The vaunted Correlates of War project would be useful in this respect. Steve Yetiv 103 outside the scope of social science analysis. Certainly, that would be true of our examples here of American empire and potential decline, not to mention that of other great powers in history. Second, at the theoretical level, the question of change in world politics is critical, because the main theories of IR make fundamental assumptions about change. Assessing the extent to which these claims or assumptions are on target or are useful requires some understanding of history. Of course, some IR scholars may feel no need to be bothered with history inasmuch as assumptions do not have to be realistic to be useful. After all, the rationality assumption is crucial to economics and to various fields of political science. Yet, while assumptions can be useful even when they are unrealistic—successful predictive models often fit that description—there can be value in assessing to what extent they conform with reality. This message is reinforced by the exegesis of neuroscience and decision making from Zak and Kugler (2011). Realists ⁄ neorealists assume that world politics is cyclical; that wars recur; that cooperation is perpetually difficult to achieve; that not much changes at the heart of world politics (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). By contrast, their detractors in the liberal ⁄ neoliberal school, as well as constructivists such as Wendt (1999), assume fundamentally that much changes over time, be it the rise and impact of international institutions (Keohane 1984, 1987; Keohane and Martin 1995:39–51; Martin and Simmons 1998:729–757; Russett and Oneal 2001; Dai 2007); evolutionary learning across history; changes in global culture from Hobbesian to Lockean to Kantian (Wendt 1999), or of the development and effects of globalization (for instance, Rosenau 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001; Keohane and Nye 2001; Held and McGrew 2002). All of these claims, be they theoretical or empirical, beg questions about history and change. For example, one major difference between IR theoretical schools has to do with globalization. Some scholars believe that it has generated a radically different global environment, in sharp contrast to the assumptions of realism. Thus, some theoretical attention focuses on the notion that under globalized conditions, small perturbations might ‘‘reverberate’’ or cause ‘‘cascading disruptions’’—dynamics that researchers have noticed in other forms of globalization (Jervis 1997; Rosenau 2003: chapter 9; Maoz 2006). As Rosenau suggests, there is now a ‘‘widespread understanding that unexpected events are commonplace, that anomalies are normal occurrences, that minor incidents can mushroom into major outcomes... ’’ (Rosenau 2003:209). IR has something to learn from history here, whether or not the historical work consulted by IR scholars was intended to illuminate the question of how much has really changed in terms of globalization. Analyses of different periods of history could be consulted by IR scholars to offer information useful for comparing different periods and could engender more fruitful exchange among historians and political scientists, not to mention the fodder for induction about the conditions under which change is most likely to occur. For instance, some scholars would argue that the world was more globalized in the nineteenth century than it would be 100 years later. The nineteenth century is sometimes called ‘‘The First Era of Globalization,’’ because it was characterized by high international trade and investment between the European imperial powers, their colonies, and, later, the United States. Whatever one thinks of it, it is commonly believed that this period of globalization began to break down with World War I and then the Great Depression in the early 1930s. By looking back at previous periods, it is easier to evaluate to what extent globalization in the economic, cultural, and technological sphere has risen on the back of institutional efforts to decrease trade barriers and costs. These institutions, founded at Breton Woods, New Hampshire after World War II, include the World Bank; the International Monetary Fund; and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now World 104 History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches Trade Organization), which launched a number of subsequent agreements to remove restrictions on trade. Greater historical comparison may well reveal that while economic interaction was high in the nineteenth century, it was different in many ways from economic interaction today, making the contemporary arena more interdependent. In addition to economic globalization, more historical comparisons would be of value regarding technological, political, and cultural globalization. It is hard to question the rise of numerous technologies linked to the internet and wireless interaction, and their massive impact on economic, political, and cultural relations, but just how different are such technologies and their effects on various areas of world politics? Political globalization has expanded as well, as reflected in the massive rise in the number of global organizations, international treaties, and agreements, but to what extent have they shaped international interaction across a range of areas, including business, space, conflict, energy, and the oceans? Cultural globalization can be viewed as the rise of cultural exchanges and practices among nations and peoples. But just how different is this dimension today compared to one or two centuries ago? Furthermore, understanding change, partly via the use of historical work, can help in theory-building. As Ferguson and Mansbach suggest, ‘‘IR theorists who lack historical sensitivity simply assume that the past resembles the present’’ (Ferguson and Mansbach 2008:378). And that can bedevil the ability to generate theory, especially in terms of theories about change in world politics, of which there is a relative dearth. Hegemonic war theory, power cycle theory, power transition theory, and long-cycle war theory, for instance, are theories of change, as is Wendt’s social theory of international politics (1999), but there are not many of this kind. Neorealism, according to Waltz and his critics, cannot explain change (Waltz 1979:323–330), although some scholars disagree with Waltz’s view of his own theory (Hobson and Lawson 2008:418–419). Others might say that neorealism is a theory of change insofar as it indirectly explains why things do not change; why certain patterns of behavior—balances—recur in world politics, under the unrelenting, seemingly immutable nature of anarchy. But non-change is a different dependent variable than change. Explaining persistence and change are not the same undertakings, albeit Waltzian theory provides one perspective on prospects for core change in world politics. Revealing Causal Connections and Path Dependency History can help not only in understanding change over time, but also in the related effort of understanding how events are connected or of recognizing the importance of path dependency. This is the notion that a causal dependence exists between prior events and processes and contemporary events and processes. Single, detailed case studies, or a combination of many studies or books culled from the literature, facilitate efforts to see how one event leads to another. That makes it easier to ascribe causality in history’s train. This would be harder to accomplish from more streamlined analyses of the past which lack the deep context for revealing how seemingly unrelated events might well be connected. Without historical understanding, it is harder to explain why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, an act that was shaped over a period of two decades or more. That such connections are in play is not the story, but little political science work actually tries to tease them out of the historical process, in contrast to the work of, for instance, historical institutionalism that is more attuned to such longer-run analysis (See Thelen 1999, 2005). In fact, it is not uncommon in IR to offer explanations that lack historical background, despite the large literature of historically informed social science on the causes of war. Such work can facilitate efforts to identify the cause-effect Steve Yetiv 105 connections that can inform broader generalizations about issues such as the causes of war. It can also inform broader questions: do major powers tend to pursue grand strategies over time such as hegemonic strategy (Layne 2006) or do they tend to be reactive to events over which they lack control? Why do countries use force in lieu of pursuing a bargaining outcome? Do wars cause future wars? Does an imbalance of power cause war? IR scholars sometimes ask even larger questions that deal with change, which may or may not be spurred by an understanding of history but which can be addressed in part by understanding history: for instance—why have empires declined? Answering such questions can benefit from history because they assume a comparison to past events and variables. We might also ask theory-oriented questions that require some understanding of how history is connected across much longer periods of time: for instance, how did events in one century shape another? Does the concentration of power lead to war (e.g., did German unification in 1870 contribute to the eventual outbreak of World War I?) as neorealists might ‘‘postdict’’; or does concentrated power plus the behavior of leaders (Wilhelm II, assuming power in Germany in 1890) illuminate the causes of war (World War I), as neoclassical theorists might posit? Or are these simplifications privileging parsimony at the expense of fidelity? Mainstream IR theorists abstract away from the individual level and assume in part that state preferences are either invariable or not shaped by individual beliefs. However, a greater understanding of the role of individuals in history might indicate where it might be profitable to combine levels of analysis, while retaining parsimony, and can surely benefit foreign policy theory. Of course, historians are not the only ones who study history in a way that can help IR thinkers understand change. Beyond the historical work of some IR scholars such as the neoclassical realists, three large schools of thought deserve mention here, if only in brief. The first school, historical sociology, has already been touched upon. The second school is comparative historical analysis, which is composed mainly of sociologists or IR scholars. Comparative historical analysts are concerned with causal analysis in processes over time, such as the causes of social revolutions or the formation of states; they seek to assess causality via studying similar and contrasting cases and statistical large-N analyses. However, the bifurcation between these thinkers is not clear, and they often build upon each other’s work. Thus, as Amenta (2003:97) points out, according to ‘‘some standard views, comparative and historical research involves a division of labor in which historians work for social scientists.’’ In fact, many historians pursue larger goals than that. Historical institutionalism constitutes the third school. It is largely concerned with revealing why, at a macro-level that can span centuries, countries evolved along different developmental paths; and how state institutions emerged from enduring legacies of political struggles. Such work is important to contemporary comparativists in political science as well as to IR scholars who are interested in the links between subnational and international phenomena. This is in part because, as Thelen suggests, ‘‘knowing how institutions were constructed provides insights into how they might come apart’’ (1999; 400). Historical institutionalism is different from but can also inform rational choice institutionalism which seeks to understand the coordinating functions of institutions (see Thelen 1999). Theory-Building, Modeling, and Testing The study of history and of change may provide inputs into IR theory-building and testing. As political scientists Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba effectively demonstrate (1994: 42–43), detailed studies can offer some basis for 106 History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches inference to broader generalization and aid in the most difficult task that social science faces—simplification. For his part, Gaddis points out that process tracing, which involves making deductions about how events and processes are connected with references to general principles across disciplines, is not much different from what historians do (in Gaddis 2001:324). Whether done by historians, political scientists, or others, process tracing, in aiming to uncover causal links, can then serve as fodder for building, testing, and refining hypotheses and theory. Indeed, process seeks to identify through a theory-informed approach a causal chain that links independent and dependent variables (see Bennett and George 2005:206–207), which represents a central case study method (see Bennett and Elman 2007). In this sense, and in others, qualitative and quantitative work are similar and can inform each other (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier 2008). General theory-building or modeling, be it in the form of statistics, game theory, or various forms of simulation, requires a sense of how things hang together in reality; of how variables are related. The parsimony that even purist IR theorists seek need not preclude the value of historical study. Rather, such study can augment the search for what the critical variables should be in the first place and how they might be correlated or causally connected. Presumably, at least some of the most abstract thoughts in IR must have their genesis in something observed. IR phenomena are not like physics or mathematics where imagination is a sufficient leap for theory-building and for eventual discovery. Einstein did not observe the phenomena about which he theorized, but the leading lights of IR theory certainly observed the modern subjects of world politics and presumably have some education in history. Some might argue that a better understanding of the Great Depression might have led risk modelers on Wall Street to include variables in their models helpful to predicting or even limiting the Wall Street meltdown of 2008. The other contributions to the symposium offer similar observations about how political processes may be more fully understood, anticipated, and even altered (at least implicitly) through greater understanding of psychological, technological, and neuroactive forces. Historical evidence, of course, may be used in quantitative approaches, even if not conducted by historians. Thus, some comparative historical analysis uses large-N statistical analysis, such as the analysis of revolutions. While the level of detail in this work which is conducted often by sociologists falls short of that of traditional historians, it is more involved than that of most political scientists, but it feeds into the study of IR (see Goldstone 2003). Historical evidence can also be critical for testing hypotheses and theories, especially in areas where metadata or artificial evidence are prominent, and quantitative methods are neither possible nor appropriate for the subject matter. As Larson points out, historical evidence is ‘‘essential to assess the accuracy of psychological explanations of foreign policy decisions,’’ because experiments generate useful hypotheses about cognitive and motivational influence, albeit in an artificial environment, in need of ‘‘validation by real-world data’’ (Larson 2001:327). Of course, history also can be a laboratory for the study of counterfactuals, as a means for drawing inference or testing theory. Such ‘‘what if’’ questions, which are employed across disciplines, can help identify the importance of hypothesized variables that are assumed to have been absent. Often, such variables may be tied to broader theories, allowing for those theories to be tested, if the counterfactual approach is used effectively. Indeed, all counterfactuals are not created equal. As is well known, they can be misused, especially if the variable assumed to have been absent is too divorced in time from the outcome that it is hypothesized to explain (Tetlock and Belkin 1996; King and Zeng 2007). Steve Yetiv 107 History may also help, to some extent, in calibrating models. For instance, assume that one develops an agent-based simulation model to study the impact of terrorist attacks on the global shipping system. One can populate the model with actors whose behavior is governed by algorithms that approximate how those actors are likely to behave, but calibrating the model requires identifying past events that may approximate terrorist attacks, such as earthquakes or labor strikes and then assessing their effects. Since we cannot create terrorist attacks, these other events help assess whether our model captures the essential effects that it purports to predict and explain. Historians may offer the work that, when combined with data analysis of such effects, can help in identifying cases and their key contours for calibrating models of various stripes, or non-historians can engage in historical analysis for this purpose.7 Historians who are especially interested in theory—some of it even IR theory—should also cooperate more with theory-oriented IR scholars. We see little published work of this kind. Yet, historians, as Gaddis points out, must strike a balance between particularization and generalization (see Gaddis 2002, especially pp. 14–15), as must many IR scholars, and so there is an area of intersection that can be exploited better. The technical methods of IR and sociology may also help in understanding history, producing a two-way street of interaction. For instance, modelers have tried to represent critical nodes in history in models in order to understand the historical process better. Exploiting social network analysis, scholars have attempted to answer questions of this kind: when, if ever, do single events change history (Bearman et al. 2002)? This question is of obvious cross-disciplinary significance, and answering it would enrich an understanding of history and also of the conditions under which events produce major effects—in other words, it would provide key information for theory-building. History and Non-Positivist Agendas Beyond the positivist agenda, IR scholars of a different type can benefit from history. For instance, some IR constructivists can use history in their own way. They can draw upon the work of social and cultural historians in particular. This is because they share certain ontological claims, allowing for greater inter-operability of thought and analysis. The historical work of social and cultural historians tends to be shaped in ways that they can tap. If they seek to understand the perspective of many Palestinians and Israelis about any event in their struggle (Israel’s independence in 1948, for example, or the 1967 Six Day War), such historians are more likely to provide such accounts. Scholars identify a so-called cultural turn in the social sciences, and certainly cultural studies and postmodernism have gained some ground in IR. These schools of thought consist of numerous approaches that defy easy categorization and can overlap with constructivism, but they tend to reject causal analysis as a central goal of social sciences and instead highlight the implications of context for inter-subjective understandings over perceived causal relations within them (Mahoney and Rueschmeyer 2003: especially 21–23). In contrast to social and cultural historians who may be more able to interface with IR constructivists and postmodernists, traditional historians will seek to discover what actually occurred in historical events, with far less regard or even disdain for multiple perspectives or contingent truths. However, that is not to say that the work of traditional historians cannot benefit IR constructivists and postmodernists. They can draw on such historical accounts to try to understand 7 On approaches to, and challenges regarding, scientific progress in IS, see James (2002). 108 History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches better the influences of ideas. This may help them assemble disparate historical accounts of how culture and ideas have shaped lenses of actors, and in turn political action, and how those lenses interacted with the environments in which they sought to generate outcomes (for a brief example, see Reus-Smit 2008:411–414). The Limits of History for IR Scholars A number of limits and misuses of history are worth mentioning in brief. History can only take us so far in the study of IR, partly because pure deduction is sometimes its own intellectual leap, anchored in the mind’s ether with only modest empirical moorings. Pure IR theorists could study one hundred historical cases and still not ferret out insightful generalizations for theory. Imagination, even if uninformed, can be its own engine of discovery. Some IR scholars such as those who want to use history to test theory may question the extent to which historians have achieved an ‘‘accurate’’ narrative, because most IR scholars will lack the knowledge of the event or period in question to make a good judgment. While historians can help IR scholars in understanding change, that presupposes that we understand history well enough to use it as a benchmark and that we also have a clear grasp of the present to compare with the past. As political scientist Ian Lustick points out, we cannot treat the work of historians as an ‘‘unproblematic background narrative from which theoretical neutral data can be elicited for the framing of problems and the testing of theories’’ (1996:604). Insofar as those engaged in historical study are unaware of IR theory, they are not concerned with, or possibly able to ferret out, connections in their work that are salient for IR theory. Thus, it is up to theorists to discern such connections in material that may not be suited for such purposes. That creates the potential for intellectual dislocation or for seeing in history the patterns of theory not intended by the historian. To be sure, some historians are engaged in all sorts of generalizations, causal analysis, and theoretically-informed work; they are not simply atheoretical recorders of processes and events whose work IR scholars must trust for their own purposes. However, in some cases, political scientists can have difficulty drawing on extremely focused historical studies that do not connect with key questions, debates, or theoretical notions in IR. The extent of the problem will depend on many factors, including the subject matter, the goals of the scholars, the epistemological and ontological assumptions of their enterprise both within and between the disciplines, and how their work is presented and located in the literature. All historians, of course, are not the same. As noted earlier, some historians, such as Gaddis (1982), Kennedy (1987), and George Herring (2008), help meet this challenge by producing works of breadth that tie into the IS literature on issues such as strategies of containment; the decline of empires; and the nature of great power behavior and the causes of war. That makes it easier for them to have a dialogue with political scientists. Of course, it is true that history can serve the practical goal of informing decision makers, on the assumption that if they knew more history, they would be more likely to make better decisions (Neustadt and May 1986). As Joseph Nye, who served in high-level policy-making positions in the administration of President Bill Clinton, illuminates quite effectively, theory, history, and policy go hand in hand and should not be regarded as separate efforts (George 1993; Nye 2009). But history can also mislead us if, for instance, we are seduced by historical analogies that do not fit present conditions. As they say, a cat that has sat on a hot stove may not sit on one again, but nor will it sit on a cold stove. Santayana’s famous warning may be true, but it may also be true that those who remember history may not understand the present. Steve Yetiv 109 As Kammen (2008) rightly explains, history can be misused for partisan or policy objectives. Those who invoke it may be pushing their own agendas. Or, in the view of a constructivist, they are constructing reality using history for political goals. It may also be that, even if the history is accurate, its lessons may be too complex to understand; subjected to different interpretations by different actors; or too painful to put in effect (see Heisler 2008). Synergies across Borders Some historians think negatively that political scientists know little about a lot, while some political scientists think that historians know a lot about little of import. These views are not productive. Nor are the divisions between comparativists and IR scholars, the qualitative and quantitative thinkers, inductive and deductive thinkers, and positivists and non-positivists. Or between the economists who see themselves as closest to the hard sciences, and their critics who see them as unable to explain or predict much, outside the confines of optimistic rationality assumptions and artificial models. McDermott, Wernimont, and Koopman (2011) offer a constructive way forward on the latter intellectual stalemate, in which rational choice is seen as a basic model of human behavior in need of elaboration and even modification by context. In short, derived from various flawed dichotomies, ‘‘all or nothing’’ views divide departments, disciplines, and scholars at least some of whom should really be asking how their disciplines can most profitably inform each other. But the question arises as to how it might be possible to build bridges within and across disciplines in a systematic manner and to create synergies across different levels of analysis. As former International Studies Association President Michael Brecher put it a decade ago in his presidential address, failure to do so has ‘‘long bedeviled International Studies’’ (Brecher 1999:229). While progress has been made since his address, his exhortations to cross epistemological, empirical, and theoretical borders through sensible integration within and across disciplines still make eminent sense, especially in a world whose problems increasingly cross borders and intersect across disciplines. The Integrated Approach for Enhancing Interdisciplinary Study So far, the essay has focused on what history can offer IR, but it now seeks to explore the second question of the essay which examines how to enhance interdisciplinarity in IS. Asking what history can contribute to IR is part of this inquiry, but now I seek to present what I call the ‘‘integrated approach.’’ Such approaches, I believe, may spur thought on how to enhance interdisciplinarity in international studies. It is sensible here to draw upon the example with which I am most familiar—my book, Explaining Foreign Policy (Yetiv 2004, 2011). It introduced what I called the ‘‘integrated approach’’ for the study of government behavior. Drawing on this work can illustrate the broader concept of ‘‘integrative approaches’’ that I seek to advance here. The integrated approach consists of using different perspectives to help explain government behavior: how decisions are made (decision making) and why governments do what they do, or the reasons for their actions. The goal of the integrated approach is to explain a foreign policy behavior such as the choice to go to war, to sign a peace treaty, or to make an alliance using different cuts on reality derived from different models or perspectives. After offering these competing explanations of the same behavior, we then test these perspectives or different model-driven narratives against the record. I argue that doing so can yield insights that can be integrated into better explanations of 110 History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches government behavior than we would have in using just one perspective or model as a guide to explanation. After testing the perspectives against the record, the integrated approach can also be used to bridge areas of theory that tend to be treated as separate, such as the domains of system structure and individual psychology as identified by McDermott, Wernimont, and Koopman (2011). Thus, a rational actor model explanation could be combined at the system level with an individual-level explanation to enhance overall explanation. Cross-fertilization of notions and insights from different disciplines is fairly common in foreign policy studies and elsewhere, such as between economics and psychology (for instance, see Ariely 2008, 2010) in the increasingly important field of behavioral economics.8 Such cross-fertilization is also attempted in various other ways between psychology and political science in areas of political psychology (for instance, see McDermott 2004; Welch 2005; Renshon and Suedfeld 2007) or in the more specific field of prospect theory (Levy 1997; McDermott 2004). Efforts in political science to integrate cognitive and rational theories in particular overlap these various fields and subfields (Mintz 2003; Mintz and DeRouen 2010). It is very difficult to develop a broad and sophisticated understanding of rationality—one of the central concepts in the social sciences and possibly beyond—without crossing disciplinary boundaries. However, the integrated approach seeks to expand on such approaches, by drawing systematically on key disciplines. Existing approaches often advance just one perspective or model preferred by the analyst (Allison and Zelikow 1999; especially 13, 15–17; Byman and Pollack 2001; especially 107–114). The model will often vary with the analyst, but we tend to assume that states try to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of various options for dealing with the issue at hand, and then choose, or try to choose, the best option that advances national interests (Allison and Zelikow 1999; especially 13, 15–17). We then tend to describe their behavior as if they acted as a coordinated actor rather than as a combination of competing groups, bureaucracies, committees, and individuals with their own interests, preferences, and modes of behavior. This conception of government behavior is captured explicitly in the state-centric version of what is called the rational actor model. It is drawn from the study of IR, with some basis in economics. Such mono-theoretical explanations based fundamentally on the rational actor model can certainly illuminate government behavior. They are important building blocks to more complex explanations. And in some cases, they may capture enough of what is vital to be satisfactory. But they can also be misleading or incomplete,9 if they seek to force reality into prefitted boxes. The rational actor model derives chiefly from political science as applied to states, but could be cross-fertilized better with other disciplines to explain foreign policy behavior. The point of making greater use of political psychology is developed by McDermott, Wernimont, and Koopman (2011). The perspectives used in the integrated approach are chosen because, as Table 1 suggests, they cover basic aspects of government behavior and offer alternative and sometimes competing explanations.10 Using these five perspectives yields five different explanations for the same government behavior, in Rashomon style. 8 Thaler is viewed as one of the founders of this field. In recent years, he has worked with scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Daniel Kahneman to illuminate how economic theory can be made more robust if it accounts for how people actually behave, given cognitive and psychological factors. On this genre, see their latest work (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). 9 Allison offered one of the first challenges to the rational actor model on the basis of domestic political processes. On the revision of this work, see Allison and Zelikow (1999). 10 The term ‘‘perspective’’ downplays pretension to theory insofar as it does not necessarily connote the ability to generate or falsify predictions, while not precluding the potential for doing so. 111 Steve Yetiv TABLE 1. Perspectives Within the Integrated Approach Level of analysis Goal or result Decision making Disciplines Maximize perceived national interests Simplify reality and decision making Cost ⁄ benefit analysis Schema ⁄ analogies ⁄ biases Domestic politics model Unitary actor ⁄ strategic context Human mind ⁄ information processing Politicians ⁄ domestic politics Meet domestic objectives Groupthink Group chiefly Government politics model Individual in committee setting Likely defective decision making Push agency interests ⁄ generate collage Constrained by domestic concerns Group dynamics Political science ⁄ economics Cognitive psychology ⁄ history Political science ⁄ philosophy Rational actor model Cognitive Bargaining ⁄ conflict Sociology Political science ⁄ business The five perspectives are based on different assumptions about what level of analysis is most crucial (level of analysis) in explaining government behavior; what are the direct or indirect goals or results of the behavior of the central actor posited in the perspective (goal or result); and how that actor makes decisions consciously or subconsciously (decision making). For each case in question, we would start off by offering a rational actor model explanation of the behavior we seek to examine and then move to offer competing explanations. In contrast to the rational actor model, the cognitive approach offers a different explanation or part of an explanation for government behavior by focusing on the minds of decision makers. Drawn from psychology and tied to history, it assumes that individuals consciously or subconsciously use mental shortcuts, like analogies to historical events, to simplify reality in order to facilitate decision making (Khong 1992). As pointed out at greater length by McDermott, Wernimont, and Koopman (2011), cognitive approaches can complement or challenge rationalist explanations. The domestic politics model highlights how government behavior is shaped by leaders who construct reality to meet their own domestic-level goals at least as much if not more than national objectives. Unlike the other models, this model, drawn from political science and from philosophy’s contribution to constructivism, assumes that leaders are concerned with their position, influence, and reputation in the domestic realm. By contrast, the social psychology theory of groupthink focuses on the impact of group dynamics on decision making, on the pressures for individuals in groups to conform. It offers its own unique take on government behavior. For its part, the bureaucratic politics model, drawn from political science and business, centers chiefly on individuals within a committee setting who bargain with others and take positions driven by the interests and politics of their respective fiefdoms. Seeing government behavior through the bureaucratic lens highlights other possible explanations for how decisions were made. The integrated approach allows for integration of insights between two disciplines or more. For instance, the application of the cognitive approach can illuminate historical cases and, in turn, inform explanations of foreign policy action. It can help assess how analogies impact upon decision making. In turn, that can help in assessing if and how analogical reasoning complements or challenges rational actor model explanations. Integrating insights into one account can yield better explanations of events, but the approach also allows for more complex integration across areas that are 112 History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches often treated separately. The different perspectives carry some irreconcilable assumptions, but when used in combination as cuts on reality, they allow for integration of domestic and international relations theory and variables. This is because the rational actor model is an IR theory of how states interact, while the other four perspectives are foreign policy theories that feature domestic-level variables. The integrated approach also allows for integrating the three key areas of foreign policy: process, choice, and outcome. The rational actor model is designed to explain just one of the two central dimensions of decision making—‘‘choice.’’ In basic terms, it tells us how actors choose. It tells us that when faced with a choice between alternatives, actors will take (or try to take) the option that promises the best outcome. But it ignores process or the nature, content, and origin of the beliefs, perceptions, preferences, and objectives of actors. Process is what happens in decision making prior to choice or to choosing among options. The rational actor model treats these elements of process as a given and then tells us how choices will be made. They are assumed rather than established through research and analysis. But what if, for instance, we seek to understand how actors form their preferences in the first place, or in other words, why they prefer certain policies over others, such as free trade over protectionism, economic sanctions over negotiation, and war over economic sanctions. All of the non-rational actor model perspectives offer insight at different levels of analysis into preference formation—a key aspect of process. The integrated approach shows how analogies can be a source of preferences, how certain policies are preferred because they accommodate the historical lesson or message provided by the analogy. Others are less preferred because they clash with the lesson or message of the analogy—something that historical study can help flesh out. The analogy acts as a prism through which preferences can be formed, downgraded in importance, and even rejected if the analogy is powerful in its impact. The domestic politics model assumes that preferences cannot simply be presumed to be national and largely invariant. They may arise from the personal interests of leaders or organizations. It also suggests that preferences can form as a function of the discursive environment created by decision makers who seek to construct the adversary, but in the process alter that environment as well. The environment, then, can push leaders to prefer certain policies over others. While the domestic politics model highlights preference formation, group dynamics can as well. The theory of groupthink assumes that group preferences will form early in an event. This occurs largely through group dynamics driven in part by a partial group leader whose preferences can prevail in part because of groupthink dynamics. Moreover, the bureaucratic politics model illuminates factors that may shape each player’s perceptions, preferences, and likely course of action. It informs us that preferences will be derived based on the bureaucracies from which individuals hail and from bargaining among individuals. These interests, in competition, may ultimately shape the international behavior of actors more than concern for perceived national interests. Generating and Exploring Propositions The integrated approach generates propositions that can further our understanding about how to integrate domestic and IR theory and variables; to integrate process, choice, and outcome in the study of foreign policy; and to integrate insights from different disciplines. A few, basic hypotheses may illustrate this notion, starting with one that involves history, followed by others that involve other disciplines. Steve Yetiv 113 Proposition 1: Analogizing back to a historic event that induces fear among decision makers will increase the potential for groupthink. (Reasoning: it will generate stress that is linked to groupthink.) Proposition 2: Strategic interactions that resemble non-iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma are more likely to generate groupthink. (Reasoning: the external threat will be higher in a noniterated situation where cooperation is lower, and groupthink in theory is more likely when the external threat is higher.) Proposition 3: The higher the level of government politics (bargaining and rivalry among committee members who represent particular departments and agencies) in a government, the less bargaining leverage that government will have at the interstate level on the issue being addressed by the committee. (Reasoning: it will be harder to generate resolve at the interstate level with greater politics and rivalry at the domestic level.) The first two propositions are in line with positions advocated by McDermott, Wernimont, and Koopman (2011) that we must do more in international studies to explore the impact of stress and other psychological factors. And these propositions link different levels of analysis and draw upon different disciplines to highlight possible causality. The first requires an understanding of history and cognition as it relates to a past event. The second requires an understanding of strategic interaction between actors at the international level and the impact of such interaction on group behavior at the domestic level. The third proposition bridges foreign policy theory (the government politics model from political science and business) with IR theory (bargaining, strategic interaction, game theory). The division of foreign policy and IR theory, while sometimes useful for research, may also be bridged profitably in a systematic manner. History has another role in the integrated approach presented herein. It involves presenting different theory-driven perspectives of the same government behavior but also testing them. Thus, we may argue that the decision making of President George W. Bush in the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis, which was triggered by Iraq’s August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait, was influenced by the Munich analogy especially given that he participated in World War II. Exploring such a notion would require not only a good historical understanding of the Persian Gulf crisis, but also of the period of the Munich analogy (See Yetiv 2004, 2011). Such tests of the present perspectives cannot easily be conducted with statistics or other quantitative approaches, though more specific hypotheses derived from the integrated approach may be amenable to that kind of assessment. As such, part of the testing needs to be done with detailed case studies either drawn from the work of historians or conducted by non-historians with an appreciation for the importance of understanding history. Conclusion This essay started by examining what history can contribute to IR. It argued that history is most useful to IR in the study of short- and long-run change, as well as in testing IR theories, but that the usefulness of history for IR depended on the type of history and the type of IR in question and on how history was used. In this sense, the great diversity of thought within both fields on issues of method, theory, and empirics, and on what is most critical for scholars to study makes it difficult to evaluate them with a broad brush. The real question then becomes: what history and for what IR? The essay addressed a second, larger question about how to enhance interdisciplinary work in the IS, including but moving beyond history and IR. The essay 114 History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches offered the idea of integrated approaches and presented a particular kind of integrated approach aimed at the study of government behavior, an approach that is flexible and could include fewer or different perspectives as well (for more details on the approach, see Yetiv 2004, 2011). While this essay considered government behavior, I would also argue that such integrated approaches are worthy of consideration in other areas that are interdisciplinary by nature. An example would be the study of transnational issues, such as terrorism, energy, or the environment (see Anderson et al. 2008). These areas are hard to study from any one disciplinary angle, although each discipline can additionally illuminate them in its own right. Energy, for instance, involves at a minimum political science, economics, history, business, and science. 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