Require:
Book: The Fundamentals of Ethics by Russ Shafer Landau Third Edition
For the assignments- Three detailed paragraphs. One quote with quotation marks and
cited APA from the book in each of three paragraphs is mandatory. So each paragraph
has a quote with quotation marks and cited in APA from the book (three quotes minimum
from the book for the assignment). Then discuss the quote by quoting or paraphrasing
from at least one of your other sources in each of three paragraphs. Each paragraph has
a quote from the book and at least one cited paraphrase or quote from another source.
Four total sources for the assignment!
Question:
•
Explain the difference between intrinsic value and instrumental value, and give
examples of things you take to be valuable in each way. Next, define hedonism. What
does the hedonist claim is intrinsically valuable, and what does he claim is instrumentally
valuable?
•
Hedonists distinguish between two types of pleasure. Explain this distinction and give
examples of each type of pleasure. Which type of pleasure do hedonists claim is more
important? Why do you think they say this? Do you agree with this claim?
•
Can you think of any case in which experiencing pleasure fails to contribute to a
person’s well-being? If so, consider what a hedonist might say in order to undermine
such a case.
•
What are “evil pleasures” and why do they seem to be a problem for hedonism?
•
Do we always have a reason to do whatever would benefit ourselves? How does the
desire satisfaction theorist explain the connection between reason and self-interest? Is
the desire theorist's account better than the objective theorist's? Why or why not?
24 THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS
When asking about what makes a life go better for us, we will of course
want to know which things are instrumentally valuable, so we can get our
hands on them. But when we take a philosophical step back and ask why
(for instance) going to the dentist, or making money, makes us better off,
we will need to have some grasp of what is intrinsically good for us-
something whose presence, all by itself, makes us better off.
A natural way to start thinking about this is to consider some clearly
good lives, ones that definitely qualify as being good for the people who
live them. My top ten wouldn't include those of anyone you'd ever heard
of. Instead, I'd pick the lives of certain of my friends and acquaintances,
people who are deeply invested in their exciting work, secure in their love
for others, physically healthy and active, and possessed of modest but
real self-esteem and self-respect. But there is no need to be limited by my
choices. Think about your own top candidates, and then ask yourself this
question: What makes each of those lives so good? Is there a single feature
that each of them shares, something that explains why they are as good as
they are? If so, what is it?
The most popular answer is just what you'd expect: happiness. On this
view, a good life is a happy life. This means something pretty specific. It
means that happiness is necessary for a good life; a life without happiness
cannot be a good life. It also means that happiness is sufficient for a good
life: When you are happy, your life is going well. The happier you are, the
better your life is going for you. And the unhappier you are, the worse off
you are.
On this view, there is only a single thing that is intrinsically good for
us: happiness. Everything else improves our lives only to the extent that it
makes us happy. Likewise, there is just one thing that is intrinsically bad
for us: unhappiness. Unhappiness is the only thing that directly reduces
our quality of life.
There is a name for this kind of view: hedonism. The term comes from
the Greek word hédoné, which means “pleasure” According to hedonists,
a life is good to the extent that it is filled with pleasure and is free of pain.
Before we can assess hedonism, we have to recognize that there are
two fundamental kinds of pleasure: physical pleasure and attitudinal plea-
sure (enjoyment). The first kind is the sort we experience when we taste a
delicious fall apple, or when we let the jets from a hot tub dissolve the ten-
sion in our backs. These very different kinds of pleasurable feelings usually
make us happy, at least for the moment. But such feelings are not the same
thing as happiness.
The Attractions of Hedonism
Hedonism can trace its origins in the West to the ancient Greeks. Epicu-
rus (341-270 BCE), the first great hedonist, argued that pleasure was the
only thing worth pursuing. Yet he was not calling on us to pursue carnal
pleasures. Epicurus argued that the most pleasant condition is one of
inner peace. The ideal state of tranquility comes largely from two sources:
moderation in all physical matters, and intellectual clarity about what is
truly important.
2. Many who reject hedonism still believe that happiness is the key to a good life. The
disagreement is about what happiness really is. Hedonists insist that it is a kind of experience
we have—the experience of enjoyment. Others, such as Aristotle, claim that happiness is much
more than this; it is, in particular, a combination of enjoyment, intelligence, virtue, and activity.
The sort of happiness that we discuss in this chapter and the next is the one that hedonists have
in mind-namely, enjoyment.
26 THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS
Philosophy is the path to such clarity. Philosophy can reveal the false
beliefs that cause so much unhappiness-specifically, as Epicurus saw it,
our beliefs that death is bad for us, that the gods are mean-spirited and
easily angered, and that sex and money are key ingredients in the good
life. Philosophy can help explain the error of such popular ways of think-
ing, and thereby ease us along the path to happiness.
Skip ahead a couple thousand years, and consider the view of English
philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), perhaps the most famous
hedonist since Epicurus. Mill's critics claimed that hedonism was a "doc-
trine of the swine." because it advised us to live like animals, gaining as
much brute pleasure as possible. Mill argued that pleasures come in dif-
ferent levels of quality, and that the best pleasures for human beings were
those that come only through hard work—especially the work of the mind.
Intellectual and artistic pleasures topped his list; physical pleasures were at
the bottom. Mill thought that people who have enjoyed both physical and
Conclusion
Hedonism has always had its fans. And, as we have seen, there are many
good reasons for its popularity. It explains why there are many paths
to a good life. It strikes a balance between a view that imposes just one
blueprint of a good life and a view that allows anything to be valuable so
long as you think it is. It provides a ready explanation for why misery so
clearly damages a life and why happiness so clearly improves it. Hedonism
offers a natural stopping point for explaining what is intrinsically valu-
able. It accounts for why the rules of a good life allow for exceptions. And
happiness is what we want for our loved ones—what better evidence that
happiness truly contributes to a good life?
And yet hedonism is not problem-free. I think that hedonists have
good replies to the paradox of hedonism, the worry about evil pleasures,
and Ross's Two Worlds objections. But things become trickier when we
consider the value of a happiness that is based on false beliefs. Further,
hedonists cannot allow for the intrinsic value of autonomy. They can't
make sense of the idea that, of two lives containing the same amount of
happiness, the one that continually shows improvement is better than the
one that has gone steadily downhill. Hedonists also fail to appreciate that
CHAPTER 2 Is Happiness All that Matters? 43
unhappiness is often a symptom that something intrinsically valuable-
something other than happiness—has been lost.
Perhaps happiness is not, after all, the key to our well-being. Let's now
consider an alternative approach—one that tells us that getting what you
want is the measure of a good life.
Evil Pleasures
Some people take great delight in doing the most awful things. Think of
supposed friends who tempt others into addiction, or a powerful boss
who betrays a vulnerable employee. These tawdry people may really be
enjoying themselves. But when such enjoyment comes at someone else's
expense, it hardly seems a good thing, much less the best thing.
We can build another anti-hedonist argument around this point. Call
it the Argument from Evil Pleasures:
1. If hedonism is true, then happiness that comes from evil deeds is as
good as happiness that comes from kind and decent actions.
2. Happiness that comes from evil deeds is not as good as happiness
that comes from kind and decent actions.
3. Therefore, hedonism is false.
This argument fails, and it's instructive to see why. There is a confu-
sion contained within it, and it's one that is easy to fall prey to.
When we say that happiness that comes from one source is as good
as happiness from any other source, we might mean that each is mor-
ally equivalent to the other. When we read premise 2 and nod our heads
approvingly, this is probably what we have in mind.
But this is not what hedonists have in mind. They don't think that
each episode of happiness is as morally good as every other. Rather, they
think that the same amount of happiness, no matter its source, is equally
beneficial. According to hedonism, happiness gained from evil deeds can
improve our lives just as much as happiness that comes from virtue. In
this sense, happiness derived from evil deeds is as good as happiness that
comes from virtue—each can contribute to our well-being just as much as
the other. Hedonists therefore reject premise 2.
And aren't they right to do so? Think about why the happiness of the
wicked is so upsetting. Isn't it precisely because happiness benefits them,
and we hate to see the wicked prosper? If happiness doesn't make us better
CHAPTER 2 Is Happiness All that Matters? 35
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