Paul Reveres Engraving of the boston massacre- History Discussion post

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Paul Revere’s engraving of the Boston Massacre, “the Bloody Massacre in King Street,” is considered a masterful example of war propaganda. How does Revere’s engraving illustrate the thinking of participants in Revolutionary era mobs. Be sure to relate your discussion post to the Gilje and Wood readings. At least 250 words

I have attached the readings below.

A Note on Mobs in the AmericanRevolution Gordon S. Wood* here used to be a time when we thoughtthat mob violencein the T preindustrial age of the eighteenth century was strictly a European phenomenon. In recent years, however, we have been made increasingly aware of how important and prevalent mob activity was in early American history. From the time of the first settlements on through the eighteenth century, social eruptions and popular disturbances were a recurrent event in the American colonies. Mob rioting at one time or another paralyzed all the major cities; and in the countryside violent uprisings of aggrieved farmers periodically destroyed property, closed courts, and brought government to a halt. With such a history of popular disturbances in the colonies it was not surprising then that mob action would become, as the Tories pointed out, "a necessary ingredient" in fomenting the American Revolution. "Mass violence," Arthur M. Schlesinger reminded us in I955, "played a dominant role at every significant turning point of the events leading up to the War for Independence. Mobs terrified the stamp agents into resigning and forced a repeal of the tax. Mobs obstructed the execution of the Townshend Revenue Act and backed up the boycotts of British trade. Mobs triggered the Boston Massacreand later the famous Tea Party." And even after the Revolution had begun "civilian mobs behind the lines systematically intimidated Tory opponents, paralyzing their efforts or driving them into exile." In short, the American colonies were no more free of urban and rural riots and disturbancesthan eighteenth-centuryEngland and France.' Yet while recognizing that eighteenth-century crowd disturbances were as prevalent in the colonies as in Europe, almost all historical accounts of American mob activity have suggested that the colonial mobs were fundamentally different from their European counterparts. True, the American Revolution produced mob violence, but these crowd disturbances, most historians imply, were by no means comparable to the * Mr. Wood is a memberof the Departmentof History, HarvardUniversity. 1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, "Political Mobs and the American Revolution, I765I776," in American Philosophical Society, Proceedings, XCIX (r955), 244. For a succinct summary of mob violence in colonial America see Bernard Bailyn, ed., Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750-1776,I (Cambridge,Mass., I965), 58i584. This content downloaded from on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 23:00:53 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 636 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY popular uprisings during the French Revolution, or even to the various English mob demonstrations during the same period. The American mobs seem to have behaved in a particularly unusual fashion, and in contrast to the violent uprisings of eighteenth-century Europe they appear to be hardly mobs at all. Apparently in order to distinguish the American from the European crowds of the eighteenth century, historians have usually emphasized the middle-class character of the colonial mobs. "It is evident," Carl Bridenbaugh has written, "that in American cities those who constituted the mob, so called, were far from being a mere 'rabble' seeking bread and an opportunity to release pent-up boorish boisterousness by despoiling the Egyptians." Indeed, "the contrast with the still medieval English mob is striking in that the colonial variety had in them always a majority of middle-class citizens and the approval of many more." Bridenbaugh has concluded, however, as has Bernard Bailyn in a more recent note on American mobs, that the American crowds possessed many real "deeply rooted, popular grievances" which found expression in general political issues and principles, a conclusion which by itself has important and unsettling implications for our traditional assumption about the character of American mob behavior. In his comprehensive account of the mob violence surrounding the Stamp Act and its marked effectiveness in pressuring the stamp distributors into resigning, Edmund S. Morgan has given us a somewhat different view, denying that the mobs were the "spontaneous outbursts of the rabble," and picturing them more as passive bodies of men manipulated by their socially superior leaders; indeed "the episodes of violence which defeated the Stamp Act in America were planned and prepared by men who were recognized at the time as belonging to the better and wiser part." So extraordinaryin fact were the mobs' discipline and discrimination in the destruction of property that Morgan was led into a noticeably sympathetic description ("the previous evening's entertainment") of the mob violence. The American Revolutionary mob, Lloyd Rudolph has concluded in a pointed comparison of eighteenthcentury European and colonial mobs, demonstrated particular restraint "in confining its activities to specific and limited objectives. . . . In America, the mob stopped when it had attained what it set out to do." The rioters destroyed only property, and particularly selected property, and took no, or few, lives during the Revolution. "Heads did not roll in the American Revolution," wrote Bailyn; "mobs did not turn to butchery." "A singular self-restraint characterized the frenzies," declared Schlesinger, "for the participants invariably stopped short of death." In short, as Rudolph has summarized, the American mob, like the RevoluThis content downloaded from on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 23:00:53 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MOBS IN THE REVOLUTION 637 tion of which it was a part, was remarkably moderate and disciplined. It was "never swept up into an irrational destruction of lives and property." Thus America was "spared from the mob in the European sense of the word." Indeed, it seems to be the assumed conclusion of all historians of eighteenth-century American crowd disturbances that it was only "in Europe that the real mob existed."2 But what actually is a "real mob," a mob "in the European sense of the word"? It would seem that our image of the eighteenth-centuryEuropean mob has been very impressionistic and hazy, but understandably so, since only in recent years have scholars begun to study the preindustrial European crowds with care and sympathy, investigating them not as static abstractionsbut as concrete historical and social phenomena, seeing them not as the authorities saw them, but as they were to the participants. One of the boldest and most prolific of these scholars is George Rude, who has recently sought to bring together his several studies of the European crowd into a more general discussion, entitled The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, I730I848.3 Speculative as Rude's conclusions about the European crowd may be, they still have interest and significance for all historians; but they have a special relevance for students of the American Revolution, for in effect they call into question the assumptions about the unique quality of the American mobs in the eighteenth century. Far from discovering the irrational, fickle, and destructive abstractions described by Gustave Le Bon, the father of modern crowd psychology, and others, Rude found the eighteenth-century English and French crowds to be unusually rational with a "remarkable single-mindedness and discriminating purposefulness.""In fact," he writes, "the study of the pre-industrial crowd suggests that it rioted for precise objects and rarely engaged in indiscriminate attacks on either properties or persons." The Gordon Riots of I78o, for example, were "directed against carefully selected targets," and "considerable care was taken to avoid damage to 2Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743-1776 (New York, r955), 114, 305-306; Bailyn, Pamphlets of the American Revolution, I, 583, 58r; Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to RevoluSchlesinger, "PoliticalMobs tion, rev. ed. (New York, i963), 231-232, i64, i89-i9i; and the American Revolution," 244; Lloyd I. Rudolph, "The Eighteenth Century Mob in America and Europe,"American Quarterly,XI (1959), 459, 460, 453, 46i, 469. 3 (New York, I964). Rude'sother studies include The Crowd in the French Revolution (Oxford, I959); Wilkes and Liberty: A Social Study of 1763 to 1774 (Oxford, i962); and a number of articles, esp., "The London 'Mob' of the Eighteenth Century,"The HistoricalJournal,II (959), i-i8. This content downloaded from on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 23:00:53 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 638 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY neighboring property."Moreover, those who assume that the mobs "have no worthwhile aspirations of their own and, being naturally venal, can be prodded into activity only by the promise of a reward by outside agents or 'conspirators'" are greatly mistaken. The crowd's motives were diverse and complicated, ranging from the seeking of "elementary social justice at the expense of the rich, les grands, and those in authority" to the devotion to political principles and generalized beliefs about man's place in society. Such complex goals reflected the varied composition of the crowds. For the crowds of eighteenth-century England and France, even the French Revolutionary mobs, were not composed of the riffraff of society, but rather represented a fair cross section of the working class together with some petty employees and craftsmen occasionally interspersed with men of "the better sort." Nor were the preindustrial crowds bloodthirsty. According to Rude the usually selective destruction of property was a constant characteristic, "but not the destruction of human lives." There were notably few fatalities among the rioters' victims. In the week-long Gordon Riots not a single person was killed by the mobs. And, in fact, "the French Revolution in Paris, for all the destructive violence that attended it, was not particularly marked by murderous violence on the part of crowds." Most of those who died during the European demonstrations were rioters killed by the magistracy or the army. "It was authority rather than the crowd," Rude concludes, "that was conspicuous for its violence to life and limb."4 What is particularly striking about Professor Rude's analysis of the eighteenth-century European crowd is its resemblance to the description of the American Revolutionary mobs that we have been used to. When viewed in light of Rude's study, eighteenth-century American crowd behavior loses much of its distinctiveness. It now becomes more difficult to emphasize the peculiar rationality and discrimination of American mobs in their treatment of property. It is also hard to see how they were composed of more respectable, middle-class elements than their European counterparts. And it appears especially distorting to stress the unusual moderation and respect for lives displayed by American crowds.5 It seems misleading, in short, to conclude that during the American Revolutionary crisis "no mob action approached the mayhem and destruction of French and English mobs of roughly the same period."' 4Rude, The Crowd in History, 6o, 214, 224, 233, 253-257. 5 For examples of mob persecutionand violence in the American Revolution see Wallace Brown, The King's Friends: The Compositionand Motives of the American LoyalistClaimants(Providence, i966), 47-48,64-65, 78, I35, 215. 6 Rudolph, "The Eighteenth Century Mob," 458. It seems more misleading than This content downloaded from on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 23:00:53 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MOBS IN THE REVOLUTION 639 Nevertheless the historical and social situation and the consequences of mob violence in America were very different from those in Europe, and it would be distorting the very basis of Rude's studies to ignore these differences. Eighteenth-century American society had neither the complexity nor the number of grievances possessed by eighteenth-century French society. In the colonies there were no bread riots, no uprisings of the destitute. Yet, as Rude has pointed out, it was not really poverty that precipitated rioting in Europe. Many of the disturbances occurred in times of greatest prosperity; even the food riots were not the product of long-suffering deprivation but of temporary price rises and shortages. Rude's study suggests that the preindustrial demonstrations represented not the anarchic uprisings of the poor and hopeless but rather a form of political protest made both necessaryand possible by the increasing democratization of a society lacking the proper institutions for either the successful expression or the swift repression of that protest. It is perhaps in this context that the American mobs can most instructively be viewed and compared with the European crowds. What particularly seems to set mob violence in the colonies apart from the popular disturbances in England and France is not so much the character of the mob, the purposeful and limited nature of its goals, its consideration for human life, or even the felt intensity of its grievances; rather it is the almost total absence of resistance by the constituted authorities, with all that this absence may signify in explaining the nature of the society and the consequences of the outbursts. If the institutions of law and order were weak in eighteenth-century England and France, in America they were unusually ineffectual. Scholars have emphasized time and again the helplessness of the imperial government when confronted by a colonial mob reinforced by widespread sympathy in the community.8 It was apparently helpful in understanding the course of the French Revolution to lump the mob clamor and violence of the period with the organized terror of the revolutionary authoritiesin 1793-94. The Terror was the instrument of the state, and its brutality is perhapsbetter equated with the repressiveactions of governing bodies faced with antiauthoritarianthreats. 7 Rude,The Crowdin History,2i8-2i9. See, for example, Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, i62, i64-i65, i68, T70, I92, 253Whenever troops were used by the British against the mobs, deaths did result. A British major, in command of Fort George during the Stamp Act riots in New York on Nov. i, I765, later testified that if he had fired on the crowd he could have killed goo of the mob that night. Herbert M. Morais, "The Sons of Liberty in New York," in Richard B. Morris, ed., The Era of the American Revolution (New York, I939), 284; Morgan,Stamp Act Crisis,254. 8 255. This content downloaded from on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 23:00:53 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 640 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY more the restraint and timidity of the British authorities, and less the moderation of the American crowds, that prevented a serious loss of lives during the American rioting. The nearly complete breakdown of the royal government's ability to command support in the society in the years before independence worked to retard an aggravation of colonial grievances and a rapid escalation of killing and violence, but it did not make the American mob any less a mob.9 Moreover, the weakness of the legally constituted authority in America did not end with the Declaration of Independence and the formation of new popular governments. The Whig belief in the people's "right of resistance" (which had often hampered magistrates in England dealing with mobs)10 became a justification for continued disorder in the years after I776. Serious rioting recurred in many of the major cities and formed the background for the incorporation movements in Boston, New Haven, Philadelphia, and Charleston in the I780's." Extralegal groups and conventions repeatedly sprang up to take public action into their own hands, to intimidate voters, to regulate prices, or to close the courts.12To some in the I780's it seemed as though mobs were taking over the functions of government.'3 This was not simply a chimerical fear, for the legislatures in the I780's appeared to be extraordinarilysusceptible to mass 9 For a discussionof the psychologicalimportanceof opposition and resistancein intensifying revolutionaryferocity and commitment, see Silvan S. Tomkins, "The Psychology of Commitment: The Constructive Role of Violence and Suffering for the Individual and for His Society,"in Martin Duberman, ed., The Antislavery Vanguard:New Essayson the Abolitionists (Princeton, i965), 270-298. R. R. Palmer interestinglysuggests in The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America 1760-i800. Volume II: The Struggle (Princeton, i964), I25, that John Adams, under counterrevolutionarypressures such as those in France, might well have followed a course similar to that of Robespierre,another provincial lawyer thrust into revolutionaryleadership 10 Rude, The Crowd in History, 263. 11Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation,1781-1789 (New York, 1958), ii8-122. 12 See, for examples, Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counterrevolutionin Pennsylvania, 1776-1790 (Harrisburg, I942), 70-74; Robert J. Taylor, WesternMassachusetts in the Revolution (Providence, I954), 75-80, II2, ii6-iI7, 120-12I, I43-150; Irving Brant, James Madison, Father of the Constitution, I787-1800 (Indianapolis, I950), ii6; South-CarolinaGazette and General Advertiser (Charleston), July I5, I783, May TI-13, 1784. '3Meriwether Smith to Jefferson, June 25, July 30, 1779, William Fleming to Jefferson, July I3, 1779, all in Julian Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jeflerson (Princeton, I950- ), III, i6, 33, 59; Samuel Adams to John Adams, Apr. i6, 1784, and to Noah Webster, Apr. 30, 1784, both in Harry A. Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams (New York, i908), IV, 296, 305-306. This content downloaded from on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 23:00:53 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MOBS IN THE REVOLUTION 64i demonstrations and mob violence. The state governments were continually forced to submit to various kinds of popular pressures, often expressed outside the regular legal channels. In this atmosphere Shays's Rebellion represented something of an anomaly, largely because the farmers of western Massachusetts,unlike other groups in the I780's, found no release for their pent-up grievances in legislative action but instead were forcefully resisted by the authorities. Connecticut had no violence like that of Massachusetts,said Noah Webster, "because the Legislature wear the complexion of the people." Only "the temporising of the legislatures in refusing legal protection to the prosecution of the just rights of creditors," remarked David Ramsay, freed the Southern states from similar disturbances. Within a few months, however, observers noted that the Shaysites were trying their strength in another way, "that is," said James Madison, "by endeavoring to give the elections such a turn as may promote their views under the auspices of Constitutional forms." With "a total change" of men in the legislature, wrote Webster, "there will be, therefore, no further insurrection, because the Legislature will represent the sentiments of the people." Some Americans in the I780's could thus come to believe that "sedition itself will sometimes make law."'14Hence, it might be argued that it was the very weakness of the constituted authorities, their very susceptibility to popular intimidation of various kinds, or, in other words, the very democratic character of legislative politics in the I780's, rather than any particular self-restraint or temperance in the people, that prevented the eruption of more serious violence during the Confederation period. If this is the case then our current conception of the period and our understanding of the Federalist movement may have to be reexamined. What Professor Rude's analysis of the eighteenth-century European crowd requires at the very least, it seems, is a new look at American mob violence during the Revolution focusing on the structure of the society which prompts popular demonstrations and on the nature of the institutions which are compelled to deal with them. If the conservatism of the American mobs is not as peculiar as we once assumed, if the crowds were not simply the passive instruments of outside agents, we must learn more 14David Ramsay to Jefferson,Apr. 7, 1787, Madison to Jefferson,Apr. 23, 1787, John Jay to Jefferson,Apr. 24, 1787, all in Boyd ed., Jeflerson Papers, Xl, 279, 307, 3I3; [Noah Webster], "To the Public" [May 8, 1787], in Harry R. Warfel, ed., Letters of Noah Webster (New York, I953), 64; Independent Chronicle (Boston), May Io, 1787. See also Robert A. East, "The MassachusettsConservativesin the CriticalPeriod,"in Morris,ed., The Era of the AmericanRevolution,378. This content downloaded from on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 23:00:53 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 642 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY abouttheircomposition,theirgoals,and the sourcesof their discontents.15 Particularlywe need to know more about the circumstancesand consequencesof repressionor the absenceof it. In short,in light of Rude'sfindings the obvious differencesbetween mob action in America and in Europethat do exist demanda broaderand yet more preciseexplanation than we have had. It is not enough now to say that the nature of the Americanmob in andby itselfwas distinctive. Moreover,if the mob is pictured as a kind of microcosmof the Revolution,Rude'sstudiesmay even have wider implications.Perhapsthe AmericanRevolutionwas as moderateas it seems,so lackingin the violence and ferocity of the French Revolution, not because it was inherentlyconservativeand unrevolutionary,led by law-abidingmen with limited objectives,but ratherbecauseit was so unrestrained,so lacking in strong resistancefrom counterrevolutionary and authoritarianelements, and consequentlyso successfullyrevolutionary.Uncheckedby any serious internal opposition,unrestrainedby any solid institutionalbulwarks,the AmericanRevolutionariesmay have ultimatelycarriedthemselvesfurtherin the transformationof their society,althoughwithout the bloodshedor the terror,than even the FrenchRevolutionarieswere eventually able to do. For if the Americanmob was no less a mob becauseof the absenceof effectiveresistance,was the Revolutionany less a revolution? 15 See Richard Walsh, Charleston'sSons of Liberty: A Study of the Artisans, 1763-1789 (Columbia, i959). This content downloaded from on Sun, 05 Apr 2015 23:00:53 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
From Paul A. Gilje, Rioting in America (Bloomington, Ind., 1999), 35-59, 192-198. stribcd Ftc thc RIOTINGINTHE cdsis REVOLUTION rc rpr tcd itat d a l.t dra- "ty tt " The Epidcmie ofRioting In 1765 an epidemic ofrioting broke upon the Amcrican scene. Bctween the besinning of that y€ar and th€ end of 1769 there wcrc at least onc hundred 6fry riots. During the 1770s the prce ofrioting did not slacken. Mobs shattered the peace in commuaity aft€r commuritja eod in the pro€ess Amcricans propdled themsdver into r rcvolution. Whydid rhis rioting tlke placc) Thc resistancc movement against British imag!{qglures led to many ofthcst disrurbrnces. But ir did not triggw rll -ofthem. Moreover, opposition to customs regulations and raxcs like the Stamp Act did rct necessarily have to take a riotous form. Constitutional and lcgal objections to actions by parliament cannot cxplain tie angry mechanics and seamen in thc strects, not can it explain the hostility offarmers when they closed county couns. Motives for thcsc disturbanccs twistcd in a maze of€ur Ents th.t sugg€st that therc was something wrong with Amcrican society. In the second half of the eighteenth ccnory the British North American cotonies experienced several crises. First, there wrc rapid popuhtion gmwth from both r€production and immigration. Scvcral colonics doubled in popuhtion betw€cn 1750 and 1770 rnd ell colonies sharcd in this ortreordiniry t"prlrt;, "rpki".. W,th ;onomic e,:]rfe6[-i6a somctimcs dcstrolcd prop.rty. ht sddom ph)6i."lthermcd rnlonc. Sociaj diacontcnt wrs widcsprcad during th. 1750s .nd dprcss.d i6clf in thc rcguletor mowmcnts, lund rioting_on thc ftonticr, c wcll rs urban unrcsi- ovcr w commiatcd to maric politic. had bccun to p.ople end pr chimed that t - Rioting in thc drc devil h.ld -Republicaas : in thc ramc as rnd ef[gy imdld towns oa Although c-tupublicrn undcclrrcd lib.rty polcs, lcnlists rnd sailcd Jcfcr- uchcd to thc ight somc of dcrrlist6 md dcralist mob idcrrlist rnd ladcrs con,.stiry thcir : thc Frcnch thc studcnt . hiSh zst majority ' ludcd !4E4sl: Samp Act, Pq!r. Socid i"dt:jry smallpox and labor compctition with British soldicn. In e fcw instencrs, usually rt thc instigrtion ofauthorirics, somc ofthis rioting cndcn in frtditics. But like thc rioting over thc impcrial crisis, most ofdis disordcr contrincd e low lcrtl ofviolcnce. During the ltrrs ofrcsis:iincg Amcricrns chbonted on thcir ritual ofrioting, dcveloping tar and fcatherc to rn .rt and crc.ting . rEpertoire of collcctiw bchavior that ultim.tcly c.nicd thc colonics to rcr"olution. Crovd action pcrsisrcd in thc forms dcvclopcd h th. prcc.din8 yc{s dudnt the War for Indcpcndcncc, dthough thc prssions somctimcs rclcrsed by thc committcd to a typc of riotiog thd limit.d violcncc whilc crpcricncing &amatic political and social chznge. But by thc cnd of thc_92q,!&!igl_tion had bcqUl torhange. Riotcrs still bdicwd thet thcy rctcd in thc namc of thc people and protcctcd tle communityi intcrcst. Thosc in Sovcmmcnt no$, claimed that thcy rcprcsentcd thc pcoplc and drat politics out oldoon was no longer neccssary. The logic of dcmocrrcy was pushing Amcricans to a new and diff€lcnt world, Th€ community int rcst was becoming morc dimcuft to idcntif among many scp.r.te and compcdng intc.csts. In thc grcat riots of communal nguhtion thc cmwd mighr cling to thc notion thrt thcy rcted for the benefit of all. So, too, might thos. fumds Eb.lling ryinst an outsidc authority intruding upon t.tleir world. But in-pditicd dist'r'brnccs dret fiction bccame morc difiicult to maintdn. In thr the Amcricm R.volution, dillcrcnt intcrcsts scemed to bc strugglint against one another, and, .t lelst in thc politicd arenl those who cspous.d tiosc interests w.rc not afreid to bring conflicts violcntly into th. srccts. in informrl -!EE'EET 59 internecin conflict .rupted into grcrtcr violcncc. In thc ftcrmadr ofindcpendencc, populer f.ith in riotinS rlmaincd in placc, ,s dcmonstrded in Shays' Rcbellion, morc land rioting, occasional urban uphcrvrl, rnd rioting accompanlng thc ratiication of thc Comtihrtion. Perhrps wt mry ncver fi.rlly unrlcrstrnd how Amcricens could rcrnein t propegeadr r Rcvolution ) ,f No"Es 192 $. p^cEs 29-36 Norr rt. H;ltory ofly,.hing ia Cultm ll@rd.r, Ctubd.lttion, 57. 49. Jamcs Elbcn Cuda, tt ro ryn -Ie: ltn Inwt;tar;h; a NJ.,1961orig. pub. 1905),46-47; NN Ya Gdz,tt., ' \Montcl^i, Dcc.X1,l752;NuYotlCautt andW.. r Pon-BE, F$,12, 1753. S.c dso Nltalic Z.mon Davis,'Womcn on Top," ir Dtis, s@i,q and c/hy,. ;a Edrlt Moddn Fn,.. (Stsfod, 1975), 12+51, ,nd 315, n45. Unit dStrt n!in 1763-1 I 3. Po$- Wriglt 51. BridcnbNgh, Ciia in R.aok, 117; Rosmrm, ''Th.t Th.y Wcre Crowa UDruly, (M.A. th.sis, Nodh.rn Iliiois UnivcBig, 1974) , 2rilohn S,.,'.il]|,, Ihn,ab Coart'hi?, a Ttu. Nandt;a.: Tb. W@ing 6f th. Daugbb oJlanb Logon . . . 6 Rnd,.d in tk Dia,! ofHn Lo1q, tt HonalabhJot Sdit'..., A.lbcnCook M}tB,.d. 342-43 50. Bnd!,tbalgb, EoyJdy 23,1753. C . u,am$,388-A9i N.sYdl Aak (Ptil.d.hhiq U90al), 69-70. 52. Thom.s C. Briow, Tlad, rnd Ei?iru: Tk ,ndia B Stan? Act Pub. 1953), 59-67. C/i'it: Ptulogr. RMl,ion, to and w.*t 4.1 5.1 l Hclcn 1962i o) 5t-76; nn Cubd Scrui.. in Calon;al Mot8an sd H.lm M. rq. .d. (Ncw York, 1962; ori8. 1660-177 s lo,,}rbtidg!, Mas., 1967), 91; E(rmund Mor$n, Tb. c S. Ulban 89-90;John Ld rnd Williarn Petrcalq'Th. Kndl€s "?n4 io M.ssechur.tts,' Pmrs.r'oa ;n,4n *an Hiro/l, 70 Riot lnd thc Crisi6 ofth. 1740. (19 6), !66i N^rh, &ban Ctu;tt, 217 -38. 5a. J.$c Lcmis.h, T.r in th. Strccts: M.rchdr Scamen in thc Politie of Revolntio.rry IaMQ 3rd &i, 25 (1968), 381-95i Ls sd Pcncalq twLs Nor,' Pd. k,lrt r Hnt.,10 (1976)i N.uYort ahd W..ttt Pon-Bo!, I 53. Bsott,Ttud. ann E ln i.."' 'K toly 12, 1764. 55. St oLy Mccrory PatE ]I:,, Lard Ldon in NdtbAturn NcwHav.n,1933), 128-29i Ho.rdfi, Ctulrd Anioa 58., Nculot Md."ry, l\iy 9, 16, 23, 1764, Do\das crcarbeg, citu dd I@ Eilolcddt in tb. Calo,t tNtuYdt, 16e1-1?76 (Ith^.a r971),122. 2. Rioting in dlc Rcvolution 1760-1, StuEgh 2$-nt thc Sr.r Richad (Baltimo 6. Yo Rdicati! disrion daeloprd in this.nd thc trdt fivc priag'rphs Hcrntt .nd Gr.gory H. Nob],i, E@tzrio, aad Rdotstioa:,ndi an, 1600-1820 (L.,in$oi, Mss., 1984; JohI ,. Mccuker and Rus*I R. M.aaA, Tb. E on at of B,,thb ,1,nqia, 1607-1789 \Chapcl HiI, 1985I Cary B. Nath, Tk &b.n Cruc;th:86id Chang., Patitiat Contioa,l,$, dnd tk Oigitu o/ tb. Peter Sh 1981),16 R@olltion(,Mss., 1979)i K.on.thA. Lod
Paul Revere, “The Bloody Massacre in King-Street” By the beginning of 1770, there were 4,000 British soldiers in Boston, a city with 15,000 inhabitants, and tensions were running high. On the evening of March 5, crowds of day laborers, apprentices, and merchant sailors began to pelt British soldiers with snowballs and rocks. A shot rang out, and then several soldiers fired their weapons. When it was over, five civilians lay dead or dying, including Crispus Attucks, an African American merchant sailor who had escaped from slavery more than twenty years earlier. Produced just three weeks after the Boston Massacre, Paul Revere’s historic engraving, “The Bloody Massacre in King-Street,” was probably the most effective piece of war propaganda in American history. Not an accurate depiction of the actual event, it shows an orderly line of British soldiers firing into an American crowd and includes a poem that Revere likely wrote. Revere based his engraving on that of artist Henry Pelham, who created the first illustration of the episode—and who was neither paid nor credited for his work. (’s-engraving-boston-massacre-1770) Unhappy BOSTON! see thy Sons deplore, Thy hallowe'd Walks besmear'd with guiltless Gore: While faithless --- and his savage Bands, With murd'rous Rancour stretch their bloody Hands; Like fierce Barbarians grinning o'er their Prey, Approve the Carnage, and enjoy the Day. If scalding drops from Rage from Anguish Wrung If speechless Sorrows lab' ring for a Tongue, Or if a weeping World can ought appease The plaintive Ghosts of Victims such as these; The Patriot's copious Tears for each are shed, A glorious Tribute which embalms the Dead. But know, FATE summons to that awful Goal, Where JUSTICE strips the Murd'rer of his Soul: Should venal C-ts the scandal of the Land, Snatch the relentless Villain from her Hand, Keen Execrations on this Plate inscrib'd, Shall reach a JUDGE who never can be brib'd. The unhappy Sufferers were Messs. SAM. L GRAY, SAM.L MAVERICK, JAM.S CALDWELL , CRISPUS ATTUCKS & PAT.K CARR Killed. Six wounded two of them (CHRIST.R MONK & JOHN CLARK) Mortally

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School: New York University




The Revolutionary Era Mob Exemplified By the Boston Massacre



The Revolutionary Era Mobs Exemplified By the Boston Massacre
Paul Revere produced a historical engraving in less than a month following the famous
Boston Massacre of 5th March 1770. The engraving was an impression of the sad happening with
soldiers firing at an unarmed crowd. Although Revere's iconic w...

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