Research Articles
Rethinking
Nonintervention
The Challenge of the
UN Charter and
Protecting the Dispossessed
DAVE O.BENJAMIN
Abstract
Nonintervention remains axiomatic in affirming the sovereignty of the state and is
underscored by Article 2(4)(7)ofthe UN Charter.Recentepisodes ofcrimes against
humanity and genocide have revealed the glaring inadequacy ofnonintervention and
the enormous challenge posed by the Charter.Furthermore,the seeming inability of
the Security Council to act on manmade disasters historically has undermined the
authority and ability of the UN to live up to the title of the Preamble to the Charter:
“We the Peoples.” A more recentrethinking of the conceptof sovereignty lays bare
the inadequacies ofArticle 2(4)(7)as protectorofthe nation-state from interference
and intervention. This paper addresses the question of nonintervention, contending that there is scope for reinterpreting the Article and placing greater demands
on the Security Council through nongovernmental organizations that increasingly
representthe dispossessed.
More than a decade after the signing of the Rome Statute in July 1998,there seems
to be even less politicalwillto investigate allegations and evidence ofcrimes against
humanity and prosecute those alleged to be responsible for such crimes.The ability
of the internationalcommunity to achieve enforcementof internationalhumanitarian law has been hampered by a number of factors:the unwillingness of key states,
especially the United States, China, and India, to ratify the Rome Statute; shifts
in state policies and laws that have exacerbated violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law;and a failure to impose sanctions on states thatwould
pressure governments to hand over those accused of crimes againsthumanity to the
InternationalCriminalCourtfor prosecution.
Human rights violations,especially againstwomen and children,are more prevalent.The United Nations Security Council, long bolstered by the Permanent Five
(the United States,Russia,China,France,and the United Kingdom,also known as
the P-5) and the veto,has failed to actto preventor stop genocide.
The internationalcommunity is increasingly accepting the principle thatthe conPublic Integrity,Summer 2010,vol.12,no.3,pp.201–218.
© 2010 ASPA.Allrights reserved.
ISSN 1099-9922/2010 $9.50 + 0.00.
DOI 10.2753/PIN1099-9922120301
Dave O.Benjamin
ventionaldefinition ofsovereignty is flawed.The notion thatsovereignty is inviolable
is flawed.At one level of analysis,there is a reliance on a measure of neutrality in
internationallaw in setting outcriteria for statehood thatcan be applied universally.
Atanotherlevel,there is an almostMachiavellian notion thatthe state does allitcan
to protect its people but has a duty to keep the nation together even if that means
permitting acts of cruelty againstthe people by those who govern.
The dawn of the millennium saw the adoption of two landmark principles by the
United Nations:first,thatthe state is notan abstraction thatis entitled to protection
in international law in all circumstances; second, that the most basic measure of
the sovereignty of the people rests in the materialwell-being of the population.The
outcome has been two constructs:human security,and the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs).The notion thatstate sovereignty,as defined in customary internationallaw and the Montevideo Convention 1933,is a largely abstractsetofprinciples
that subsume the responsibility of those who hold power to the sovereign will of
the people is supported by Kofi Annan’s (1999) “Two Concepts of Sovereignty.”
Human security and the MDGs are a response to the failure of the conceptof state
sovereignty in customary internationallaw and the Montevideo Convention.
This study contends that Article 2(4)(7) of the UN Charter is fundamentally
flawed. It presumes a construct of the state and sovereignty that is outmoded and
inapplicable to much ofthe postcolonialworld.Itis inconsistentwith the long history
ofintervention by permanentmembers ofthe Security Councilin the internalaffairs
ofpostcolonialstates,and disregards humanitarian intervention by nongovernmental
organizations.Finally,Article 2 precludes the imperative ofintervention,especially
humanitarian intervention, in an era of ethnic and resource conflict in which the
victims are countless civilians who are murdered,raped,and maimed in pursuitof
absolute politicalpower and wealth.The following section examines evolving concepts of security and sovereignty,and introduces the “responsibility to protect.”
Background
This section addresses the background to the contemporary discourse abouthumanitarian intervention in the contextofa definition ofsovereignty thatgoes beyond law,
the complementary and contrasting roles played by the UN and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in protecting the vulnerable, and the historical failure of
the UN Security Council to authorize humanitarian intervention,especially where
genocide is either being planned or in progress.
FormerUN secretary-generalKofi Annan (1999)proposed two concepts ofsovereignty:one a theoretical,abstractWestern conceptthatsees the state as a sovereign
entity with institutions thatattend to its longevity and politicalsuccession;the other
a notion of the responsibility to the sovereign people of those who govern in the
name of state and people to protect the people from the excesses of the state.The
Machiavellian rightof the state to actwithoutrestriction has thus been replaced by
the responsibility of the state to its citizens.
The Annan thesis was been built upon by the reports of a succession of UNsponsored international commissions and conferences.For example,a conference
of NGOs hosted by the UN Department of Public Information in September 2003
devoted its proceedings and reportto human security.The Commission on Human
Security defines human security as “freedom from want and freedom from fear”
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(2003,10).To the secretary-generaland his team,human security derived from the
notion that political and economic rights are intertwined with meeting the basic
needs of humans—food, clothing, shelter, water, employment, and, of course,
protection from the state.
The Report of the High Level Panel on Threats,Challenges and Change called
attention to the immense challenge facing the internationalcommunity:
Collective security institutions have proved particularly poor atmeeting the challenge
posed by large scale,gross human rights abuses and genocide.This is a normative
challenge to the United Nations:the conceptof State and internationalresponsibility
to protectcivilians from the effects of war and human rights abuses has yetto truly
overcome the tension between the competing claims of sovereign inviolability and
the rightto intervene.Itis also an operationalchallenge:the challenge of stopping a
Governmentfrom killing its own civilians requires considerable military deployment
capacity.(Panyarachun etal.2004,18)
Beyond this, the report noted “growing” acceptance of the idea that “the issue is
not the right to intervene” of any state,but the “responsibility to protect” of every
state when itcomes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe—mass murder
and rape,ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror,and deliberate starvation
and exposure to disease” (Panyarachun etal.2004,65).Carsten Stahn (2007,100)
observes thatthe Security Councilputmeaning to this interpretation in Resolution
1674 (April28,2006),in which itendorsed the World SummitOutcome Document
regarding “the responsibility to protectpopulations from genocide,warcrimes,ethnic cleansing and crimes againsthumanity.” Itis worth noting,however,thatthere
has historically been a significantdivide between the debates and resolutions of the
GeneralAssembly and of the Security Council, especially given the dynamics of
power plays and the veto in the latter organ.
While the literature has focused on the material conditions that promote human
security,another reality exists: that the conditions of so many civilians are affected
by civilwars,including ethnic conflictand conflicts fueled by resources.Postconflict
issues have centered on the plightofchild soldiers,the effects ofland mines on civilians,trafficking of women and children,and nation building after a catastrophic episode.There has been a notable failure on the partofintergovernmentalorganizations
to protect the dispossessed, especially during episodes of genocide, as occurred in
Rwanda in 1994 and atpresentin Sudan.The task ofprotecting the innocenthas been
left,forthe mostpart,to NGOs,from providing human and materialresources forthe
care of displaced persons to representing the dead and living in judicialprocesses.
Nongovernmentalorganizations have been placed atthe forefrontin gathering and
reporting evidence,especially statisticaldata,to the UN and the wider international
community,offering recommendations based on the needs ofcivilians,and capacity
building in civilsociety.The NGO community has amassed an impressive record of
accomplishments (Allen and Styan 2000).Mostnotable,and probably mostwidely
recognized, was the pivotal role played by NGOs in the negotiation of the Rome
Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt.On this occasion the NGO community,
togetherwith “like-minded” governments,impressed on the internationalcommunity
the imperative of accountability and enforcementof internationallaw on individual
politicaland military leaders foracts ofcommission and omission (Allen and Styan
2000;Forsythe 2006,106;Wippman 2004).
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Therefore,while humanitarian intervention has not really occurred as foreseen
by the architects of the UN and the authors of the Charter,it is occurring through
NGOs,with tacitacceptance by governments in industrialand developing countries
and even the countries in which humanitarian crises are occurring.
A different school of thought contends that humanitarian intervention is open
to political and partisan ideological abuse. Jack Donnelly notes that, while noble,
“purely humanitarian intervention may threaten internationalorder” by reintroducing
“human rights violations and humanitarian crises as legitimate subjects of internationalconflict” (2002,97).He argues a case againsthumanitarian intervention,even
as an exception,observing quite accurately that,throughout the cold war,both the
United States and the Soviet Union appealed to humanitarian intervention as justification for their incursions into either proxy or belligerent states,such as Korea,
Afghanistan,and Grenada.The thesis has merit.The declarations of humanitarian
crises in Korea in 1950 and Congo in 1960 were clearly motivated by the cold war.
The subsequentassassination ofLumumba by the Congolese army with the assistance
of the CIA made a powerful statement about the political will of the United States
to use humanitarian intervention to overthrow and execute a third world leader who
was considered a threatto U.S.and European hegemony (De Witte 2001).Clearly,
therefore,there is a history ofArticle 2(4)(7) being invoked in military expeditions
thathave less to do with humanitarian intervention and assistance than with superpower expansion.In contrast,there was an unwillingness to take action in instances
of genocide and other crimes againsthumanity such as in Cambodia.
Thus,state sovereignty has been radically redefined in the lastdecade,from the
unlimited power and authority of the state to a responsibility to protectits citizenry.
Humanitarian intervention,although necessary,has been given conservative treatment by the UN.The main obstacle,as the Security Council has seen it,is Article
2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which asserts state sovereignty.While the UN has
resisted humanitarian intervention, NGOs have been active in both advocacy and
operations, although their work does not substitute for the moral authority of the
UN.The section below examines humanitarian intervention in internationallaw and
historicalapplication.Itchallenges the notion thatthe United Nations has resorted
to humanitarian intervention to promote internationalpeace and security.
Humanitarian Intervention
There are a number of definitions of humanitarian intervention.Almostinvariably,
they revert to the debate about the sovereignty of the state,the inviolability of the
territory of the state, and the right of self-determination (Held 2002). However,
the accepted wisdom has long been that humanitarian intervention occurs when a
government,holding the powers of the state and representing the sovereign people,
fails to protectthe people.Ellery Stowelldefines humanitarian intervention as “the
reliance upon force forthe justifiable purpose ofprotecting the inhabitants ofanother
state from treatmentwhich is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the
limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason
and justice” (1921,53).
This definition has two problems. First, it views humanitarian action as essentially a bilateralissue,which is notthe norm in the contemporary dispensation.The
other is thatitnecessitates the use of force.In the post–cold war era of multilateral
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humanitarian intervention,a certain politicalwillholds thatintervention is almostof
necessity avoidance of the use of force,peacemaking if possible,and the protection
of civilians and peacekeepers.1
Another definition of humanitarian intervention is propounded by Fernando
Tesón: “Proportionate trans-boundary help, including forcible help, provided by
governments to individuals in anotherstate who are being denied basic human rights
and who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive
government” (1988,5).
This definition is more compelling because itdoes not
regard the use of force as imperative.The use of force is T h e fu n d a m en t a l ch a l l en ge
conditionalupon a necessity,where help otherwise is not
r em a i n s t h e p a r a d ox of
possible. It also assumes that humanitarian intervention
is undertaken on a multilateral basis to assist communi- l ega l vs. m or a l r esp on si b i l i t y
ties that, if it were possible, would revolt against their t o a ct .
governments.Third,the communities are unable to revolt
precisely because of the oppression meted outby their governments.
Humanitarian intervention is therefore justified in a number of special circumstances:(1) an inability or unwillingness on the partof the governmentto defend its
people; (2) collusion between agents of the state and those responsible for crimes
againstthe population;(3)violentoppressive action by nonstate actors,withoutpunitive action taken by the state to repel such action; and (4) international knowledge
of the oppressive action by the state,agents of the state,or nonstate actors with the
collusion of the state.
The internationalcommunity is therefore faced with a legalversus a moralchallenge in resorting to humanitarian intervention. The imperative of intervening to
save lives is challenged by the principle of nonintervention enshrined in Article 2
of the Charter.
The Legalvs.MoralChallenge
The fundamentalchallenge remains the paradox of legalvs.moralresponsibility to
act.On the one hand,Article 2(4) and (7) of the Charter recognize state sovereignty
as inviolable and assertnonintervention in the internalaffairs of states.This implies
prima facie thatitis illegalforthe UN to intervene “in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction ofany state,” even to protectthe citizenry.Moreover,
Article 2(7)asserts thatthe UN cannot“require the Members to submitsuch matters
to settlement.” Of course,it is accepted that this principle was based on the notion
thatevery state accepted its responsibility to protectits nationals.On the otherhand,
there is an accepted wisdom that the international community has a responsibility
to act to protect the most vulnerable.Article 39 of the Charter gives the Security
Council wide-sweeping authority “to determine the existence of any threat to the
peace,breach of the peace,or act of aggression” and,of course,the right of binding resolutions including agreeing to the use of force.Article 2(7) also contains a
proviso that state sovereignty “shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII,” emphasizing that enforcement supersedes the right
of protection from noninterference and nonintervention.
The challenge arises when the internationalcommunity,recognizing an imminent
humanitarian crisis, exercises the political will to intervene in the interests of the
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dispossessed—the vulnerable civilians who are the victims ofthe crisis.This politicalwillhas notbeen manifeston occasions when threats to internationalpeace and
security have involved threats to the vulnerable,including the 1935–36 bombing of
Abyssinia by Italy,in the aftermath of which the League of Nations failed to take
punitive action againstthe aggressor;the Holocaust,when itappeared thatthere were
no enemies on the right,which included NaziGermany (where the issue was German
territorialconquest,notthe Holocaust);the 1975–79 genocide in Cambodia,which
was mired by the complexities ofcold wargeopolitics;the enormous crimes against
humanity in Zimbabwe in the early 1980s;and,of course,the genocide in Rwanda
in 1994, during which the UN actually pulled out 75 percent of its peacekeeping
mission.As the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
stated: “Rwanda in 1994 laid bare the full horror of inaction.The UN Secretariat
and some permanentmembers ofthe Security Councilknew thatofficials connected
to the then government were planning genocide. . . . But the Security Council refused to take the necessary action.Thatwas a failure of internationalwill—of civic
courage—atthe highestlevel” (2001,1).
Annan is more blunt.In referring to Rwanda,and to the Balkans immediately before
that,he said,“The internationalcommunity clearly had the capacity to preventthese
events.Butitlacked the will” (Annan 2004).Rwanda stands outbecause itoccurred
after the end of the cold war,with a unipolar internationalsystem,and yetthere was
considerable debate in the finalanalysis aboutthe logisticalcostto the five permanent
members of the Security Council(Moose 2004).There was even a reluctance atthe
time to refer to the events in Rwanda as genocide—as George Moose (2004) putit,
“one of the mostshamefulfailures thatcertainly rises rightto the top—the factthat
ittook us so long to come to whatshould have been a fairly obvious conclusion.”
The debate about morality and logistics aside,there is a real question about the
legality of humanitarian intervention.Ahmad Ajajcontends that
reading the Charter with an eye on the matter of the legality of humanitarian intervention,one has to make a delicate choice:either people die because no-one has the rightto
intervene in a sovereign state;or an intervention oughtto take place.The firstsuggestion
is very hard to acceptbecause itstrips us of our humanity and degrades our civilization;
the second one is entirely dependenton whether or notintervention is to be undertaken
unilaterally or collectively under the auspices of the United Nations.(1993,227)
The Security Council failed to take the initiative during the crisis in Korea in
1950,prompting the GeneralAssembly to adoptthe “Uniting for Peace” resolution
(UN GeneralAssembly 1950).Both the Security Counciland the GeneralAssembly
failed to act during the crisis in Biafra in the 1960s, when the military in Nigeria
laid siege and effectively starved the people of Biafra into submission. Rwanda
was even more extreme.Yet the axiom that governed the notion of humanitarian
intervention when the UN was being founded was “Never Again,” referring to the
horror of the Holocaust.
Beyond the failure to actin humanitarian crises is the reality thatso many countries in the internationalsystem do notsatisfy the basic criteria ofsovereignty (Aust
2005,16;Higgins 1994,39).Defined territory and conceptualnationality are offset
by the virtualnonexistence of any competentadministration thatenjoys a mandate
and is capable of delivering basic services to the people.Rather,there is evidence
of collapsed state institutions,warlordism,a gross failure on the partof those who
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hold political and military power to deliver benefits to the people, and a manifest
inability to protect the people, especially the most vulnerable, against aggression
by agents of the state.
Over the pastfifteen years WestAfrica has been replete with examples of failed
states, warlordism, and crimes committed by agents of the state against civilian
populations.Farfrom the UN acting in defense of“We the Peoples,” as Annan putit
(Jentleson 2007,19),private military contractors have been hired to installordepose
governments,placing civilians atthe centerofconflicts thatare resource driven,and
warlords have killed, maimed, and tortured
the innocentin search ofresources needed to
finance theirwars.In many cases,the regimes D eca d es of ci vi l w a r s, cor r u p t i on a n d
that were the cause of humanitarian crises vi ol en t r u l e, w a r l or d i sm , a n d et h n i c
were proxies to superpowers that sought con i ct h a ve r esu l t ed i n gen er a t i on s
spheres of influence,mineralresources,and l ost t o p over t y, r esou r ce a n d t er r i t or i a l
votes in the United Nations during the cold con i ct , p ow er st r u ggl es, a n d gen oci d e.
war.In othercases,agents of change were as
violentin seeking and defending theirobjectives as those they sought to depose. Decades of civil war, corruption and violent
rule, warlordism, and ethnic conflict have resulted in generations lost to poverty,
resource and territorialconflict,power struggles,and genocide.
The challenges faced by the internationalcommunity are complicated by the new
emphasis on terrorism.In the process,criticalissues such as wars foraccess to fossil
fueland other mineralresources,humanitarian crises as in Sudan,the impactof the
floods across sub-Saharan Africa,trafficking in women and children,globalpoverty,
the increasing use of mercenaries by superpowers,and extraordinary rendition and
the use of secret prisons receive minimal debate and less coverage. One is left to
contemplate the degree of effectiveness with which the five permanentmembers of
the Security Councilare likely to impose their willon the military junta in Burma/
Myanmar to transition to democracy and end the gross violation of human rights,
or to compel the government of Sudan to halt its collaboration with the Janjaweed
in the destruction of Darfurians.
There is a realquestion to be asked:Given the limitations of the legalauthority
granted by Article 2 (4)(7)and ChapterVIIofthe UN Charter,and the moralimperative thatthe vulnerable be protected by the internationalcommunity,is there a case
for arguing that the international community does have an obligation to intervene
to protect the vulnerable and dispossessed? If it does, who sets out the mandate
and on what terms? Are representatives of the dispossessed and the state in which
intervention is to occur to be consulted? How and by whom?
While Article 2 limits intervention by the UN,intrastate conflictclaims civilian
victims who have no means ofself-defense.The issue is neitherinterstate conflictnor
noninterference buthow the individualand the community can be protected against
the government,paramilitaries,and even mercenaries who actwith impunity.This
calls for a paradigm shiftin understanding the nature of conflict.
A Paradigm Shift
In many respects,a paradigm shift has occurred.While realists may contend that
the internationalsystem is based on states competing for power in a hierarchy,and
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the terms determining the place ofa state in thathierarchy are based on war,the harsh
reality is thatthe Eurocentric conceptof nation-statehood is largely irrelevantto the
existence ofmuch ofthe population ofthe world.The increasing alienation between
state and individualand between state and community is indicative ofthe reality that
the abstractstate has been replaced by a self-appointed government thatabuses its
people in order for the members of the governmentto acquire wealth and absolute
power.Alliances between these quasi-states (Jackson 1990) and the superpowers
that are the five permanent members of the Security Council increasingly alienate
the sovereign people and,more especially,the mostvulnerable in society.
Modern conflict is often not between and among states.Rather it falls into one
or another of four main categories:
• con icts between states and “shadowy networks of individuals” (White
House 2002) who are involved with broader nonstate groups
• con icts between the government and the citizenry, not necessarily civil war
• con icts between nonstate actors and civilians where transnational
corporations seek collusion of mercenaries,governments,or nonstate actors
to further their economic ambitions (e.g.,Zaire in the later days of Mobutu,
or the adventures of the private military company Executive Outcomes in
Sierra Leone in the early 1990s,or,for thatmatter,the events thatled up the
execution of leaders of the Ogonipeople in Nigeria in 1993)
• con icts between or among warlords in which civilians are the direct targets
(e.g.,Liberia and Somalia)
There is need for a new paradigm shift,a recognition that the inability of the
government—the state in the Eurocentric construct—to legitimately protect all
its citizens represents a fundamental loss of sovereignty that leads ultimately
to chaos and anarchy or, worse, the use of the resources of the state against
the vulnerable in society. It is therefore imperative that the international community act, not in defense of the government—the quasi-state—but in defense
of the vulnerable who become the targets of the military and police apparatus
of the government.An inability to protect the vulnerable represents not even a
gross violation, but a clear dereliction of duty. If the apparatus of the government is not willing or able to protect the innocent,the international community
needs to do so—at the level of self-interest if nothing else,just so the industrial
countries do not have to accept hordes of people seeking refugee status. The
international community cannot afford to be blind as it was in the 1960s during
the Biafra crisis (when ignorance of the event could have been presented as a
defense), or worse, as it was during the Rwanda genocide (known worldwide),
or Sudan today.
International law has progressed significantly since the end of World War II.
Myriad conventions and treaties intended to protect civilians during peace and
conflicthave been ratified,butthey have proved largely ineffectual.
Public InternationalLaw
The universalapplication ofpublic internationallaw has evolved since 1945 through
a numberoftreaties and conventions,including the UN Charter1945,the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 1948, the Geneva Conventions 1949, the Genocide
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Convention 1949, the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, and the Rome
Statute.Arguably,these conventions aimed atsetting down universalstandards and
codes of conduct for states and individuals in peace and wartime. They are also
intended to hold all governments, political leaders, and military commanders and
officers responsible fortheiractions in relation to civilians and combatants alike.The
HelsinkiFinalAct1975 “was a complex compromise between the Sovietdesire for
recognition ofits hegemony in Eastern Europe and Western desire foran international
codification of human rights among other things” (“A Caviar Ending” 1977).
The culmination of these legalinstruments is found in the Rome Statute,which
came into effect in 2002. It created the International Criminal Court, which tries
individual political leaders and public officials, military commanders, and rankand-file military personnel for acts of commission and omission (ICC 1998).As
Brownlie observes, there are four categories of binding multilateral conventions
protecting human rights:
• the two “comprehensive” International Covenants on Economic, Social, and
CulturalRights,and on Civiland PoliticalRights,adopted in 1966
• the comprehensive regional conventions: the European Convention on
Human Rights 1950,the American Convention on Human Rights 1969,and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’Rights 1981
• the conventions prohibiting speci c wrongs: genocide, torture, and racial
discrimination
• conventions protecting the rights of speci c categories of people: women,
children,refugees,and migrantworkers (Brownlie 2003,536;Gurowitz
2004)
Although signatories are obligated to abide by the principles outlined in these
conventions and treaties,there are caveats aboutthe functioning ofallofthem.First,
public knowledge of the commission of crimes: Only when there is public knowledge,and the pressure of public activism,is prosecution likely to occur.Moreover,
knowledge is often notsufficient,as in the case of an unnamed U.S.Marine Corps
corporalwho was notcourt-martialed forexecuting an unarmed Iraqiata mosque in
Fallujah,Iraq,in 2004 (Chadwick 2005).On another occasion,a group of marines
was charged with the murder of twenty-four Iraqis in 2005,chiefly because of reporting of the incidentby the media (Whitaker 2007).The other caveatinvolves the
use ofprivate military contractors,ormercenaries,in combatoperations.According
to ProtocolI to the Geneva Conventions:
A mercenary is any person who:(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order
to fightin an armed conflict;(b) does,in fact,take a directpartin the hostilities;(c) is
motivated to take partin the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and,
in fact,is promised,by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict,materialcompensation
substantially in excess of thatpromised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of thatParty;(d) is neither a nationalof a Party to the conflict
nor a residentof territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;(e) is nota member of
the armed forces of a Party to the conflict;and (f) has notbeen sentby a State which is
nota Party to the conflicton officialduty as a member of its armed forces.(ICRC 1977)
A mercenary is therefore an unlawfulcombatantand does notenjoy the protections granted to lawful combatants.A mercenary does not fulfill the basic criteria
for identification as a lawfulcombatant:
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•
•
•
being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates
having a xed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance
carrying arms openly
conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
(Roberts and Guelff 2000,202)
Mercenaries are not agents of either the state or any resistance to conflict in international law and are therefore not entitled to the protections afforded the state
military apparatus or volunteer corps that are banded together in defense of the
state or nation.
Yet mercenaries are granted license to act without restraint because they will
not be held responsible under any national or international code of conduct or operations.Antonio Cassese summarizes the debate about the status of mercenaries
using the 1970s,when “the number of mercenaries became conspicuously large in
Africa,where they were used both by the ruling elites (for internal security,intelligence,the training of specialcommandos,etc.) and by foreign powers as tools for
organizing or strengthening movements to destabilize African regimes” (Cassese
2001, 333). The African states regarded them as unlawful combatants, while the
West regarded them as lawful combatants entitled to the protection of the Geneva
Conventions.The Protocolrepresented a compromise with significantconcessions
on the part of the West.Today the involvement of mercenaries in conflict and the
implications for protection of civilians is manifest in Iraq where the United States
has contracted a number of companies to supplementand replace the U.S.military
in operations (Singer 2003).
To date,public internationallaw has notcaughtup with the transition from the old
style of mercenary activity to the use of military contractors by states to represent
either public or private interests in conflict.Mercenaries,like paramilitaries led by
warlords,targetcivilians withoutfearofprosecution underinternationalhumanitarian law.This is especially the case where ethnic conflictprevails.
The Reality of Ethnic Conflict
Ethnic, including religious, conflict is nothing new. It is, however, having a dramatic impact today. This may be because of the communications revolution that
has broughtconflictto the home of the civilian in realtime,thanks to satellites and
on-site reporters. There is also greater public outrage both at ethnic conflict and
at the seeming failure of the international community to respond in defense of the
vulnerable.Social activism has cut across ethnic,religious,and even class lines to
demand an end to conflicts, episodes of genocide, and crimes against humanity,
irrespective of the culprits and collaborators.
Ethnic conflictis exacerbated by economic issues:resource endowment,resource
depletion, failure of economic programs, the manifest absence of economic programs altogether.Itis also a catalystfor corruption and malfeasance,authoritarian
rule,and absolute dictatorship.The language of genocide is often heard—referring
to subject peoples in dehumanizing terms—to justify their extermination and to
whip up support among the majority population. Ethnic conflict is indicative not
necessarily of secession,butof a major cleavage in society thathas the potentialto
fracture the geography of the state.
The international community faces an imperative, therefore.When the state is
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unable or unwilling to protectcivilian populations,the UN is expected to intervene.
This, after all, is part of the mission of the organization in two respects: “We the
Peoples” and “NeverAgain.”
The Responsibility to Protect
The internationalcommunity has a duty to protectthe vulnerable.According to the
InternationalCommission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,the “responsibility
to protect” clause implies that“The principle of non-intervention in internalaffairs
cannotbe used to protectgenocidalacts or other atrocities,” because there is a “collective internationalresponsibility to protectpopulations from genocide,warcrimes,
ethnic cleansing,and crimes againsthumanity” (Jentleson 2007,20).
The notion that Article 2(4) and (7) of the UN Charter offer protection to the
state such that the government can actwith impunity against its people,especially
when the state does not exist as a collective of political,economic,and legislative
institutions capable of guaranteeing protections to the people against abuse of the
instruments ofcoercion ofthe state represents atbesta misconstruction ofthe intent
of those sections of the charter.Atworst,itis a recipe for collaboration between the
internationalcommunity,which swore “neveragain,” and those who hold office and
are directing the resources and apparatus of the government against the sovereign
people.Beyond this,itis clear thatthere is an implied loss of sovereignty when the
state is unable to guarantee protection of its population.
The challenge ofArticle 2(4)and (7)has deeperimplications.Thomas Fues (2005)
condenses the “deficits in legitimacy”—the undercutting of the moral authority of
the UN—as follows:
• dictatorships and unlawful regimes enjoy the same rights as democracies
(e.g.,Zimbabwe and Sudan)
• the UN is an organization not of abstract states but of real governments,
even those thatshow little regard for principles such as accountability and
transparency
• the UN is a collective of member states whose governments pursue their
nationalinterests in and through the organization
• the Security Council has supranational powers that members of the UN
willingly agreed to on acceeding to membership
The UN,therefore,has to be more resolute in making a distinction between states
that live up to the responsibility to protect their populations and those that do not
butexpectthatthe UN willnotinterfere in their internalaffairs.
Formersecretary-generalAnnan has observed thatthe UN Charteris an agreement
among governments on behalfofthe peoples ofthe world;hence the declaration “We
the Peoples” (Annan 1999).Beyond this, the responsibility of the UN to preserve
international peace and security has to be interpreted broadly. If there is a natural
disaster in a member state and its governmentis incapable of meeting the needs of
the people,the governmentasks the UN for humanitarian assistance.If the governmentofa memberstate fails to observe some standard accepted by the international
community as a norm (by virtue of the many conventions asserting the rights of
civilians, children, women, ethnic and religious groups, and any other groupings
thatmay be targeted),there is going to be a “knock-on” effecton bordering states.
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Displaced persons will seek the protection of neighboring states,imposing spatial
and resource pressures on thatstate.There is,therefore,an impacton international
peace and security. The UN is thereby required to act in defense of those who are
targeted by their governmentorgroups supported by the government.Ellery Stowell,
writing on the eve of the Holocaust,asserted:“When ...the conductof a state,not
excused by some untoward eventlike revolution orcivilwar,constitutes,on the part
ofthe responsible governmenta deliberate violation ofthatminimum ofsecurity and
justice to which every individualin a civilized community is entitled,itbecomes the
rightand the duty of other states to intervene in so far as itis practicable to prevent
or lessen such severities” (1939,734).Annan has been equally direct: “The sovereignty of states must no longer be used as a
shield for gross violations of human rights”
E t h n i c con i ct i s exa cer b a t ed b y
(Evans 2004).
econ om i c i ssu es: r esou r ce en d ow m en t ,
Negotiating with an oppressive regime
r esou r ce d ep l et i on , fa i l u r e of econ om i c
for access to target populations defeats the
p r ogr a m s, or a m a n i fest a b sen ce of
very ethos of the United Nations with regard
to humanitarian intervention.Targetpopulaecon om i c p r ogr a m s a l t oget h er. I t i s
tions are dehumanized and isolated,and the
a l so a ca t a l yst for cor r u p t i on a n d
signalsentto the internationalcommunity is
m a l fea sa n ce, a u t h or i t a r i a n r u l e a n d
that the problem is being dealt with. Target
a b sol u t e d i ct a t or sh i p .
populations are referred to as blight on the
landscape that will be remedied by further
isolation,dislocation,or death.This makes the notion of negotiating access counterproductive.As Bronwyn Leebaw puts it, “The idea of negotiating with leaders
for access to civilian populations makes little sense when the primary goalof those
leaders is to murder civilians” (2007,227).
There is no compulsion on the partofthe internationalcommunity to recognize a
governmentthatdoes nothold a mandate accepted by the United Nations.Although
the Khmer Rouge held politicalpower in Cambodia during the 1970s,the UN recognized Prince Sihanouk as the legitimate rulerand,thereby,granted him the seatat
the United Nations.The UN also suspended South Africa during apartheid.Atone
levelthis could be construed as intervention in the internalaffairs of a member state
and,therefore,a violation ofArticle 2(4) and (7).Atanother level,the international
community deemed apartheid sufficiently objectionable thatitresolved to suspend
South Africa from membership.
The responsibility to protect is based on a notion that member states, having
voluntarily agreed to the rights and obligations of membership in the UN,commit
themselves to living up to the duties of members. Included is the duty to protect
the citizens of states on a collective and mutual basis.States and governments are
recognized as custodians of the peoples of the world. Inasmuch as the UN has
responsibility for protection and preservation of internationalpeace and security—
generally regarded as conflicts between and among states—it has a responsibility
to protect the peoples of states from acts by the state and agents thereof that are
injurious to communities.To that extent,Article 39 of the Charter clearly extends
to the Security Councilthe authority to “determine the existence of any threatto the
peace,breach ofthe peace,[and to]make recommendations,ordecide whatmeasures
shallbe taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42,to maintain or restore internationalpeace and security.” The obvious harm done to civilians,including death and
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dislocation,combined with the movementof civilians across borders,constitutes a
threatto internationalpeace and security.The arming ofgovernments and extremist
organizations—as the French armed the Hutu in Rwanda in 1994—constitutes an
even greater threatto internationalpeace and security (McNulty 2000).
Moreover,much has been said and written aboutpunishmentfor crimes against
humanity including genocide.The UN Genocide Convention 1948 soughtto address
prevention,butdid notlay outa platform for either prevention or punishment.The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court lays out a set of procedures for
investigation,prosecution,and punishmentof those responsible for crimes against
humanity.However,the central issue remains that tens of thousands or millions of
innocent people have to die in order for investigations and prosecutions to occur.
Neither the Genocide Convention nor the Rome Statute 2002 makes provision for
the prevention of crimes againsthumanity including genocide (Fowler 2003).This
leaves a centralconclusion:thatwhereas punishment—including investigation and
prosecution—is essentially a legal action, prevention is based on a moral imperative. This leads to the conclusion that there is no requirement that states pursue
humanitarian intervention as a legalaction beyond the provisions ofthe UN Charter.
Moreover,if,as in the Clinton administration,there is no politicalwillto use the term
“genocide,” states can absolve themselves of responsibility to act and consequent
responsibility for failure to act.
Furthermore, crimes against humanity are often associated with state collapse,
whether current or impending, actual or potential. The Charter places no legal
obligation on the community of states to keep collapsing or collapsed states together. Recognition of Kosovo by the United States and some European powers,
contrasted by the refusal of Russia to do likewise,makes the point that there is no
binding obligation on UN member states, and certainly not on the P-5, to recognize new states. By the same token, there is no obligation to intervene to prevent
humanitarian crises, including crimes against humanity (Held 2002). That is one
of the reasons for the continued stalemate in Sudan,the involvementof the African
Union notwithstanding.
The burning question,then,as Gareth Evans has putit,is: “Is there” a “responsibility to protect?” (Evans and Sahnoun 2002).The International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty proposed such a responsibility on the basis that
“millions of human beings remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, state
repression and state collapse” (ICISS 2001,11).The commission further expressed
its belief that “the responsibility to protect implies an accompanying responsibility to prevent” (ibid., 19). The commission based its view on the implications of
localized conflict for international peace and security, a responsibility on the part
of the UN to actbased on numerous GeneralAssembly and Security Councilresolutions, and the report of the UN secretary-general, Prevention of Armed Conflict
(UN GeneralAssembly 2001).Atthe very outsetthe reportof the secretary-general
noted that“Conflictprevention is one of the primary obligations of Member States
setforth in the Charter of the United Nations,and United Nations efforts in conflict
prevention must be in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.
Conflict prevention is also an activity best undertaken under Chapter VI of the
Charter” (ibid.,2).
However, the report qualified responsibility for prevention with national governments primarily, and declared that the main role of the UN and the internaP UBLIC INTEGRITY
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tional community is “to support national efforts for conflict prevention and assist
in building national capacity in this field” (UN General Assembly 2001, 2). To
Secretary-GeneralAnnan,“the Charter provides the United Nations with a strong
mandate for preventing armed conflict” on two bases: Conflict prevention is more
cost-effective than post-conflictreconstruction;and peacefulprevention of conflict
preserves internationalpeace and security,and is consistentwith Article 2(3) of the
Charter (ibid.,9).
In 2003,the GeneralAssembly essentially skirted the necessity of intervention
to prevent armed conflict and crimes against humanity by reaffirming support for
the Millennium DevelopmentGoals,the commitmentof 0.7 percentof GNP in foreign assistance by developed countries,and the implementation of the Program of
Action to Prevent,Combatand Eradicate the IllicitTrade in SmallArms and Light
Weapons.While reaffirming supportfor the Millennium DevelopmentGoals has a
certain appeal in principle, it is not a substitute for intervention to prevent human
catastrophe.The UN effortin Rwanda in 1994 failed notbecause of economic and
social conditions, but because the United Nations Observer Mission in Rwanda
(UNAMIR) was understaffed and ill-equipped. The memorandum from General
Dallaire to GeneralBarilwas ignored by the UN Secretariatand the Security Council,and,rather than increasing the contingent,the Security Councildrastically and
regrettably cutthe peacekeeping force.
The responsibility to protect rests on three basic tenets: that there is a legal
obligation to act where a humanitarian crisis is in evidence; that there is a moral
responsibility to act, especially in the light of the post-Holocaust axiom “Never
Again”; and that failure to exercise the political will needed to save the lives of
the vulnerable and dispossessed might be regarded as a crime against humanity in
time to come.
First,Article 2 (7) of the Charter is unambiguous;while the state enjoys the right
ofnonintervention,“this principle shallnotprejudice the application ofenforcement
measures under ChapterVII.” Article 39 is equally unambiguous in the authority it
gives to the Security Councilto “determine the existence of any threatto the peace,
breach ofthe peace,oractofaggression and shallmake recommendations,ordecide
whatmeasures shallbe taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42,to maintain or
restore internationalpeace and security.” The Counciltherefore enjoys a legalright
and responsibility to employ measures appropriate and necessary for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. If the Council is satisfied
thatpeacefulmeans,including sanctions,are notsuccessful,then itreserves the right
to “take such action by air,sea,or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security.Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade,and other operations by air,sea,or land forces of Members of the United
Nations.” It clearly enjoys an unchallenged right of the use of force to prevent an
internationalcatastrophe given the emphasis placed on conflictprevention.Article
50 extends to the Council a right of preventive measures, clearly requiring that
peacekeepers be subscribed by member states.
Moreover, the Charter offers the perfect operational mechanism in resorting to
regional arrangements (Chapter VIII).Article 53 authorizes the Security Council,
“where appropriate,[to]utilize such regionalarrangements oragencies forenforcementaction under its authority.” Regionalorganizations can be involved in dispute
settlementwith the authority ofthe Council.While this may have been a concession
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to the Organization of American States when the Charter was being negotiated, it
has real application today when Africa is seeking to resolve its internal ethnic and
politicalissues.
Finally, the Charter authorizes the secretary-general to take the initiative in
informing the Security Council of threats to the international peace and security
(Article 99).Although the secretary-generalwas envisioned as a chief executive of
the UN,there is a history ofholders ofthe office initiating programs and approaches
to issues thathave been revolutionary in theirtime.Dag Hammarskjöld took the UN
into the development era chiefly because he was persuaded that development and
underdevelopment were the major issues of the day,not the cold war.Kofi Annan,
in his second term in office, sought to initiate a debate about human security that
yielded results in the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development
Goals.Conversely,the failure of the UN to actduring the Rwanda genocide was as
much a bloton the copybook of Secretary-GeneralBoutros Boutros-Ghali(and the
assistant secretary-general responsible for peacekeeping, Kofi Annan) as it was a
lack of politicalwillon the partof the self-appointed P-5.
Itis ironic that,while there has been a failure of politicalwillon the partof governments and of the UN as an institution,NGOs have succeeded in mobilizing the
vitalhuman,technical,material,and financialresources in industrialand nonindustrialcountries needed for humanitarian efforts in conflictzones,especially in cases
of conflict within states. The appointment of Bernard Kouchner, a co-founder of
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors WithoutBorders),as foreign ministerofFrance
in 2007, it can be argued, is more than tacit acceptance of both the work and the
political will of NGOs, especially those involved in treating and assisting civilian
victims of manmade disasters.
Conclusions
Nonintervention remains a contentious principle ofpublic internationallaw because
it continues to offer protection to regimes that do not protect their peoples. The
challenge posed by Article 2(4)(7) of the UN Charter is less real than theoretical,
because internal conflict that threatens the lives and safety of civilians,displacing
them in some way, is indicative of the collapse of the state in the first place. Furthermore,a state that is unable to guarantee security of individual and community
is a failed or collapsed state,devoid of institutions of government and governance
thatprotectsubjectpeoples from victimization and crimes againsthumanity.In such
circumstances,invocation ofArticle 2(4)(7) strains credulity.
Rather,the invocation of2(4)(7)is indicative ofthe failure ofpoliticalwill,both in
the Security Councilas an institution and among the nations of the P-5,which have
veto power.Despite precedentin “Uniting for Peace 1950,” the GeneralAssembly
has also manifested a failure of politicalwillin notcalling on the Security Council
to authorize humanitarian intervention in internal civil conflict, especially crimes
against humanity and genocide. While political will was not absent in the Korea
and Congo incidents—largely an ideologicalmatter—itwas glaringly absentduring
the Rwanda tragedy in 1994.The failure to actin Rwanda and now Sudan suggests
thatthe obstacle to effective action is notthe legalinstrumentbutthe politicalwill
of the five permanentmembers of the Security Council.
Finally,the notion of nonintervention in the internalaffairs of the state is flawed
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Dave O.Benjamin
at its root. It presupposes the existence of a nation-state bound by ideals and loyalties that transcend ethnicity, language, and the common history of the colonial
experience.Fractured states,devoid of institutions of governmentand governance,
with no binding agents,with genocidal regimes in power,are quasi-states that are
simply incapable of guaranteeing the physical security and safety of minority and
subject peoples. Such states cannot be held to the same standard as those with
institutions of government and governance, some measure of accountability and
transparency, and a concept of the responsibility to the sovereign people of those
who controlthe institutions ofstate and government.In such circumstances,Article
2(4)(7) becomes a legal instrument that protects genocidal regimes against their
own subjectpeoples.
NOTE
1.There is recognition offundamentalflaws in the mandate thatthe Security Council gave to UN peacekeepers in the Balkans in the early 1990s allowing Blue Berets to
defend themselves but not civilians through the use of force—this led to the debacle of
Srebrenica as a case in point.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dave O. Benjamin is assistant professor of international political economy and diplomacy atthe University of Bridgeport.He received his B.A.Hons.degree in history from
Carleton University (1986),diploma in internationalrelations from the University of the
WestIndies (1987),M.Phil.in internationalrelations from the University of Cambridge
(1988), and Ph.D. in international studies from the University of Cambridge (1999).
His articles include “Protecting the Protectors: NGO Action and the Responsibility to
Protect,” International Journal on World Peace (March 2009); “Implications of Mass
Terrorism for the Caribbean Community:The Case of Grenada,” University of the West
Indies (February 2002); and “Sudan and the Responsibility to Protect,” International
JournalofHuman Rights (June 2010).
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Researcher
Published by CQ Press, a division of Congressional Quarterly Inc.
thecqresearcher.com
Stopping Genocide
S ho uld the U.S . and U.N. tak e ac tio n in S udan?
T
en years ago, nearly a million ethnic-minority
Rwandans died in a government-planned massacre.
Political leaders in the United States and the United
Nations later admitted they should have intervened
and vowed “Never again” — just as they vowed after the Holocaust. But as ethnic killings occurring today in western Sudan
make tragically clear, genocide still flourishes. The Bush administration supports sanctions against the Khartoum government, but
human-rights activists say an international force is needed to protect civilians. With U.S. troops stretched thin in Iraq, however, the
United States has been reluctant to act. Some question whether
A mak e shift me mo r ial in Camb o dia e x hib its the r e mains
o f v ic tims o f the Khme r Ro ug e r e g ime in the late 1970s.
Americans, preoccupied with terrorism, have the appetite for humanitarian military actions. The U.N. has tried to improve its poor
record of mobilizing troops by authorizing Western powers to lead
forces in recent crises. But many believe the U.N. is politically
paralyzed by the competing interests of the five major members of
the Security Council, who can veto any military action.
The CQ Researcher • Aug.27,2004 • www.thecqresearcher.com
Volume 14,Number 29 • Pages 685-708
RECIPIENT OF SOCIETY OF P ROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS AWARD FOR
E XCELLENCE ◆ AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SILVER GAVEL AWARD
I
N
S
I
D
E
THIS REPORT
THE ISSUES ......................6 8 7
CHRONOLOGY ..................6 9 5
BACKGROUND ..................6 9 6
CURRENT SITUATION ..........6 9 8
AT ISSUE ..........................7 0 1
OUTLOOK ........................7 0 2
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................7 0 5
THE NEXT STEP ................7 0 6
STOPPING GENOCIDE
CQ Re se arc he r
T
H
E
THE IS S UES
687
• Is the United States
doing enough to stop and
prevent genocide?
• Is the United Nations
doing enough to stop
genocide?
• Will the International
Criminal Court prevent
genocide?
BACKGROUND
696
696
699
699
699
702
Ge noc ide Conv e ntion
A 1948 U.N. treaty calls
for action to stop future
genocides.
OUTL OOK
702
U.S . Role ?
American troops may be spread
too thin to stop atrocities.
MANAGING EDITOR: Thomas J. Colin
AS S IS TANT MANAGING EDITOR: Kathy Koch
AS S OCIATE EDITOR: Kenneth Jost
688
S IDEBARS AND GRAPHICS
S TAF F WRITERS : Mary H. Cooper,
Ge noc ide in S uda n
Rampaging militiamen have
left a million people homeless since early 2003.
CONTRIBUTING WRITERS : Sarah Glazer,
689
The Ge noc ide Tr e a ty
The 1948 convention defines
genocide and calls for action.
692
Mode r n Ge noc ide s v s . the
Holoc a us t
Today’s ethnic killings often
stem from wars or rebellions.
William Triplett
David Hatch, David Hosansky,
Patrick Marshall, Tom Price, Jane Tanner
DES IGN/ PRODUCTION EDITOR: Olu B. Davis
AS S IS TANT EDITOR: Kenneth Lukas
Wa r ning s Ig nor e d
The United States didn’t
stop killings in Cambodia
in the 1970s.
695
Chr onolog y
Key events since 1915.
CURRENT S ITUATION
697
Ethnic Cle a ns ing in Bos nia
Some 200,000 people were
killed in the early 1990s.
DIRECTOR, L IBRARY PUBL IS HING: Kathryn C. Suárez
He a ling Rwa nda Afte r the
Ge noc ide
Progress has been slow.
CONGRES S IONAL QUARTERL Y I NC.
Punis hing Ge noc ide
In 1994, a special U.N.
tribunal was authorized to
try suspects in Rwanda’s
genocide.
Hus s e in Tr ibuna l
A special Iraqi court is
hearing war-crimes charges
against Saddam Hussein.
700
701
At Is s ue
Should the U.S. support the
International Criminal Court?
F OR F URTHER RES EARCH
Inte r na tiona l Cour t
The United States opposes
joining the International
Criminal Court.
704
F or Mor e Infor ma tion
Organizations to contact.
705
Bibliog r a phy
Selected sources used.
Cr is is in Da r fur
At least 50,000 Sudanese
have been killed since
2003.
706
The Ne xt S te p
Additional articles.
707
Citing The CQ Researcher
Sample bibliography formats.
Cover:A youth examines the remains of victims of the Khmer Rouge in a makeshiftmemorial.
Two million Cambodians died under the murderous regime in the late 1970s. (AFP Photo)
686
Aug . 2 7 , 2 0 0 4
Volume 1 4 , Numbe r 2 9
The CQ Researcher
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Stopping Genocide
BY S ARAH GL AZER
THE ISSUES
although experts say the 1948
treaty is notspecific aboutwhat
that entails. (S e e b o x , p . 689.)
fter Arab nomads
Even some ofthe mostcomraided the Sudanese
mitted activists have been revillage of Korneiand
luctantto bandy abouta word
killed Hatum Atraman Bashir’s
like genocide, concerned that
husband, she fled with her
itshould be reserved for clearseven children. But when
cut cases. As of mid-August,
Bashir and a few other mothgroups like Amnesty Internaers crept out one day to find
tionaland Human Rights Watch
food, the raiders raped them.
said they did nothave enough
“They said, ‘You are black
information to callthe violence
women, and you are our
in Darfur genocide, even as
slaves,’ ” she recalled, weepthey called for tougher action
ing softly.“One ofthe women
by the international commucried, and they killed her.
nity. The African Union also
Then they told me, ‘If you
declined to label the situation
cry, we will kill you, too.’ ”
genocide even as it was sendBashir, already pregnant
ing 150 troops to Darfur to
by one of the rapists when
protect its cease-fire monitors
she told this story earlier this
and was expressing interest in
S ur v iv o r s o f e thnic v io le nc e r e st in a r e fug e e c amp in
summer, was camping in the
sending more troops with a
we ste r n S udan’s e mb attle d Dar fur r e g io n, whe r e 50,000
shade of a tree after stumbroadened mandate to prop e o p le hav e b e e n k ille d and a millio n le ft ho me le ss. On July
bling across the border into
tect civilians. 8
22, the U.S . Co ng r e ss de c lar e d the v io le nc e “ g e no c ide .”
Chad in search of help from
Complicating the question
one of the overburdened aid agencies been bombed by Sudan’s air force and ofwhether the situation in Darfur could
then attacked by Arab militias. 4
serving Sudanese refugees. 1
be called genocide is the fact that
Although the violence began in some of the victims of the militias are
Bashir is part of a wave of more
than a million people from the west- early 2003, it took until July of this Arab, and not all Arab groups particern Darfur region of Sudan left home- year for the U.S. government and the ipated in the killings. 9
less by rampaging nomadic militia- international community to back up
Yet critics in Congress and humanmen on horseback, known as the statements of concern with threats of rights groups called the response to
Janjaweed. Since early 2003, the Arab serious action. On July 30, the Unit- Darfur too slow and — in some eyes
militias have been killing and raping ed Nations Security Council passed — too weak. They said it bore a disblack Africans, who traditionally farm a U.S.-drafted resolution giving the turbing resemblance to the world’s inthe land, and have burned many of Sudanese government 30 days to dis- action 10 years ago, when close to a
their villages to the ground. The Unit- arm and prosecute the Arab militias million Rwandans died in killings now
ed Nations estimates that violence in or face unspecified sanctions. 5
widely described as genocide.10 In 1994,
Congress declared the violence “geno- the Clinton administration also had inDarfur has killed 50,000 and left 2
million short of food and medicine. 2 cide” on July 22 and urged President tentionally avoided describing the RwanThe Agency for International Devel- Bush to do the same. 6 But as of mid- da crisis as genocide because Pentagon
opment warns that between 300,000 August, Secretary of State Colin L. Pow- lawyers had advised that using the term
and a million people could die by ell studiously avoided using the word could commit the United States “to acyear’s end, depending on how much “genocide” on the advice of govern- tually do something” under the interment lawyers, he explained. 7 Under national genocide convention. 11
aid reaches the refugees. 3
Human-rights groups have accused the International Convention on the
Both former President Bill Clinton
the Sudanese government of arming Prevention and Punishmentofthe Crime and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
the militias in an effort to root out and of Genocide, the United States and have since traveled to Rwanda to exthreaten rebels from Darfur’s black other participating countries are oblig- press regret over the world’s failure to
African tribalgroups.Some villages had ed “to prevent and punish” genocide, stop the genocide. “We did not act
AFP Photo/Marco Longari
A
Av a ila ble online : www.the c qr e s e a r c he r.c om
Aug . 2 7 , 2 0 0 4
687
STOPPING GENOCIDE
Ge noc ide in S uda n
S udan is Afr ic a’s lar g e st c o untr y — almo st fiv e time s the siz e o f
F r anc e . In the we ste r n Dar fur r e g io n, r amp ag ing Ar ab militiame n
o n ho r se b ac k , k no wn as the Janjawe e d, hav e le ft mo r e than a
millio n p e o p le ho me le ss sinc e e ar ly 2003. T he militias hav e b e e n
k illing and r ap ing b lac k Afr ic ans, who tr aditio nally far m the land.
T he v io le nc e has k ille d so me 50,000 and le ft 2 millio n sho r t o f fo o d
and me dic ine . Aid o ffic ials e stimate up to a millio n r e fug e e s c o uld
die b y y e ar ’s e nd witho ut suffic ie nt sup p lie s. T he v io le nc e b e g an in
e ar ly 2003, b ut it to o k until July 2004 fo r the wo r ld c o mmunity to
thr e ate n se r io us ac tio n. Altho ug h Co ng r e ss c alle d the k illing s
“ g e no c ide ” o n July 22, as o f mid-Aug ust, S e c r e tar y o f S tate Co lin L .
Po we ll has av o ide d the wo r d. On July 30, the U.N. S e c ur ity Co unc il
p asse d a U.S .-dr afte d r e so lutio n g iv ing S udan 30 day s to disar m
and p r o se c ute the Ar ab militias o r fac e unsp e c ifie d sanc tio ns.
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quickly enough after the killing began,”
Clinton told hundreds of genocide survivors after hearing harrowing eyewitness accounts of the massacre. “We did
not immediately call these crimes by
their rightful name: genocide.” 12
Two months later, after touring a
memorialcontaining the bones of3,000
genocide victims, Annan somberly acknowledged, “The world failed Rwanda at that time of evil. The international community and the United
Nations could not muster the political
will to confront it.” 13
Instead, Clinton officials had urged
the Rwandan government to negotiate with rebel militants from the Tutsi
ethnic minority — the group the Hutuled Rwandan government had targeted for killing. An estimated 800,000
minority Tutsi and moderate Hutu’s
were killed in three months — most
hacked to death with machetes. The
daily death rate exceeded even Hitler’s
killing machine. Many observers now
agree Rwanda’s leaders used their participation at the peace table as a cover
for the killings they were planning and
executing elsewhere in the country.
Similarly, Bush administration officials have stressed their role in encouraging north-south peace talks between the Sudan governmentand rebel
groups, which want a share of Sudan’s
oil wealth. (The African rebel groups
from Darfur charge they have been
largely excluded from those agreements,
which is one reason they are rebelling.)
“Once again, the world is turning its
back on a defenseless people,” said Rep.
Tom Lantos, D-Calif., ranking minority
member of the House International Relations Committee.He had warned State
Department officials earlier this spring
that Sudanese government leaders were
“masters of manipulating” the internationalcommunity,even as they engaged
in the peace process. 14
What does it take for a country like
the United States to intervene in an ethnically driven massacre abroad — particularly if it puts American soldiers at
The Genocide Treaty
T
he United States and 135 other nations have signed the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide since the United Nations General
Assembly approved it on Dec. 9, 1948. The treaty recognizes
that genocide “is contrary to the spirit and aims of the United
Nations and condemned by the civilized world” and that “in
order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international cooperation is required. . . .”
Key treaty provisions:
• The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime
under international law which they undertake to prevent
and to punish.
• In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
risk?Increasingly,observers seem to concur with former journalist Samantha
Power, a lecturer at Harvard’s Kennedy
School of Government. Her 2002 book,
A Pro b le m fro m He ll, argues that American presidents from Franklin D.Roosevelt
to Clinton have been reluctant to intervene unless they perceive it to be in
their political interest. And humanitarian
intervention is widely viewed as unlikely to be popular with voters.
It’s hard to argue for a compelling
U.S. interest in far-off Sudan, even if
it once harbored al-Qaeda terrorists.
But proponents of humanitarian intervention say genocidalcountries could
indeed threaten the United States because they often become breeding
grounds for terrorism and disease.
“Sudan’s chaos is destabilizing surrounding countries, especially Chad,
which is an increasing source of oil
for us,” Ne w Yo r k T ime s columnist
Nicholas D. Kristof recently argued,
adding that recent outbreaks of ebola
virus and polio in Sudan could also
spread to neighboring countries. 15
whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
• The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance
with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties
for persons guilty of genocide. . . .
• Persons charged with genocide [or attempted genocide or
related crimes] . . . shall be tried by a competent tribunal
of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties
which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
• Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the
Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide. . . .
In a recent example of how ethnic
persecution can spread to surrounding
countries, a Hutu rebel faction in Burundi on Aug. 13 shot or hacked to
death at least 189 Tutsi refugees from
neighboring Congo, who had fled to
a refugee camp in Burundi to escape
a civil war at home. 16
Rwandan President Paul Kagame
later said the massacre “proves . . .
that there have been incidents that are
ignored by the international community and the U.N. where people are
being killed in eastern Congo, being
targeted for who they are.” 17
U.N. officials were investigating
whether the killings were perpetrated
by Hutu insurgents from neighboring
Rwanda, who fled to Congo after participating in the 1994 genocide against
Rwanda’s minority Tutsi ethnic group.
Some of President Bush’s harshest
critics have given his administration
credit for publicly condemning the
killings in Sudan — if late in the game.
In early July, Powell visited Sudan and
received pledges from Sudanese offi-
Av a ila ble online : www.the c qr e s e a r c he r.c om
cials to disarm the militias. The continuing killings in late July spurred the
United States to push the Security Council to threaten punitive measures if a
30-day deadline was not met. 18
According to Power, 10,000 peacekeeping troops would be needed to stop
the killing.19 Butwith its forces stretched
thin in Iraq, the United States has so far
been unwilling to committroops to Darfur. In July, the United States was instead urging countries in the African
Union and Europe to help, according
to Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues. 20
“What about the Europeans, Spain —
all those people not helping us in Iraq?”
he asks. “Why don’t they help us? We’re
pretty locked down in Iraq right now.”
American and U.N.reliance on Sudan’s
government to pacify the same Arab
militias they have been charged with
arming means “the wolf will guard the
henhouse,” in the opinion of John Prendergast,who handled African affairs during the Clinton administration. Only an
international military force backed by
Aug . 2 7 , 2 0 0 4
689
STOPPING GENOCIDE
the United States and Europe is likely
to succeed, he has suggested. 21
Complicating matters, the current
scandal over American soldiers’ abuse
of Iraqi prisoners may have fatally undermined the United States’moralcredibility if it calls for international military action in Sudan, argues Holly
Burkhalter, U.S. policy director for
Physicians for Human Rights.
“The U.S. has no authority in the
world right now. We couldn’t get consensus on a lemonade stand much less
United Nations intervention,” says
Burkhalter, who favors sending troops
to protect the delivery of food, medicine and shelter to Sudanese refugees,
many of them in unprotected camps
inside Sudan.
Some critics blame international inaction on the fact that the Security
Council must approve the mobilization of U.N. peacekeepers. Any one
of the five permanent members — including nations like Russia and China,
which have themselves been accused
of human-rights abuses — can veto a
resolution. “In this case, it’s not the
U.S. that’s the spoiler as we were with
Rwanda,” Burkhalter notes.
This time, however, the Security
Council has an option that was not
available in 1994: It could seek action
by the International Criminal Court
(ICC) in the Hague, Netherlands, established in 1998 to try crimes against
humanity. 22 But such a move would
be “difficult for us to even contemplate supporting,” Prosper says. Expressing concern that American peacekeepers abroad could be hauled before
the court on politically motivated warcrimes charges, the Bush administration has refused to join the court.
Human-rights activists say the administration’s opposition to the court
reflects its overall disdain for international law. Similarly, some see the administration’s choice of an Iraqi-led tribunalto try Saddam Hussein on charges
of genocide as just another chance to
reject international justice.
690
The CQ Researcher
“You’ve got an effort to deliberately hold at arms length international involvement and expertise in the name
of an Iraqi-led effort while behind the
scenes you have a U.S.-motored effort,” says Richard Dicker, director of
the International Justice Program at
Human Rights Watch.
Bush administration officials counter
that the Iraqi court could prove to be
an improvement over the tribunals the
U.N. set up after the genocides in
Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the early
1990s. Those tribunals were criticized
for being slow to bring cases to trial
and for being held outside the countries where the crimes occurred.
As the United States struggles over
its roles in Sudan and Iraq, here are
some of the debates taking place in
Congress and the international arena:
Yet other analysts say Rwanda has
sensitized the administration to the
need for earlier action. The United
States has taken “the strongest public
stance” of any nation against the situation in Darfur, Human Rights Watch
declared in May, amid what it called
a “shameful” void in international response. 25 In April, Bush called on
Sudan to stop the militia attacks.
“I condemn these atrocities, which
are displacing hundreds of thousands
of civilians, and I have expressed my
views directly to President [Omar Hassan Ahmed al] Bashir,” Bush said.
Author Power saw Bush’s statement
as an improvementover Rwanda.“President Bush called Bashir, which is one
more phone call than Clinton made
to Rwanda in 1994,” she said. “At least
he’s not saying, ‘We’re not going to
send troops, so let’s stay mute,’ which
Is the United States doing enough is what happened before. That’s a verto stop and prevent genocide?
sion of progress.” 26
Sudan may be the test case for deIt’s too early to say how much more
termining whether the United States Bush might be willing to do in Sudan.
learned any lessons from Rwanda. But some experts say American presSome human-rights activists have crit- idents only risk military intervention if
icized the United States for doing too they see some political payoff.
little too late, waiting more than a
“We don’t intervene because the
year after the attacks began on Su- political risks of not acting are less
danese civilians to consider stronger than the political risks of acting,” says
steps. But as of August, despite con- Jerry Fowler, staff director of the Comtinued killing and raping, the admin- mittee on Conscience, which guides
istration still was not contemplating the genocide-prevention activities of
military action, despite the urging of the United States Holocaust Memorial
some human-rights groups. 23
Museum. For the first time in its hisHuman rights in Darfur started to tory, the committee declared a “genodeteriorate after two rebel groups at- cide emergency” on July 26, saying
tacked Sudanese troops in February that genocide in Sudan “was imminent
2003 over the government’s failure to or actually happening.” 27
protectcivilians there or to include DarOther observers suggest that Amerfur in ongoing peace negotiations. 24 icans tend to be far less sympathetic
Some activists say the Bush adminis- to genocide in remote continents like
tration’s slowness to act shows the Africa, where black people are vicUnited States has not learned the main tims, than to similar events in Europe.
lesson of Rwanda — act early, before In 1999, an American-backed NATO
crimes escalate to genocide.
bombing campaign to end ethnic killing
“We wouldn’t be facing hundreds in Kosovo, in the former Yugoslavia,
of thousands of deaths in western came after enormous media attention
Sudan today if we’d learned enough,” and political pressure, in contrast to
Burkhalter says.
scant press attention to Rwanda. 28
AFP Photo/Alessandro Abbonizio
Noting the handful of reporters cov- dicators that lead to a legal definition protecting peace and security,notes Dickering a May 6 hearing on Darfur before of genocide. And that’s the advice of er of Human Rights Watch.
the International Relations Committee, my lawyers.” 30
However, the international convenRep.Donald M.Payne,D-N.J.,an AfricanOn July 1, the liberal grass-roots tion does commit participating counAmerican, said, “Perhaps if this was in group MoveOn.org urged its members tries to undertake to “prevent and punEurope, we’d have TV cameras all over to lobby the administration to declare ish genocide,” an obligation weighty
the place.But since it’s just another gov- genocide in Darfur: “Formally recog- enough thatadministration lawyers have
ernment in Africa, we don’t.”
nizing the genocide would enable the advised presidents against using the
The country’s attitude toward foreign U.N.Security Councilto authorize other term. American presidents mistakenly
disasters has also been influenced by countries, like Germany, France, and — and repeatedly — assume their rethe Sept.11,2001,terrorist
sponse to genocide must be
attacks, Ne w Yo rk T ime s
either military action or nothcolumnist James Traub
ing at all, Power observes. 31
argued recently. “One of
President Bush demonthe consequences of 9/11
strated thatpoliticalcloutcould
may be that vital interests
be exerted in other ways with
have come to seem so
his call to Sudan’s President
pressing that humanitarial Bashir on April 7 to deanism has become an unnounce the killings in Darfur.
affordable luxury,” he sugAnxious to have economic
gested. 29
sanctions lifted, Sudan anDuring his first presinounced an immediate ceasedential campaign, Presifire. When U.S. attention
dent Bush said the “best
waned, however, the killings
interests of the United
resumed.
States” would guide his
Often forgotten in the deinternationalpolicies,not
bate over stopping genocide
the well-being of foreign
is another obligation of nanations. He indicated he
tions under the internationwould not send troops if
al convention — to make
another Rwanda occurred
genocidal leaders accounton his watch. In justifyable for their crimes. Many
ing the invasions of Iraq
experts see the Internationand Afghanistan, howeval Criminal Court as a cruer, Bush has recently
cial ingredient in preventing
borrowed the moral arfuture genocides.
guments used by liberal F o r me r Rwandan Pr ime Ministe r Je an Kamb anda r e c e iv e s a life
“By leaving perpetrators of
se nte nc e in S e p te mb e r 1998 fo r his r o le in the de aths o f 800,000
humanitarian intervengenocide unpunished, we
Rwandans in 1994. T he sp e c ial U.N. tr ib unal in T anz ania was
tionists during the 1990s
only make genocide more
the fir st inte r natio nal c o ur t to c o nv ic t any o ne fo r g e no c ide
to push for military acpossible, not less,” says Juan
and the fir st to ho ld a he ad o f g o v e r nme nt r e sp o nsib le .
tio n in Rwan d a an d
E.Mendez,the U.N.’s recently
Bosnia.
appointed special adviser on
Over the summer, Secretary of State Spain,which don’t have troops in Iraq, the prevention of genocide.
Powell came under fire for refusing to help stop the killing in Sudan.”
But the United States has refused
to call the Sudan killings genocide.
Contrary to MoveOn’s perception, to join the court and has sought ex“Why would we call it a genocide declaring a genocide is not needed to emptions from the court’s jurisdiction
when the genocide definition has to trigger military action by either the Unit- for U.S. troops and officials, drawing
meet certain legal tests?” he told Na- ed States or the United Nations under fire from human-rights groups.
tional Public Radio on June 30. “And the international genocide convention.
“The U.S should be leading the efbased on what we have seen, there The U.N. Charter empowers the Secu- fort to have the Security Council refer
were some indicators but there was rity Councilto ordermilitary forces abroad the situation in Darfur to the Internacertainly no full accounting of all in- to protect civilians, under its mission of tional Criminal Court,” Dicker argues.
Av a ila ble online : www.the c qr e s e a r c he r.c om
Aug . 2 7 , 2 0 0 4
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STOPPING GENOCIDE
Modern Genocides vs. the Holocaust
T
he horrendous death toll from the Nazi Holocaust —
6 million Jews and another 5 million Gypsies, homosexuals and communists — prompted U.S. political leaders to vow “Never again.”
And yet genocides continue with little effort to stop them.
One reason — or excuse — may be that ethnic killings since
World War II look very different from the Nazi atrocities. Genocide today usually occurs in the context of wars or armed rebellions, with killing occurring on both sides. This fueled the
argument against intervening during the Bosnian war, when
Muslims and Serbs were killing each other. “It’s been easy to
analogize [the Bosnia situation] to the Holocaust,” President
Bill Clinton’s secretary of State, Warren Christopher, told the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 18, 1993, “but I
never heard of any genocide by the Jews against the German
people.”
Historian Frank Chalk, co-director of the Montreal Institute
for Genocide and Human Rights Studies at Concordia University, observes, “The public has in its mind cases like that of
the Holocaust, where you could never sustain the argument
“The court was created to go after those
who are behind the Janjaweed and the
Sudanese military authorities in theircampaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur.”
The Bush administration’s opposition
to the court makes that unlikely. (S e e
“ At Issue ,” p . 701.) Instead, the administration supports setting up ad hoc courts
to punish perpetrators as each new genocide arises — as in Rwanda, Yugoslavia
and most recently Iraq. But the court’s
advocates say ad hoc tribunals take too
long to establish and are too expensive.
Ambassador Prosper disagrees.“The
world has learned over the years and
is more efficientin creating those mechanisms,” he maintains. He notes that
a tribunal set up in about 45 days in
Sierra Leone last year indicted those
bearing the greatest responsibility for
atrocities committed during a civil war
that ended in 2002.
The administration also objects to the
international court because it does not
come under Security Council jurisdiction. If it did, State Department officials
argue, the Security Council would preventpoliticized prosecutions by the court.
692
The CQ Researcher
that the Jewish people were lethal enemies of the Nazis or
that the killing was part of military necessity.”
But when both the government and the armed opposition
are using famine as a weapon to starve civilians on the opposing side, he adds, “It’s very hard to tell the public that both sides
are doing that, and then mobilize the pressure for intervention.”
Rwanda is a case in point. In 1994, the Rwandan government was battling an armed rebellion by the Tutsi Rwandan
Patriotic Front at the same time that it was exhorting Hutu
mothers and fathers to machete their Tutsi neighbors. But Joyce
Leader, the U.S. deputy chief of mission to Rwanda in 1994,
says her State Department superiors had enough information
to distinguish military from civilian killings.
“That was a clear situation where the violence could have been
stopped if there was a show of force by the international community; but the U.S. didn’t want to get involved in a civil war —
even when the killing of Tutsis was separate from the Tutsi rebel
group fighting with government forces,” Leader says. “We did inform the higher-ups that different kinds of killings were occurring,
but they initially didn’t hear it or didn’t want to hear it.”
Moreover, as an independent entity, the
international court doesn’t have the political clout to force a state to give up
a genocide suspect, Prosper argues.
On June 23, however, the Bush administration backed down from its attempt to get the U.N. to exempt U.S.
military personnel serving as U.N.
peacekeepers from international court
jurisdiction. Secretary-General Annan
had criticized the move in light of the
accusations that American soldiers in
Iraq were torturing prisoners.
“The U.S. is engaging in torture and
pretending that it’s not,” Burkhalter says.
“It puts us in a uniquely bad position
to be rallying around a moral cause.” 32
cide, citing what happened in Rwanda.
Some critics blame the weak record
on the structure of the Security Council, the only U.N. organ empowered to
authorize military force. Any one of the
five permanent members — the United States, England, France, China or
Russia — on the 15-member body can
block council action. Human-rights
groups have accused Russia of genocidal abuses in Chechnya, and China
of violating human rights in Tibet.
The qualifications for Security Council membership need to be changed to
eliminate members who practice genocide, says William Pace, who heads the
Coalition for the International Criminal
Court. Likening the council to a fire deIs the U.N. doing enough to stop
partment, he says: “We shouldn’t have
and prevent genocide?
pyromaniacs on the Security Council.”
Annan has spoken outforcefully against
The Security Council’s makeup has
the killings in Darfur and sent a special been blamed for the U.N.’s paralysis on
envoy there this summer. The U.N. also several occasions. In June, the council
surprised some critics on July 30 when failed to pass a U.S.-backed resolution
the Security Council threatened punitive criticizing Sudan because of opposition
measures if Sudan did not disarm the from Pakistan and Algeria,the two MusArab militias. But human-rights activists lim countries currently on the council,
say the U.N.has a weak record on geno- and China. 33
When the Clinton administration
wanted the Security Council to charge
Iraq’s Hussein with war crimes, the opposition of a few permanent members
— Ch in a, Ru ssia an d Fran ce —
blocked any action, according to David
J.Scheffer,then-U.S.ambassador-at-large
for war-crimes issues. They were more
interested in protecting their oil interests in Iraq, he has charged. 34
In Rwanda, the council responded
to the 1994 ethnic killings by reducing its peacekeeping force to just 270
soldiers — one-tenth its original size.
Many believe a larger contingent
could have saved lives. Author Power
has argued thatAnnan,who then headed U.N. peacekeeping operations, had
so internalized the paralysis governing the veto-prone Security Council
that he did not even bother to ask
for a council vote in response to an
urgent cable from the U.N. troop commander in Rwanda, Romeo Dallaire,
warning of an impending massacre.
In the cable, Dallaire said he planned
to seize arms that he had been informed were being assembled by local
Hutu militias to exterminate Tutsi’s.
Annan’s cable rejected the proposed
arm raids telling him,“the United States
in particular would not support such
an aggressive interpretation ofhis mandate,” Power writes. 35
“We’ve acknowledged our responsibilities in failing the people of Rwanda,” says U.N.spokesman Farhan Haq.
However, Mendez, the special adviser, notes when it comes to genocide,
“In the last 10 years there hasn’t been
a veto on action by any of the permanent five members. I don’t see it as having been the main reason the international community failed to act.”
Rather, the council’s inaction may
stem from individual members’ desire
to avoid a veto, Mendez suggests. In
the case of Kosovo, for example, the
NATO countries decided not even to
seek Security Council authorization for
military intervention because they feared
a veto, Mendez notes. Instead, they
acted on their own,sending in a NATO
force in 1999. “It seems to me the U.N.
is sometimes scapegoated for the lack
of will of some member states: If you
don’t want to do something, you can
argue, ‘I can’t do it because there will
be a veto,’ ” Mendez says.
The U.N.GeneralAssembly has discussed proposals to abolish the council’s veto power, but U.N. spokesman
Haq says, “Frankly, I don’t think it will
be resolved any time quickly.”
In April, Annan announced that he
wanted his main legacy to be a U.N.
better equipped to prevent genocide.
Saying regrets over Rwanda had “dominated” his thoughts ever since, Annan
announced a plan built around giving
early warning ...
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