C HA PATER EIGHT
Liberty
23 The Liberal Argument from On Liberty
JOHN STUART MILL
The object of this essay is to assert one very sim- him must be calculated to produce evil to some
ple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the one else. The only part of the conduct of any
dealings of society with the individual in the way one, for which he is amenable to society, is that
of compulsion and control, whether the means which concerns others. In the part which merely
used be physical force in the form of legal penal- concerns himself, his independence is, of right,
ties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. absolute. Over himself, over his own body and
That principle, that the sole end for which man- mind, the individual is sovereign.
kind is warranted, individually or collectively, in It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this
interfering with the liberty of action of any of doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in
their number, is self-protection. That the only the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking
purpose for which power can be rightfully exer- of children, or of young persons below the age
cised over any member of a civilized community, which the law may fix as that of manhood or wom-
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His anhood. Those who are still in a state to require
own good, either physical or moral, is not a suf- being taken care of by others must be protected
ficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be com- against their own actions as well as against external
pelled to do or forbear because it will be better injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of
for him to do so; because it will make him happier; consideration those backward states of society in
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would which the race itself may be considered as in its
be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for nonage. The early difficulties in the way of sponta-
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, neous progress are so great that there
seldom
or persuading him, or entreating him, but not any choice of means for overcoming them; and a
for compelling him, or visiting him with any ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted
evil, in case he does otherwise. To justify that, in the use of any expedients that will attain an end,
the conduct from which it is desired to deter perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a
From On Liberty, excerpts from Chapters I and II, and all of Chapter IV. First published in 1859.
- 251 -
252 CHAPTER 8 Liberty
answerable for
JOHN STUART MILL . The Liberal Argument from On Liberty 253
for don
external
same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.
and pursuits, of framing the plan of our life to
suut our own character; of doing as we like, subject
to such consequences as may follow; without
impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long
as what we do does not harm them, even though
likely
produce
step
into the
vacan
account
legitimate mode of government in dealing with
barbanans, provided the end be their improvement,
former. To make any one
evil to others is the rule; to make him
and the means justified by actually effecting that
for not preventing evil is, comparatively
end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to
held in the manner of a prejudice, with little com
the exception. Yet there are many cases de
enough and grave enough to justify that en
any state of things anterior to the time when man-
prehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And
of thought itself, and resting in great part on the
not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the
kind have become capable of being improved by
tion. In all things which regard the
doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or
free and equal discussion. Until then, there is noth-
tions of the individual, he is de jure amenable
those whose interests are concerned, and if we
Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes
enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the
ang for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or
character and conduct: the dogma becoming a
a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find
be, to society as their protector. There are o
mere formal profession, inefficacious for good,
one. But as soon as mankind have attained the good reasons for not
holding him to the respons
but cumbering the ground, and preventing the
capacity of being guided to their own improvement
bility, but these reasons must arise from the
growth of any real and heartfelt conviction from
expediencies of the case: either because it is akin
by conviction or persuasion (a period long since
reason or personal experience....
reached in all nations with whom we need here
they should think our conduct foolish, perverse,
of case in which he is on the whole
or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each indi-
concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct better, when left to his own discretion,
vidual, follows the liberty, within the same limits,
OF THE LIMITS TO THE
form or in that of pains and penalties for non-com-
when controlled in any way in which
of combination among individuals; freedom to
pliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their have it in their power to control him; or because
AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY
unite, for any purpose not involving harm to
own good, and justifiable only for the security of the attempt to exercise control would
others: the persons combining being supposed
OVER THE INDIVIDUAL
others
other evils, greater than those which it would poc
to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.
No society on which these liberties are not, on
What, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty
It is proper to state that I forego any advan-
vent. When such reasons as these preclude the
tage which could be derived to my argument
of the individual over himself? Where does the
enforcement of responsibility, the conscience
the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its
from the idea of abstract right, as a thing inde-
form of government; and none is completely free
authority of society begin? How much of
the agent himself should
in which they do not exist absolute and unquali-
human life should be assigned to individuality,
pendent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate judgment-seat, and protect those interests
fied. The only freedom which deserves the name
and how much to society?
appeal on all ethical questions, but it must be util- others which have no external protection; juda
is that of pursuing our own good in our own
Each will receive its proper share, if each has
ity in the largest sense, grounded on the perma-
ing himself all the more rigidly, because
way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive
that which more particularly concerns it. To indi-
nent interests of man as a progressive being.
case does not admit of his being made
others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain
viduality should belong the part of life in which it
Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjec- able to the judgment of his fellow-creatures,
it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health,
is chiefly the individual that is interested; to soci-
tion of individual spontaneity to external control, But there is a sphere of action in which
whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind
ety, the part which chiefly interests society.
only in respect to those actions of each, which
ety, as distinguished from the individual, has,
are greater gainers by suffering each other to live
Though society is not founded on a contract,
as seems good to themselves, than by compelling
concern the interest of other people. If any one
and though no good purpose is answered by
that portion of a person's life and conduc
any, only an indirect interest; comprehendinga
does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima
each to live as seems good to the rest....
inventing a contract in order to deduce social
We have now recognized the necessity to the
face case for punishing him, by law, or, where which affects only himself, or, if it also affect
obligations from it, every one who receives the
mental well-being of mankind (on which all their
protection of society owes a return for the benefit,
legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general others, only with their free, voluntary, and unde
other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion,
and the fact of living in society renders it indis-
disapprobation. There are also many positive acts ceived consent and participation. When I say on
and freedom of the expression of opinion, on
for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully
pensable that each should be bound to observe
himself, I mean directly, and in the first instante
four distinct grounds, which we will now briefly
a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This
be compelled to perform; such as, to give evi- for whatever affects himself may affect othen
recapitulate
conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests
dence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share through himself, and the objection which
- First, if any opinion is compelled to silence
of one another; or rather certain interests, which,
may be
that opinion may, for aught we can certainly
in the common defence, or in any other joint grounded on this contingency will receive congid
know, be true. To deny this is to assume our either by express legal provision or by tacit under-
work necessary to the interest of the society of eration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropa
own infallibility.
standing, ought to be considered as rights, and
which he enjoys the protection, and to perform ate region of human liberty. It comprises, firs,
- Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an secondly, in each person's bearing his share (to
certain acts of individual beneficence, such as say- the inward domain of consciousness, demanding
error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors
ing a fellow creature's life, or interposing to pro- liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive
and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or
portion of truth; and since the general or prevail-
in the defenseless against ill-usage, things which sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolut
ing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the its members from injury and molestation. These
whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all
nghtfully be made responsible to society
costs to those who endeavor to withhold fulfill-
practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theo opinions that the remainder of the truth has any
or mor deg. A person may cause evil to others logical. The liberty of expressing and publishing chance of being supplied.
ment. Nor is this all that society may do. The
by his serions but by his inaction, and in opinions may seem to fall under a different princi Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or
he is accountable to them for the ple, since it belongs to that part of the conducted only true, but the whole truth, unless it is suffered wanting in due consideration for their welfare,
The laner
without going the length of violating any of
after css, it is true, requires a much an individual which concerns other people; but, to be, and actually is vigorously and earnestly con-
tested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be their constituted rights. The offender may then
tous exercise of compulsion than the being almost of as much importance as the liber
500
354 CHAPTER
(except as to his conduct to
respect
1
those that can be
immeasurably surpassing
pos
society
likely
2$ not to
wrong, and even if right, are as
exercise
personal attachment, can have in it is trilling
pared with that which he himself has the
Any part of a person's conduct ates
he hustle punished by person, though not by law
nes which sociery has in him individually
others) is fractional,
preitadically the interests of others, society has
and altogether indirect: while, with
diction over it, and the
con whether
the general welfare will or will not be promoted
his own kechings and circumstances, the
ordinant man a woman has means of knowledge
by intertering with it becomes open to discussion
But there is no room for catertang air such
question when a person's conduct affects the
sessed by an one else. The interference of
terests of no persons besides himself, or incerts
to overrule his judgment and purposes in what
bor affect them unless they like all the persons
only regards himself must be grounded on gen
concerned being of full age, and the ordinary
eral presuinptions, which may be altogether
inoint of understanding in all such cases
there should be perfect freedom, legal and social,
be misapplied to individual cases, by persons
to do the action and stand the consequences
better acquainted with the circumstances of
doctrine to suppose that it is one of selfish indit such cases than those are who look at them
It would be a great misunderstanding of this
ference, which pretends that human beings have
merch from without. In this department, there
no business with cach other's conduct in life, and
fore, of human affairs, individuality has its proper
that they should nor concern themselves about
field of action. In the conduct of human being
toward one another, it is necessary that general
rules should for the most part be observed, in
the well-doing or well-being of one another,
unless their own interest is involved. Instead of
onder that people may know what they have to
any diminution, there is need of a great increase
of disinterested exertion to promote the good of espect; but in each person's own concerns, his
others. But disinterested benevolence can find
individual spontaneity is entitled to free
other instruments to persuade people to their
to strengthen his will, may be offered to him,
Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations
good than whips and scourges, either of the lit
even obtruded on him, by others; but he, himself,
eral or the metaphorical sort. I am the last person
to undervalue the self-regarding virrues, they are is the final judge. Ali errors which he is likely to
commit against advice and warning are far out
only second in importance, if even second, to the
social. It is equally the business of education to
weighed by the evil of allowing others to con
cultivate both. But even education works by con-
strain him to what they decm his good
viction and persuasion as well as by compulsion,
I do not mean that the feelings with which a
and it is by the former only that, when the period
person is regarded by others ought not to be in
of education is past, the self-regarding virtues
any way affected by his self-regarding qualities
strould be inculcated. Human beings owe to
or deficiencies. This is neither possible nor desir
each other help to distinguish the better from
able. If he is eminent in any of the qualities which
the worse, and encouragement to choose the for
conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper
mer and avoid the latter. They should be forever object of admiration. He is so much the nearer
stimulating each other to increased exercise of to the ideal perfection of human nature. If he is
their higher faculties, and increased direction grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment
of their feelings and aims toward wise instead of the opposite of admiration will follow. There is
may
be
foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects a degree of folly, and a degree of what
and contemplations. Bur neither one person, called though the phrase is not unobjectionable
or any number of persons, is warranted in saying lowness or depravation of taste, which, though it
to another human creature of ripe years that he cannor justify doing harm to the person who
shall not do with his life for his own benefit manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly
what he choose to do with it. He is the person a subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of
most interested in his own well-being the interest contempt: a person would not have the opposite
had any other person, except in cases of strong qualities in due strength without entertaining
JOHN STUART MILL. The Liberal Arame Frem by 265
person should ever be subjected for the portion
these feelings. Though doing so wrong to any
of his conduct and character which camera
judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a
ac, a person may so act as compel uste
his own good, but winch does not affect their
ests of others in their relations with a
being of an inferior order and since this ide-
injurious to others require a total different treat-
meet and feeling are a fact which he would prefer
ment. Encroachment on the ghoon on
o avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of
them of any loss or damage not justified by has
is beforehand, as of any other disagreeable conse-
own nights, faischood or duplast in dealing
quence to which he exposes himself. It would be
Well, indeed, if this good office were much more
with them: unfair or angenous use of adam
tages over them, even selfish abstinene from
freely rendered than the common notions of
defending them against injury these are fois
politeness at present permit, and if one person
objects of moral reprobation, and, in grare
could honestly point out to another that he
cases, of moral retribution and punishment. And
thinks him in fault, without being considered
not only these acts, bar the disposition which
unmannery or presuming. We have a right,
lead to them, are properly immoral, and fit subots
also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavorable
opinion of any one, not to the oppression of of disapprobation which may use to abhorrence
his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We Cruelty of disposition, malice and mature, the
are not bound, for example, to seek his society: most antisocial and odious of all passins, envy.
o have a right to avoid it (though not to parade dissimulation and insincerity, irascibility on a
the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the cient cause, and resentment disproportioned to the
society most acceptable to us. We have a right, provocation, the love of domineering over others:
and it may be our duty to caution others against the desire to engross more than one's shame of
him, if we think his example or conversation likely advantages (the cover of the Greeks: the
to have a pernicious effect on those with whom pride which derives gratification from the abase
he associates. We may give others a preference ment of others; the egotism which thinks self
over him in optional good offices, except those and its conccms more important than everything
which tend to his improvement. In these various else, and decides all doubtful questions in his
modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at own favor- these are moral vices, and constitute
the hands of others, for faults which directly con- a bad and odious moral character: unlike the self
corn only himself; but he suffers these penalties regarding faults previously mentioned, which are
only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch
were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness
themsches, not because they are purposely inflicted They may be proofs of any amount of Bolly.
on him for the sake of punishment. A person who want of personal dignity and self respect, but
shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit--who can- they are only a subject of moral reprobation
not live within moderate means--who cannot when they involve a breach of dure to others, for
restrain himself from hurtful indulgences-- who whose sake the individual is bound to have care
pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those for himself. What are called duties to ourches
of feelings and intellect-must expect to be low- are not socially obligatory, unless circumstances
ered in the opinion of others, and to have a less render them at the same time duties to the
share of their favorable sentiments, but of this he The term duty to meet when it means thing
has no right to complain, unless he has merited more than prudence, means self respect of
their favor by special excellence in his social rela- development, and for none of these is anyon
tions and has thus established a title to their accountable to his fellow-creatures, because for
good offices, which is not affected by his demerits none of them is it for the good of mankind this
toward himself
he be held accountable to than
What I contend for is that the inconveniences The distinction between the loss of consider
which are strictly inseparable from the unfavorable anion which a person may tightly incare deti
judgment of others are the only ones to which a of
of prudence or of personal dignity, and
256 CHAPTER 8 - Liberty
near con
amount, the
gen
to their predecessors.
on him for
any
obligation
or mislead.
becomes
porting
consequen
without mischief reaching at least to his
reprobation which is due to him for an offense
nections, and often far beyond them. If he injures
against the rights of others, is not a merely nom
his property, he does harm to those who directly
inal distinction. It makes a vast difference both in
or indirectly derived support from it, and usually
our feelings and in our conduct toward him,
diminishes, by a greater or less
whether he displeases us in things in which we
cral resources of the community. If he deterio
think we have a right to control him, or in things
rates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only
in which we know that we have not. If he dis-
pleases us, we may express our distaste, and we
brings evil upon all who depended
mav stand aloof from a person as well as from a
any portion of their happiness, but disqualifies
himself for rendering the services which he owes
thing that displeases us, but we shall not there
fore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable,
to his fellow-creatures generally, perhaps becomes
benevolence; and if
We shall reflect that he already bears, or will bear
a burden on their affection or
such conduct were very frequent, hardly
the whole penalty of his error; if he spoils his life
offense that is committed would detract more
by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason,
from the general sum of good. Finally, if by his
desire to spoil it still further instead of wishing to
vices or follies a person does no direct harm to
punish him, we shall rather endeavor to alleviate
others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious
his punishment, by showing him how he may
avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to
by his example; and ought to be compelled t
control himself, for the sake of those whom the
bring upon him. He may be to us an object of
sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt
pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or
resentment; we shall not treat him like an enemy
of society: the worst we shall think ourselves justi-
And even (it will be added) if the
ces of misconduct could be confined to the vicious
fied in doing is leaving him to himself, if we do
or thoughtless individual, ought society to aban
not interfere benevolently by showing interest or
don to their own guidance those who are mani-
concern for him. It is far otherwise if he has
infringed the rules necessary for the protection festly unfit for it? If protection against themselves
is confessedly due to children and persons under
of his fellow-creatures, individually or collectively.
age, is not society equally bound to afford it to
The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall
on himself, but on others; and society, as the pro-
persons of mature years who are equally incapable
of self-government? If gambling, or drunkenness,
tector of all its members, must retaliate on him;
or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, arc
must inflict pain on him for the express purpose
of punishment, and must take care that it be suffi- as injurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance
to improvement, as many or most of the acts pro-
ciently severe. In the one case, he is an offender at
our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in
hibited by law, why it may be asked) should not
law, so far as is consistent with practicability and
judgment on him, but, in one shape or another,
social convenience, endeavor to repress these
to execute our own sentences in the other case,
also? And as a supplement to the unavoidable
it is not our part to inflict any suffering on him,
except what may incidentally follow from our imperfections of law, ought not opinion at least
using the same liberty in the regulation of our to organize a powerful police against these
own affairs, which we allow to him in his. vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties those
The distinction here pointed out between the who are known to practice them? There is no
part of a person's life which concerns only him- question here (it may be said) about restricting
self, and that which concerns others, many per- individuality, or impeding the trial of new and
sons will refuse to admit. How it may be original experiments in living. The only things it
asked) can any part of the conduct of a member is sought to prevent are things which have been
tried and condemned from the beginning of
of society be a matter of indifference to the
other members? No person is an entirely isolated the world until now; things which experience
being it is impossible for a person to do anything has shown not to be useful or suitable to any
seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, person's individuality. There must be some
JOHN STUART MILL . The Liberal Argument from On Liberty 257
punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier
Jength of time and amount of experience, after
or a policeman should be punished for being
which a moral or prudential truth may be
drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a def-
regarded as established: and it is merely desired
inite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either
to prevent generation after generation from fall-
to an individual or to the public, the case is taken
ing over the same precipice which has been fatal
out of the province of liberty, and placed in that
fully admit that the mischief which a person of morality or law.
But with regard to the merely contingent, or,
does to himself may seriously affect, both through
as it may be called, constructive injury which a
their sympathies and their interests, those nearly
person causes to society, by conduct which nei-
connected with him, and in a minor degree, soci-
ther violates any specific duty to the public, nor
ery at large. When, by conduct of this sort, a per-
occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable indi-
son is led to violate a distinct and assignable
to any other person or persons, the vidual except himself; the inconvenience is one
case is taken out of the self-regarding class, and
which society can afford to bear, for the sake of
becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the greater good of human freedom. If grown
the proper sense of the term. If, for example, a
persons are to be punished for not taking proper
care of themselves, I would rather it were for their
man, through intemperance or extravagance,
becomes unable to pay his debts, or, having own sake, than under pretense of preventing
undertaken the moral responsibility of a family, them from impairing their capacity of rendering
from the same cause incapable of sup- to society benefits which society does not pretend
or educating them, he is deservedly it has a right to exact. But I cannot consent to
reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it argue the point as if society had no means of
is for the breach of duty to his family or creditors, bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary
not for the extravagance. If the resources which standard of rational conduct, except waiting till
ought to have been devoted to them had been they do something irrational, and then punishing
diverted from them for the most prudent invest- them, legally or morally, for it. Society has had
ment, the moral culpability would have been the absolute power over them during all the carly
same. George Barnwell murdered his uncle to get portion of their existence: it has had the whole
for his mistress, but if he had done it to set period of childhood and nonage in which to try
himself up in business, he would equally have whether it could make them capable of rational
been hanged. Again, in the frequent case of a conduct in life. The existing generation is master
man who causes grief to his family by addiction both of the training and the entire circumstances
to bad habits, he deserves reproach for his of the generation to come; it cannot indeed make
unkindness or ingratitude; but so he may for cul- them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself
tivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom;
are painful to those with whom he passes his and its best efforts are not always, in individual
life, or who from personal ties are dependent on cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly
him for their comfort. Whoever fails in the con- well able to make the rising generation, as a
sideration generally due to the interests and feel- whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself.
ings of others, not being compelled by some If society lets any considerable number of its
more imperative duty, or justified by allowable members grow up mere children, incapable of
self-preference, is a subject of moral disapproba- being acted on by rational consideration of dis-
tion for that failure, but not for the cause of it, tant motives, society has itself to blame for the
nor for the errors, merely personal to himself, consequences. Armed not only with all the
which may have remotely led to it. In like manner; powers of education, but with the ascendency
when a person disables himself, by conduct purely which the authority of a received opinion always
self-regarding, from the performance of some def- exercises over the minds who are least fitted to
inite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is judge for themselves; and aided by the natural
guilty of a social offense. No person ought to be penalties which cannot be prevented from falling
money
258 CHAPTER 8 Liberty
son or a similar majority, imposed
right; for in
or bad
aberrations
or conve-
injury
to
dant
instances,
themsches and
may
human propensities.
It is easy
JOHN STUART MILL. The Liberal Argument from On Liberty 259
The evil here pointed out is not one which countries. Would it be a legitimate exercise of
exists only in theory; and it may perhaps be the moral authority of public opinion and of
expected that I should specify the instances in
which the public of this age and country improp-
not, why not? The practice is really revolting to
such a public. They also sincerely think that it is
forbidden and abhorred by the Deity. Neither
erly invests its own preferences with the character
of moral lavor existing morát felan essay on the
could the prohibition be ccnsured as religious
of feeling
persecution. It might be religious in its origin.
but it would not be persecution for religion,
weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically,
since nobody's religion makes it a duty to cat
and by way of illustration. Yet examples are nec-
essary, to show that the principle I maintain is
of serious and practical moment, and that I am
pork. The only tenable ground of condemnation
would be that with the personal tastes and self-
regarding concerns of individuals the public has
nary evils. And it is not difficult to show, by abun- no business to interfere.
that to extend the bounds of what To come somewhat nearer home: the major-
be called moral police, until it encroaches on
ity of Spaniards consider it a gross impiety, offen-
the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the sive in the highest degree to the Supreme Being,
individual, is one of the most universal of all
to worship him in any other manner than the
Roman Catholic; and no other public worship is
As a first instance, consider the antipathies lawful on Spanish soil. The people of all Southern
which men cherish on no better grounds than
Europe look upon a married clergy as not only
that persons whose religious opinions are differ- irreligious, but unchaste, indecent, gross, disgust
observances, especially their religious abstinences.
To cite a rather trivial example, nothing in the them against non-Catholics? Yet, if mankind are
creed or practice of Christians does more to justified in interfering with each other's liberty
envenom the hatred of Mahomedans against in things which do not concern the interests of
them, than the fact of their eating pork. There others, on what principle is it possible consistently
are few acts which Christians and Europeans to exclude these cases? or who can blame people
regard with more unaffected disgust than Mus- for desiring to suppress what they regard as a
sulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying scandal in the sight of God and man? No stronger
hunger. It is in the first place, an offense against
case can be shown for prohibiting anything which
their religion, but this circumstance by no means is regarded as a personal immorality than is made
explains either the degree or the kind of their out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of
repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by their those who regard them as impieties, and unless
religion, and to partake of it is by all Mussulmans we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors,
accounted wrong, but not disgusting. Their aver- and to say that we may persecute others because
sion to the flesh of the "unclean beast" is, on the
contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an
instinctive antipathy, which the idea of unclean-
The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point
ness, when once it thoroughly sinks into the feel- When this industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants
of the Persian fire-worshippers, flving from the native coun
ings, seems always to excite even in those whose
try before the Caliphs, arrived in Western India, they were
personal habits are anything but scrupulously
admitted to toleration by the Hindoo sovereigns, on condi
cleanly, and of which the sentiment of religious tion of not eating beef. When those regions afterwards tell
under the dominion of Mahomedan conquerors, the res
impurity, so intense in the Hindoos, is a remark
obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, on condi
able example. Suppose now that in a people, of
tion of refraining from pork. What was at tirst obedience to
whom the majority were Mussulmans, that authority became a second nature, and the Parsees to this
day abstain both from beef and pork. Though not required
majority should insist upon not permitting pork
by their religion, the double abstinence has had time to
to be eaten within the limits of the country,
grow into a custom of their mbe; and custom, in the last
is a religion
This would be nothing new in Mahomedan
which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be
of those who know them; let noe iets pretend practice would affect themselves. But the opin
on those who incur the distaste or the contempt
as a law on the
that it needs, besides all this, the power to issue
commands and enforce obedience in the personal minority, on questions of self regarding conduct
1x qune ds likely to be wrong as
concerns of individuals, in which, on all principles
these cases public opinion means, at the best,
of fun and policy, the decision ought to rest
with those who are to abide the consequcnces. Some people's opinion of what is good
for other people; while very often it does not
Nor is there anything which tends more to dis.
eren mean that; the public, with the most perfect
nedit and frustrate the better means of influence
indifference, passing over the pleasure
ang conduct than a resort to the worse. If there be
nience of those whose conduct they censure,
among those whom it is atrempred to coerce into
prudence or temperance any of the material of and considering only their own preference.
There are many who consider as an
conduct which they have a distaste
which vigorous and independent characters are
made, they will intallibly rebel against the yoke.
No such person will ever feel that others have a for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings, as
they have to prevent him from injuning them in the religious feelings of others, has been known to
right to control him in his concerns, such as a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding
retort that they disregard his feelings, by persist.
theirs; and it casily comes to be considered a
mark of spirit and courage to ils in the face of ing in their abominable worship or creed. But
there is no parity between the feeling of a person
such usurped authority, and do with ostentation
for his own opinion, and the feeling of another
the exact opposite of what it enjoins; as in the
ashion of grassness which succeeded, in the who is offended at his holding it; no more than
between the desire of a thief to take a purse,
time of Charles IT, to the fanatical moral intoler
of the necessir of protecting society from the And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar
ance of the Puntans. With respect to what is said and the desire of the right owner to keep it.
purse.
self-indulgent: it is true that bad example may
for any one to imagine an ideal public, which
are a pernicious effect, especially the example leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in
all uncertain matters undisturbed, and only
doing wrong to others with impunity to the
arongdoer. But we are now speaking of conduct
requires them to abstain from modes of conduct
which while it does no wrong to others, is sup
which universal experience has condemned. But
ped to do great harm to the agent himself: where has there been seen a public which set
and I do not see how those who believe this can
any such limit to its censorship? or when does
dekorere than that the example, on the the public trouble itself about universal experi
wholms be more salutary than hurtful, since, ence? In its interferences with personal conduct
displays the misconduct, it displays also the it is seldom thinking of anything but the enor
por degrading consequences which, if the mity of acting or feeling differently from itself;
is hy ensured, must be supposed to and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised,
he wall or more attendant on it
is held up to mankind as the dictate of religion
But the strongest of all the arguments against and philosophy, by nine tenths of all moralists
de amerience of the public with purely per and speculative writers. These teach that things
sont consthat when it does interfere, the
ods that interferes wrongly, and in the them to be so. They tell us to search in our
are right because they are right; because we feel
On questions of social morality, of own minds and hearts for laws of conduct bind-
tore, the option of the public, that ing on ourselves and on all others. What can
erine monts, dough often the poor public do but apply these instructions,
key to he will ofer nghe, because and make their own personal feelings of good
on the only required to
udge of the owner of the manner in
and evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in
them, obligatory on all the world?
bad cumple set to others by the vicious or the concern as his opinion or his
Purchase answer to see full
attachment