The Liberal Argument philosophy

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C HA PATER EIGHT Liberty 23 The Liberal Argument from On Liberty JOHN STUART MILL The object of this essay is to assert one very sim- him must be calculated to produce evil to some ple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the one else. The only part of the conduct of any dealings of society with the individual in the way one, for which he is amenable to society, is that of compulsion and control, whether the means which concerns others. In the part which merely used be physical force in the form of legal penal- concerns himself, his independence is, of right, ties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. absolute. Over himself, over his own body and That principle, that the sole end for which man- mind, the individual is sovereign. kind is warranted, individually or collectively, in It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this interfering with the liberty of action of any of doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in their number, is self-protection. That the only the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking purpose for which power can be rightfully exer- of children, or of young persons below the age cised over any member of a civilized community, which the law may fix as that of manhood or wom- against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His anhood. Those who are still in a state to require own good, either physical or moral, is not a suf- being taken care of by others must be protected ficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be com- against their own actions as well as against external pelled to do or forbear because it will be better injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of for him to do so; because it will make him happier; consideration those backward states of society in because, in the opinions of others, to do so would which the race itself may be considered as in its be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for nonage. The early difficulties in the way of sponta- remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, neous progress are so great that there seldom or persuading him, or entreating him, but not any choice of means for overcoming them; and a for compelling him, or visiting him with any ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted evil, in case he does otherwise. To justify that, in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, the conduct from which it is desired to deter perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a From On Liberty, excerpts from Chapters I and II, and all of Chapter IV. First published in 1859. - 251 - 252 CHAPTER 8 Liberty answerable for JOHN STUART MILL . The Liberal Argument from On Liberty 253 for don external same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. and pursuits, of framing the plan of our life to suut our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though likely produce step into the vacan account legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbanans, provided the end be their improvement, former. To make any one evil to others is the rule; to make him and the means justified by actually effecting that for not preventing evil is, comparatively end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to held in the manner of a prejudice, with little com the exception. Yet there are many cases de enough and grave enough to justify that en any state of things anterior to the time when man- prehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And of thought itself, and resting in great part on the not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the kind have become capable of being improved by tion. In all things which regard the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or free and equal discussion. Until then, there is noth- tions of the individual, he is de jure amenable those whose interests are concerned, and if we Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the ang for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or character and conduct: the dogma becoming a a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find be, to society as their protector. There are o mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, one. But as soon as mankind have attained the good reasons for not holding him to the respons but cumbering the ground, and preventing the capacity of being guided to their own improvement bility, but these reasons must arise from the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction from expediencies of the case: either because it is akin by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reason or personal experience.... reached in all nations with whom we need here they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, of case in which he is on the whole or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each indi- concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct better, when left to his own discretion, vidual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, OF THE LIMITS TO THE form or in that of pains and penalties for non-com- when controlled in any way in which of combination among individuals; freedom to pliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their have it in their power to control him; or because AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY unite, for any purpose not involving harm to own good, and justifiable only for the security of the attempt to exercise control would others: the persons combining being supposed OVER THE INDIVIDUAL others other evils, greater than those which it would poc to be of full age, and not forced or deceived. No society on which these liberties are not, on What, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty It is proper to state that I forego any advan- vent. When such reasons as these preclude the tage which could be derived to my argument of the individual over himself? Where does the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its from the idea of abstract right, as a thing inde- form of government; and none is completely free authority of society begin? How much of the agent himself should in which they do not exist absolute and unquali- human life should be assigned to individuality, pendent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate judgment-seat, and protect those interests fied. The only freedom which deserves the name and how much to society? appeal on all ethical questions, but it must be util- others which have no external protection; juda is that of pursuing our own good in our own Each will receive its proper share, if each has ity in the largest sense, grounded on the perma- ing himself all the more rigidly, because way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive that which more particularly concerns it. To indi- nent interests of man as a progressive being. case does not admit of his being made others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain viduality should belong the part of life in which it Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjec- able to the judgment of his fellow-creatures, it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, is chiefly the individual that is interested; to soci- tion of individual spontaneity to external control, But there is a sphere of action in which whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind ety, the part which chiefly interests society. only in respect to those actions of each, which ety, as distinguished from the individual, has, are greater gainers by suffering each other to live Though society is not founded on a contract, as seems good to themselves, than by compelling concern the interest of other people. If any one and though no good purpose is answered by that portion of a person's life and conduc any, only an indirect interest; comprehendinga does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima each to live as seems good to the rest.... inventing a contract in order to deduce social We have now recognized the necessity to the face case for punishing him, by law, or, where which affects only himself, or, if it also affect obligations from it, every one who receives the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their protection of society owes a return for the benefit, legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general others, only with their free, voluntary, and unde other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and the fact of living in society renders it indis- disapprobation. There are also many positive acts ceived consent and participation. When I say on and freedom of the expression of opinion, on for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully pensable that each should be bound to observe himself, I mean directly, and in the first instante four distinct grounds, which we will now briefly a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This be compelled to perform; such as, to give evi- for whatever affects himself may affect othen recapitulate conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests dence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share through himself, and the objection which - First, if any opinion is compelled to silence of one another; or rather certain interests, which, may be that opinion may, for aught we can certainly in the common defence, or in any other joint grounded on this contingency will receive congid know, be true. To deny this is to assume our either by express legal provision or by tacit under- work necessary to the interest of the society of eration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropa own infallibility. standing, ought to be considered as rights, and which he enjoys the protection, and to perform ate region of human liberty. It comprises, firs, - Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an secondly, in each person's bearing his share (to certain acts of individual beneficence, such as say- the inward domain of consciousness, demanding error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors ing a fellow creature's life, or interposing to pro- liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or portion of truth; and since the general or prevail- in the defenseless against ill-usage, things which sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolut ing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the its members from injury and molestation. These whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all nghtfully be made responsible to society costs to those who endeavor to withhold fulfill- practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theo opinions that the remainder of the truth has any or mor deg. A person may cause evil to others logical. The liberty of expressing and publishing chance of being supplied. ment. Nor is this all that society may do. The by his serions but by his inaction, and in opinions may seem to fall under a different princi Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or he is accountable to them for the ple, since it belongs to that part of the conducted only true, but the whole truth, unless it is suffered wanting in due consideration for their welfare, The laner without going the length of violating any of after css, it is true, requires a much an individual which concerns other people; but, to be, and actually is vigorously and earnestly con- tested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be their constituted rights. The offender may then tous exercise of compulsion than the being almost of as much importance as the liber 500 354 CHAPTER (except as to his conduct to respect 1 those that can be immeasurably surpassing pos society likely 2$ not to wrong, and even if right, are as exercise personal attachment, can have in it is trilling pared with that which he himself has the Any part of a person's conduct ates he hustle punished by person, though not by law nes which sociery has in him individually others) is fractional, preitadically the interests of others, society has and altogether indirect: while, with diction over it, and the con whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted his own kechings and circumstances, the ordinant man a woman has means of knowledge by intertering with it becomes open to discussion But there is no room for catertang air such question when a person's conduct affects the sessed by an one else. The interference of terests of no persons besides himself, or incerts to overrule his judgment and purposes in what bor affect them unless they like all the persons only regards himself must be grounded on gen concerned being of full age, and the ordinary eral presuinptions, which may be altogether inoint of understanding in all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, be misapplied to individual cases, by persons to do the action and stand the consequences better acquainted with the circumstances of doctrine to suppose that it is one of selfish indit such cases than those are who look at them It would be a great misunderstanding of this ference, which pretends that human beings have merch from without. In this department, there no business with cach other's conduct in life, and fore, of human affairs, individuality has its proper that they should nor concern themselves about field of action. In the conduct of human being toward one another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of onder that people may know what they have to any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of espect; but in each person's own concerns, his others. But disinterested benevolence can find individual spontaneity is entitled to free other instruments to persuade people to their to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations good than whips and scourges, either of the lit even obtruded on him, by others; but he, himself, eral or the metaphorical sort. I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virrues, they are is the final judge. Ali errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning are far out only second in importance, if even second, to the social. It is equally the business of education to weighed by the evil of allowing others to con cultivate both. But even education works by con- strain him to what they decm his good viction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, I do not mean that the feelings with which a and it is by the former only that, when the period person is regarded by others ought not to be in of education is past, the self-regarding virtues any way affected by his self-regarding qualities strould be inculcated. Human beings owe to or deficiencies. This is neither possible nor desir each other help to distinguish the better from able. If he is eminent in any of the qualities which the worse, and encouragement to choose the for conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper mer and avoid the latter. They should be forever object of admiration. He is so much the nearer stimulating each other to increased exercise of to the ideal perfection of human nature. If he is their higher faculties, and increased direction grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment of their feelings and aims toward wise instead of the opposite of admiration will follow. There is may be foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects a degree of folly, and a degree of what and contemplations. Bur neither one person, called though the phrase is not unobjectionable or any number of persons, is warranted in saying lowness or depravation of taste, which, though it to another human creature of ripe years that he cannor justify doing harm to the person who shall not do with his life for his own benefit manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly what he choose to do with it. He is the person a subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of most interested in his own well-being the interest contempt: a person would not have the opposite had any other person, except in cases of strong qualities in due strength without entertaining JOHN STUART MILL. The Liberal Arame Frem by 265 person should ever be subjected for the portion these feelings. Though doing so wrong to any of his conduct and character which camera judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a ac, a person may so act as compel uste his own good, but winch does not affect their ests of others in their relations with a being of an inferior order and since this ide- injurious to others require a total different treat- meet and feeling are a fact which he would prefer ment. Encroachment on the ghoon on o avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of them of any loss or damage not justified by has is beforehand, as of any other disagreeable conse- own nights, faischood or duplast in dealing quence to which he exposes himself. It would be Well, indeed, if this good office were much more with them: unfair or angenous use of adam tages over them, even selfish abstinene from freely rendered than the common notions of defending them against injury these are fois politeness at present permit, and if one person objects of moral reprobation, and, in grare could honestly point out to another that he cases, of moral retribution and punishment. And thinks him in fault, without being considered not only these acts, bar the disposition which unmannery or presuming. We have a right, lead to them, are properly immoral, and fit subots also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavorable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of of disapprobation which may use to abhorrence his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We Cruelty of disposition, malice and mature, the are not bound, for example, to seek his society: most antisocial and odious of all passins, envy. o have a right to avoid it (though not to parade dissimulation and insincerity, irascibility on a the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the cient cause, and resentment disproportioned to the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, provocation, the love of domineering over others: and it may be our duty to caution others against the desire to engross more than one's shame of him, if we think his example or conversation likely advantages (the cover of the Greeks: the to have a pernicious effect on those with whom pride which derives gratification from the abase he associates. We may give others a preference ment of others; the egotism which thinks self over him in optional good offices, except those and its conccms more important than everything which tend to his improvement. In these various else, and decides all doubtful questions in his modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at own favor- these are moral vices, and constitute the hands of others, for faults which directly con- a bad and odious moral character: unlike the self corn only himself; but he suffers these penalties regarding faults previously mentioned, which are only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness themsches, not because they are purposely inflicted They may be proofs of any amount of Bolly. on him for the sake of punishment. A person who want of personal dignity and self respect, but shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit--who can- they are only a subject of moral reprobation not live within moderate means--who cannot when they involve a breach of dure to others, for restrain himself from hurtful indulgences-- who whose sake the individual is bound to have care pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those for himself. What are called duties to ourches of feelings and intellect-must expect to be low- are not socially obligatory, unless circumstances ered in the opinion of others, and to have a less render them at the same time duties to the share of their favorable sentiments, but of this he The term duty to meet when it means thing has no right to complain, unless he has merited more than prudence, means self respect of their favor by special excellence in his social rela- development, and for none of these is anyon tions and has thus established a title to their accountable to his fellow-creatures, because for good offices, which is not affected by his demerits none of them is it for the good of mankind this toward himself he be held accountable to than What I contend for is that the inconveniences The distinction between the loss of consider which are strictly inseparable from the unfavorable anion which a person may tightly incare deti judgment of others are the only ones to which a of of prudence or of personal dignity, and 256 CHAPTER 8 - Liberty near con amount, the gen to their predecessors. on him for any obligation or mislead. becomes porting consequen without mischief reaching at least to his reprobation which is due to him for an offense nections, and often far beyond them. If he injures against the rights of others, is not a merely nom his property, he does harm to those who directly inal distinction. It makes a vast difference both in or indirectly derived support from it, and usually our feelings and in our conduct toward him, diminishes, by a greater or less whether he displeases us in things in which we cral resources of the community. If he deterio think we have a right to control him, or in things rates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only in which we know that we have not. If he dis- pleases us, we may express our distaste, and we brings evil upon all who depended mav stand aloof from a person as well as from a any portion of their happiness, but disqualifies himself for rendering the services which he owes thing that displeases us, but we shall not there fore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable, to his fellow-creatures generally, perhaps becomes benevolence; and if We shall reflect that he already bears, or will bear a burden on their affection or such conduct were very frequent, hardly the whole penalty of his error; if he spoils his life offense that is committed would detract more by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, from the general sum of good. Finally, if by his desire to spoil it still further instead of wishing to vices or follies a person does no direct harm to punish him, we shall rather endeavor to alleviate others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious his punishment, by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to by his example; and ought to be compelled t control himself, for the sake of those whom the bring upon him. He may be to us an object of sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or resentment; we shall not treat him like an enemy of society: the worst we shall think ourselves justi- And even (it will be added) if the ces of misconduct could be confined to the vicious fied in doing is leaving him to himself, if we do or thoughtless individual, ought society to aban not interfere benevolently by showing interest or don to their own guidance those who are mani- concern for him. It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection festly unfit for it? If protection against themselves is confessedly due to children and persons under of his fellow-creatures, individually or collectively. age, is not society equally bound to afford it to The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others; and society, as the pro- persons of mature years who are equally incapable of self-government? If gambling, or drunkenness, tector of all its members, must retaliate on him; or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, arc must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be suffi- as injurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many or most of the acts pro- ciently severe. In the one case, he is an offender at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in hibited by law, why it may be asked) should not law, so far as is consistent with practicability and judgment on him, but, in one shape or another, social convenience, endeavor to repress these to execute our own sentences in the other case, also? And as a supplement to the unavoidable it is not our part to inflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow from our imperfections of law, ought not opinion at least using the same liberty in the regulation of our to organize a powerful police against these own affairs, which we allow to him in his. vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties those The distinction here pointed out between the who are known to practice them? There is no part of a person's life which concerns only him- question here (it may be said) about restricting self, and that which concerns others, many per- individuality, or impeding the trial of new and sons will refuse to admit. How it may be original experiments in living. The only things it asked) can any part of the conduct of a member is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of of society be a matter of indifference to the other members? No person is an entirely isolated the world until now; things which experience being it is impossible for a person to do anything has shown not to be useful or suitable to any seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, person's individuality. There must be some JOHN STUART MILL . The Liberal Argument from On Liberty 257 punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier Jength of time and amount of experience, after or a policeman should be punished for being which a moral or prudential truth may be drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a def- regarded as established: and it is merely desired inite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to prevent generation after generation from fall- to an individual or to the public, the case is taken ing over the same precipice which has been fatal out of the province of liberty, and placed in that fully admit that the mischief which a person of morality or law. But with regard to the merely contingent, or, does to himself may seriously affect, both through as it may be called, constructive injury which a their sympathies and their interests, those nearly person causes to society, by conduct which nei- connected with him, and in a minor degree, soci- ther violates any specific duty to the public, nor ery at large. When, by conduct of this sort, a per- occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable indi- son is led to violate a distinct and assignable to any other person or persons, the vidual except himself; the inconvenience is one case is taken out of the self-regarding class, and which society can afford to bear, for the sake of becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the greater good of human freedom. If grown the proper sense of the term. If, for example, a persons are to be punished for not taking proper care of themselves, I would rather it were for their man, through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable to pay his debts, or, having own sake, than under pretense of preventing undertaken the moral responsibility of a family, them from impairing their capacity of rendering from the same cause incapable of sup- to society benefits which society does not pretend or educating them, he is deservedly it has a right to exact. But I cannot consent to reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it argue the point as if society had no means of is for the breach of duty to his family or creditors, bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary not for the extravagance. If the resources which standard of rational conduct, except waiting till ought to have been devoted to them had been they do something irrational, and then punishing diverted from them for the most prudent invest- them, legally or morally, for it. Society has had ment, the moral culpability would have been the absolute power over them during all the carly same. George Barnwell murdered his uncle to get portion of their existence: it has had the whole for his mistress, but if he had done it to set period of childhood and nonage in which to try himself up in business, he would equally have whether it could make them capable of rational been hanged. Again, in the frequent case of a conduct in life. The existing generation is master man who causes grief to his family by addiction both of the training and the entire circumstances to bad habits, he deserves reproach for his of the generation to come; it cannot indeed make unkindness or ingratitude; but so he may for cul- them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself tivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom; are painful to those with whom he passes his and its best efforts are not always, in individual life, or who from personal ties are dependent on cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly him for their comfort. Whoever fails in the con- well able to make the rising generation, as a sideration generally due to the interests and feel- whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself. ings of others, not being compelled by some If society lets any considerable number of its more imperative duty, or justified by allowable members grow up mere children, incapable of self-preference, is a subject of moral disapproba- being acted on by rational consideration of dis- tion for that failure, but not for the cause of it, tant motives, society has itself to blame for the nor for the errors, merely personal to himself, consequences. Armed not only with all the which may have remotely led to it. In like manner; powers of education, but with the ascendency when a person disables himself, by conduct purely which the authority of a received opinion always self-regarding, from the performance of some def- exercises over the minds who are least fitted to inite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is judge for themselves; and aided by the natural guilty of a social offense. No person ought to be penalties which cannot be prevented from falling money 258 CHAPTER 8 Liberty son or a similar majority, imposed right; for in or bad aberrations or conve- injury to dant instances, themsches and may human propensities. It is easy JOHN STUART MILL. The Liberal Argument from On Liberty 259 The evil here pointed out is not one which countries. Would it be a legitimate exercise of exists only in theory; and it may perhaps be the moral authority of public opinion and of expected that I should specify the instances in which the public of this age and country improp- not, why not? The practice is really revolting to such a public. They also sincerely think that it is forbidden and abhorred by the Deity. Neither erly invests its own preferences with the character of moral lavor existing morát felan essay on the could the prohibition be ccnsured as religious of feeling persecution. It might be religious in its origin. but it would not be persecution for religion, weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically, since nobody's religion makes it a duty to cat and by way of illustration. Yet examples are nec- essary, to show that the principle I maintain is of serious and practical moment, and that I am pork. The only tenable ground of condemnation would be that with the personal tastes and self- regarding concerns of individuals the public has nary evils. And it is not difficult to show, by abun- no business to interfere. that to extend the bounds of what To come somewhat nearer home: the major- be called moral police, until it encroaches on ity of Spaniards consider it a gross impiety, offen- the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the sive in the highest degree to the Supreme Being, individual, is one of the most universal of all to worship him in any other manner than the Roman Catholic; and no other public worship is As a first instance, consider the antipathies lawful on Spanish soil. The people of all Southern which men cherish on no better grounds than Europe look upon a married clergy as not only that persons whose religious opinions are differ- irreligious, but unchaste, indecent, gross, disgust observances, especially their religious abstinences. To cite a rather trivial example, nothing in the them against non-Catholics? Yet, if mankind are creed or practice of Christians does more to justified in interfering with each other's liberty envenom the hatred of Mahomedans against in things which do not concern the interests of them, than the fact of their eating pork. There others, on what principle is it possible consistently are few acts which Christians and Europeans to exclude these cases? or who can blame people regard with more unaffected disgust than Mus- for desiring to suppress what they regard as a sulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying scandal in the sight of God and man? No stronger hunger. It is in the first place, an offense against case can be shown for prohibiting anything which their religion, but this circumstance by no means is regarded as a personal immorality than is made explains either the degree or the kind of their out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by their those who regard them as impieties, and unless religion, and to partake of it is by all Mussulmans we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, accounted wrong, but not disgusting. Their aver- and to say that we may persecute others because sion to the flesh of the "unclean beast" is, on the contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive antipathy, which the idea of unclean- The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point ness, when once it thoroughly sinks into the feel- When this industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of the Persian fire-worshippers, flving from the native coun ings, seems always to excite even in those whose try before the Caliphs, arrived in Western India, they were personal habits are anything but scrupulously admitted to toleration by the Hindoo sovereigns, on condi cleanly, and of which the sentiment of religious tion of not eating beef. When those regions afterwards tell under the dominion of Mahomedan conquerors, the res impurity, so intense in the Hindoos, is a remark obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, on condi able example. Suppose now that in a people, of tion of refraining from pork. What was at tirst obedience to whom the majority were Mussulmans, that authority became a second nature, and the Parsees to this day abstain both from beef and pork. Though not required majority should insist upon not permitting pork by their religion, the double abstinence has had time to to be eaten within the limits of the country, grow into a custom of their mbe; and custom, in the last is a religion This would be nothing new in Mahomedan which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be of those who know them; let noe iets pretend practice would affect themselves. But the opin on those who incur the distaste or the contempt as a law on the that it needs, besides all this, the power to issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal minority, on questions of self regarding conduct 1x qune ds likely to be wrong as concerns of individuals, in which, on all principles these cases public opinion means, at the best, of fun and policy, the decision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequcnces. Some people's opinion of what is good for other people; while very often it does not Nor is there anything which tends more to dis. eren mean that; the public, with the most perfect nedit and frustrate the better means of influence indifference, passing over the pleasure ang conduct than a resort to the worse. If there be nience of those whose conduct they censure, among those whom it is atrempred to coerce into prudence or temperance any of the material of and considering only their own preference. There are many who consider as an conduct which they have a distaste which vigorous and independent characters are made, they will intallibly rebel against the yoke. No such person will ever feel that others have a for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings, as they have to prevent him from injuning them in the religious feelings of others, has been known to right to control him in his concerns, such as a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding retort that they disregard his feelings, by persist. theirs; and it casily comes to be considered a mark of spirit and courage to ils in the face of ing in their abominable worship or creed. But there is no parity between the feeling of a person such usurped authority, and do with ostentation for his own opinion, and the feeling of another the exact opposite of what it enjoins; as in the ashion of grassness which succeeded, in the who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, time of Charles IT, to the fanatical moral intoler of the necessir of protecting society from the And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar ance of the Puntans. With respect to what is said and the desire of the right owner to keep it. purse. self-indulgent: it is true that bad example may for any one to imagine an ideal public, which are a pernicious effect, especially the example leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters undisturbed, and only doing wrong to others with impunity to the arongdoer. But we are now speaking of conduct requires them to abstain from modes of conduct which while it does no wrong to others, is sup which universal experience has condemned. But ped to do great harm to the agent himself: where has there been seen a public which set and I do not see how those who believe this can any such limit to its censorship? or when does dekorere than that the example, on the the public trouble itself about universal experi wholms be more salutary than hurtful, since, ence? In its interferences with personal conduct displays the misconduct, it displays also the it is seldom thinking of anything but the enor por degrading consequences which, if the mity of acting or feeling differently from itself; is hy ensured, must be supposed to and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised, he wall or more attendant on it is held up to mankind as the dictate of religion But the strongest of all the arguments against and philosophy, by nine tenths of all moralists de amerience of the public with purely per and speculative writers. These teach that things sont consthat when it does interfere, the ods that interferes wrongly, and in the them to be so. They tell us to search in our are right because they are right; because we feel On questions of social morality, of own minds and hearts for laws of conduct bind- tore, the option of the public, that ing on ourselves and on all others. What can erine monts, dough often the poor public do but apply these instructions, key to he will ofer nghe, because and make their own personal feelings of good on the only required to udge of the owner of the manner in and evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in them, obligatory on all the world? bad cumple set to others by the vicious or the concern as his opinion or his
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Explanation & Answer

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Running head: THE LIBERAL ARGUMENT FROM ON LIBERTY

The Liberal Argument from on Liberty
Name
Institution

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THE LIBERAL ARGUMENT FROM ON LIBERTY
The Liberal Argument from on Liberty
In his chapter, "The liberal argument from on liberty," John Stuart Mill talks of the
principle of whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the
moral coercion of public opinion. The policy is of self-protection and can be inferred in
situations where an individual interferes with the liberty of action either individually or
collectively (Feinberg & Coleman, 2007). Mill has a purpose in his assertion of the idea of
self-protection where he aims to ensure that the people of the civilized community can do
whatever they can to prevent harming others.
The principle has the part of liberty that deals with the expression and the publication
of opinions that may seem to fall under a different principle. The consideration of falling
under a different law arises because of the consideration of belonging to an individual's
conduct concerning...


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