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attached is the discussion instructions and a few articles for you to choose from. please respond substantively to the questions and use at least 1 article to support claims.

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Final Paper Progress: Prepare: In preparation for this discussion, make a list of what you learned most throughout this process, as well as difficulties you may have encountered along the way. Reflect: Think about what you have learned in the development of your research findings on the global societal issue you chose in the Week 1 discussion, your proposed solution and its ethical outcomes, and share with your classmates why this specific issues requires further research. Write: For this discussion, you will address the following prompts: • • • • Identify the global societal issue you have chosen to research for your Final Paper, an argumentative essay, and explain why further research on this topic is important. Provide a clear and concise thesis statement that includes a solution to the global societal issue. Explain how this global societal issue impacts a specific population. Locate a peer-reviewed scholarly source and provide statistical data that you found surprising on the topic. Your initial post should be at least 250 words in length, which should include a thorough response to each prompt. You are required to provide in-text citations of applicable required reading materials and/or any other outside sources you use to support your claims. Challenge, 60(3):294–320, 2017 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0577-5132 print/1558-1489 online DOI: 10.1080/05775132.2017.1289776 Europe’s Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Economic and Political Ambivalences IRENEUSZ PAWEL KAROLEWSKI and ROLAND BENEDIKTER Few if any predicted the extent of mass migration across Europe in the wake of the Arab Spring and atrocities in Syria. As the authors point out, it is both a migrant and refugee crisis, and it tests European resolve, economic policy, and the consequences. With it has arisen a tide of right-wing populism and intense nationalism, running counter to the long constructive evolution of Europe since World War II. What to do? The authors have answers. The refugee and migrant crisis has been one of the most important and divisive issues in recent European history. It has unfolded with both a symbolic and a practical character having potentially far-reaching consequences. While often inappropriately identified as a pure refugee crisis, according to the facts it is in reality a much more multifaceted and encompassing “mixed” refugee-migrant crisis (BBC 2016a). Most political refugees come to Europe Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski holds the Chair of Political Science at the Willy Brandt Center for German and European Studies, University of Wroclaw, Poland. His main areas of research are European integration and democratic governance, including citizenship, identity politics, civil society, and nationalism in Europe. His recent publications include European Identity Revisited (2016) and Extraterritorial Citizenship in Postcommunist Europe (2015). Roland Benedikter is research professor of multidisciplinary political analysis at the Willy Brandt Center for German and European Studies of the University of Wroclaw/Breslau, research affiliate of Stanford University, and senior research fellow of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs in Washington, D.C. He is coauthor of two Pentagon and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff white papers and more than a dozen books on international and global strategic issues. He served eight years (1995–2003) in European politics and has published more than 300 essays and book chapters in journals, including Foreign Affairs, Harvard International Review, National Interest, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, European Foreign Affairs Review, New Global Studies, Global Policy, Global Social Policy, Welttrends Berlin, and Challenge. Parts of this article are based on the article by Roland Benedikter and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, “We can handle this”—How the refugee and migration crisis is changing the German political landscape, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 10, no. 3: 423–435, doi:10.1080/23739770.2016.1260250. 294 Europe’s Refugee and Migrant Crisis 295 through Greece, while most migrants (economic refugees), particularly from Africa south of the Sahara, choose Italy as their entry port (cf. Göbl et al. 2016). The problem of Africa-to-Europe migration has existed for decades without much notice by either Africa, the EU, or the international community, with the United Nations as the only actor to pick out the topic as a central theme of transnational development (Benedikter 2014). It has continuously gained traction since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the East-West divide in 1989–91, and the start of globalization in the 1990s. The core of the most recent crisis began in 2011 in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and has continuously worsened in the course of the subsequent Syrian, Iraqi, and Libyan civil wars and upheavals in other Middle Eastern and African nations since July–October 2011. Yet it arrived at the heart of the European Union’s political concern only in 2015. In that year, more than 1.3 million refugees and migrants came to Hungary, Austria, Germany, and France, and Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Before that, the southern peripheral EU member states with the most central access to the Mediterranean—Italy and Greece—were the most affected, with other EU member states largely ignoring problem (Annan 2016). Both nations remain heavily burdened, particularly after the closure in March 2016 of the so-called Balkan route from Greece to Germany, previously used by at least 700,000 migrants. In June 2015, shortly before the largest wave of migrants arrived in Europe, Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi, in one of his many dramatic calls for support, described the refugee crisis as a European challenge, not just an Italian or Greek problem. In August 2016, Renzi renewed the call, stating that Europe’s most urgent need is not to hinder arrivals but to “block departures from the countries of origin” (Gallori 2016). Yet until today, not much has happened in this regard—with the perspectives still unknown in the framework of the profound European Union crisis after the Brexit vote of June 2016 and the recent authoritarian development in Turkey. The uncertainty is widely due to the political effects of insecure European borders combined with a (still) missing joint long-term strategy. “WE CAN HANDLE THIS” Since September 2015 about 1 million refugees have arrived in Germany alone, as the country opened its borders to refugees stuck in Hungary. Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel declared at the end of August 2015 that there are no limits to the number of refugees Germany can accept, coining her most famous phrase, “We can do it” or “We can cope” (BBC 2016b; Delcker 2016; Der Spiegel 2015). 296 Karolewski and Benedikter By doing so, Germany de facto and unilaterally suspended part of the EU law, mainly the Dublin conventions declaring that the first EU country in which refugees enter is responsible for the processing of their asylum claims. Second, with this action Merkel to some extent unilaterally decided EU immigration and refugee policy, since by “inviting” large numbers of migrants and refugees to travel “now or never” without consultation among the EU-28, she put considerable burdens on other EU nations such as Italy and Greece, given that most migrants from the African continent cannot reach Germany directly but have to enter the EU in Italy or Greece (Euronews 2016; Kroet 2016). Some German and European politicians declared Merkel’s “We can handle this” policy to be a great humanitarian gesture. Others saw it as an enlightened political choice serving German interests, given the German labor force shortages, historically low unemployment (6.4 percent, the lowest since 1991), historically low interest rates (in the Q2 of 2016 it was 0.08 percent), and rising tax revenues (Dettmer at al. 2016; Sola 2016). However, there has also been growing criticism of Germany, both in Germany and other EU countries (e.g., Der Spiegel 2016a; Soros and Schmitz 2016). In Germany, the decision to accept large numbers of Muslim refugees in 2015 and 20161 raised serious concerns about Germany’s cultural preparedness for such a step. Already in 2006 the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (a political foundation close to the German Social Democratic Party) had published a report claiming that right-wing extremism was neither a problem at the margins of the German society nor was it mainly a phenomenon of Eastern Germany, since it could be found in the very middle of German society (Decker and Brähler 2006; see also Adida et al. 2016; Koopmans 2013, 2016). More recent political developments seem to confirm those findings, as the Federal Criminal Police Office counted more than 1,000 violent attacks on asylum seeker homes in Germany in 2015 (Diehl 2016). An anti-migration party, the AfD (Alternative for Germany), rose to new levels of popularity, winning seats both in Eastern German and Western German regional parliaments in 2016. In March 2016, with 24.3 percent of the vote, the AfD became the second strongest party in the regional parliament of Sachsen-Anhalt, behind only the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) with its win of 29.8 percent. And in September 2016 in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the political homeland of Chancellor Angela Merkel, the AfD replicated its success with 20.8 percent, in second place after the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which got 30.6 percent of the vote, reducing the chancellor’s CDU party to a meager 19 percent. In the September 18, 2016, elections for the capital Berlin’s parliament, the AfD in its first bid immediately jumped to 14 percent and became the big winner, while the CDU lost more than 5 percent and thus achieved its worst result since the end of World War II with 18 percent. Further, the SPD, which has governed the city in an alliance with the CDU over the past five Europe’s Refugee and Migrant Crisis 297 years, also lost 5 percent and ended up with 22 percent. It is likely that the AfD, whose leading politicians openly espouse anti-migrant and partly racist positions, will reach more than 10 percent in the German Federal parliamentary elections in 2017 (Häusler 2016). In her self-critique following the series of defeats on September, 19 Merkel admitted “errors” with regard to the refugee policy and stated she would not use the slogan “We can handle this” any longer, since it had become “an empty formula” (Sueddeutsche Zeitung 2016). At the same time, she insisted on her course (ibid.). ECONOMIC AMBIGUITY: IS IT REALLY MAINLY ABOUT KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS? The German government has been at great pains to put a positive spin on “Europe’s broken borders,” as Lukas Kaelin (2015) put it in a Foreign Affairs article in the midst of the 2015 turmoil, and more in general on the refugee and migrant influx into Germany by highlighting economic advantages for the German society. Many of the optimistic arguments of the government are based on the analysis conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin. A DIW analysis conducted in 2015 claims that refugees and migrants coming to Germany will be a long-term economic investment (Fratzscher and Junker 2015). The analysis (or simulation, as the authors never tire of claiming) makes a number of assumptions, such as the continuing but decreasing influx of refugees until 2020, a very high number of refugees of working age, and the growing productivity of refugees. Based on these assumptions, it offers an optimistic prediction about a general boost to the German economy, as well as an improved income level for people already living in Germany, within a couple of years. The main thrust of the argument is a Keynesian one: increased economic demand (based both on private consumption and the consumption of the state) will not only balance the initial costs incurred by the German state quite soon but will also benefit the entire German economy, considerably increasing the GDP per capita. In a sense, the expenditures on the refugees (new public administration personnel, additional teachers of the German language, construction of new asylum-seeker homes, as well as direct payments to the refugees—annually on average 12,000 euros per refugee) amount to a huge stimulus package.2 However, as critics pointed out, the DIW analysis was not just based on overtly optimistic assumptions (e.g., a relatively quick absorption of refugees by the labor market) and biases (e.g., stimulus packages can translate into inflation, rather than generate only productivity gains, as claimed by the DIW) but also on dubious calculations. An analysis of the Center for Applied Economic Research at Münster University claims that when 298 Karolewski and Benedikter correctly calculated, the DIW model would bring about opposite long-term effects, in particular an annual net burden of 14.3 billion euros for German society. Moreover, the Münster analysis (2015) argues that negative wage effects would be considerable, as the refugee influx is likely to produce a 26.6 percent decrease in the per capita income of the low-qualified workers already living in Germany, while the per capita income of the skilled workers would increase only marginally by 0.8 percent. This negative outlook is also supported by the Ifo-Institute for Economic Research in Munich, whose (now former) head, Hans-Werner Sinn, sees the influx of refugees as a source of growing economic inequality and instability in Germany. According to Sinn (Tagesspiegel 2016), not only will the migrants and refugees become a huge burden to the German welfare state, but also, given their comparatively poor education (based on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] prewar data on Syria, 75 percent of the Syrian refugees are functionally illiterate), they are likely to become part of the underprivileged class of the poor, unemployed, and largely uneducated (Hintermeier 2016; Wech 2016). Even calculated conservatively, one generation of refugees is likely to increase the German public debt by 450 billion euros, thus putting a serious strain on the country’s economic development (Die Welt 2015). Even the young age of many refugees might be of limited advantage, as employees with low qualifications pay fewer taxes and fewer social contributions. This suggests that they will be a rather limited support for the German aging society and its strained pension system (FAZ 2016a). The differences in the economic analyses of migration have far-reaching consequences. The German state can afford to pay for the refugees in 2017, and probably even 2018, as Germany expected to have an additional 5 billion euros in tax revenues in 2016 and a very low unemployment rate of 6.3 percent. Still, migration as a long-term investment remains highly controversial. According to the Ifo-Institute analysis, even if the German GDP grows due to the refugee-related expenditures of the state, the GPD per capita will decrease, as the new inhabitants are likely to be much less productive than the current German population (Battisti et al. 2015). Interestingly, the Ifo-Institute also calculated that an introduction of national border controls in Germany would be much less expensive than accepting refugees and migrants in the coming years. While a new border control regime would limit trade and thus reduce the German economy by about 15 billion euros, it would be still much less than an uncontrolled influx of refugees and migrants into Germany, whose costs would amount to 21 billion euros, according to the Ifo-Institute (Felbermayr et al. 2016). HansWerner Sinn argues that the consequences might not only be dangerous for the further economic development of Germany, but the entire German society could be destabilized in the long term (Die Welt 2016a; see also Astheimer 2016a). Europe’s Refugee and Migrant Crisis 299 POLITICAL AMBIGUITY: WHO BENEFITS FROM THE INFLUX AND THE SUBSEQUENT DEBATES? Nevertheless, it is not only radically deviating economic analyses that are remarkable. According to some commentators, they might reflect preconceived political positions. The head of the DIW, Marcel Fratzscher, acted as economic adviser to Chancellor Merkel and the former minister for economic affairs, Sigmar Gabriel, (both have been supporters of the “welcome culture” refugee policy). Some critics suggest that the DIW might have delivered a justification of the political choices of Merkel and her coalition partner rather than an unbiased economic analysis. The Münster analysis, on the other hand, might be biased, too, as one of the authors—Ulrich van Suntum—used to be a member of the economically liberal wing of the AfD, which, after a split from the AfD, formed the new liberal fringe party ALFA (Alliance for Progress and Renewal), thus promoting a rather liberal-conservative approach to state budgeting. Whether or not the political bias in German economic analysis holds true, the economic advantages of the massive refugee influx are far from certain. Rather, the huge divergences in the economic evaluation show that the German government decided to take serious political risks. Should the economic trend turn out to be negative, it will have serious political consequences, particularly given the increasingly skeptical mood vis-à-vis refugees and, in particular, migrants in the German society. According to a survey analysis conducted by Jürgen Schupp in 2016, only 28 percent of the respondents in Germany are in favor of accepting migrants and refugees without time limits, while a majority of the German society agrees to their stay only as a temporary mechanism for humanitarian reasons rather than economic investment (Schupp 2016). At the same time, more than 50 percent of Germans see more risks than opportunities in the massive influx of migrants and refugees. As a consequence, a political backlash against the current refugee policy is possible, and it could not only lead to a further decrease in popularity for the current government but also threaten the entire political system of Germany, boosting further popularity of the AfD. GROWING INTERIOR DIVISIONS The growing number of attacks against the German government’s migration policy by its own members and the CDU’s Bavarian sister Christian-Social Union party (CSU), which is itself part of the governmental coalition in Berlin, manifests a deep turmoil in the German political system, which is one of the main effects of the migrant crisis. As Bavarian CSU chief Horst Seehofer put it after the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern elections, “the issue is 300 Karolewski and Benedikter not about single questions, but about systemic failure,” since “the majority of German voters don’t like this policy from Berlin” (Bild Zeitung 2016a). On that occasion he rejected Merkel’s “We can do it” rhetoric once again and classified the election results as “slaps in the face” of the chancellor’s decisions and future. In their party congress on September 9–10, 2016, the CSU, in open confrontation of Merkel, requested a “clear change” of “Berlin’s asylum politics,” trying to integrate refugee and migration problems into one comprehensive vision. The CSU demanded that an upper limit of 200,000 asylum seekers per year be stipulated by federal law, the abolition of double citizenships in order to enforce the loyalty of the migrants towards the German state, the establishment of transit zones at the German borders, and the immediate deportation of migrants without approved asylum. It also listed a permanent federal ban on burkas and the development of a general “law to limit immigration” (Einwanderungsbegrenzungsgesetz) among its main demands for cooperation between Merkel’s CDU and the CSU between October 2016 and fall 2017, when the next ...
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