do you consider the migration in the postwar period in Central America to be forced, voluntary or both?

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In our class, we inquired into the ways in which Central Americans who fled violent civil wars and arrived in the U.S., and elsewhere may or may not represent a diasporic community. This representation, in large part, depends on whether their migration is understood to be "forced" or "by choice." Drawing from various perspectives from our course material to date, do you consider the migration in the postwar period from the northern region of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, to be forced, voluntary, or both? Explain your answer by reviewing examples and arguments presented in our course material.

Respond to this question in a short essay that includes a brief introduction with your thesis statement; body paragraphs that each support your argument in a different way, using specific evidence from course material; and a short conclusion. Your paper should cite specific evidence to support your argument, referencing texts that we have read in preparation for this class. It may also include supporting evidence from media, lecture, and discussion points presented during class time.

This short paper should be between 750 and 850 words. Papers exceeding 850 words in length are subject to a penalty. formatting it with Times New Roman 12-point font and one-inch margins. At the end of the paper, include a “Works Cited” section with course texts. I recommend that you reference them in APA format.

we need at least 3 sources from those i attached.

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1 © Garcia, Maria Cristina, Mar 06, 2006, Seeking Refuge : Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada University of California Press, Berkeley, ISBN: 9780520939431 THE WARS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS [Central America is the] most dramatic and divisive foreign policy issue since the Vietnam war. It has dominated the front pages of newspapers for many months; co-opted almost all of the prime moments of national television news; fueled acrimonious exchanges in Congress; and ignited a national protest movement, centered in the universities and the churches but reaching into unions, professional associations, and the cultural community. Mark Falcoff, Commentary The revolutions in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala were each the product of decades of struggles over land, resources, and power. However, what began as localized conflicts became international crises that affected dozens of nations, including neighboring Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico; hemispheric allies such as the United States and Canada; and even Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the European Community. Thousands of Central Americans died, and millions were uprooted as a consequence of the domestic and foreign policy decisions of these various actors. But just as local political conflicts became internationalized, so, too, did their eventual resolution. The negotiated peace settlements and the reintegration of the displaced involved some of these very same actors, who through diplomacy, investment, and aid tried to establish peace, social and political stability, and economic opportunity in the region. THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA In 1979, the Sandinista rebels overthrew the US-supported government of Anastacio Somoza Debayle. The Somoza family—Anastacio Sr. and his sons, Luis and Anastacio (Tachito)—had controlled Nicaraguan politics since 1934, thanks in some part to the United States, which helped them to consolidate their political control. From the Truman to the Ford admin- 13 © Garcia, Maria Cristina, Mar 06, 2006, Seeking Refuge : Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada University of California Press, Berkeley, ISBN: 9780520939431 istrations, the Somozas were regarded by the United States government as reliable allies in the Cold War1 and were rewarded with millions of dollars in economic and military aid, much of which found its way to private coffers. US support also guaranteed the Somoza dictatorship millions of dollars in loans from the international banking community, as well as substantial investments in the nation’s industries. US corporations, in particular, benefited from their government’s relationship with the dictatorship. Not only did Nicaragua get most of its imports from the United States, but US corporations also controlled thousands of acres of Nicaragua’s most fertile land and owned or managed the leading mines, the railroads, and the lumber and banking industries. The extensive US presence in Nicaragua’s national life never guaranteed the people peace or socioeconomic mobility. The majority of the three million Nicaraguans lived in extreme poverty, and high infant mortality, illiteracy, and unemployment were common features of day-to-day life.2 Two percent of the farms controlled nearly half of the tillable land, and over two hundred thousand peasants were landless. In turn, the Somoza family’s wealth was estimated at more than a billion dollars. The Somoza family was said to control one-third of the country’s acreage; the nation’s construction, meatpacking, and fishing industries; the national airline and major television station; and banks, radio stations, and various other businesses. American investors made handsome profits from their ventures in Nicaragua: US investments yielded hundreds of millions of dollars in yearly income that was exported back to the United States.3 The extreme disparities in wealth and the corruption in the highest echelons of the government raised the consciousness of the citizenry, especially labor organizers, university students, journalists, and public intellectuals. Prior to 1972, the US-trained Nicaragua National Guard helped to keep the opposition weak and disorganized by assassinating over thirty thousand of the dictator’s opponents and driving thousands more into exile.4 (A former US Speaker of the House once called the Guard “murderers, marauders, and rapists.”)5 However, after an earthquake devastated the capital city of Managua in December 1972, the forces of opposition expanded. Strikes and demonstrations increased in the months after the earthquake as Nicaraguans protested the blatant theft of international aid and the shameless corruption of government officials who financially profited from the devastation.6 Inspiring the protests was the politically 14 T h e Wa r s i n C e n t r a l A m e r i c a © Garcia, Maria Cristina, Mar 06, 2006, Seeking Refuge : Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada University of California Press, Berkeley, ISBN: 9780520939431 moderate editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, who used his small opposition newspaper, La Prensa, to meticulously document the corruption and abuse of authority. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) increased its support base at this time. Founded in Havana in 1961, the FSLN favored a revolutionary political and socioeconomic agenda.7 Over the next eight years, the Sandinistas, as members the FSLN were popularly called, waged war against the dictatorship, kidnapping and ransoming prominent political officials and business leaders and attacking military garrisons, government offices, and other symbols of Somoza’s authority. Determined to eliminate the FSLN, the Nicaragua National Guard increased its surveillance of the population as well as its campaign of imprisonment, torture, and assassination.The Guard especially targeted the northern provinces, where the Sandinistas were believed to have their greatest support. Even the political moderates came under attack: Chamorro was jailed and finally assassinated in 1978. This action, more than any other, turned the political tide. A two-week general strike calling for Somoza’s unconditional resignation evolved into a full-scale, nationwide insurrection. By May 1979 the Sandinistas controlled the nation’s major towns and cities, including parts of Managua.8 On July 17, 1979, Somoza fled to Miami with some of the senior commanders of the National Guard.9 Rank-and-file members of the Guard were left to protect what remained of the government, but without leadership the Guard easily crumbled. Many of the soldiers fled to neighboring countries, especially Honduras, to avoid the retribution that would inevitably follow. On July 19, a coalition of moderates and leftists took control of Nicaragua’s government. Calling itself the Government of National Reconstruction, the coalition debated ways to rebuild the wartorn country, provide desperately needed social services, and encourage the consumer and investor confidence needed for economic growth. The ideological cleavages among the coalition members proved difficult to overcome.While all were committed to agrarian reform and basic social welfare programs such as universal health care, literacy, and free public education, they disagreed on the roles that the private sector and the multiparty political system would play in the new Nicaragua—if any. The more radical members of the FSLN saw no role for such institutions in their socialist state. As this segment assumed control of the national directorate T h e Wa r s i n C e n t r a l A m e r i c a 15 © Garcia, Maria Cristina, Mar 06, 2006, Seeking Refuge : Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada University of California Press, Berkeley, ISBN: 9780520939431 and the armed forces, moderates in the coalition, such as Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (the widow of the slain newspaper editor) and Alfonso Robelo (the founder of the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement), felt increasingly silenced and shut out of the decision making. Particularly disturbing to the moderates was a series of measures taken to consolidate the government’s authority and protect against counterrevolution: the suspension of elections for six years; restrictions on the press, free speech, free association, and other civil liberties; the strengthening of the internal security apparatus; increased defense spending; the arrival of Cuban and East European advisers and Soviet arms shipments; and the export of arms to Salvadoran rebels.10 By 1982 several moderates had resigned from the coalition or gone into exile, including former Sandinista Edén Pastora Gomez, the famed “Comandante Zero” who had led a spectacular and much publicized attack on the National Palace.11 Many middle- and upper-class Nicaraguans also chose to exile themselves to the United States, Costa Rica, and other countries during this transitional period rather than live in what they perceived as an evolving communist state. Most nations in the hemisphere, with the notable exception of Central American neighbors Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, cautiously welcomed the change in Nicaragua’s government. Despite its thirty-plus years of assistance to the Somoza government, in the final year of the revolution Mexico offered the Sandinistas tactical support and then recognized the new government almost immediately. In the 1980s, Mexico became one of Nicaragua’s principal trade partners, providing Nicaragua with most of its oil even though that strained Mexican relations with the United States and potentially sabotaged Mexico’s own economic relationship with its northern neighbor. With a long history of challenging the United States and supporting leftist movements in Latin America,12 Mexico became the region’s most vocal critic of US policy in Nicaragua, but it also viewed itself as a “middle power” that could negotiate an easing of tensions in the region.13 Since the 1960s, Mexico’s evolving status as a major oil producer had increased its diplomatic clout, and the Central American crisis provided an opportunity for asserting a new status in the hemisphere. As early as 1981, José López Portillo (president, 1976–1982) tried to arrange talks between the Sandinistas and the Reagan administration to discuss a nonaggression pact but failed to convince Washington.14 López Portillo’s suc- 16 T h e Wa r s i n C e n t r a l A m e r i c a © Garcia, Maria Cristina, Mar 06, 2006, Seeking Refuge : Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada University of California Press, Berkeley, ISBN: 9780520939431 cessor, Miguel de la Madrid (president, 1982–1988), later launched the regional peace initiative known as Contadora. Mexico’s philosophical position was best summarized by de la Madrid: “Every country in the continent must do its utmost to restore peace and avoid war by respecting and upholding the sovereign right of its people to decide their own destiny and by rejecting interventionist solutions of any kind.”15 Canada’s response, on the other hand, was substantively different. Ottawa officially welcomed the end of the Somoza era and even prohibited Somoza’s entry into the country when he asked to relocate there, but postponed recognition of the Sandinista government.16 Throughout the 1980s Canadian policymakers opposed US policy in Nicaragua and criticized the militarization of the region, but avoided any official condemnation of the United States that might strain US-Canadian relations, especially in trade and commerce.17 Instead, they tried to use their diplomatic influence behind closed doors, with limited success. As the most powerful nation in the hemisphere, the United States shaped the tone and content of the political debate over Nicaragua throughout the next decade.With billions of dollars in regional investments and a moral commitment to the expansion of democratic institutions, the United States had a geopolitical interest in containing revolution in the Americas. However, US policy shifted dramatically in a relatively short period of time. Immediately following his inauguration in January 1977, President Jimmy Carter declared US aid to individual Latin American countries contingent upon their human rights policies, and thus withdrew economic and military aid from the Somoza dictatorship.18 Although his administration would have preferred—and tried to negotiate—a more centrist government in Nicaragua, Carter officially recognized the Sandinista government and hoped that it would offer its country peace, security, and basic civil liberties. The United States granted Nicaragua close to a hundred million dollars in emergency aid during 1979–1980; helped to restructure Nicaragua’s massive international debt (estimated at 582 million dollars); and facilitated over two hundred million dollars in new loans and grants, all with the goal of maintaining positive relations and avoiding the mistakes the United States had made with Cuba twenty years earlier.19 The symbolic significance of such actions was considerable given the role the United States had played in supporting the Somozas and their National Guard during the previous forty-five years. However, in light of T h e Wa r s i n C e n t r a l A m e r i c a 17 © Garcia, Maria Cristina, Mar 06, 2006, Seeking Refuge : Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada University of California Press, Berkeley, ISBN: 9780520939431 this history, the Sandinistas were understandably suspicious of any US involvement—a suspicion that was not completely unwarranted. Key figures in the Carter administration, among them National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, were equally suspicious of the Sandinistas and the role Nicaragua might play in exporting revolution in Central America. They worked to steer US policy away from this more accommodationist position, and it was this philosophical perspective that ultimately dominated in the Carter administration. By the end of 1980, the administration had been forced to shift its attention to the Middle East and the hostage crisis in Iran, but the CIA worked behind the scenes in Nicaragua, funding a variety of anti-Sandinista organizations with the goal of eroding the Sandinistas’ popular support.20 Shortly before leaving office, Carter canceled the remaining aid promised the Sandinistas in protest over the shipment of arms to Salvadoran rebels. US-Nicaraguan relations collapsed after Ronald Reagan moved into the White House in January 1981. The Reagan administration, particularly hard-liners such as Alexander Haig, Elliott Abrams, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and William Casey, acknowledged that the Sandinista revolution and the conflicts in Central America began as nationalist struggles for socioeconomic and political justice.21 However, the Cold War framed the gathering of intelligence, the interpretation of the data, and ultimately the policymaking in this administration.They were determined not to let post-Vietnam guilt interfere with the containment of what they saw as a growing Cuban– Soviet–East European presence in the region. Congress accepted the administration’s evidence that Nicaragua had become a base for exporting communism in the region and appropriated the funds that the administration needed to carry out its policy of containment. They supported the economic embargo on Nicaragua and redirected aid to the “Contras”: contra-revolucionarios on the Honduras-Nicaragua border, whom the Reagan administration directed to stop the flow of arms from the Sandinista government to the leftist guerrillas of the FMLN (Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation) in El Salvador.22 By the end of Reagan’s first term it was clear that the administration was interested in more than just containing the flow of arms in Central America: it was using the Contras to destabilize—and overthrow—the Nicaraguan government.23 Honduras and Costa Rica were critical to this campaign, and by the mid-1980s the United States had directed millions 18 T h e Wa r s i n C e n t r a l A m e r i c a © Garcia, Maria Cristina, Mar 06, 2006, Seeking Refuge : Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada University of California Press, Berkeley, ISBN: 9780520939431 of dollars to both these countries for the establishment of camps and safe houses from which the Contra operatives could conduct their operations.24 As in the CIA-sponsored raids in Cuba in the 1960s,25 the Contras’ military maneuvers were designed to force the Sandinistas to commit the Nicaraguan armed forces to domestic defense and to create a climate of political instability that would erode popular support and encourage revolt. The Contras were instructed to bomb industrial and other economic targets, but excerpts of a CIA training manual later published in the press revealed that they were also trained in kidnapping and murder.26 By 1983, the CIA itself was directly engaged in sabotage—bombing Nicaraguan oil reserves and mining harbors, for example—in clear violation of international law and the United States’ own Boland Amendment, which prohibited assisting or using the Contras to overthrow the Nicaraguan government or to provoke conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras.27 Congress responded with the second Boland Amendment in 1984, which severed lethal aid to the Contras once and for all. Nicaragua filed a complaint against the United States in the World Court for the mining of its harbors, and two years later the court officially condemned the United States. However, neither domestic pressure nor international sanction deterred the Reagan administration from its foreign policy objectives: the administration turned to the illegal sale of arms to Iran in order to redirect the profits to its Contra protégés.28 The Reagan administration’s policy in Nicaragua drew criticism at home and abroad. Critics argued that US policy only served to increase poverty and homelessness in Nicaragua, destabilize neighboring countries and producing a large-scale regional migration. NGOs such as Amnesty International, Americas Watch, Church World Service, and the International Red Cross documented the human toll produced by the militarization of Central America.While public opinion polls showed that most Americans could not locate Nicaragua on a map,29 a vocal and influential minority protested US policy and ultimately forced Congress to monitor the administration’s support of the Contras. Not since the Watergate scandal had Americans taken so passionate an interest in the activities of their government, and the administration received thousands of letters from Americans who warned that Central America would become another Vietnam.30 Such popular pressure undoubtedly influenced the congressional and judicial scrutiny that followed the discovery of the illegal sale of arms to Iran. T h e Wa r s i n C e n t r a l A m e r i c a 19 © Garcia, Maria Cristina, Mar 06, 2006, Seeking Refuge : Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada University of California Press, Berkeley, ISBN: 9780520939431 In the years following the Iran-Contra hearings, the Bush administration continued to undermine the Sandinistas, albeit through more traditional pressure—the economic embargo, diplomatic isolation, and financial support of opposition groups. In 1989, when the Sandinista government finally agreed to elections under the terms of the Esquipulas II peace plan, most knew that their days in power were numbered. The United States funneled millions of dollars to the opposition parties to ensure the Sandinistas’ defeat. In February 1990, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, representing the National Oppo ...
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Outline

Introduction
Body
Conclusion
References


Running head: POSTWAR PERIOD IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Postwar Period in Central America
Student's Name
Course Number-Name of Course
Instructor’s Name
Date

POSTWAR PERIOD IN CENTRAL AMERICA

2

Introduction
The civil war was fought between the Confederate States of America which comprised a
group of eleven states from the south which had detached themselves from the Union between
1860 and 1861. They went ahead to form their own country with the intention of protecting the
institution of slavery. The Confederacy, as it was called, was never recognized diplomatically by
the government of the United States neither by any foreign country. Those states that remained
loyal to the U.S were referred to as the union. Amongst many causes of the civil war were trade,
states and tariffs rights as well as the discrepancies between the northern and southern states on
the idea of slavery (Montgomery, 2018). The war came to an end at the Battle of Appomattox
Court House when General Robert surrendered to General Ulysses accompanied by the surrender
of Generals for the Confederate in the southern states. After the civil war, people fled from the
northern part of EI Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to the United States. This paper is an
establishment of the facilitating factors that led to the migration.
After the end of the civil war, tens of thousands of women, children, and other family
members forcefully migrated and are still migrating from Guatemala, EI Salvador, and Honduras
to free from the surging tide of violence. Assault, rape, extortion as well as the threat by
members from the transnational criminal group who were heavily armed (Jonas, 2018). Families
in these homelands have contended with disappearances, threats of death as well as gunfights.
Authorities have been unable to bear positive results in curbing violence as well as providing
redress. This has made many families be left with no other choice but to run for their lives. The
journey of migration is hectic. It involves the payment of exorbitant fees to coyotes who are
unscrupulous, beating and much often migrants are subjected to killing.

POSTWAR PERIOD IN CENTRAL AMERICA

3

This kind of violence in Central America can be attributed to the violence experienced
during the civil wars as well as political instability. The violence originally was yielded by the
transition from the authoritarian rule (Schulz, 2018). The authoritarian transition came effect by
the beginning of the Sandinista Revolution where most of the countries underwent far-reaching
processes that could overthrow the authoritarian government ruling the region of Central
America. The countries developed a new set of authoritarian institutions for electoral purposes,
stopping conflicts of the military raving the regions as well as creating institutions that could be
used for the enforcement of law and respect for human rights (Montgomery, 2018).
It is as a result of this authoritarian transition that criminal violence was yielded. This
criminal violence has flooded Central America since the 1990s turning these countries to be the
most violent region worldwide. The criminal wave has further produced a paradox in the regimes
for electoral democracies to living under a state of de facto of the siege that is being produced by
the violent crime. The increased homicide rates for Honduras, Guatemala, and EI Salvador
account for more than half of the Latin America's crime rates (Schulz, 2018).
Other than criminal violence there are other circumstances that forcefully spearheaded
families to migrate from Central America. Among these issues include higher indicators of
poverty, segregation as well as inaccessibility to resources and services, for instance, health care,
land, and education. Other people from Central America migrated to the United States to search
for employment since the rates of unemployment and underemployment were very high in these
regions during and after the civil war (Montgomery, 2018). This was as a result of disruption of
the countries’ economies since they lacked international economic assistance. There were other
individuals who migrated voluntarily to the U.S. in order to connect with their relatives mostly

POSTWAR PERIOD IN CENTRAL AMERICA

4

located in the refugee camps that were managed by the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) in the southern part of Mexico.
Conclusively, there has been an increase in the number of people who are migrating from
the regions of Central America from the Northern Triangle of Guatemala, Honduras and EI
Salvador to the United States. This increase in the cases for asylum fr...

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