Transportation management

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I am attaching four articles and file word, the file work has questions for each article, Please read the articles and read the questions carefully and answer them , As I mentioned in the word file , the answer should not be that long , make it easy , three or four sentences for each question.

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I am attaching four articles, each one has question, I am going to write the question down here, so please read the articles and answer the questions; The first article “ The New Managerial Work” Question: What are the motivational sources for managers to guide performance ? How they are changing over time? The second article “ Shooting The Rapids” Question: What techniques scenario designers use to maximize their scenario effectiveness? How scenario designers help managers to choose the best option? The third article “ How senior Manager Think” Question: How to create effective organizational processes? How to deal with one or two overriding concerns, or very general goals? The fourth articles “ Meeting The Challenges Of Disruptive Change” Question : Can the possibility of smart infrastructure transform , sustain or destroy the transportation system, if so Why?, if not Why? Read the articles before starting to answer the question, also the answer should not be that long , three or four sentence is enough. Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved. Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved. Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved. Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved. Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved. Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved. Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved. Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved. Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved. Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved. It's no wonder that innovation is so difficult for established firms. They employ highly capable people - and then set them to work within processes and business models that doom them to failure. But there are ways out of this dilemma. 66 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 2000 Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change by Clayton M. Christensen and Michael Overdorf HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 2000 T HESE ARE SCARY TIMES FOR MANAGERS in big companies. Even before the Internet and globalization, their track record for dealing with major, disruptive change was not good. Out of hundreds of department stores, for example, only oneDayton Hudson-became a leader in discount retailing. Not one of the minicomputer companies succeeded in the personal computer business. Medical and business schools are struggling-and failing-to change their curricula fast enough to train the types of doctors and managers their markets need. The list could go on. 67 Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change It's not that managers in big companies can't see disruptive changes coming. Usually they can. Nor do they lack resources to confront them. Most big companies have talented managers and specialists, strong product portfolios, first-rate technological know-how, and deep pockets. What managers lack is a habit of thinking about their organization's capabilities as carefully as they think about individual people's capabilities. One of the hallmarks of a great manager is the ability to identify the right person for the right job and to train employees to succeed at the jobs they're given. But unfortunately, most managers assume that if each person working on a project is well matched to the job, then the organization in which they work will be, too. Often that is not the case. One could put two sets of identically capable people to work in different organizations, and what they accomplished would be significantly different. That's because organizations themselves-independent of the people and other resources in t h e m have capabilities. To succeed consistently, good managers need to be skilled not just in assessing people but also in assessing the abilities and disabilities of their organization as a whole. This article offers managers a framework to help them understand what their organizations are capable of accomplishing. It will show them how their company's disabilities become more sharply defined even as its core capabilities grow. It will give them a way to recognize different kinds of change and make appropriate organizational responses to the opportunities that arise from each. And it will offer some bottom-line advice that runs counter to much that's assumed in our can-do business culture; if an organization faces major change-a disruptive innovation, perhaps-the worst possible approach may be to make drastic adjustments to the existing organization. In trying to transform an enterprise, managers can destroy the very capabilities that sustain it. Before rushing into the breach, managers must understand precisely what types of change the existing organization is capable and incapable of handling. To help them do that, we'll first take a systematic look at how to recognize a company's core Clayton M. Christensen is a professor of business administration at Harvard Business School in Boston and the author of Tbe Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Harvard Business School Press. 1997). Michael Overdorf is a Dean's Research Fellow at Harvard Business School. 7b discuss this article, join HBR's authors and readers in theHBR Forum at wvvw. 68 capabilities on an organizational level and then examine how those capabilities migrate as companies grow and mature. Where Capabilities Reside Our research suggests that three factors affect what an organization can and cannot do: its resources, its processes, and its values. When thinking about what sorts of innovations their organization will be able to embrace, managers need to assess how each of these factors might affect their organization's capacity to change. Resources. When they ask the question, "What can this company do?" the place most managers look for the answer is in its resources-both the tangible ones like people, equipment, technologies, and cash, and the less tangible ones like product designs, information, brands, and relationships with suppliers, distributors, and customers. Without doubt, access to abundant, high-quality resources increases an organization's chances of coping with change. But resource analysis doesn't come close to telling the whole story. Processes. The second factor that affects what a company can and cannot do is its processes. By processes, we mean the patterns of interaction, coordination, communication, and decision making employees use to transform resources into products and services of greater worth. Such examples as the processes that govern product development, manufacturing, and budgeting come immediately to mind. Some processes are formal, in the sense that they are explicitly defined and documented. Others are informal: they are routines or ways of working that evolve over time. The former tend to be more visible, the latter less visible. One of the dilemmas of management is that processes, by their very nature, are set up so that employees perform tasks in a consistent way, time after time. They are meant not to change or, if they must change, to change through tightly controlled procedures. When people use a process to do the task it was designed for, it is likely to perform efficiently. But when the same process is used to tackle a very different task, it is likely to perform sluggishly. Companies focused on developing and winning FDA approval for new drug compounds, for example, often prove inept at developing and winning approval for medical devices because the second task entails very different ways of working. In fact, a process that creates the capability to execute one task concurrently defines disabilities in executing other tasks." The most important capabilities and concurrent disabihties aren't necessarily embodied in the most HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 2000 Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change visible processes, like logistics, development, manufacturing, or customer service. In fact, they are more likely to be in tbe less visible, background processes tbat support decisions about wbere to invest resources-tbose tbat define bow market researcb is babitually done, how sucb analysis is translated into financial projections, bow plans and budgets are negotiated internally, and so on. It is in tbose processes tbat many organizations' most serious disabilities in coping witb cbange reside. Values. Tbe tbird factor tbat affects wbat an organization can and cannot do is its values. Sometimes tbe pbrase "corporate values" carries an etbical eormotation: one tbinks of tbe principles tbat ensure patient well-being for Jobnson & Jobnson or tbat guide decisions about employee safety at Alcoa. But witbin our framework, "values" bas a broader meaning. We define an organization's values as tbe standards by wbicb employees set priorities that enable tbem to judge wbether an order is attractive or unattractive, wbether a customer is more important or less important, whether an idea for a new product is attractive or marginal, and so on. Prioritization decisions are made by employees at every level. Among salespeople, tbey consist of on-tbe-spot, day-to-day decisions about wbicb products to push witb customers and wbich to deempbasize. At tbe executive tiers, tbey often take tbe form of decisions to invest, or not, in new products, services, and processes. Tbe larger and more complex a company becomes, tbe more important it is for senior managers to train employees tbrougbout tbe organization to make independent decisions about priorities tbat are consistent with the strategic direction and the business model of the company. A key metric of good management, in fact, is whether such clear, consistent values bave permeated the organization. But consistent, broadly understood values also define what an organization cannot do. A company's values reflect its cost structure or its business model because those define the rules its employees must follow for the company to prosper. If, for example, a company's overhead costs require it to achieve gross profit margins of 40%, then a value or decision rule will have evolved that encourages middle managers to kill ideas that promise gross margins below 40%. Sucb an organization would be incapable of commercializing projects targeting low-margin markets- sucb as tbose in e-commerce- even thougb anotber organization's values, driven by a very different cost structure, migbt facilitate the success of the same project. Different companies, of course, embody different values. But we want to focus on two sets of values HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 2000 in particular that tend to evolve in most companies in very predictable ways.Tbe inexorable evolution of tbese two values is wbat makes companies progressively less capable of addressing disruptive cbange successfully. As in tbe previous example, the first value dictates the way the company judges acceptable gross mar- Often, it seems, financia] analysts have a better intuition about the value of resources than they do about the value of processes. gins. As companies add features and functions to their products and services, trying to capture more attractive customers in premium tiers of their markets, they often add overhead cost. As a result, gross margins that were once attractive become unattractive. For instance, Toyota entered the North American market with tbe Corona model, wbicb targeted tbe lower end of the market. As that segment became crowded witb look-alike models from Honda, Mazda, and Nissan, competition drove dovra profit margins. To improve its margins, Toyota then developed more sophisticated cars targeted at higher tiers. Tbe process of developing cars like tbe Camry and tbe Lexus added costs to Toyota's operation. It subsequently decided to exit tbe lower end of tbe market; the margins bad become unacceptable because tbe company's cost structure, and consequently its values, had changed. In a departure from tbat pattern, Toyota recently introduced tbe Ecbo model, boping to rejoin the entry-level tier with a $10,000 car. It is one thing for Toyota's senior management to decide to launcb this new model. It's anotber for tbe many people in tbe Toyota system - including its dealers - to agree that selling more cars at lower margins is a better way to boost profits and equity values tban selling more Camrys, Avalons, and Lexuses. Only time will tell wbetber Toyota can manage tbis down-market move. To be successful witb tbe Ecbo, Toyota's management will bave to swim against a very strong current-the current of its own corporate values. Tbe second value relates to how big a business opportunity bas to be before it can be interesting. Because a company's stock price represents tbe discounted present value of its projected earnings stream, most managers feel compelled not just to maintain growth but to maintain a constant rate of growth. For a $40 million company to grow 25%, for instance, it needs to find $10 million in new business the next year. But a $40 billion company needs to find $10 billion in new business the next year to grow at tbat same rate. It follows tbat an opportunity tbat excites a small company isn't big 69 Meeting the Challenge.of Disruptive Change enough to be interesting to a large company. One of the bittersweet results of suecess, in fact, is that as companies become large, they lose the ability to enter small, emerging markets. This disability is not caused by a change in the resources within the companies-tbeir resources typically are vast. Ratber, it's caused by an evolution in values. The problem is magnified wben companies suddenly become mucb bigger tbrough mergers or acquisitions. Executives and Wall Street financiers wbo engineer megamergers between already-buge pbarmaceutieal companies, for example, need to take tbis effect into account. Altbougb tbeir merged researcb organizations migbt bave more resources One of the bittersweet results of success is that as companies become large, they lose sight of small, emerging markets. 70 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 2000 Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change to throw at new product development, their commercial organizations will probably have lost their appetites for all hut the higgest hlockhuster drugs. This constitutes a very real disability in managing innovation. The same prohlem crops up in high-tech industries as well. In many ways, Hewlett-Packard's recent decision to spht itself into two companies is rooted in its recognition of this prohlem. The Migration of Capabilities In the start-up stages of an organization, much of what gets done is attributable to resources-people, in particular. The addition or departure of a few key people can profoundly influence its success. Over time, however, the locus of the organization's capabilities shifts toward its processes and values. As people address recurrent tasks, processes hecome defined. And as the business model takes shape and it heeomes clear which types of business need to be accorded highest priority, values coalesce. In fact, one reason that many soaring young companies flame out after an IPO based on a single hot product is that their initial success is grounded in resources-often the founding engineers - and they fail to develop processes that can create a sequence of hot products. Avid Technology, a producer of digital-edit ing systems for television, is an apt case in point. Avid's well-received technology removed tedium from the video-editing process. On the back of its star product, Avid's stock rose from $i6 a share at its 1993 IPO to $49 in mid-r995. However, the strains of heing a one-trick pony soon emerged as Avid faced a saturated market, rising inventories and receivables, increased competition, and shareholder lawsuits. Customers loved the product, hut Avid's lack of effective processes for consistently developing new products and for controlling quality, delivery, and service ultimately tripped the company and sent its stock hack down. By contrast, at highly successful firms such as McKinsey & Company, the processes and values have become so powerful that it almost doesn't matter which people get assigned to which project teams. Hundreds of MBAs join the firm every year, and almost as many leave. But the company is ahle to crank out high-quality work year after year hecause its core capabilities are rooted in its processes and values rather than in its resources. When a company's processes and values are heing formed in its early and middle years, the founder typically has a profound impact. The founder usually has strong opinions about how employees should do their work and what the organization's HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 2000 priorities need to he. If the founder's judgments are flawed, of course, the company will likely fail. But if they're sound, employees will experience for themselves the validity of the founder's prohlemsolving and decision-making methods. Thus processes become defined. Likewise, if the company hecomes financially successful hy allocating resources according to criteria that reflect the founder's priorities, the company's values coalesce around those criteria. As successful companies mature, employees gradually come to assume that the processes and priorities they've used so successfully so often are the right way to do their work. Once that happens and employees begin to follow processes and decide priorities by assumption rather than hy conscious choice, those processes and values come to constitute the organization's culture.^ As companies grow from a few employees to hundreds and thousands of them, the challenge of getting all employees to agree on what needs to be done and how can be daunting for even the hest managers. Culture is a powerful management tool in those situations. It enables employees to act autonomously hut causes them to act consistently. Hence, the factors that define an organization's capabilities and disahilities evolve over time-they start in resources; then move to visible, articulated processes and values,- and migrate finally to culture. As long as the organization continues to face the same sorts of problems that its processes and values were designed to address, managing the organization can be straightforward. But because those factors also deflne what an organization cannot do, they constitute disabilities when the problems facing the company change fundamentally. When the organization's capabilities reside primarily in its people, changing capabilities to address the new problems is relatively simple. But when the capahilities have come to reside in processes and values, and especially when they have become embedded in culture, change can be extraordinarily difficult. (See the sidebar "Digital's Dilemma."] Sustaining Versus Disruptive Innovation Successful companies, no matter what the source of their capabilities, are pretty good at responding to evolutionary changes in their markets-what in The Innovator's Dilemma (Harvard Business School, 1997), Clayton Christensen referred to as sustaining innovation. Where they run into trouble is in handling or initiating revolutionary changes in their markets, or dealing with disruptive innovation. 71 Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change Sustaining technologies are innovations that make a product or service perform better in ways that customers in the mainstream market already value. Compaq's early adoption of Intel's 32-bit 386 microprocessor instead of the 16-bit 286 chip was a sustaining innovation. So was Merrill Lynch's introduction of its Cash Management Account, which allowed customers to write checks against their equity accounts. Those were breakthrough innovations that sustained the best customers of these companies by providing something better than had previously been available. Disruptive innovations create an entirely new market through the introduction of a new kind of product or service, one that's actually worse, initially, as judged hy the performance metrics that mainstream customers value. Charles Schwab's initial entry as a bare-b ...
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School: University of Virginia



Transportation Management
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The New Managerial Work
The old motivational managerial tools include hierarchies, clear distinction of titles,
departments, and tasks. These motivational tools are changing due to the levels of complexity
and interdependence. Competitive structures are for...

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Tutor went the extra mile to help me with this essay. Citations were a bit shaky but I appreciated how well he handled APA styles and how ok he was to change them even though I didnt specify. Got a B+ which is believable and acceptable.

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