For each game, circle all payoffs corresponding to

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EQJ9631

Economics

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For each game, circle all payoffs corresponding to a player’s best response. Identify whether either player has a strictly dominant strategy (and, if so, what). Identify all pure strategy Nash equilibria, if any, by writing the equilibrium strategies (not payoffs) as ordered pairs.For each game, circle all payoffs corresponding to a player’s best response. Identify whether either player has a strictly dominant strategy (and, if so, what). Identify all pure strategy Nash equilibria, if any, by writing the equilibrium strategies (not payoffs) as ordered pairs.

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1 Getting started For each game, circle all payoffs corresponding to a player’s best response. Identify whether either player has a strictly dominant strategy (and, if so, what). Identify all pure strategy Nash equilibria, if any, by writing the equilibrium strategies (not payoffs) as ordered pairs. Bowling Movies Bowling 3, 3 0,1 Movies 1,0 1,1 Yufei a. Kyra Swing Pass Fastball 1, 3 3,1 Curveball 2,2 3,1 Slider 4,0 0,4 Batter b. Pitcher Sure Shrug Okay 0, 0 0, 0 Fine 0, 0 0, 0 Dr. Blah c. Dr. Meh Copyright 2018 by Brendan M. Price. All rights reserved. 1 Watch Ignore 4, 2 4,3 Work Slack −1,1 0,−1 Manager d. Employee 2 Going high or going low? Two politicians are running for mayor. Each one chooses whether to run a Positive campaign or a Negative campaign. Their payoffs are as follows. Candidate 2 Candidate 1 Positive Positive Negative 8, 8 1, 10 Negative 10, 1 4, 4 a. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria (if any). Remember to name the equilibrium strategies, not the equilibrium payoffs. b. Can there be a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which Candidate 1 sometimes plays Positive and sometimes plays Negative? Justify your answer. c. Now suppose that Candidate 1 wants to run for statewide office someday. This increases her payoff from going Positive by an amount R (a better reputation), regardless of what Candidate 2 does. Assuming that Candidate 2 continues to play his optimal strategy, what is the smallest value of R for which Candidate 1 runs a Positive campaign? 3 Technology adoption California and Oregon are adopting electronic medical records (EMR) systems, provided by either Cerner or Epic. California prefers Cerner’s system, while Oregon prefers Epic, but all else equal, both states would like to use the same system since doing so makes it easier to coordinate healthcare for people who commute across state lines. Cerner Copyright Epic 2018 by Brendan M. Price. All rights reserved. 2 Cerner Epic 5,2 0,0 0,0 2,4 Oregon California a. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria (if any). b. Find a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which each state has a positive probability of picking each EMR system. The next part relates to material on dynamic games, which we may not cover before the due date. But try to figure it out! This subpart will definitely be graded on an “effort” basis. c. Now imagine that California makes its decision first. California’s decision will be public knowledge, so Oregon will get to see what California did before making its decision. What will California do? How will Oregon respond? Does it matter who goes first? 4 Homer at the Bat Sometimes, before looking for a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, we can simplify a game through the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Swing Bunt Pass Fastball 0,4 3,1 4,0 Curveball 3,1 4,0 2,2 Screwball 1,3 0,4 Homer 1,3 Darryl a. Which strategy is strictly dominated? Cross it out! Copyright 2018 by Brendan M. Price. All rights reserved. 3 b. Now that you’ve ruled out one strategy, another strategy is strictly dominated. Which one? Cross that one out too! c. You should now be left with a 2×2 payoff matrix. Find a mixed strategy in which all of the remaining strategies are played with positive probability. 5 The Super Mario Challenge! (completely optional) This problem is completely optional, quite challenging, and just for fun. It’s here to provoke your intellectual curiosity, but don’t worry about understanding this problem for the exams. Mario and Luigi are playing a game with the following rules. Each one secretly writes the word “Two”, “Three”, or “Four” on a piece of paper. If their choices add up to an even number, Mario wins. Otherwise, Luigi wins. The payoff matrix is as follows: Two Three Four Two 1,0 0,1 1,0 Three 0, 1 1,0 0,1 Four 1,0 0,1 Luigi 1,0 Mario a. Does this game have any pure strategy Nash equilibria? If so, identify them. b. This game has many mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Describe them all. c. Mario and Luigi always play a MSNE. Which player would you rather be, and why? Copyright 2018 by Brendan M. Price. All rights reserved. 4
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Explanation & Answer

Attached.

Running Head: GAME THEORY

1

Game Theory
Student’s Name
Course Name
Instructor’s Name
Date

Copyright

2018 by Brendan M. Price. All rights reserved.

1

1. Getting started
For each game, circle all payoffs corresponding to a player’s best response. Identify whether
either player has a strictly dominant strategy (and, if so, what). Identify all pure strategy Nash
equilibria, if any, by writing the equilibrium strategies (not payoffs) as ordered pairs.
a.

The players have a pure strategy Nash equilibria
of (3, 3) and (1,1) and Kyra has a strictly
dominated strategy of (3,3) for bowling and (1,0)
for movies
b.

The players have no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Copyright

2018 by Brendan M. Price. All rights reserved.

2

They have a strictly dominant strategy as follows

c.

These player have pure strategy equilibria of
(0,0) and also strictly dominant strategy of
(0,0) for all the choices.

Copyright

2018 by Brendan M. Price. All rights reserved.

3

d.

Employee

Manager
The pure strategy Nash equilibrium for
these players is (4,3) and both Dr. Blah
and Dr. Meh players has a strictly
dominant strategy of choosing work
with payoffs of (4,2) for when watched
and (4,3) when ignore.

2

Going high or going low?

Two politicians are running for mayor. Each one chooses whether to run a Positive campaign or a
Negative campaign. Their payoffs are as follows.

Candidate 2

Candidate 1

Positive

Negative

Positive

8, 8

1, 10

Negative

10, 1

4, 4

a. Find a...


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