product case

timer Asked: Oct 26th, 2018
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Question description

project paper


...your understanding of course material
...your ability to develop a moral argument
...your ability to apply course concepts to concrete, real-world cases

End Product

A short paper defending a solution or analysis of a particular business ethics case. While there is no strict page limit or style requirements, use the following guidelines:

● 12 point font
● Times New Roman typeface
● Double-spaced

● Chicago-style parenthetical reference for citations (however, no reference are required beyond reference to the case study itself)


  • Product Dumping
  1. Write a brief (approximately 400 word) summary of the issue, identifying and explaining ethical concerns.

only summary this time.

Sample Case Outcry Over EpiPen Prices Hasn’t Made Them Lower by Charles Duhigg New York Time – June 4, 2017 A few weeks ago, after some particularly incompetent parenting on my part (nuts in the dessert, a rushed trip to an emergency room after my child’s allergic reaction), I visited the local pharmacy to fill an EpiPen prescription. You might recall EpiPen as last year’s poster child for out-of-control drug prices. Though this simple medical device contains only about $1 of the drug epinephrine, the company that sells it, Mylan, earned the public’s enmity and lawmakers’ scrutiny after ratcheting up prices to $609 a box. Outraged parents, presidential candidates and even both parties in Congress managed to unite to attack Mylan for the price increases. By August, the company, which sells thousands of drugs and says it fills one in every 13 American prescriptions, was making mea culpas and renewing its promise to “do what’s right, not what’s easy,” as the company’s mission statement goes. So I was surprised when my pharmacist informed me, months after those floggings and apologies had faded from the headlines, that I would still need to pay $609 for a box of two EpiPens. Didn’t we solve this problem? Not quite. What’s more, Mylan is back in the news. On Wednesday, regulators said the company had most likely overcharged Medicaid by $1.27 billion for EpiPens. The same day, a group of pension funds announced that they hoped to unseat much of Mylan’s board for “new lows in corporate stewardship,” including paying the chairman $97 million in 2016, more than the salaries of the chief executives at Disney, General Electric and Walmart combined. Over the last several weeks, I’ve spoken with 10 former high-ranking executives at Mylan who told me that they weren’t surprised EpiPen prices were still high. Nor were many startled by last week’s developments. Mylan, they said, is an example of a firm that has thrived by learning to absorb, and then ignore, opprobrium. The company has an effective monopoly on a lifesaving product, which has allowed its leaders to see public outrage as a tax they must pay, and then move on. Mylan has been called out again and again over the years — by the company’s own employees, regulators, patients, politicians and the press — and hasn’t changed, even as revenue has skyrocketed, hitting $11 billion last year. The firm is a case study in the limits of what consumer and employee activism, as well as government oversight, can achieve. Which means this time, if we’re hoping for a different outcome, something more needs to be done. To understand Mylan’s culture, consider a series of conversations that began inside the company in 2014. A group of midlevel executives was concerned about the soaring price of EpiPens, which had more than doubled in the previous four years; there were rumors that even more aggressive hikes were planned. (Former executives who related this and other anecdotes requested anonymity because they had nondisclosure agreements or feared retaliation. Aspects of their accounts were disputed by Mylan.) In meetings, the executives began warning Mylan’s top leaders that the price increases seemed like unethical profiteering at the expense of sick children and adults, according to people who participated in the conversations. Over the next 16 months, those internal warnings were repeatedly aired. At one gathering, executives shared their concerns with Mylan’s chairman, Robert Coury. Mr. Coury replied that he was untroubled. He raised both his middle fingers and explained, using colorful language, that anyone criticizing Mylan, including its employees, ought to go copulate with themselves. Critics in Congress and on Wall Street, he said, should do the same. And regulators at the Food and Drug Administration? They, too, deserved a round of anatomically challenging selffulfillment. When the executives conveyed their anxieties to other leaders, including the chief executive, Heather Bresch, these, too, were brushed off, they told me. Those top leaders’ responses are a far cry from the message on Mylan’s website, which says that “we challenge every member of every team to challenge the status quo,” and that “we put people and patients first, trusting that profits will follow.” But Mylan is a prime example of how easy it is for leaders to say one thing publicly and act differently in private. When we talk about consumer or employee activism, we tend to focus on firms like United Airlines, which quickly apologized and changed its policies after a video emerged of a passenger being dragged off a plane. However, in many other cases, outrage is ineffective. Mylan’s behavior persists because it is hard, and often tedious, for employees and the public to continue complaining — particularly when bosses disagree, or when some newer outrage appears on our Facebook feed. But the costs of going silent are real. Regulators missed an opportunity to reform Mylan in 2012 when the company produced a television commercial showing a mother driving her son to a birthday party and implying that he could eat whatever he wanted, despite his nut allergy, as long as an EpiPen was nearby to counteract a reaction. The commercial also suggested that an EpiPen was a sufficient treatment on its own. Mylan knew neither of those was true, according to executives from that period. In fact, Mylan had recently started a major lobbying effort to encourage schools to stock EpiPens by arguing that people with serious food allergies are always at risk, and that EpiPens were a necessary supplement to emergency medical treatment. Before the birthday advertisement aired, the ad went through multiple internal review processes. Mylan executives told Ms. Bresch that the commercial was improper. One employee went so far as to send an internal email saying the advertisement would increase the frequency of allergic reactions, according to a person who saw the correspondence. Ms. Bresch disagreed. She said it was better to act boldly, according to a former executive who participated in that conversation. So the advertisement went on television. And a record number of consumer complaints arrived at the Food and Drug Administration. The agency ordered the commercial pulled after just a few days because it was “false and misleading,” “overstates the efficacy of the drug product” and “may result in serious consequences, including death.” The agency ordered Mylan to broadcast another ad, this one acknowledging that the “EpiPen cannot prevent an allergic reaction.”But regulators never investigated why Mylan’s internal protocols had allowed the dangerous ad to air. And a year later, Mylan received something akin to a government endorsement. President Barack Obama signed a federal law encouraging schools to stock emergency epinephrine supplies. The White House celebrated it as the “EpiPen Law.” When I approached Mylan about these and other anecdotes, the company disputed employees’ accounts. In a statement, it wrote that “any allegations of disregard for consumers who need these lifesaving drugs, government officials, regulators or any other of our valued stakeholders are patently false and wholly inconsistent with the company’s culture, mission and track record of delivering access to medicine.” Mr. Coury declined to be interviewed, but Ms. Bresch sat down with me last month at Mylan’s Manhattan offices. She said that Mylan was “a pretty rare and unconventional company,” and that it was focused on delivering low-cost drugs. A broken health care system, she said, is responsible for the inefficiencies and high prices that plague consumers. She added that Mylan had responded promptly when the Food and Drug Administration criticized the company’s advertisement in 2012, and that the EpiPen had become more expensive because Mylan had invested in public awareness and improving the device. “Look at what we’ve built, and what we deliver day-in and day-out,” Ms. Bresch told me, “and at the center of all of that is the patient.” But it seems hard to reconcile those comments with allegations from employees, regulators and other companies. In December, attorneys general in 20 states accused Mylan and five other firms of conspiring to illegally keep prices high on an antibiotic and a diabetes drug. In October, Mylan returned nearly a half-billion dollars to the federal authorities in an attempt to stem the investigation into overcharging that regulators cited on Wednesday. And in April, one of Mylan’s competitors, Sanofi, filed a lawsuit accusing the firm of committing antitrust violations to keep an EpiPen competitor off the market. Then there are situations that, at other firms, might have set off firings or corporate soul-searching, but that at Mylan caused neither. In 2007, reporters discovered that Ms. Bresch had not received the M.B.A. degree she claimed on her résumé. In 2012, Mr. Coury was criticized by investors and the media for repeatedly using the company plane to fly his son to music concerts. (And then there was the time, in 2013, when Mr. Coury, at a Goldman Sachs conference, indicated his dislike for hypothetical questions by saying that “if your aunt had balls, she’d be your uncle.”) In our interview, Ms. Bresch said there was nothing in Mylan’s culture she would change. The company also said it had found no evidence of price-fixing or antitrust behavior, that the government overcharges had resulted from an innocent disagreement over regulatory interpretations and that Mylan’s compensation policies were appropriate. “We are a for-profit business, and we have a commitment to shareholders,” Ms. Bresch told me. “But I think if there’s any company out there that has demonstrated you can do good and do well, we’re one of the few.” For instance, Ms. Bresch noted that Mylan had recently released a generic version of EpiPen. When I asked my pharmacist for the generic EpiPen, he told me that I would have to wait 90 minutes, until he could get my doctor on the phone to authorize the substitution. Then, he charged me $370 for the generics. Mylan points out there are online coupons for EpiPen customers. In fact, the company says that since it came under attack in August, nearly 90 percent of EpiPen buyers have paid less than $100 per box because of insurance, discounts or coupons. But for parents in urgent need of an EpiPen, or for patients who are poor, are not internet savvy or have high insurance deductibles — which are increasingly common — those programs can mean little. The most vulnerable often end up paying the highest prices, which is troubling when you consider that 15 million Americans have food allergies. But hope springs eternal. With the recent criticisms coming on the heels of last year’s controversies, Mylan will have to change, right? Perhaps. But only if people stay angry and active. Doctors need to write different prescriptions. Pharmacists need to guide patients to alternatives. Investors should examine further efforts to elect new Mylan board members. In the meantime, I still believe — perhaps foolishly — that sustained attention might create change. And so, as long as Mylan flouts the norms of good corporate behavior, it seems worth continuing to scrutinize what the company is doing, and questioning why EpiPens cost so much. Sample Case Summary The Epipen is a life-saving medical device that allows a dose of epinephrine to be quickly and easily administered to someone experiencing a severe allergic reaction. While the device itself and the dose of medicine it contains are inexpensive to produce, its price for a box of two ranges from $370 for the generic version to $609 for the name-brand version. Even though these prices are steep, those with lifethreatening allergies have little choice but to pay. These high prices have lead to widespread criticism of the device’s produce, Mylan. While the company’s reaction has been apologetic on the surface, its actual behavior has been anything but. There are numerous reports from former employees of disdain and contempt by Mylan executives for critics. Regulators claim that Mylan has overcharged Medicaid $1.27 billion dollars for epipens. Mylan released a commercial that encouraged allergy sufferers to engage in dangerous behavior. The list goes on. We are left with a clear picture of a company that is concerned with profit to the exclusion of all else. Clearly, it would be in the best interest of patients to receive life-saving medicine at an affordable price. On the other hand, some would argue that firms must look after the interests of their shareholders, so long as they do not violate anyone’s rights in the process. However, while patients might not have a positive right to be provided with this medicine at a low price, it is plausible that they do have a negative right to not be misled or endangered by advertising. Finally, because of the nature of the product that Mylan sells and its promise to “do what’s right, not what’s easy,” it is clear that Mylan has a moral duty to its customers that other firms might not bear. In an ideal situation, the market forces would prevent firms from acting in the way that Mylan has: competitors could outperform Mylan on price or service. However, because of the circumstances surrounding pharmaceutical patents, these market forces are frustrated. We cannot expect competition alone to solve this problem. Sample Argument Outline (P1) It is morally acceptable for firms to do things that go against the best interest of stakeholders, e.g., customers and employees, only if this doesn’t (1) violate the rights of stakeholders or (2) violate a moral duty that the firm has to those stakeholders (P2) Firms that (1) make promises to customers or (2) offer invaluable products or services have a moral duties to act in the best interest of those customers (P3) Mylan has (1) made promises to put patients first and (2) sells life-saving products (C1) Mylan has a moral duty to act in the best interest of its customers (from P2, P3) (P4) Firms that have a duty to act in the best interest of their customers violate that duty if their products are high priced and those prices are necessary, e.g., to stay in business or to do research (P5) The price of Mylan’s Epipen is not necessary (C2) Mylan violates its moral duty to its customers by setting the price of the Epipen so high (from C1, P4, P5) (C3) It is not morally acceptable for Mylan to set the price of its Epipen so high (from P1, C2) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Note: My ultimate conclusion (my thesis) is that Mylan’s actions are wrong. There are many ways that I could build a case for that conclusion. For example, I could have argued that it is never morally permissible for firms to act against the best interests of stakeholders and then I would only need to show that setting the price of the Epipen so high is not in the best interest of stakeholders. But many people would not accept the claim that firms must act in the best interest of stakeholders. So, instead, I opted for an argument that utilizes that idea that Mylan has a special moral obligation to its customers. I believe this will make for a stronger argument because it will utilize premises that are more widely accepted. Note: Your argument outline doesn’t have to look like this, but I do need to see (1) what your conclusion is and (2) what claims you’re using to support that conclusion, including (3) the moral claims that support that conclusion. Sample Paper The Epipen is a life-saving medical device that allows a dose of epinephrine to be quickly and easily administered to someone experiencing a severe allergic reaction. The maker of this device, Mylan, has set its price at $609 for a box of two, despite the fact that the device costs very little to produce. This high price poses a significant hardship for many who need the Epipen. I argue that it is morally unacceptable for Mylan to set the price so high. Normally, market forces would keep products from being overpriced. If you sell for $10 a product that costs $1 to make, then I could sell that same product $9 and lure your customers away. You, then, would need to lower your price to remain competitive. In this situation, the question of morally unacceptable prices does not arise: customers will not buy overpriced products so there is no incentive to price products too high. However, these market forces do not always apply in the case of pharmaceuticals for two reasons. First, the cost of producing pharmaceuticals is minuscule compared to the cost of researching and developing (R&D) them. A pharmaceutical company can only stay in business if it charges enough to cover the cost of production and the cost of R&D. However, if I make the investment for R&D, it would be simple for a competing firm to use that research to make their own version. Since they would only need to cover the cost of production, they could undercut my price. So, few would do R&D in the first place unless anti-competitive measures were taken. Since pharmaceutical R&D is good for society, governments typically grant patents to pharmaceutical firms, granting them exclusive rights to produce and sell their discoveries for a period of years. Even so, I could not set the price of my product as high as I might want. Even if no one can compete with me, customers might decide that the price is too high and refuse to buy my product. The second reason pharmaceutical prices tend to remain high is that many of them are invaluable: people are willing to pay any price for a product that they need to survive. This combination of anti- competitive patents and invaluable products prevents normal market forces from driving down the price of Epipens. I will not argue that firms should always look out for the best interests of customers and society when they set prices. Perhaps it is sometimes morally acceptable for firms to set prices so as to maximize benefits to shareholders by maximizing costs for other stakeholders. However, it is clearly wrong for firms to do this when they have a special moral duty to look out for the best interests of these other stakeholders. Furthermore, I argue that Mylan has duties of this sort. First, Mylan has a moral duty to act in the best interest of customers because it has promised to do so. In its mission statement, Mylan promises to “do what’s right, not what’s easy.” The firm’s website declares “we put people and patients first, trusting that profits will follow.” In an official statement, Mylan declared that “any allegations of disregard for consumers who need these lifesaving drugs, government officials, regulators or any other of our valued stakeholders are patently false and wholly inconsistent with the company’s culture, mission and track record of delivering access to medicine.” (Duhigg 2017) Mylan is clearly representing itself as a firm that cares about the interests of its customers. It is tempting to think of these sorts of assertions as empty words, as making no real promises to customers. I do not think that we can afford to adopt such a cynical attitude. Society functions because we trust each other. Consider, for example, the largely unregulated secondary market. The ability to buy and sell used products creates significant value, allowing those who no longer value a product to recoup some of their cost and allowing those who desire a product, but not enough to purchase it new, to acquire that product. The secondary market functions, to a large extent, because we trust each other. Regulation of the secondary market would introduce costly inefficiencies. The same is true in primary markets, though perhaps not so obviously. Business works, in part, because we trust one another. If we put no faith in the words of others, markets would not function nearly so well. Second, even if Mylan had not made promises to look out for the best interests of customers, they acquired a duty to do so by opting to sell life-saving pharmaceuticals. Those in the medical field have special moral obligations that others do not. A certified public accountant who happens across someone in desperate need of tax help would do nothing wrong by walking away (though it would be awfully nice of her to help), but a medical doctor who sees someone clutch their chest and collapse is morally required to lend assistance. Medical professionals occupy a special role that carries with it special obligations. By extension, those who produce and sell life-saving medicine occupy a special role and, likewise, have special obligations. Even if these special obligations do not require pharmaceutical firms to run as charities, it does require them to operate with some concern for the public good. So, Mylan has a special obligation to look out for the best interest of its customers. This, by itself, would not mean that Mylan is in the wrong for pricing its Epipen as it does. As noted above, the high price of pharmaceuticals sometimes reflects the high cost of R&D. Furthermore, an executive at Mylan suggests that “a broken health care system is responsible for the inefficiencies and high prices that plague consumers” and “that the EpiPen had become more expensive because Mylan had invested in public awareness and improving the device.” (Duhigg 2017) If the high price of a product reflects inefficiencies outside of the firm’s control, efforts to genuinely improve the product, steps necessary to stay in business, or programs aimed at serving the public good, then the price might be justified even when the firm has special moral obligations to look out for the best interest of its customers. There is strong reason to believe that the high price of the Epipen is not justified in this manner. Mylan has been accused of a laundry list of self-serving behaviors, including overcharging Medicaid by $1.27 billion, paying the chairman of its board of executives $97 million in 2016 (an amount that far outstrips typical compensation for that role), using the company jet for personal trips, airing dangerously misleading commercials, and conspiring with other firms to fix the price of pharmaceuticals. (Duhigg 2017) Obviously, none of these activities would justify the high price of Epipens. Works Cited Duhigg, Charles. 2017. “Outcry Over EpiPen Prices Hasn’t Made Them Lower.” The New York Times, June 4.
MADE IN THE U.S.A. ETHICS CASE: DUMPED IN BRAZIL, AFRICA, Ethics in Dealing With Uncertainty in Capital Budgeting, or What Happens When a Project is No Longer Sellable In an uncertain world, capital budgeting attempts to determine what the future of a new product will bring and how then to act on that forecast. We never know for certain what the future will bring, but we do arrive at some idea of what the distribution of possible outcomes looks like. Unfortunately, when there is uncertainty, the outcome is not always a good one. For example, what happens if the government rules that our product is not safe? The answer is that we must abandon the product. The question then becomes what to do with the inventory we currently have on hand. We certainly want to deal with it in a way that is in the best interests of our shareholders. We also want to obey the law and act ethically. As with most ethical questions, there is not necessarily a right or wrong answer. When it comes to the safety of young children, fire is a parent's nightmare. Just the thought of their young ones trapped in their cribs and beds by a raging nocturnal blaze is enough to make most mothers and fathers take every precaution to ensure their children's safety. Little wonder that when fire-retardant children's pajamas hit the market in the mid-1970s, they proved an overnight success. Within a few short years more than 200 million pairs were sold, and the sales of millions more were all but guaranteed. For their manufacturers, the future could not have been brighter. Then, like a bolt from the blue, came word that the pajamas were killers. In June 1977, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) banned the sale of these pajamas and ordered the recall of millions of pairs. Reason: The pajamas contained the flame-retardant chemical Tris (2,3-dibromoprophyl), which had been found to cause kidney cancer in children. Whereas just months earlier the 100 medium- and small-garment manufacturers of the Tris-impregnated pajamas could not fill orders fast enough, suddenly they were worrying about how to get rid of the millions of pairs now sitting in warehouses. Because of its toxicity, the sleepwear could not even be thrown away, let alone sold. Indeed, the CPSC left no doubt about how the pajamas were to be disposed of—buried or burned or used as industrial wiping cloths. All meant millions of dollars in losses for manufacturers. The companies affected—mostly small, family-run operations employing fewer than 100 workers—immediately attempted to shift blame to the mills that made the cloth. When that attempt failed, they tried to get the big department stores that sold the pajamas and the chemical companies that produced Tris to share the financial losses. Again, no sale. Finally, in desperation, the companies lobbied in Washington for a bill making the federal government partially responsible for the losses. It was the government, they argued, that originally had required the companies to add Tris to pajamas and then had prohibited their sale. Congress was sympathetic; it passed a bill granting companies relief. But President Carter vetoed it. While the small firms were waging their political battle in the halls of Congress, ads began appearing in the classified pages of Women's Wear Daily. "Tris-TrisTris We will buy any fabric containing Tris," read one. Another said, "Tris—we will purchase any large quantities of garments containing Tris."' The ads had been placed by exporters, who began buying up the pajamas, usually at 10 to 30% of the normal wholesale price. Their intent was clear: to dump the carcinogenic pajamas on overseas markets. Tris is not the only example of dumping. In 1972, 400 Iraqis died and 5,000 were hospitalized after eating wheat and barley treated with a U.S.-banned organic mercury fungicide. Winstrol, a synthetic male hormone that had been found to stunt the growth of American children, was made available in Brazil as an appetite stimulant for children. Depo-Provera, an injectable contraceptive known to cause malignant tumors in animals, was shipped overseas to 70 countries where it was used in U.S.-sponsored population control programs. And 450,000 baby pacifiers, of the type known to have caused choking deaths, were exported for sale overseas. Manufacturers that dump products abroad clearly are motivated by profit or at least by the hope of avoiding financial losses resulting from having to withdraw a product from the market. For government and health agencies that cooperate in the exporting of dangerous products, the motives are more complex. For example, as early as 1971, the dangers of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device were well documented.4 Among the adverse reactions were pelvic inflammation, blood poisoning, pregnancies resulting in spontaneous abortions, tubal pregnancies, and uterine perforations. A number of deaths were even attributed to the device. Faced with losing its domestic market, A. H. Robins Co., manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, worked out a deal with the Office of Population within the U. S. Agency for International Development (AID), whereby AID bought thousands of the devices at a reduced price for use in populationcontrol programs in 42 countries. Why do governmental and population-control agencies approve the sale and use overseas birth control devices proved dangerous in the United States? They say their motives are humanitarian. Since the rate of dying in childbirth is high in Third World countries, almost any birth control device is preferable to none. Third World scientists and government officials frequently support this argument. They insist that denying their countries access to the contraceptives of their choice is tantamount to violating their countries' national sovereignty. Apparently this argument has found a sympathetic ear in Washington, for it turns up in the "notification" system that regulates the export of banned or dangerous products overseas. Based on the principles of national sovereignty, selfdetermination, and free trade, the notification system requires that foreign governments be notified whenever a product is banned, deregulated, suspended, or canceled by an American regulatory agency. The State Department, which implements the system, has a policy statement on the subject that reads in part: "No country should establish itself as the arbiter of others' health and safety standards. Individual governments are generally in the best position to establish standards of public health and safety." "Dumping" is a term apparently coined by Mother Jones magazine to refer to the practice of exporting to overseas countries products that have been banned or declared hazardous in the United States. Unless otherwise noted, the facts and quotations reported in this case are based on Mark Dowie, Critics of the system claim that notifying foreign health officials is virtually useless. For one thing, other governments rarely can establish health standards or even control imports into their countries. Indeed, most of the Third World countries where banned or dangerous products are dumped lack regulatory agencies, adequate testing facilities, and well-staffed customs departments. Then there is the problem of getting the word out about hazardous products. In theory, when a government agency such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) finds a product hazardous, it is supposed to inform the State Department, which is to notify local health officials. But agencies often fail to inform the State Department of the product they have banned or found harmful. And when it is notified, its communiques typically go no further than the U.S. embassies abroad. One embassy official even told the General Accounting Office (GAO) that he "did not routinely forward notification of chemicals not registered in the host country, because it may adversely affect U.S." exporting. When foreign officials are notified by U.S. embassies, they sometimes find the communiques vague or ambiguous or too technical to understand. In an effort to remedy these problems, at the end of his term in office, President Carter issued an executive order that (1) improved export notice procedures; (2) called for publishing an annual summary of substances banned or severely restricted for domestic use in the United States; (3) directed the State Department and other federal agencies to participate in the development of international hazard alert systems; and (4) established procedures for placing formal export licensing controls on a limited number of extremely hazardous substances. In one of his first acts as president, however, President Reagan rescinded the order. Later in his administration, the law that formerly prohibited U.S. pharmaceutical companies from exporting drugs that are banned or not registered in this country was weakened to allow the export of drugs not yet approved for use in the United States to 21 countries. But even if communication procedures were improved or the export of dangerous products forbidden, there are ways that companies can circumvent these threats to their profits—for example, by simply changing the name of the product or by exporting the individual ingredients of a product to a plant in a foreign country. Once there, the ingredients can be reassembled and the product dumped.5 Upjohn, for example, through its Belgian subsidiary, continues to produce DepoProvera, which the FDA had consistently refused to approve for use in this country. And the prohibition on the export of dangerous drugs is not that hard to sidestep. "Unless the package bursts open on the dock," one drug company executive observe, "you have no chance of being caught." Unfortunately for us, in the case of pesticides, the effects of overseas dumping are now coming home. The EPA bans from the United States all crop uses of DDT and Dieldrin, which kill fish, cause tumors in animals, and build up in the fatty tissue of humans. It also bans heptachlor, chlordane, leptophos, endrin, and many other pesticides, including 2,4,5-T (which contains the deadly poison dioxin, the active ingredient in Agent Orange, the notorious defoliant used in Vietnam), because they are dangerous to human beings. No law, however, prohibits the sale of DDT and these other U.S.-banned pesticides overseas, where, thanks to corporate dumping, they are routinely used in agriculture. The PDA now estimates, through spot checks, that 10% of our imported food is contaminated with illegal residues of banned pesticides. And the PDA's most commonly used testing procedure does not even check for 70% of the pesticides known to cause cancer.

Tutor Answer

School: UC Berkeley




Product Dumping
Institution affiliated



Product dumping refers to the selling of domestically banned or prohibited products in
other countries. Usually, the domestic regulators have identified these products to contain
potentially harmful components. The ethical hazards involved in product dumping are great,
including the endangering of the lives of people in the dumping destinations. Clearly,
manufacturers are in the industry for business, and if does not make sense to invest...

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