ECO2023 GEA Rubric
Learning
Outcome
Component
4
3
2
1
Economic
Concepts
Appropriate use
of economic
terminology critical/analytical
thinking ‘like an
economist’.
Theoretical
analysis
Applies a supply
and demand
diagram to the
policy issue
Terminology relevant to the
assignment is used
appropriately throughout
the commentary.
Terminology relevant to the
assignment is used
appropriately in the bulk of
the commentary.
(1 or fewer mistakes).
(2 or fewer mistakes).
Terminology
relevant to the
assignment is used
inappropriately
throughout the
much of
commentary.
Terminology relevant to
the assignment is used
inappropriately
throughout the
commentary.
(4 or greater).
(3 or fewer
mistakes).
Clearly presents and
fully explains the
impact of the proposed
change in terms of a
supply and demand
diagram
Presents and explains
the impact of the
proposed change in
terms of a supply and
demand diagram, but
explanation is unclear
Presents and
explains the
impact of the
proposed change
in terms of a
supply and
demand diagram,
but presentation
contains factual
errors
Does not present the
impact of the
proposed change in
terms of a supply
and demand
diagram or the
presentation
contains serious
factual errors
Correct explanation of
the existing policy. The
effects of the policy are
clearly stated.
Clearly identifies and
summarizes main
problem, question or
issue. Identifies
secondary or implicit
issues. If applicable,
notes relationships
between factors in the
situation and how they
relate to each other.
Some effects are stated
but are not complete or
are partially incorrect.
Summary of issue is
mostly accurate but
some aspects are
incorrect or confused;
nuances and critical
details are absent or
glossed over.
Some effects are
stated but are
incorrect.
Summary of
issue is partly
accurate and
many aspects are
incorrect or
confused;
nuances and
critical details
are absent or
glossed over.
There is no
explanation and
evaluation of the
policy
Does not attempt to
or fails to identify
and summarize the
problem accurately
Evaluation
Description
And Explanation
of the existing
policy
Problem Solving
Finds solutions
to difficult or
complex issues.
Actively seeks and
suggests solutions to
problems. Proposed
solutions is correctly
outlined
Actively seeks and
suggests solutions to
problems. Proposed
solution is slightly
flawed (when applying
economic concepts).
And/or
Does not offer and new
solution however,
Improves on previously
existing solutions
Solution offered
is extremely
flawed.
And/or
Does not try to offer
new solutions or
defend
existing/defense is
flawed.
Does not offer
new/improved
solutions, but
sufficiently
argues current
regulations are
sufficient
Writing
Well organized,
demonstrates logical
sequence and sentence
structure. Grammar,
spelling, and
punctuation are correct
(3 or fewer mistakes).
Well organized but
demonstrates illogical
sequencing or sentence
structure. Few grammar,
spelling, and punctuation
mistakes (6 or fewer
mistakes)
Well organized,
but
demonstrates
illogical
sequencing and
sentence
structure.
Several
grammar,
spelling, and
punctuation
mistakes (9 or
fewer mistakes)
Weakly/unorganized
Many grammar,
spelling, and
punctuation
mistakes (10 or
greater)
____________ Subtotal
____________ 2 point penalty for incomplete/incorrect/missing citations and references
____________ 2 point penalty per incomplete/late assignment (#GEA2 only)
____________ 5 point penalty if assignment does not meet length and formatting requirements but reasonable (10
point penalty if unreasonable)
____________ 5 point penalty for late submissions (additional 5 point deduction per 24 hours past due date/time)
____________ TOTAL out of 20 (multiply by 2 for #GEA2 – out of 40)
6/7/2018
How to stop fishermen fishing | The Economist
Fishing and rights
How to stop fishermen fishing
Of all the sea’s many problems, overfishing should be the most fixable. Here’s how
Feb 25th 2012
ACIDIFICATION, warming, the destruction of coral
reefs: the biggest problems facing the sea are as vast,
deep and seemingly intractable as the oceans themselves.
So long as the world fails to cut its emissions of
greenhouse gases, cause of the global warming behind
these troubles, they will grow. By comparison,
overfishing, another great curse, should be easier to put
right, especially in the coastal waters where most fishing
occurs. And yet it goes on, year after year.
Fishermen have every reason to do something. Many fisheries are hurtling towards collapse; stocks of
large fish have been reduced by up to 90%. When stocks are overfished, they yield a smaller catch. The
cost of mismanagement, in lost economic output, is huge: some $50 billion a year, according to the
World Bank.
One reason why the pillage continues is that knowledge of fish stocks is poor, especially in developing
countries. A new statistical attempt at estimating the remaining shoals (see article
(http://www.economist.com/node/21548212) ), from the University of California, Santa Barbara, is
therefore welcome—even if that is not true of its findings, that stocks are even more ravaged than
previously thought. The study found that better-understood fisheries are likelier to be healthy. Another
reason for overfishing is new technology (developed, aptly enough, for battlefields), which makes shoals
easier to detect. As large boats and refrigeration have spread, fishing fleets have covered greater
distances and hoovered up larger catches. Because technology lets fishermen fish with less effort, it
disguises just how fast the stocks are depleting.
Fishermen generally understand the risks of overfishing. Yet still they flout quotas, where they exist.
That is often because they take a short-term view of the asset—they would rather cash in now and invest
the money in something else. And it is invariably compounded by a commons-despoiling feeling that if
they don't plunder, others will.
https://www.economist.com/node/21548240/print
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6/7/2018
How to stop fishermen fishing | The Economist
In most fisheries, the fishermen would make more money by husbanding their resource, and it should
be possible to incentivise them to do so. The best way is to give them a defined, long-term right to a
share of the fish. In regulated industrial fisheries, as in Iceland, New Zealand and America, this has
taken the form of a tradable, individual share of a fishing quota. Developing countries, where law
enforcement is weak, seem to do better when a group right over an expanse of water is given to a cooperative or village fleet. The principle is the same: fishermen who feel like owners are more likely to
behave as responsible stewards. The new statistical study confirms that rights-based fisheries are
generally healthier.
The rights stuff
Yet only a few hundred of the oceans' thousands of fisheries are run this way, mainly because such
schemes are hard to get right. Limiting access to a common resource creates losers, and therefore
discord. Cultural differences affect success rates; not everyone is as law-abiding as Icelanders. Almost
everywhere it takes time to convince fishermen, the last hunter-gatherers, to change their habits. But,
barnacled by caveats though it may be, the rights-based approach is the best available.
In rich countries, satellite imagery will increasingly help, by making monitoring cheaper and better. In
many poor ones, devolution is making it easier to form local organisations. Another promising idea is to
incorporate rights-based fisheries with no-catch zones. These safeguard breeding-stocks and are easier
to monitor than individual catches. Where stocks are recovering, as a result of these reforms, fishermen
are likelier to see scientifically determined quotas as in their self-interest. In the end, that may be the
only hope.
This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition
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2/2
6/7/2018
Study: Program To Protect Fish Is Saving Fishermen's Lives, Too : The Salt : NPR
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Study: Program To Protect Fish Is Saving
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February 16, 2016 · 7:00 AM ET
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6/7/2018
Study: Program To Protect Fish Is Saving Fishermen's Lives, Too : The Salt : NPR
The captain and crew of the Moriah Lee pose with sablefish caught off the coast of Half Moon Bay, Calif. A new study found
that fishermen in the West Coast sablefishery were much less likely to engage in risky behavior — like sailing out in stormy
weather — after catch share quotas were implemented.
Courtesy of Ethan Righter
A program used in many U.S. fisheries to protect the marine environment and
maintain healthy fish populations may have an immensely important added benefit:
preserving the lives of American fishermen.
That's according to a new study published Monday in the Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences. Researchers found that catch share programs (where fishermen
are allotted a set quota of the catch) reduce some of the notoriously risky behavior
fishermen are known for, such as fishing in stormy weather, delaying vessel
maintenance, or heading out to sea in a boat laden with too much heavy fishing gear.
Traditional fishery-management programs open and close fishing seasons on specific
days. By contrast, catch shares work on a quota system, under which fishermen have a
longer window to harvest their predetermined share. That gives fishermen the luxury
(and perhaps the life-saving option) of time.
The findings don't surprise Scott Campbell Sr., who spent most of his 35-year career
fishing the Bering Sea for king crab the way it used to be done: derby-style. Crab
season would open, and regardless of weather, Campbell and his crew would be on the
water, hoping to nab enough crab during the season's brief window to keep his
business afloat.
Article continues after sponsorship
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6/7/2018
Study: Program To Protect Fish Is Saving Fishermen's Lives, Too : The Salt : NPR
"If you can picture a four-day season for crab — and that's the only four days you're
going to get — and a 50-knot storm blows in for 24 to 48 hours of that four days, well,
a lot of boats didn't stop fishing, because that was their only revenue stream for the
whole year," says Campbell. "It forced us to take unnecessary risks for financial
survival." (His son, Scott Campbell Jr., is a former star of Discovery Channel's
Deadliest Catch, about the hazards of the fishing industry.)
That kind of risk-taking has historically made fishing one of the nation's most
dangerous professions, with a fatality rate more than 30 times the U.S. average,
according to the new report.
Today there are approximately two dozen state and federal catch share programs in
the U.S. Most launched in the last decade. However, derby-style fishing still exists in
many U.S. regions, including the Pacific and Atlantic swordfish fisheries, the
Northeast's monkfish and herring fisheries, and the West Coast dungeness crab
fishery.
Plenty of studies have looked at the environmental benefits of catch share programs —
such as the reduction of bycatch, the ability to maximize the value of the catch, and
direct impacts on the way fisheries are managed. But what makes this paper
innovative is that it's looking at actual risk-taking data, says the study's author, Lisa
Pfeiffer, an economist at the Northwest Fisheries Science Center.
Pfeiffer examined the impact a catch share management program had on fishing safety
by looking at the particularly data-rich West Coast sablefish fishery.
In 1994, the fishery had a nine-day season and was managed with traditional
commercial fishing licenses. In 2001, it transitioned to a catch share management
system, with a set quota divided among fishermen and a season that now lasted seven
months. Pfeiffer crunched data pulled from fishing records with information from the
National Weather Service. She tracked high wind days — where fishermen would face
rough waves and stormy conditions. And she found that, under the catch share
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/02/16/466612148/study-program-to-protect-fish-is-saving-fishermens-lives-too
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6/7/2018
Study: Program To Protect Fish Is Saving Fishermen's Lives, Too : The Salt : NPR
program, fishermen were far more likely to keep their boats docked than risk their
lives at sea — fishing trips on high wind days dropped by 79 percent.
Tim Fitzgerald, director of impact at the Environmental Defense Fund (which
supports and promotes catch share programs), says that dramatic jump in safe fishing
behavior makes sense.
"Usually, catch share programs are implemented for environmental or economic
reasons. Safety is probably not the goal at the outset, but it's one of those things that
gets realized almost immediately, whether you're fishing in tropical waters like the
Gulf of Mexico or in the cold waters of Alaska," says Fitzgerald.
But can Pfeiffer's findings be applied broadly to the other 23 U.S. catch share
programs? If a catch share program replaces derby-style fishing seasons, then yes, she
says. But she warns that catch share programs may not reduce risk in fisheries where
derby-style fishing didn't previously exist.
Not everyone is convinced that catch share programs help all fishermen equally. Many
worry that these programs push small fishermen out of the market. That includes Niaz
Dorry, coordinating director for the Northwest Atlantic Marine Alliance, a fishermenled nonprofit that focuses on marine biodiversity.
She says fisheries that operate under catch share quotas "probably have [fewer]
incidents because there are fewer boats involved and fewer fishermen. When fleet
consolidation from catch shares happens, and you go from 200 smaller boats to five
large boats, you're going to have fewer deaths because you have fewer fishermen at
sea," Dorry says.
Indeed, the study did note a 30 percent reduction of the sablefish fishery's fleet size.
But Pfeiffer, the study's author, suggests that more boats in the water would have
buoyed the safety findings.
"If there's a change in the size of the vessels fishing, that could be a contributing
factor," she says, because larger ships may withstand stormy weather better. "But in
this case, the boats fishing for sablefish aren't the huge processing vessels you may
imagine. Here they have a two- or three-member crew on board," says Pfeiffer.
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/02/16/466612148/study-program-to-protect-fish-is-saving-fishermens-lives-too
4/8
6/7/2018
Study: Program To Protect Fish Is Saving Fishermen's Lives, Too : The Salt : NPR
But Dorry says that there are other ways to protect the lives of fishermen without
pushing small fishermen out of the market. She points to community supported
fishery programs, which create a ready-made market for what fishermen are able to
catch, regardless of weather.
"Finding markets that understand fishermen better gives them more control over
when they should go fishing and other means of staying safe at sea," she says.
Clare Leschin-Hoar is a journalist based in San Diego who covers food policy and
sustainability issues.
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Marine Policy 91 (2018) 49–57
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Marine Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
“Overarching sustainability objectives overcome incompatible directions in
the Common Fisheries Policy”
T
⁎
Leyre Goti-Araluceaa,b, , Mike Fitzpatrickc, Ralf Döringa, David Reidd, John Mumforde,
Anna Rindorff
a
Thünen Institute of Sea Fisheries, Palmaille 9, 22767 Hamburg, Germany
Department of Applied Economics I, University of the Basque Country, Faculty of Economics and Business, Lehendakari Agirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
c
Irish Observer Network Ltd, 3 Burton Place, Gardiners Hill, Cork, Ireland
d
Marine Institute, Rinville, Oranmore, Co.Galway, Ireland
e
Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College London, Silwood Park Campus, Ascot, Berkshire SL57PY, UK
f
Technical University of Denmark, DTU Aqua, Jægersborg allé 1, 2920 Charlottenlund, Denmark
b
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords:
Common Fisheries Policy
High level objective
Sustainability goal
Participatory method
EU fisheries management
Impact assessment
The lack of clarity in the objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) must be addressed to create a more
efficient balance across diverse ecological, economic and social dimensions. Particularly economic and social
objectives present at an overarching level must be made explicit and addressed in lower level management
measures, in order to link them to biological objectives and allow policy to build a balance across types of
objectives. Selecting clear objectives is essential, particularly for policy impact assessment. The aim of this paper
is to demonstrate how more specific high level objectives to managing fisheries can be derived from stakeholders. The paper first reviews the definition of objectives, from a historical and conceptual perspective.
Secondly, it discusses the issues of manageability and acceptability, and finally describes an articulation of the
high level objectives derived from extensive stakeholder consultations at European and regional level. The results from workshops at the European level to identify objectives were further examined at regional level for the
Baltic and North Seas in additional individual consultations. The German case addresses two seas (Baltic and
North Seas), has a complex governance structure (due to federalism) and significant roles for the three types of
actors (industry, government and environmental NGOs). The analysis suggests that establishing higher level
sustainability objectives within the CFP can help diverse interest groups to develop a consensus on management
actions to meet complex social goals.
1. Introduction
Article 2 of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) [1] contains a series
of overarching objectives. These tend to focus on core fisheries management issues, such as Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and the
Landing Obligation (LO), but also include very high level objectives for
sustainability in an ecological, economic and social context – the three
pillars of sustainability. Across the different framework regulations for
fisheries issued in Europe since 1983 the description of objectives has
changed from the conservation of fishing grounds to the restructuring
of the sector or the conservation of the resource, and in the same way
the scope of the policy has been modified to include fisheries, aquaculture and EU registered vessels fishing abroad.
Little prioritization between objectives can be discerned in the latest
policy, which includes all three aspects of sustainability. It ranges from
high level, and quite vague, objectives covering all three aspects, to
specific objectives, such as for coastal activities (Article 2.5i).
Prioritization has been demanded at the higher level, for example setting conservation over other goals and also creating a distinction between principles and technical implementation to avoid micro-management and a short term focus [2].
Clear objectives are critically important for the evaluation of the
impact and success of any proposed management measure [3,4]. This
includes the outcomes in terms of changes in the fishery and incentives
for that, changes in the ecosystem (for example, progress towards Good
Environmental Status (GES) under the MSFD [5]), and changes in the
social and economic indicators chosen to represent those two pillars.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how clear high level
⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: leyre.goti@thuenen.de (L. Goti-Aralucea), mike@irishobservernet.com (M. Fitzpatrick), ralf.doering@thuenen.de (R. Döring), David.Reid@Marine.ie (D. Reid),
j.mumford@imperial.ac.uk (J. Mumford), ar@aqua.dtu.dk (A. Rindorf).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2018.02.006
Received 5 October 2017; Received in revised form 5 February 2018; Accepted 6 February 2018
Available online 16 February 2018
0308-597X/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Marine Policy 91 (2018) 49–57
L. Goti-Aralucea et al.
Regarding social and economic aspects, Article 1.2 refers to human
health and “legitimate uses of the sea”. Another aim of the MSFD is to
coherently integrate environmental aspects into other policies affecting
the marine environment,1 most pertinently, the CFP, whose first objective is specified in the current regulation Article 2.1 [1] as “The CFP
shall ensure that fishing and aquaculture activities are environmentally
sustainable in the long-term and are managed in a way that is consistent with
the objectives of achieving economic, social and employment benefits, and of
contributing to the availability of food supplies”. Therefore, the objective
includes sustainability and the three pillars concept (environmental,
economic and social) in an explicit way.
The history of the CFP provides an alternative way to understand
how objectives have evolved. A framework regulation on the European
fisheries sector dates back to 1983, with successive reforms in 1992 and
2002. In the first framework regulation for fisheries [12] the first element of the statement of objectives was “the protection of fishing
grounds”, mirroring the discussion at the time over the sovereignty of
territorial waters.
In the second framework regulation in 1992 [13], the scope was
increased to include aquaculture, processing and marketing, as well as
to EU vessels operating beyond EU waters. The preamble of the regulation mentions the existence of new fishing opportunities and a need
to restructure the sector, increasing the complexity as new issues shift
the focus beyond the original objectives. The third framework regulation from 2002 [14] introduced the integrative concept of ecosystem
management. An analysis of the implementation of ecosystem based
management in the CFP can be found in [15].
The most recent reform process (completed in 2013) has also gone
through several stages of development, with a corresponding evolution
of objectives. The Green Paper on the reform of the CFP [2] mentions
the lack of prioritization of objectives in the previous regulations,
considering that the three types of objectives are compatible in the long
term, but not in the short term. At the same time, and in more practical
terms, the document highlights the fact that in the CFP both principles
and instruments to achieve them are decided at the same level (the
Council of Ministers), promoting inappropriate high level micro-management as issues that could be managed at a lower level need to go
through the Council of Ministers and in many cases also the European
Parliament.2 The communication from the European Commission on
the reform of the CFP from 2011 [16] includes a broad section on objectives, many of which can be categorized as social. In addition to a
first objective on improved status of the stocks, the other proposed
objectives include “a future for fisheries and aquaculture industry and
jobs”, “thriving coastal communities”, “satisfying the real needs of informed
consumers” and “better governance through regionalization”. A summary of
the evolution of the objectives in the different versions of the CFP is
given below (see Table 1).
The objectives of the CFP and MSFD cover most Member States and
regional differences, for example between the Baltic and Mediterranean
areas, are critically important for the discussion of objectives. The
context here includes the different economic, social and cultural importance of fishing for areas that are considered “most fishery dependent
regions”. There are also regional objectives outside of EU regulations
that affect fisheries, such as the environmental objectives in regional
organizations (such as the Helsinki Commission or the Barcelona
Convention) or economic and social objectives (such as in the Bergen
Statement of the OSPAR Commission). At a more local level there will
objectives [6] can be derived with stakeholders to effectively and efficiently manage fisheries across a range of sustainability criteria. The
paper addresses this first by reviewing the definition of sustainability
objectives, from a historical and conceptual perspective. Secondly, we
discuss the issues of manageability and uncertainty and finally describe
an articulation of the high level objectives derived from extensive stakeholder consultations at European, regional and local levels from two
research projects, as described in Marchal et al. [7] and Rindorf et al.
[8].
2. The problem of defining objectives
2.1. Sustainability objectives in context
The sustainability objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy cannot
be considered in isolation, as they exist under a wider suite of global
and European objectives. The most widely used definition of a sustainability objective promoted by the United Nations at a global level
was developed by the Brundtland Commission in 1987 [9], stating that
“sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.” This statement is completed by an emphasis on its two main
elements. The “needs”, with priority given to the needs of the poor,
representing a social objective, and the “limitations” imposed by the
need to maintain a healthy environment, representing an ecosystem
objective. With respect to fisheries, the United Nations Convention for
the Law of the Sea in its Article 61 states that conservation measures
should be designed to “maintain or restore populations of harvested species
at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by
relevant environmental and economic factors, including the economic needs
of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of developing
States”. This qualifies a primarily technical indicator (maximum sustainable yield, MSY) to include social, economic and ecological factors,
in a very similar fashion to Article 2.1 of the CFP. This demonstrates
how the objectives of conservation and social and economic development are tightly connected in international policies. Finally, Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) were also defined by the UN [10], and in
particular SDG 14 - Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and
marine resources for sustainable development. In terms of fisheries SDG
14 states: “By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing,
IUU and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at
least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by
their biological characteristics”, again focusing on MSY, but with a wider
scope. SDG 14 further states: “By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries
subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing” which can be
seen as a specific governance measure. SDG 14 also emphasizes social
and economic sustainability, especially for developing countries, but in
very general terms. The UN Conference to Support the Implementation
of Sustainable Development Goal 14 in New York, 2017, set out a “Draft
call for action” but without stating any specific objectives beyond those
from 2015.
At the European level, the fundamental aim of the European Union
is asserted in the Treaty of Lisbon where, in Article 2, it is formulated as
“to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”. The same
Article states sustainability as an aim of the internal market, detailing
aspects of economic growth, employment and social progress and, finally, protection and even improvement of the environment. Within the
European legislative framework fisheries are included under the same
section as agriculture, both using similar economic measures such as
subsidies and price support mechanisms, despite having objectives that
differ substantially [4]. Again, all three pillars of sustainability are represented, but without detail.
Further at the European level, the Marine Strategy Framework
Directive MSFD [5,11] refers to “enabling the sustainable use of marine
goods and services by present and future generations” (Article 1.3).
1
This is a slightly different approach than fulfilling the three pillars of sustainability
equally in every sector or activity. It hopefully gives clearer priorities as the MSFD defines
ecosystems with good environmental status as a necessary basis for every activity.
2
In the new CFP a co-decision process was introduced for certain decisions while in
some other cases regionalization is a priority. For some issues, like discard plans, Member
States in a certain region can agree on measures, which after approval by the EC clarifying
whether the proposals fulfill the requirements, go into force without a decision in Council
or Parliament (delegated acts).
50
Marine Policy 91 (2018) 49–57
L. Goti-Aralucea et al.
Table 1
Sustainability objectives in the CFP across time.
Definition of ecological, economic and social sustainability
objectives
Additional objectives
CFP version reference
“conservation of the biological resources […]in appropriate economic and
social conditions”
“protect […] living marine aquatic resources […] in appropriate economic and
social conditions for the sector”
“ensure exploitation of living aquatic resources that provides sustainable
economic, environmental and social conditions”
“environmentally sustainable in the long-term and […] consistent with the
objectives of achieving economic, social and employment benefits”
“the protection of fishing grounds”
(EEC) No 170/83 of 25 January
1983, Art.1
(EEC) No 3760/92 of 20
December 1992, Art.2
(EC) No 2371/2002 of 20
December 2002, Art.2
(EU) No 1380/2013 of 11
December 2013, Art. 2
“implications for the marine ecosystem”
“the needs of both producers and consumers”
“providing a fair standard of living for those who depend on fishing
activities and taking into account the interests of consumers.”
“ and of contributing to the availability of food supplies”
point [23]).
The pillar of economic sustainability is often not a high priority in
conventional fisheries management. But economic factors can still act
as a clear limit or constraint that needs to be given some consideration
even in what appears, at first glance, to be a simple conservation issue
(e.g. [24]). Fisheries are an economic activity and there may be market
constraints that make fishing economically difficult or impossible under
some conservation measures. The price and availability of fish, together
with the dependence on the processing industry as the main market, are
issues that may bring economic sustainability to the forefront. This was
the case for the closure of the anchovy fishery in the Bay of Biscay in
2005. Most of the catch was used in the processing industry and the
closure of the fishery created the risk that the processing industry
would look for another source of supply [25]. Fishers may thus prefer to
reduce their catches to a minimum TAC for a faster re-opening of the
fishery so that they can more effectively serve the needs of the processing industry [25]. They may also introduce individual daily limits
to influence prices [26]. In this way the market (the processing industry
in this case) may set the speed of the stock recovery. Therefore, a
temporal and a sectoral scale are used to emphasize the economic pillar.
Finally, social objectives could also alter the equilibrium of the
three pillars model. A possible social objective might be ensuring the
survival of local fish processing firms. A good, if negative, example of
this was the gradual disappearance of the filleting industry on the
German Baltic Sea coast since the 1990s [27]. Only one firm now remains, and the catches of herring are generally trucked to other countries due to the lack of processing capacity. Fishing cooperatives in such
areas can employ in fishing and processing in a ratio of 4:3. This added
social value to the local community is lost when most of the catch is
exported [27]. Demographic factors may be a clear limiting factor in
certain fisheries, especially where fishing is a part-time occupation. In
these cases, a closure in certain fisheries breaks the income stability of a
community, causing emigration of the young and loss of training of
local fishermen [28]. The breakdown of social sustainability can thus
have irreversible consequences, which may make it worthwhile to reconsider alternative management targets when dealing with the biological pillar. In general, however, social objectives are not strongly
emphasized in fisheries management [29] and yet, understanding of
social and economic dimensions can impact on the success or failure of
a simple conservation policy [30].
be regional and sub-regional differences in the importance of small
scale coastal fisheries, in attitudes of those fishing, and in Member State
choices of GES indicators and targets. More specifically, some multiannual management plans include similar, but not identical, objectives
to the high level aims in the CFP. For example, the management plan
for Baltic cod mentions social and economic incentives only implicitly
by stating that sustainability will be attained by “gradually reducing and
maintaining fishing mortality rates” [17], thus allowing industry to adapt
and plan in the longer term.
2.2. Priorities between the three pillars of sustainability
The three pillars of sustainability were introduced in the 2002
Johannesburg Declaration [18] “the interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development - economic development, social
development and environmental protection - at the local, national, regional
and global levels”. The interdependence of those pillars is clear, but with
regard to fisheries objectives, it is less clear that these have equal
priority or importance.
The assumption of three equal pillars is that no priority exists between them and the text avoids explicit statements about that balance
[19]. However, some approaches to objective prioritization have been
carried out [6,20,21]. In the case of fisheries objectives, there can be
different levels of importance attached to each of the pillars, either due
to specific social values or due to practical constraints. We detail examples of this below.
The pillar of ecological sustainability in some cases constitute a
clear priority in fisheries management. In the Green Paper on the CFP
Reform [2], it states “Ecological sustainability is therefore a basic premise
for the economic and social future of European fisheries”, which implies a
long time horizon, long enough for ecological feedback processes.
Conservation of stocks, while a clear ecological objective, is also important for a sustainable industry, and hence has both economic and
indeed social connotations, suggesting a sequential priority between
pillars. The stock conservation advice is provided by the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), dating from 1902. This
advice is further refined by the EC Scientific, Technical and Economic
Committee for Fisheries (STECF), which may add an economic context.
STECF was not founded until 2002, again suggesting the evolving importance of the economic pillar catching up with the ecological pillar.
Further, there are particular situations where there is a clear asymmetry
towards conservation objectives, such as where stocks are managed
under an explicit recovery plan. An example of a recovery plan is that
for the stock of Irish Sea cod [22], among many other European stocks.
In these cases, the ecological pillar is given priority, but again, with
expected benefits under the other two pillars. The Green Paper formulates it as “the economic and social viability of fisheries can only result
from restoring the productivity of fish stocks”. Sometimes this asymmetry
is incorporated into harvest control rules, as for example in the Baltic
Sea long term management plan for cod, where higher restrictions in
fishing mortality are foreseen in cases of particular danger for the stock
(when stock spawning biomass is below the stock specific reference
3. Managing fisheries to meet the overarching principles of the
CFP
3.1. The problem: Manageable and acceptable objectives
A common description for a good objective in management is expressed by the acronym SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable,
Relevant and Time-bound [31,32]. However, in the case of fisheries this
may not be so simple to achieve. Fisheries management is largely based
on objectives for stock biomass (B) achieved by controlling fishing
mortality (F). So, while an objective can be specific, for example, to
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recordings from onboard cameras. Finally, while the enforcement of the
management system is already very expensive, it is still considered
insufficient [2,4,34].
The Marine Strategy Framework Directive is an example of a related
policy that is more recent than the original CFP and is more management-oriented. It incorporates many of the elements described above.
The directive uses the DPSIR (Driver, Pressure, State, Impact, Response)
framework and sets a series of descriptors with associated indicators,
where particular values can be considered as objectives [5]. In this way
the objectives are intrinsically linked to the management measures, as
they have been designed based on those criteria. The CFP, on the other
hand, tends to describe objectives that lack manageability. For example,
the CFP suggests that “Measures are needed to reduce the current high
levels of unwanted catches and to gradually eliminate discards”. But despite
the specificity of the discard policy in some respects, other components
are not clearly prescribed and remain difficult to manage. For example,
how to proceed with choke species (those whose quota is exhausted
already when there is still quota for other species that are caught together), what to do with the landed fish that are not allowed to be used
for human consumption (from storage in port to allowed options for use
of the fish), or how to determine the survival rate of discarded fish in
order to benefit from an exception to the obligation to land. Such an
objective is likely to be very difficult to manage, or needs further
careful specification in order to be manageable [35,36].
In addition to being manageable, the objectives of the CFP need to
be acceptable to fishers simply because the cost in terms of compliance
of not being so is too high. If an objective, and the measures adopted to
achieve it, lack acceptability, legitimacy and credibility, it is highly
unlikely there will be full compliance. Lack of compliance will lead to
conflict between fishers and managers and indeed between different
groups of fishers who view the measures as more or less acceptable
[37–39]. On one side, there is the cost of conflict, with cases such as the
strikes in the brown shrimp fishery in Germany due to low product
prices in 2011 or the blocking of the port of La Rochelle in France in
2008 due to high fuel costs. On the other, there are the particularly high
costs of enforcement, due to the complexity of surveillance of many
vessels, across wide areas and throughout the year. Participation (in the
objective setting and measures process) has been reported to improve
compliance [40,41]. Nevertheless, there are critics of the value of
participation in improving social outcomes of fisheries management,
based on its potential to allow powerful vested interest to further entrench inequality in management regimes [42].
Overall, manageability and acceptability are two clear requisites for
objectives when dealing specifically with fisheries management.
Manageability is necessary, given the perspective of fishing as an economic activity dealing with a highly variable resource and with an already over-complex fisheries management system. Acceptability is also
a requirement, as this should lead to better compliance and a reduced
control and enforcement burden. Manageability should thus be taken
into account when designing management actions to meet objectives
and acceptability, to have those management actions successfully implemented.
recover a stock to a given biomass, a measure to achieve the objective
may not be. This would be most obvious in mixed fisheries where a
measure specific to one species, say reduce F, could also impact on
many other species via food web interactions, but also fishing opportunities where fish are caught together. Equally, while we can estimate
fish stocks, monitoring them is more difficult, and often lags by one or
more years behind the current situation in the ocean. Whether an objective is achievable depends on many factors in addition to fisheries
management, most obviously those factors that affect recruitment. Even
the best management is ineffective in the face of a persistent stock recruitment failure, such as that of North Sea herring in the early 2000s
[33]. F and biomass (B) objectives can probably always be seen as relevant, as B is the ecologically relevant objective and F is relevant for
economic and social dimensions. F may also affect other species
through ecological interaction with the target species. Finally, it is very
difficult to have time bound objectives in a complex ecosystem where
many factors interact to drive fish abundance over different time scales.
As an example, the target of the Johannesburg Summit, which set 2015
as a time limit for reaching MSY, was already postponed by the Green
Paper of the CFP to 2020 to allow more time to develop management.
While recognizing the value of SMART objectives, we would suggest
evaluating the objectives for the Common Fisheries Policy in terms of
two key characteristics: manageability and acceptability. Policy objectives clearly need to be manageable. However, there will be complex
environmental, ecosystem, technical, geographical and cultural factors
that make manageability in fisheries a complex issue. An additional
difficulty is the existence of elements outside human control, illustrated
by the use of biomass as an objective. Biomass is something that cannot
be tightly controlled by management due to the diverse array of uncontrolled natural environmental and ecosystem factors that interact,
so management needs to be adaptable and resilient. Objectives of
fisheries management regulations have consequently moved from
highly dynamic and hard to measure biomass objectives (e.g. the Bay of
Biscay plaice long term management plan) to fishing mortality targets
(e.g. the Baltic Sea cod long term management plan), a variable that can
be directly influenced by management. This is not the only source of
complexity of fisheries that makes manageability a key issue. Fisheries
regulations need to devise mechanisms to manage a wide array of
fishing techniques, from artisanal gillnets to the latest satellite technology used by high sea trawlers. Geography is an issue when we
consider the different areas where European fisheries occur, and the
implications of spatial issues and climate, for example for seasonal or
area closures. Finally, setting up the needed governance mechanisms is
a challenge when we consider the cultural diversity of the EU, which
also faces different time horizons from international framework policies, the activity of a commercial sector or the life of a fishing community. A set of objectives needs to consider these factors, at least at a
later stage of development, if it is to be manageable.
Management of fisheries comprises four basic stages; policy design,
implementation, monitoring and enforcement. All of these phases present challenges that should be foreseen when drafting the objective of
the policy. First, in the design phase, information is needed, in at least
the three basic aspects of biological, economic and social data. None of
these data will be simple to obtain. As an example, economic data for
fishing firms or individual fishers is not readily available, as there are
confidentiality issues in many fleets, an informal economy in subsistence sectors with low data availability and in general a fear of
control that often creates an incentive to misreport. Second, in the
implementation phase there are elements that create costs both to the
management and to the fishers, and this can create negative incentives
towards these objectives. Examples include changes in mesh size, which
for the fishers means buying new nets, or the setup of a license system,
which entails administrative costs for the management authority involved. Thirdly, monitoring progress towards the objectives is costly,
from creating and using Vessel Monitoring Systems VMS (both for the
vessel owners and for the management authority) to analyzing the vast
3.2. Management under lack of clear objectives
The above discussion illustrates the need for careful consideration in
the setting of objectives, and in the measures taken to achieve them.
One further critical factor that should be considered is the lack of clarity
in the objectives themselves, and hence in the information needed to
evaluate them.
The problem of the definition of objectives in an uncertain world
has been identified in the literature [2,43] and defining management
objectives is one of the key challenges. To improve the clarity on what
constitutes an objective we approach the definition by considering the
social objective that we want to achieve (such as in the social utility
function) as conceptually separated from restrictions (the “resource
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Another source of confusion when setting the objectives for fisheries
management, would be limited knowledge about the real needs of
consumers and citizens. On a lower level in the hierarchy of objectives,
the available options for management would also be a source of confusion. Meeting the needs of consumers is limited in fisheries policy to
one part of the supply chain of fish as a product. For example, the idea
that discards need to be minimized or eliminated to achieve stock
conservation ignores the fact that more is lost in the distribution and
processing of the fish than is discarded; approximately 9% of catch is
discarded compared to approximately 13% wasted in distribution and
processing [50]. To be consistent with an aim to protect the stock, a
proportionate emphasis should be given to avoiding the removal of
wasted fish from the sea.
Another issue arises with consumption, where increasing consumption of fish is not differentiated from social well-being, considering both real needs for overall food consumption (see for example,
[51]) and for a balance in the diet (as has been done with meat, see
[52]). Therefore, setting the objective at the level of satisfying human
needs fosters a more global view that can reduce fish demand in a
greater proportion, by considering the whole food supply and consumption cycle. When considering this, avoiding discards is no longer a
high level objective but just a part of a larger objective. In addition to
this, limitations of knowledge often constrain management actions
where the different levels of targets are more aligned. An example of
this would be management measures that foster synergies between
objectives, for example practices that improve both production and
good environmental effects. Examples for fisheries would include some
forms of results based management [53]. In a field where so many
external uncertainties exist, aligning economic and conservation outcomes is a way to work towards higher level objectives. Hence, a proposal could be to assign fishing rights to fleets that are more sustainable
as suggested by environmental NGOs and small scale fisheries associations [54] and to relate fishing rights concessions to compliance
[55]. The gradual and adaptive learning process that occurs during
participatory management and research allows time to tackle questions
as the in depth definition of objectives, the time horizons required for
their achievement and at the same time opens a wider array of management options.
constraint”). Objective definitions of the social utility function that fall
into this conceptual characterization are sustainable development as in
the Brundtland Report (meet the needs of the people) and the overarching objective in the Lisbon Treaty (promote peace and well-being).
The study of well-being (for instance [44]) has recently been developed
in economics and other social sciences, where it is well known that
money has a decreasing influence on feelings of “well-being” above a
certain level of income. So the capacity of individuals to work to
achieve their goals by their own effort is key to well-being. This provides a guide to why the Brundtland wording of “without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” is quite appropriate. This type of objective was also found in the documents of the
CFP reform [16] as “take into account the interests of both consumers and
producers” or “projecting the principles of the CFP internationally”. As to
the restrictions, those suggested in Section 3.1 above, present circumstances under which social, economic and biological factors can be
limiting. Higher level restrictions are not normally considered in fisheries, but an example of such conceptual restrictions can be found in the
idea of planet boundaries [45], which are a minimum threshold to keep
the biophysical characteristics of the planet, such as marine biodiversity
or the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles.
There is also a confusion between intermediate and final objectives
making it unclear what needs to be achieved within particular time
frames. In the general hierarchy of objectives of society there is welfare
as a very high goal, and the objective of fisheries policy is not to fish, to
keep the ecosystem healthy or to provide employment, these become all
subordinate objectives or tools to achieve the higher objective of welfare. The difference can be seen, for example, inside the hierarchy of
objectives of fisheries policy, when a technical innovation is used to
catch more fish in an overfished stock or to improve the working
conditions of fishers using a sustainable gear. This distinction is also
important because in the last CFP reform discussion there was a tendency to define objectives as the avoidance of a problem, for example to
decrease impact on the ecosystem or to reduce overcapacity. These are
not objectives per se, but results, either of fishing or of the management
process itself, which we then seek to restore by setting these objectives.
Effort and resources may also be wasted due to an inappropriate conceptualization of an objective. Overall, the building of a structure
composed of clear objectives, from higher goals to management
strategy and control measures and further to their incorporation to
regulations is key to success [33]. Therefore, once objectives are clear,
we need to look at other knowledge limitations, mainly those related to
lack of knowledge about the future and the ecosystem and future socioeconomic mechanisms, as for example economic crises (e.g.[46]).
From there, it should be possible to try to derive the complementarities
between objectives that could be useful for assessing hypotheses, as will
be shown in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 below.
For the lack of clarity in the time horizon of objectives, there are
two main issues, one internal and one external. For internal issues the
need to consider time comes from the manageability of objectives: the
inherent complexity of resource management systems that, in order to
avoid harmful generalizations in management design need a longer
period of time for an analysis and learning process [47]. Another cause
of this internal need to consider time comes from management implementation. Co-management, defined from a scientific point of view,
is a process that requires knowledge acquisition and, as such, is progressive [42] and requires a longer time horizon than other ways of
meeting objectives. For external issues the need to consider time comes
from the longer time horizons of stock and ecosystem functions themselves, and in a similar way to addressing the likely impacts of climate
change, it requires a sequential planning of objectives. As new aspects
like ecosystem interactions and new modelling capabilities [48] are
being incorporated into management, the target for management may
need to be more adaptive. Following Lind [49] the question might be
“what should we be doing over the next ten years to position ourselves to act
on new information and new technological developments?”.
4. Lessons from participatory research
It is the role of scientists to evaluate how well management measures meet objectives with the best scientific and social knowledge
available. For this there is a need to design an effective analytical framework, which includes not only appropriate models but also consideration of wider hypotheses about the relevant scenarios, states of
the world and management options.
4.1. Participatory definition of management objectives in research projects
Investigating the socioeconomic effects of the current Common
Fisheries Policy requires targets against which the effects of the policy
can be assessed, including the identification of high level policy objectives. The focus in the SOCIOEC project was on objectives that can be
dealt with through the use of management measures and which are
relevant to stakeholders.
To derive the high level objectives the project team used the results
of a combined workshop with the MYFISH EU research project held at
Vigo, Spain, in 2012 and several interviews (see Section 4.2 below) to
test the applicability of the objectives in a regional context. The
workshop gathered representatives from different stakeholder groups,
geographic regions and potential objective sets [56] and proceeded to
identify objectives and prioritise them. These inputs from stakeholders
were analysed to produce a narrower set of objectives that could be
used in the SOCIOEC project to study the impact of fisheries management measures under the CFP [56]. The results from this process of
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Table 2
High level objectives for fisheries management developed from the combined SOCIOEC-MYFISH workshop.
Sustainability pillar
Population level
Short/ long term
High level objective
Ecological
Ecological
Ecological
Ecological
Economic
Economic
Economic
Social
Social
Social
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Firm/Individual
Society
Society
Individual
Long term
Long term
Long term
Long term
Long term
Short term
Short term
Long term
Long term
Long term
Maximize yield in tonnes of commercial species
Gradually eliminate discards on a case-by-case basis
Minimizing bycatch of vulnerable and protected species
Minimizing negative impact on seabed habitats
Maximization/optimization of present value
Maximization/optimization of gross value added (or rent)
Maximization of profits (within ecological and social constraints)
Ensure viable coastal communities
Improve policy and decision making through improved inclusive governance structures
Ensure fair living standard, improved working and security conditions on board of fishing vessels
measures to protect seabirds and harbour porpoises across the DanishGerman border. In the German Baltic coast gillnets are seen as harmful
for harbour porpoises and seabirds and therefore suffer restrictions,
whereas in the close by Danish coast gillnets are seen as sustainable and
harmless and they are not restricted due to bycatch of those species.
This is also influenced by the different objectives of environmental
NGOs in both countries [60]. An economically efficient way to achieve
this objective would be to promote sustainable seasonal consumption of
regional fish to foster ecological values, such as avoiding certain fish
consumption in some periods to allow for undisturbed seasonal presence of seabirds. Finally, the fishing activities that have low seabed
impact could be encouraged through targeted management measures
based on detailed knowledge of fishing operations, including high definition spatial and temporal data on gear operation, as well as through
support for operational (like real-time feedback mechanisms) and
technical innovation (which also supports the auxiliary industries
through the development of new types of more sustainable gear).
There are also management measures that meet economic objectives
as well as ecological and social sustainability objectives. To increase the
net present value of fisheries aspects such as food quality, leisure value
(fisheries attractive to tourism [61]), and environmental values (programmes such as “fish for litter” or scientific cooperation) should be
promoted. This can be done by identifying the fleet segments that have
significant contributions to these values and taking them into account
when proposing closures or quota or effort restrictions. Profits can be
enhanced through the promotion of higher value through certification,
regional product status, higher quality fish through optimized operations and technological improvements. Ecological sustainability is
therefore indirectly improved by measures that avoid higher catches,
with an objective that lies at a higher level than, for example, overcapacity reduction.
In a shorter term perspective, maximization of gross value added
(GVA) could be pursued through cost reduction, as well as through
policies that optimize employment according to fair living standards
and improved working and security conditions on board. This has
special importance when referring to international fisheries (see Section
4.2 below). At the firm level, improvement of profits subject to ecological and social constraints is encouraged through the reduction of inefficiency costs (as fuel costs of gear operation, vessel steaming to and
from fishing areas and final product transportation). A cost benefit
approach that reduces negative externalities by minimizing fuel use
could reduce societal expenditure in the current implicit subsidy (as tax
exemption [4]) for fuel. To maximize long term net present value in a
cost benefit approach the reduction of fuel use would not only reduce
subsidies, but also minimize the environmental cost in CO2 from the
catch sector and from the transport sector from imported fish.
Some management measures may meet both the high level social
sustainability objectives and ecological sustainability goals, despite
often being blamed for not meeting one of them. For example, measures
to soften TAC reductions to keep local employment have been blamed
for jeopardizing stock recovery [2]. To contribute to the viability of
identification of objectives are shown below (Table 2).
As with any objective in fisheries, the chosen examples (see Table 2
below) present challenges when defining associated indicators. To
achieve MSY it is judged more convenient to set fishing mortality as a
management target instead of stock biomass, as, in contrast to fishing
mortality, the stock level is driven by many factors outside the control
of management. Target species discard as well as bycatch still present
challenges with respect to reliable data collection, while the impact on
bottom habitat requires a combined indicator that maps fishing effort
(including gear and size) to habitat types through empirical and modelled relationships. The economic objectives also present challenges,
such as showing the difference between societal and company interests,
or including externalized costs in the net present value to be optimized
for the whole society. Finally, the social objectives require the collection of composite indicators (employment and opportunities, hours at
work and number of accidents, etc.) and an evaluation of not only the
presence or absence of co-management processes, but also their inclusiveness.
More relevant with respect to the management of fisheries policy
objectives is the study of how objectives influence each other, in order
to avoid unintended effects due to policy [47]. A practical way to do
this is to identify management measures for each objective that are
compatible (at least partially) with the other objectives. There might be
a negative effect from some measures on some objectives and this
should be clearly shown [57]. Ideally the partial or complete fulfillment
of other objectives would be reinforced, or the effect should be neutral.
Examples of how objectives are compatible within various management
measures are given below.
A first example would be to move towards MSY in a socially
proactive way by promoting (through quota or marketing incentives)
the fishing gears that have a catch composition appropriate to a relevant multispecies MSY. This may imply social decisions, like deciding
on trade-offs between species: consume more cod or more pelagic
species [58,59]. Another socially and economically compatible measure
to implement this objective would be to promote responsible consumption patterns, regarding for example the minimization of fish
waste across the supply chain [50] to raise awareness on excess catch.
The elimination of discards can also be promoted by fostering fishing
techniques that have sustainable catch composition, to then promote
the marketing of those less valued discard species [50] either as standard or sub-standard products.
The reduction of bycatch is compatible with using socially acceptable management measures specific to each case, as short temporary
closures that enable the fishers to have other sources of rent and
therefore allow for viable coastal communities [28]. Another way to
improve management measures to reach the bycatch objective is to
benchmark different management measures employed in nearby areas,
and reach an agreement to implement similar measures regionally. This
can prevent potential problems of social acceptance due to a perception
of unfairness when implementing different measures in close by areas
that share a bycatch problem. An example of this is the different
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actors (industry, governments and environmental NGOs).
For the ecological sustainability objectives there was agreement on
MSY as a high level objective, with the exception of an environmental
organization representative that expressed the need to consider a higher
biomass value to provide an additional buffer for ecosystem and climate
change effects. The issue of manageability came across in a very clear
manner in a statement by a producer representative who said: “I want
the objective, but I think it is not achievable”. An environmental representative also related objectives to the means to achieve them by
saying “When this is the objective, but the capacity to reach it is not given,
then it is a political error”. Additionally, other high level objectives in
relation to ecological sustainability included the reduction of ghost nets
(nets lost by fishing boats [66]) and the consideration of fuel consumption per unit of fish, which bring a wider perspective (ecosystems
and economic efficiency) that can be better grasped by many actors.
These measures could make different objectives compatible, as seen in
the previous Section 4.1, but note the fact that, as many objective delivered by policy makers and stakeholders, they imply defining a
“consequence” of the fishing activity (losing nets or consuming fuel) as
an “objective”.
Economic sustainability was judged by at least one representative of
each group to be closely connected to the other types of objectives. A
fisheries manager related it to regional development and jobs (objective
of viable coastal communities) and with the carbon footprint of the
fishing industry (ecological sustainability). The importance of fishing as
an activity despite its environmental effects was also highlighted by an
NGO representative: “The question is where they fish, how and how much.
This must be regulated, but it does not mean to say that there should not be
any fisheries”. A fisheries manager suggested that a more targeted approach through the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF, an
EU structural fund promoting sustainability and employment in fisheries) would strengthen both economic and social sustainability of the
CFP.
Finally, the discussion on social sustainability objectives of fisheries
also produced some ideas that simultaneously support (or do not
hinder) other sustainability objectives. A producer representative proposed that management use cooperation and search for shared incentives instead of fines, while a fisheries manager suggested making
regulations compatible with other regulations. These approaches could
improve policy making and governance structures without necessarily
reducing profitability or stocks, by incorporating more than one pillar
in a single objective and through gains in efficiency of implementation.
Education of both fish producers (on sustainability) and consumers (on
effects of the whole fish supply chain) were also suggested by a representative of an environmental NGO to achieve high level objectives
such as reducing discards.
A summary of useful inputs to the manageability of the objectives
and the synergy between objectives can be found in the following quote
from an environmental NGO representative, who pleaded to ensure that
“the fisher that goes fishing every day, is sustainable and works for the region, is the one that receives most advantage from the CFP”. This outlook
offers a useful cue to the application of Article 17 of the CFP. In relation
to the allocation of quotas, it calls for “transparent and objective criteria”
which may include “the impact of fishing on the environment, the history of
compliance, the contribution to the local economy”, in addition to historic
catch levels. Without specifically asking for it, all stakeholders came up
with relationships between the objectives presented, as well as other
objectives at a higher conceptual level (such as ecosystem effects or
supply chain aspects). This shows how clear it is that objectives of
fisheries management should not be considered in isolation, and that
high level perspectives can help to bring both consensus and practical
inputs for policy.
coastal communities there should be an evaluation prior to any management measure of the total economic value of sustainable fisheries, to
avoid spatial developments that reduce the net value creation in a
community [61]. Monitoring potential problems with succession of
fishers [28], building realistic mid-term expectations for the return to
fishing activity and investigating of alternative sources of income
[27,62] through longer term policy coordination should also be incorporated into policy design, especially during fishery closures and
adaptation periods.
To improve policy and decision making processes it is important to
identify the governance level at which the objectives above can be more
effectively implemented, referring to location of resources, including
knowledge, and incentives for action [63,64]. To promote fair living
standards and improved working and safety conditions on board it is
necessary to study the social impact of combined management measures at the stage of design, for example in cases where combined effort
and quota limits drive fishers in small-scale fisheries to fish in bad
weather conditions. Social objectives are also important, for example
during fishery closures or gear bans, where policy coordination with
other non-fishery policies becomes especially relevant. Finally, a current issue is to monitor living conditions of non-EU workers in EU
vessels, especially outside EU waters through international agreements.
Ecological and economic sustainability goals could also be met in accordance with social objectives if special attention would be paid to the
whole fish supply chain. This would include living standards related to
the provision of imported fish products as in life cycle analysis for the
full environmental and economic impacts of manufacturing processes.
Relating to the lack of clarity in models brought about by the existence of intermediate (even implicit) and final objectives, further
workshops and modelling exercises in the MYFISH project show a clear
example. The decision support tables resulting from the project within
the example of the North Sea [56] maximized the fleet catches or their
revenue from fishing. Referring to the catch maximization, a step following the approach described in our study would entail the analysis of
food security objectives in the area of origin and of consumption of the
catches [65]. Beyond enhancement of revenues, the overarching objectives approach would imply considering the fair conditions of work
in the area of origin of the catches including outside the EU as a
minimum constraint (as in the social utility function objective of
“projecting the principles of the CFP internationally”) or tackling the distributional aspects of optimized revenue from catches beyond distribution between fleet segments (e.g. inside the affected fishing community, through social capital that allows for participation and
succession in the industry for future generations, see [41]). Kempf et al.
[56] also show the distinction between objectives (e.g. promoting inclusive governance) and restrictions (e.g. respecting good environmental status according to the MSFD) as already assumed in our study.
These perspectives on the definition of objectives open new options for
the design of indicators and modelling approaches, and would make the
management conceptually more coherent.
4.2. Adapting overarching objectives to regional context: A case study
The SOCIOEC project involved stakeholders in several different
ways, from analyzing incentives in management measures to feedback
on impact of measures to the participants who suggested them.
Stakeholders were consulted on both high level objectives and their
implications at regional level, giving them a unique opportunity to
participate in a research exercise. This work on high level objectives
includes both group consultation (as presented in Section 4.1 above)
and also additional individual consultation by means of semi-structured
interviews. Five semi-structured interviews were performed, with two
fishing sector representatives, two environmental NGOs and one fisheries manager. The case of Germany was found to be useful because it
includes two seas (Baltic and North Seas), it has a complex governance
structure (due to federalism) and has a significant roles of three types of
5. Conclusion
Working on policy objectives at a high level and observing the
55
Marine Policy 91 (2018) 49–57
L. Goti-Aralucea et al.
hierarchy among objectives both from a research perspective allows the
perception of synergistic effects that may get lost when looking only at
subordinate objectives. These effects are fundamental, given the ineffectiveness of the existing complex regulatory and micro-management
approach, especially when facing the current poor state of some fishing
communities and stocks.
Nevertheless, manageability and acceptability must be kept in mind
when considering high level objectives in fisheries. Manageability is a
prerequisite if the objectives are to be met, given the complexity of
fisheries in the EU. Otherwise they will only be a paragraph in a regulation. On the other hand acceptability is a key factor for compliance,
if the management actions are to be successfully implemented. The
results of the workshop and interviews show objectives to which stakeholders can agree, indicating the acceptability of management measures in the CFP.
The approach presented here is useful because it allows the analysis
of objectives in relative terms with respect to the time perspective over
which risks occur. Issues such as the scale at which an objective is to be
reached or the relative risk of disappearance (in terms of urgency of
action) of a particular species, specific fishing community, ecosystem or
industry, should be incorporated into the policy design discussion. The
extension of the objectives to food security [65,67], ecosystems [68]
and community livelihoods would imply more coordination between
policies outside the fisheries area (including international relations and
regional development in the EU) and a more adaptive approach to take
advantage of bottom up participatory arrangements, e.g. those started
from fishing communities. As discussed by Kempf et al. [56], “inclusive
governance can be seen as an essential part of fisheries management because
of the need for a balanced and stable outcome on all three dimensions of
sustainability – ecological, economic and social”. The policy design process
would benefit from a deeper conceptual analysis of objectives, and this
study shows not only how this conceptual analysis is useful for the
design of management measures, but also how certain processes of
participation from stakeholders can contribute to deliver more coherent, manageable and acceptable fisheries management.
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Acknowledgements
The research leading to these results has received funding from the
European Community´s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/20072013) under grant agreement no 289192 (SOCIOEC) and grant agreement no 289257 (MYFISH). This publication reflects the views only of
the authors, and the European Union cannot be held responsible for any
use which may be made of the information contained therein.
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