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[G.R. Nos. L-33037-42. August 17, 1983.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellant, vs. DEMETRIO JARDIN, accused-

appellee.

The Solicitor-General for plaintiff-appellant.

Marcos C. Lucero, Jr. for accused-appellee.

D E C I S I O N

GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

Two constitutional rights — speedy trial and

freedom from double jeopardy — are

interposed as defenses by the accused in this

petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioner asks us to review and annul the

orders of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,

Branch V, which dismissed the criminal cases

against accused Demetrio Jardin because his

constitutional right to speedy trial was allegedly

violated.

The criminal prosecutions originated from a

letter-complaint of the Provincial Auditor of

Quezon requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file

the necessary criminal action under Article 217

of the Revised Penal Code against Demetrio

Jardin for malversation of public funds thru

falsification of public documents on six counts.

LLjur

The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal

Meliton V. Angeles who set them for

preliminary investigation. The accused moved

to postpone the preliminary investigation twice.

On the third time that the investigation was re-

set, the accused and his counsel failed to

appear.

On the fourth resetting, the accused and his

counsel again failed to appear. Inspite of their

absence, the preliminary investigation was

conducted and shortly afterwards, six

informations were filed against the accused

before the Court of First Instance of Quezon,

Branch II, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.

16052 (0043-M), 16053 (0044-M), 16054 (0045-

M), 16055 (0046-M), 16056 (0047-M), and

16057 (0048-M). The arraignment was set for

May 9, 1967.

The records show that from May 9, 1967, the

arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set

for June 26; then from August 16, the same was

re-set for September 5, all because of the

motions for postponement filed at the instance

of the accused. (Original records [0043-M] pp.

54, 61, 66 and 69).

When the arraignment of the accused was

called on September 5, 1967, counsel for the

accused verbally moved for reinvestigation on

the ground that the accused was not given the

opportunity to present his defense during the

preliminary investigation. This was granted by

the court and the first reinvestigation was set

on November 24, 1967. On this date, however,

the Investigating Fiscal motu proprio postponed

said reinvestigation due to the non-appearance

of accused and his counsel and re-set the date

for December 21, 1967. LLpr

A series of postponements was again filed by

the accused causing further delays of the

reinvestigation. On June 27, 1968, accused and

his counsel appeared together but requested

for a period of fifteen (15) days within which to

file a memorandum.

In view of the expiration of the 15-day period,

the Investigating Fiscal filed a manifestation

before the court that the records of these cases

be returned and the trial on the merits of the

same be set.

The court without acting on said manifestation,

issued an order transferring the six (6) cases to

the new branch (Branch V) of the Court of First

Instance at Mauban, Quezon. Upon receipt by

the latter of the records of these cases, the

arraignment and trial were set for December 3,

1968.

On the latter date, the counsel for the accused

sought again the postponement of the

arraignment and this was followed by more

postponements, all at the instance of the

accused. (Original records, [0043-M], pp. 90, 93,

120 and 125).

On March 31, 1969, counsel for the accused

moved for the postponement of the

arraignment and requested the court that the

records be returned again to the Office of the

Fiscal for further reinvestigation. This was

granted and the reinvestigation was again set

for May 5, 1969. The accused and his counsel,

however, failed to appear and thus, the said

reinvestigation was re-set for June 2, 1969. On

this date, counsel for accused requested that he

be given five (5) days within which to file a

written sworn statement of the accused which

would constitute the defense of the latter,

subject to the cross-examination of the

Investigating Fiscal.

Considering the fact that the period to file such

sworn statement had already expired without

anything being filed, the records of the cases

were returned to the court which set said cases

for arraignment and trial on September 2, 1970.

On this date, the accused again moved for

postponement.

When these cases were called for arraignment

on September 8, 1970, Demetrio Jardin,

pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged, after

which he requested that the trial be postponed

and re-set for September 29, 1970.

On September 29, 1970, the trial scheduled on

that day was postponed again on motion of

counsel for the accused. The trial was re-set for

October 12, 1970, with notice to both parties.

On October 12, 1970, when the said criminal

cases were called for hearing, no one appeared

for the prosecution, except a state witness, Mr.

Cesar Alcala of the Provincial Auditor's office

who remained silent during the proceedings.

Invoking his client's constitutional right to

speedy trial and seizing the opportunity to take

advantage of the prosecution's failure to appear

on that day, the defense counsel moved for the

dismissal of the cases. The respondent court

granted the oral motion for dismissal "for

reasons of constitutional rights of the accused

Demetrio Jardin." Cdpr

Two questions are now raised by the People in

this appeal:

I. Considering the factual setting in the

criminal cases at bar, was the respondent Court

correct in dismissing the cases and in

predicating the dismissal on the right of the

defendant to a speedy trial?

II. Does the present appeal place the

respondent accused in double jeopardy?

The respondent court committed a grave abuse

of discretion in dismissing the cases and in

basing the dismissal on the constitutional right

of the accused to speedy trial. The right to a

speedy trial means that the accused is free from

vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its

salutary objective being to assure that an

innocent person may be free from anxiety and

expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of

having his guilt determined within the shortest

possible time compatible with the presentation

and consideration of whatever legitimate

defense he may interpose. (See Andres v.

Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216)

From a perusal of the facts, it is readily seen

that all the delays in the prosecution of the

cases were caused by the accused himself. All

the postponements of proceedings were made

at his instance and for his behalf. Hence, the

constitutional right to a speedy trial afforded to

an accused by our Constitution cannot be

invoked. From the start of the preliminary

investigation of the cases up to the trial on the

merits, the accused always managed to delay

the proceedings through postponements and

requests for reinvestigation. It would,

therefore, be a mockery of the criminal justice

system if the accused would be allowed to

benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical

maneuvers intended to frustrate the

administration of justice. By his own deliberate

acts, he is deemed to have waived or

abandoned his right to a speedy trial. In the

case of Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216, we

ruled:

"In this case, however, there was a waiver or

abandonment of the right to a speedy trial in

the first case when the herein petitioners

sought and obtained several postponements of

the trial: first, when they asked for the

deferment of the arraignment because the

accused Ladislao Tacipit was not present;

second, when they asked for the postponement

of the trial for March 5, 1968 upon the ground

that they have requested the Provincial Fiscal of

Cagayan for a reinvestigation of the case; and

finally, when they agreed, with the prosecution,

to postpone the hearing set for November 28,

1968 to January 4, 1969" . . . .

The dismissal of the criminal cases against the

accused by the respondent court on the ground

that his right to speedy trial had been violated

was devoid of factual and legal basis. The order

denying the motion for reconsideration is

similarly infirm. There being no basis for the

questioned orders, they are consequently null

and void. prcd

Would a reinstatement of the dismissed cases

place the accused in double jeopardy?

In order that the protection against double

jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an

accused, the following requisites must be

present in the first prosecution: (a) a valid

complaint or information; (b) a competent

court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the

charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or

convicted, or the case against him was

dismissed or otherwise terminated without his

express consent. (Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of

Court; People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77). The last

requisite assumes a valid acquittal and a valid

acquittal presupposes a valid judgment by a

court of competent jurisdiction. Since in the

instant cases, the dismissal was void for having

been issued without legal basis, it follows that

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[G.R. Nos. L-33037-42. August 17, 1983.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DEMETRIO JARDIN, accused-appellee. The Solicitor-General for plaintiff-appellant. Marcos C. Lucero, Jr. for accused-appellee. D E C I S I O N GUTIERREZ, JR., J p: Two constitutional rights — speedy trial and freedom from double jeopardy — are interposed as defenses by the accused in this petition for review on certiorari. The petitioner asks us to review and annul the orders of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch V, which dismissed the criminal cases against accused Demetrio Jardin because his constitutional right to speedy trial was allegedly violated. The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter-complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents on six counts. LLjur The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles who set them for preliminary investigation. The accused moved to postpone the preliminary investigation twice. On the third time that the investigation was re-set, the accused and his counsel failed to appear. On the fourth resetting, the accused and his counsel again failed to appear. Inspite of their absence, the preliminary investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, six informations were filed against the accused before t ...
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