First, review the required module resources, carefully examining the behavioral competencies within the leadership domain. As a reminder, the two clusters within the leadership domain are leadership and navigation and ethical practice.Once you are familiar with the leadership domain clusters, conduct a self-reflection and analysis by responding to each of the following three questions.Strengths: What are your areas of strength within the leadership domain, and how did you determine a cluster as a strength? Provide supportive examples.Weaknesses: What are your areas of weakness within the leadership domain, and how did you determine a cluster as a weakness? Provide supportive examples.Strategies: What are your strategies for the development of behavioral competencies within the leadership domain? Provide supportive examples and information from your research. Guidelines for Submission: Submit assignment as a Word document with double spacing, 12-point Times New Roman font, and one-inch margins. Dedicate a minimum of one paragraph of analysis for each of the three questions listed above.LINK: https://www.shrm.org/about-shrm/press-room/press-r...

This week you will respond to the following forum questions:FQ1: Select a major challenge facing the security industry. Why do you see this as major challenge? What do you believe are the best ways to resolve this major challenge? Why so?FQ2: How can security/loss prevention strategies be evaluated for effectiveness?Needs to be 500 words..

STUDENT 1 (Jena): Record keeping and maintaining an adequate documentation trail for auditing purposes is essential for all forms of contracting. However, ensuring proper documentation is especially important in contingency environment. According to the Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook (2017), “because normal checks and balances and electronic administration tools might not exist right away in contingency environments, Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) should put due diligence in maintaining hard-copy contract files with proper documentation to tell the story of the respective acquisition” (p. 199). The establishment of effective administrative produces, audit capabilities and maintenance is high recommended as early as possible in contingency situations. This can enhance audit supportability and minimize any potential fraud, waste or abuse problems. In different contingency settings CCOs should become familiar with local acquisition instructions (AIs) and standard operating procedures (SOPs). This allows CCOs to gain knowledge about contract support administration for the given area of responsibility (AOR). According to the Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook (2017), “contract files must be organized and sufficiently annotated to document the actions taken and the supporting rationale for the entire procurement process” (pg. 201). The CCO must do their best to ensure that all document contract file tells the complete story of the acquisition life cycle from raw material to disposition. It is imperative that CCOs understand that their roles and responsibilities to not end with the award of a contract and purchase and delivery orders. Improper contract administrating can ultimately waste the efforts put forth on planning, describing, and funding customer requirements (Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook, 2017)References DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTINGENCY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT GUIDEBOOK . (2014, September). Retrieved June 8, 2020, from https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/US...STUDENT 2 (Derek): The risks of a lack of contingency contract administration described in the opening line of the executive summary for the 2011 commission on wartime contracting final report to Congress. At least $31 Billion, and possibly as much as $60 Billion, has been lost to contract waste in America’s contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report indicates that much of the contingency contract waste was avoidable if contract administration efforts had been adequate. Such figures undermine programs, diverts money, and undermines public confidence in the US government’s fiduciary duty to spend taxpayer money. Another risk of insufficient CCAS aside from high costs are violations of human trafficking standards. In particular, when contractors in contingency areas look to reduce their labor costs by employing third-country nationals or local nationals who are vulnerable to such violations.Then there is a threat to safety and life when contractor performance is not properly inspected. The best example of this was KBR’s negligent performance in properly constructing shower facilities in Iraq resulted in a soldier electrocuted in the shower.When contractor performance is not managed correctly, and contractor service falters or fails in the contingency environment, soldiers are left unsupported and vulnerable. In such cases, military personnel and resources end up being used to perform tasks that were funded to be completed by contractors. CCAS should not be an afterthought or resource at the last minute; contracts that do not have a robustly resourced CCAS plan should not be awarded. There must also be a reasonable expectation as to whether or not you are asking civilian contractors to perform inherently military tasks. These are tasks that only a well-armed military force could perform in a non-permissive environment.The risks of a lack of contingency contract administration described in the opening line of the executive summary for the 2011 commission on wartime contracting final report to Congress. At least $31 Billion, and possibly as much as $60 Billion, has been lost to contract waste in America’s contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report indicates that much of the contingency contract waste was avoidable if contract administration efforts had been adequate. Such figures undermine programs, diverts money, and undermines public confidence in the US government’s fiduciary duty to spend taxpayer money. Another risk of insufficient CCAS aside from high costs are violations of human trafficking standards. In particular, when contractors in contingency areas look to reduce their labor costs by employing third-country nationals or local nationals who are vulnerable to such violations.Then there is a threat to safety and life when contractor performance is not properly inspected. The best example of this was KBR’s negligent performance in properly constructing shower facilities in Iraq resulted in a soldier electrocuted in the shower.When contractor performance is not managed correctly, and contractor service falters or fails in the contingency environment, soldiers are left unsupported and vulnerable. In such cases, military personnel and resources end up being used to perform tasks that were funded to be completed by contractors. CCAS should not be an afterthought or resource at the last minute; contracts that do not have a robustly resourced CCAS plan should not be awarded. There must also be a reasonable expectation as to whether or not you are asking civilian contractors to perform inherently military tasks. These are tasks that only a well-armed military force could perform in a non-permissive environment.The risks of a lack of contingency contract administration described in the opening line of the executive summary for the 2011 commission on wartime contracting final report to Congress. At least $31 Billion, and possibly as much as $60 Billion, has been lost to contract waste in America’s contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report indicates that much of the contingency contract waste was avoidable if contract administration efforts had been adequate. Such figures undermine programs, diverts money, and undermines public confidence in the US government’s fiduciary duty to spend taxpayer money. Another risk of insufficient CCAS aside from high costs are violations of human trafficking standards. In particular, when contractors in contingency areas look to reduce their labor costs by employing third-country nationals or local nationals who are vulnerable to such violations.Then there is a threat to safety and life when contractor performance is not properly inspected. The best example of this was KBR’s negligent performance in properly constructing shower facilities in Iraq resulted in a soldier electrocuted in the shower.When contractor performance is not managed correctly, and contractor service falters or fails in the contingency environment, soldiers are left unsupported and vulnerable. In such cases, military personnel and resources end up being used to perform tasks that were funded to be completed by contractors. CCAS should not be an afterthought or resource at the last minute; contracts that do not have a robustly resourced CCAS plan should not be awarded. There must also be a reasonable expectation as to whether or not you are asking civilian contractors to perform inherently military tasks. These are tasks that only a well-armed military force could perform in a non-permissive environment.vSTUDENT 3 (Chris): Contract administration is an important aspect of the holistic view of contracting, it ensures that schedules are kept, contractors are compensated and both parties (government and contractor) adhere to the agreed upon terms of the contract. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is responsible for providing this phase of contracting. Contract administration according to the DCCH (2017) “involves record keeping and ensuring the documentation is adequate for an audit trail” (p.198). If contract administration is applied during a contingency then it is known as contingency contract administration services (CCAS). CCAS may be quite perplexing during the formative weeks or months of a contingency, depending if the area of operations is a mature (established systems) environment or immature (no established systems) enviroment. If the area is the latter of the two then this could lead to several risks such as; Field order officers (FOO) only using cash, vendors not providing receipts for services completed and vendors receiving advance payment but failing to return. Allowing the FOOs to pay for everything with cash may lead to the temptation to defraud the government and vendors located in a immature locations usually do not provide receipts. DCCH (2017) states that “overseas vendors operate on a cash-and-carry basis and are not in the habit of furnishing paper receipts or using invoicing procedures “(p.205). The aforementioned risk did not include issues that may be associated with military units or the contingency contracting officer (CCO). Depending on the size of the contingency, military units normally rotate every 3 to 6 months depending on the military service. This may cause an issue with the CCAS if the leaving unit did not close out or turnover existing contracts during the relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA). According to the DCCH “Such responsibility transfers include property books and the assignment of CORs and FOOs” (p.206). If the proper turnover was not conducted correctly and CCAS was not involved this could lead to missing documentation which is a key aspect of contract administration. CCOs may encounter the same issue regarding proper documentation while dealing with vendors in an immature location, while rapidly establishing logistic lines in support of the geographic combatant commander (GCC). This could include not completing all the paperwork and submitting incomplete documentation to the CCAS. The CCO must ensure that this does not happen because as stated by the DCCH (2017) “the contract file tells the acquisition story” (p.207). Contract administration under the tutelage of the DCMA, applied correctly provide the depository for each acquisition story ever written.r/ChrisReferencesAccuquisition Policy, D. &. (2017). Defense contingency contracting handbook. Washington, DC: Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Contingency Contracting