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De la Llana vs Alba
Constitutional Law Political Question if there is no question of law involved BP 129
In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes”, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the
judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He
averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP
129).
HELD: The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its
effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the
fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were
the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no
departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved
by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents
vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.

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Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to
be preferred.”
Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board
e Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill
Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The
PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The
amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to
regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of
videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such
loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross
receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is a rider
and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject.
HELD: The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include
the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and
every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute
are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance
of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." The rule also
is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction.
In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject
and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the PD. The express purpose of the PD to include taxation of the video industry in order to
regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of
the said PD which explain the motives of the lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title of the PD,
which is the creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its
Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the
title or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

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De la Llana vs Alba Constitutional Law – Political Question – if there is no question of law involved – BP 129 In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). HELD: The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.  Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abol ...
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