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Citizenship and Domicile Uytengsu v. Republic Romualdez- Marcos v Comelec
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-6379. September 29, 1954.]
In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be admitted a citizen of
the Philippine. WILFRED UYTENGSU,petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Manuel A. Zosa, for appellee.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo, for appellant
SYLLABUS
1.CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ABSENCE DURING PERIOD INTERVENING
BETWEEN FILING OF APPLICATION AND HEARING AN OBSTACLE TO PETITIONER'S
NATURALIZATION. Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition
for naturalization and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof,
notwithstanding his explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines
"from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship", he
has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently,
not entitled to a judgment in his favor.
D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, J p:
This is an appeal taken by the Solicitor General from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, granting the application of Wilfred Uytengsu, for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines.
The main facts are not disputed. Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927. He began his primary education at the Saint
Theresa's College in said municipality. Subsequently, he attended the Little Flower of Jesus Academy,
then the San Carlos College and, still later the Siliman University all in the same locality where
he completed the secondary course. Early in 1946, he studied, for one semester, in the Mapua Institute
of Technology, in Manila. Soon after, he went to the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was
enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California, and was graduated, in 1950, with the
degree of Bachelor of Science. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4)
months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was
filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a postgraduate course, in chemical
engineering, in another educational institution, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He finished this course in July
1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the hearing of the case,
originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to be postponed on motion of counsel for the
petitioner.
The only question for the determination in this appeal is whether or not the application for
naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately
after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing
thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu decided this question in the affirmative and accordingly
rendered judgment for the petitioner. The Solicitor General, who maintains the negative, has appealed
from said judgment.
Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 reads as follows:
"Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the
competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the
petitioner, setting forth his name and surname, his present and former place of
residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married
and if the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and
of each of the children; the approximate date of his arrival in the Philippines, the name
of the port of debarkation, and if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he
came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the
same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this
Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act, and that he
will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up
to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
In conformity with this provision, petitioner stated in paragraph 13 of his application:
". . . I will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing
of my petition up to the time of my admission to Philippine citizenship." (Record on
Appeal, page 3.)
Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word "residence", as used in the aforesaid
provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by
physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be
domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that
time, being, merely to study therein.
It should be noted that to become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization, one must
reside therein for not less than 10 years, except in some special cases, in which 5 years of residence
is sufficient (sections 2 and 3, Commonwealth Act No. 473). Pursuant to the provision above quoted,
he must, also, file an application stating therein, among other things, that he "has the qualifications
required" by law. Inasmuch as these qualifications include the residence requirement already referred
to, it follows that the applicant must prove that he is a resident of the Philippines at the time, not only of
the filing of the application, but, also, of its hearing. If the residence thus required is the actual or
constructive permanent home, otherwise known as legal residence or domicile, then the applicant must
be domiciled in the Philippines on both dates. Consequently, when section 7 of Commonwealth Act No.
473 imposes upon the applicant the duty to state in his sworn application "that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines" in the intervening period, it can not refer merely to the need of an
uninterrupted domicile or legal residence, irrespective of actual residence, for said legal residence or

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Citizenship and Domicile Uytengsu v. Republic Romualdez- Marcos v Comelec
domicile is obligatory under the law, even in the absence of the requirement contained in said clause,
and, it is well settled that, whenever possible, a legal provision must not be so construed as to be a
useless surplusage, and, accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having
no effect whatsoever thereon. This consequences may be avoided only by construing the clause in
question as demanding actual residence in the Philippines from the filing of the petition for naturalization
to its determination by the court.
Indeed, although the words "residence" and "domicile" are often used interchangeably, each
has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different from that of the other.
xxx xxx xxx
". . . There is a decided preponderance of authority to the effect that
residence and domicile are not synonymous in connection with citizenship,
jurisdiction, limitations, school privileges, probate and succession.
". . . the greater or less degree of permanency contemplated or intended
furnishes a clue to the sometimes shadowy distinction between residence and
domicile. To be a resident one must be physically present in that place of a longer or
shorter period of time. 'The essential distinction between residence and domicile is
this: the first involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which he has taken up
his abode ceases; the other has no such intent, the abiding is animo manendi. One
may seek a place for purposes of pleasure, of business, or of health. If his intent be
to remain it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
accomplished, it is his residence. Perhaps the most satisfactory definition is that one
is a resident of a place from which his departure is indefinite as to time, definite as to
purpose; and for this purpose he has made the place his temporary home.
"For many legal purposes there is a clear distinction between 'residence'
and 'domicile.' A person may hold an office or may have business or employment or
other affair which requires him to reside at a particular place. His intention is to remain
there while the office or business or employment or other concern continues; but he
has no purpose to remain beyond the time the interest exists which determines his
place of abode. Domicile is characterized by the animus manendi. . . .
"Residence and domicile are not to be held synonymous. Residence is an
act. Domicile is an act coupled with an intent. A man may have a residence in one
state or country and his domicile in another, and he may be a nonresident of the state
of his domicile in the sense that his place of actual residence is not there. Hence
the great weight of authorities. rightly so, as we think that a debtor, although his
legal domicile is in the state, may reside or remain out of it for so long a time and
under such circumstances as to acquire so to speak, an actual nonresidence within
the meaning of the attachment statute."
"Domicile is a much broader term than residence. A man may have his
domicile in one state and actually reside in another, or in a foreign country. If he has
once had a residence in a particular place and removed to another, but with the
intention of returning after a certain time, however long that may be, his domicile is
at the former residence and his residence at the place of his temporary habitation.
Residence and habitation are generally regarded as synonymous. A resident and an
inhabitant mean the same thing. A person resident is defined to be one 'dwelling and
having his abode in any place,' 'an inhabitant,' 'one that resides in a place.'
The question of domicile is not involved in determining whether a person is a resident
of a state or country. The compatibility of domicile in one state with actual residence
in another has been asserted and acted upon in the law of attachment by the Courts
of New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, Mississippi and Wisconsin.
"Residence indicates permanency of occupation, distinct from lodging or
boarding, or temporary occupation. It does not include as much as domicile, which
requires intention combined with residence.' . . . 'one may seek a place for purposes
of pleasure, of business, or of health. If his intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent be to leave as soon as his purpose is accomplished, it is his
residence.'
"The derivation of the two words 'residence' and 'domicile' fairly illustrates
the distinction in their meaning. A home (domus) is something more than a temporary
place of remaining (residendi) however long such stay may continue.
'While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the
same thing, residence combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while
an established abode, fixed permanently for a time [!] for business or other purposes,
constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return
to the true domicile.'
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. 'Residence' is used
to indicate the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary' 'domicile' denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.' 'Residence is
not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence
generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means necessarily so, since no
length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile." (Kennan
on Residence and Domicile, pp. 26, 31-35)
Such distinction was, in effect, applied by this Court in the case of Domingo Dy, alias William
Dy Chinco vs. Republic of the Philippines (92 Phil., 278). The applicant in that case was born in Naga,
Camarines Sur, on May 19, 1915. "At the age of seven or eight, or in the year 1923, he went to China,
with his mother to study, and while he used to go back and forth from China to the Philippines during
school vacations, he did not come back to live permanently here until the year 1937." He applied for
naturalization in 1949. The question arose whether, having been domiciled in the Philippines for over
30 years, he could be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, without a previous declaration of
intention, in view of section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
535), exempting from such requirement "those who have resided in the Philippines continuously for a
period of thirty years or more, before filing their application." This Court decided the question in the
negative, upon the ground that "actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, not legal
residence", or "domicile," along, is essential to the enjoyment of the benefits of said exemption.
If said actual and substantial residence not merely legal residence is necessary to
dispense with the filing of a declaration of intention, it is even more necessary during the period
intervening from the filing of the petition for naturalization to the date of the hearing thereof. In this
connection, it should be remembered that, upon the filing of said petition, the clerk of court is ordained
by law to publish it with a notice of the date of the hearing, which, pursuant to section 7 of Act No. 2927,
shall not be less than 60 days from the date of the last publication. This period was extended to two (2)

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EN BANC [G.R. No. L-6379. September 29, 1954.] In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be admitted a citizen of the Philippine. WILFRED UYTENGSU,petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant. Manuel A. Zosa, for appellee. Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo, for appellant SYLLABUS 1.CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ABSENCE DURING PERIOD INTERVENING BETWEEN FILING OF APPLICATION AND HEARING AN OBSTACLE TO PETITIONER'S NATURALIZATION. — Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for naturalization and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines "from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship", he has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment in his favor. D E C I S I O N CONCEPCION, J p: This is an appeal taken by the Solicitor General from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, granting the application of Wilfred Uytengsu, for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines. The main facts are not disputed. Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927. He began his primary education at the Saint Theresa's College in sa ...
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