Citizenship and Domicile Uytengsu v. Republic Romualdez- Marcos v Comelec
domicile is obligatory under the law, even in the absence of the requirement contained in said clause,
and, it is well settled that, whenever possible, a legal provision must not be so construed as to be a
useless surplusage, and, accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having
no effect whatsoever thereon. This consequences may be avoided only by construing the clause in
question as demanding actual residence in the Philippines from the filing of the petition for naturalization
to its determination by the court.
Indeed, although the words "residence" and "domicile" are often used interchangeably, each
has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different from that of the other.
xxx xxx xxx
". . . There is a decided preponderance of authority to the effect that
residence and domicile are not synonymous in connection with citizenship,
jurisdiction, limitations, school privileges, probate and succession.
". . . the greater or less degree of permanency contemplated or intended
furnishes a clue to the sometimes shadowy distinction between residence and
domicile. To be a resident one must be physically present in that place of a longer or
shorter period of time. 'The essential distinction between residence and domicile is
this: the first involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which he has taken up
his abode ceases; the other has no such intent, the abiding is animo manendi. One
may seek a place for purposes of pleasure, of business, or of health. If his intent be
to remain it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
accomplished, it is his residence. Perhaps the most satisfactory definition is that one
is a resident of a place from which his departure is indefinite as to time, definite as to
purpose; and for this purpose he has made the place his temporary home.
"For many legal purposes there is a clear distinction between 'residence'
and 'domicile.' A person may hold an office or may have business or employment or
other affair which requires him to reside at a particular place. His intention is to remain
there while the office or business or employment or other concern continues; but he
has no purpose to remain beyond the time the interest exists which determines his
place of abode. Domicile is characterized by the animus manendi. . . .
"Residence and domicile are not to be held synonymous. Residence is an
act. Domicile is an act coupled with an intent. A man may have a residence in one
state or country and his domicile in another, and he may be a nonresident of the state
of his domicile in the sense that his place of actual residence is not there. Hence
the great weight of authorities. — rightly so, as we think — that a debtor, although his
legal domicile is in the state, may reside or remain out of it for so long a time and
under such circumstances as to acquire so to speak, an actual nonresidence within
the meaning of the attachment statute."
"Domicile is a much broader term than residence. A man may have his
domicile in one state and actually reside in another, or in a foreign country. If he has
once had a residence in a particular place and removed to another, but with the
intention of returning after a certain time, however long that may be, his domicile is
at the former residence and his residence at the place of his temporary habitation.
Residence and habitation are generally regarded as synonymous. A resident and an
inhabitant mean the same thing. A person resident is defined to be one 'dwelling and
having his abode in any place,' 'an inhabitant,' 'one that resides in a place.'
The question of domicile is not involved in determining whether a person is a resident
of a state or country. The compatibility of domicile in one state with actual residence
in another has been asserted and acted upon in the law of attachment by the Courts
of New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, Mississippi and Wisconsin.
"Residence indicates permanency of occupation, distinct from lodging or
boarding, or temporary occupation. It does not include as much as domicile, which
requires intention combined with residence.' . . . 'one may seek a place for purposes
of pleasure, of business, or of health. If his intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent be to leave as soon as his purpose is accomplished, it is his
residence.'
"The derivation of the two words 'residence' and 'domicile' fairly illustrates
the distinction in their meaning. A home (domus) is something more than a temporary
place of remaining (residendi) however long such stay may continue.
'While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the
same thing, residence combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while
an established abode, fixed permanently for a time [!] for business or other purposes,
constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return
to the true domicile.'
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. 'Residence' is used
to indicate the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary' 'domicile' denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.' 'Residence is
not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence
generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means necessarily so, since no
length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile." (Kennan
on Residence and Domicile, pp. 26, 31-35)
Such distinction was, in effect, applied by this Court in the case of Domingo Dy, alias William
Dy Chinco vs. Republic of the Philippines (92 Phil., 278). The applicant in that case was born in Naga,
Camarines Sur, on May 19, 1915. "At the age of seven or eight, or in the year 1923, he went to China,
with his mother to study, and while he used to go back and forth from China to the Philippines during
school vacations, he did not come back to live permanently here until the year 1937." He applied for
naturalization in 1949. The question arose whether, having been domiciled in the Philippines for over
30 years, he could be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, without a previous declaration of
intention, in view of section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
535), exempting from such requirement "those who have resided in the Philippines continuously for a
period of thirty years or more, before filing their application." This Court decided the question in the
negative, upon the ground that "actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, not legal
residence", or "domicile," along, is essential to the enjoyment of the benefits of said exemption.
If said actual and substantial residence — not merely legal residence — is necessary to
dispense with the filing of a declaration of intention, it is even more necessary during the period
intervening from the filing of the petition for naturalization to the date of the hearing thereof. In this
connection, it should be remembered that, upon the filing of said petition, the clerk of court is ordained
by law to publish it with a notice of the date of the hearing, which, pursuant to section 7 of Act No. 2927,
shall not be less than 60 days from the date of the last publication. This period was extended to two (2)