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Leo-Echegaray-vs-Sec-of-Justice

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Today is Tuesday, June 17, 2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990
temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the
submission of public respondents that:
1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that
sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be
an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question
may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period
given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at
the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.

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5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or
modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death
penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of
Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No.
629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any
move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary
and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust
all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred
thirteen (113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does
not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution
was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public
respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital
punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed
before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472,
where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were
filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules
and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the
Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated
January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State
is properly represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at
bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final
judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as
there should be a place to begin litigation."
1
To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is
appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds
are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in this
Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed

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Today is Tuesday, June 17, 2014 Top of Form Bottom of Form Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC ? G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999 LEO ECHEGARAY,?petitioner,? vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,?ET AL.,?respondents. R E S O L U T I O N ? PUNO,?J.: For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that: 1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority; 2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law. 3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . . 4. Under the time honored?maxim lex futuro,?judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review. 5. At th ...
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