(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4)
the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino
vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28,
1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2,
pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31,
1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the petition
herein states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our
duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the
present controversy, a number of significant points stand out in bold
relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some
consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every
legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and
stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the
appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal
Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions
thereof — particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections
1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-
mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee
laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To
forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information
thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was found expedient to
request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However,
likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the
pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation
thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A
point of difference as to the correct construction to be given to the
applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in which the
parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The
confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position was
matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his
ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open
warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a
fraud order will have to be issued against it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy
prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of
the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and
consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded,
undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the
dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of
a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a
real — not a mere theoretical — question or issue. The contenders are
as real as their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the
uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of
construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business.
To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's proposed contest
believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an
unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the
appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the
contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and
inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized
by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the
insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be
said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts,
or by the fears of others" — which admittedly does not confer a cause of
action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable
controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive
claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West
Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that
there is here no question of construction because the said appellant
"simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as
embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for
declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it
proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstances here
presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced
from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is
not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering
and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention
is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the
given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black,
Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or
not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an
inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our
mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation as
any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a
pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to nothing more
than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a
declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as
yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction
thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and
final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of
immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of
speaking, the propriety — nay, the necessity — of setting the dispute at
rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion
and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited),
cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs.
Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in
22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the
situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose
between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and
definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of
the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with
these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes
thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with
the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma
which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it
abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits
the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship
which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these
considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which
the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object
(section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) — which, in the instant case,
is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
respect to, rights and duties under a law — we can see in the present
case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity
in our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding
effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if he believes that it will
not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is
calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound.
But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction,
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of
the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect,
judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and,
until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that
they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not
only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty
bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no
misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate the
controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we
have herein just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar
Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation
engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county
prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the
characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were
conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it
was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory
relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of
its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway,
17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh,
supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for
declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code,
using almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983