Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. Case Digest
Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.
139 SCRA 139
Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in
Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had
two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on
the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in
Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City
asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which
Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared
with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred
by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had
acknowledged that the couple had no “community property”.
Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court,
between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the
latter.
Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen.
Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United
States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of
the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards
of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the
husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
as petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He
is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch
CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City
and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van
Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August
3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which
denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that
they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children
born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the
parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in
Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the
Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and
that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The
Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject
of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are
neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of
the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then
it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a
case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
1
Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings.
2
Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the
exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no
community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether
the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after
their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court
during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San
Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp
& Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in
the understanding that there were neither community property nor
community obligations.
3
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney
he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W.
Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an
Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to
represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he
is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in
this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code,
5
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law.
6
In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton
vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony
by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty.
that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other,
is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
