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Deliverable 05 Worksheet 1

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Probability
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Rasmussen University
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Deliverable 05 Worksheet
1. Market research has determined the following changes in the polls based on the
different combinations of choices for the two candidates on the tax bill in the upcoming
debate:
Use this payoff matrix to determine if there are dominant strategies for either player. Find any
Nash equilibrium points. Show
Incumbent
Challenger
Stay
Break
Stay
(0, 4)
(3, 0)
Break
(1, 2)
(2, 3)

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We first determine whether there exist dominant strategies for the challenger by working on
the incumbent choices and determine the existence of challenger’s preferences in either cases.
Incumbent
Challenger
Stay
Break
Stay
(0, 4)
(3, 0)
Break
(1, 2)
(2, 3)
Its shows the challenger preference shifts as the incumbent strategy changes. For that reason
there lacks a dominant strategy for the challenger. The same process will be carried out for the
incumbent.
Incumbent
Stay
Break
Stay
(0, 4)
(3, 0)
Break
(1, 2)
(2, 3)
Similarly the incumbent preference shifts as the challenger strategy changes. Consequently the
incumbent lacks a dominant strategy. The game lacks a dominant strategy. Subsequently we
look every cell for Nash equilibrium points. We begin with (stay, stay)
Incumbent
Stay
Break
Stay
(0, 4)
(3, 0)
Break
(1, 2)
(2, 3)
Since the challenger would like to change strategies to “Break” if the incumbent selects stay,
they isn’t a Nash equilibrium point .we move to check (break, stay)

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Deliverable 05 – Worksheet 1. Market research has determined the following changes in the polls based on the different combinations of choices for the two candidates on the tax bill in the upcoming Challenger Incumbent Stay Break Stay (0, 4) (3, 0) Break (1, 2) (2, 3) debate: Use this payoff matrix to determine if there are dominant strategies for either player. Find any Nash equilibrium points. Show We first determine whether there exist dominant strategies for the challenger by working on the incumbent choices and determine the existence of challenger’s preferences in either cases. Challenger Incumbent Stay Break Stay (0, 4) (3, 0) Break (1, 2) (2, 3) Its shows the challenger preference shifts as the incumbent strategy changes. For that reason there lacks a dominant strategy for the challenger. The same process will be carried out for the incumbent. Challenger Incumbent Stay Break Stay (0, 4) (3, 0) Break (1, 2) (2, 3) Similarly the incumbent preference shifts as the challenger strategy changes. Consequently the incumbent lacks a dominant strategy. The game lacks a dominant strategy. Subsequently we look every cell for Nash equilibrium points. We begin with (stay, stay) Challenger Incumbent Stay Break Stay (0, 4) (3, 0) Break (1, 2) (2, 3) Since the challenger would like to change strategies to “Break” if the incumbent selects stay, they isn’t a Nash equilibrium point .we move to check (break, stay) Challenger Incumbent ...
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