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Network contribution games N described by Anshelevich and Hoefer [AH12]. We model a social graph in
which the vertices represent players who can divide up a personal budget of effort Bi ≥ 0 among their
potential relationships, represented by edges. The benefit each player derives from a relationship e = {i,
j} is given by a non-negative, non-decreasing and symmetric reward function fe : R2 ≥0 → R≥0 in terms
of the amount of effort each of them invests, and each player’s total utility is just the sum of benefits
from all relationships. In the original paper, players are both allowed to deviate individually if it benefits
themselves and to coordinate a joint deviation with a neighbouring player if it benefits them both; this is
both seen as more realistic for pairwise relationships, and necessary to enable interesting defection
patterns for some classes of payoff functions to exist at all. We will follow this approach in the tribal
extension, calling deviations by single players and connected pairs unilateral and bilateral respectively.
We will denote an equilibrium stable against bilateral deviations as a pairwise equilibrium, giving rise to
a pairwise Price of Tribalism.

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Network contribution games N described by Anshelevich and Hoefer [AH12]. We model a social graph in which the vertices represent players who can divide up a personal budget of effort Bi ≥ 0 among their potential relationships, represented by edges. The benefit each player derives from a relationship e = {i, j} is given by a non-negative, non-decreasing and symmetric reward function fe : R2 ≥0 → R≥0 in terms of the amount of effort each of them invests, and each player’s total utility is just the sum of benefits from all relationships. In the original paper, players are both allowed to deviate individually if it benefits themselves and to coordinate a joint deviation with a neighbouring player if it benefits them both; this is both seen as more realistic for pairwise relationships, and necessary to enable interesting defection patterns for some classes of payoff functions to exist at all. We will follow this approach in the tribal extension, calling deviations by single players and connected pairs unilateral and bilateral respectively. We will denote an equilibrium stable against bilateral deviations as a pairwise equilibrium, giving rise to a pairwise Price of Tribalism. Name: Description: ...
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