need someone to write a 2-4 page paper APA style

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I need a paper written APA style. 2-4 pages long. This paper is due Sunday evening.

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The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 606 A jubilant uncle Sam Celebrates Victory in the Spanish-American War and anticipates the building of an American Empire. This cover of an American magazine, 1898, commemorates the country's swift victory in the Spanish-American War. A jubilant Uncle Sam celebrates victory and anticipates the building of an American empire. Hear the Audio Hear the audio files for Chapter 22 at THE ROOTS OF IMPERIALISM (page 610) WHAT ARGUMENTS were made in favor of American expansion in the late nineteenth century? FIRST STEPS (page 612) WHAT STEPS did the United States take to expand its global influence in the decades before the Spanish-American War? THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (page 616) WHAT WERE the most important consequences of the Spanish-American War? Library of Congress IMPERIAL AMBITIONS: THE UNITED STATES AND EAST ASIA, 1899–1917 (page 620) WHAT WAS the nature of U.S. involvement in Asia? IMPERIAL POWER: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA, 1899–1917 (page 624) HOW DID Latin Americans respond to U.S. intervention in the region? ENGAGING EUROPE: NEW CONCERNS, OLD CONSTRAINTS (page 630) ISBN 1-256-41052-7 WHY DID the United States take a larger role in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century? 607 The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 608 CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 ONE AMERICAN JOURNEY Havana, Cuba October 1901 When the Spanish-American war was declared the United States . . . assumed a position as protector of the interests of Cuba. It became responsible for the welfare of the people, politically, mentally, and morally. The mere fact of freeing the island from Spanish rule has not ended the care which this country should give. . . . The effect will be to uplift the people, gaining their permanent friendship and support and greatly increasing our own commerce. At present there are two million people requiring clothing and food, for but a small proportion of the necessaries of life are raised on the island. It is folly to grow food crops when sugar and tobacco produce such rich revenues in comparison. The United States should supply the Cubans with their breadstuffs, even wine, fruit, and vegetables, and should clothe the people. . . . The money received for their crops will be turned over in a great measure in buying supplies from the United States. . . . Naturally the manufacturers of the United States should have precedence in furnishing machinery, locomotives, cars, and rails, materials for buildings and bridges, and the wide diversity of other supplies required, as well as fuel for their furnaces. With the present financial and commercial uncertainty at an end the people of the island will . . . come into the American market as customers for products of many kinds. The meeting of the Constitutional Convention on November 5th will be an event in Cuban history of the greatest importance, and much will depend upon the action and outcome of this convention as to our future control of the island. . . . I considered it unwise to interfere, and I have made it a settled policy to permit the Cubans to manage every part of their constitution-making. This has been due to my desire to prevent any possible charge of crimination being brought against the United States in the direction of their constitutional affairs. . . . There is no distrust of the United States on the part of the Cubans, and I know of no widespread antipathy to this country, its people, or its institutions. There are, of course, a handful of malcontents, as there must be in every country. . . . I could not well conceive how the Cubans could be otherwise than grateful to the United States for its efforts in their behalf. . . . In the brief time since the occupation of the island by American troops the island has been completely rehabilitated—agriculturally, commercially, financially, educationally, and governmentally. This improvement has been so rapid and so apparent that no Cuban could mistake it. To doubt in the face of these facts that their liberators were not still their faithful friends would be impossible. Major-General Leonard Wood, “The Future of Cuba,” The Independent 54 (January 23, 1902): 193–194; idem, “The Cuban Convention,” The Independent 52 (November 1, 1900): 265–266. Read the Document at Personal Journeys Online • Josiah Strong, Our Country, 1885. An appeal for Anglo-Saxon imperialism by an American minister. • Charles Denby, Shall We Keep the Philippines?, 1898. An argument for an economic empire by an American diplomat. • Vincent F. Howard, Imperialism, 1900. A poem denouncing the imperialist journey. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 CHAPTER 22 609 C H R O N O L O G Y 1861–1869 Seward serves as secretary of state. 1867 United States purchases Alaska from Russia. 1870 Annexation of the Dominican Republic is rejected. 1879 France conquers Algeria. 1881 Naval Advisory Board is created. 1882 Great Britain occupies Egypt. 1887 United States gains naval rights to Pearl Harbor. 1890 Alfred Thayer Mahan publishes The Influence of Sea Power upon History. 1893 Harrison signs but Cleveland rejects a treaty for the annexation of Hawaii. 1893–1897 Depression increases interest in economic expansion abroad. 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War is fought. 1895 United States intervenes in Great Britain– Venezuelan boundary dispute. 1896 1898 First Hague Peace Conference creates Court of Arbitration. 1900 Boxer Rebellion against foreign influence breaks out in China. 1901 Theodore Roosevelt becomes president. 1903 Platt Amendment restricts Cuban autonomy. Panama “revolution” is abetted by the United States. 1904 United States acquires the Panama Canal Zone. Roosevelt Corollary is announced. 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War is fought. 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth ends the Russo-Japanese War through U.S. mediation. 1906–1909 United States occupies Cuba. 1907–1908 Gentlemen’s Agreement restricts Japanese immigration. 1909 United States intervenes in Nicaragua. 1912–1933 United States occupies Nicaragua. William McKinley is elected president on an imperialist platform. 1914 Panama Canal opens. 1914–1917 United States intervenes in Mexico. 1915–1934 United States occupies Haiti. 1916–1924 United States occupies the Dominican Republic. Treaty of Paris is signed. 1917 Puerto Ricans are granted U.S. citizenship. Filipino-American War is fought. 1917–1922 United States occupies Cuba. Spanish-American War is fought. Anti-Imperialist League is organized. General Leonard Wood’s reports on Cuba, ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Open Door note is issued. Cuban insurrection against Spain begins. Hawaii is annexed. 1899–1902 1899 then under his control as military governor, captured the complex mixture of attitudes and motives that underlay the journey of the United States from a developing nation to a world power. Plans for economic expansion, a belief in national mission, a sense of responsibility to help others, scarcely hidden religious impulses and racist convictions—all combined in an uneasy mixture of self-interest and idealism. The tension between what a friend of Wood’s called the “righteous” and the “selfish” aspects of expanding American influence lay beneath the surface in Wood’s reports. His claim that he was not interfering with Cuba’s constitutional convention was disingenuous, for he had already undertaken to limit those who could participate as voters or delegates and was even then devising means to restrict the convention’s autonomy. And in his repeated insistence that the Cubans were grateful for the intervention of “their faithful friends,” the Americans, Wood obviously protested too much: Cubans, as well as Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, and others, rarely perceived American motives or American actions as positively as did Wood and other proponents of American expansion. Victory in the Spanish-American War had provided the United States with an extensive empire, status as a world power, and opportunities and problems that would long shape U.S. foreign policy. The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 610 CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 THE ROOTS OF IMPERIALISM WHAT ARGUMENTS were made in favor of American expansion in the late nineteenth century? The policy and practice of exploiting nations and peoples for the benefit of an imperial power either directly through military occupation and colonial rule or indirectly through economic domination of resources and markets. imperialism Read the Document at Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden” (1899) W WHERE TO LEARN MORE Mission Houses, Honolulu, Hawaii The United States had a long-established tradition of expansion across the continent. Indeed, by the 1890s, Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts boasted that Americans had “a record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century.” Lodge now urged the country to build an overseas empire, emulating the European model of imperialism based on the acquisition and exploitation of colonial possessions. Other Americans favored a less formal empire, in which United States interests and influence would be ensured through extensive trade and investments rather than through military occupation. Still others advocated a cultural expansionism in which the nation exported its ideals and institutions. All such expansionists could draw from many sources to support their plans. (see Overview, Rationales for Imperialism). Ideological and Religious Arguments The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Scholars, authors, politicians, and religious leaders provided interlocking ideological arguments for the new imperialism. Some intellectuals, for example, invoked Social Darwinism, maintaining that the United States should engage in a competitive struggle for wealth and power with other nations. “The survival of the fittest,” declared one writer, was “the law of nations as well as a law of nature.” As European nations expanded into Asia and Africa in the 1880s and 1890s, seeking colonies, markets, and raw materials, these advocates argued, the United States had to adopt similar policies to ensure national success. Related to Social Darwinism was a pervasive belief in racial inequality and in the superiority of people of English, or Anglo-Saxon, descent. To many Americans, the industrial progress, military strength, and political development of England and the United States were proof of an Anglo-Saxon superiority that carried with it a responsibility to extend the blessings of their rule to less able people. As a popular expression put it, colonialism was the “white man’s burden,” carrying with it a duty to aid and uplift other peoples. Such attitudes led some expansionists to favor imposing American ideas and practices on other cultures regardless of their own values and customs. Reflecting this aggressiveness, as well as Darwinian anxieties, some Americans endorsed expansion as consistent with their ideals of masculinity. Forceful expansion would be a manly course, relying upon and building strength and honor among American males. Men who confronted the challenges of empire would thereby improve their ability to compete in the international arena. “Pride of race, courage, manliness,” predicted one enthusiast, would be both the causes and the consequences of an assertive foreign policy. American missionaries also promoted expansionist sentiment. Hoping to evangelize the world, American religious groups increased the number of Protestant foreign missions sixfold from 1870 to 1900. Women in particular organized foreign missionary societies and served in the missions. Missionaries publicized their activities throughout the United States, generating interest in foreign developments and support for what one writer called the “imperialism of righteousness.” Abroad they pursued a religious transformation that often resembled a cultural conversion, for they promoted trade, developed business interests, and encouraged westernization through technology and education as well as religion. Sometimes, as in the Hawaiian Islands, American missionaries even promoted annexation by the United States. Indeed, the American religious press endlessly repeated the themes of national destiny, racial superiority, and religious zeal. Missionaries contributed to the imperial impulse by describing their work in terms of the conquest of enemy territory. Thus, while missionaries were motivated by what they considered to be idealism and often brought real benefits to other lands, especially in education and health, religious sentiments reinforced the ideology of American expansion. CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 CHAPTER 22 611 OVERVIEW Rationales for Imperialism Category Beliefs Racism and Social Darwinism The conviction that Anglo-Saxons were racially superior and should dominate other peoples, either to ensure national success, establish international stability, or benefit the “inferior” races by imposing American ideas and institutions on them Righteousness The conviction that Christianity, and a supporting American culture, should be aggressively spread among the benighted peoples of other lands Mahanism The conviction, following the ideas advanced by Alfred Thayer Mahan, that U.S. security required a strong navy and economic and territorial expansion Economics A variety of arguments holding that American prosperity depended on acquiring access to foreign markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities Strategic Concerns ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Other expansionists were motivated by strategic concerns, shaped by what they saw as the forces of history and geography. America’s location in the Western Hemisphere, its coastlines on two oceans, and the ambitions and activities of other nations, particularly Germany and Britain, convinced some Americans that the United States had to develop new policies to protect and promote its national security and interests. Alfred Thayer Mahan, president of the Naval War College, emphasized the importance of a strong navy for national greatness in his book The Influence of Sea Power upon History. To complement the navy, Mahan proposed that the United States build a canal across the isthmus of Panama to link its coasts, acquire naval bases in the Caribbean and the Pacific to protect the canal, and annex Hawaii and other Pacific islands to promote trade and service the fleet. Mahanism found a receptive audience. President Benjamin Harrison declared in 1891 that “as to naval stations and points of influence, we must look forward to a departure from the too conservative opinions which have been held heretofore.” Still more vocal advocates of Mahan’s program were a group of nationalistic Republicans, predominantly from the Northeast. They included politicians like Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, journalists like Whitelaw Reid and Albert Shaw, and diplomats and lawyers like John Hay and Elihu Root. Read the Document at Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power (1897) Mahanism The ideas advanced by Alfred Thayer Mahan, stressing U.S. naval, economic, and territorial expansion. Emily Hartwell, an American missionary, and her Chinese converts (“Bible Women”) in the Foochow Mission in 1902. American missionaries wanted to spread the Gospel abroad but inevitably spread American influence as well. Hartwell used the ethnocentric and militant rhetoric of the imperialism of righteousness in appealing to Americans for money and prayers for her “picket duty on the very outskirts of the army of the Lord.” The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 612 CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 Even so, Mahan was not solely responsible for the large-navy policy popular among imperialists. Its origins went back to 1881, when Congress established the Naval Advisory Board, which successfully lobbied for larger naval appropriations. An extensive program to replace the navy’s obsolete wooden ships with modern cruisers and battleships was well under way by 1890, when Mahan’s book appeared. The United States soon possessed the formidable navy the expansionists wanted. This larger navy, in turn, demanded strategic bases and coaling stations. Economic Designs One reason for the widespread support for a larger navy was its use to expand and protect America’s international trade. Nearly all Americans favored economic expansion through foreign trade. Such a policy promised national prosperity: more markets for manufacturers and farmers, greater profits for merchants and bankers, more jobs for workers. Far fewer favored the acquisition of colonies that was characteristic of European imperialism. (See Global Connections: European Colonial Imperialism.) The United States had long aggressively fostered American trade, especially in Latin America and East Asia. As early as 1844, the United States had negotiated a trade treaty with China, and ten years later a squadron under Commodore Matthew Perry had forced the Japanese to open their ports to American products. In the late nineteenth century, the dramatic expansion of the economy caused many Americans to favor more government action to open foreign markets to American exports. Exports, especially of manufactured goods, which grew ninefold between 1865 and 1900, did increase greatly in the late nineteenth century. Still, periodic depressions fed fears of overproduction. The massive unemployment and social unrest that accompanied these economic crises also provided social and political arguments for economic relief through foreign trade. In the depression of the 1890s, with the secretary of state seeing “symptoms of revolution” in the Pullman strike and Coxey’s Army of unemployed workers (see Chapter 20), the interest in foreign trade became obsessive. More systematic government efforts to promote trade seemed necessary, a conclusion strengthened by new threats to existing American markets. In that tumultuous decade, European nations raised tariff barriers against American products, and Japan and the European imperial powers began to restrict commercial opportunities in the areas of China that they controlled. Many American leaders decided that the United States had to adopt decisive new policies or face economic catastrophe. FIRST STEPS WHAT STEPS did the United States take to expand its global influence in the decades before the SpanishAmerican War? Despite the growing ideological, strategic, and economic arguments for imperialism, the government only fitfully interested itself in foreign affairs before the mid-1890s. It did not pursue a policy of isolationism from international affairs, for the nation maintained normal diplomatic and trade ties and at times vigorously intervened in Latin America and East Asia. But in general the government deferred to the initiative of private interests, reacted haphazardly to outside events, and did little to create a professional foreign service. In a few bold if inconsistent steps, however, the United States moved to expand its influence. Seward and Blaine The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Two secretaries of state, William H. Seward, secretary under Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson (1861–1869), and James G. Blaine, secretary under Presidents James Garfield and Benjamin Harrison (1881, 1889–1892), laid the foundation for a larger and more aggressive U.S. role in world affairs. Seward possessed an elaborate imperial vision, based on his understanding of commercial opportunities, strategic necessities, and national destiny. His interest in opening East Asia to American commerce and establishing American hegemony over the Caribbean anticipated the subsequent course of American expansion. Seward purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, approved the navy’s occupation of the Midway Islands in the Pacific, pushed American trade on a reluctant Japan, and repeatedly tried to acquire Caribbean naval bases (see Map 22–1). Blaine was an equally vigorous, if inconsistent, advocate of expansion. He worked to extend what he called America’s “commercial empire” in the Pacific. In an effort to induce Latin American nations to import manufactured products from the United States rather than Europe, Blaine proposed a customs union to reduce trade barriers, expecting it to strengthen U.S. control of hemispheric markets. Wary of economic subordination to the colossus of the north, however, the Latin American nations rejected Blaine’s plan but did agree to establish what eventually came to be known as the Pan American Union. Based in Washington, it helped to promote hemispheric understanding and cooperation. If U.S. officials were increasingly assertive toward Latin America and Asia, however, they remained little involved in Europe and wholly indifferent to Africa, which the European powers were then carving up into colonies. In short, despite some important precedents for the future, much of American foreign policy remained undeveloped, sporadic, and impulsive. 613 CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 W WHERE TO LEARN MORE James G. Blaine House, Augusta, Maine International organization originally established as the Commercial Bureau of American Republics by Secretary of State James Blaine’s first Pan-American Conference in 1889 to promote cooperation among nations of the Western Hemisphere through commercial and diplomatic negotiations. Pan American Union Bering Strait United States territory Alaska (purchased from Russia, 1867) RUSSIAN EMPIRE 60° CANADA Aleutian Islands (1867) MANCHURIA OUTER MONGOLIA Port Arthur Beijing KOREA CHINA Midway Islands (annexed 1867) FUKIEN PROVINCE Canton Hong Kong TAIWAN Manila UNITED STATES JAPAN Tokyo Philippines Wake Island (ceded by Spain after (annexed 1898) Spanish-American War, 1898) Guam (ceded by Spain after Spanish-American War, 1898) ATLANTIC OCEAN 30° Pearl Harbor (1887) GULF OF MEXICO Hawaiian Islands (annexed 1898) Puerto Rico (1898) MEXICO CARIBBEAN SEA PACIFIC OCEAN 0° INDIAN OCEAN American Samoa (annexed 1899) 30° 0 1000 0 1000 90° 2000 2000 3000 Miles 3000 Kilometers 120° 150° 180° 150° 120° 90° 60° United States Expansion in the Pacific, 1867–1899 Pursuing visions of a commercial empire in the Pacific, the United States steadily expanded its territorial possessions as well as its influence there in the late nineteenth century. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 MAP 22–1 How did a desire to expand American economic activity in China motivate and shape U.S. expansion in the Pacific? What light does this map shed on this question? The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 614 CHAPTER 22  CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 GLOBAL CONNECTIONS EUROPEAN COLONIAL IMPERIALISM T he United States was not alone in expanding its role in the world. Beginning in the 1870s, leading European nations engaged in a competitive struggle to partition much of Africa and Asia in pursuit of their imperial ambitions. Like Americans, Europeans advanced many justifications for imperialism. Many favored colonies to acquire markets, resources, and investment opportunities; others saw in colonies strategic advantages or international prestige. Some interwove racist and religious attitudes to justify European empire building as “an instrument for the good of humanity.” But advanced industrialization, more than the questionable blessings of religion and race, accounted for European success. Railroads, steamships, and ocean cables facilitated transportation and communication, and modern weaponry easily overcame native resistance. In the Battle of Omdurman in 1898, a British expedition armed with machine guns massacred 11,000 Sudanese tribesmen trying to defend their independence while itself suffering only 28 casualties. Said one observer: “It was not a battle but an execution.” Before the 1870s Africa had largely escaped European colonialism, but within 30 years European powers had divided much of the continent. France gained most of northwestern Africa, conquering Algeria in 1879, occupying Tunisia in 1881, and dividing Morocco with Spain. Britain acquired territory from the Mediterranean Sea to the Cape. To control the area around  the Suez Canal, viewed as the empire’s lifeline to India, the British occupied Egypt in 1882 and then seized the Sudan. With unimaginable brutality, Belgium’s King Leopold colonized the Congo in central Africa. Germany established colonies in southwestern Africa and, like Italy, in East Africa. European powers also advanced on Asia. To its earlier control of India, Great Britain added Burma and Malaya. France extended its authority over Indochina in the 1880s and 1890s by gaining control of Vietnam and Laos. Russia expanded its empire into contiguous territories, securing Turkestan in Central Asia and then reaching toward East Asia, particularly the Manchurian region of China. Other nations also sought spheres of influence in China, acquiring ports, naval stations, and railroad and mining concessions. Competitive imperialism risked conflict, between expansive nations as well as with colonized peoples, but such risks did not deter aspiring imperialists. In 1887 the Japanese foreign minister insisted: “We have to establish a new, European-style empire on the edge of Asia.” And in 1895 an American leader declared of European imperialism: “The United States must not fall out of the line of march.” • While many Americans distinguished their foreign policy goals from European imperialism, how might the nation’s expansion into the American West and its treatment of Native Americans correspond to such colonialism? Hawaii Read the Document at Henry Cabot Lodge, Annex of Hawaii (1895) The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Blaine regarded Hawaii as “indispensably” part of “the American system.” As early as 1842, the United States had announced its opposition to European control of Hawaii, a key waystation in the China trade and where New England missionaries and whalers were already active. Although Hawaii continued to be ruled by native monarchs, American influence grew, particularly as other Americans arrived to establish sugar plantations and eventually dominate the economy. Treaties in 1875 and 1887 integrated the islands into the American economy and gave the United States control over Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu. In 1887, the United States rejected a proposal from Britain and France for a joint guarantee of Hawaii’s independence and endorsed a new Hawaiian constitution that gave political power to wealthy white residents. The obvious next step was U.S. annexation, which Blaine endorsed in 1891. A combination of factors soon impelled American planters to bid for annexation. The McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 effectively closed the U.S. market to Hawaiian sugar producers, threatening their economic ruin. At the same time, Queen Liliuokalani moved to restore native control CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 of Hawaiian affairs. To ensure market access and protect their political authority, the American planters decided to seek annexation to the United States. In 1893, they overthrew the queen. John Stevens, the American diplomatic representative, ordered U.S. marines to help the rebels and then declared an American protectorate over the new Hawaiian government. A delegation from the new provisional government, which did not include any native Hawaiians, went to Washington to draft a treaty for annexation. President Harrison signed the pact but could not get Senate approval before the new Cleveland administration took office. Grover Cleveland immediately called for an investigation of the whole affair. Soon convinced that “the undoubted sentiment of the people is for the Queen, against the provisional Government, and against annexation,” Cleveland apologized to the queen for the “flagrant wrong” done her by the “reprehensible conduct” of U.S. diplomats and troops. But the American-dominated provisional government refused to step down, and Cleveland’s rejection of annexation set off a noisy debate in the United States. Many Republicans strongly supported annexation, which they regarded as merely part of a larger plan of expansion. Democrats generally opposed annexation. They doubted, as Missouri senator George Vest declared, whether the United States should desert its traditional principles and “venture upon the great colonial system of the European powers.” The Hawaiian episode of 1893 thus foreshadowed the arguments over imperialism at the end of the century and emphasized the policy differences between Democrats and the increasingly expansionist Republicans. CHAPTER 22 615 As other imperial powers look on, the United States abandons its traditional principles to rush headlong into world affairs. Uncle Sam would not always find it a smooth ride. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Chile and Venezuela American reactions to developments in other countries in the 1890s also reflected an increasingly assertive national policy and excitable public opinion. In 1891, American sailors on shore leave in Chile became involved in a drunken brawl that left two of them dead, 17 injured, and dozens in jail. Encouraged by a combative navy, President Harrison threatened military retaliation against Chile, provoking an outburst of bellicose nationalism in the United States. Harrison relented only when Chile apologized and paid an indemnity. A few years later, the United States again threatened war over a minor issue but against a more formidable opponent. In 1895, President Cleveland intervened in a boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela over British Guiana. Cleveland was motivated not only by the long-standing U.S. goal of challenging Britain for Latin American markets but also by ever more expansive notions of the Monroe Doctrine and the authority of the United States. Secretary of State Richard Olney sent Britain a blunt note demanding arbitration of the disputed territory and stoutly asserting American supremacy in the Western Hemisphere. Cleveland urged Congress to establish a commission to determine the boundary and enforce its decision by war if necessary. As war fever swept the United States, Britain agreed to arbitration, recognizing the limited nature of the issue that so convulsed Anglo-American relations. Cleveland’s assertion of U.S. hemispheric dominance angered Latin Americans, and their fears deepened when the United States decided arbitration terms with Britain without consulting Venezuela, which protested before bowing to American pressure. The United States had intervened less to protect Venezuela from the British bully than to advance its own hegemony. The further significance of the Venezuelan crisis, Captain Mahan noted, lay in its “awakening of our countrymen to the fact that we must come out of our isolation . . . and take our share in the turmoil of the world.” The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 616 CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR WHAT WERE the most important consequences of the Spanish-American War? The forces pushing the United States toward imperialism and international power came to a head in the Spanish-American War. Cuba’s quest for independence from the oppressive colonial control of Spain activated Americans’ long-standing interest in the island. Many sympathized with the Cuban rebels’ yearning for freedom, others worried that disorder in Cuba threatened their own economic and political interests, and some thought that intervention would increase the influence of the United States in the Caribbean and along key Pacific routes to Asian markets. But few foresaw that the war that finally erupted in 1898 would dramatically change U.S. relationships with the rest of the world and give the United States a colonial empire. The Cuban Revolution yellow press A deliberately sensational journalism of scandal and exposure designed to attract an urban mass audience and increase advertising revenues.  QUICK REVIEW The Press and Cuba 쏆 쏆 쏆 Yellow press stimulated interest in Cuba. Newspapers emphasized violence, sex, and corruption. Much of America’s religious press advocated American intervention. The last major European colony in Latin America, Cuba held an economic potential that attracted American business interests and a strategic significance for any Central American canal. In the late nineteenth century, American investors expanded their economic influence in Cuba, while Cubans themselves rebelled repeatedly but unsuccessfully against increasingly harsh Spanish rule. Cuban discontent erupted again in 1895, when the Cuban patriot José Martí launched another revolt. The rebellion was a classic guerrilla war, with the rebels controlling the countryside and the Spanish army the towns and cities. American economic interests were seriously affected, for both Cubans and Spaniards destroyed American property and disrupted American trade. But the brutality with which Spain attempted to suppress the revolt promoted American sympathy for the Cuban insurgents. Determined to cut the rebels off from their peasant supporters, the Spanish herded most civilians into “reconcentration camps,” where tens of thousands died of starvation and disease. American sympathy was further aroused by the sensationalist yellow press. To attract readers and boost advertising revenues, the popular press of the day adopted bold headlines, fevered editorials, and real or exaggerated stories of violence, sex, and corruption. A circulation war helped stimulate interest in a Cuban war. Failure to intervene to protect the innocent from Spanish lust and cruelty, insisted the yellow journalists, would be dishonorable and cowardly. The nation’s religious press, partly because it reflected the prejudice of many Protestants against Catholic Spain, also advocated American intervention. The Catholic Herald of New York sarcastically referred to the “bloodthirsty preachers” of the Protestant churches, but such preachers undeniably influenced American opinion against Spain. As the Cuban rebellion dragged on, more and more Americans advocated intervention to stop the carnage, protect U.S. investments, or uphold various principles. In the election of 1896, both major parties endorsed Cuban independence. Growing Tensions The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 In his 1897 inaugural address, President William McKinley outlined an expansionist program ranging from further enlargement of the navy to the annexation of Hawaii and the construction of a Central American canal in Nicaragua, but his administration soon focused on Cuba. McKinley’s principal complaint was that chronic disorder in Cuba disrupted American investments and agitated public opinion. Personally opposed to military intervention, McKinley first used diplomacy to press Spain to adopt reforms that would settle the rebellion. In late 1897, Spain modified its brutal military tactics and offered limited autonomy to Cuba. But Cubans insisted on complete independence, a demand that Spain rejected. CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 Relations between the United States and Spain deteriorated. On February 15, 1898, the U.S. battleship Maine blew up in Havana harbor, killing 260 men. The Spanish were not responsible for the tragedy, which a modern naval inquiry has attributed to an internal accident. But many Americans agreed with Theodore Roosevelt, the assistant secretary of the navy, who called it “an act of dirty treachery on the part of the Spaniards” and told McKinley that only war was “compatible with our national honor.” Popular anger was inflamed, but the sinking of the Maine by itself did not bring war, though it did restrict McKinley’s options and pressure him to be more assertive toward Spain. Other pressures soon began to build on the president. Increasingly, business interests favored war as less disruptive than a volatile peace that threatened their investments. Further, McKinley feared that a moderate policy would endanger Republican congressional candidates. At the end of March 1898, McKinley sent Spain an ultimatum. He demanded an armistice in Cuba, an end to the reconcentration policy, and the acceptance of American arbitration, which implied Cuban independence. Again, Spain made concessions, abolishing reconcentration and declaring a unilateral armistice. But McKinley had already begun war preparations. He submitted a war message to Congress on April 11, asking for authority to use force against Spain. Congress declared war on Spain on April 25, 1898. A few national leaders welcomed the war as a step toward imperialism, but there was little popular support for an imperialist foreign policy. Most interventionists were not imperialists, and Congress added the Teller Amendment to the war resolution, disclaiming any intention of annexing Cuba and promising that Cubans would govern themselves. Congress also refused to approve either a canal bill or the annexation of Hawaii. Nevertheless, the Spanish-American War did turn the nation toward imperialism.  QUICK REVIEW Pressure on McKinley to Go to War 쏆 쏆 쏆 ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Spain was reluctant to modify oppressive policies in Cuba. Destruction of the Maine inflamed public opinion. Political advisers warned of election defeats if action were not taken. Read the Document at The Teller Amendment (1898) Teller Amendment A congressional resolution adopted in 1898 renouncing any American intention to annex Cuba. War and Empire The decisive engagement of the war took place not in Cuba but in another Spanish colony, the Philippines, and it involved the favored tool of the expansionists, the new navy (see Map 22–2). Once war was declared, Commodore George Dewey led the U.S. Asiatic squadron into Manila Bay and destroyed the much weaker Spanish fleet on May 1, 1898. This dramatic victory galvanized expansionist sentiment in the United States. With Dewey’s triumph, exulted one expansionist, “We are taking our proper rank among the nations of the world. We are after markets, the greatest markets now existing in the world.” To expand this foothold in Asia, McKinley ordered troops to the Philippines, postponing the military expedition to Cuba itself. Dewey’s victory also precipitated the annexation of Hawaii, which had seemed unlikely only weeks before. Annexationists now pointed to the islands’ strategic importance as stepping stones to Manila. In July, Congress approved annexation, a decision welcomed by Hawaii’s white minority. Native Hawaiians solemnly protested this step taken “without reference to the consent of the people of the Hawaiian Islands.” Filipinos would soon face the same American imperial impulse. Military victory also came swiftly in Cuba, once the U.S. Army finally landed in late June. Victory came despite bureaucratic bungling in the War Department, which left the American army poorly led, trained, and supplied. More than 5,000 Americans died of diseases and accidents brought on by such mismanagement; only 379 were killed in battle. State militias supplemented the small regular army, as did volunteer units, such as the famous Rough Riders, a cavalry regiment of cowboys and eastern dandies organized by Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt. While the Rough Riders captured public attention, other units were more effective. The 10th Negro Cavalry, for example, played the crucial role in capturing San Juan Hill, a 617 Read the Document at William McKinley, ”Decision on the Philippines” (1900)  QUICK REVIEW Dewey’s Victory 쏆 쏆 쏆 May 1, 1898: Dewey’s squadron destroys Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Expansionists saw victory as an opportunity for greater U.S. presence in the region. McKinley followed up Dewey’s victory by sending troops to the Philippines. The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 618 CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 0 UNITED STATES American forces Spanish forces American victories BAHAMA ISLANDS (Br.) Havana HONDURAS of HAINAN Tonkin PACIFIC OCEAN LUZON CUBA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Santiago CAYMAN ISLANDS (Br.) Hong Kong (Br.) Gulf ATLANTIC OCEAN TAIWAN (Japanese) Canton y we De USS Maine sunk Feb. 15, 1898 400 Kilometers CHINA American naval blockade Spanish possessions GULF Tampa OF FLORIDA MEXICO 400 Miles 0 San Juan PHILIPPINES SOUTH CHINA SEA FRENCH INDOCHINA Manila HAITI PUERTO RICO JAMAICA (Br.) LEYTE BRITISH NORTH BORNEO CARIBBEAN SEA Sulu Sea MINDANAO BRUNEI El Caney July 1, 1898 NICARAGUA Santiago PANAMA Santiago Harbor Kettle Hill July 1, 1898 San Juan Hill July 1, 1898 Manila surrenders Aug. 13, 1898 n taa ula Ba ins n Pe COSTA RICA SARAWAK BORNEO CELEBES Corregidor 0 0 200 200 400 Miles Spanish fleet destroyed July 3, 1898 Dewey Manila Bay Manila Spanish fleet destroyed May 1, 1898 400 Kilometers MAP 22–2 The Spanish-American War The United States gained quick victories in both theaters of the Spanish-American War. Its naval power proved decisive, with Commodore Dewey destroying one enemy fleet in the Philippines, and a second U.S. naval force cutting off the Spanish in Cuba. How did the Philippines become part of a war that began in Cuba? What does the American attack on the Philippines tell you about the goals of American officials during the Spanish-American War? battle popularly associated with the Rough Riders. Nevertheless, the Rough Riders gained the credit, thanks in part to Roosevelt’s self-serving and well-promoted account of the conflict. U.S. naval power again proved decisive. In a lopsided battle on July 3, the Spanish squadron in Cuba was destroyed, isolating the Spanish army and guaranteeing its defeat. U.S. forces then seized the nearby Spanish colony of Puerto Rico without serious opposition. Humbled, Spain signed an armistice ending the war on August 12. Read the Document at Mark Twain, ”Incident in the Philippines” (1924) at Roosevelt’s Rough Riders The armistice required Spain to accept Cuban independence, cede Puerto Rico and Guam (a Pacific island between Hawaii and the Philippines) to the United States, and allow the Americans to occupy Manila, pending the final disposition of the Philippines at a formal peace conference. The acquisition of Puerto Rico and Guam indicated the expansionist nature the conflict had assumed for the United States. So did the postponement of the Philippine issue. McKinley knew that delay would permit the advocates of expansion to build public support for annexation. The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Watch the Video The Treaty of Paris ISBN 1-256-41052-7 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 CHAPTER 22 619 McKinley defended his decision to acquire the Philippines with self-righteous imperialist rhetoric, promising to extend Christian influence and American values. But he was motivated primarily by a determination to use the islands to strengthen America’s political and commercial position in East Asia. Moreover, he believed the Filipinos poorly suited to self-rule, and he feared that Germany or Japan might seize the Philippines if the United States did not. Meeting in Paris in December, American and Spanish negotiators settled the final terms for peace. Spain agreed—despite Filipino demands for independence—to cede the Philippines to the United States. The decision to acquire the Philippines sparked a dramatic debate over the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Imperialists invoked the familiar arguments of economic expansion, national destiny, and strategic necessity, while asserting that Americans had religious and Uncle Sam considers the expansionist menu offered by President McKinley. The Sandwich Islands (Hawaii) was only the racial responsibilities to advance civilization by appetizer. uplifting backward peoples. Opponents of the treaty raised profound questions about national goals and ideals (see American Views: A Southern Senator Opposes Annexation). Opponents included such prominent figures as the civil service reformer Carl Schurz, the steel baron Andrew Carnegie, the social reformer Jane Addams, the labor leader Samuel Gompers, and the author Mark Twain. Their organizational base was the Anti-Imperialist League, which campaigned against the treaty, distributing pamphlets, petitioning Congress, and holding rallies. The League’s criticisms reflected a conviction that imperialism was a repudiation of the moral and political traditions embodied in the Declaration of Independence. The acquisition of overseas colonies, they argued, conflicted with the nation’s commitment to liberty and its claim to moral superiority. But other arguments were less high-minded. Many anti-imperialists objected to expansion on the racist grounds that Filipinos were inferior and unassimilable. Gompers feared that cheap Asian labor would undercut the wages and living standards of American workers. The San Francisco Call, representing California-Hawaiian sugar interests, wanted no competition from the Philippines. Finally, on February 6, 1899, the Senate narrowly ratified the treaty. All but two Republicans supported the pact; most Democrats opposed it, although several voted in favor after William Jennings Bryan suggested that approval was necessary to end the war and detach the Philippines from Spain. Thereafter, he hoped, a congressional resolution would give the Filipinos their independence. But by a single vote, the Republicans defeated a Democratic proposal for Philippine independence once a stable government had been established; the United States would keep the islands. Republicans countered William Jennings Bryan’s attempt to make imperialism an Bryan attempted to make the election of 1900 a referendum on issue in 1900 by wrapping themselves in patriotism and the American flag. “Take “the paramount issue” of imperialism, promising to free the Philippines if the Your Choice,” a cartoon from Judge, posed President McKinley raising Old Glory Democrats won. But other issues determined the outcome. Some of the most over the Philippines with a disheveled and frantic Bryan chopping down the symbol of American pride and power. ardent anti-imperialists were conservatives who remained loyal to McKinley The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 620 CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 AMERICAN VIEWS  A Southern Senator Opposes Annexation I n the Senate’s debate over the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, ending the Spanish-American War and ceding the Philippines to the United States, both supporters and opponents appealed to noble ideals, invoked base motives, and expressed anxiety for the future. Senator James H. Berry, a conservative Democrat from Arkansas, delivered a particularly forceful attack upon the treaty. The following passages from his speech outline some of his views of what he termed President McKinley’s “wild scheme of colonization and acquisition of territory.” • In what ways did Berry regard the treaty as a repudiation of the war itself? • What were the dangers that Berry saw for the United States in approving the treaty? • What forces did Berry believe were directing the development of American foreign policy? When the protocol for peace was signed on the 12th day of last August, I think it could have been truthfully said that there had never been a time since the organization of the Government when the American Republic commanded so much respect from the nations of the world, and never a time when its own  QUICK REVIEW The Anti-Imperialist League 쏆 쏆 쏆 Central to campaign against the Treaty of Paris (ratified 1899). League members saw treaty as a repudiation of American moral and political traditions. Many anti-imperialists objected to expansion on racist grounds. WHAT WAS the nature of U.S. involvement in Asia?  citizens felt for that Republic so much love, so much devotion, and so much admiration. Less than six months have passed and there are thousands and tens of thousands of intelligent and patriotic citizens who sincerely believe that the danger of the destruction and overthrow of our institutions has never been so great as it is today. What has been the cause of the remarkable change in the policy of our Government? What has been the mighty influence that has caused us to depart from the teachings of our fathers and to enter upon a course of action directly opposed to all that we have professed? . . . The cause for the universal rejoicing of our people at the close of the war can be easily understood. . . . The pride and glory that the American people felt in the Army and Navy was greatly enhanced by the fact that all felt and knew that the war had been waged by us from unselfish and disinterested motives. We had fought to make others free as we ourselves were free; we had fought to enable the Cuban people to throw off their colonial dependence upon Spain and establish a free and independent government for themselves; we had disclaimed, in the act declaring war, any intention of acquiring territory in the island. The President because they could not tolerate Bryan’s economic policies. Republicans also benefited from the prosperity the country experienced under McKinley after the hard 1890s, and they played on the nationalist emotions evoked by the war, especially by nominating the “hero of San Juan Hill,” Theodore Roosevelt, for vice president. Bryan lost again, as in 1896, and under Republican leadership, the United States became an imperial nation. IMPERIAL AMBITIONS: THE UNITED STATES AND EAST ASIA, 1899–1917 The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 In 1899, as the United States occupied its new empire, Assistant Secretary of State John Bassett Moore observed that the nation had become “a world power. . . . Where formerly we had only commercial interests, we now have territorial and political interests as well.” American policies to promote these expanded interests focused first on East Asia and Latin America, where the Spanish-American War had provided the United States with both opportunities and challenges. In Asia, the first issue concerned the fate of the Philippines, but looming beyond it were American ambitions in China, where other imperial nations had their own goals. CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 himself had said that the forcible acquisition of territory would not be tolerated by the American people, and that such an attempt would be criminal aggression. The American people were proud because they had done a brave and generous and unselfish deed, which would be a gratification to them and to their children in all the years to come. They had no thought then that the great combinations of wealth and greed would be able thereafter to unite and bring to bear such a mighty influence as would control the public press, to a large extent public sentiment, the President, and the Senate of the United States, and secure the adoption of a policy that would hereafter forever dim and obscure the glory that they had fairly won. We fought Spain in order to free the Cubans from her control. We can not, in my opinion, without placing a blot upon the fair name of the Republic, without dishonor to ourselves, fight the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in order to subject them to our control. But such is the proposition made to us today. . . . We are told that we must conquer these people in the interest of humanity and for their own good, that we must entail enormous expense upon our own people, that we must drag our youth to that far-off land, and kill and slaughter hundreds and, it may be, thousands of CHAPTER 22 621 these people in order that we may civilize and Christianize the remainder. . . . [But] the plea of humanity is not the true cause of this movement. It doubtless has controlled the judgment of many, but the all-powerful force behind it is the desire of extending trade and commerce. It is the desire for gain, and not to relieve suffering. . . . But it is not the people of these far-off islands that concern me most; it is the effect upon our own country, our own Government, and our own institutions; . . . it is the regret that I feel for the great demoralization of our people which must come when all their ideals are shattered and when we adopt a line of action which we have for more than a hundred years denounced as unjust and wicked. . . . We are entering upon a dangerous field. We are doing it on the pretense, it may be, of humanity and Christianity, but behind it all, I repeat, is the desire for trade and commerce; and whenever and wherever considerations of money making are placed above the honor and fair fame of this Republic, the men who are doing it are undermining the very foundations of the Government under which we live. Source: Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., pp. 1297–99 (January 31, 1899). ISBN 1-256-41052-7 The Filipino-American War Filipino nationalists, like the Cuban insurgents, were already fighting Spain for their independence before the sudden American intervention. The Filipino leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, welcomed Dewey’s naval victory as the sign of a de facto alliance with the United States; he then issued a declaration of independence and proclaimed the Philippine Republic. His own troops captured most of Luzon, the Philippines’ major island, before the U.S. Army arrived. When the Treaty of Paris provided for U.S. ownership rather than independence, Filipinos felt betrayed. Mounting tensions erupted in a battle between American and Filipino troops outside Manila on February 4, 1899, sparking a long and brutal war. Ultimately, the United States used nearly four times as many soldiers to suppress the Filipinos as it had to defeat Spain in Cuba and, in a tragic irony, employed many of the same brutal methods for which it had condemned Spain. U.S. military commanders adopted ever harsher measures, often directed at civilians, who were crowded into concentration camps in which perhaps 200,000 died. American troops often made little effort to distinguish between soldiers and noncombatants, viewing all Filipinos with racial antagonism. After reporting one massacre of a thousand men, women, and children, an American soldier declared, “I am in my glory when I can sight my gun on some dark skin and pull the trigger.” Read the Document at William Graham Sumner, “On Empire and the Philippines” (1898) The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 622 CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 A California newspaper defended such actions with remarkable candor: “There has been too much hypocrisy about this Philippine business. . . . Let us all be frank. WE DO NOT WANT THE FILIPINOS. WE DO WANT THE PHILIPPINES. All of our troubles in this annexation matter have been caused by the presence in the Philippine Islands of the Filipinos. . . . The more of them killed the better. It seems harsh. But they must yield before the superior race.” Other Americans denounced the war. The Anti-Imperialist League revived, citing the war as proof of the corrosive influence of imperialism on the nation’s morals and principles. Women figured prominently in mass meetings and lobbying efforts to have the troops returned, their moral stature further undercutting the rationale for colonial wars. By 1902, the realities of imperial policy—including American casualties far exceeding those of the Spanish-American War—disillusioned most of those who had clamored to save Cuba. By that time, however, the American military had largely suppressed the rebellion, and the United States had established a colonial government headed by an American governor general appointed by the president. Filipino involvement in the government was limited on educational and religious grounds. Compared to the brutal war policies, U.S. colonial rule was relatively benign, though paternalistic. William Howard Taft, the first governor general, launched a program that brought the islands new schools and roads, a public health system, and an economy tied closely to both the United States and a small Filipino elite. Independence would take nearly half a century. China and the Open Door America’s determined involvement in the Philippines reflected its preoccupation with China. By the mid-1890s, other powers threatened prospects for American commercial expansion in China. Japan, after defeating China in 1895, annexed Formosa (Taiwan) and secured economic privileges in the mainland province of Fukien (Fujian); the major European powers then competed aggressively to claim other areas of China as their own spheres of influence Regions dominated and controlled by an outside power.  QUICK REVIEW Filipino-American War 쏆 쏆 쏆 Filipinos felt betrayed by Treaty of Paris. February 4, 1899: fighting between American and Filipino troops sparked war. 1902: U.S. colonial rule is established after a brutal war. Open Door American policy of seeking equal trade and investment opportunities in foreign nations or regions. spheres of influence. The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 These developments alarmed the American business community. It was confident that, given an equal opportunity, the United States would prevail in international trade because of its efficient production and marketing systems. But the creation of exclusive spheres of influence limited the opportunity to compete. In early 1898, business leaders organized the Committee on American Interests in China to lobby Washington to promote American trade in the shrinking Chinese market. The committee persuaded the nation’s chambers of commerce to petition the McKinley administration to act. This campaign influenced McKinley’s interest in acquiring the Philippines, but the Philippines, in the words of Mark Hanna, were only a “foothold”; China was the real target. In 1899, the government moved to advance American interests in China. Without consulting the Chinese, Secretary of State John Hay asked the imperial powers to maintain an Open Door for the commercial and financial activities of all nations within their Chinese spheres of influence. Privately, Hay had already approved a plan to seize a Chinese port for the United States, if necessary to join in the partition of China, but equal opportunity for trade and investment would serve American interests far better. It would avoid the expense of military occupation, avert further domestic criticism of U.S. imperialism, and guarantee a wider sphere for American business. The other nations replied evasively, except for Russia, which rejected the Open Door concept. In 1900, an antiforeign Chinese nationalist movement known as the Boxers laid siege to the diplomatic quarter in Beijing. The defeat of the Boxer Rebellion by a multinational military force, to which the United States contributed troops, again raised the prospect of a division of China among the colonial powers. Hay sent a second Open Door note, CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 CHAPTER 22 623 reaffirming “the principle of equal and impartial trade” and respect for China’s territorial integrity. Despite Hay’s notes, China remained a tempting arena for imperial schemes. But the Open Door became a cardinal doctrine of American foreign policy in the twentieth century, a means by which the United States sought to dominate foreign markets. The United States promoted an informal or economic empire, as opposed to the traditional territorial colonial empire identified with European powers. Henceforth, American economic interests expected the U.S. government to oppose any developments that threatened to close other nations’ economies to American penetration and to advance “private enterprise” abroad. Rivalry with Japan and Russia A diplomatic agreement in 1907 between Japan and the United States curtailing but not abolishing Japanese immigration. Gentlemen’s Agreement At the turn of the twentieth century, both the Japanese and the Russians were more deeply involved in East Asia than was the United States. Japan and Russia expressed little support for the Open Door, which they correctly saw as favoring American interests over their own. But in pursuing their ambitions in China, the two countries came into conflict with each other. Alarmed at the threat of Russian expansion in Manchuria and Korea, Japan in 1904 QUICK REVIEW attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur and defeated the Russian army in Manchuria. American sympathies in the Russo-Japanese War lay with Japan, for the Russians were Trade with China 쏆 American business interests lobbied attempting to close Manchuria to foreign trade. President Theodore Roosevelt privately for access to China’s markets. complained that a reluctant American public opinion meant that “we cannot fight to keep 쏆 1899: Secretary of State John Hay calls Manchuria open.” He welcomed the Japanese attack in the belief that “Japan is playing our game.” for an Open Door policy. But he soon began to fear that an overwhelming Japanese victory would threaten American inter- 쏆 Open Door became a central doctrine of American foreign policy. ests as much as Russian expansionism did, so he skillfully mediated an end to the war. In the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, Japan won control of Russia’s sphere of influence in Manchuria, half the Russian island of Sakhalin, and recognition of its domination of Korea. The treaty marked Japan’s emergence as a great power, but, ironically, it worsened relations with the United States. Anti-American riots broke out in Tokyo. The Japanese people blamed Roosevelt for obstructing further Japanese gains and blocking a Russian indemnity that would have helped Japan pay for the war. Tensions were further aggravated by San Francisco’s decision in 1906 to segregate Asian and white schoolchildren. Japan regarded this as a racist insult, and Roosevelt worried that “the infernal fools in California” would provoke war. Finally, he persuaded the city to rescind the school order in exchange for his limiting Japanese immigration, which lay at the heart of California’s hostility. Under the Gentlemen’s Agreement, worked out through a series of diplomatic notes in 1907 and 1908, Japan agreed to deny passports to workers trying to come to the United States, and the United States promised not to prohibit Japanese immigration overtly or completely. The United States and Japan entered into other agreements aimed at calming their mutual suspicions in East Asia but failed to mend the deteriorating relationship. Increasingly, Japan began to exclude American trade from its territories in East Asia and to press for further control over China. General Leonard Wood complained that the Japanese “intend to dominate Asia as we do the Americas.” The United States usually preferred the “annexation of trade” to the annexation of Elihu Root, Roosevelt’s secretary of state, insisted that the Open Door territory. The Open Door policy promised to advance American commercial and American access had to be maintained but asserted also that the expansion, but Uncle Sam had to restrain other imperialists with colonial objectives. ISBN 1-256-41052-7  The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 624 CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 United States did not want to be “a protagonist in a controversy in China with Russia and Japan or with either of them.” The problem was that the United States could not sustain the Open Door without becoming a protagonist in China. This paradox, and the unwillingness to commit military force, would plague American foreign policy in Asia for decades. IMPERIAL POWER: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA, 1899–1917 HOW DID Latin Americans respond to U.S. intervention in the region? In Latin America, where no major powers directly challenged American objectives as Japan and Russia did in Asia, the United States was more successful in exercising imperial power (see Map 22–3). In the two decades after the Spanish-American War, the United States intervened militarily in Latin America no fewer than 20 times to promote its own strategic and economic interests (see Overview, U.S. Interventions in Latin America, 1891–1933). Intervention at times achieved American goals, but it often ignored the wishes and interests of Latin Americans, provoked resistance and disorder, and aroused lasting ill will. U.S. Rule in Puerto Rico  QUICK REVIEW U.S. Rule in Puerto Rico 쏆 쏆 쏆 Insular Cases (1901): U.S. Supreme Court upholds Puerto Rico’s inferior status as “unincorporated territory.” Economic development of island favors American investors. Puerto Ricans leave island in growing numbers to seek work in United States. Military invasion during the Spanish-American War and the Treaty of Paris brought Puerto Rico under American control, with mixed consequences. A military government improved transportation and sanitation and developed public health and education. But to the dismay of Puerto Ricans, who had been promised that American rule would bestow “the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization,” their political freedoms were curtailed. In 1900, the United States established a civil government, but it was under U.S. control, with popular participation even less than under Spain. In the so-called Insular Cases (1901), the Supreme Court upheld the authority of Congress to establish an inferior status for Puerto Rico as an “unincorporated territory” without promise of statehood. Disappointed Puerto Ricans pressed to end this colonial status, some advocating independence, others statehood or merely greater autonomy. This division would continue for decades to come. In 1917, the United States granted citizenship and greater political rights to Puerto Ricans, but their island remained an unincorporated territory under an American governor appointed by the president. Economic development also disappointed most islanders, for American investors quickly gained control of the best land and pursued large-scale sugar production for the U.S. market. The landless peasants struggled to survive as workers on large plantations. Increasingly, Puerto Ricans left their homes to seek work in the United States. Cuba as a U.S. Protectorate The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Despite the Teller Amendment, the Spanish-American War did not leave Cuba independent. McKinley opposed independence and distrusted the Cuban rebels. Accordingly, a U.S. military government was established in the island. Only in 1900, when the Democrats made an issue of imperialism, did the McKinley administration move toward permitting a Cuban government and withdrawing American troops. McKinley summoned a Cuban convention to draft a constitution under the direction of the American military governor, General Leonard Wood. Reflecting the continuing U.S. fear of Cuban autonomy, the constitution restricted suffrage on the basis of property and education, leaving few Cubans with the right to vote. Even so, before removing its troops, the United States wanted to ensure its control over Cuba. It therefore made U.S. withdrawal contingent on Cuba’s adding to its constitution CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 NEBRASKA NEW YORK IOWA COLORADO ILLINOIS INDIANA KANSAS PENNSYLVANIA OHIO MISSOURI UNI TE D NEW MEXICO STATE S KENTUCKY WEST VIRGINIA VIRGINIA MASSACHUSETTS RHODE ISLAND CONNECTICUT NEW JERSEY DELAWARE MARYLAND OKLAHOMA ARKANSAS NORTH CAROLINA TENNESSEE Columbus Santa Ysabel 625 U.S. Expeditionary Force, 1916–1917 TEXAS MISSISSIPPI ALABAMA GEORGIA A T L A N T I C O C E A N LOUISIANA Houston CHIHUAHUA SOUTH CAROLINA New Orleans Parral FLORIDA GULF OF MEXICO BAHAMAS (Br.) Miami MEXICO U.S. troops, 1898–1902, 1906–1909; 1912, 1917–1922 Platt Amendment, 1903–1934 Havana Tampico CUBA U.S. troops, 1915–1934 Financial supervision, 1916–1941 U.S. takes control of customs house, 1905 U.S. troops, 1916–1924 Financial supervision, 1905–1941 Guantánamo U.S. possession after 1898 VIRGIN ISLANDS (purchased from Denmark, 1917) U.S. seizure, 1914 Mexico City Vera Cruz U.S. Naval Base, 1903 BRITISH HONDURAS GUATEMALA HONDURAS EL SALVADOR HAITI JAMAICA (Br.) U.S. troops, 1907, 1924–1925 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC PUERTO RICO GUADELOUPE (Fr.) C A R I B B E A N U.S. troops, 1909–1910, 1912–1925, 1926–1933 Financial supervision, 1911–1924 S E A NICARAGUA U.S. leased Corn Islands, 1914 Caracas TRINIDAD (Br.) P A C I F I C Canal option, 1916 O C E A N 0 100 200 300 400 Miles Venezuela debt crisis, 1903–1904 COSTA RICA PANAMA U.S. acquired Canal Zone, 1904 Canal completed, 1914 MARTINIQUE (Fr.) BARBADOS (Br.) VENEZUELA COLOMBIA GUYANA Bogota 0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers BRAZIL MAP 22–3 The United States in the Caribbean For strategic and economic reasons, the United States repeatedly intervened in the Caribbean in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Such interventions protected the U.S. claim to dominance but often provoked great hostility among Latin Americans. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 What does this map tell you about the attitudes of American policymakers toward the Caribbean and Central America? the provisions of the Platt Amendment, drawn up in 1901 by the U.S. secretary of war. The Platt Amendment restricted Cuba’s autonomy in diplomatic relations with other countries and in internal financial policies, required Cuba to lease naval bases to the United States, and most important, authorized U.S. intervention to maintain order and preserve Cuban independence. As General Wood correctly observed, “There is, of course, little or no independence left Cuba under the Platt Amendment.” To preserve American influence, the United States sent troops into Cuba three times between 1906 and 1917. During their occupations of Cuba, the Americans modernized its financial system, built roads and public schools, and developed a public-health and sanitation program that eradicated the deadly disease of yellow fever. But most Cubans A stipulation the United States had inserted into the Cuban constitution in 1901 restricting Cuban autonomy and authorizing U.S. intervention and naval bases. Platt Amendment The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 626 CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 OVERVIEW U.S. Interventions in Latin America, 1891–1933 Country Type of Intervention Year Chile Ultimatum 1891–1892 Colombia Military intervention 1903 Cuba Occupation 1898–1902, 1906–1909, 1912, 1917–1922 Dominican Republic Military and administrative intervention 1905–1907 Occupation 1916–1924 Haiti Occupation 1915–1934 Mexico Military intervention 1914, 1916–1917 Nicaragua Occupation 1912–1925, 1927–1933 Panama Acquisition of Canal Zone 1904 Puerto Rico Military invasion and territorial acquisition 1898 Read the Document at Platt Amendment (1901) Read the Document at From Then to Now Online: The Panama Canal Read the Document at Theodore Roosevelt, Panama Canal Message to Congress (1903) thought that these material benefits did not compensate for their loss of political and economic independence. The Platt Amendment remained the basis of U.S. policy toward Cuba until 1934. The Panama Canal The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 The Spanish-American War intensified the long American interest in a canal through Central America to eliminate the lengthy and dangerous ocean route around South America. Its commercial value seemed obvious, but the war emphasized its strategic importance. McKinley declared that a canal was now “demanded by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the prospective expansion of our influence and commerce in the Pacific.” Theodore Roosevelt moved quickly to implement McKinley’s commitment to a canal after becoming president in 1901. First, Roosevelt persuaded Britain to renounce its treaty right to a joint role with the United States in any canal venture. Where to build the canal was a problem. One possibility was Nicaragua, where a sea-level canal could be built. Another was Panama, then part of Colombia. A canal through Panama would require an elaborate system of locks. But the French-owned Panama Canal Company had been unsuccessfully trying to build a canal in Panama and was now eager to sell its rights to the project before they expired in 1904. In 1902, Congress directed Roosevelt to purchase the French company’s claims for $40 million and build the canal in Panama if Colombia ceded a strip of land across the isthmus on reasonable terms. Otherwise, Roosevelt was to negotiate with Nicaragua for the alternative route. In 1903, Roosevelt pressed Colombia to sell a canal zone to the United States for $10 million and an annual payment of $250,000. Colombia, however, rejected the proposal, fearing the loss of its sovereignty in Panama and hoping for more money. Roosevelt was furious. After threatening “those contemptible little creatures” in Colombia, he began writing a message to Congress proposing military action to seize the isthmus of Panama. Instead of using direct force, however, Roosevelt worked with Philippe BunauVarilla, a French official of the Panama Canal Company, to exploit long-smoldering CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 CHAPTER 22 627 Panamanian discontent with Colombia. Roosevelt ordered U.S. naval forces to Panama; from New York, Bunau-Varilla coordinated a revolt against Colombian authority directed by officials of the Panama Railroad, owned by Bunau-Varilla’s canal company. The bloodless “revolution” succeeded when U.S. forces prevented Colombian troops from landing in Panama, although the United States was bound by treaty to maintain Colombian sovereignty in the region. Bunau-Varilla promptly signed a treaty accepting Roosevelt’s original terms for a canal zone and making Panama a U.S. protectorate, which it remained until 1939. Panamanians themselves denounced the treaty for surrendering sovereignty in the zone to the United States, but the United States took formal control of the canal zone in 1904 and completed construction of the Panama Canal in 1914. The Roosevelt Corollary To protect the security of the canal, the United States increased its authority in the Caribbean. The objective was to establish conditions there that would both eliminate any pretext for European intervention and promote American control over trade and investment. The inability of Latin American nations to pay their debts to foreign lenders raised the possibility of European intervention, as evidenced by a German and British blockade of Venezuela in 1903 to secure repayment of debts to European bankers. “If we intend to say hands off to the powers of Europe,” Roosevelt concluded, “then sooner or later we must keep order ourselves.” Toward that end, in 1904, Roosevelt announced a new policy, the so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. “Chronic The Puck cartoonist criticizes Theodore Roosevelt’s aggressive foreign policy wrongdoing,” he declared, would cause the United States to exercise by depicting him in his Rough Rider uniform and indicating his preference for the “an international police power” in Latin America. The Monroe crown of European imperialism over the simple American hats of previous presidents. Doctrine had expressed American hostility to European intervention in Latin America; the Roosevelt Corollary attempted to justify U.S. intervention and authority in the region. Roosevelt invoked his corolQUICK REVIEW lary immediately, imposing American management of the debts and customs duties of the Dominican Republic in 1905. Commercial rivalries and political intrigue in that poor nation Acquisition of the Canal Zone 쏆 Possible canal sites were located had created disorder, which Roosevelt suppressed for both economic and strategic reasons. in Nicaragua and Panama (then part Financial insolvency was averted, popular revolution prevented, and possible European of Colombia). intervention forestalled. 쏆 1903: Colombia rejects Roosevelt’s offer to purchase canal zone in Panama. Latin Americans vigorously resented the United States’ unilateral claim to authority. 쏆 1903–1904: U.S. forces support By 1907, the so-called Drago Doctrine (named after Argentina’s foreign minister) was Panamanian rebellion against Colombia incorporated into international law, prohibiting armed intervention to collect debts. Still, and take control of canal zone. the United States would continue to invoke the Roosevelt Corollary to advance its interests in the hemisphere. Roosevelt Corollary President  ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Dollar Diplomacy Roosevelt’s successor as president, William Howard Taft, hoped to promote U.S. interests in less confrontational ways. He proposed “substituting dollars for bullets”—using government action to encourage private American investments in Latin America to supplant European interests, promote development and stability, and earn profits for American bankers. Under this dollar diplomacy, American investments in the Caribbean increased dramatically during Taft’s Theodore Roosevelt’s policy asserting U.S. authority to intervene in the affairs of Latin American nations; an expansion of the Monroe Doctrine. dollar diplomacy The U.S. policy of using private investment in other nations to promote American diplomatic goals and business interests. The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 628 CHAPTER 22 Read the Document at Dollar Diplomacy (1912)  QUICK REVIEW American Economic Involvement in Latin America 쏆 쏆 쏆 1913: U.S. investment in region reaches 1.5 billion. Americans captured large share of Latin America’s foreign trade. American investment failed to improve conditions for most Latin Americans. CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 presidency from 1909 to 1913, and the State Department helped arrange for American bankers to establish financial control over Haiti and Honduras. But Taft did not shrink from employing military force to protect American property or to establish the conditions he thought necessary for American investments. In fact, Taft intervened more frequently than Roosevelt had, with Nicaragua a major target. In 1909, Taft sent U.S. troops there to aid a revolution fomented by an American mining corporation and to seize the Nicaraguan customs houses. Under the new government, American bankers then gained control of Nicaragua’s national bank, railroad, and customs service. To protect these arrangements, U.S. troops were again dispatched in 1912. To control popular opposition to the American client government, the marines remained in Nicaragua for two decades. Dollar diplomacy increased American power and influence in the Caribbean and tied underdeveloped countries to the United States economically and strategically. By 1913, American investments in the region reached $1.5 billion, and Americans had captured more than 50 percent of the foreign trade of Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. But this policy failed to improve conditions for most Latin Americans. U.S. officials remained primarily concerned with promoting American control and extracting American profits from the region. Not surprisingly, dollar diplomacy proved unpopular in Latin America. Wilsonian Interventions Taking office in 1913, the Democrat Woodrow Wilson repudiated the interventionist policies of his Republican predecessors. He promised that the United States would “never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest” but would instead work to promote “human rights, national integrity, and opportunity” in Latin America. The Big Stick in the Caribbean Sea. The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 The Roosevelt Corollary proclaimed the intention of the United States to police Latin America. Enforcement came, as this cartoon shows, with Roosevelt and subsequent presidents sending the U.S. Navy to one Caribbean nation after another. CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 629 Nonetheless, Wilson soon became the most interventionist president in American history. Convinced that the United States had to expand its exports and investments abroad and that U.S. dominance of the Caribbean was strategically necessary, he also held the racist belief that Latin Americans were inferior and needed paternalistic guidance from the United States. In providing that guidance, through military force if necessary, Wilson came close to assuming that American principles and objectives were absolutes, and that different cultural traditions and national aspirations were simply wrong. Caribbean interventions. In 1915, Wilson ordered U.S. marines to Haiti to preserve “gravely menaced” American interests. The United States saved and even enhanced those interests by establishing a protectorate over Haiti and drawing up a constitution that increased U.S. property rights and commercial privileges. The U.S. Navy selected a new Haitian president, granting him nominal authority over a client government. Real authority, however, rested with the American military, which controlled Haiti until 1934, protecting the small elite who cooperated with American interests and exploited their own people. Wilson also intervened elsewhere in the Caribbean. In 1916, when the Dominican Republic refused to cede control of its finances to U.S. bankers, Wilson ordered the marines to occupy the country. The marines ousted Dominican officials, installed a military government to rule “on behalf of the Dominican government,” and ran the nation until 1924. In 1917, the United States intervened in Cuba, which remained under American control until 1922. See the Map at Activities of the United States in the Caribbean, 1898–1930s  QUICK REVIEW Woodrow Wilson and Mexico 쏆 쏆 쏆 쏆 ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Interfering with Mexico. Wilson also involved himself in the internal affairs of Initially supported Venustiano Carranza and the Constitutionalists. Switched to support of Francisco “Pancho” Villa when Carranza proved too independent. Ended up fighting both Villa and Carranza. Extended full recognition to Carranza’s government in January 1917. Mexico. The lengthy dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz had collapsed in 1911 in revolutionary disorder. The popular leader Francisco Madero took power and promised democratic and economic reforms that alarmed both wealthy Mexicans and foreign investors, particularly Americans. In 1913, General Victoriano Huerta seized control in a brutal counterrevolution backed by the landed aristocracy and foreign interests. Appalled by the violence of Huerta’s power grab and aware that opponents had organized to reestablish constitutional government, Wilson refused to recognize the Huerta government. Wilson authorized arms sales to the Constitutionalist forces led by Venustiano Carranza, pressured Britain and other nations to deprive Huerta of foreign support, and blockaded the Mexican port of Veracruz. In 1914 Wilson exploited a minor incident to have the marines attack and occupy Veracruz. This assault damaged his image as a promoter of peace and justice, and even Carranza and the Constitutionalists denounced the American occupation as unwarranted aggression. After Carranza toppled Huerta, Wilson shifted his support to Francisco (“Pancho”) Villa, who seemed more susceptible to American guidance. But Carranza’s growing popular support in Mexico and Wilson’s preoccupation with World War I in Europe finally led the United States to grant de facto recognition to the Carranza government in 1915. Villa then began terrorizing New Mexico and Texas, hoping to provoke an American intervention that would undermine Carranza. In 1916, Wilson ordered troops under General John J. Pershing to pursue Villa into Mexico, leading Carranza to fear a permanent U.S. Racist attitudes about the “white man’s burden” underlay many of Wilson’s occupation of northern Mexico. Soon the American soldiers were interventions in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America. The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. 630 CHAPTER 22 CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 fighting the Mexican army rather than Villa’s bandits. On the brink of full-fledged war, Wilson finally ordered U.S. troops to withdraw in January 1917 and extended full recognition to the Carranza government. Wilson lamely defended these steps as showing that the United States had no intention of imposing on Mexico “an order and government of our own choosing.” That had been Wilson’s original objective, however. His aggressive tactics had not merely failed but also embittered relations with Mexico. ENGAGING EUROPE: NEW CONCERNS, OLD CONSTRAINTS WHY DID the United States take a larger role in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century? The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 While the United States expanded its power in Latin American and strove to increase its influence in Asia in the early twentieth century, it also took a larger role in Europe. Its traditional policy of noninvolvement, however, remained popular with many Americans and constituted an important restraint upon the new imperial nation. Responding to the lopsided outcome of the Spanish-American War, European nations immediately began to adjust their policies to take into account the evident power of the United States. German officials even considered seeking an alliance in order to strengthen Germany in Europe. But Germany’s rival, Great Britain, moved quickly to resolve all possible disputes with the United States and thereby establish a basis for long-term cooperation. Britain’s support for the American annexation of the Philippines and its decision in 1901 to accede to American control of the projected Panama Canal were early examples of this policy. By 1905, only a decade after Britain and the United States seemed on the verge of war over Venezuela, British and American diplomats agreed that their nations’ interests were “absolutely identical and that the more closely we can work together, the better it will be for us and the world at large.” Roosevelt also cautiously intervened in European affairs. The great European powers were aligning themselves into rival blocs: the Entente of Britain and France (and sometimes Russia) and the Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary (and sometimes Italy). When France and Germany quarreled over the control of Morocco in 1906, Roosevelt helped arrange an international conference at Algeciras, Spain, to resolve the crisis. While placating Germany, American diplomats then helped uphold France’s claims, upon its pledge to maintain an open door in Morocco, a pledge the United States would later use to insist upon securing petroleum and commercial opportunities. Roosevelt had helped preserve the balance of power in Europe while advancing what he saw as America’s own interests. Eager to ensure stability, American leaders also engaged Europeans in efforts to promote arbitration of international disputes. In 1899, the United States participated in the First Hague Peace Conference, which created the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Roosevelt helped arrange a second Hague conference in 1907. It did not accept American proposals for compulsory arbitration, but it led to another conference in 1909 which issued the Declaration of London codifying international law for maritime war and establishing the rights of neutral nations. And Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson negotiated dozens of arbitration or conciliation treaties providing for submitting international disputes to the Hague Court. However, public opinion and Senate opposition, rooted in older perspectives toward involvement in world affairs, persistently restricted the effectiveness of these efforts. Although the treaties themselves had broad loopholes, the Senate insisted upon further restricting the possible questions to be arbitrated and reserved for itself the right to approve every particular decision to arbitrate. These restrictive views, grumbled Roosevelt and Taft, rendered the treaties ineffective; they would shortly cause Wilson still greater difficulty.  CREATING AN EMPIRE 1865–1917 CHAPTER 22 631 CONCLUSION ISBN 1-256-41052-7 By the time of Woodrow Wilson’s presidency, the United States had been expanding its involvement in world affairs for half a century. Several themes had emerged from this activity: increasing American domination of the Caribbean, continuing interest in East Asia, the creation of an overseas empire, and the evolution of the United States into a major world power. Underlying these developments was an uneasy mixture of ideas and objectives. The American involvement in the world reflected a traditional, if often misguided, sense of national rectitude and mission. Generous humanitarian impulses vied with ugly racist prejudices as Americans sought both to help other peoples and to direct them toward U.S. concepts of religion, sanitation, capitalist development, and public institutions. American motives ranged from ensuring national security and competing with European colonial powers to the conviction that the United States had to expand its economic interests abroad. But if imperialism, both informal and at times colonial, brought Americans greater wealth and power, it also increased tensions in Asia and contributed to anti-American hostility and revolutionary ferment in Latin America. It also entangled the United States in the Great Power rivalries that would ultimately result in two world wars. The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. WHERE TO LEARN MORE Mission Houses, Honolulu, Hawaii. Built between 1821 and 1841, these buildings were homes and shops of missionaries sent to Hawaii by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Their exhibits include furnishings and memorabilia of a group important in developing American ties with Hawaii. Funston Memorial Home, Iola, Kansas. Operated as a museum by the Kansas State Historical Society, this is the boyhood home of General Frederick Funston, prominent in the SpanishAmerican War and the Filipino-American War. For a virtual tour, together with military information, political cartoons, Roosevelt correspondence, and Funston links, see museums/funston. James G. Blaine House, Augusta, Maine. The Executive Mansion of Maine’s governor since 1919, this house was formerly Blaine’s home and still contains his study and furnishings from the time he served as secretary of state and U.S. senator. http://www R EVIEW Q UESTIONS 1. After the Spanish-American War, General Leonard Wood asserted that Cubans believed that their American “liberators” were “still their faithful friends.” Why might Cubans not have agreed with Wood? 2. What factors, old and new, shaped American foreign policy in the late nineteenth century? How were they interrelated? 3. How were individual politicians and diplomats able to affect America’s foreign policy? How were they constrained by governmental institutions, private groups, and public opinion? 4. To what extent was the United States’ emergence as an imperial power a break from, as opposed to a culmination of, its earlier policies and national development? 5. How effective were U.S. interventions in Latin America? What were the objectives and consequences? 6. In what ways did the policies of other nations shape the development of American foreign policy? K EY T ERMS Dollar diplomacy (p. 627) Gentlemen’s Agreement (p. 623) Imperialism (p. 610) Mahanism (p. 611) Open Door (p. 622) Pan American Union (p. 613) Platt Amendment (p. 625) Roosevelt Corollary (p. 627) Spheres of influence (p. 622) Teller Amendment (p. 617) Yellow press (p. 616) The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 1-256-41052-7 632 Connections Reinforce what you learned in this chapter by studying the many documents, images, maps, review tools, and videos available at Read and Review Research and Explore Study and Review Study Plan: Chapter 22 Read the Document Personal Journeys Online Read the Document The Teller Amendment (1898) From Then to Now Online: The Panama Canal William Graham Sumner, “On Empire and the Philippines” (1898) Exploring America: White Man’s Burden William McKinley, “Decision on the Philippines” (1900) Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden” (1899) Dollar Diplomacy (1912) Carl Schurz, Platform of the American Anti-Imperialist League (1899) Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power (1897) Henry Cabot Lodge, Annex of Hawaii (1895) Watch the Video Roosevelt’s Rough Riders Platt Amendment (1901) Mark Twain, “Incident in the Philippines” (1924) Theodore Roosevelt, Panama Canal Message to Congress (1903) See the Map Activities of the United States in the Caribbean, 1898–1930s Hear the Audio ISBN 1-256-41052-7 Hear the audio files for Chapter 22 at 633 The Brief American Journey, Sixth edition, by David Goldfield, Carl E. Abbott, Virginia D. Anderson, Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Peter H. Argersinger, William M. Barney, and Robert M. Weir. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc.
Instructional Objectives for this activity: Describe the motivations and the consequences of our expansionism of the early 20th Century. By the beginning of the 20th century the U.S. began to expand its involvement in world affairs. Goldman et. al (2010) states this reflected a traditional but often misguided sense of humanitarianism and mission toward U.S. concepts. Your assignment is to write a 2-4 page paper discussing the motivations and consequences of our growing involvement with the rest of the world. • • Discuss the reasons behind the new expansionism that characterized US foreign policy in the 1890s? Follow APA guidelines. For citation guidelines, please refer to the table in the APA Style section of the syllabus. Save your document with a file name that includes your name, course code-section number, and title. • For example: JaneSmith_AMH2030-12_Week3.docx To submit your Individual Work, go to the Dropbox and click "Submit Assignment." Submit this document to the Week 3: Individual Work basket in the Dropbox.

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