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Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection
Modes
Access control has two modes:
• Passive strategies: screening of employees, contractors, and vendors
• Develop screening program for employees, contractors, and vendors
• Screen for criminal background and drug abuse (and financial responsibility
where possible)
• Enforce the screening program strictly
• Active strategies: screening of entry by employees, contractors, vendors, and visitors. Access control should be arranged in layers, typically including
• Public layers will be nearest the main public door(s), such as a public lobby,
customer waiting area, or service desks.
• Semipublic areas are areas where the general public may not freely go but
where they may be escorted, such as to an interview or triage room or the
emergency department in a hospital.
• Controlled areas are for those individuals with authorization, such as nonpublic office floors, mechanical rooms, auto mechanic work areas, airport
tarmacs, and so on.
• Restricted areas are those that require a high degree of vetting and where
access is limited to a relatively small number of persons, such as research and
development areas, the boardroom, the main information technology server
room, cash vaults, counting rooms, and so on.
Access control can be achieved by technology or personnel means. There are two
basic types of access control for both
• General access control
• Positive access control
General access control assumes that if one person in a group has access to a space,
anyone they are escorting is also permitted. This approach is commonly used in employee
work spaces and the like, where an access card reader on a suite door controls access
to the space. General access control should not be used where it is important to assure
that each person in a group has access privileges. This is because of the phenomena of
an unauthorized person “tailgating” entry behind an authorized person as the door is
opened. Although many organizations have tried to encourage employees to vet visitors
who try to tailgate, none I know have fully succeeded.
Positive access control uses technology or guards to assure that each person is checked
to be sure that they are authorized to enter the space. Examples of positive access control
include card reader controlled revolving doors and turnstiles, theater or sports event
ticket checkers, and airport boarding screening.
DETERRENCE
282
Goals
Deterrence is the ultimate goal. Deterrence achieves security without intervention
against a threat actor. Deterrence builds its own momentum. The longer attacks are
Countermeasure Goals and Strategies
283
Remove all
metal objects
before passing
through
metal detector
FIGURE 15.1
Security checkpoint.
deterred, the less likely it is that an attack may take place. But do not depend on
deterrence.
Deterrence occurs when potential threat actors evaluate the risks and rewards of an
attack and determine that the risk is not worth the reward.
• For terrorists, this could mean that an attack is not likely to succeed, that their
attack would not capture the media’s attention, or that they could be perceived
negatively by their own constituency.
• For economic criminals, it could mean that they may not be able to access the
desired assets, that they may not be able to leave with them, or that the likelihood of capture after the heist would be high.
• For violent criminals, this could mean that the threat actor could not reach his
target, could not succeed in the attack, might not escape, or might be captured
later.
• For subversives, this could mean that they might not succeed in subverting the
normal operations of the organization.
• For petty criminals, this could mean that they might not be able to carry out
their crime or would likely be captured in the act or later.
Strategies
Deterrence is achieved through making countermeasures so visible that possible threat
actors think twice about their crime. Deterrence countermeasures can include architectural hardness, access control measures, guards, obvious cameras, witnesses, alarms,
alarm signs, and so on. To be effective as a deterrent, countermeasures must be visible
and must seem to create too much risk to carry out the attack. Ultimately, the entire baseline security program is about deterrence, and it creates the environment for all the other
countermeasure functions (Figure 15.2).
There are no such things as deterrent-specific countermeasures. All visible countermeasures can act as deterrents, but no countermeasures deter alone. Deterrence is a side
effect of the countermeasure’s other (primary) role. Countermeasures deter because the
potential threat actor believes that the countermeasure creates risk to him. That risk is
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Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection
FIGURE 15.2
Deterrence.
the result of the countermeasure serving its primary role of limiting access and enabling
detection, assessment, response, or evidence gathering.
DETECTION
Goals
Although at first the reader may be tempted to think that detection means catching the
crook in the act, in fact every threat actor must carry out a plan in order to attack a facility, and detection also means detecting this plan. The basic steps in every threat action,
whether it is terrorism or vandalism, include
•
•
•
•
•
•
Select an appropriate target for an attack
Surveil the target to determine the target’s vulnerabilities
Determine the best way to carry out the attack
Plan the attack (the approach, the attack, and the escape)
Test the target to determine if the vulnerability assessment is correct
Execute the attack
• Enter
• Establish and maintain control
• Establish and maintain countersurveillance
• Execute the objective
• Escape
For petty crimes, all these steps may occur in one linear timeline. However, the more
valuable the asset, the more important the attack is to the threat actor’s strategic goals,
the more robust the countermeasures, and the more time is required to carry out all these
steps. Interviews with highly successful criminals indicate that the planning cycle for
Countermeasure Goals and Strategies
285
some crimes can take months or even years. This gives the target many opportunities to
detect the plan through surveillance and the interception of planning communications.
Strategies
Strategies include surveillance detection and attack detection.
Surveillance Detection
Most people think of detection as occurring during an attack; however, detection can also
occur during surveillance. Surveillance is required for virtually every attack in order to
•
•
•
•
Select the target
Surveil target vulnerabilities
Determine the best way to carry out the attack
Test the target to determine if the vulnerability assessment is correct
Additionally, the longer a criminal spends time with his eyes on the target, the more
interaction he may have with individuals working in the target space. Each individual
interaction gives the target an opportunity to recognize surveillance, attack planning, or
testing and to interrupt the attack before it occurs.
A good countersurveillance program is highly useful to all organizations where asset
values are high and especially where there is a possibility of violence occurring in the carrying out of a crime. For terrorism, a good countersurveillance program is an absolutely
essential component of any workable terrorism countermeasures program.
A good countersurveillance program includes
•
•
•
•
Ample use of video surveillance in exterior and public spaces
Trained and alert security officers
Trained and alert console officers
Loitering detection software on the video system
Attack Detection
Once an attack of any kind is underway, whether it is terrorism, economic crime, violent
crime, subversive action, or petty crime, it is important, where possible, to be able to
detect the crime underway. Detection countermeasures may include
•
•
•
•
Intrusion detection system on property and building perimeters
Intrusion detection system applied to critical passageways and internal spaces
Duress alarms at critical counters and desks
Hold-up alarms
Intrusion detection systems on property and building perimeters may include fence
detection systems, microwave and infrared beams, seismic detectors, pneumatic line
detectors, video fence line detection systems, glass break detectors, and door position
switches. Internal space detection systems may include door position switches, area
motion detectors, and video motion detectors. Duress alarms may include hidden finger
switches, footswitches, and so on. Hold-up alarms may include duress alarms and bill
traps (the last bill removed in a cash drawer triggers a silent alarm).
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Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection
Alarms may be either silent or audible. It is best to use an audible alarm if the
property is vacant such as at nighttime, when the audible alarm could itself act as
a deterrent, frightening the intruder away. Silent alarms are best where an audible
alarm could be false or a nuisance, where on-site security staff can respond quickly,
and where such a response would not possibly escalate the crime to the point of
violence.
ASSESSMENT
Goals
When an attack is detected, it is then necessary to assess the threat for the following
characteristics:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Is the detection itself real, false, or a nuisance detection?
If the detection is real, what is the level and nature of the threat actors?
What is their goal?
What weapons are they carrying?
What are their tactics?
Does this appear to be a unfolding as a property or violent crime or a property
crime with potential for violence?
• Are the threat actors employing countersurveillance methods?
• How are they dressed? How can law enforcement distinguish the threat actors
from ordinary employees or customers?
• What is their apparent exit strategy?
Is the Detection Itself Real, False, or a Nuisance Detection?
Many alarms are either false or nuisance alarms. Before responding to any alarm, it is
useful to investigate and assess to see if the alarm is real. This can often be done by using
a second alarm device as a confirmation or by using a second technology to confirm it.
For example, on perimeter alarms where nuisance alarms are very common, it is useful
to have two types of alarm detection technologies, each having different nuisance modes
and both working together. Consider, for example, the use of infrared beams and fence
line detection, where infrared is subject to nuisance alarms from blowing newspapers or
animals and the fence line detection is subject to nuisance alarms from nearby trains. If
only one alerts, it could be a nuisance alarm, but when both do, it is confirmed. Video
cameras can also be used to confirm the alarm when the presence of an intruder can be
seen on camera.
If the Detection Is Real, What Is the Level and Nature of the Threat Actors?
Once confirmed, it is important to know the nature of the threat actors. How many
threat actors are there? Does their intrusion seem organized or chaotic? Is there an obvious leader? Is the group cohesive and professional or are they displaying anxiety and fear?
What Is Their Goal?
Are they carrying a sign protesting the activities of the organization or are they carrying
automatic weapons? How many threat actors are there? Can their intentions be determined by their actions?
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Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection
facility entries in order to get a positive identification of any threat actors who enter
the facility and to determine what external support they have in terms of lookouts and
getaways.
It is very useful to have a video camera viewing every area where a threat action could
reasonably occur, including all entry control locations. This allows both the detection
and assessment of crimes in progress. It is also very useful to have a two-way voice station
(intercom station or station without call button) near the camera wherever a threat action
could occur. This allows interruption of the threat action by a remote console operator,
and, for many crimes, this is enough to end the crime.
RESPONSE
Goals
Once a threat action is detected, a response is possible. Responses to threat actions could
include
• Take no direct action to counter the threat actors, instead try to minimize any
potential harm to innocent people
• Gather evidence for an investigation and for a post event analysis, resulting in
scenario planning and training later
• Call others (such as the police) for help
• Intervene directly against the attack to stop it and/or capture the threat actors
Before any response is undertaken, it is necessary to formulate an appropriate
response. I propose that the best time to do this is before any attack, when heads are clear
and planning time is leisurely. It may be necessary to adjust the plan if an actual attack
takes place, but at least there will be a response plan in place.
For example, before September 11, 2001, it was the policy of airlines to cooperate
with airplane hijackers and let negotiators arrange for freedom of the hostages once back
on the ground. This strategy included allowing hijackers access to the cockpit to avoid
casualties on the plane. However, when United Flight 93 passengers used their cell phones
to call loved ones after the plane was hijacked, the passengers learned that another plane
had crashed into the World Trade Center, and the passengers themselves changed the
strategy from one of cooperation to one of counterforce. Although this strategy did not
save their own lives, it did save many lives in the ultimate target in Washington, and as
such, it was certainly an act of heroism.
Strategies
Responses may also include delaying the threat actors, denying them access to the target
asset, voice communications for negotiations, and ultimately force-on-force.
As a design consultant, I am a big believer in using technology to counter threat
actors instead of placing lives at risk. The use of reactive electronic automated protection
systems (REAPS technologies) may include two-way voice communications, delaying
technologies, disruptive technologies, and active force technology for direct use against
Countermeasure Goals and Strategies
289
threat actors. See Chapter 16 for more on REAPS technologies.* Also REAPs technologies are covered in great detail in my book Integrated Security Systems Design.
Intercoms are the forgotten technology of security. Security intercom systems, along
with the ample use of security video systems, allow for immediate assessment of threat
actions without dispatching a guard, which could escalate the crime to violence. One of
the most effective tools against convenience store crimes has proven to be a two-way voice
communication system that allows console officers in a remote security command center
to speak directly to store robbers, alerting them that they are not only being recorded by
video cameras, but that their identification is solid, that police have been called and are
on the way, and that any escalation to violence will result in more severe charges by law
enforcement. This has proven to be effective in getting robbers to stop the robbery and
leave the premises immediately without further harm to the store employees or customers
and in many cases also without completing the robbery.
It is very useful to have a two-way voice station (intercom station or station without
call button) near the camera wherever a threat action could occur. This allows interruption of the threat action by a remote console operator, and for many crimes, this is
enough to end the crime.
EVIDENCE GATHERING
Goals
The goals of evidence include providing resources for investigations, strategy development, and training (Figure 15.3).
Evidence sources may include
•
•
•
•
•
Video footage
Audio recordings
Fingerprints
Crime scene forensics
Computer forensics
Strategies
The security program should be designed to gather evidence from its outset and personnel
should be trained to protect physical evidence. Camera placements should be useful to
identify threat actors as they approach and enter the facility and at the locations where
crimes are most likely to occur. During the risk analysis, this requires careful consideration of the types of threat scenarios that are most likely and the locations where such
scenarios might occur. All these should be noted in the report. Audio should be recorded
on all outgoing calls to emergency responder phone numbers (911 in the United States
and 112 in other countries) and on all active security intercom stations.
Security officers should be trained to secure a crime scene immediately after a crime
until law enforcement arrives. Security barrier marker tape (“Crime Scene—Do Not
* For even more on REAPS technologies, see the author’s book Integrated Security Systems Design: Concepts,
Design and Implementation.1
290
FIGURE 15.3
Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection
Evidence gathering.
Cross”) should be kept in stock for this use. Any computers that could have been involved
in a crime should be unplugged from the network but left powered on, secured, and
sealed for the arrival of a law enforcement or internal computer forensics team.
COMPLY WITH THE BUSINESS CULTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION
Goal
Each organization has its own unique business culture. It may be formal or relaxed, topdown or lateral, open for free movement of the public or imposing restricted movements.
The security program should be configured to comply with the business culture of the
organization. All security measures have some consequences both for normal business
operations and for the business culture. Both should be minimized as much as possible.
I have been consulted on many projects to correct failed security programs that, on
review, were sound in principle but did not take the organization’s business culture into
Countermeasure Goals and Strategies
291
account and thus were not accepted by the users. The users are stakeholders in the system.
If their points of view and expectations of convenience and perceived intrusion are not
taken into account, the security provisions will not be accepted. This is the most important nontechnical element that addresses directly the success or failure of the system.
People will naturally take the path of least resistance. And, if after many years of
moving freely, they are suddenly confronted by a queue or a barrier, they will attempt to
circumvent it because they are used to being able to move freely through a portal without
impediment. If there is a sneak-path, they will use it. If there is a guard, they will argue with
him or her. There will be complaints, and pressure will be applied to the security manager
to change the procedures or technology. It is important to take traffic flow, throughput, and
people’s perceptions of how they are being treated by management into account.
Strategies
In the countermeasure planning phase, it is important to understand the organization’s
business culture as much as possible. This is perhaps the most difficult task that a security
practitioner has to carry out. Business cultures are rarely well documented. Culture by
definition is that body of knowledge that is common and allows a common communication based on the shared assumptions of those working together.
For example, in one high-security project, the entire campus could have been easily
secured by moving all visitor parking to an adjacent parking lot and having all visitors
clear through a single visitor center. However, the business culture of that organization
required that all visitors be granted access to parking on the campus itself, thus allowing
visitors past the visitor center. Security took second place to business culture. It should be
assumed that the security program should impede the movements of people as little as possible and should assure that everyone is treated with consideration, kindness, and respect.
MINIMIZE IMPEDIMENTS TO NORMAL BUSINESS OPERATIONS
Goals
As with business culture, all security measures have some impact on normal business operations. The security program should impede normal business operations as little as possible.
Strategies
The key impediment to business operations is almost always in the area of access control.
A key strategy of controlling access without creating the sense of an impediment is to rely
more on technology than on people for security access control.
It takes more time to clear a staffed checkpoint than to clear through a card reader.
And people tend to see technological delays as part of the environment. However, when
the delay is associated with a security guard, they tend to personalize the screening action
(people sometimes presuppose a bias against the person by the screener and infer an
intent on the part of the security officer to delay the person). No such intent can be
imposed on a card reader, as technology has no capacity to develop intent or biases or to
distinguish any one person from another.
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Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection
This strategy has other benefits as well. Because technology does not distinguish
between people, it treats everyone fairly and cannot be compromised by threat, intimidation, or enticement.
All security officers dealing with the public should be trained to be gracious under
fire and not to personalize any verbal abuse. In areas where people are carrying bags or
totes, provisions should be made to use as few hand actions as possible. In such cases, the
use of photo IDs as an access vetting measure can help speed people along.
SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT
Goals
The aim is to help to create an environment where people feel safe and secure and can
focus on the purpose of the organization.
Strategies
The use of crime prevention through industrial design (CPTED) principles helps to create
a safe and secure environment and conveys a feeling of safety and security to all. Good
lighting, gracious guards, well-maintained facilities and security equipment, good wayfinding signage, and security awareness inserts in the company newsletter all contribute
to a feeling of well-being on the part of users.
DESIGN PROGRAMS TO MITIGATE POSSIBLE HARM
FROM HAZARDS AND THREAT ACTORS
The security program should include elements to deal with unwanted exceptions such
as
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Intruders and offenders
Disruptive people
Medical emergencies
Natural disasters
Civil disorder and riot
Loss of business continuity
Chemical, biological, radiological emergency
Challenges to the security program from outside and inside sources (Table 15.1)
SUMMARY
Introduction
The name security countermeasures implies correctly that these are measures taken
to counter a threat action. In an ideal world, security countermeasures would be so
Chapter
15
Countermeasure Goals
and Strategies
INTRODUCTION
On completion of this chapter, you will understand why security countermeasures are
required and the elements of countermeasure objectives, goals, and strategies. The name
security countermeasures implies correctly that these are measures taken to counter a
threat action. In an ideal world, security countermeasures would be so effective as to
completely eliminate the will of potential threat actors to take action.
While most people believe that this is not possible, in fact it has been done. There
are actually numerous examples, but perhaps the best known one is the Fort Knox gold
depository. As one can imagine, there have been many potential threat actors who would
have been interested in accessing the gold at Fort Knox since it was built. But none have
even attempted it. Countermeasures, including a formidable building and complex, heavily armed guards, layered detection systems, and automatic weapons, are so well developed that no one has ever attempted a robbery there. And do not forget it sits next to the
largest assembly of U.S. Army tanks and tank crews in the world.
Compare that to the average U.S. convenience store, which as a class have the highest
incidence of robberies of any fixed asset, including many fatal violent attacks. It is worthwhile to compare the two in order to develop study models of risk mitigation.
Fort Knox has multiple layers of protection for its assets, including heavy arms and
multiple layers of detection systems. Its focus is on access control.
Convenience stores have little if any protection; often the cash register drawer is
directly accessible by reaching across the counter from the public side. Access to the store
is free to anyone, good or bad. There are often no responsive weapons and no detection until a robbery is announced by the threat actor himself. The greatest protection is
usually a video camera system, which records the robbery but cannot intervene. Access
control is often limited to a hopeful expectation of politeness and the occasional but
undependable entry of a police officer.
In the first of these examples, access control is heavy. In the other, access control
is virtually nonexistent. The obvious lesson is that keeping bad people out is good for
security.
I am not suggesting that all facilities should be equipped like Fort Knox, because
most organizations could not function with this level of access control and the presence
of automated 50-caliber weapons and guards on parapets with scoped weapons would be
not only a deterrent to crime but a deterrent to normal business.
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Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection
Thus, countermeasures should be focused not only on security measures but also on
being balanced with the needs of the organization’s daily business needs. Like all other
business programs, compromises are necessary. What, then, are the goals of countermeasures, given that compromises are necessary?
COUNTERMEASURE OBJECTIVES, GOALS, AND STRATEGIES
All security countermeasures have the broad goal of adjusting the behavior of potential
threat actors so that they do not pose a threat to the organization.
There are three main goals for all security countermeasures. These are
• Where possible, identify and deny access to potential threat actors
• Deny access to weapons, explosives, and dangerous chemicals (except for legitimate exceptions, which should be well controlled and monitored)
• Make the environment suitable for appropriate behavior and unsuitable for inappropriate, criminal, or terroristic behavior; and mitigate the actions of both hazards and threats
Implementation objectives and strategies include
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Control access to the target, denying access to possible threat actors
Where possible, deter threat actors from acting
Detect any threat action
Assess what has been detected
Respond to any active threat action
Gather evidence for prosecution, investigations, and training
Comply with the business culture of the organization
Minimize any impediment to normal business operations
Help to create an environment where people feel safe and secure and can focus
on the purpose of the organization
• Design programs to mitigate possible harm from hazards and threat actors
Each aspect of the overall security program has the ability to support one of the three
main goals. An incomplete example of how to map these is illustrated in Table 15.1. You
can use this as an example to help build your own list of countermeasures.
ACCESS CONTROL
Goals
Access control should be sufficient to facilitate access by authorized users and to deny
access to unauthorized persons to all critical areas. Unlike Fort Knox, most organizations
rely on access by the public to their facilities. However, access should not be universal. All
members of the public and all employees do not require full access to all areas of a facility. In the most humble shop, there is a public area and a storeroom or office. In complex
facilities, access may be layered so that one needs progressively higher access authorization as one moves deeper into the facility.
Table 15.1
Examples of Countermeasure Goals and Functions
Countermeasure
Goals
Countermeasure Functions
Access Control
Access control,
screening posts,
and employee
screening
Deny access to
weapons,
explosives, and
dangerous
chemicals
Make the
environment
suitable for
appropriate
behavior and
unsuitable for
inappropriate,
criminal, or
terroristic
behavior; and to
mitigate the
actions of both
hazards and
threats
Screening, guard
posts, and
procedures
Visible
devices,
signage,
guards, and
procedures
Signage,
guards, and
procedures
CPTED
CPTED design,
design,
policies and
policies and
procedures,
training programs, procedures,
training
and security
programs,
awareness
and security
programs
awareness
programs
Detection
Assessment
Delay
Operable
Guards, dogs and Console,
barriers and
guards, and
alarm devices
guard posts
security
including video
awareness
motion
policy
Detectors, dogs,
Screening posts, Operable
barriers and
guards, and
detectors,
guard posts
procedures
dogs, and
patrols
Patrols and
reports by
organization
members
Patrols and
reports by
organization
members
See above
Response
Evidence
Console, guards, CCTV, intercoms,
and witness
operable
reports
barriers, and
intercoms
Console, guards, CCTV, intercoms,
and witness
operable
reports
barriers and
intercoms
See above
CCTV, intercoms,
and witness
reports
Countermeasure Goals and Strategies
Identify and deny
access to
potential threat
actors
Deterrence
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Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection
Modes
Access control has two modes:
• Passive strategies: screening of employees, contractors, and vendors
• Develop screening program for employees, contractors, and vendors
• Screen for criminal background and drug abuse (and financial responsibility
where possible)
• Enforce the screening program strictly
• Active strategies: screening of entry by employees, contractors, vendors, and visitors. Access control should be arranged in layers, typically including
• Public layers will be nearest the main public door(s), such as a public lobby,
customer waiting area, or service desks.
• Semipublic areas are areas where the general public may not freely go but
where they may be escorted, such as to an interview or triage room or the
emergency department in a hospital.
• Controlled areas are for those individuals with authorization, such as nonpublic office floors, mechanical rooms, auto mechanic work areas, airport
tarmacs, and so on.
• Restricted areas are those that require a high degree of vetting and where
access is limited to a relatively small number of persons, such as research and
development areas, the boardroom, the main information technology server
room, cash vaults, counting rooms, and so on.
Access control can be achieved by technology or personnel means. There are two
basic types of access control for both
• General access control
• Positive access control
General access control assumes that if one person in a group has access to a space,
anyone they are escorting is also permitted. This approach is commonly used in employee
work spaces and the like, where an access card reader on a suite door controls access
to the space. General access control should not be used where it is important to assure
that each person in a group has access privileges. This is because of the phenomena of
an unauthorized person “tailgating” entry behind an authorized person as the door is
opened. Although many organizations have tried to encourage employees to vet visitors
who try to tailgate, none I know have fully succeeded.
Positive access control uses technology or guards to assure that each person is checked
to be sure that they are authorized to enter the space. Examples of positive access control
include card reader controlled revolving doors and turnstiles, theater or sports event
ticket checkers, and airport boarding screening.
DETERRENCE
Goals
Deterrence is the ultimate goal. Deterrence achieves security without intervention
against a threat actor. Deterrence builds its own momentum. The longer attacks are
200
Introduction to International Disaster Management
Some membership organizations for public entities
sponsor pools or endorse insurance products that are then
marketed to their members. However, sponsorship or
endorsement by a membership organization does not guarantee that the insurance is broad enough to meet the needs
of a given entity or that the insurance provider is financially
stable. A public entity must apply the same due diligence to
a consideration of these programs that it would apply to a
comparison of available commercial insurance programs.
(Reiss, 2001)
OBSTACLES TO MITIGATION
Mitigation is not yet practiced to its fullest extent.
Though the potential exists to reduce hazard risk
throughout the world through the various mitigation
measures discussed in the previous section, among
others, formidable obstacles stand in the way.
The first and primary obstacle is cost. Mitigation
projects can be very expensive. Though governments
may have the resources to carry out even very costly
mitigation projects, they choose not to in favor of
spending money on programs that are perceived to be
more pressing. The reality is that governments maintain limited funds to support development, and many
consider hazards to be chance events that might not
occur. When drafting their budgets, they therefore
tend to favor programs requiring regular funding, such
as military, educational, economic, or infrastructure
projects.
The second obstacle is low levels of political support or “buy-in.” It is important for politicians to
maintain their high public standing, so they tend to
prefer projects that increase their stature over risky
endeavors that may not offer a return in the short run.
Mitigation, which is often conducted during periods
that no imminent threat exists and which may require
some level of sacrifice or hardship, may be hard to
“sell” to the local politicians. Convincing the local
decision-making authority of the need to undertake a
mitigation measure is crucial to getting the project off
the ground.
Sociocultural issues are a third potential obstacle.
Mitigation measures almost always result in a change
of some sort, whether to place (location), practice,
or a physical structure. People and cultures may
tie meaning to these factors and resist any project
that involves an alteration they find undesirable.
Disaster managers unaware of these sociocultural
ties are likely to create mitigation measures that
do not take these important issues into consideration,
dooming their program to failure before it even
begins.
Risk perception is the fourth major obstacle to mitigation. How people perceive a hazard that threatens
them will play a large part in what they do to prevent
it, and how much they are willing to sacrifice to avoid
it. First, the hazard must be recognized. Second, the
two risk components of consequence and likelihood
must be accurately perceived. And third, there must be
a belief that the hazard risk is reducible. Inaccuracies
in any of these three areas can quickly derail a mitigation effort.
ASSESSING AND SELECTING
MITIGATION OPTIONS
Once a comprehensive hazards risk analysis and
assessment have been completed, as described in
Chapters 2 and 3, and risk mitigation options have
been generated for each hazard on the prioritized list,
disaster managers can begin assessing their options.
Each hazard may have several risk mitigation options
to choose from, each option resulting in different
impacts upon society. Several factors must be considered when assessing each identified risk mitigation
actions, including:
●
●
●
The expected impact that each risk mitigation
option will have on reducing the identified hazard risks and vulnerabilities
The probability that each action will be
implemented
Mechanisms for funding and leveraging
of resources necessary to implement each
option
Chapter 4
Mitigation
IMPACT OF RISK MITIGATION OPTIONS ON
COMMUNITY RISK REDUCTION
The most critical issue in assessing a risk mitigation option is determining its impact on reducing the
identified risk or vulnerability in the community. Several factors must be considered when assessing the
risk reduction to be accomplished through individual
mitigation options or groups of mitigation options.
These factors, each of which is analyzed according to
the six categories of mitigation listed above, include:
●
●
●
Reduced number of deaths and injuries
Reduced property damage
Reduced economic loss
PROBABILITY THAT EACH ACTION WILL
BE IMPLEMENTED
Determining the probability that an individual
mitigation action or a group of mitigation actions will
be implemented is critical in determining feasibility.
Numerous factors impact the probability that an
individual mitigation action or a group of mitigation
actions will be implemented, including:
1. Political support. Without sufficient political
support, it is difficult or impossible to implement mitigation actions. Strong political support, developed over the course of the planning
process, increases the probability of implementation. Weak political support, as a result of
limited or even no understanding of the risk
management strategy, decreases the probability
of implementation.
2. Public support. Support from the public is critical, especially when such support is needed to
pass funding bills and regulatory restrictions to
enable the implementation of particular mitigation actions. Public support is most easily
acquired through public participation throughout the entire disaster management process,
including the implementation phase.
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3. Support from the business sector. Business owners play a key role in their communities, and so
their support for a community risk management
strategy is critical for successful implementation. Businesses may have much to gain, but
also have much to lose, from the consequences
of a particular mitigation option. The business
community generally plays a large role in any
community in generating funding and public
support for risk management actions and, likewise, is a good partner in mitigation.
4. Support from nonprofit and interest groups. A
variety of groups are active in any community,
including environmental groups, voluntary organizations, neighborhood and church organizations, and labor unions, to name a few. Their
participation helps generate support among community members and their families. Conversely,
their opposition can generate great resistance
and even legal action that could delay or foreclose the implementation of mitigation actions.
5. Cost. The cost of a mitigation action can impact
the probability of its implementation. The best
way to mitigate cost issues is to educate political leaders, the public, the business sector,
and nonprofit and community groups of the
expected benefits of the action and the expected
reduction in casualties and property losses when
the next disaster strikes. If a mitigation option
has been analyzed accurately and has been
chosen because its benefits clearly outweigh its
costs, then selling it to these stakeholders is
possible. Changing risk perceptions to match
reality is the primary obstacle.
6. Long-term vs. short-term benefits. Political
leaders and business executives are sensitive to
the need to produce immediate results, either
in their term of office or in the next business
quarter. This may cause them to support shortterm actions that will produce fast, identifiable
results. The long-term, sustainable option is
always the best, though convincing people may
not be easy when cheaper, shorter-term options
exist.
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might not work, but without public support, that
the taken action will almost certainly fail.
THE STAPLEE METHOD OF ASSESSING
MITIGATION OPTIONS
There are many methods by which the hazards risk
management team can assess the mitigation options
that they have generated for each identified hazard
risk. One method, or framework as it is often called,
that has been developed by FEMA is the STAPLEE
method.
STAPLEE guides the disaster managers in their
assessment by utilizing a systematic approach for
addressing options. The term “STAPLEE” is an
acronym that stands for the following evaluation
criteria:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Social
Technical
Administrative
Political
Legal
Economic
Environmental
Each of these terms represents an opportunity or
constraint to implementing a particular mitigation
option. Because communities are generally very different in their overall makeup, a single mitigation
option analyzed according to the STAPLEE criteria
may produce very different outcomes in different
places.
Each criteria considers a different aspect of the
community and requires different methods of information collection and analysis. There is no definable
or identifiable priority or weight assigned to any of
these criteria—the order of the letters in the acronym
was determined by the word they formed (which was
meant to be easy to remember).
The criteria include (adapted from FEMA, 2005b):
1. Social. A mitigation option will only be viable if
it is socially accepted within the community
where it is implemented. The public is instrumental in guiding decisions such as these
through their support or lack thereof. Even with
public support, a proposed mitigation option
Disaster managers must have a clear understanding
of how the mitigation option will affect the population. They must investigate several questions that will
guide their interpretation of this criterion, including:
●
●
●
●
Will the proposed action adversely affect any one
segment of the population? Will it give some
disproportionate benefit to only one segment?
Will the action disrupt established neighborhoods, break up legal, political, or electoral
districts, or cause the relocation of lower-income
people?
Is the proposed action compatible with present
and future community values?
Will the actions adversely affect cultural values
or resources?
2. Technical. If the proposed action is investigated
and found to not be technically feasible, it is
probably not a good option. Additionally, it is
important to investigate, when looking into the
technical feasibility of each option, whether it
will help to reduce losses in the long term and
whether it has any secondary effects that could
nullify its benefits.
By addressing the following questions, the hazards
risk management team can determine the suitability of
their proposed actions based on the actual degree of
help those actions will ultimately provide:
●
●
●
How effective is the action in avoiding or reducing future losses? It is important that the measures taken are able to achieve the anticipated
results, not a fraction thereof.
Will it create more problems than it fixes?
Does it solve the problem or only a symptom?
3. Administrative. This measure investigates the
community’s capabilities for carrying out the
projects that would be required to implement
each of the mitigation options. Specifically, the
disaster managers will look at each option’s
requirements in terms of:
Chapter 4
●
●
●
Mitigation
Staffing
Funding
Maintenance
The community may be able to implement some
options on their own, using their own resources, while
other options will require (often significant) outside
assistance. The questions disaster managers must
answer include:
●
●
●
Does the jurisdiction have the capability (staff,
technical experts, and/or funding) to implement
the action, and can it be readily obtained?
Can the community provide the necessary maintenance work required to maintain the method of
mitigation?
Can the implementation project be accomplished
in a timely manner, without excessive disruption
to the community?
4. Political. Mitigation actions tend to be highly
political. Like most other government actions,
they tend to entail the spending of local funds and
the use of local services, require permits and permissions, involve some alteration to the fabric of
the community, may involve some use of public
lands, and involve a certain amount of risk for the
political leaders who authorize the actions. The
political nature of each option will likewise be an
influential decision-making factor when options
are being chosen for implementation.
Disaster managers will need to be aware of or will
need to investigate how local, regional, and national
political leaders feel about issues related to such
agenda items as the environment, economic development, safety, and emergency management. Logically,
actions that go against the current administration’s
political ideology in any of these areas are likely to
receive less support than those that are in line with its
beliefs. It is not uncommon for proposed mitigation
actions to fail because they lack this much-needed
political support.
Disaster managers can measure political support
for their mitigation options by addressing the following questions:
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●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Is there political support to implement and maintain this action?
Have political leaders participated in the planning process so far?
Is there a local champion willing to help see the
action to completion?
Who are the stakeholders in this proposed action,
and how do they feel about the changes that will
occur as a result of the action?
Is there enough public support, toward which
political leaders are likely to lean, to ensure the
success of the action?
Have all of the stakeholders been offered an opportunity to participate in the planning process?
How can the mitigation objectives be accomplished at the lowest “cost” to the public?
5. Legal. Many mitigation options will require
actions to be taken that need legal authority in
order to be lawfully conducted. Disaster managers must determine whether they will be able
to establish the legal authority at the national,
provincial, state, or local levels to implement
the proposed mitigation actions. It even may be
necessary to propose the passage of new laws or
regulations to accommodate the needs of the
mitigation measure if such legal authority is
weak or does not exist. However, this legal
authority is best established long before the mitigation action is taken because of the exhaustive
process of making or changing laws.
Depending upon the country where the mitigation
actions are being conducted, government entities at
each structural level may operate under their own specific source of delegated authority. Local governments
may operate under “enabling legislation” that gives
them the power to engage in certain activities, or
under informal governance systems based on tribal or
other forms of law.
Disaster managers will need to identify the unit of
government that will ultimately have the authority to
grant or deny the permission to undertake the actions
necessary to implement the mitigation action. They
will be well served to understand the interrelationships
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between the various levels of government in order to
better anticipate any political roadblocks or challenges
that may arise. Much of this information can be
obtained by asking:
●
●
●
●
●
●
Does the government in question have the
authority to grant permissions or permits for the
work that is to be conducted?
Is there a technical, scientific, or legal basis for
the mitigation action (i.e., does the mitigation
action “fit” the hazard setting?)?
Are the proper laws, ordinances, and resolutions
in place to implement the action?
Are there any potential legal consequences?
Will there by any issues of liability for the
actions or support of actions, or lack of action,
by any of the mitigation stakeholders?
Is the action likely to be challenged by stakeholders who may be negatively affected?
likely to be more willing to support a mitigation
option if it can be funded, either in part or in whole,
by some alternative (outside) source or sources. Disaster managers should ask the following questions
when considering the economic aspects of mitigation
options:
●
●
●
●
●
●
6. Economic. Like all community projects, mitigation options must prove to be cost-effective
to the community before they are considered
viable for implementation. The mitigation measures must be also be affordable to those who
will be funding the project. Mitigation projects
often require maintenance long after the project
is completed, at the expense of the community
where it is implemented. For this reason, affordability means many things, including being
fundable without restructuring local budgets,
fundable but with some budget restructuring
required, fundable but requiring a special tax to
be imposed, fundable but requiring external
loans, and so on.
Mitigation measures that are cost-free to the community or that can be financed within a current budget
cycle are much more attractive to government officials
who are making funding decisions than options that
will require general obligation bonds or other forms of
debt that will ultimately draw upon future community
funds.
Those communities that have very little money to
support mitigation actions (a common condition) are
Are there currently sources of funds that can be
used to implement the action?
What benefits will the action provide?
Does the cost seem reasonable for the size of the
problem and likely benefits?
What financial burden will be placed on the tax
base or local economy to implement or maintain
this action?
Will the result of the action negatively affect the
economy in some secondary manner, such as
reducing some form of income generation that
was dependent upon the existence of the hazard?
Does the action contribute to other community
economic goals, such as capital improvements or
economic development?
7. Environmental. Many mitigation measures
affect the natural environment, either positively
or negatively (and occasionally both positively
and negatively to some degree). Disaster
managers must consider these effects, as their
actions could have long-term effects on the
community and could negate any positive gains
of the mitigation action.
Of course, benefits to the environment often that
arise from the implementation of a mitigation measure, which must be considered in the choosing of
options. Floodplain buyout programs, for instance,
which include acquisition and relocation of structures
out of identified floodplains, help to restore the natural
function of the floodplain. Vegetation management,
which is often performed to control the wildfire hazard risk to humans and property, also provides the
same protection to the environment.
Questions that disaster managers should ask when
considering the environmental factors associated with
particular mitigation options include:
Chapter 4
●
●
●
Mitigation
How will this action affect the environment
(including land, water, and air resources and
endangered species)?
Will this action comply with environmental laws
and regulations?
Is the action consistent with the community’s
environmental values and goals?
EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPACITY AS A
RISK MITIGATION MEASURE
Development of a nation’s emergency response
capacity is often cited as one of the most important
mitigation measures that can be taken. The ability of
emergency and disaster response mechanisms to manage a disastrous event and prevent further injuries,
fatalities, and destruction of property and the environment will play a large part in determining that community’s or country’s vulnerability.
To be truly effective, emergency capabilities must
be tailored to the risks of the community. Though they
are primarily designed to handle the routine emergencies experienced by the community, the region, or the
country, these resources can be developed so they can
manage large-scale events as well. In general, emergency and disaster management systems will minimally include:
●
●
●
Fire department resources
Law enforcement resources
Public health infrastructure (clinics, hospitals,
ambulances, etc.)
Additional resources that help to specialize emergency management and ensure that the community or
country is prepared for major disasters include, but are
not limited to:
●
●
●
●
●
Search-and-rescue teams (wilderness and urban)
Hazardous materials teams
Special weapons and tactics teams
Emergency management specialists or departments
Disaster medical and mortuary teams
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●
●
●
●
●
Debris management teams
Mass casualty management teams
Infrastructure repair resources
Communications coordinators
Volunteer management teams
Developing an emergency management capacity
also involves taking several important actions. These
may involve:
●
●
●
●
Creation of comprehensive emergency response
plans for the range of known hazards that exist,
detailing responsibilities, operational tasks, leadership roles, and administrative issues (such as
what agency pays for what actions, and what
reimbursement will occur)
Establishment of statutory authority for response
and recovery
Creation of mutual aid agreements within countries (between communities) and around international regions, to formalize assistance before
disasters strike
Development of a full training and exercise
regimen
Preparedness and response actions and resources
will be described in much greater detail in Chapters 5
and 6, while the components of an emergency
response capacity will be described in Chapter 8.
INCORPORATING MITIGATION INTO
DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF PROJECTS
More and more each year, especially as a result of
the United Nations’ efforts during the International
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction and the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, mitigation
is recognized as an essential component of all preand postdisaster development projects. Development
workers, be they national, international, or other, must
be aware of the hazard risks that exist where they are
developing and must incorporate those risks into their
project designs (see Exhibit 4-4).
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EXHIBIT 4-4 Organization of American States:
“Decision Criteria with Limited Information”
Unfortunately, even with the current efforts to
map worldwide risk, there are situations where
projects must go ahead with little or no information
on risk. The Organization of American States,
which is heavily involved in development and
reconstruction in Latin America, has designated
four available options to accommodate such situations when international funding is involved:
Cut-off period. This is the crudest procedure for
incorporating natural hazard risk into economic
analysis. For the most part, it is used by private
investment agencies with a primary interest in capital return. To be economically feasible under the
cut-off-period method, a project must accrue benefits that exceed its cost in relatively few years. For
very risky projects, such as those at high risk of
flooding or landslides, the cut-off period might be
set as low as two or three years. The logic of the
cut-off-period rule is that, because costs and benefits are uncertain beyond the cut-off date, they
should be ignored when determining project feasibility. To determine the length of the cut-off period,
a rough idea of the riskiness of the project should
be sought during the pre-feasibility analysis. The
method is appropriate when three conditions are
present: (1) few records concerning natural hazard
risk are available, (2) the likely hazards are of fast
rather than slow onset, and (3) the magnitude of
potential disasters is great.
Discount rate adjustment. Adding a risk premium to the discount rate is another ad hoc way to
reflect uncertainty in project analysis. A variation is
to add a premium to the discount rate for the benefits accruing to the project as a result of mitigation,
and to subtract a premium for the costs, a procedure
consistent with the fact that hazards decrease benefits and increase costs. Introducing these premiums
into feasibility calculations has the effect of giving
less weight to increasingly uncertain future costs
and benefits. This is consistent with the conventional expectation that an investor will require
higher rates of return for riskier investments. The
analyst using this method must determine an arbitrary risk premium to add to the discount rate. The
same kind of hazard information used for the cutoff method is applicable here, and the method is
applicable to both slow- and rapid-onset hazards.
Again, this information should be available by the
pre-feasibility stage of planning.
Game-theory approaches. Two strategies from
game theory are applicable to introducing risk
assessment into the economic appraisal of projects:
the “maximin-gain” and the “minimax-regret.”
Both can be applied at the earliest stages of project
formulation, as the necessary minimum information on historical hazardous events and damage
becomes available. From this information, it is possible to estimate the comparative benefits of equivalent project alternatives, given varying severities
of a hazardous event. The game-theory approaches
are best suited to short-term, high-impact hazards
for which most-least-damage scenarios can be
produced.
Given the possible net benefits accrued under
different hazard conditions, the maximin-gain
approach seeks the project alternative that will give
the highest net return in the worst-case scenario; the
selection of a particular project alternative is based
entirely on security and is thus very conservative.
Minimax-regret takes a different approach by considering the sum of the losses that each project
alternative might incur given the probabilities of
hazardous events occurring. The alternative with
the smallest sum of possible losses when all
scenarios are considered is the one that would be
selected.
Chapter 4
Mitigation
Sensitivity analysis. Using this method, an analyst tests the effect of changes in the values of key
project parameters (e.g., halving the income from
admission fees or doubling the maintenance cost)
on net costs and benefits. To assess the impact of
natural hazards, values are changed according to
previous hazard information, damage reports, etc.,
so that the effects of a possible natural event on the
Of course, mitigation is costly, and for this reason
its incorporation may be resisted. However, through
education, regulation, and enforcement, it is easy to
teach these officials that it may not be worth spending
the money on the project in the first place if there is
little chance the structure or system is unlikely to
survive a disaster in the near or even distant future.
This is especially true for projects that involve large
amounts of national or foreign debt, because the debt
will still exist even if the structure has been destroyed.
Resilience is one of the fundamental bases of sustainable development.
The World Bank has begun to embrace this philosophy and has created the Disaster Management Facility to assess risks around the world and incorporate
their findings into consideration for development
projects. They are gradually gaining a greater awareness of site-specific risks that exist in many countries
of the world, especially poor countries, where risk
assessments were nonexistent, inaccurate, or severely
out of date. With this tool in hand, they can more
accurately assess large development projects, such as
schools, hospitals, or other components of infrastructure, and determine if the project design accounts for
the hazard risks with which the new structure will
need to contend. It is in the best interest of both the
lender and the borrower to take such actions, because
both will ultimately suffer in the event of a disaster
that results in loss of the structure or project.
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economic feasibility of the project can be quantified. With this type of analysis, it is possible to
determine how much a key parameter can change
before the project becomes economically unfeasible. The analysis can also be used to test the effect
of mitigation measures.
Source: OAS, 1991.
Finally, mitigation must be incorporated into relief
projects. It has often been said that disasters are
opportunities in disguise. Despite the death, suffering,
and destruction, the event allows for a fresh start, and
with proper planning, the society that is rebuilt can be
made resilient to the hazard that brought about its
previous destruction. There are conflicting goals in the
aftermath of disasters—the goal to rebuild as quickly
as possible, and the goal to rebuild as strongly as possible. It is vital that relief efforts fully assess the future
risks of the region, based upon the new information
gained in the aftermath of the disaster, and incorporate
all of those findings into any relief and reconstruction
project. For the structures that are left standing, this
information may be used to retrofit, relocate, or
perform other mitigation measures as listed above.
Finally, the opportunity to fine-tune both public education efforts and response capabilities may be gained
in this period as well.
CONCLUSION
Mitigation traditionally has been perceived as a
luxury of the wealthy nations. Yet, through unilateral,
multilateral, and nonprofit financial and technical
assistance, many of the poorer nations of the world are
beginning to not only recognize mitigation’s benefits
but to benefit from its practice as well.
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●
FIGURE 4-9 Incidence of dengue fever (in red) showing 1970
levels during a mosquito eradication campaign, and 1997 levels,
many years after the eradication campaign was stopped. (Source:
US Centers for Disease Control.)
●
Behavioral Modification
Through collective action, a community can alter
the behavior of individuals; resulting in some common risk reduction benefit. Voluntary behavior modification measures are more difficult to implement than
the regulatory measures listed above, because they
usually involve some form of sacrifice. However,
through effective public education, behavioral modification is possible. Tax incentives, or subsidies, can
help to increase the success of behavioral modification
practices. Examples of mitigation measures that
involve behavioral modification include:
●
Rationing. Rationing is often performed prior to
and during periods of drought. Because it can be
very difficult for governments to limit vital services such as water to citizens, it is up to citizens to
limit their individual usage. Electricity rationing is
also performed during periods of extreme heat or
cold to ensure that electrical climate control systems are able to perform as required.
●
Environmental conservation. Many practices, in
both urban and rural areas, are very destructive
to the environment. Once the environmental
feature—be it a body of water, a forest, or a
hillside—is destroyed, secondary hazardous
consequences may appear that could have been
avoided. Through proper education and the offering of alternatives, destructive practices can be
halted before too much damage is done. Examples of environmental conservation include environmentally friendly farming practices, wood
harvesting that does not cause deforestation, and
protecting coral reefs from dynamite fishing and
other fishing practices.
Tax incentives, subsidies, and other financial
rewards for safe practices. Individuals and businesses can be coaxed into safer practices that
reduce overall risk through financial incentives.
Examples of schemes that use financial incentives include lower insurance premiums, housing
buyout programs to move out of high-risk areas,
farm subsidies for allowing land to be used for
flood control during emergencies, and environmentally friendly farming practices (no deforestation, responsible grazing practices, flexible
farming and cropping).
Strengthening of social ties. When a community
strengthens its social ties, it is more likely to
withstand a hazard’s stresses. For many reasons,
the largest of which is urbanization, these ties
break and are not replaced. In Chicago in 1995, a
heat wave caused the death of 739 people. It was
later determined that weak social structures were
primarily to blame for the deaths, which could
have been prevented had friends, family, or
neighbors checked on the victims.
RISK TRANSFER, SHARING, AND SPREADING
Risk transfer, sharing, and spreading are often
considered mitigation measures, though they do
Chapter 4
Mitigation
absolutely nothing to reduce actual disaster consequences or reduce hazard likelihood. The concept
behind them is that the financial disaster consequences
that do occur are shared by a large group of people,
rather than the entire burden falling only on the
affected individuals. The result is a calculated average
consequence cost, such as an insurance premium.
Insurance, which is the most common mitigation
measure in this category, is defined as: “A promise of
compensation for specific potential future losses in
exchange for a periodic payment” (InvestorWords.
com, 2003). Insurance is a mechanism by which the
financial well-being of an individual, company, or
other entity is protected against an incidence of unexpected loss. Insurance can be mandatory (required by
law) or optional.
Insurance operates through the use of premiums, or
payments determined by the insurer. In exchange for
premiums, the insurer agrees to pay the policyholder
a sum of money (up to an established maximum
amount) upon the occurrence of a specifically defined
disastrous event. The majority of insurance policies
include a deductible, which can be a fixed amount per
loss (e.g., the first $1000 of a loss), a percentage of the
loss (5% of the total loss), or a combination. The
insurer pays the remaining amount, up to the limits
established in the original contract. In general, the
lower (smaller) the deductible associated with a policy, the higher the premiums. Common examples of
insurance include automobile insurance, health insurance, disability insurance, life insurance, flood insurance, earthquake insurance, terrorism insurance, and
business insurance.
Insurance allows losses to be shared across wide
populations. To briefly summarize, insurance works as
follows. An auto insurer (for example) takes into
account all of the policyholders it will be insuring. It
then estimates the cost of compensating policyholders
for all accidents expected to occur during the time
period established in the premiums (usually six
months to a year.) The company then divides that cost,
adding its administrative costs, across all policyholders. The premiums can be further calculated using
191
information that gives more specific definitions of
risk to certain individuals. For example, if one policyholder has 10 moving violations (speeding tickets) in
a period of 10 years and has been found at fault in
five accidents during the same period, that policyholder is statistically a greater risk to the insurer than
someone who has never had an accident or moving
violation. It follows, then, that the first policyholder
would be expected to pay a higher premium for
equal coverage. Insurance companies make the
majority of their profits through investing the premiums collected.
To cover losses in case the severity of accidents or
disasters is greater than estimated when the policies
were created, insurance companies rely on the services of reinsurance companies. Reinsurance companies insure insurance companies, and tend to be
internationally based to allow the risk to be spread
across even greater geographical ranges.
Insurance industry researchers Howard Kunreuther
and Paul Freemen investigated the insurability of
risks, especially those associated with disastrous consequence. They found that two conditions must be satisfied for a risk to be insurable. First, the hazard in
question must be identifiable and quantifiable. In
other words, the likelihood and consequence factors
must be well understood before an insurer can responsibly and accurately set insurance premiums such
that they will be able to adequately compensate customers in the event of a disaster. Second, insurers
must be able to set premiums for “each potential
customer or class of customers” (Kunreuther and
Freement, 1997). Common hazards, such as house
fires and storm damage, have a wealth of information
available upon which insurers may calculate their premiums. For catastrophic but rare events, such as earthquakes, it can be difficult or impossible to estimate
with any degree of precision how often events
will occur and what damages would result (see
Exhibit 4-2).
In the wealthier nations of the world, most property
owners and renters have some form of insurance that
protects the structure itself, the contents of the
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EXHIBIT 4-2 Findings of the ProVention Consortium International Conference on the
Potential of Insurance for Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries: Challenges
Lack of information needed for underwriting.
Many developing countries lack the data and information needed for sound underwriting and product
development. The quality and availability of data
may vary, such that in a capital city some information may be available, while in rural areas information may be held only locally and in forms that are
not easily understood by noncommunity individuals. Insurance services require information about
potential losses and client demand, including data
on assets at risk and the vulnerability and hazard
exposure of those assets.
Lack of local insurance expertise. In countries
where insurance is not common, there is often a distinct lack of local expertise, ranging from actuarial
science, underwriting, and risk assessment to
claims management and client support.
Lack of awareness and understanding of
insurance. It takes time to develop awareness
among potential clients about the benefits and costs
of insurance, whether the clients are national or
local governments, community groups, or lowincome individuals. Awareness is important not
only for demand development and sales; but also
because the design of insurance products should be
based on client needs. Potential clients need an
awareness of basic insurance principles and how
these tools could help them before they can articulate their needs and thus generate demand.
High opportunity cost of premiums for the
poor. It is often asked if insurance is truly a viable
option for the very poor, because premiums are not
productive (unless a claim is made), and other
needs may be more pressing. Paying premiums will
generally not be a priority for a poor household if
doing so would require foregoing essentials.
Lack of legal structure and financial services
infrastructure. Many developing countries lack
the regulatory framework that makes insurance pro-
vision possible. Some micro-insurance services are
provided in semi-legal ways because the legal environment in host countries does not allow formal
insurance. Community groups may be able to
aggregate business and overcome moral hazard,
adverse selection, and data needs, but formal insurance providers may not be legally allowed to offer
services to these groups. Some developing countries’ legal systems are developing towards market
economy standards, but may not yet be mature
enough to link with the international capital markets. Also, many developing countries lack the
infrastructure to provide insurance services. Inadequate technological infrastructure such as communications may hinder insurance services and claims
management.
Lack of a culture of risk reduction and mitigation. Insurance functions on the assumption that
the underlying risk is reduced as much as possible,
with insurance thus mitigating against the remaining unpreventable and unpredictable events (“residual risk”). Many developing countries lack a culture
of predisaster risk reduction, or resources and
incentives for action are often inadequate. Without
a culture of risk reduction and insurance as forms of
mitigation, establishing successful insurance will
be challenging.
Partner differences in vocabulary, organizational operations, and timelines. Partners in different schemes that provide insurance services
might include any mix of national and local governments, NGOs, civil society and the poor, commercial enterprises, and international organizations.
Each potential partner may operate with different
vocabularies, goals, and methods, and along different timelines. Different operational structures can
also be a challenge: While national governments
may need to run decisions through complex and
time-consuming democratic decision-making
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Mitigation
processes, commercial entities need to make decisions based on profitability and other strategic concerns. There is the example of a partnership that fell
apart when the involved national government could
not provide insurance and reinsurance partners with
necessary data by a certain deadline, even though
products had been developed and the partnership
was ready to move forward.
Need to define partner roles clearly. The word
“partnership” among international organizations
and national governments often signifies a broad
willingness to engage in discussions, while in business the term often implies contractual obligations.
Further to such basic differences of understanding
and interpretation, there are examples of a national
government establishing a pattern of “bailing out”
disaster victims following earthquakes, thus creating a disincentive to purchase insurance from a
scheme that the government itself supported as
mandatory. International organizations have at
structure, or both (see Figure 4-10). However, for the
reasons listed above, this coverage is often limited
to common events, with specific preclusions against
more unlikely natural and technological disasters.
These special disasters require the purchase of policies formulated to assume the specific risk for each
causative hazard.
General homeowner and renter policies cover
losses that commonly occur and are not catastrophic
in nature, such as fires, wind damage, theft, and
plumbing damage. Catastrophic hazards, like earthquakes, landslides, and floods, are often precluded
because of the wide spatial damage they inflict.
Hazard damages that affect a wide spatial territory
present a special problem for insurance companies
because of the mechanisms by which insurance functions. For example, in the event of a fire or theft in
a single home, the cost of the damages or losses
would be easily absorbed by the premiums of the
unaffected policyholders. However, in the case of an
193
times acted as reinsurers for client countries, which
in many cases is inappropriate. Roles and agreements must be examined carefully and adjusted so
that there is no confusion and detraction of the
opportunities and responsibilities of each partner.
Lack of national stability and thus insurance
industry confidence. Developing countries may
lack the stability in government, regulatory framework, and economy that is required for the provision of sustainable insurance services. Constantly
changing governments and regulatory frameworks
make it difficult for the insurance industry to establish itself and develop a viable market. Unstable
macroeconomies can affect the ability of potential
clients to pay premiums over a long period of time.
The insurance industry is aware of these risks and
commensurately wary of doing business under such
conditions.
Source: ProVention Consortium, 2004.
earthquake, a large number of people will be
affected, resulting in a sum total much greater than
their collective premiums, such that the total funds
collected from the premiums will be less than the capital required to pay for damages. The bankruptcy of
insurance companies due to catastrophic losses has
been prevalent throughout the history of the insurance
industry.
Policies for specific catastrophic hazards can often
be purchased separately from basic homeowners or
renters insurance policies or as riders to them. However, these entail specific problems that deserve mentioning. In general, only those people who are likely to
suffer the specific loss defined in the policy are likely
to purchase that type of policy, creating the need for
much higher premiums than if the specific hazard policy were spread across a more general population.
This phenomenon, called “adverse selection,” has
made the business of hazard insurance undesirable to
many insurance companies.
194
Introduction to International Disaster Management
FIGURE 4-10
Worldwide insurance coverage. (Source: MunichRe, 2004, Munich.)
Several methods have been adopted to address the
problems associated with adverse selection. Examples
include:
●
●
The inclusion of these disasters in basic/comprehensive homeowners and renters policies,
regardless of exposure or vulnerability. This
spreads out the risk across the entire population
of policyholders in the country, regardless of differential risk between individuals. Additionally,
controls are placed upon the minimum spatial
zones within which each company can provide
policies to ensure that the ratio of policies
affected by a disaster to those unaffected are kept
as low as possible.
The introduction of government backing on
insurance coverage of catastrophic events. In
●
this scenario, the insurers are liable for paying
for damages up to an established point, beyond
which the government supplements the payments. Terrorism insurance, as discussed later in
this section, is an example of government backing on insurance coverage of catastrophic events.
Heavier reliance on international reinsurance
companies. Buying reinsurance can spread the
local risk to wider areas of coverage, thereby
reducing the chance that annual claims exceed
collected premiums. Unfortunately, many companies are unable to purchase all the reinsurance
that they would like to have. Additionally,
because many of these policies require the insurers to pay a percentage of total claims placed, the
amount they ultimately pay in catastrophic disasters can be massive despite reinsurance coverage.
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Several advantages gained through the use of
insurance have been identified, including:
1. Victims are guaranteed a secure and predictable
amount of compensation for their losses. With
this coverage, they do not have to rely on disaster relief, and reliance on government assistance
is reduced as well.
2. Insurance allows for losses to be distributed in
an equitable fashion, protecting many for only a
fraction of the cost each would have incurred
individually if exposed to hazards. This can help
the economy overall by reducing bankruptcies,
reducing reliance on federal government assistance, and increasing the security of small businesses and individuals, often the most severely
affected victims of disaster.
3. Insurance can actually reduce hazard impact by
encouraging policyholders to adopt certain
required mitigation measures. As policyholders
reduce their vulnerability to risk, their premiums fall. The owners of automobiles that have
airbags, antitheft devices, and passive restraint
devices, for instance, will receive a discount on
their premiums. Homeowners who develop
outside of the floodplain or who install fire
suppression systems will also receive these benefits. Additionally, this gives financial/economic
disincentives for people or businesses to build
in areas that are exposed to hazards.
Limitations on hazard insurance exist as well, and
include the following issues:
1. Insurance may be impossible to purchase in the
highest-risk areas if the private insurance companies decide that their risk is too high. This is
especially true for hazards like landslides that
affect a very specific segment of the population.
2. Participation in insurance plans is voluntary.
Although private insurance companies can earn
a profit despite overall low participation, benefits in terms of mitigation value become limited
by low participation. Furthermore, it is not
uncommon for homeowners and renters to save
195
money by purchasing policies that cover less
than is needed for catastrophic losses, which
increases their potential (though reduced)
reliance on government relief.
3. Participation in insurance has been known to
encourage people to act more irresponsibly than
they may act without such coverage. For instance,
if a person knows that his furniture is likely to be
replaced if it is damaged in a flood, he is less
likely to move that furniture out of harm’s way
(such as moving it to a second floor of his home)
during the warning phase of the disaster. This phenomenon is termed the “moral hazard.” In the
long run, this causes damage payouts to increase
and, as a result, premiums to increase as well.
4. Many insurance companies are pulling out of
specific disaster insurance plans because the
probability that they will not be able to cover
catastrophic losses is too great. Before 1988,
there had never been a single disaster event for
which the insurance industry as a whole needed
to pay over $1 billion in claims. Since that time,
there have been over 20 events for which claims
have exceeded that threshold (see Table 4-1).
Hurricane Andrew required $15.5 billion in
compensation, and estimates for insured losses
in the September 11th terrorist attacks have
been as high as $40 billion (International Insurance Society, 2003).
5. Catastrophic losses that cover a wide but specific geographic space within a country may
result in inequitable premium increases if coverage areas are too general. For instance, the
Northridge, California earthquake cost insurers
more than $12 billion in claims, but only $1
billion in premiums had been collected in the
entire state of California. Therefore, the payment for this event and, likewise, the required
increase in premiums were “subsidized” by
other states that were not affected and were not
at such high risk (Mileti, 1999).
Insurance has been denied status as a true mitigation measure by many experts because it is seen as
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Introduction to International Disaster Management
TABLE 4-1 The 10 Most Costly World Insurance Losses, 1970–2004
Rank
Insured loss in
2004 U.S. dollars
(millions)b
Date
Country
Event
1
Aug. 23, 1992
United States, Bahamas
Hurricane Andrew
2
Sept. 11, 2001
United States
Terrorist attack
20,035
3
Jan. 17, 1994
United States
Northridge earthquake (magnitude 6.6)
17,843
4
Sept. 2, 2004
United States, Caribbean: Barbados, etc.
Hurricane Ivan; damage to oil rigs
11,000
5
Aug. 11, 2004
United States, Caribbean: Cuba, Jamaica, etc.
Hurricane Charley
8,000
6
Sept. 27, 1991
Japan
Typhoon Mireille
7,831
7
Jan. 25, 1990
Europe: France, United Kingdom, etc.
Winter storm Daria
6,639
8
Dec. 25, 1999
Europe: France, Switzerland, etc.
Winter storm Lothar
6,578
$21,542
9
Sept. 15, 1989
Puerto Rico, United States, etc.
Hurricane Hugo
6,393
10
Aug. 26, 2004
United States, Bahamas
Hurricane Frances
5,000
a
Property and business interruption losses, excluding life and liability losses.
Adjusted to 2004 dollars by Swiss Re.
c
Note that, while final figures for the insurance losses for Hurricane Katrina (August, 2005) have not yet been tallied, industry estimates place
the final cost at between $30 and $40 billion, thereby ensuring its status as the greatest insurance loss from a single event.
b
Source: Swiss Re, sigma, No. 1/2005. Insured losses for natural catastrophes in the United States and the Sept. 11 terrorist attack from ISO.
redistributing losses rather than actually eliminating
exposure to the hazard (which would effectively limit
absolute losses). This is a widely debatable issue,
which requires many assumptions. For instance, one
must assume that an individual has the ability to move
out of a risky situation or has other options that present less risk before stating that the mere presence of
insurance encourages him to live in the riskier situation. One also must assume that we would be able to
limit all losses, or that we could reach consensus as a
society about which hazard risk should be considered
insurable and at which level of risk insurance should
be limited or prevented.
The International Insurance Institute maintains
profiles on the insurance industry in most countries
of the world, accessible at: www.internationalinsurance.org/international/toc/
The United States has a nationally managed insurance program designed to insure against the risk of flood
hazards. Exhibit 4-3 describes this program in detail.
EXHIBIT 4-3 The U.S. National Flood Insurance Program
History of the Program
Up until 1968, federal actions related to flooding
were primarily responses to significant events that
resulted in using structural measures to control
flooding. Major riverine flood disasters of the 1920s
and 1930s led to considerable federal involvement
in protecting life and property from flooding
through the use of structural flood-control projects,
such as dams and levees, with the passage of the
Flood Control Act of 1936. Generally, the only
available financial recourse to assist flood victims
was in the form of disaster assistance. Despite the
billions of dollars in federal investments in struc-
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tural flood-control projects, the losses to life and
property and the amount of assistance to disaster
victims from floods continued to increase.
As early as the 1950s, when the feasibility of
providing flood insurance was first proposed, it
became clear that private insurance companies
could not profitably provide such coverage at an
affordable price, primarily because of the catastrophic nature of flooding and the inability to
develop an actuarial rate structure that could adequately reflect the risk to which flood-prone properties are exposed. The U.S. Congress proposed an
experimental program designed to demonstrate the
feasibility of the private sector providing flood
insurance by enacting the Federal Insurance Act of
1956, but this Act was never implemented.
In recognition of increasing flood losses and disaster relief costs, major steps were taken in the
1960s to redefine federal policy and approaches to
flood control. In 1965, Congress passed the Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act. The Act was as
a result of the extensive damage caused by Hurricane Betsy in the Gulf states. The Act provided
financial relief for the flooding victims and authorized a feasibility study of a national flood insurance program. The resulting report was entitled
“Insurance and Other Programs for Financial Assistance to Flood Victims.” Shortly thereafter, the
Bureau of the Budget Task Force on Federal Flood
Control in 1966 advocated a broader perspective
on flood control within the context of floodplain
development in House Document 465, “A Unified
National Program for Managing Flood Losses.”
House Document 465 included five major goals:
1. Improve basic knowledge about flood
hazards
2. Coordinate and plan new developments in the
floodplain
3. Provide technical services
4. Move toward a practical national program of
flood insurance
197
5. Adjust federal flood control policy to sound
criteria and changing needs
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968
Congressional Document 465 and the prior feasibility study provided the basis for the National
Flood Insurance Act of 1968. The primary purposes
of the 1968 Act creating the NFIP are to:
1. Better indemnify individuals for flood losses
through insurance
2. Reduce future flood damages through state
and community floodplain management
regulations
3. Reduce federal expenditures for disaster
assistance and flood control
Section 1315 of the 1968 Act is a key provision
that prohibits FEMA from providing flood insurance unless the community adopts and enforces
floodplain management regulations that meet or
exceed the floodplain management criteria established in accordance with Section 1361(c) of the
Act. These floodplain management criteria are contained in 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
Part 60, Criteria for Land Management and Use.
The emphasis of the NFIP floodplain management
requirements is directed toward reducing threats to
lives and the potential for damages to property in
flood-prone areas. Over 19,700 communities
presently participate in the NFIP. These include
nearly all communities with significant flood
hazards.
In addition to providing flood insurance and
reducing flood damages through floodplain management regulations, the NFIP identifies and maps
the nation’s floodplains. Mapping flood hazards
creates broad-based awareness of the flood hazards
and provides the data needed for floodplain management programs and to actuarially rate new construction for flood insurance.
When the NFIP was created, the U.S. Congress
recognized that insurance for “existing buildings”
198
constructed before a community joined the program
would be prohibitively expensive if the premiums
were not subsidized by the federal government.
Congress also recognized that individuals who did
not have sufficient knowledge of the flood hazard to
make informed decisions built most of these floodprone buildings. Under the NFIP, “existing buildings” are generally referred to as Pre-FIRM (Flood
Insurance Rate Map) buildings. These buildings
were built before the flood risk was known and
identified on the community’s FIRM. Currently
about 26% of the 4.3 million NFIP policies in force
are Pre-FIRM subsidized, compared to 70% of the
policies being subsidized in 1978.
In exchange for the availability of subsidized
insurance for existing buildings, communities are
required to protect new construction and substantially improved structures through adoption and
enforcement of community floodplain management
ordinances. The 1968 Act requires that full actuarial rates reflecting the complete flood risk be
charged on all buildings constructed or substantially improved on or after the effective date of the
initial FIRM for the community or after December
31, 1974, whichever is later. These buildings are
generally referred to as “Post-FIRM” buildings.
Early in the program’s history, the federal government found that providing subsidized flood
insurance for existing buildings was not a sufficient
incentive for communities to voluntarily join the
NFIP or for individuals to purchase flood insurance.
Tropical Storm Agnes in 1972, which caused extensive riverine flooding along the East Coast, proved
that few property owners in identified floodplains
were insured. This storm cost the nation more in
disaster assistance than any previous disaster. For
the nation as a whole, only a few thousand communities participated in the NFIP and only 95,000
policies were in force.
As a result, Congress passed the Flood Disaster
Protection Act of 1973. The 1973 Act prohibits federal agencies from providing financial assistance
Introduction to International Disaster Management
for acquisition or construction of buildings and certain disaster assistance in the floodplains in any
community that did not participate in the NFIP by
July 1,1975, or within one year of being identified
as flood-prone.
Additionally, the 1973 Act required that federal
agencies and federally insured or regulated lenders
had to require flood insurance on all grants and
loans for acquisition or construction of buildings in
designated Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) in
communities that participate in the NFIP. This
requirement is referred to as the Mandatory Flood
Insurance Purchase Requirement. The SFHA is
that land within the floodplain of a community
subject to a 1% or greater chance of flooding in any
given year, commonly referred to as the 100-year
flood.
The Mandatory Flood Insurance Purchase
Requirement, in particular, resulted in a dramatic
increase in the number of communities that joined
the NFIP in subsequent years. In 1973, just over
2200 communities participated in the NFIP. Within
four years, approximately 15,000 communities had
joined the program. It also resulted in a dramatic
increase in the number of flood insurance policies
in force. In 1977, approximately 1.2 million flood
insurance policies were in force, an increase of
almost 900,000 over the number of policies in force
in December of 1973.
The authors of the original study of the NFIP
thought that the passage of time, natural forces,
and more stringent floodplain management
requirements and building codes would gradually
eliminate the number of Pre-FIRM structures.
Nevertheless, modern construction techniques have
extended the useful life of these Pre-FIRM buildings beyond what was originally expected. However, their numbers overall continue to decrease.
The decrease in the number of Pre-FIRM buildings
has been attributed to a number of factors, such as
severe floods in which buildings were destroyed
or substantially damaged, redevelopment, natural
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attrition, acquisition of flood damaged structures, as
well as flood control projects.
In 1994, Congress amended the 1968 Act and the
1973 Act with the National Flood Insurance Reform
Act (NFIRA). The 1994 Act included measures,
among others, to:
●
●
●
●
●
●
Increase compliance by mortgage lenders
with the mandatory purchase requirement and
improve coverage
Increase the amount of flood insurance coverage that can be purchased
Provide flood insurance coverage for the cost
of complying with floodplain management
regulations by individual property owners
(Increased Cost of Compliance coverage)
Establish a Flood Mitigation Assistance grant
program to assist states and communities to
develop mitigation plans and implement
measures to reduce future flood damages to
structures
Codify the NFIP’s Community Rating System
Require FEMA to assess its flood hazard map
inventory at least once every five years
Funding for the NFIP is through the National
Flood Insurance Fund, which was established in the
Treasury by the 1968 Act. Premiums collected are
deposited into the fund, and losses and operating
Risk-Sharing Pools
Claire Reiss of the Public Entity Risk Institute and
author of Risk Identification and Analysis: A Guide for
Small Public Entities describes an alternative for local
governments and other small public entities that are
considering purchasing insurance: risk-sharing pools.
Reiss writes:
A public entity that is considering purchasing traditional
insurance may also consider public risk-sharing pools.
These are associations of public entities with similar functions that have banded together to share risks by creating
their own insurance vehicles. Pools sometimes structure
199
and administrative costs are paid out of the fund. In
addition, the program has the authority to borrow
up to $1.5 billion from the Treasury, which must
be repaid along with interest. Until 1986, federal
salaries and program expenses, as well as the costs
associated with flood hazard mapping and floodplain management, were paid by an annual appropriation from Congress. From 1987 to 1990,
Congress required the program to pay these
expenses out of premium dollars. When expressed
in current dollars, $485 million of policyholder
premiums were transferred to pay salary and other
expenses of the program. Beginning in 1991, a
Federal policy fee of $25, which was increased to
$30 in 1995, is applied to most policies in order
to generate the funds for salaries, expenses, and
mitigation costs.
The program currently has three basic
components:
1. Identifying and mapping flood-prone
communities
2. Enforcing the requirement that communities
adopt and enforce floodplain management
regulations
3. The provision of flood insurance
Source: FEMA and FIMA, 2002.
themselves or their programs as group insurance purchase
arrangements, through which individual members benefit
from the group’s collective purchasing power. Members pay
premiums, which (1) fund the administrative costs of operating the pool, including claims management expenses and
(2) pay members’ covered losses.
Pools can provide significant advantages to their members. For example, they offer insurance that is specific to
public entities at premiums that are generally stable and
affordable. Many pools also offer additional benefits and services at little or no extra charge, including advice on safety
and risk management; seminars on loss control; updates on
changes in the insurance industry; and property appraisal and
inspection. Some pools offer members the opportunity to
receive dividends for maintaining a good loss record.
Chapter 4
Mitigation
179
either way, and may appear as one form in this text
and another form elsewhere. These two categories are
described in detail below.
STRUCTURAL MITIGATION
Structural mitigation measures are those that
involve or dictate the necessity for some form of construction, engineering, or other mechanical changes
or improvements aimed at reducing hazard risk
likelihood or consequence. They often are considered
attempts at “man controlling nature” when applied to
natural disasters. Structural measures are generally
expensive and include a full range of regulation, compliance, enforcement, inspection, maintenance, and
renewal issues.
Though each hazard has a unique set of structural
mitigation measures that may be applied to its risk,
these measures may be grouped across some general
categories. Each category will be described below,
with examples of how the mitigation type would be
applied to one or more individual hazard types. The
general structural mitigation groups to be described
are:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Resistant construction
Building codes and regulatory measures
Relocation
Structural modification
Construction of community shelters
Construction of barrier, deflection, or retention
systems
Detection systems
Physical modification
Treatment systems
Redundancy in life safety infrastructure
Resistant Construction
Clearly, the best way to maximize the chance that a
structure is able to resist the forces inflicted by various
hazards is to ensure that it is designed in such a way
prior to construction to do just that. Through aware-
FIGURE 4-1 House built on stilts above annual flood levels in
Guayas Province, Ecuador. (Source: Author.)
ness and education, individual, corporate, and government entities can be informed of the hazards that exist
and the measures that can be taken to mitigate the
risks of those hazards, allowing resistant construction
to be considered. As a mitigation option, designing
hazard resistance into the structure from the start is the
most cost-effective option and the option most likely
to succeed.
Of course, whether builders choose to use hazardresistant design depends upon whether they have
access to the financial resources, the technical expertise necessary to correctly engineer the construction,
and the material resources required for such measures.
Where cultures have adapted to living with a hazard, construction styles may incorporate hazardresistant design. This is often seen in areas with
annual flooding, where houses are built on stilts (see
Figure 4-1). An example of a culturally adjusted
hazard-resistant construction style is the houses built
by the Banni in India (discussed in Chapter 3), which
resist the shaking of earthquakes. Little funding...