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Behavioral Scientist
Being Tough on Terrorism or Respecting Human Rights : A False Dilemma of Authoritarian and Liberal
Responses
Rein Müllerson
American Behavioral Scientist 2005 48: 1626
DOI: 10.1177/0002764205278081
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Being Tough on Terrorism or
Respecting Human Rights
A False Dilemma of Authoritarian and Liberal Responses
REIN MÜLLERSON
King’s College, London University
Today the world has become too small to remain too different—liberal-democratic and
authoritarian-totalitarian, rich and poor, healthy and mired in epidemics. Such variations
also constitute a fertile ground for terrorism. The concepts of East and West, South and North
have all emerged as Homo sapiens, starting from an African village, spread throughout the
world. Today we are creating the global village of planet Earth. In this village, differences
acquired during the millennia of separation and isolation not only enrich humankind but
some also can serve as a cause, a catalyst, or a pretext for conflicts, including terrorism.
Having dissimilated for millennia, humankind is slowly and often reluctantly assimilating.
However, sustainable integration, whether economic or political, is not possible without
some kind of assimilation taking place (i.e., integrating entities becoming in some respect
similar to each other).
Keywords: communitarianism; East-West relations; democracy and human rights; terrorism;
integration and assimilation in the globalizing world
If Professor Etzioni (2004) was right in observing that the EU suffers from not
only a democratic deficit but also a “community deficit” (p. 187), then there are
indeed few hopes that in the foreseeable future a global community may emerge.
One could justifiably yearn for more community spirit within the now 25 EU
member states, but in no Pollyannaish dream can I imagine a world community
emerging that may approximate the EU in the realization of communitarian ideals. Therefore, if effective global governance is not possible without a global
community, then there will be no such governance. Things may, however, not be
so hopeless, and various trends that Etzioni described in his book may indeed in
the longer run lead to a kind of “normative synthesis,” which will probably,
using Michael Walzer’s (1994) definition, be quite “thin,” and which may nevertheless facilitate finding more effective solutions to some existing or emerging
global problems, including terrorism.
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 48 No. 12, August 2005 1626-1656
DOI: 10.1177/0002764205278081
© 2005 Sage Publications
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There may be two interrelated but nevertheless distinct communitarian tendencies in the world, only the second of which—hardly discernable today—
directly belongs to the domain of international relations. The first, and somewhat stronger, tendency manifests itself in domestic political, economic, and
cultural domains and stems from the fact that in today’s interdependent world,
competing and cooperating societies, if they want to succeed, almost inevitably
have to become in some important respects (notwithstanding all the existing and
remaining differences) more and more similar to each other. How, and to what
extent, this approximation of domestic societies can spill over into the domain of
international relations is more difficult to tell. However, and as discussed further
in this article, there are signs indicating that the need to face global challenges in
the more and more interdependent world is indeed leading toward some normative synthesis, although this second communitarian tendency (i.e., the development of global community based on such normative synthesis) is still rather
fragile.
I agree with Etzioni (2004) that it is not only non-Western countries that
should “borrow” from the Western experience; there should be a two- (or multi)
way street between various societies. Here a “soft” or responsive communitarianism, which avoids the extremisms of unfettered individualism and authoritarianism (the latter is often underpinned by “hard” communitarian ideology),
may well be one of the solutions to some serious social illnesses. Therefore, I
find that Etzioni’s approach to international relations avoids the extremes of
some other international relations theories and constitutes an internally coherent
theoretical vision of the topic under study.1 Because it is organically linked to
internal developments in various societies, it is helpful for understanding major
changes going on in the world. As I hope will be clear from the following analysis, some aspects of the communitarian approach also enlighten my study of
problems relating to terrorism and human rights.
In this article, after a short personal introductory note concerning both the
clash and meeting of minds between the East and the West at the shores of beautiful Lake Issyk Kul in Kyrgyzstan, I try to analyze different approaches to combating terrorism. Today no society, Eastern or Western, is free from terrorist
threats. In that respect, too, we are in the same boat. There had better be neither
East nor West when humankind faces global challenges, including the scourge
of the beginning of the 21st century—terrorism. In this struggle, the coordinated
measures of all governments and societies are needed not only in the lawenforcement or military domains. No less, if not more, important is cooperation
in areas such as economic development, democratization, and protection of
human rights. The world has simply become too small to remain too different—
liberal-democratic and authoritarian-totalitarian, rich and poor, healthy and
mired in epidemics. Such variations, among other things, also create a fertile
ground for terrorism.
I finish the article with some reflections of a more general nature on an idea
that is contextual to my study of terrorism and human rights and echoes
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Etzioni’s (2004) communitarian approach to international relations. The concepts of East and West, South and North, have all emerged as Homo sapiens,
starting from an African village, spread throughout the world. Today, having
filled all hospitable and even inhospitable spaces, we are in the process of creating the global village of planet Earth. In this village, differences acquired during
the millennia of separation and isolation not only enrich humankind but some
also can serve as a cause, a catalyst, or a pretext for conflicts. Terrorism, especially terrorism inspired or reinforced by religious differences, is one of the
manifestations of such conflicts. Of course, this new “coming together” not only
stimulates conflicts but also provides new conflict resolution mechanisms and
forces societies to become more similar to each other. Having dissimilated for
millennia, humankind is slowly and often reluctantly assimilating. Sometimes
the resistance to assimilation takes violent forms. However, sustainable integration, whether economic or political, is not possible without some kind of assimilation taking place (i.e., integrating entities becoming in some respect similar to
each other). Even the tolerance of differences requires assimilation in the sense
that societies or individuals have all to acquire the same quality—tolerance of
differences. At the same time, there are practices in some parts of the world that
are, or that have become, intolerable (such as torture, racial or gender discrimination, or slavery). By overcoming such practices, different peoples become
more similar, in other words, the process of assimilation is taking place.
REINTERPRETING KIPLING
AT THE SHORES OF LAKE ISSYK KUL
Shortly after I had had the pleasure of meeting the communitarian guru
Amitai Etzioni at picturesque Lake Issyk Kul, where the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and the government of Kyrgyzstan
had organized the Dialogue of Cultures or Clash of Civilizations Conference, I
spent some wonderful days traveling with my family and friends, among them a
new one—Musurkul Kabylbekov, whose powerful Toyota Land Cruiser took us
around the lake. Musurkul, a Kazakh who was born and has lived most of his life
in Kyrgyzstan, is a successful businessman and journalist with a Ph.D. in philosophy from Almaty University in Kazakhstan. Musurkul is one of the most politically incorrect intellectuals I have ever met and this naturally attracted me. But
even in my hatred of political correctness (in the Soviet Union, where in the
occupied Estonia I was born and brought up, one had to be officially declared
politically correct and morally stable), I sometimes felt embarrassed. But my
passionate discussions with Musurkul sharpened some ideas that had interested
me for years and brought them home also in a literal sense because my family
members—wife Irina and son George—took part in our heated exchanges. Even
my Westernized Russian wife, whom Musurkul found extremely intrusive in
men’s affairs, did not cease to respect Musurkul. High personal integrity,
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obvious respect for one’s parents and elders, well-educated and well–brought
up sons, and generous Eastern hospitality are all qualities that call for respect.
Indeed, I find that there are many things besides Chinese food or Japanese
ikebana from which the West may benefit while borrowing from the East.
Musurkul is a devout Muslim who prays five times a day and observes all the
other strict requirements of his faith. From his point of view, the liberal Central
Asian Islam, especially its Sufi brand that is still widely professed in the region,
is a clear heresy. Of course, this is exactly why Sufism appeals to me; namely,
because of its heretic foundation and history. Former Soviets, in my opinion and
almost by definition, should be either conformists or heretics. There is hardly a
middle ground possible.
From Musurkul’s point of view, I exemplify, especially in my capacity as a
UN human rights adviser, the weaknesses and softness of the West, whose
impending decline he clearly foresees. Today’s Western emphasis on human
rights and democracy, in Musurkul’s opinion, has similarities with the decay of
the Roman Empire, which fell because of its softness under the blows of fierce
barbarians who knew neither mercy nor hesitation. He believes that the lack of
toughness and the tolerance toward everything and everybody are like worms
nibbling away the core of the West in the face of challenges from new barbarians
at the gates who also know neither mercy nor hesitation. Musurkul says that he
not only likes me but in abstract is also even sympathetic to some of my decadent
views—yet according to him, they are not for the bloody world that we inhabit.
And of course, the world will remain bloody because such is human nature and
not much can be done about it. To emphasize his point, Musurkul told me a parable about the fall of the Caliphate of Cordoba, which was established in the Iberian Peninsula as an emirate by the Umayyads prince from Damascus Abd alRahman I in the second half of the 8th century A.D.
As is well known, the Christians did not cease dreaming to reconquer Cordoba from the Muslims; but for a lengthy period of time, the balance of power
did not favor Christian kings and princes. Once upon a time they even sent a spy
whose task was to find out whether the time was ripe to win the Caliphate back
from the Arabs. This wise man spoke perfect Arabic, was familiar with details of
Muslim culture, and was even an Arab look-alike (at that time, in the absence of
SIGINT—signal intelligence—there were such spies). On his arrival in Cordoba, the spy noticed a group of young boys who were arduously praying, and
only one boy was sitting aloof, obviously in deep distress. The spy asked the boy,
“What has happened to you? Why are you in such pain?” Without raising his
head, the boy responded almost inaudibly, “Oh, nobody can help me. My father
can send an arrow to over 400 meters while my arrow hardly flies 300 meters.”
The futility of any attempt of reconquering the lost land was immediately clear
to the spy and he returned with the firm conclusion that it was impossible to triumph over the defenders of Cordoba—a people of such a firm faith and
unflinching military spirit.
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More than 100 years passed, and a grandson of the old spy, who equaled his
grandfather in cloak-and-dagger work, was sent by the Christian princes to
Cordoba. There he also saw a huge crowd of young people—boys and girls—
dancing and singing. Like a century before, one boy, he noticed, was sitting
alone and impetuously weeping. The spy asked him, “Why do you weep? What
has happened to you? Who has offended you?” “Oh, nobody can help me,” was
the reply, “my fiancée is going to marry my brother.” All became clear for the
spy, who returned with convincing advice—the time was ripe for a decisive
attack. The Muslims of Cordoba had lost their faith; the young had become decadent, caring only about pleasure and the boys were weeping like girls. In contradistinction to the CIA or MI 6 (British Secret Service) conclusions regarding
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction or whether the Iraqis would welcome or resist
their liberators (most of them probably welcomed the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein but hated being liberated by outsiders who, moreover, did not leave
after the mission was accomplished), the conclusions of this spy were right.
Thus, the Caliphate of Cordoba fell—not thanks to the increased strength of the
Christian rulers but instead, due to the internal rottenness of the Moorish society.2
Although disagreeing with Musurkul on many fundamental issues, some of
his controversial observations are not completely without foundation. For
example, exclusive emphasis on respect for rights and liberalism may have, as a
side effect, a tendency toward softening one’s toughness and decisiveness.
However, in a world that (notwithstanding all the progress achieved in the
domain of human rights and democracy in some parts of the world) is still quite
bloody and barbaric, one often needs to make tough and even unpleasant decisions. Here it is difficult to disagree with Etzioni’s (2004) analysis that the
world, with some significant exceptions, is even today “in a Hobbesian state and
is not ready for a Lockean one” (p. 116). And although the West may indeed, and
I hope it will, show to the rest of the world how many things, including respecting human rights, can be done, there are signs of Western, especially Western
European, weakness in the face of multiple challenges.3 Of course, these signs
of weakness are themselves side effects of Western strengths, but one should try
to recognize and avoid as far as possible such side effects. How can a person or
society as a whole be kind and tough, merciful and merciless, depending on circumstances and needs? This question is especially topical when we deal with the
scourge of the 21st century: terrorism.
Notwithstanding our deep differences and sometimes-frenzied exchanges of
remarks, Musurkul and I retained mutual respect. That is why I said to Musurkul
that Rudyard Kipling (1994) was, probably, wrong when he wrote, “Oh East is
East, and West is West, and never the Twain shall meet, / Till Earth and Sky stand
presently at God’s great Judgment Seat” (p. 65). “No,” responded Musurkul,
Kipling was right, but I had stopped short of reading the next phrase of the poem:
“But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth, / When two
strong men stand face to face, tho’they come from the ends of the earth!” (p. 65).
Naturally for Musurkul, I believe for Kipling too, only when two strong men
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meet, not strong women—an obvious oxymoron from their point of view—
there will be neither East nor West.
In that respect too our differences stayed. I believe in the possibility of giving
a modern, not a fundamentalist or literal, interpretation to Kipling’s (1994) “The
Ballad of East and West.” “There is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor
Birth” for all men and women who are strong enough to overcome their religious, racial, or ethnic prejudices and associate themselves with not only their
tribe or faith but also the whole of humankind. Of course, for Musurkul, such a
reinterpretation of Kipling—changing the meaning depending on the context
and time (called ijtihad in Islam) contains seeds of heresy. It would be a slippery
slope: One who starts modifying and modernizing Kipling may well also end up
reinterpreting the holy book.
Here, too, our differences are deep; I believe that one has to overcome the fear
of “slippery slopes.” Social progress is often, if not in most cases, made on slippery slopes. It has often been necessary for human beings to walk slippery
slopes, to negotiate a midway between various extremes, such as between Scylla
of unbridled liberalism and Charybdis of authoritarianism; between unbounded
permissiveness and all-embracing state (social) control. For example, the idea of
introducing ID cards in Britain is considered by many as taking a slippery slope
that may, or is even bound to, lead to the severe limitation of civil liberties. However, this may be a necessary, or even an inevitable, step to be taken not only to
fight terrorism but also to cope with, for example, social security fraud. Of
course, there may be a danger for civil liberties, but this means that there should
be an effective control to see to it that this potential slippery slope does not lead
to unnecessary restrictions of civil liberties; this should not mean that one
should not take this risky road. The more advanced and sophisticated a society
becomes, the more it will face such slippery slopes. For Western societies, the
need to introduce certain elements of communitarianism and social responsibility may necessitate stepping on a slippery slope that indeed has the potential of
leading to restriction of individual liberties. But for many Eastern societies, the
introduction of liberal values may well be seen as stepping on a slippery slope,
leading toward permissiveness and moral degradation. These are indeed slippery slopes, but without taking them, societies, both Eastern and Western, will
be unable to realize their potential. In the process of fighting terrorism, all
societies face such slippery slopes.
“FLATLAND” THINKING IN COMBATING TERRORISM
The current debate about terrorism and responses to it has revealed a dichotomy (sometimes almost an abyss) in thinking and acting between the hawks and
the doves, between the Left and the Right, between the liberals and the conservatives, between human rights activists and military (and some political) leaders.
Here, I am speaking not of a natural chasm between the mentality and behavior
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of terrorists and their supporters on one hand and those who reject terror tactics
on the other. It is about those who at least in principle denounce terrorism.
This division is reflected in approaches to issues of how to combat crime,
including the crime of terror, and how to deal with other forms of antisocial
behavior. The doves (liberals) speak of changing social, economic, or political
conditions that they say are to be blamed for high crime rates or terrorism,
whereas the hawks (conservatives) call for zero tolerance, longer prison terms,
or wider use of the death penalty. As American philosopher Ken Wilber (2001)
wrote,
Liberals tend to believe in exterior causes, whereas conservatives tend to believe
in interior causes. That is, if an individual is suffering, the typical liberal tends to
blame external social institutions (if you are poor it is because you are oppressed
by society), whereas the typical conservative tends to blame internal factors (you
are poor because you are lazy). (p. 84)
In regard to the issue of fighting terrorism, this dichotomy is expressed in
answers to questions concerning whether to pursue terrorists vigorously, to have
them caught, using all necessary means, dead or alive, or as Etzioni (2004) also
stated, whether to “drain the swamp” (i.e., to deal with what some call root
causes of terrorism, e.g., poverty, social inequality, injustice in various forms or
religious fundamentalism, and extremism). What are the so-called root causes
of terrorism? How can we guarantee security in a liberal society without
sacrificing human rights?
These are not always easy questions, and sometimes there may be real dilemmas in the sense that by choosing one option, we may foreclose other choices.
Often, however, this is not the case, and even when choices have to be made, they
need not always be dictated by the same set of concerns (e.g., either exclusively
by humanitarian concerns or exclusively by security rationale). When we listen
to or read what, for example, Benjamin Netanyahu (2001) has said or written
about terrorism, or what some Amnesty International representatives and many
other human rights activists tell us about these issues, one may feel frustrated by
the simplicity and simplemindedness of the former and by the sophistication of
nice recipes of the latter that, however, have little practical relevance in our
imperfect world. Those who are tough on crime, on terrorism, on “rogue” states
and on other such things, seem to see any talk about human rights, even economic assistance and state building or other similar issues, at best as an annoyance or at worst as pouring water on the mill of terror.4 On the other hand, human
rights activists, leftist liberals, and sophisticated academics often seem to be
blind to real life’s hard choices.
The former Prime Minister of Israel Ehud Barak (2002), in analyzing the
September 11 attacks, wrote,
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This kind of terror cannot be defeated without determined patience, strategic goals
and tactical flexibility. You have to think and act, not by the book, but “out of the
box”: open-eyed, your mind free from any dogma or conventional wisdom. The
approach must be systematic: intensive worldwide intelligence-gathering; a wide
operational and logistical deployment; economic sanctions and no softness in
applying them; diplomatic ultimatums and no backing down from them. (p. 93)
Beyond this, wrote Barak, a systematic battle will require fully streamlined
immigration rules and procedures, internationally coordinated antimoney-laundering legislation, and also important, the reassessment of generations-old American practice, which did not allow preemptive strikes against terrorists and terror operatives (p. 93). All these measures are important and necessary to fight terrorists, but are they sufficient? As the experiences of many
countries show, including the British policies in Northern Ireland, military and
law-enforcement measures clearly are not sufficient. It is futile and even counterproductive to use only such measures in the war against terrorism. As Professor Lawrence Freedman (2002) observed, “If raids failed to differentiate
between the guilty, the half-committed and the innocent then the main result
would be to generate many new recruits and supporters” (p. 40).
If Barak were only a former general, it would be possible to understand his
exclusive attention to military and law-enforcement measures. But Barak was
also prime minister of a country that constantly faced terrorist attacks. For a politician, such one-sidedness and single-mindedness may be fatal. And this is
Ehud Barak and not Benjamin Netanyahu, whose views on terrorism are much
more simpleminded.5
However, the other side does not come out any better. Daniel Warner (2001),
the acting Secretary General of the Institute of International Studies in Geneva,
for example, wrote,
But what is terrorism? It is the activity of dispossessed, the voiceless, in a radically
asymmetrical distribution of power. . . . Terrorism has causes. Growth in inequalities of wealth and lack of political access lead to frustration, which eventually
leads to aggression, violence and terrorism. The greater the levels of frustration,
the greater the levels of violence. The higher the levels of repression, the higher the
levels of reaction. (p. 11)
This is a liberal approach to terrorism. Is it wrong? Although there is certainly
some truth in this approach, such a view is also one-sided and even naive. Moreover, it is not only useless to argue about the causes or roots of terrorism, but
because there are deeply entrenched different and even opposite views on this
issue, it is also worthless, for in social life generally it is impossible to distinguish clearly between causes or circumstances conducive to and pretexts or justifications for various phenomena, including terrorism. “To a Western
observer,” wrote Bernard Lewis (2002),
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schooled in the theory and practice of Western freedom, it is precisely the lack of
freedom—freedom of the mind from constraint and indoctrination, to question
and inquire and speak; freedom of the economy from corrupt and pervasive mismanagement; freedom of women from male oppression; freedom of citizens from
tyranny—that underlies so many of the troubles of the Muslim world. But the road
to democracy, as the Western experience amply demonstrates, is long and hard,
full of pitfalls and obstacles. (p. 289)
Thomas Friedman (2001) observed that “the anti-terror coalition has to understand what this war is about. It is not fighting to eradicate ‘terrorism.’ Terrorism
is just a tool. It is fighting to defeat an ideology: Religious totalitarianism” (p. 7).
The question of whether religious totalitarianism is a cause (the main or just one
of the causes) of terrorism or whether it belongs to the category of circumstances
conducive to terrorism is beside the point. It certainly is a factor that is closely
linked to terrorism, especially to its modern version. However, for many a Western liberal, it is not religious totalitarianism in some Third World countries but
rather, the policies of Western liberal-democracies in and toward Third World
countries that are root causes of terrorism.
Real-life situations vary so much that to call any one of these approaches—
the hawkish or the doveish (or liberal or conservative, for that matter)—the only
and universal recipe for all circumstances, is bound to fail. Wilber (2001) called
both of these approaches “flatland” thinking and acting: “Truly integral politics
would . . . equally encourage both interior development and exterior development—the growth and development of consciousness and subjective wellbeing, as well as the growth and development of economic, social, and material
well-being” (p. 88). Therefore, a pathway that Etzioni (2004) laid “between the
might-makes-right course, a Jacksonian version of neo-conservative international relations, and the consensus-makes-might hyper-liberal course, which
presumes that a new order can and should be based on international law and
institutions and multilateral commitments” (p. 2), is rather appealing when
looking at how to combat terrorism. What seems difficult, if not impossible, for
many is to be hawkish and doveish depending on circumstances and needs.
Poverty, repression, inequality, and religious intolerance are all factors that
may contribute to the emergence and flourishing of terrorism. However, not all
the poor or oppressed are terrorists, and most of the terrorists are not at all poor
and oppressed. Therefore, there should not be the following dilemma: Whether
to concentrate on changing the conditions that may be conducive to terrorism
(e.g., poverty, discrimination, denial of self-determination, religious totalitarianism) or to respond forcefully to acts of terror. This is a false dilemma, one
between the Left (liberals, doves) who see all the problems arising from external
factors and the Right (conservatives, hawks) who blame only internal factors—
the mindset of perpetrators of criminal acts. Addressing both factors is equally
important and necessary. Responses to terrorism should involve a variety of
methods; they should address all the causes and conditions favorable to its emergence and development. As Audrey Cronin (2001) wrote, “The United States,
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working in tandem with key allies from the UK to Japan, must disable the
enabling environment of terrorism” (p. 133).
However, one should not renounce the use of military and/or law-enforcement
measures against terrorists and their accomplices. Etzioni (2004) is right that
“there is no way to appease a fundamentalist” (pp. 65-66). It is equally impossible and even dangerous to try to appease a terrorist and it is hopeless to try to
meet their demands6 while believing that that could put an end to terrorism. Terrorists usually understand only strength and power even if they do not necessarily respect or even if they hate that power. What is always certain is that terrorists
despise weakness and they see it in every concession and moderation. When
people ask whether it is possible (or necessary) to negotiate with terrorists they
should also ask, Negotiate on what? If it is about releasing hostages or otherwise
saving lives it is necessary to talk as long as it takes. Political concessions, on the
other hand, are counterproductive and should be generally avoided, although on
this difficult and sensitive issue, it is difficult to be absolutist. However, it would
be wise to acknowledge that negotiations with terrorists are not like any other
negotiations where “gentlemen’s agreements” apply; a word or promise given to
terrorists is not binding. For example, in extreme circumstances to save lives,
one may even agree to pay a ransom—but then one should do everything possible not only to return the ransom but also to get the terrorists, dead or alive.
Successful domestic societies try to lower the crime rate by using both criminal justice methods and social programs. In a similar manner, in international
society it would be inadequate to resort to only one category of measures. Conditions conducive to terrorism have to be addressed and terrorists as well as
those who assist and support them have to be arrested and tried; or depending on
the circumstances, military force, as a necessary measure of self-defense or collective security, may be used against them.
Combating terrorism without addressing circumstances conducive to the rise
of terrorism will be in most cases simply a Sisyphean toil. As Dmitri Trenin
(2002), writing on the future place and role of Russia in the world and referring,
inter alia, to the Russian problems with Islamic militants, observed,
There is no acceptable alternative to fighting Islamic terrorism. At the same time,
cultural and humanitarian dialogue across that divide is a must, and the development of economic links, including new communications along both East-West and
North-South axes [sic], is one of the few instruments available to encourage modernization and help resolve or manage the various conflicts. (p. 196)
SEPARATING POLITICS AND TERRORISM
I have to acknowledge that the topic of this article was, at least partly, dictated by the timing of the proposal to contribute to this issue of American
Behavioral Scientist. Being on sabbatical from London University and repre-
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senting the United Nations on human rights in Central Asia (which is not free
from terrorist threats) I received the letter from the journal later than it was
intended—September 3, 2004—the day the terrorist attack on more than a 1,000
children, parents, and teachers in the small North Ossetian town of Beslan came
to a bloody end. After 9/11, I had also put aside some theoretical topics that I
usually like to reflect on because I believe the capacity to reflect on abstract
issues and philosophize is one of the most, if not the most, important characteristics that distinguishes humans from all the other living species. However,
like 9/11, or even more than 9/11 (because in September 2004 these were children who were specifically targeted), did 9/3 show that humans not only might
be able to ascend above the rest but also descend to levels of inhumanity that no
animal could ever reach.
The Russian 9/3, which came almost exactly 3 years after the American 9/11
tragedy, will if not change the world the way 9/11 did, certainly have an impact
far beyond Russia. The magnitude of the crime and the fact that children were
specifically targeted singles this crime out of the chain of terrorist attacks
against Russia.
Reflecting on 9/3, I am worried by the emphasis on the link that has been
made by many experts and commentators between the killing of hundreds of
schoolchildren and the need to find a political, not military, solution to the conflict in Chechnya. It is hardly possible to deny that such a link really exists, that
the whole bloody history of Chechnya from the first half of the 19th century to
Stalinist purges and to Yeltsin’s and Putin’s wars, with their massive human
rights violations by all sides, forms a context for the Beslan crime. However,
often exaggerating a linkage between two or more issues simply creates an
impasse that is used (or abused) by those who do not want to find any solution to
the problem.
It goes almost without saying that political crises, historical wrongs, or ongoing oppression, poverty, and many other negative factors are conducive to terrorism and create conditions in which terrorists can flourish and even be considered
martyrs or heroes. However, no political or other motives should play any role in
the assessment of the behavior of terrorists. Not all oppressed and poor kill children. In violent conflicts, terrorists, who are often “natural born killers,” find circumstances in which their instincts and inclinations are able to flourish. There is
no justification for inhumane acts carried out by or on behalf of Chechnya—
whatever Russia does in this country. At the same time, there is no justification
for Russia not doing her utmost to find a political solution for the conflict in
Chechnya and especially for not putting an end to egregious violations of
humanitarian law by its troops and the Chechen security forces loyal to the
Kremlin, whatever the Chechen or international terrorists do. Political issues
have to be separated from terrorism. The same applies to other conflicts: Israel
should evacuate its settlements in the occupied territories notwithstanding what
the Palestinians do, and the Palestinian groups must unconditionally stop all terrorist acts even if Israel does not end the occupation of Palestinian territories.
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Political solutions should not be held hostage to terrorist acts and terrorist acts
should not be justified or even explained (sometimes the borderline between
understanding and justifying is too fine to be noticed) by references to the lack
of political solutions. Claiming that America brought 9/11 on itself, or declaring
that Russian authorities are responsible for terrorist attacks against Russian children, or asking the Russian government to explain how this tragedy could have
happened are not only insensitive but also shift responsibility from terrorists to
others—whoever they may be. Such attitudes toward terrorism are reminiscent
of the age-old argument that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom
fighter. The only way to overcome the impasse of this argument is to separate
means from aims, methods used from the objectives that they are allegedly, or in
reality, meant to achieve.
Although terrorism by definition (I think, however, that this definition is not
always correct) has political aims, the world community has already started to
decouple terrorism from politics. In extradition treaties, terrorist acts are considered extraditable crimes rather than political offences; special antiterrorist conventions, for instance on hijacking, also provide that these crimes shall be made
extraditable. Now it is necessary to decouple further the means from the ends
(terrorism from politics), especially because inhumane means have the tendency to confuse completely means and ends. In the case of a tragedy of the
scale of Beslan, where schoolchildren and mothers with babies were not what in
the insensitive legal language is called “collateral damage” but rather were the
immediate targets (wider targets being the Russian and the world society as a
whole), one emphasizes the need for political settlement—not only the hearts
but also the minds of these people are in the wrong place. The correct approach
seems to have been taken by White House spokesman Richard Boucher, who
at a September 2, 2004, press briefing stated that “we don’t link the political
settlement [with Chechen separatists] with acts of terror. We’re absolutely
firm condemning these acts of terror and standing with the Russian government in fighting terrorism” (Torbakov, 2004, para. 4). However, many Western
commentators, even at the time when the terrorists were still holding the children at the school in Beslan, did not emphasize the need to do everything to save
the children, the inhumanity of the terrorists, and the necessity to fight them by
all means available. They blamed the Russian leadership for its policy in
Chechnya and accused it of bringing this tragedy on the Russian people. It was
not surprising that many Russian newspapers singled out this aspect of the Western media coverage of this terrorist attack against Russia.
At the same time, quite a few Russian commentators still see the world in the
cold war context as a conflict between the United States and Russia, where
Washington is using international (Islamic) terrorism in continuing to dismember what is left over from the former USSR—Russia. I quote from one of the
most popular Russian newspapers, Argumenty i Fakty (Arguments and Facts), in
the first issue published after the terrorist attack on the school in Beslan. Political scientist Stanislav Belkovskii stated that
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international terrorism is a creature of the United States. It is a result of the unipolar world established in the 1990s and of the crisis of liberalism because Washington is using this international terrorism to finish with the failed liberal project at
home and justify the American dominance in the world. (“The Beslan Tragedy,”
2004, p. 2)
Alexander Dugin, the leader of the Eurasia movement, observed that “‘al Qaeda’
and ‘international terrorism,’ as a whole, are not more than instruments. The
roots of the evil have to be sought amongst those who order the music and not
amongst the perpetrators” (“The Beslan Tragedy,” 2004, p. 2). And of course,
the whole tonality of the article leaves no doubt that it is Washington that composes the tune. Finally, political scientist Sergei Kurginyan argued that “Islamic
terrorism is not a subject but a tool. Whose tool is it? It is a tool of the radical
rearrangement of the world that cannot be carried out without the collapse of
Russia” (“The Beslan Tragedy,” 2004, p. 2). Terrorism usually is indeed a tool to
attain certain political aims, although it seems that for many terrorists it becomes
the only modus vivendi and looses any other purpose. But this article too leaves
no doubt that this tool is used by America against Russia. Unfortunately, such
conspiracy theories are widespread in Russia. Even Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of Russia Vladislav Surkov, answering the question
regarding who may benefit from the terrorist attacks against Russia, spoke of
certain decision makers in America, Europe, and the East who cannot get rid of
cold war phobias and, therefore, continue to see Russia as a potential adversary.
According to Surkov, their aim is the collapse of Russia and the emergence in its
stead of many nonviable quasi states (Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 2004, p. 10).
Perceptions may be wrong, but they are able to influence reality.
The search for political solutions to any crisis, especially if such a crisis may
lead or has already led to violence, must go on—terrorism or not, although it is
true that acts of terror make finding a political solution more difficult and they
may even foreclose certain solutions. Today, for example, independence for
Chechnya is certainly not in the cards. Moreover, it is necessary to remember not
only Russia’s historical and contemporary injustices but also that twice within
the past 12 years—from 1991 to 1994 and from 1996 to 1999—Chechnya was
de facto, although not de jure, independent. Nothing good came out of it.
Chechnya became a lawless entity and a breeding ground for international terrorists. No doubt, Russia has to use all possible means to try to find a political
solution to the Chechen crisis; there is no doubt that a military option would not
resolve the crisis. However, it is equally true that terrorists themselves do not
speak the language of politics. Terrorism should not bring any benefits
(although unfortunately it too often does) to terrorists or to their alleged causes.
And there is finally the last, but not the least, important point. When I saw Mr.
Ahmed Zakayev, the former Chechen field commander, who in 2003 was
granted political asylum in Great Britain, lying on television that there were no
Chechens among the terrorists in Beslan or that there were no foreign fighters in
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Chechnya, I recalled what then Iranian Vice-President Mohammad Ali Abtahi
(2004) said at the Dialogue of Cultures or Clash of Civilizations Conference in
Kyrgyzstan: “I suffer more from the fact that terrorists are using Islam trying to
justify their acts than from the cruelty of the Americans in Iraq.” I was not the
only one who applauded him. Only when a substantial number of people feel
more about wrongs committed allegedly on their behalf, in the name of their
country or religion, than against them is there hope that interethnic and interreligious conflicts and tensions will be resolved through peaceful means. It is difficult to achieve such a change of people’s mindsets. It would be even contrary to
natural group instincts that all human communities have worked out during the
millennia of their development. This is why Ernest Gellner (1983) wrote that
the political effectiveness of national [I would add: or religious] sentiment would
be much impaired if nationalists [or religious extremists] had as fine sensibility to
the wrongs committed by their nation [or by their coreligionists] as they have to
those committed against it. (p. 2)
Be that as difficult as it may seem, but without suppressing and overcoming this
pseudopatriotic instinct, there is little hope that we would have a more peaceful
world community. Fortunately, there are signs that there are more and more people who feel ashamed by wrongs done by or on behalf of the groups they belong
to. This may be one of the symptoms indicating that more and more people are
identifying themselves not only with their ethnic or religious kinsmen but also
with humankind as a whole. Is not this one of the manifestations of communitarian tendencies in the world?
TERRORISM AND FAITH
A link between terrorism and faith is not accidental. Terrorists are usually
ardent believers, not necessarily religious believers (Lenin and Stalin were
indeed atheists), but believers in a superior, transcendental cause (even in the
case of atheists). Whether it is religious martyrdom or sacrificing oneself for a
revolutionary cause, it is all done not for this life here and now but rather, for the
sake of some ideal in a distant future or in a different world. A violent criminal
without a transcendental cause is only a serial killer, hardly a terrorist. As Alexander Solzhenitsyn (1974) wrote in The Gulag Archipelago,
Macbeth’s self-justifications were feeble—and his conscience devoured him. Yes,
even Iago was a little lamb too. The imagination and the spiritual strength of
Shakespeare’s evildoers stopped short at a dozen corpses. Because they had no
ideology. Ideology—that is what gives evildoing its long-sought justification and
gives the evildoer the necessary steadfastness and determination. . . . That is how
the agents of the Inquisition fortified their wills: By invoking Christianity; the
conquerors of foreign lands, by extolling the grandeur of their Motherland; the
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colonizers, by civilization; the Nazis, by race; and the Jacobins (early and late), by
equality, brotherhood, and the happiness of future generations. (pp. 173-174)
This list may go on and on.
Steven Pinker (2002) noted that “the recurrence of evil acts committed in the
name of God shows that they are not random perversions” (p. 189). Today, many
use mantras such as “Islam is a peaceful religion,” or “Christianity is a peaceful
religion,” or “Judaism is a peaceful religion”; but from where, then, did the
Inquisition come or the conquest by Arab Muslims of adjacent as well as faraway territories? “The sad but unavoidable fact is that Islam, like Christianity
and Judaism, has both temperate and virulent strands,” observed Etzioni
(2002b):
Christianity in earlier ages not only had an inquisition—but also those who justified it in religious terms. The Church supported the mass torture and murder that
took place during military dictatorships in Argentina, deeming them necessary to
“excise the cancer of communism.” The terrorism in Northern Ireland has religious roots, and Operation Rescue claims religious justifications. Militant Judaism not merely claims the right to the West Bank and finds scriptural support for a
still Greater Israel, but also blessed those who assassinated Yitzhak Rabin, the
peacemaker. Similarly, to equate Islam with peace, to consider it inherently moderate is to blind oneself—or to try to pull the wool over others’ eyes—about the
same facts. (p. 30)
Are only atheists guilty of genocide? Sometimes people even try to pass off
somebody who is good and prominent as a convert to their religion, whereas evil
personalities are denied any religious affiliation. For example, there have been
widespread rumors that Jacques Ives Cousteau, having discovered that the
waters of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean do not mix and having been
told by a Muslim scholar that there is nothing new in it because it had been said
in the Koran, had converted to Islam (Answering-Islam, n.d.). However,
Cousteau’s farewell after his death June 25, 1997, was held in Notre Dame
Cathedral in Paris; and the Cousteau Foundation, as early as 1991, had already
declared, “We state precisely to you that Commander Cousteau has not become
Muslim and that this rumour passes around without foundation” (as quoted in
Answering-Islam, n.d.). At the same time, it is only natural that few people
would like to be associated with Adolf Hitler, to recognize him as their
coreligionist, hence, a widespread myth that Hitler was an atheist and that this
may have contributed to his horrendous crimes. But one should read Hitler’s
(1999) Mein Kampf to see that he was not an atheist. There, Hitler was clear
about religion: “Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance with the
will of the Almighty Creator: By defending myself against the Jew, I am fighting
for the work of the Lord” (p. 65). There are many such references in Mein Kampf
as well as in numerous Hitler speeches. Hitler was, as Pinker wrote, “A moralist
(indeed, a moral vegetarian) who, by most accounts, was convinced of the
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rectitude of his cause” (p. 280). The “doctor death” of the Auschwitz concentration camp, Joseph Mengele, was a devout Catholic. Ian Buruma (2000) concluded, “This shows once again that true believers can be more dangerous than
cynical operators. The latter may cut a deal; the former have to go to the end—
and drag the world down with them” (p. 13).
All religions have always had, and many still have, this totalitarian exclusivist trend. As Hamid Enayat (1982) has written, “If Islam comes into conflict
with certain postulates of democracy it is because of its general character as a
religion. . . . An intrinsic concomitant of democracy . . . involves a challenge to
many a sacred axiom” (p. 126). And Rabbi David Hartman (as quoted in Enayat,
1982) wrote, “All faiths that come out of the biblical tradition—Judaism, Christianity and Islam—have the tendency to believe that they have the exclusive
truth” (p. 126). However, in contradistinction to Christianity, Islam has not gone
through what Francis Fukuyama (1995, p. 41) has called the Protestantization of
Catholicism or the secularization of religious worldviews. Bassam Tibi (1998)
wrote,
In the Middle East as well as in other parts of the World of Islam, there has never
been a process of structural change underlying a substantive shift in worldview
from a religious one to a secular one, as did occur in the historical process that took
place in Europe. Given the community and dominance of the Muslim’s worldview
there has never been a genuine process of secularisation in the Middle East underlain by secular ideologies. (p. 97)
Secularization of religious worldview has helped Western societies to
change (modernize) in response to natural and social challenges. It is often
(maybe too often) reiterated that Islam, in contradistinction to Christianity, does
not differentiate between Caesar’s and God’s domains and, therefore, Muslim
societies cannot be secular. However, such assertions seem to exaggerate the differences between these religions. First, not all Christian societies have always
made such distinctions. Secondly, the development of some Muslim societies
(e.g., Turkey, Malaysia, and today’s Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in Central
Asia) shows that in that respect too, Islam is much less rigid than some of its
adherents, as well as its opponents, want us to believe. Here also there are signs
of rapprochement between the East and the West. That Islam and secularism are
not incompatible has recently been confirmed by the Iraqi Kurds’ stance on the
issue. Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Iraqi
president said, “We will never accept any religious government in Iraq. Never.
This is a red line for us. We will never live inside an Islamic Iraq. Islam is our
religion. . . . The Islamic identity of Iraqi people must be respected, but not an
Islamic government” (Loyd, 2005, para. 17). And it is not a non-Islamic minority in an Islamic society that is advocating secular government but instead, a
Muslim minority whose brand of Islam (Sunni) and ethnic origin are different
from the majority of the population (Shia Arabs).
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Back to basics is never an adequate response to new challenges, and only by
adequately responding to constant challenges are societies able to develop and
flourish. Modernization, including democratization; development of human
rights, including freedom of expression; and equality between sexes is a
conditio sine qua non of development of Islamic and other societies in the socalled developing world. Karim Raslan (2001), a Malaysian lawyer, wrote that
the moral bankruptcy of militant Islam as embodied by the Taliban, as well as its
abject failure in socio-economic terms, should embolden the leaders of moderate,
predominantly Muslim nations such as Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia in their
struggle against religious obscurantism and backwardness. Needless to say, Saudi
Arabia, as an absolute monarchy with no concern for civil liberties, does not constitute a model Islamic polity. (p. 8)
Raslan also correctly pointed out that reforms must be driven from within the
Islamic world. However, I am doubtful whether those Islamic scholars who, as
Raslan wrote, try to “extract the prophetic truths from the Koran to show the
inherent compatibility of modern-day concerns with sacred texts” (p. 8) can do
what Christian scholars failed in doing. Tibi (1998) has written that
the predicament of Islamic fundamentalists vis-à-vis modernity has in fact
become an expression of their ambiguity: on the one hand they seek to accommodate instrumentally all or most of the material achievements of modernity (that is,
science and technology) into Islamic civilisation; on the other hand, they reject
vehemently the adoption of the man-centred rationality that has made these
achievements possible. (p. 118)
As a result, we have postmodern weapons in premodern hands. The strongest
criticism of Islam’s problems by an influential Islamic leader came from then
Prime Minister of Malaysia Muhammad Mahatir (2003) in his opening speech
to the 10th session of the Islamic Summit in Putrajaya, the administrative capital
of Malaysia. Although his speech is unfortunately better known for its traditional anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli diatribes, its originality and emphasis is on
the need for Muslims not only to unite but also to learn, and learn first of all from
Jews, to be creative, not to be concerned with forms but with the substance of
Islam, and to recognize that times have changed since the 7th century A.D. and
there is no way of going back to those times while at the same time hoping to
compete successfully in the modern world.
TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Terrorism has an inverse relationship with democracy and human rights,
although terrorism may be one of the pitfalls on the road to the rapid democratization and liberalization of closed, traditional, or authoritarian societies. Even
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governments of countries that have experience with democratic institutions and
liberal traditions have had difficulties fighting terrorism with clean hands. It is
not accidental that most cases before the European Commission and Court of
Human Rights, where Great Britain was found in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, were related to the fight against terrorism in Northern
Ireland. The British experience in that part of the United Kingdom may serve as
an example of both what one should not do while fighting terrorism and especially since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, what may work in even the
seemingly most intractable of situations. What certainly did not work and was
counterproductive were measures such as internment and inhuman treatment of
prisoners—measures that were found by the European institutions to be contrary to European human rights standards. Where the shoots of democracy and
human rights are fragile or absent altogether, authoritarian rulers can even benefit from terrorism that is ostensibly directed against them. The absence of economic reforms and the suppression of civil and political rights can be masked as
a war against terrorism, especially a war against international terrorism, because
no authority admits that terrorism may have domestic causes and, thus, that
they face homegrown terrorism. At the same time, wrong also are those wellmeaning human rights advocates who neglect the reality or diminish the danger
of terrorism, especially religiously motivated terrorism, which has indeed
evolved into a loose worldwide network, a kind of terrorist international.
I am one of those, probably not so many, human rights experts who would
agree with Etzioni (2004) that “the recognition that the first duty of the state is to
provide security to its people fully applies to the evolving international community” (p. 117). From this follows, especially today when terrorists are attacking
all kinds of societies from the most liberal to the quite authoritarian (only the
most authoritarian such as North Korea or the Stalinist Soviet Union of years
back seem to be free from terrorism; but is there indeed only a choice between
private and state terrorism?), that human rights defenders and all liberals have to
recognize that security from terrorist attacks is one of the priorities of many governments. If we do not recognize this, our voices will not be heard by governments and most sad, most of the people in many societies that experience the
urgent need for democratization and liberalization will not understand us either.
Only by being a hawk vis-à-vis terrorists can one also be a dove whose voice on
human rights issues may be heard. Only by recognizing that terrorist attacks are
the most egregious human rights violations that not only deserve but also often
cry out for tough responses can we responsibly request that these responses be
carried out within the rule-of-law framework without unnecessarily restricting
human rights.
Etzioni (2004) observed that
those societies that have given up on their strongly “Eastern” sets of beliefs and
regimes and have moved sharply in the individualistic direction, but have formed
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few if any new shared sets of beliefs, experience sharp increases in anti-social
behaviour. (p. 23)
The sudden and unprepared introduction of liberal reforms in countries like
Russia has indeed led to chaos that has resulted in nostalgia for order (poryadok
in Russian and ordnung in German have been the words used to tighten the
screws). After the Beslan tragedy, when President Putin introduced a series of
antidemocratic and antiliberal political reforms, critical comments by Russian
liberals, including the Russian Human Rights ombudsman Vladimir Lukin,
sounded very much like lone voices crying out in the wilderness.
This process can be observed in many, if not in most (the Baltic countries
being the only clear exceptions), post-Soviet states. Gorbachev’s reforms were
enthusiastically welcomed by many Soviets who were fed up with the order that
had its roots in Leninism-Stalinism and that had brought immense suffering to
the people. I remember well how the population of Moscow, in March 1989 in
the elections for the Congress of Peoples Deputies, voted for Boris Yeltsin
(approximately 90% of the Moscovites cast their vote for him). This amazing
result was a protest vote because Yeltsin was persecuted by Gorbachev, and
most of the mass media, following the lead, was mud flinging at Yeltsin. People
were fed up with having been told whom to respect and whom to denounce and,
therefore, they voted for Yeltsin (in the Soviet mission to the United Nations in
New York where, as a then member of the UN Human Rights Committee, I cast
my vote, the result was 95% for Yeltsin, this notwithstanding—or due to—the
fact that the diplomats were told in no uncertain terms to guarantee an antiYeltsin result). This was a vote for freedom, against order. People were fed up
with the existing order; they were missing freedom. Today the situation is different. Unprepared, not-thought-through, and poorly administered liberal economic and political reforms not only destabilized the country but also discredited the very ideas of democracy and human rights. Now many people are
nostalgic for order, and most people in Russia unfortunately support Putin’s
reforms of “strengthening the vertical of power,” which has thrown Russia’s
feeble democratic achievements back a long while at least.
Of course, one can justifiably blame terrorists for this setback to democracy
and human rights in Russia and also for the inability, or even unwillingness, of
the Russian authorities to combat terrorism without unnecessarily restricting
human rights. That is all true. However, liberals in Russia as well as their Western advisers should bear a part of the responsibility for that as well. The attempt
to liberalize rapidly a totalitarian society with long authoritarian traditions
(although with some active and well-educated liberal elements) created chaos
and anarchy (there was little liberalism or democracy during Yeltsin’s term in
office) that in turn, quickly transformed the yearning for freedom to nostalgia
for order. Unfortunately, Russia’s sad experience is now serving well autocratic
rulers in, say, Central Asia. Moreover, the threat of terrorism makes their
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message of sacrificing freedom for the sake of order and safety acceptable to
many people in post-Soviet societies and beyond.
To draw the moral from this experience, it has to be emphasized that democratic and liberal reforms that many societies in the non-Western world need
should be gradual and tailored to correspond to the characteristics of the society.
The opening up of such societies, as Etzioni (2004) called for, may really be the
first step in the long road toward a more liberal and democratic society. At the
same time, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between genuine limitations that
do not allow more rapid democratization and liberalization of society and the
self-interests of political leaders and oligarchs who have vested interests in the
absence of any change.
FROM AFRICA TO THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
AND BACK TO THE SAME BOAT?
Having discussed the issue of terrorism in the context of human rights or vice
versa, human rights in the context of the fight against terrorism, I would like to
finish by attempting to present a wider panorama showing that, in a sense,
humankind may indeed be in the process of completing a full circle: From a single community through the proliferation and diversification of communities
toward the emergence of a community of communities that should and probably
will become, in some respect, more and more similar to each other (i.e., the process of assimilation has replaced the process of dissimilation). Etzioni’s (2004)
suggestion is well within this panorama and gives additional support to it:
The world actually is moving towards a new synthesis between the West’s great
respect for individual rights and choices and the East’s respect for social obligations (in a variety of ways, of course); between the West’s preoccupation with
autonomy and the East’s preoccupation with social order; between Western legal
and political egalitarianism and Eastern authoritarianism. (pp. 14-15)
Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza (2000) wrote, “Modern humans appear first in
Africa, then move to Asia, and from this big continent they settled its three
appendices: Oceania, Europe and America” (p. 81). Cavalli-Sforza observed
that in accordance with some estimates, “the date of the human-chimps separations was estimated about five million years ago, and the separation of Africans
from non-Africans gave a date of 143,000 years ago using mtDNA results” (p.
131), whereas “a number of recent independent genetic dates place the beginning of expansion from Africa close to 50,000 years ago” (p. 131). Homo sapiens moved out of Africa, out of a community, or a few communities, of which we
know next to nothing, presuming only that these were indeed very traditional
communities without any autonomy enjoyed by their members. These Homo
sapiens simply did not distinguish themselves from their communities as indi-
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viduals (and, therefore, probably they should not be called individuals). Alexis
de Tocqueville (1856/1955) noted,
That word “individualism”, which we have coined for our own requirements, was
unknown to our ancestors, for the good reason that in their days every individual
necessarily belonged to a group and no one could regard himself as an isolated
unit. (p. 96)
Gradually, during the course of many millennia, humans spread throughout
the world, creating various communities, some of which became completely
isolated from other communities and in the process of this proliferation, started
to differ more and more from each other. Most of these communities have been
closely knit traditional communities and only relatively recently have some of
them become so individualistic that concerns have been raised regarding the
weakening of societal bonds holding such communities together.
However, today, for the expanding world population of almost 6.5 billion, the
whole planet Earth has become smaller than Eastern Africa was for the first
groups of Homo sapiens, and there are no hospitable, or even inhospitable,
spaces without human traces. Although we retain the differences that we
acquired during this long process of spreading throughout the world and conquering nature, in the new “global village,” practically all the peoples closely
interact; and in this process of interaction, they exchange not only goods but also
views and practices.
Although cultural exchange and change are slower than is the spread of technological, economic, or political novelties, cultures are not immutable either.
Pinker (2002) observed that
preserving cultural diversity is considered a supreme virtue today, but the members of diverse cultures don’t always see it that way. People have wants and needs,
and when cultures rub shoulders, people in one culture are bound to notice when
their neighbours are satisfying those desires better than they are. When they do
notice, history tells us, they shamelessly borrow whatever works best. Far from
being self-preserving monoliths, cultures are porous and constantly in flux. (p. 66)
Moreover, although during the millennia following the exodus from Africa the
human race became gradually more and more different, it remained the human
race and therefore it naturally retained characteristics that are common to all
humans and to all human societies. Cultural relativists, emphasizing differences
between societies (and they may be more or less right about the differences), fail
to appreciate the commonalities.
For example, Marcel Granet (1934) wrote that “attempts to express ancient
Chinese thinking with English as an instrument would be worth making, even if
they did no more than demonstrate the disaccord between the two methods of
thought and language” (p. 9). Adda Bozeman (1971) was of the opinion that
“ideas, even under the best of auspices, are not transferable in their authenticity,
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and that reliable intercultural accords are therefore difficult to reach” and that
“in the final analysis cultures are different because they are associated with different modes of thought” (p. 14). Professional translators, as well as those who
speak several languages, know indeed how difficult it is to convey in another
language the exact meaning of the original, to say nothing of the translation of
metaphoric utterances. This observation is true not only in the case of, say, the
Chinese or English languages. I even feel frustrated that I have to use one and the
same language when writing this article because some thoughts can be better
formulated not in English but in another language I know. But this is not surprising if we keep in mind that many languages developed in isolation. What is
really surprising is that languages that have developed independently from each
other have nevertheless so much in common that their bearers can communicate
with each other. Is it not true, as Pinker (2002) wrote, that “universal mental
mechanisms can underlie superficial variations across cultures” and that “all
human languages can convey the same kinds of ideas” (p. 37)?
Of course cultures differ. But the question is, How much do they differ? Do
they differ to such an extent that their bearers cannot understand each other, to
the extent that there cannot be any significant common elements in them?
Anthropologists’ latest research shows that there is more in common between
different cultures, even if these cultures have never had any post-African contacts with each other. Allow me to quote a lengthy passage from Pinker (2002):
Some anthropologists have returned to an ethnographic record that used to trumpet differences among cultures and have found an astonishingly detailed set of
aptitudes and tastes that all cultures have in common. This shared way of thinking,
feeling, and living, and living makes us look like a single tribe, which the anthropologist Donald Brown has called the Universal People, after Chomsky’s Universal Grammar. Hundreds of traits, from fear of snakes to logical operators, from
romantic love to humorous insults, from poetry to food taboos, from exchange of
goods to mourning the dead, can be found in every society ever documented. It’s
not that every universal behaviour directly reflects a universal component of
human nature—many arise from the interplay between universal properties of the
mind, universal properties of the body, and universal properties of the world.
Nonetheless, the sheer richness and detail in the rendering of the Universal People
comes as a shock to any intuition that the mind is a blank slate or that cultures can
vary without limit, and that there is something on the list to refute almost any
theory growing out of those intuitions. (p. 55)
In the annex to his book, Pinker (pp. 435-439) reproduced Donald Brown’s list
(five pages) of human universals that can be found in all cultures, even if they
have not had any interactions. To name but a few: dance, cooking, coyness,
death rituals, distinguishing right and wrong, envy, fears, gossip, music, preference for own children and next to kin, taboos, conflicts, conflict resolution, and
so forth.
Here I would like to emphasize three points. First, there is more in common
between various communities because these are not simply communities of
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different species but all human communities. Like wolves remain wolves and
wolf packs remain wolf packs, notwithstanding whether they inhabit the Asian
steppes or Alaskan mountains (having, of course, depending on the climate,
landscape and available food, different hunting habits), humans remain humans
and human communities remain human communities notwithstanding where
they live and what different characteristics—physical or cultural—they may
have acquired in the process of their adaptation to the environment. As Walzer
(1994) wrote, “Every human society is universal because it is human, particular
because it is a society” (p. 8). Secondly, these human communities that became
more and more different in the process of expansion from Africa are now
becoming more similar due to increasing interactions between them. And
finally, although there remain, and I am sure there will always remain, many differences between various communities, one has to differentiate also between
these differences.
The advocates of multiculturalism say that there is an inherent value in the
rich tapestry of humankind. To a great extent that is true. Having different foods,
music, national literatures and even languages7 immensely enriches us. However, not everything in this rich tapestry is of equal value, not all cultural traits
deserve to be retained. Slavery, torture to extract confessions to be used as the
surest evidence in court, xenophobia, and many similar things belong to the history of practically all peoples. Even today, the cultural traditions of many societies discriminate against women; in other societies, traditions, such as respect for
the elderly, transform into genuflexion before authorities—big and small.
Unfortunately, more than human rights, human wrongs are natural for human
societies; or to put it otherwise, human nature contains both the capacity for
good and for evil—they both are natural for human beings. As Pinker (2002)
wrote, “Most activities that moral people extol—being faithful to one’s spouse,
turning the other cheek, treating every child as precious, loving thy neighbor as
thyself—are ‘biological errors’ and are utterly unnatural in the rest of the living
world” (p. 164), and
some faculties may endow us with greed or lust or malice, but others may endow
us with sympathy, foresight, self-respect, a desire for respect from others, and the
ability to learn from our own experiences and those of our neighbours. (p. 166)
Consistent respect for and observance of human rights requires humans to rise
above their nature, even to act against their nature and in this process, transform it.
Can humans live closely together and remain as different as they have
become in the process of the long journey from Africa? To an extent, the answer
is yes. In the Ottoman Empire, there was a millet system in which persons
belonging to different faiths lived side by side while maintaining their own laws
and customs; the Europeans enjoyed a special status under the institute of capitulations in several “noncivilized” nations (see, e.g., Martens, 1873). Even today
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in some large Western European cities, different ethnic, racial, and religious
communities do not intermingle with each other, but this voluntary segregation
is not so innocuous; it is already creating serious problems, even conflicts. The
reports of different commissions in Britain that were created after the summer
2001 race riots in Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley blame “deep-rooted segregation which authorities had failed to address for generations” (“Race ‘Segregation’ Caused Riots,” 2001, para. 6). The reports conclude that “too many of our
towns and cities lack any sense of civic identity or shared values” (“Race ‘Segregation’ Caused Riots,” 2001, para. 14), and they warn that “segregation, albeit
self-segregation, is an unacceptable basis for a harmonious community and it
will lead to more serious problems if it is not tackled” (“Race ‘Segregation’
Caused Riots,” 2001, para. 7).
Of course, these disturbances were a result of the lack of integration within
one country—Great Britain—where people of different cultures, religions, and
ways of life live closely together. As a result of this segregation, they had (and
still have) hugely differing levels of education, employment or unemployment
rates, and life opportunities. It is not surprising that in such an ambience, frictions and conflicts arise. However, we may observe the same worldwide, where
communities organized as sovereign states hugely differ as to their wealth,
power, levels of education, health care, and many other indicators. It would not
have mattered at all, or it would have mattered much less, had not these communities become so interdependent and close. Now these differences matter a lot.
What is visible in a large cosmopolitan city such as London also exists worldwide. Many countries cooperate closely, most societies interpenetrate. In many
ways they are becoming more similar to each other. Cars, computers, airplanes,
washing machines, and television sets have lost their nationality. Of course,
these are inanimate things, but market economies and financial institutions that
determine interpersonal and intergroup relations have also become global phenomena, and those who would like to retain their identities intact end up like
North Korea or Albania (until recently). In a world of isolated societies, it would
not have mattered that such societies have different value systems. My values
would not have conflicted with the values of faraway peoples of whom I knew
next to nothing. It would have even satisfied one’s curiosity to know that somewhere people eat each other or that adulterous women are stoned to death. But in
today’s world, it matters. Today Turkey, for example, has to rescind criminal
responsibility for adultery if it wants to join the EU. Not only have practically all
nations of the world become interdependent but also people with different value
systems often live next door in the same neighborhood. They simply cannot
ignore each other, and passive tolerance toward different ways of life is not good
enough; one needs mutual respect for diverse ways of living. At the same time,
there are cases when not only respect for other traditions but also their simple
tolerance seems impossible. Where does or where should my tolerance of values
I do not share, but which other people cherish, end? So-called honor killings,
female genital mutilation, and forced (not simply arranged) marriages are only
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some of the prominent examples of practices that I believe must not be accepted,
whatever their historical justifications or explanations. There are other values,
such as the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, racial discrimination, or slavery, that should be universally enforced and no justification for the
denial of these values accepted. However, even here the question of how to
address these unacceptable practices remains. Sometimes remedies may do
more harm than the illness itself. For example, the almost universally accepted
principle of gender equality needs special attention because discrimination of
women is widespread in many societies. This is a domain where discrimination
indeed has roots in age-old traditions that cannot be changed overnight, but at
the same time, not only do references to these traditions serve the power
interests of male chauvinist thugs but also their continuation inhibits the
economic development of gender-unequal societies.
Unfortunately, the positive side of the rich tapestry of world cultures sometimes expresses itself only in the possibility of having Indian, Chinese, Italian,
or Thai food. The desire and attempts of the elders and leaders of some faith or
racial communities to prevent closer intermingling (e.g., intermarriages)
between persons belonging to other communities that live a few streets away (or
today a couple of hours of flights away) may lead to tragic conclusions (forced
marriages, suicides, honor deaths). Moreover, when people who have migrated
as refugees or have done it for economic reasons retain all their traditions, this
means that they also bring with them those traditions that caused them to
migrate. Certain cultural traits, characteristics of economic relations or other
endogenous causes—and not always exogenous factors as asserted by traditional liberals—contribute to the creation of situations that force people to leave
their homes to look for a better life elsewhere. Therefore, fear of assimilation
and the desire to retain all traditions at all costs often mean that communities living in close physical proximity to each other not only have different ways of life
but also live in different worlds. Multiculturalism has both good and bad
aspects; some of them enrich us, whereas other parts impoverish us and even
cause or create conditions for conflict.
INDIVIDUALISM, COMMUNITARIANISM,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Two of the phenomena that have in many ways already become globalized
but in other respects still retain their particular character are democracy and
human rights. They have become universal because they are codified in many
UN human rights documents and most, although not all, national constitutions
swear allegiance to them. And certainly there has indeed been some real, in contradistinction to hypocritical paper acceptance, spread of democracy and human
rights in different parts of the world. At the same time, there is not only practical
resistance in many countries to the acceptance of human rights and democracy
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but also religious and ideological foundations that are not conducive to their universal acceptance. However, even they are slowly changing because the experience of other peoples is contagious. Here we also see that “the communitarian
East” and “the individualistic West” are not so different that no rapprochement
is possible.
The rise of the nation state, the development of the market economy, individualism (as a philosophical doctrine), and the emergence of ideas of human rights
are linked in their genesis. Both individualism and ideas of human rights were
aimed at liberating human beings from oppression by the state and by the church
and at getting rid of feudal hierarchies that kept individuals in shackles and also
stifled economic and social development as a whole. Etzioni (2002a) observed
that “individualism played a significant role in the history of Western societies.
It loosened the excessive bonds, oppressive structures, and largely monotheistic
values of traditional, ascribed communities” (p. 51). As these developments
took place in Western Europe, the advocates of “Asian values,” less vocal after
the East Asian economic crisis than before, who argued that as individualism is a
Western concept so also are human rights, have a point. However, it is not the
whole truth. The West has not always been individualistic. Some influential
Western schools of thought (Rousseau, Marx, and fascism) are in fact rather
communitarian. The guru of British sociologists and the main ideologue of the
British “third way,” Anthony Giddens (1998), for example, correctly observed
that “a collectivist attitude has also long been part of Christian democratic ideology in Continental countries” (p. 34). Chris Brown (1999) of the London School
of Economics even argued that “in so far as liberal societies have been successful over the last two centuries it has been because they have been constructed as
approximations to the communitarian model rather than because of the dependence on rights-based individualism” (p. 113). Although there may be some
exaggeration in this assertion, individualism and communitarianism have both
influenced, in different countries and at different times and degrees, the development of Western European societies. Western success during the past half a
millennium is due to many factors, which have indeed also included the right
dose of individualism (certainly more of it than in other cultures) that has been
necessary for the emancipation of individuals, the enhancement of their
creativity, and their entrepreneurship.
Successful societies vacillate somewhere close to the middle of the spectrum
where at one end is absolute communitarianism (i.e., totalitarianism) and at the
other end absolute individualism (i.e., chaos and the disruption of societal and
civic bonds). It is probably because of one of those, using the phrase of Hans
Morgenthau (1978, pp. 4-15), “perennial forces” of politics that no society can
steer a straight course but has to negotiate a curvy road compensating a tilt to the
left with the correction to the right and so on and on. A social-democratic rule
has to be balanced by a conservative rule, and when they get things right it means
only that their remedy has been right for these concrete circumstances and for
this concrete period of time. Thatcherism worked in Great Britain for a while not
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because Thatcherite theories are truer or better than Labor ones but because the
latter had for too long informed the political decision making in the country.
Only totalitarian or authoritarian governments can lay in a straight course, but it
usually ends in an abyss.
Currently, many Western thinkers as well as politicians are more concerned
with societal cohesion than with individual liberties. Raymond Seitz (1995),
former U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom, speaking of the United Kingdom and the United States, wrote that “if a democracy becomes only a matter of
asserting rights—merely an excuse for licence—then society can rapidly
become a melée of self-indulgence” (p. 8). The Report of the Commission on
Global Governance also stresses that “rights need to be joined with responsibilities” and that “the tendency to emphasise rights while forgetting responsibilities
has deleterious consequences” (Global Governance, 1995, p. 56).
Indeed, as Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi (1995) has rightly emphasized,
excessive individualism may lead to the destruction of civic bonds in society:
Gross individualism and cut-throat morality arise when political and intellectual
freedoms are curbed on the one hand while on the other fierce economic competitiveness is encouraged by making material success the measure of prestige and
progress. The result is a society where cultural and human values are set aside and
money value reigns supreme. (p. 24)
Excessive individualism can also be counterproductive to human rights. Jack
Donnelly (1999) warned that
the common complaint that Westerners in general, and Americans in particular,
have gone “rights crazy” merits serious consideration. We must guard against
what might be called the imperialism of rights, the view that all important goods
should be recognised as and implemented through the mechanisms of (human)
rights. (p. 99)8
This criticism of excessive individualism does not mean, however, that what
Etzioni (2004) called “authoritarian” communitarianism is the answer. I tend to
agree with Hamish McRae (1994), who concluded that
maybe the real message is that all modern industrial societies have to find a way of
striking a balance between individualism and social control, and that somehow the
democratic process has to maintain that balance, making the costs and benefits
clear. (p. 204)
In short, societies usually need more of what they are lacking and less of what
they have in excess. If many Western societies need to emphasize the importance of individual responsibility and the strengthening of communal bonds,
most Asian societies (although not only Asian societies, of course) must come to
see the development of individual liberties as one of their main concerns.
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CONCLUSIONS
Hence, if in the process of proliferation from Africa, communities of Homo
sapiens became more and more different in terms of the color of the eyes and
skin of their members, the languages they spoke, the songs they sang, the animals they hunted or domesticated, the food they ate, and the Gods they prayed
to, now a reverse process is taking place. This is a slow process with many setbacks and counterreactions but nevertheless, different societies are becoming
more and more similar in some important respects. Of course, many differences
remain, and there is a strongly positive side to that. However, as we have discussed above, not all of the differences are equally welcome or acceptable, not
everything in the rich tapestry of the world carpet is of equal value. When huge
developmental gaps are taken for cultural differences while at the same time it is
denied that certain cultural factors condition the existence of these gaps (and
that such factors may also be a serious source of wealth for some societies and
poverty for others) we close our eyes to phenomena that may be either causes of
or circumstances conducive to violent conflicts.
There is both the tendency and the need for different societies to become
more similar to each other, and it is within this perception that I see the main idea
of Etzioni’s (2004) book having the potential to be realized in practice. The East
and the West will meet in a middle ground, and they both are not merely bringing
their respective values to the evolving global normative synthesis but instead,
these values are being modified in this process. However, this is a painful process; many resist the modification of values and sometimes they do so violently.
Neither exclusively “Eastern authoritarian” nor exclusively “Western liberal
individualistic” responses are adequate when facing contemporary violence and
its most prominent form—terrorism. Here too a normative synthesis is
necessary.
NOTES
1. I believe that no single theory can do justice to such multifaceted phenomena as international
law or relations because every theoretical approach, quite naturally, strives to become internally
more and more coherent, noncontroversial, and complete; that is to say, it strives to become academically more and more rigorous. This, in turn, tends to lead to the loss of the capacity to reflect reality,
which is often controversial and volatile (i.e., nonrigorous), comprehensively. As Douglass North
(1994), Nobel Prize winner in economics, has said, “The price you pay for precision is an inability to
deal with real world questions” (p. 1). Not entering into the discussion of the substantive merits of
various international relations theories, one may nevertheless conclude, for example, that Kenneth
Waltz’s (1979) neorealism, concentrating all the attention on the structure of the international system
and on the power of the state, offers a rigorous and parsimonious theoretical explanation of some
aspects of international relations. However, it leaves many important variables out of the picture and
it seems to be particularly unable to explain the change in international society. At the same time,
James Rosenau’s (1997) turbulence model of international relations and his theory of
“fragmegration” (i.e., explaining processes of both fragmentation and integration in international
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AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
society) are free from the shortcomings of Waltz’s theory. However, it certainly is much more volatile
and less rigorous than theories concentrating on fewer variables and using Occam’s razor less sparingly. Hence, there simply have to be various international relations theories that highlight (some
better, others not so well) different facets of this complex phenomenon.
2. This is only a parable, although it contains some important morals. The reality was much more
complex. One of the main reasons of the fall of the Muslim rule in Al-Andalus, as Maria Rosa
Menocal (2002) observed, was “the relentless warfare among all the Muslim-held cities, and especially ferocious competition between al-Mamun’s Toledo and Abbadid Seville” (p. 134).
3. On weaknesses of postmodern Western Europe vis-à-vis premodern challenges, see, for example, Cooper (2000, 2002a, 2002b).
4. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union (2001) harshly criticized former Attorney
General John Ashcroft for his testimony regarding political dissent:
In a blatant attempt to stifle growing criticism of recent government policy, Attorney
General Ashcroft delivered testimony last week equating legitimate political dissent with
something unpatriotic and un-American. We urge the Attorney General to learn from the
history of American dissent—from the Civil War to the civil rights struggle—that free
and robust debate is one of the main engines of social and political justice. (para. 1)
5. Although most, if not all, of the remedies he has proposed may be in concrete circumstances
necessary indeed, they are all limited to law-enforcement measures, economic or diplomatic sanctions, and use of military force (see Netanyahu, 2001, pp. 129-148).
6. In a way, terrorists act counterproductively to the content of their demands because to meet
their demands, even if these demands were justified if not made by terrorists, would encourage further terrorism. For example, many Palestinian terrorists demand to end the Israeli occupation and
dismantle settlements in the occupied territories. But to end this occupation would be seen, in this
context and by terrorists, as surrendering to their demands and would tempt them to increase their
demands underpinned by terrorist threats. Moreover, there are those who are not content with such
“moderate” demands. They want to push the Jews into the Mediterranean.
7. Although I am not a polyglot and speak fluently only three or four languages, I understand how
poor a person who speaks only one language is. It is often impossible to convey exactly the meaning
of something expressed in one language in another language. It is impossible to enjoy Shakespeare or
Pushkin even in the best of translations. There are many unique and interesting things said or written
in languages that are spoken by few people and never translated into so-called world languages. So,
the linguistic tapestry of the world is rich in a very positive sense although, for example, the need to
translate the multitude of documents within the EU is one of the negative side effects of this aspect of
the rich tapestry of the world.
8. Limited space prevents me from elaborating on this very interesting observation. However, I
believe it is very important to note that many enthusiasts often try to conceptualize practically all
goods and values in terms of human rights. Even such paramount goods as peace and economic
development are hard to express in terms of human (i.e., individual) rights. Sometimes such attempts
may lead to watering down the very concept of human rights.
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