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Philos 1850, Autumn 2015 Professor Joráti FINAL EXAM (TAKE-HOME) Due date: December 15th, at noon [upload your file any time before this deadline] Submission: Please upload a MS-Word-compatible file (or, if that is not possible, a PDF file) with your answers to the designated Carmen dropbox. Do not put your name in the document! Rules: You are not allowed to work together on this, or receive help from anybody. You are, however, allowed to consult your notes, the assigned readings, and the slides. You do not need to use any other sources (such as optional readings or literature that you found elsewhere), and in fact, it’s better if you don’t. And avoid direct quotations as much as you can. Whenever possible, explain things in your own words to show that you understand the material. You must use quotation marks (“ ”) whenever you are quoting word-by-word from any source, and you must say where the quotation comes from. If you are merely paraphrasing someone else’s arguments or ideas, don’t use quotation marks, but you must nevertheless cite the source. It should always be clear which ideas are yours and which ones are not yours. Likewise, if an idea is not yours, it should be clear whose idea it is. For the assigned and optional readings, you don’t need to provide the bibliographic information; it’s okay, for instance, to say “As Zagzebski says on p. 123 …”. If you use additional sources (which, again, I do not recommend), provide a bibliography. If you have questions about these rules and policies, please email the instructor or the grader. PART A [up to 5 points per question]: Answer each of the following four questions. Each answer should be 100–150 words long. Label each answer (1, 2, 3, and 4) so that it’s clear which question it answers. 1) What is the problem of evil, and what is the difference between the logical and the evidential version of the problem of evil? 2) What is the doctrine of karma, and is it a satisfactory solution to the problem of evil? (Say what the doctrine is, how it might solve the problem of evil, and why you do or do not think that karma is a satisfactory solution to the problem. No need to explain the problem of evil again, since you’ve already done so in response to question 1.) 3) Is it possible for a human person to survive the death of his/her body? Describe one theory of what a person is. (It has to be one of the theories we discussed in class). Next, explain whether and how, according to that theory, a human person might be able to survive his or her biological death. Note any special difficulties that the theory has in making room for the possibility of an afterlife. [Do not mention near-death experiences; they are not relevant here.] 4) Many of our readings touched on the relation between faith and reason (e.g. Pascal, Kierkegaard, Zagzebski, Clifford, Shapiro). Having read and discussed all of these different perspectives, what is your own view on the relation between faith and reason? Your own view can, but does not have to, be one of the views we encountered in class. Be as precise as you can in describing your view. Then say whether on your view there are any situations in which reason and faith come into conflict and in which it is necessary to choose between them. If you believe that there are such situations, give an example; if you don’t, explain why not. 1 Philos 1850, Autumn 2015 Professor Joráti PART B [up to 20 points]: Read the text at the end of this document and then answer the following questions in your own words (no direct quotations, please). Each answer should be 50–100 words long. [Note that one goal of this part of the exam is similar to the goal of the short writing assignments: you are supposed to demonstrate your ability to understand and accurately describe a philosophical text. To do well, you need to read the text very carefully, more than once. Another goal of this section is the following: you are supposed to show that you can observe and discuss connections between new material and material we covered in the course.] 1) In the first paragraph, the author announces that he will defend what he calls “friendly atheism.” In the last paragraph, the author uses the term ‘paradoxical’ to describe friendly atheism. What, ultimately, is the author’s position toward friendly atheism, and why? 2) According to this author, is it possible to be rationally justified in believing something that is false? Explain why the author does or does not think this. 3) How does this text relate to the distinction between exclusivism and inclusivism that we discussed this semester? And how would you classify the author’s position, using the terminology we learned (e.g. ‘exclusivism about truth,’ ‘exclusivism about rationality,’ etc.) 4) How does this text relate to the article about reasonable religious disagreement by Richard Feldman that we discussed this semester? Does the author of the passage below completely agree or completely disagree with Feldman, or does he partially agree with Feldman? Explain why you think this. If you think that he partially agrees with Feldman, specify the respects in which these two philosophers do and do not agree. Make sure to state what Feldman’s view is. “If one is persuaded by the argument for atheism, as I find myself to be, how might one best view the position of the theist? Of course, he will view the theist as having a false belief, just as the theist will view the atheist as having a false belief. But what position should the atheist take concerning the rationality of the theist’s belief? There are three major positions an atheist might take, positions which we may think of as some varieties of atheism. First, the atheist may believe that no one is rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists. Let us call this position ‘unfriendly atheism.’ Second, the atheist may hold no belief concerning whether any theist is or isn’t rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists. Let us call this view ‘indifferent atheism.’ Finally, the atheist may believe that some theists are rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists. This view we shall call ‘friendly atheism.’ … I propose to discuss and defend the position of friendly atheism. If no one can be rationally justified in believing a false proposition then friendly atheism is a paradoxical, if not incoherent position. But surely the truth of a belief is not a necessary condition of someone’s being rationally justified in having that belief. So in holding that someone is rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists, the friendly atheist is not committed to thinking that the theist has a true belief. What he is committed to is that the theist 2 Philos 1850, Autumn 2015 Professor Joráti has rational grounds for his belief, a belief the atheist rejects and is convinced he is rationally justified in rejecting. But is this possible? Can someone, like our friendly atheist, hold a belief, be convinced that he is rationally justified in holding that belief, and yet believe that someone else is equally justified in believing the opposite? Surely this is possible. Suppose your friends see you off on a flight to Hawaii. Hours after takeoff they learn that your plane has gone down at sea. After a twenty-four hour search, no survivors have been found. Under these circumstances they are rationally justified in believing that you have perished. But it is hardly rational for you to believe this, as you bob up and down in your life vest, wondering why the search planes have failed to spot you. Indeed, to amuse yourself while awaiting your fate, you might very well reflect on the fact that your friends are rationally justified in believing that you are now dead, a proposition you disbelieve and are rationally justified in disbelieving. So, too, perhaps an atheist may be rationally justified in his atheistic belief and yet hold that some theists are rationally justified in believing just the opposite of what he believes. What sort of grounds might a theist have for believing that God exists? Well, he might endeavor to justify his belief by appealing to one or more of the traditional arguments: Ontological, Cosmological, Teleological, Moral, etc. Second, he might appeal to certain aspects of religious experience, perhaps even his own religious experience. Third, he might try to justify theism as a plausible theory in terms of which we can account for a variety of phenomena. Although an atheist must hold that the theistic God does not exist, can he not also believe, and be justified in so believing, that some of these ‘justifications of theism’ do actually rationally justify some theists in their belief that there exists a supremely good, omnipotent, omniscient being? It seems to me that he can. If we think of the long history of theistic belief and the special situations in which people are sometimes placed, it is perhaps as absurd to think that no one was ever rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists as it is to think that no one was ever justified in believing that human being would never walk on the moon. But in suggesting that friendly atheism is preferable to unfriendly atheism, I don’t mean to rest the case on what some human beings might reasonably have believed in the eleventh or thirteenth century. The more interesting question is whether some people in modern society, people who are aware of the usual grounds for belief and disbelief and are acquainted to some degree with modern science, are yet rationally justified in accepting theism. Friendly atheism is a significant position only if it answers this question in the affirmative. It is not difficult for an atheist to be friendly when he has reason to believe that the theist could not reasonably be expected to be acquainted with the grounds for disbelief that he (the atheist) possesses. For then the atheist may take the view that some theists are rationally justified in holding to theism, but would not be so were they to be acquainted with the grounds for disbelief—those grounds being sufficient to tip the scale in favor of atheism when balanced against the reasons the theist has in support of his belief. Friendly atheism becomes paradoxical, however, when the atheist contemplates believing that the theist has all the grounds for atheism that he, the atheist, has, and yet is rationally justified in maintaining his theistic belief. But even so excessively friendly a view as this perhaps can be held by the atheist if he also has some reason to think that the grounds for theism are not as telling as the theist is justified in taking them to be.” 3
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