Consider the following game pl

FratBro23
Category:
Economics
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Question description

Consider the following game played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently. Then each player is informed about the actions taken by the other player in the first play and, given this, they play it again, and so on. The payoff for the whole game is the sum of the payoffs a player obtains in the T plays of the game.        a       b      c A   3,2    5,2    1,1B   2.6    4,4    1,3C   1,2    0,2    2,3(a) How many subgames are there if T=3(b) Is it possible for B and b to be played in the first play of the game, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, if (i) T=2 (ii) T=3 (iii) T=4? (Explain your answers - if you say yes to any of these, describe the SPNE strategies.)

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(Top Tutor) Daniel C.
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