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Claiming our heritage: Chinese women and Christianity International Bulletin of Missionary Research; Oct 1992; 16, 4; ProQuest Central pg. 150 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92 R. T. Simpson with the adherents of other world religions, reflecting the commitment to truth and humanity which has characterized all his writings. Scott Cowdell is a graduate student and tutor in the Department of Studies in Religion at the University of Queensland, Australia, and honorary curate ofan inner-city Anglican parish. Notes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I I I2 13 14 15 16 17 18 P. F. Knitter, 'Catholic Theology of Religions at a Crossroads' Concilium 183 (1986), PP·99- 108. R. Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism (DL'r 1964). See P. F. Knitter, .;Vo Other Name? (SCM 1985). J. Hick, God and The Universe of Faiths (Fount 1977). H. Kung, 'The World Religions in God's Plan of Salvation' inJ. Neuner (ed.), Christian Revelation and World Religions (Burns and Oates 1967), pp. 25-66. ibid., p.66. H. Kung, On Beinga Christian (Collins 1976). (Originally published in German in 1974.) P. F. Knitter, 'World Religions and the Finality of Christ: A Critique of Hans Kung's On Being a Christian' in R. Rousseau (ed.), Interreligious Dialogue (Ridge Row Press 198 I), pp. 202-22 I. ibid., p. 205. H. Kung, Does GodExist? (Collins 1980). (Originally published in German in 1978.) ibid., p. 602. H. Kung, Christianity and the World Religions (with Josef van Ess, Heinrich von Stietencron & Heinz Bechert) (Collins 1987). (Originally published in German in 1985.) N. Smart, World Religions: A Dialogue (SCM 1960). H. Kung, Ope cit., pp. 392-3. H. Kung, 'Towards an Ecumenical Theology of Religions-Some Theses for Clarification' Concilium 183 (1986), pp. 119-126. P. F. Knitter, 'Hans Kung's Theological Rubicon' in L. Swidler (ed.), Toward a Universal Theology of Religion (Orbis Books 1987), pp. 224-230. H. Kung, 'What is True Religion? Toward an Ecumenical Criteriology' in ibid., pp. 231-250. J. Hick & P. F. Knitter (eds), The Myth of Christian Uniqueness (SCM 1987), P·194· The New Dialogue between Christianity and Other Religions R. T. SIMPSON UNITY AND UNIFORMITY Historically, the preferred solution to the problem of dissent has generally been coercion in the interests of uniformity. For example, the emerging national states at the time of the Reformation were Downloaded from at Apollo Group - UOP on November 11, 2016 .New Dialogue with Other Religions 93 united in their condemnation of religious dissent, irrespective of whether it was Catholic dissent in a Protestant state, or Protestant dissent in a Catholic state. On the other hand, the later colonial empires generally allowed a considerable variety of religious practice, but this was only the case where they were confident that political control lay firmly in their own hands. Of course they were also quite happy to use religion as a means of consolidating their power. Sometimes this backfired rather badly. In South Africa today, the most radical Christian critics of the regime are to be found in the ranks of the black sections of the Dutch Reformed Churches-critics who are both more hostile to, and better informed about, their foe than any 'outsider' could possibly be. But even today, most people's instinctive reaction to the problem of disunity between different Christian Churches, or between Christianity and other religions, is to bewail the fact that it is no longer possible to achieve uniformity. Either one religion (ours, of course) should prevail at the expense of the others, or all religions should be combined to form a new faith which could replace them all. Too often the attitude is reminiscent of that of Professor Higgins in My Fair Lady who, you may remember, thought that difficulties between the sexes would be eased if only a woman could be 'more like a man'. While it may be true that the popular assumption has often tended to be that no relationship between different faiths is possible other than one of undying rivalry and hostility, there have always been some theologians who have tried to work out a correlation between their faith and the contemporary scene-with its dominant philosphy and/or traditional religious culture. The assumption made by John Hick,' for example, that Christianity has generally adopted an 'exclusive' approach to its possession of the truth is impossible to reconcile with the 'Greek' theology of the early Christian centuries, and makes nonsense of Tertullian's protest against the hellenization of Christian theology. In fact, Hick's position seems to reflect that unconscious assumption that all Christian theologians are Calvinists at heart. All the same, it has to be admitted that even the most well-meaning efforts to find a place for other faiths and philosophies under the Christian umbrella tend to have a paternalistic character, reflecting the assumption that Christianity represents the fulfilment of the search for the truth found in other faiths and philosophies. In the last few decades we have witnessed the triumph of the idea that people have the right to work out their own ideas and make their own mistakes in all spheres of life, including the religious sphere. The result of this, as far as Christianity is concerned, has been to impale the Churches on the horns of a dilemma. There is general agreement that the 'theology of adaption'-'the attempt to adapt the practices of the western church as much as possible to the socio-culturallife of the African peoples', 2 is no longer acceptable to Downloaded from at Apollo Group - UOP on November 11, 2016 94 R. T. Simpson Africans or to other non-Western peoples. The assumption that Western Christianity can provide a broad framework within which the cultures of non-Western peoples can somehow be accommodated by being conformed to Western norms is now regarded with the deepest suspicion as a disguised form of paternalism, or even neo-colonialism. On the other hand, the hope that the repudiation of the paternalism implicit in this approach would lead to 'critical irenics' based on a 'new and perhaps unforeseen incarnation of the Gospel message' has not yet been fully realized. Gabriel Setiloane, of the University of Cape Town, raises two questions at the end of his interesting and provocative article, 'Where are we in African Theology?" One question is why he remains a Christian himself. His answer is that he can't shake off the 'Christian witchcraft'! We are reminded of Luther's remark that that 'strange man on his cross' would not let him go..But Setiloane also quotes a young West African Christian who asks him 'Why do we continue to seek to convert to Christianity the devotees of African traditional religion?' This question also needs to be answered-either with a frank repudiation of the mission of the Church outside its traditional 'homelands', or with a new interpretation of the relationship between Christianity and other faiths. I 'propose to explore the second alternative, in the belief that 'critical irenics' is not altogether impossible in spite of the heavy legacy of ancient wrongs which the Christian community in the Third World now has to carry. A NEW POSSIBILITY OF DIALOGUE In his little book, A Rumour ofAngels, the American sociologist Peter L. Berger makes an important contribution to the debate about the place of religion in human society. Berger suggests that it is the things we take for granted in our daily life, our faith in order, in hope, in humour, that offer 'signals of transcendence' ,4 and thus provide a starting-point for the religious view of life. It is the religious man's wisdom or folly that he ascribes to ultimate reality some mode of personal existence; that is, that he assumes that the personal dimension which distinguishes his life from that of the animals is a reflection of the personal being of the ultimate. For in so far as we attribute ultimate value to human persons we are ipso facto ascribing personhood to ultimate reality. Berger's presentation of this argument offers something new precisely because he approaches the issue as a sociologist rather than as a philosopher or theologian. Sociologists have familiarized us with the idea that religion forms part of the 'meaning system' established by human cultures. Berger's argument implies that such meaning systems are also by their very nature 'value systems'; they enshrine and perpetuate the values which give direction and shape to human existence. And he also implies that all such human value systems Downloaded from at Apollo Group - UOP on November 11, 2016 New Dialogue with Other Religions 95 have at their centre the supren1e value, humanitas, which we might roughly translate as 'human personhood'. This is, I believe, our first major clue in the search for a new possibility of dialogue between different faiths. If such faiths enshrine differing, but perhaps complementary, images of humanitas, then surely there is common ground to be explored. There is a real possibility of dialogue based on our common human experience. All too often our religious experience is something that seems to hold us apart from one another, and dialogue can easily regress into a mere repetition and restatement of differing concepts of divinity which have taken shape within rival religious traditions. Humanitas is, after all, something that we all share, in spite of the many and varied differences between us. Berger insists that he has no intention of reviving the idea of some kind of fixed 'essence' of human nature which is supposed to serve as a yardstick for all societies. This is an important qualification. No doubt different societies have differing perceptions of personal existence, and a different ordering of relationships among their members. Even in the same society, there may be considerable changes in such things over a period of time. All the same, the fundamental perception of human persons as ends and not means, as subjects and not merely objects, is one that runs like a golden thread through the bewildering variety of human culture like a symphonic theme which supports an almost infinite number of possible variations. Hence, while there may be a lot of scope for argument about what humanitas really is, and many differing perceptions of the human person in his social relations, that 'people matter more than anything else' seems to be the one absolute rule characteristic of all societies which could claim to be civilized, and the one universally recognized yardstick in terms of which, ultimately, progress, renewal and reform have to be evaluated. In trying to find a starting-point for inter-faith dialogue, we have followed up some clues from sociology and social ethics. It may be suspected that we would not have travelled this route had we started from theology rather than ethics. I t is interesting to discover therefore that Orlando E. Costas,' speaking as a 'radical evangelical' from Latin America, reaches a position which is very similar to mine (though stated in rather different terms). Like many liberation theologians, Costas takes as his starting point the central significance of the theme of the Kingdom of God in modern biblical theology. In his argument, Costas makes two assumptions about the Kingdom which could be questioned. Though I believe him to be substantially correct in both cases, it will be helpful to examine these assumptions and to make some brief comments on them. Costas' first assumption is thatJesus expected the Kingdom to be realized in this world. That is, what Jesus was saying was that God was reasserting his kingly power over his creation, starting with his ancient people, Israel. While the ultimate goal of this process might be Downloaded from at Apollo Group - UOP on November 11, 2016 96 R. T. Simpson beyond human history, it is nevertheless rooted in history. The two consecutive phrases in Matthew's version of the Lord's Prayer, 'Your Kingdom come, Your will be done' (Matt. 6.9-10) are in fact two alternative ways of saying the same thing: God's Kingdom will come as, when, and insofar as people do his will. Through the mission ofJesus, God has set in train the course of events which will culminate in the final re-establishment of God's rule over a disobedient world. Thus Jesus did not see his task as that of preparing people for heaven after death, but rather in preparing them for the divine 'over-rule' of this earth, and the subjugation of the 'kingdoms of this world' to the Kingdom of God (Rev. 11.15). He expected that God himself would bring about this transformation, but believed that those who obey the will of God are his instruments in the fulfilment of his purpose. Costas' second assumption is that the coming of the Kingdom means the coming of a time, already beginning to be experienced, 'but still to be fully realized, when the 'justice, freedom and hope' of the Old Testament promises (the classic text is Isa. 61.1-2) will be fulfilled. What this implies, of course, is that the kind of socio-ethical concerns which have been under discussion in this article are also central to the biblical presentation of the Kingdom of God. The coming of the Kingdom implies the emergence of a new social reality, a new ordering of relationships characterized by the inversion of the order of this world-or, more accurately, this age-so that the captives will obtain release, the oppressed will find liberty (Luke 4.18), and the meek will inherit the earth (Matt. 5.S). Even if Chilton is correct" in arguing that the authentic Kingdom sayings are primarily statements about God and his imminent selfmanifestation in kingly power, we must surely recognize that the Bible always views God's self-disclosure as a transforming vision which transfigures worldly reality. That Jesus envisaged that this renewed world focussed upon the emergence of a new social reality, and did not merely concern the transformation of individuals is surely one of the major positive insights of liberation theology.' But if Costas is substantially right in his interpretation of Jesus' preaching of the Kingdom, as I believe him to be, then we must accept his-at first sight rather startling-conclusion that the Christian Church can justify its own existence only in so far as it is able to demonstrate its practical utility as a servant of God's Kingdom, and thus as the instrument of God's justice, freedom and compassion in his world. Hence the Church (here Costas echoes the Second Vatican Council) is meant to be the 'sign and instrument' of the Kingdom, and it cannot fulfil this role unless in its inner life as well as in its outreach to the poor and rejected it 'models' the justice, freedom and compassion of the Kingdom. Costas also suggests that the same criteria that are applicable to the Christian Church, and thus to Christianity as a 'religious' phenomenon, must also be applied to other religions. Thus the basis Downloaded from at Apollo Group - UOP on November 11, 2016 New Dialogue with Other Religions 97 of inter-faith dialogue is to be found in the self-critique, by the different faiths, of their own adequacy as signs and instruments of the justice, freedom and compassion which it is God's purpose to bring to his world. Costas starts from the preoccupations and assumptions of Christian theology. But precisely because he interprets these Christian concerns in socio-ethical terms, he is able to lay out a proposal for inter-faith dialogue which has a right to serious consideration by the followers of faiths other than the Christian, and even by Marxists and other 'non-believers'. The starting-point would be the function of our various social and political institutions as signs and instruments of justice, freedom and compassion. SOCIO-ETHICS AS A BASIS FOR DIALOGUE At this point it is necessary to say something about the standpoint on ethics, and on the relationship between ethics and social structure adopted in this article. The background to much of what follows is to be found in Kant's formulation of the central moral imperative as the obligation to 'act so as to treat humanity never only as a means but always also as an end'. Together with Kant's insistence on the importance of universality in ethics, and of the 'kingdom of ends' (in which people treat each other as ends as well as means), this provides the basis for a critique of society and its institutions in terms of their potential for the enhancement, or impoverishment of personal values and relations. It has already been suggested that different cultures incarnate differing concepts of humanitas, human personhood. It does not follow from this, however, that relativism is the only absolute guide in such matters. In his Roles and Values (197 I), Professor Downie argues persuasively" that most societies tend to distinguish between what actually pertains at any given moment and what is 'really' supposed to happen. In principle at least, then, all cultures recognize the need for some criterion on which positive self-criticism can be made. We are now in a position to state this point rather more precisely: All cultures (we may safely assume) enshrine some distinctive perception of humanitas, a characteristic 'life-style' which represents the mode of being human in that particular society. 2 We may also take it for granted that all cultures reflect, at least in some degree, and in some areas of their common life, the insight expressed in Kant's formulation of the moral law in terms of the obligation to treat people always as ends and never only as means. 3 Unfortunately, it has to be recognized that no cultural group expresses this principle with total success at all times, and with equal regard for all sub-groups within the society-women, Downloaded from at Apollo Group - UOP on November 11, 2016 98 R. T. Simpson children, 'outsiders' and so on. In fact, all societies tend to marginalize some of the people for at least some of the time. 4 It follows that different cultural and religious groups could usefully engage in a dialogue which would have as its objective the clarification of the values built-in to their structures, and that this dialogue could serve as a stimulus for change without necessarily having a destructive effect upon the distinctive heritage of the participating groups. The crucial point, of course, is that any criticism should be self-criticism. The point of the dialogue would be to enable each group to distinguish and to be more loyal to the best in its own heritage. The best in each case would be determined by the extent to which the assumptions about the rights and duties of persons within the structure reflect the principle that persons are never only a means, but always also an end in themselves. 5 Hence differing groups would draw closer to one another by learning from each other how to be more truly human. This would not represent the borrowing of something alien to the group, but rather the enhancement of those perceptions about reality central to the life of the group. In this way the uncritical 'assimilation' of one group by another could be avoided, and yet real interchange and renewal could take place. The territory which we are exploring is in the borderland between ethics, theology, and sociology. This is territory which is not yet very fully charted. We are not concerned here with personal ethics; that is judgements as to what the individual ought to do in a given situation. But neither are we concerned with social ethics; that is judgements as to how society ought to act in regard to the problems and issues which confront it. Rather, we are concerned with the notions about right and wrong which are built into social institutions and systems of social relationships; and we are concerned to try to find some way in which different social groups may try to draw closer to one another by engaging together in constructive selfcriticism about their own adequacy as the bearers of humanitas. I t is convenient to describe this as an exercise in socio-ethics. For our purposes, we may assume that a social institution is a system which brings people together in relationships characterized by rights and obligations. The relationship may be (subjectively) perceived as unjust if there is felt to be an imbalance between these rights and obligations. It is often very difficult to make a more objective judgement, though the 'golden rule' that we should do unto others as we would wish them to do to us seems to offer the best yardstick for determining whether injustice is being done. In extreme cases, the imbalance between rights and obligations may be so pronounced as to be dehumanizing and exploitative. In particular, a relationship may be said to be dehumanizing when a Downloaded from at Apollo Group - UOP on November 11, 2016 New Dialogue with Other Religions 99 personal service is required for an impersonal reward, as when a manufacturer tries to buy loyalty by paying high wages for boring and unrewarding work. Surprisingly, however, it is not necessarily the nature of the task but the nature of the reward which determines whether a relationship is dehumanizing. Thus, women in Africa engaged in the traditional task of weeding the fields may not feel themselves to be diminished by such a task. The rewards may be highly tangible-in terms of the quality of life for the family in the coming months-and though the job itself may be extremely boring and mechanical, in this case we have an impersonal service offered for a personal reward, rather than the other way round. What this discussion reveals is the great difficulty of determining just when a person is being treated exclusively as a means and not as an end. A relationship can be 'just' (in the sense that the financial reward might be regarded as adequate) and yet be perceived as dehumanizing (as when a secretary is 'paid for putting up with the boss's bad temper'). On the other hand, the reward may be very small, and yet the work satisfying and fulfilling, as is often the case with people involved in social work, or in creative work in the arts or sciences. What seems to be of overriding importance in all cases is the quality of the relationship between the different parties. The more one party takes in terms of the personal quality of the service rendered, demanding such characteristically personal qualities as loyalty-creativity, imagination, or affection-the more he must be prepared to give in personal commitment to the other party. Thus to demand a personal commitment from others while making no such commitment oneself is an act of exploitation, and results in the dehumanization and marginalization of the other party. Another important concept in this regard is ideology, which may be regarded as the use of language in order to disguise the fact that exploitation is occurring. Such ideology is typically found when loyalty to the Sta te or to a religious group is presented as an absolute moral imperative even for those who are given no opportunity to determine the life-style of the group. Hence the kind of unity attained by merging divergent groups and placing them under a strong central authority is invariably destructive. I t is characteristic of fascist political systems, as well as highly authoritarian religious groups, to try to merge divergent elements by placing them under the authority of some controlling group buttressed by an ideology of unity through loyalty. Hence, if we wish to determine whether any given society, or institution within a society, is just or unjust, creative or exploitative, we need to determine just what are the rights and obligations of the parties combined in this particular structure. In this exercise, the stimulus of an outside group may be very important, so that, for example, Christians may be able to assist African traditional society to take another look at itself in terms of the ethical structures of African society; and at the same time, African tradition may offer a Downloaded from at Apollo Group - UOP on November 11, 2016 100 R. T. Simpson starting-point for a critique of the Christian Churches in terms of their own ethical structures. In this way, real dialogue based on mutual respect and aiming at genuine social development for all may become a possibility. In the end, this may lead to a convergence of the two traditions, but it should be noted that this kind of convergence based on a common commitment to a just society is a very different matter from the kind of syncretistic merging of divergent parties under the banner of 'unity before everything else'. THE NEW DIALOGUE AND THE OLD The new dialogue between Christianity and other faiths offers an agenda for mutual self-criticism rather than a formula for knitting together different faiths. The importance of this is that it leaves the final responsibility for evolving new expressions of faith in the hands of the adherent of that particular faith. Naturally, the kind of mutual self-criticism envisaged would involve a radicalization of the tradition, a sifting process in which the self-understanding of the religious community would undergo important changes. But the point is that such changes would reflect a kind of radical loyalty to the tradition rather than a falsification of it, and they would emerge from within the tradition rather than being imposed on it from outside. Just how important it is that convergence should be sought in this way rather than under the 'liberal' banner of 'abandoning prejudices' may be seen from a brief look at some of John Hick's proposals for dialogue as reflected in his articles reprin ted in Problems of Religious Pluralism (19 85). Hick tends to take for gran ted an individualistic approach to 'salvation/liberation' which is perhaps most clearly evident in the final essay in the collection, 'Present and Future Life'. Thus the 'ultimate goal' of the 'great world religions' is a 'state in which individual ego-boundaries have been transcended' as the 'conscious ego' voluntarily relinquishes 'its own self-centred existence'. This approach will hardly commend itself even to those other Christians who are rooted in a more catholic, communitycentred tradition of Christian thinking, and who would understand the gospel in terms of the transformation of people in community rather than the 'salvation/liberation' of individuals. 'Liberation theology' is the most obvious example of this kind of thinking today, but by no means its only representative. A further, and very disconcerting, element in Hick's thinking is that religions can be 'graded' (see p. 67 ff.) in terms of their potential for assisting their followers to the transcending of ego-cented existence. I find this acutely embarrassing in the context of my work in an African University. No one could claim that the kind of mystical self-transcendence which Hick regards as the goal of the 'great world religions', 'great world faiths', 'great traditions' is a Downloaded from at Apollo Group - UOP on November 11, 2016 Neio Dialogue with Other Religions 101 prominent characteristic of African traditional religion. On the other hand, African tradition has a great deal to say about human relationships, in fact, about humanitas. Hick's preoccupation with eastern religions seems to have blinded him to the richness of other traditions in which individual self-transformation plays little or no part. Finally, Hick's central argument that we must move from 'exclusivism', through 'inclusivism' to 'pluralism' (see especially pp. 3134) seems to reflect some confusion as to what precisely 'inclusivism' implies, and how it originated. It is surely possible to argue that the New Testament use of the concept of the logos commits at least some New Testament writers to an inclusivist position. Furthermore, inclusivism need not necessarily be presented as a form of paternalism. There is another factor here which Hick hints at, but does not bring clearly into focus. The fact that we live in a pluralistic world means that uncritical loyalty to one's own tradition is no longer an option except for those who want to live in the past. But while exclusivism is necessarily-almost by definition-unself-critical, inclusivism may be either self-critical or unself-critical. Thus an unself-critical inclusivist-and we may readily admit that this was the normal position in the past-tends to assume that his religion must provide the overall framework in terms of which the contributions of other cultures and faiths must be assessed. The natural expression of this kind of approach is the sort of theology of 'adaption' mentioned earlier, where Christianity bends towards other faiths, and at the same time selects those elements of them which can be readily taken into a Christian context. On the other hand, a self-critical inclusivist would take the view that his adherence to his own religion implies that he believes that his faith enshrines the best expression of the truth-for that is precisely why he maintains his loyalty to it as his religion. But this kind of provisionalism or 'self-critical inclusivism' takes it for granted that this truth has to be tested against the universal religious experience of humankind. To live in the faith that one's own religion is best is not at all the same thing as erecting that faith into a defensive dogmatism which refuses even to give the other person a hearing. Indeed, such a defensive dogmatism is of course the opposite of true faith, since the truth need never fear debate. Another possible objection to approaching inter-faith dialogue from the standpoint of socio-ethics is that this involves the elimination of the 'religious' content of religions, and reduces them to ethical systems, In Rules and Values, Downie distinguishes four possible relationships between religion and ethics (p. 16 ff.). The objection just raised assumes that my proposals involve adherence to Downie's fourth (Cupitt-like) option, namely that ethics and religion are identical. In fact, however, I actually subscribe to a version of Downie's third option, namely that religion offers an endorsement of human values by affirming that these values reflect the nature of Downloaded from at Apollo Group - UOP on November 11, 2016 102 R. T. Simpson God himself, and therefore that true humanitas reflects and participates in divinitas. The approach to inter-faith dialogue recommended here may be regarded as a radical approach in contrast to the liberal proposals of John Hick and his colleagues. A radical approach recommends that people search for truth within their own traditions, by looking to their roots. They should look to their own foundations if they wish to be successful in building bridges to other traditions . The search for Christian reunion has surely brought us to the point where it is recognized that the recovery of unity must go hand in hand with renewal and reform. The same is no less true of the search for unity between people of different faiths. This is in strong contrast to the liberal, reductionist approach, which involves the abandonment of traditional beliefs rather than their radicalization. Inevitably therefore, the radical looks for group-renewal through the re-appraisal of tradition rather than the abandonment of group loyalty in the search for common ground between individuals. A radical approach also demands that we take group structures seriously, and therefore requires a re-appraisal of religious, social and political structures, while the liberal tends to by-pass such issues in the search for personal enlightenment and for the meeting of like minds across the barriers of 'prejudice'. Formerly Associate Professor of Theology at the University of Swaziland, R. T. Simpson is Chaplain andpart-timetutor in Religious Studies at the College of St Mark and St John, Plymouth. Notes 1 John Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism (Macmillan 1985), see esp. PP·3 134· 2 3 4 5 6 Ngindu Mushete, 'The History of Theology in Africa: from Polemics to Critical Irenics' in Kofi Appiah-Kubi and Sergio Torres (eds.), African Theology en Route (Orbis Books 1979), p. 27· Gabriel Setiloane, 'Where are We in African Theology?' in ibid., p. 64· Peter L. Berger, A Rumour of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural (Pelican 1970), p. 92. Orlando E. Costas, 'A Radical Evangelical Contribution from Latin America', in Gerald H. Anderson and Thomas F. Stransky (eds.), Christ's Lordship and Religious Pluralism (SPCK, 1983), pp. 154 fr. Bruce D. Chilton, 'God in Strength', Journal for the Study of the Old Testament (1979)· 7 8 E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judasim (SCM 1985) argues that Jesus' teaching reflected 'Jewish restoration eschatology', which of course focussed on the restoration of Israel, the People of God. R. S. Downie, Roles and Values: An Introduction to Social Ethics (Methuen 197 1), P·177· Downloaded from at Apollo Group - UOP on November 11, 2016

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