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Literary Ge Requirements: Here's your first response journal assignment: (1) Make your own electronic copy of the attached file. It's a section of numbered paragraphs from Hegel's book The Phenomenology of Spirit. (Alternatively translated as The Phenomenology of Mind.) You can find the whole translation on Terry Pinkard's website if you want to read it. We're using this as an example of a theoretical narrative or philosophical narrative. (2) Read it and insert your comments under each passage in another font color or style so I can tell what you've written. Your goal is to try to make sense of it in your writing, so you should try to summarize what it says while noting difficulties, questions, reactions, objections, etc. “Master and Servant”: Hegel’s Phenomenology Paragraphs 178-196, pp. 161-173. (Trans. Terry Pinkard. Acquired from Pinkard’s Hegel webpage on 1/26/2015: http://terrypinkard.weebly.com/phenomenology-of-spirit-page.html) I have reformatted the text and removed endnotes. Numbers in brackets are page numbers in Pinkard. Literary Genres 2 A: Self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency of self-consciousness; mastery and servitude [161] 178. Self-consciousness exists in and for itself by way of its existing in and for itself for an other; i.e., it exists only as a recognized being. The concept of its unity in its doubling, of infinity realizing itself in self-consciousness, is that of a multi-sided and multi-meaning intertwining, such that, on one hand, the moments within this intertwining must be strictly kept apart from each other, and on the other hand, they must also be taken and cognized at the same time as not distinguished, that is, they must be always taken and cognized in their opposed meanings. This twofold sense of what is distinguished lies in the essence of self-consciousness, which is to be infinitely or immediately the opposite of the determinateness in which it is posited. The elaboration of the concept of this spiritual unity in its doubling presents us with the movement of recognition. 179. For self-consciousness, there is another self-consciousness; self-consciousness is outside of itself. This has a twofold meaning. First, it has lost itself, for it is to be found as an other essence. Second, it has thereby sublated that other, for it also does not see the other as the essence but rather sees itself in the other. 180. It must sublate its otherness. This is the sublation of that first two-sided ambiguity and is for that reason itself a second two-sided ambiguity. First, it must set out to sublate the other self-sufficient [162] essence in order to become certain of itself as the essence by way of having sublated the other. Second, it thereby sets out to sublate itself, for this other is itself. 181. This double-edged sense of the act of sublating its double-edged sense of otherness is likewise a double-edged sense of a return into itself. This is so in the first place because it gets itself back by way Literary Genres 3 of sublation, for it comes to be in selfsameness with itself once again by way of the sublation of its otherness. However, in the second place, it likewise gives the other self-consciousness back to itself, since it existed for itself in the other, but it sublates its being in the other, and it thus sets the other free again. 182. In this way, this movement of self-consciousness in its relation to another self-consciousness has been represented as the activity of one self-consciousness, but this activity on the part of one selfconsciousness has itself the twofold significance of being equally its own activity as well as the other’s activity, for the other is likewise self-sufficient. The other is just as enclosed within himself, and there is nothing within him which is not there by way of himself. The first does not have the object before it in the way that the object merely is initially for desire. Instead, it has an object existing for itself self-sufficiently. For that reason, it can do nothing on its own about that object if that object does not do in itself what the first self-consciousness does in it. The movement is thus straightforwardly the doubled movement of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as what he himself does; each himself does what he demands of the other and for that reason also does what he does only insofar as the other does the same. A one-sided activity would be useless because [163] what is supposed to happen can only be brought about by way of both of them bringing it about. 183. The activity thus carries not only a double-edged sense inasmuch as it is an activity directed as much toward itself as it is directed toward the other, but also inasmuch as it is equally and inseparably the activity of one as well as the activity of the other. 184. In this movement we see the process repeat itself which had been exhibited as the play of forces in consciousness. What existed for us in that process exists here for the extreme terms themselves. The middle term is self-consciousness, which disintegrates into the extreme terms, and each extreme term is this exchange of its own determinateness and the absolute transition into what is its opposite. However, as consciousness, it does indeed get outside of itself, but in its beingoutside- of-itself, it is at the same time kept back within itself. It is for itself, and its self-externality is Literary Genres 4 for it. It is for consciousness that it immediately is and is not an other consciousness. Likewise, this other exists only for itself by sublating itself as existing-for-itself, and it is for itself only in the being-for-itself of the other. Each is the middle term to the other, through which each mediates itself with itself and integrates itself with itself. Each is, in its own eyes and in that of the other, an essence immediately existing for itself which at the same time exists for itself in that way only by way of this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing each other. 185. This pure concept of recognition, that is, the pure concept of the doubling of selfconsciousness in its unity, is itself now up for examination in terms of how its process [164] appears for self-consciousness. It will first of all exhibit the aspect of non-selfsameness between both of them, that is, the middle term breaking apart into the extreme terms, which are, as extreme terms, opposed to each other, and of which one is merely recognized while the other merely recognizes. 186. Self-consciousness is at first simple being-for-itself, and it is selfsame by virtue of the exclusion from itself of all that is other. In its eyes, its essence and absolute object is the I, and within this immediacy, that is, within this being of its being-for-itself, it is an individual. The other for it exists as an unessential object designated by the character of the negative. However, the other is also a selfconsciousness, and thus what comes on the scene here is an individual confronting an individual. In the way that they immediately make their appearance, they exist for each other in the way ordinary objects do. They are self-sufficient shapes absorbed within the being of life – for the existing object has here been determined to be life – which for each other have not yet achieved the movement of absolute abstraction, that is, they have not yet achieved the destruction of all immediate being and of being themselves only the purely negative being of selfsame consciousness, that is, they have not yet presented themselves to each other as pure being-for-itself, which is to say, as self-consciousness. Each is, to be sure, certain of itself but not of the other, and for that reason its own certainty of itself is still without truth, for its truth would exist only if its own being-for-itself were in its eyes to have exhibited itself as a self-sufficient object, or, what is the same thing, that the object would have turned out to be this pure certainty of itself. However, according to the concept of recognition, this is not possible without the other being for it in [165] the way it is for the other, Literary Genres 5 without each in itself achieving this pure abstraction of being-for-itself, that is, without each achieving this by virtue of its own activity and once again by virtue of the activity of the other. 187. However, the exhibition of itself as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself to be the pure negation of its objective mode, that is, in showing that it is fettered to no determinate existence, that it is not at all bound to the universal individuality of existence, that it is not shackled to life. This display is the doubled act, namely, both what the other does and what is done by way of oneself. Insofar as it is what is done by the other, each thus aims at the death of the other. However, the second aspect is also therein present, namely, what is done by way of oneself, for the former involves putting one’s own life on the line. The relation of both self-consciousnesses is thus determined in such a way that it is through a life and death struggle that each proves his worth to himself, and that both prove their worth to each other. – They must engage in this struggle, for each must elevate his self-certainty of existing for himself to truth, both in the other and in himself. And it is solely by staking one’s life that freedom is proven to be the essence, namely, that as a result the essence for self-consciousness is proven to be not being, not the immediate way self-consciousness emerges, not its being absorbed within the expanse of life – but rather, it is that there is nothing on hand in it itself which could not be a vanishing moment for it, that is, that self-consciousness is merely pure being-for-itself. The individual who has not risked his life may admittedly be recognized as a person, but he has not achieved the truth of being recognized as a self-sufficient [166] selfconsciousness. As each risks his own life, each must likewise aim at the death of the other, for that other no longer counts in his eyes as himself. In his own eyes, his essence exhibits itself as that of an other; he is external to himself, and he must sublate that being-external-to-himself. The other is a diversely entangled and existing consciousness; he must intuit his otherness as pure being-foritself, that is, as absolute negation. 188. However, this trial by death likewise sublates the truth which was supposed to emerge from it and, by doing so, completely sublates the certainty of itself. For just as life is the natural location of consciousness, that is, self-sufficiency without absolute negativity, death is the natural negation of this same consciousness, negation without self-sufficiency, which thus persists without the significance of the recognition which was demanded. Through death, the certainty has been Literary Genres 6 established that each has risked his life, and that each has cast a disdainful eye towards death both in himself and in the other. But this is not the case for those who passed the test in this struggle. They sublate their consciousness, which was posited in this alien essentiality which is natural existence, that is, they elevate themselves and, as extreme terms wanting to exist for themselves, are themselves sublated. The essential moment thereby vanishes from the fluctuating interplay, namely, that of disintegrating into extreme terms of opposed determinatenesses, and the middle term collapses into a dead unity, which disintegrates into dead extreme terms which are merely existents and not opposed terms. Neither gives back the other to itself nor does it receive itself from the other by way of consciousness. Rather, they only indifferently leave each other free-standing, like things. Their deed is [167] abstract negation, not the negation of consciousness, which sublates in such a way that it preserves and maintains what has been sublated and which thereby survives its having become sublated. 189. In this experience self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as is pure selfconsciousness. In immediate self-consciousness, the simple I is the absolute object. However, for us, that is, in itself, this object is absolute mediation and has durably existing self-sufficiency as its essential moment. The dissolution of that simple unity is the result of the first experience. It is by way of that experience that a pure self-consciousness is posited, and a consciousness is posited which exists not purely for itself but for an other, which is to say, is posited as an existing consciousness, that is, consciousness in the shape of thinghood. Both moments are essential – because they are initially not the same and are opposed, and because their reflection into unity has not yet resulted, they exist as two opposed shapes of consciousness. One is self-sufficient; for it, its essence is being-for-itself. The other is non-self-sufficient; for it, life, that is, being for an other, is the essence. The former is the master, the latter is the servant. 190. The master is consciousness existing for itself. However, the master is no longer consciousness existing for itself merely as the concept of such a consciousness. Rather, it is consciousness existing for itself which is mediated with itself through an other consciousness, namely, through an other whose essence includes its being synthetically combined with self-sufficient Literary Genres 7 being, that is, with thinghood itself. The master relates himself to both of these moments, to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness for which thinghood is essential. Because (a) the [168] master is, as the concept of self-consciousness, the immediate relation of being-for-itself, but (b) henceforth exists at the same time as mediation, that is, as a being-for-itself that is for itself only by way of an other, the master in that way relates himself a) immediately to both, and b) mediately to each by way of the other. The master relates himself to the servant mediately through self-sufficient being, for it is on this very point that the servant is held fast. It is his chain, the one he could not ignore in the struggle, and for that reason he proved himself to be non-self-sufficient and to have his selfsufficiency in the shape of thinghood. However, the master is the power over this being, for he has proved in the struggle that in his eyes it merely counted as a negative. By being the power over this being, but this being constituting the power over the other, the master thus has within this syllogism the other as subordinate to him. The master likewise relates himself to the thing mediately through the servant. The servant, as self-consciousness per se, relates himself negatively to the thing and sublates the thing. However, at the same time the thing is for him self-sufficient, and for that reason he cannot by way of his negating activity be over and done with it all the way up to the point of having eliminated it, that is, the servant merely works on it. On the other hand, to the master, the immediate relation comes to be by way of this mediation as the pure negation of the thing, that is, as the consumption of the thing. Where desire had failed, the master now succeeds in being over and done with the thing, and he achieves satisfaction in his consumption of it. On account of the thing’s self-sufficiency, desire did not achieve this much, but the master, who has interposed the servant between the thing and himself, thereby merely links up with the non-self-sufficiency of the thing and [169] simply consumes it. He leaves the aspect of its self-sufficiency in the care of the servant, who works on the thing. 191. For the master, it is in these two moments that his recognition comes about by way of another consciousness, since the latter consciousness posits itself as unessential within those moments, first of all by working on the thing, and second of all by his dependence on a determinate existence. In both moments, he cannot achieve mastery over existence and achieve absolute negation. This moment of recognition is present here such that the other consciousness sublates itself as beingfor-itself, and it thereby itself does what the first does to it. This is equally the case for the other moment. What the second self-consciousness does is the first’s own doing, for what the servant Literary Genres 8 does is really the master’s doing. The latter is merely being-for-itself, the essence; he is the pure negative power for which the thing is nothing, and he is thus the pure essential activity in this relationship. However, the servant is not a pure but rather an inessential activity. However, what prevents this from being genuine recognition is the moment where what the master does with regard to the other, he also does with regard to himself, and where what the servant does with regard to himself, he also is supposed to do with regard to the other. As a result, a form of recognition has arisen that is one-sided and unequal. 192. The unessential consciousness is therein for the master the object which constitutes the truth of his certainty of himself. However, it is clear that this object does not correspond to its concept. Rather, the object in which the master has achieved his mastery has become, in the master’s own eyes, something entirely different [170] from a self-sufficient consciousness. It is not a selfsufficient consciousness which exists for him but above all a non-self-sufficient consciousness. His certainty is therefore not that of being-for-itself as the truth; rather, his truth is to an even greater degree the unessential consciousness and the unessential activity of that unessential consciousness. 193. In these terms, the truth of the self-sufficient consciousness is the servile consciousness. At first, this consciousness admittedly appears external to itself and not as the truth of self-consciousness. However, in the way that mastery showed that its essence is the topsy-turvy inversion of what mastery wants to be, so too in its consummation will servitude become to an even greater degree the opposite of what it immediately is. As a consciousness forced back into itself, it will take the inward turn and convert itself into true self-sufficiency. 194. We only saw what servitude is in relation to mastery. However, servitude is self-consciousness, and thus what it is in and for itself is now up for examination. For servitude, the master is initially the essence. Therefore, in its eyes, the truth is the self-sufficient consciousness existing for itself, a truth which for servitude is nonetheless not yet in servitude. Yet servitude has this truth of pure negativity and of being-for-itself in fact in servitude itself, for servitude has experienced this essence in servitude. This consciousness was not driven with anxiety about just this or that matter, nor did it have anxiety Literary Genres 9 about just this or that moment; rather, it had anxiety about its entire essence. It felt the fear of death, the absolute master. In that feeling, it had inwardly fallen into dissolution, trembled in its depths, and all that was fixed within it had been shaken loose. However, this pure universal [171] movement, this way in which all durable existence becomes absolutely fluid, is the simple essence of self-consciousness; it is absolute negativity, pure being-for-itself, which thereby exists in this consciousness. This moment of pure being-for-itself is also for this consciousness, for in its eyes its object lies within the master. Furthermore, not only is there this universal dissolution as such, but, in his service, the servant also achieves this dissolution in actuality. In his service, he sublates all the individual moments of his attachment to natural existence, and he works off his natural existence. 195. However, the feeling of absolute power as such and in the various particularities of service is merely dissolution in itself, and, although the fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom, in that fear consciousness is what it is that is “for itself,” but it is not full being-for-itself. However, by means of work this servile consciousness comes round to itself. In the moment corresponding to desire in the master’s consciousness, the aspect of the non-essential relation to the thing seemed to fall to the lot of the servant, since the thing there retained its self-sufficiency. Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object, and, as a result, it has reserved to itself that unmixed feeling for its own self. However, for that reason, this satisfaction is itself merely an act of vanishing, for it lacks the objective aspect, that is, durable existence. In contrast, work is desire held in check, it is vanishing staved off, that is, work cultivates and educates. The negative relation to the object becomes the form of the object; it becomes something that is persisting because it is precisely for the laborer himself that the object has self-sufficiency. This negative middle term, this formative activity, is at the same time [172] individuality, the pure being-for-itself of consciousness, which in the work external to it now enters into the element of persistence. Thus, by those means, the working consciousness comes to an intuition of self-sufficient being as its own self. 196. However, what the formative activity means is not only that the serving consciousness as pure being-for-itself becomes in its own eyes an existing being within that formative activity. It also has the negative meaning of the first moment, that of fear. For in forming the thing, his own negativity, that is, his being-for-itself, only becomes an object in his own eyes in that he sublates the opposed Literary Genres 10 existing form. However, this objective negative is precisely the alien essence before which he trembled, but now he destroys this alien negative and posits himself as such a negative within the element of continuance. He thereby becomes for himself an existing-being-for-itself. Being-for-itself in the master is to the servant an other, that is, it is only for him; in fear, being-for-itself exists in itself within him; in culturally formative activity, being-for-itself becomes for him his own being-for-itself, and he attains the consciousness that he himself exists in and for himself. As a result, the form, by being posited as external, becomes in his eyes not something other than himself, for his pure beingfor-itself is just that form, which in his eyes therein becomes the truth. Therefore, by way of this retrieval, he comes to acquire through his own means a mind of his own, and he does this precisely in the work in which there had seemed to be merely some outsider’s mind. – For this reflection, the two moments of fear and service per se, as well as the moments of culturally formative activity are both necessary, and both are necessary in a [173] universal way. Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear is mired in formality and does not extend itself to the conscious actuality of existence. Without culturally educative activity, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become the “it” which is for itself. If consciousness engages in formative activity without that first, absolute fear, then it has a mind of its own which is merely vanity, for its form, that is, its negativity, is not negativity in itself, and his formative activity thus cannot in his own eyes give him the consciousness of himself as consciousness of the essence. If he has not been tried and tested by absolute fear but only by a few anxieties, then the negative essence will have remained an externality in his eyes, and his substance will not have been infected all the way through by it. Because not each and every one of the ways in which his natural consciousness was brought to fruition was shaken to the core, he is still attached in himself to determinate being. His having a mind of his own is then merely stubbornness, a freedom that remains bogged down within the bounds of servility. To the servile consciousness, pure form can as little become the essence as can the pure form when it is taken as extending itself beyond the individual be a universal culturally formative activity, an absolute concept. Rather, the form is a skill which, while has dominance over some things, has dominance over neither the universal power nor the entire objective essence.
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Running head: JOURNAL ASSIGNMENT

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JOURNAL ASSIGNMENT

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Paragraph 178

Self-consciousness exists in and for itself. Its existence occurs in as much, and only in as
much, as it exists in itself and for itself for another. That is in as much as it is acknowledged.
Therefore, it is basically one only in replication, and it discloses itself in several traits. This traits
have to be kept firmly separate and go ahead to reveal themselves as always melting into one
another and disbanding this separation.
Paragraph 179
Self-consciousness sees in another self-consciousness, not the other but its own self in the
other. It exists outside of itself in another form of self-consciousness, in which it at a time loses
and also retraces itself.
Paragraph 180
Self-consciousness is essentially meant to eliminate this strange selfhood that exists in
each and everyone’s conscious mind. It is not only set to eliminate the other in order to gain its
own self-certainty but to also eliminate itself in the process. This is dully because selfconsciousness is itself that other. This is an anxious time when it must do away with his its other
form by superseding it. Consequently, since it is itself in the other, it is as such also superseded.
Superseding in this case refers to cancelling or removing without destroying while also elevating.
Paragraph 181
This twofold removal comprises, however, a return to self because what is removed is its
own other-being. Moreover, this elimination at the same time also allows the other to be other.
This is because it eliminates its own being from the other. This elimination also lets the other
again to go free since its own self is no longer in the other.

JOURNAL ASSIGNMENT

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