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    Unbundling  the  Regime  Complex:  The  Effects  of  Private   Authority         Jessica  F.  Green*  &  Graeme  Auld**     Abstract   The  work  on  'regime  complexes'—loosely  coupled  regimes  linked  through  non-­‐hierarchical  relationships—provides   a  lens  for  understanding  the  increasing  density  of  international  rules  and  institutions.  However,  the  role  of  private   authority  in  the  regime  complex—situations  where  non-­‐state  actors  set  rules  or  standards  that  other  actors   adopt—has  only  recently  received  academic  attention.  In  this  article,  we  'unbundle'  the  concept  of  the  regime   complex  in  two  novel  ways.    First,  we  argue  that  an  accurate  depiction  of  any  regime  complex  must  also  include   private  authority.    Second,  using  examples  from  environmental  governance,  we  carefully  elaborate  four  specific   mechanisms  through  which  public  and  private  authority  interact,  demonstrating  the  ways  in  which  private   authority  can  improve  the  problem-­‐solving  capacity  of  regime  complexes.    In  short,  a  full  understanding  of  the   contributions  of  private  authority  to  solving  environmental  problems  requires  examining  its  interactions  with   public  rules  and  institutions.       Keywords:  Environmental  governance,  regime  complex,  international  cooperation,  private  authority       Acknowledgements:     We  thank  Jennifer  Hadden,  Virginia  Haufler,  Robert  Keohane,  Stacy  Vandeveer  for  their  helpful  comments  on   earlier  versions  of  this  paper.    We  also  appreciated  the  feedback  received  from  participants  at  the  Transnational   Governance  Interactions  —  Theoretical  Approaches,  Empirical  Contexts  and  Practitioners’  Perspectives  workshop   held  at  the  European  University  Institute  in  Florence,  Italy  in  May  2011,  and  at  the  Annual  Meeting  of  the   American  Political  Science  Association  in  September  2011  held  in  Seattle,  Washington.  The  final  article  benefited   considerably  from  the  comments  of  four  referees  and  the  editorial  team  at  Transnational  Environmental  Law.                                                                                                                                           * Corresponding author. New York University, Department of Environmental Studies, New York, NY (United States). Email:  jessica.green@nyu.edu. Green and Auld are equal authors.   ** Carleton University, School of Public Policy and Administration, Ottawa, ON (Canada) Email: graeme.auld@carleton.ca.     1.  INTRODUCTION     The  growth  in  interdependence  among  states  has  produced  a  corresponding  increase  in  governance  activities  to   manage  that  interdependence.    Observers  of  world  politics  have  noted  (and  politicians  have  criticized)  the   increasing  density  and  complexity  of  institutional  arrangements.1    This  is  particularly  true  in  the  area  of  global   environmental  governance,  which  has  experienced  a  proliferation  of  new  types  of  institutions  and  actors  in  the   transnational  arena.    Work  on  ‘regime  complexity’  seeks  to  understand  the  interactions  among  regimes  in  a  given   issue  area  which  are  loosely  linked  through  non-­‐hierarchical  relationships.2    This  analytic  focus  has  helped  to   identify  and  explain  important  patterns  such  as  forum  shifting,  less  visible  in  studies  of  single  regimes.    However,   with  few  exceptions,  which  cluster  in  the  area  of  climate  change,  research  on  regime  complexity  neglects  the  role   of  private  authority.3         Private  authority—situations  where  non-­‐state  actors  set  rules  or  standards  that  other  actors  in  world  politics   adopt—occurs  in  an  increasing  diversity  of  issue  areas,  including  the  environment.4    In  this  article,  we  begin  from   the  well-­‐accepted  observation  that  private  authority  often  emerges  when  there  are  gaps  in  public  authority.5    That   is,  where  governments  are  unable  or  choose  not  to  govern,  'entrepreneurial'  private  actors  have  an  opportunity  to   create  rules  to  fill  the  void.    In  the  environmental  arena,  these  include  environmental  certification  schemes  such  as   organic  food  or  sustainable  timber,6  as  well  as  the  adoption  of  environmental  standards  or  disclosure  practices,   such  as  the  ISO  14001  standard  or  the  Global  Reporting  Initiative     Despite  fairly  extensive  study  of  the  emergence  of  private  authority,7  research  on  interactions  between  public  and   private  authority  is  still  relatively  new.    Most  work  to  date  offers  frameworks  for  studying  interactions,  or  looks  at   specific  cases.8  Moreover,  the  few  studies  that  do  consider  private  initiatives  include  a  wide  range  of  governance                                                                                                                                       1  See,  e.g.  M.  Munoz,  R.  Thrasher  and  A.  Najam,  ‘Measuring  the  Negotiation  Burden  of  Multilateral  Environmental   Agreements’  (2009)  9(4)  Global  Environmental  Politics,  pp.  1-­‐14;  T.  Bartley,  ‘Transnational  Governance  as  the   Layering  of  Rules:  Intersections  of  Public  and  Private  Standards,  (2011)  12(2)  Theoretical  Inquiries  in  Law,  pp.  517-­‐ 542.     2  We  review  this  literature  in  detail  in  Section  3.     3  J.F.  Green,  Rethinking  Private  Authority  (Princeton  University  Press,  2014);  H.  Bulkeley  et.  al.  Transnational   Climate  Change  Governance  (Cambridge  University  Press,  2014).     4  Green,  n.  3  above,  6.   5  See,  e.g.  B.  Cashore,  G.  Auld  &  D.  Newsom,  Governing  Through  Markets:  Forest  Certification  and  the  Emergence   of  Non-­‐  state  Authority  (Yale  University  Press,  2004);  L.H.  Gulbrandsen,  ‘Overlapping  Public  and  Private   Governance:  Can  Forest  Certification  Fill  the  Gaps  in  the  Global  Forest  Regime?’  (2004)  4(2)  Global  Environmental   Politics,  pp.  75–99;  J.-­‐C.  Graz  &  A.  Nölke  (eds),  Transnational  Private  Governance  and  Its  Limits  (Routledge,  2008).   6  See,  e.g.  the  ISEAL  Alliance  (www.isealalliance.org)  or  the  Forest  Stewardship  Council  (https://ic.fsc.org/en).   7  A.C.  Cutler,  V.  Haufler  &  T.  Porter  (eds),  Private  Authority  and  International  Affairs  (SUNY  Press,  1999);  R.B.  Hall  &   T.J.  Biersteker,  The  Emergence  of  Private  Authority  in  Global  Governance  (Cambridge  University  Press,  2002);  T.   Buthe  &  W.  Mattli,  The  New  Global  Rulers:  The  Privatization  of  Regulation  in  the  World  Economy  (Princeton   University  Press,  2011);  Green,  n.  3  above.   8  On  frameworks,  see  B.  Eberlein,  K.W.  Abbott,  J.  Black,  E.  Meidinger  &  S.  Wood,  ‘Transnational  Business   Governance  Interactions:  Conceptualization  and  Framework  for  Analysis’    (2014)  8(1)  Regulation  &  Governance,   pp.  1–21.    On  cases,  see  T.  Porter,  ‘Technical  Systems  and  the  Architecture  of  Transnational  Business  Governance   Interactions’  (2014)  8(1)  Regulation  &  Governance,  pp.  110-­‐25;  L.H.  Gulbrandsen,  ‘Dynamic  Governance   Interactions:  Evolutionary  Effects  of  State  Responses  to  Non-­‐State  Certification  Programs’  (2014)  8(1)  Regulation  &   Governance,  pp.  74-­‐92;  B.  Cashore  &  M.W.  Stone,  ‘Does  California  Need  Delaware?  Explaining  Indonesian,  Chinese,   and  United  States  Support  for  Legality  Compliance  of  Internationally  Traded  Products’  (2014)  8(1)  Regulation  &   Governance,  pp.  49-­‐73;  T.  Bartley,  ‘Transnational  Governance  and  the  Re-­‐Centered  State:  Sustainability  or     institutions  (e.g.,  information  and  networking,  capacity  building,  and  rule-­‐making)  that,  we  argue,  do  not  all   conform  to  the  definition  of  private  authority.9    As  such,  this  article  advances  extant  literature  in  two  ways.    First,   we  seek  to  add  private  authority  (as  defined  below)  to  the  study  of  regime  complexity,  just  as  early  authors  added   it  to  the  study  of  regimes.10    We  show  that  including  private  authority  in  the  study  of  regime  complexity  elucidates   previously  overlooked  types  of  interactions.    These  interactions  suggest  distinct  ways  private  authority  can  affect   the  overall  design  of  the  regime  complex  and  thereby  improve  its  problem-­‐solving  capacity.    Second,  we  identify   four  mechanisms  through  which  private  authority  can  affect  the  problem-­‐solving  ability  of  the  regime  complex.    At   different  phases  of  the  policy  process,  private  authority  can:  serve  as  an  incubator  for  ideas;  provide  a   reformulation  of  the  problem;  supply  a  new  institutional  avenue  to  diffuse  public  rules;  and/or  contribute  to  rule   harmonization  through  'incorporation  by  reference'.         Our  contribution  focuses  exclusively  on  the  interaction  between  public  authority  and  private  rule-­‐making  activities.     We  do  not  include  other  forms  of  private  governance—information  and  networking,  for  instance,  which  do  not  fall   within  our  definition  of  private  authority.       We  also  recognize  that  private  authority  is  not  always  a  positive  influence  on  environmental  governance.    Its   interaction  with  public  authority  does  not  necessarily  produce  beneficial  outcomes.11    However,  by  identifying  and   illustrating  the  ways  in  which  private  authority  contributes  to  the  problem-­‐solving  ability  of  regime  complexes,  we   aim  to  advance  the  literature  towards  the  development  of  a  causal  theory  that  can  identify  conditions  under  which   we  should  expect  benign  or  deleterious  outcomes  of  public-­‐private  interactions.       Our  contribution  is  two-­‐fold.    First,  we  argue  that  private  authority  has  been  largely  excluded  from  the  regime   complex  (RC)  literature  to  date,  even  though  interactions  between  public  and  private  authority  have  been   discussed  in  other  literatures,  which  we  explore  below;  we  aim  to  bring  these  literatures  closer  together.    The   omission  from  the  RC  literature  is  not  just  cosmetic,  but  has  real  consequences  for  understanding  how  regime   complexes  evolve,  and  ultimately,  whether  and  how  they  solve  collective  action  problems.    We  therefore  argue   that  the  work  to  date  has  paid  insufficient  attention  to  how  the  boundaries  of  a  given  regime  complex  are  drawn.     Re-­‐draw  the  boundaries  to  include  private  authority,  and  a  very  different  picture  emerges.    Second,  we  add  to  a   growing  literature  on  public-­‐private  interactions12  to  show  that  private  authority  can  enhance  the  problem-­‐solving   ability  of  regime  complexes  through  four  different  mechanisms.    If  these  dynamic  effects  are  included,  the   potential  influence  of  private  authority  on  world  politics  changes  considerably.     The  article  proceeds  as  follows.    The  next  section  reviews  the  literature  on  regime  complexes  and  their  effects.     Building  on  the  recent  research  on  private  authority,  the  third  section  carefully  describes  four  mechanisms  through   which  public  and  private  authority  interact.    The  fourth  section  is  the  core  of  the  empirical  analysis.    We  first   describe  our  three  cases—climate  change,  tropical  commodities,  and  fisheries—and  then  trace  the  interaction  of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Legality?’  (2014)  8(1)  Regulation  &  Governance,  pp.  93-­‐109;  G.  Auld,  C.  Balboa,  S.  Bernstein  &  B.  Cashore,  ‘The   Emergence  of  Non-­‐State  Market  Driven  (NSMD)  Global  Environmental  Governance:  A  Cross  Sectoral  Assessment’,   in  M.A.  Delmas  &  O.R.  Young  (eds)  Governance  for  the  Environment:  New  Perspectives  (Cambridge  University   Press,  2009),  pp.  183-­‐218.     9  See,  e.g.,  K.W.  Abbott,  ‘The  Transnational  Regime  Complex  for  Climate  Change’    (2012)  30(4)  Environment  and   Planning  C:  Government  and  Policy,  pp.  571–90;  A.  Orsini,  ‘Multi-­‐Forum  Non-­‐State  Actors:  Navigating  the  Regime   Complexes  for  Forestry  and  Genetic  Resources’  (2013)  13(3)  Global  Environmental  Politics,  pp.  34–55;  K.W.  Abbott,   ‘Strengthening  the  Transnational  Regime  Complex  for  Climate  Change’  (2014)  3(1)  Transnational  Environmental   Law,  pp.  57-­‐88.   10  Cutler,  Haufler  &  Porter,  n.  7  above.   11  D.  Fuchs  &  A.  Kalfagianni,  ‘The  Causes  and  Consequences  of  Private  Food  Governance’    (2010)  12(3)  Business  and   Politics  pp?    at   21  May  2013;  F.  Mayer  &  G.  Gereffi,  ‘Regulation  and  Economic  Globalization:  Prospects  and  Limits  of  Private   Governance’    (2010)  12(3)  Business  &  Politics,  pp.  1–25.     12  Eberlein  et  al,  n.  8  above.     public  and  private  authority  in  each  to  establish  the  microfoundations  of  our  arguments.    The  final  section  draws   broader  lessons  for  work  on  regime  complexes,  which  incorporate  our  insights  about  the  role  of  private  authority.         2.  DEFINING  PRIVATE  AUTHORITY     Broadly  speaking,  private  authority  can  be  understood  as  situations  in  which  non-­‐state  actors  make  rules  or  set   standards  that  other  actors  in  world  politics  adopt.13    This  definition  is  consistent  with  the  literature  on   transnational  regulation,  which  highlights  two  central  facets  of  private  authority.    First,  non-­‐state  actors  must   create  the  rules,  which  are  designed  to  shape  behaviour.14    Non-­‐state  actors  may  include  non-­‐governmental   organizations  (NGOs),  private  firms,  multinational  corporations,  and  transnational  networks  comprising   combinations  of  these  actors.    Second,  actors  in  world  politics  must  adopt  and  adhere  to  the  rules;  that  is,  they   must  alter  their  behaviour  in  some  way  as  a  result  of  private  authority.15    Because  our  study  focuses  on  regime   complexes,  we  focus  exclusively  on  transnational  forms  of  private  authority—non-­‐state  actors  that  work  across   borders  both  above  and  below  the  level  of  the  nation-­‐state.    Of  course,  private  authority  also  exists  at  the  national   level,  but  we  do  not  consider  that  in  this  article.     Our  definition  encompasses  rules  for  different  game-­‐theoretic  structures.    Private  authority  includes  standards,   where  network  externalities  generate  incentives  to  comply  (i.e.  coordination  games).    It  also  encompasses   situations  where  compliance  requires  ongoing  incentives  to  overcome  free-­‐riding  (i.e.  prisoner’s  dilemma).16     Others  are  more  restrictive  in  their  definitions.  Abbott  and  Snidal,  for  instance,  focus  only  on  those  rules  that  seek   to  address  prisoner’s  dilemmas,  rather  than  simply  coordination  problems.17  Cashore  and  colleagues  offer  a  similar   restriction.18  Our  broader  interest  in  rules  aims  to  reflect  that  private  authority  can  be  a  source  of  rulemaking  that   addresses  situations  where  externality  incentives  apply,  where  coordination  incentives  apply,  or  where  both  may   occur.19       We  emphasize  that  the  targets  of  private  rules  need  not  be  states.  Indeed,  generally  they  are  not.    For  instance,   the  targets  of  the  Forest  Stewardship  Council  (FSC),  a  well-­‐studied  private  certification  programme,  are  timber   producers  and  companies  that  trade  and  sell  forest  products.20  Private  authority  can  also  include  instances  in   which  states  delegate  governance  roles  or  tasks  to  non-­‐state  actors  in  international  treaties  or  through   international  organizations.  Although  this  type  of  delegated  private  authority  falls  within  our  definition,  it  will  not                                                                                                                                       13  See  Green,  n.  3  above.    R.  Falkner,  ‘Private  Environmental  Governance  and  International  Relations:  Exploring  the   Links’    (2003)  3(2)  Global  Environmental  Politics,  pp.  72–87.     14  Ibid;  Cutler,  Haufler  &  Porter,  n.  7  above.   15  Our  definition  is  thus  generally  consistent  with  authority  defined  as  ‘the  ability  to  induce  deference  in  others’  by   D.  Avant,  M.  Finnemore  &  S.K.  Sell  (eds),  Who  Governs  the  Globe?  (Cambridge  University  Press,  2010),  p.  9.   16  For  discussion  of  compliance  processes,  see:  O.  Perez,  ‘Private  Environmental  Governance  as  Ensemble   Regulation:  A  Critical  Exploration  of  Sustainability  Indexes  and  the  New  Ensemble  Politics’  (2011)  12(2)  Theoretical   Inquiries  in  Law,  pp.  543-­‐79;  Büthe  &  Mattli,  n.  7  above;  G.  Auld.  ‘Private  Market-­‐Based  Regulations:  What  They   Are,  and  What  They  Mean  for  Land-­‐Use  Governance’,  in  K.  Seto  &  A.  Reenberg  (eds)  Rethinking  Global  Land  Use  in   an  Urban  Era  (MIT  Press,  2014),  pp.  217-­‐38.   17  K.W.  Abbott  &  D.  Snidal  ‘Strengthening  International  Regulation  Through  Transnational  New  Governance:   Overcoming  the  Orchestration  Deficit’  (2009)  42  Vanderbilt  Journal  of  Transnational  Law,  pp.  501-­‐78.     18  B.  Cashore,  ‘Legitimacy  and  the  Privatization  of  Environmental  Governance:  How  Non-­‐State  Market-­‐Driven   (NSMD)  Governance  Systems  Gain  Rule-­‐Making  Authority.’  (2002)  15(4)  Governance,  pp.  503-­‐29;  S.  Bernstein  &  B.   Cashore,  ‘Can  Non-­‐State  Global  Governance  Be  Legitimate?  An  Analytical  Framework’  (2007)  1(4)  Regulation  &   Governance,  pp.  347-­‐71.   19  See  also  Büthe  &  Mattli,  n.  7  above.     20  Cashore,  Auld  &  Newsom,  n.  5  above;  G.  Gereffi,  J.  Humphrey  &  T.  Sturgeon,  'The  Governance  of  Global  Value   Chains'  (2005)  12(1)  Review  of  International  Political  Economy,  pp.  78-­‐104.   be  considered  in  this  article.21  We  omit  delegated  authority  because  it  derives  from  states,  and  thus,  interactions   are  both  inevitable  and  anticipated.    Rather  we  focus  on  instances  when  non-­‐state  actors  create  rules  and   persuade  other  actors  to  adopt  those  rules  without  the  ex-­‐ante  transfer  of  authority  by  states.         Other  scholars  that  examine  public  and  private  interactions  include  governance  activities  beyond  rulemaking.   Abbott’s  delineation  of  the  transnational  regime  complex  for  climate  change  includes  initiatives  that  set  standards   and  commitments  (closest  to  our  focus  on  rulemaking),  perform  operational  functions  like  capacity  building,  share   information  and  network,  and  provide  finance.22  Andonova,  Betsill,  and  Bulkeley’s  study,  also  of  climate  change,   examines  initiatives  that  share  information,  perform  capacity  building  and  implementation,  or  undertake  rule   making.23  Eberlein  et.  al.  focus  on  transnational  business  governance  (with  an  illustration  from  the  forest  sector),   where  governance  encompasses  ‘organized  and  sustained  attempts  to  change  the  behaviour  of  target  actors  to   further  a  collective  end,  through  rules  or  norms  and  means  of  implementation  and  enforcement’.24       While  we  are  sympathetic  to  the  aims  of  these  broader  efforts  to  delineate  the  potential  full  extent  of  the  public   and  private  elements  of  climate  governance  (or  governance  of  other  problems),  our  focus  on  private  authority   enables  us  to  gain  clearer  analytic  traction  on  specific  interactions  that  may  occur  and  to  map  their  consequences.   We  encourage  more  research,  perhaps  following  Eberlein  et.  al.’s  conceptual  framework  for  the  study  of   interactions,  to  examine  how,  for  instance,  transnational  governance  initiatives  that  focus  on  information  and   networking  may  operate  through  certain  additional  mechanisms  and  have  other  kinds  of  effects.  Indeed,  drawing   from  work  on  epistemic  communities25  or  boundary  organizations26  may  be  a  fruitful  avenue  for  such   investigations.       3.  THE  EFFECTS  OF  REGIME  COMPLEXITY       This  section  reviews  the  literature  on  regime  complexity  and  other  relevant  works  that  describe  interactions   between  public  and  private  authority.    A  regime  complex  is  defined  as  ‘an  array  of  partially  overlapping  and   nonhierarchical  institutions  governing  a  particular  issue-­‐area.’27    It  is  an  analytical  unit  that  delimits  areas  of   institutional  density,  exhibiting  three  key  characteristics.    Regime  complexes  comprise  ‘elemental  regimes’  which   may  functionally  overlap.    As  Raustiala  and  Victor  discuss,28  the  elemental  regimes  in  the  regime  complex  for  plant   genetic  resources  include  entities  such  as  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  (FAO)  of  the  United  Nations  (UN),   the  UN  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity  (CBD),29  and  the  World  Trade  Organization’s  (WTO)  Agreement  on                                                                                                                                       21  Green,  n.  3  above;    T.  Buthe,  ‘The  Globalization  of  Health  and  Safety  Standards:  Delegation  of  Regulatory   Authority  in  the  SPS  Agreement  of  the  1994  Agreement  Establishing  the  World  Trade  Organization’  (2008)  71(1)   Law  and  Contemporary  Problems,  pp.  219–256.   22  Abbott,  n.  9  above.     23  L.B.  Andonova,  M.M.  Betsill,  &  H.  Bulkeley,  ‘Transnational  Climate  Governance’  (2009)  9(2)  Global  Environmental   Politics,  pp.  52-­‐73.  See  also  M.  Hoffmann.  ‘Climate  Governance  at  the  Crossroad:  Experimenting  with  a  Global   Response  After  Kyoto’  (Oxford  University  Press,  2011).     24  Eberlein  et  al,  n.  8    above,  at  3.   25  P.M.  Haas,  ‘Introduction:  Epistemic  Communities  and  International  Policy  Coordination.’  (1992)  46(1)   International  Organization,  pp.  1-­‐35.   26  J-­‐F.  Morin,  S.  Louafi,  A.  Orsini,  &  M.  Oubenal.  ‘Boundary  Organizations  in  Regime  Complexes:  A  Social  Network   Profile  of  IPBES"  Forthcoming,  Journal  of  International  Relations  and  Development.       27  K.  Raustiala  &  D.G.  Victor,  ‘The  Regime  Complex  for  Plant  Genetic  Resources’    (2004)  58(2)  International   Organization,  pp.  277–309.   28  Ibid.    Orsini  and  colleagues  offer  an  alternative,  much  more  complicated  (and  we  think,  problematic)  definition.     A.  Orsini,  J.-­‐F.  Morin  &  O.  Young,  ‘Regime  Complexes:  A  Buzz,  a  Boom  or  a  Boost  for  Global  Governance’    (2013)   19(1)  Global  Governance,  pp.  27–39.   29  Rio  de  Janeiro  (Brazil),  5  June  1992,  in  force  29  Dec.  1993,  available  at:  http://www.cbd.int.   Trade-­‐Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPS).30    Each  of  these  elemental  regimes  is  governed  by  a   separate  international  agreement,  with  its  own  organizational  structure.    Second,  there  is  no  agreed  upon   hierarchy  to  resolve  conflicts  among  regimes.    Third,  because  of  the  density  of  governance  arrangements,  regime   complexes  exhibit  path  dependence;  present  rules  constrain  and  shape  the  creation  of  new  ones.31    Beyond  plant   genetic  resources,  several  global  problems  have  been  studied  explicitly  as  regime  complexes,  including  energy,   food  security,  and  humanitarian  relief.32    In  particular,  there  has  been  a  flurry  of  recent  work  on  regime  complexity   in  the  context  of  climate  change,  though  these  works  do  not  explicitly  invoke  this  terminology.33    We  acknowledge   that  these  are  useful  contributions  to  an  emerging  literature.    While  recognizing  that  research  in  this  area  is   relatively  new  and  still  developing,  we  point  to  two  shortcomings  of  existing  research  that  we  aim  to  address  in   this  paper.    These  oversights,  in  our  view,  limit  the  conceptual  ability  of  the  regime  complex  to  explain  both   governance  arrangements  and  their  outcomes.       Our  first  critique  concerns  the  way  in  which  the  concept  has  been  defined  and  operationalized.  With  few   exceptions,  the  foundational  literature  focuses  on  public  authority,  leaving  many,  potentially  important  non-­‐ hierarchical  and  overlapping  private  rule-­‐making  institutions  unattended.  For  example,  Raustiala  and  Victor  note   that  regime  complexes  are  ‘marked  by  the  existence  of  several  legal  agreements.’34    In  their  description  of  the   regime  complex  for  climate  change,  Keohane  and  Victor  focus  on  multilateral  agreements  and  programmatic   efforts  by  international  organizations.35    A  special  issue  by  Alter  and  Meunier  similarly  focuses  on  the  institutional   fora  created  by  multilateral  arrangements.36  (The  exception  in  that  issue  is  Kelley’s  work  on  election  monitoring,   which  considers  the  role  of  non-­‐state  actors.)37    Orsini  and  colleagues  describe  a  network  of  three  or  more   international  regimes  with  potentially  problematic  interactions.38    Similarly,  earlier  work  by  Aggarwal,  which   considers  the  nesting  arrangements  and  parallel  institutions  under  conditions  of  complexity,  is  limited  to  two   institutional  forms:  bilateral  and  multilateral.39       More  recent  work  acknowledges  that  private  authority  has  been  overlooked.    It  incorporates  private  authority  into   the  broader  governance  landscape,  but  casts  a  wide  net  to  include  many  types  of  institutions.40  Abbott,  for                                                                                                                                       30  Marrakesh  (Morocco),  15  Apr.  1994,  in  force  1  Jan.  1995,  available  at:   http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-­‐trips.pdf.   31  Raustiala  &  Victor,  n.  27  above.     32  R.O.  Keohane  &  D.G.  Victor,  ‘The  Regime  Complex  for  Climate  Change’  (2011)  9(1)  Perspectives  on  Politics,  pp.  7– 23;  J.  Colgan,  R.O.  Keohane  &  T.  Van  de  Graaf,  ‘Punctuated  Equilibrium  in  the  Energy  Regime  Complex’  (2012)  7(2)   Review  of  International  Organizations,  pp.  117-­‐43.  M.J.  Struett,  M.T.  Nance  &  D.  Armstrong,  ‘Navigating  the   Maritime  Piracy  Regime  Complex’    (2013)  19(1)  Global  Governance,  pp.  93–104;  A.  Betts,  ‘Regime  Complexity  and   International  Organizations:  UNHCR  as  a  Challenged  Institution’  (2013)  19(1)  Global  Governance,  pp.  69–81.   33  M.  Betsill  et  al.,  ‘Building  Productive  Links  between  the  UNFCCC  and  the  Broader  Global  Climate  Governance   Landscape’    (2015)  15(2)  Global  Environmental  Politics,  pp.  1–10;  C.F.  Sabel  &  D.G.  Victor,  ‘Governing  Global   Problems  under  Uncertainty:  Making  Bottom-­‐up  Climate  Policy  Work’    (2015)  Climatic  Change,  pp.  1–13;  A.J.   Jordan  et  al.,  ‘Emergence  of  Polycentric  Climate  Governance  and  Its  Future  Prospects’    (2015)  5(11)  Nature  Climate   Change,  pp.  977–82.   34  Raustiala  &  Victor,  n.  27  above.   35  Keohane  &  Victor,  n.  32  above.   36  K.J.  Alter  &  S.  Meunier,  ‘The  Politics  of  International  Regime  Complexity’  (2009)  7(1)  Perspectives  on  Politics,  pp.   13–24.   37  J.  Kelley,  ‘The  More  the  Merrier?  The  Effects  of  Having  Multiple  International  Election  Monitoring  Organizations’     (2009)  7(1)  Perspectives  on  Politics,  pp.  59–64.   38  Orsini,  Morin,  &  Young,  n.  28  above,  at  p.  29.   39  V.K.  Aggarwal,  ‘Reconciling  Multiple  Institutions:  Bargaining,  Linkages  and  Nesting’,  in  V.K.  Aggarwal  (ed.)   Institutional  Designs  for  a  Complex  World:  Bargaining,  Linkages,  and  Nesting  (Cornell  University  Press,  1998),  pp.   1–31.   40  See  Andonova,  Betsill  &  Bulkeley,  n.  23  above.  Hoffmann,  n.  23  above.  H.  Bulkeley,  L.  Andonova,  M.  Betsill,  D.   Compagnon,  T.  Hale,  M.J.  Hoffmann,  P.  Newell,  Transnational  Climate  Change  Governance  (Cambridge  University     instance,  notes  that  standards  and  commitment  initiatives  (governance  institutions  that  would  fit  our  definition  of   private  authority)  are  relatively  rare  on  the  transnational  private  governance  triangle  compared  to  their  prevalence   in  the  public  regime  complex  for  climate  governance.41  Including  such  diverse  institutions  vastly  increases  the   types  of  interactions  that  might  occur  with  public  authority,  and  complicates  analysis.    To  keep  our  analysis   focused,  and  to  group  together  like  institutions,  we  restrict  our  investigation  to  private  rule-­‐making  activities,  and   their  interactions  with  equivalent  public  institutions.       Our  second  critique  builds  on  the  first.    We  demonstrate  how  the  effects  of  complexity  change  when  one  includes   private  authority  in  the  regime  complex.  To  date,  the  literature  has  identified  several  different  effects  of   complexity;  these  describe  what  happens  when  a  single  regime  no  longer  serves  as  the  focal  point  for  international   cooperation.    One  set  of  effects  resulting  from  complexity  reflects  what  happens  when  actors  can  choose  from  a   variety  of  tactics  to  avoid  inconvenient  rules.    These  include  forum-­‐shopping,  regime  shifting,  or  capitalizing  upon   inconsistencies  among  rules.42    Goldstein  and  Steinberg  describe  a  shift  in  trade  rulemaking  from  inter-­‐state   negotiations  to  a  judicial  process  for  resolving  inter-­‐state  disputes.43    Helfer  describes  attempts  by  various  actors  to   shift  the  governance  of  intellectual  property  rights  both  to  and  away  from  the  TRIPS  Agreement.44  Merry  shows   how  a  group  of  academics  and  the  United  Nations  Development  Program  (UNDP)  developed  and  promulgated  the   Human  Development  Index  (HDI)  as  an  alternative  metric  to  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  for  development  to   bypass  the  interest  of  states  and  the  resistance  of  the  United  Nations  (UN)  Statistical  Division.45  Mattli  and  Büthe   demonstrate  a  shift  in  the  form  of  regulation—from  domestic  to  international  product  standards—and  discuss   how  the  degree  of  complementarity  between  national  and  international  standard-­‐setting  institutions  affects  which   countries  have  the  most  influence  on  the  content  of  international  standards.46    Other  scholars  have  identified   situations  in  which  states  forum  shop  to  find  institutions  most  hospitable  to  their  political  goals.47       Another  commonly  identified  effect  of  complexity,  drawn  from  the  literature  on  environmental  governance,  is   fragmentation,  which  is  often  perceived  to  be  a  hindrance  to  effective  governance.    Fragmented  governance  is   characterized  by  a  patchwork  of  institutions  that  vary  in  their  “constituencies,  spatial  scope,  subject  matter  and   objectives.”48    Literature  on  the  creation  of  a  World  Environment  Organization  (WEO)  takes  up  various  strategies  to   minimize  the  ill  effects  of  fragmentation,  through  strategies  such  as  centralization,  greater  coordination,  and   clustering.49    However,  as  Biermann  and  colleagues  point  out,  ‘fragmentation  is  a  relative  concept’50  since  all  global                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Press,  2014);  K.W.  Abbott  &  Thomas  Hale,  ‘Orchestrating  Global  Solutions  Networks:  A  Guide  for  Organizational   Entrepreneurs’  (2014)  9(1)  Innovations,  pp.  195-­‐212.     41  Abbott,  n.  4  above,  at  p.  10.     42    Raustiala  &  Victor,  n.  27  above;  Betts,  n.  32  above;  L.  Helfer,  ‘Regime  Shifting  in  the  International  Intellectual   Property  System’    (2009)  7(1)  Perspectives  on  Politics,  pp.  39–44;  E.  Burton,  ‘The  Power  Politics  of  Regime   Complexity:  Human  Rights  Trade  Conditionality  in  Europe’    (2009)  7(1)  Perspectives  on  Politics,  pp.  33–7.     43  J.L.  Goldstein  &  R.H.  Steinberg,  'Regulatory  Shift:  The  Rise  of  Judicial  Liberalization  at  the  WTO',    in  W.  Mattli  and   N.  Woods  (eds)  The  Politics  of  Global  Regulation  (Princeton  University  Press,  2009),  pp.  211-­‐41.   44  N.  30  above.  See  Helfer,  n.  42  above.   45  S.E.  Merry,  ‘Global  Legal  Pluralism  and  the  Temporality  of  Soft  Law’  (2014)  46(1)  The  Journal  of  Legal  Pluralism   and  Unofficial  Law,  pp.  108-­‐22.   46  W.  Mattli  &T.  Büthe,  ‘Setting  International  Standards:  Technological  Rationality  or  Primacy  of  Power’    (2003)   56(1)  World  Politics,  pp.  1–42.   47  C.L.  Davis,  ‘International  Institutions  and  Issue  Linkage:  Builiding  Support  for  Agricultural  Trade  Liberalization’     (2004)  98(1)  American  Political  Science  Review,  pp.  153–69.     48  F.  Zelli,  ‘The  fragmentation  of  the  global  climate  architecture’  (2011)  2(2)  Wiley  Interdisciplinary  Reviews:  Climate   Change,  pp.  255-­‐270.   49  A.  Najam,  ‘The  Case  Against  a  New  International  Environmental  Organization’    (2003)  9(3)  Global  Governance,   pp.  367–84;  J.  Whalley  &  B.  Zissimos,  ‘What  Could  a  World  Environmental  Organization  Do?’  (2001)  1(1)  Global   Environmental  Politics,  pp.  29–34;  W.B.  Chambers  &  J.F.  Green,  Reforming  International  Environmental   Governance:  From  Institutional  Limits  to  Innovative  Reforms  (United  Nations  University  Press,  2005).   governance  architectures  exhibit  it  to  some  degree.    Without  a  transparent  and  replicable  way  to  measure  and   compare  degrees  of  fragmentation,  we  do  not  find  this  to  be  a  compelling  critique  of  governance  structures.     There  are  other  frameworks  that  seek  to  characterize  the  complex  nature  of  global  governance  institutions.    For example, work  on  institutional  interplay  emphasizes  the  interactions  among  institutions  that  occur  for  both   functional  and  political  reasons.51 The  growing  body  of  work  on  orchestration—defined  as  ‘a  wide  range  of   directive  and  facilitative  measures  designed  to  convene,  empower,  support,  and  steer  public  and  private  actors   engaged  in  regulatory  activities’—adopts  a  similar  interest  by  examining  how  states  and  international   organizations  can  and  should  intervene  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  highly  fragmented  transnational   governance.52         Finally,  Alter  and  Meunier’s  special  issue  on  regime  complexity  identifies  a  third  set  of  ‘feedback  effects’  that  result   from  institutional  complexity,  which  they  describe  as  competition  and  reverberation.53    Competition  among   institutions  and  actors  can  give  rise  to  both  positive  and  negative  effects.    Negative  effects  include  turf  battles,   repetitive  efforts  or  uncoordinated  policy  that  is  easily  undone.54    Positive  effects  include  productive   experimentation,  diffusion  of  risk,  a  race  to  the  top,  and  increased  resources  addressing  the  issue.    Reverberation   occurs  when  changes  in  one  institution  cause  changes  in  another,  which  are  unintended  and/or  difficult  to   control.55    We  agree  that  changes  in  one  part  of  a  complex  system  can  have  unintended  effects  on  other  parts  of   the  system;  however,  the  notion  of  reverberation  is  underspecified.         We  argue  that  forum  shopping,  fragmentation,  competition,  and  the  under-­‐specified  ‘reverberation’  are  the   effects  of  complexity  that  result  from  interactions  among  public  institutions.    However,  if  private  authority  is   included  in  the  regime  complex,  then  the  types  of  observed  effects  of  complexity  expand.    Specifically,  we  argue   that  private  authority  can  improve  the  problem-­‐solving  capacity  of  regime  complexes  through  the  following  four   different  mechanisms:  serve  as  an  incubator  for  ideas;  provide  a  reformulation  of  the  problem;  supply  a  new   institutional  avenue  to  diffuse  public  rules;  and/or  contribute  to  rule  harmonization  through  'incorporation  by   reference'.         4.  THE  EFFECTS  OF  PRIVATE  AUTHORITY  ON  REGIME  COMPLEXES   We  now  turn  to  the  mechanisms  through  which  private  authority  can  affect  the  larger  regime  complex.    These   mechanisms  build  on  our  knowledge  about  the  processes  of  both  public  and  private  rulemaking  to  uncover  the   potential  effects  of  private  authority  on  the  regime  complex.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 50  F.  Biermann,  P.  Pattberg,  H.  van  Asselt  &  F.  Zelli.  ‘The  Fragmentation  of  Global  Governance  Architectures:  A   Framework  for  Analysis’  (2009)  9(4)  Global  Environmental  Politics,  pp.  14-­‐40,  at  p.  17.   51  T.  Gehring  &  S.  Oberthur,  ‘Interplay:  Exploring  Institutional  Interaction’,  in  O.R.  Young,  L.A.  King  &  H.  Schroeder   (eds),  Institutions  and  Environmental  Change:  Principal  Findings,  Applications,  and  Research  Frontiers  (The  MIT   Press,  2008);  pp.  187-­‐224;  O.R.  Young,  The  Institutional  Dimensions  of  Environmental  Change:  Fit,  Interplay,  and   Scale  (The  MIT  Press,  2002).     52  Abbott & Snidal, above n 12. K.W. Abbott & D. Snidal. ‘International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO Performance through Orchestration’ (2010) 5(3) The Review of International Organizations, pp. 315-44.   53  Although  Alter  and  Meunier  refer  to  these  as  'feedback  effects',  this  is  accurate  in  the  strict  sense  of  systems   theory.    In  systems  theory,  a  feedback  loop  can  be  understood  as  instances  in  which  a  stock  (in  this  case,   institutions)  affect  a  flow  (in  this  case,  rule-­‐making  activities)  in  or  out  of  the  stock.    On  systems  theory  see  D.H.   Meadows,  Thinking  in  Systems:  A  Primer  (Chelsea  Green  Publishing,  2008).  Alter  and  Meunier  arguably  fail  to   describe  clearly  how  the  flow  affects  the  growth,  diminution  or  change  in  the  stock.   54  Alter  &  Meunier,  n.  36  above.   55  Alter  &  Meunier,  n.  36  above,  at  pp.    19–21.   Prior  to  describing  the  mechanisms,  we  contrast  various  design  and  operational  principles  of  public  and  private   authority.       4.1.  Differences  between  Public  and  Private  Authority   We  know  from  existing  research  that  certain  institutional  and  organizational  rigidities  affect  the  operation  of   intergovernmental  processes.56    International  institutions  often  present  the  challenge  of  path  dependence.     Keohane,  for  instance,  notes  that  increasing  returns  and  sunk  costs  help  explain  the  persistence  of  institutions  that   are  not  optimally  efficient.57    Similarly,  Young  explains  inertia  in  regimes  as  a  consequence  of  collective-­‐choice   rules  that  ossify  regime  requirements  if  some  states  stand  to  lose  from  a  new  arrangement.58    Moreover,   international  organizations  (IOs)  are  prone  to  dysfunctions  that  direct  efforts  away  from  their  core  mandate.     Barnett  and  Finnemore  provide  an  extensive  assessment  of  the  causes  of  these  challenges.59    For  example,   material  concerns  can  drive  IOs  to  pursue  their  own  interests  over  the  goals  outlined  by  their  mandate.         We  suggest  that,  though  public  and  private  authority  each  face  institutional  inertia  and  organizational   dysfunctions,  certain  rigidities  in  public  governance  are  less  acute  in  private  governance.  Consequently,  the   inclusion  of  private  authorities  in  regime  complex  may  be  beneficial  by  tempering  the  ossification  tendencies  that   plague  public  regime  complexes.     In  contrasting  the  characteristics  of  public  authority  with  private  authority,  three  key  differences  and  their   implications  become  clear.    First,  whereas  states  are  the  key  members  of  intergovernmental  regimes  with   responsibilities  for  domestic  implementation  and  enforcement,  private  authority  generally  targets  those  actors   responsible  for  economic  activities  in  a  given  sector.    Most  often,  the  targets  of  private  transnational  regulation   are  not  sovereign  states,  but  non-­‐state  actors,  who  voluntarily  accede  to  a  private  regulatory  regime.  For  example,   private  authority  projected  by  the  FSC  is  directed  at  forest  product  producers  and  at  companies  that  trade  and  sell   forest  products,  not  at  governments.         Second,  because  private  rules  are  voluntary—firms  and  other  non-­‐state  actors  decide  whether  or  not  to  adopt   them—there  is  generally  greater  turnover  of  regulatory  targets  than  with  public  authority.    States  do  emerge  and   fail  and  they  may  enter  and  exit  intergovernmental  agreements;  however,  the  level  of  volatility  among   corporations  is  without  doubt  orders  of  magnitude  higher.    If  compliance  with  private  regulation  becomes  too   costly,  or  otherwise  undesirable,  firms  can  simply  exit  the  regime,  either  by  ending  compliance  or  divesting  from   the  business  operation  targeted  by  the  rules.  The  changing  landscape  of  regulatory  targets  means  that  regulatory   gridlock  is  less  likely  to  occur  in  private  authority.    Interests  can  change  more  regularly  with  entry  and  exit,  and   private  governance  institutions  form,  collapse,  and  restructure  with  greater  ease.    Without  the  external  constraints   imposed  by  states,  private  rule-­‐makers  are  freer  than  public  ones  to  make  organizational  and  regulatory  changes   as  needed.60  For  example,  private  regulatory  institutions  faced  with  competition  from  similar  organizations  can   shift  the  focus  of  their  activities,  or  even  their  mandate,  with  relative  ease.  Certain  initiatives  are  constrained  by   influential  stakeholders—including  funders  and  members—but  most  have  considerable  decision-­‐making                                                                                                                                       56  T.N.  Hale,  D.  Held  &  K.  Young,  Gridlock:  Why  Global  Cooperation  is  Failing  when  We  Need  It  Most  (Polity,  2013).   57  R.O.  Keohane,  'International  Institutions:  Two  Approaches'  (1988)  32(4)  International  Studies  Quarterly,  pp.  379-­‐ 96.   58  O.  Young,  'The  Politics  of  International  Regime  Formation:  Managing  Natural  Resources  and  the  Environment'   (1989)  43(3)  International  Organization,  pp.  349-­‐75.   59  M.N.  Barnett  &  M.  Finnemore,  Rules  for  the  World:  International  Organizations  in  Global  Politics  (Cornell   University  Press,  2004).   60  G.  Auld,  Constructing  Private  Governance:  The  Rise  and  Evolution  of  Forest,  Coffee,  and  Fisheries  Certification   (Yale  University  Press,  2014).     discretion.61  By  contrast,  an  equivalent  change  by  an  international  organization  would  require  the  approval  of  all   member  states.62    Of  course,  state  preferences  are  not  immutable;  they  are  subject  to  change  for  any  number  of   reasons.  However,  these  changes  do  not  necessarily  translate  to  a  change  in  states’  participation  in  international   law  and  organizations.  The  greater  level  of  decision-­‐making  discretion  held  by  private  rulemaking  initiatives  mean   they  are  able  to  change  direction  and  react  more  quickly  than  an  equivalent  intergovernmental  process.  And  when   they  are  not  able  to  effect  such  changes,  they  can  simply  form  a  new  private  initiative.     Third,  forms  of  private  authority  are  often  less  highly  legalized  and  therefore  are  more  easily  changed  or   reversed.63    The  administrative  procedures  governing  private  regulators  dictate  how  rules  are  created  and  revised;   they  are  the  equivalent  to  collective-­‐choice  rules  in  public  authority.64  However,  private  governance  regulators   have  considerable  discretion  in  creating  and  amending  these  procedures.    Thus,  the  consensus  rules  that  apply  in   some  international  conventions  are  rare  in  private  authority,  and  very  few  private  rulemakers  have  procedures   that  allow  stakeholders  to  challenge  how  they  make  decisions.  The  lack  of  administrative  review,  or  stakeholder   standing,  is  a  sign  of  the  weak  legalization  of  accountability  mechanisms  for  enforcing  procedural  obligations.65   One  consequence  of  this  limited  legalization  is  that  private  regulators  can  more  easily  change  the  rules  in  response   to  new  information  or  circumstances  than  public  regulators.    Because  private  authority  is  generally  less  legalized,   we  posit  that  it  is  actually  more  flexible  in  terms  of  the  kinds  of  institutional  structures  it  can  create  at  the  outset.   It  has  greater  flexibility  to  design  institutions  that  can  respond  to  difficulties  encountered  among  public  institutions   in  the  regime  complex.  In  this  sense,  we  can  think  of  private  authority  as  politically  similar  to  soft  law,  where  actors   have  preferences  for  more  flexible  arrangements.66    It  may  also  mean  less  opposition  to  private  governance   arrangements,  since  the  targets  of  private  regulation  know  that  rules  can  be  amended.       What  do  these  three  characteristics  mean  for  interactions  between  public  and  private  authority  within  a  regime   complex?  We  identify  four  mechanisms  of  interaction  that  roughly  correspond  to  different  phases  of  the  policy   making  process.67    In  the  first  mechanism,  private  authority  serves  as  an  incubator  in  which  different  policy   approaches  can  exist  until  their  time  becomes  ripe.  The  second  mechanism  is  problem  reformulation,  where   private  actors  re-­‐frame  the  issue  in  a  way  that  overcomes  extant  political  obstacles.    This  happens  most  frequently   at  the  agenda-­‐setting  phase,  but  can  also  happen  during  policy  formulation  and  negotiation  phases,  so  that   approaches  are  viewed  as  vetted  and  appropriate  once  implementation  begins.      In  the  third  mechanism,  private   authority  serves  as  an  additional  means  through  which  to  diffuse  public  authority,  generally  in  the  implementation   phase.    Finally,  private  authority  may  provide  rules  that  are  eventually  incorporated  into  public  regulations.      We   describe  each  of  these  mechanisms  below.                                                                                                                                         61  Differences  in  the  governance  of  the  Marine  Stewardship  Council  (MSC)  and  the  Forest  Stewardship  Council   (FSC)  are  illustrative.  Broader  reviews  have  also  shown  that  many  private  regulatory  institutions  have  highly  varied   stakeholder  participation  or  engagement.  See  www.standardsmap.org.       62  K.W.  Abbott,  J.F.  Green  &  R.O.  Keohane,  ‘Organizational  Ecology  and  Institutional  Change  in  Global  Governance’   (2016)  70(Spring)  International  Organization,  pp.  1–31.   63  K.W.  Abbott  et  al.,  'The  Concept  of  Legalization'  (2000)  54(3)  International  Organization,  pp.  401-­‐20.   64  Young,  n.  58  above;  E.  Ostrom,  Governing  the  Commons  (Cambridge  University  Press,  1992).     65  See  L.H.  Gulbrandsen  ‘Accountability  Arrangements  in  Non-­‐state  Standards  Organizations:  Instrumental  Design   and  Imitation’  (2008)  15(4)  Organization,  pp.  563-­‐83;  L.H.  Gulbrandsen  &  G.  Auld  ‘Contested  Accountability  Logics   in  Evolving  Nonstate  Certification  for  Fisheries  Sustainability’  (2016)  16(2)  Global  Environmental  Politics     66  K.W.  Abbott  &  D.    Snidal,  'Hard  and  Soft  Law  in  International  Governance'  (2000)  54(3)  International   Organization,  pp.  421-­‐56.;  A.T.  Guzman  &  T.  L.  Meyer,  ‘International  Soft  Law’  (2010)  2(1)  Journal  of  Legal  Analysis,   pp.  171-­‐225.   67  Abbott  and  Snidal  refer  to  agenda-­‐setting,  negotiation,  implementation,  monitoring  and  enforcement  stages  of   the  policymaking  process,  see  K.W.  Abbott  &  D.  Snidal.  ‘The  Governance  Triangle:  Regulatory  Standards   Institutions  and  the  Shadow  of  the  State’,  in  W.  Mattli  &  N.  Woods  (eds)  The  Politics  of  Global  Regulation,   (Princeton  University  Press,  2009),  pp.  44–88.     4.2.  Idea  Incubator   The  first  way  in  which  private  authority  may  interact  with  public  authority  is  by  providing  an  'incubator'  for  ideas,   which  may  be  drawn  on  by  public  actors  at  some  point  in  the  future.    Much  like  Kingdon’s  primordial  soup  of  policy   ideas,68  private  authority  serves  as  a  space  in  which  ideas  can  sit  dormant  until  their  time  is  right.  As  others  have   argued,  private  authority  can  serve  as  an  arena  of  experimentation  and  learning,  open  to  projects  which  may  not   be  feasible  within  intergovernmental  fora.69    As  noted  above,  there  is  a  greater  potential  fluidity  in  private   institutions.    Hence,  private  authority  may  provide  an  opportunity  to  experiment  with  alternative  governance   solutions  outside  the  intergovernmental  arena.70    In  this  view,  private  authority  serves  as  a  space  for   experimenting  with  the  implementation  of  different  policies,  which  can  co-­‐exist  with  other  public  responses.    This   ensures  that  the  alternative  private  conceptualization  is  not  systematically  excluded  from  the  agenda  of  a  given   regime  complex;  rather,  it  can  remain  'dormant'  until  the  demand  for  a  new  solution  arises.71    When  thinking   about  addressing  some  of  the  dysfunctions  of  intergovernmental  processes,  such  a  latent  idea  can  serve  as  the   starting  point  for  a  broader  regime  transformation.72    In  essence,  private  authority  creates  an  alternative  approach   that  operates  alongside  existing  public  responses,  to  be  re-­‐inserted  if  and  when  public  institutions  are  more   inclined.         Idea  incubation  implies  that  individual  approaches  are  taken  from  private  authority  to  public  authority  in  a   piecemeal  way.  Unlike  problem  reformulation,  which  we  define  to  include  an  articulation  of  a  problem  and  a   proposed  set  of  institutionalized  solutions  (in  the  form  of  rules),  idea  incubation  can  be  about  smaller,  discrete   programmes  and  policies  such  as  implementation  of  transparency  measures  or  a  particular  approach  to  monitoring   or  accounting.    In  this  respect,  there  are  several  observable  implications  of  this  causal  mechanism.    First,  private   regulators  involved  with  idea  incubation  should  have  long  standing  activity  and  expertise  in  the  issue  area.     Second,  since  incubation  requires  some  trial  and  error,  we  should  expect  gradual  uptake  by  public  actors,  to   ensure  that  the  new  idea  works  before  wholesale  implementation.    Finally,  we  should  expect  the  uptake  of   incubated  ideas  through  processes  of  bricolage,73  where  the  ideas  are  adapted  to  fit  the  purpose  of  the  public   authority.       4.3.  Problem  Reformulation   Given  our  supposition  that  private  authority  has  greater  autonomy  from  the  strictures  of  intergovernmental   processes,  we  posit  that  when  faced  with  a  problem  that  has  reached  the  international  agenda,  private  authority   will  search  for  ways  to  frame  the  problem  that  will  garner  political  support.    Private  actors  learn  from  others’   actions,  sizing  up  the  political  landscape  as  well  as  the  political  constraints.  When  intergovernmental  efforts  stall,   private  actors  may  reframe  the  problem  to  alter  the  types  of  institutional  responses  and  the  political  winners  and                                                                                                                                       68  J.  Kingdon,  Agendas,  Alternatives,  and  Public  Policies  (HarperCollins  College  Publishers,  1995),  Chapter  6.   69  C.  Overdevest  &  J.  Zeitlin,  'Assembling  an  Experimentalist  Regime:  Transnational  Governance  Interactions  in  the   Forest  Sector'  (2014)  8(1)  Regulation  &  Governance,  pp.  22-­‐48.     70  Hoffmann,  n.  23  above,  broadens  this  argument  to  look  at  a  wide  range  of  climate  experiments  being   undertaken  at  different  governance  levels  and  both  by  public  and  private  institutions.  See  also  P.  Newell  &  M.   Paterson,  Climate  Capitalism:  Global  Warming  and  the  Transformation  of  the  Global  Economy    (Cambridge   University  Press,  2010).  The  experimentalist  literature  also  points  to  this  learning  approach;  however,  they  do  not   apply  it  specifically  to  private  actors.  See  C.F.  Sabel  &  J.  Zeitlin,  Experimentalist  Governance  in  the  European  Union:   Towards  a  New  Architecture    (Oxford  University  Press,  2008).     71  Kingdon  describes  this  as  the  process  through  which  solutions  become  coupled  to  problems.  Kingdon,  n.  68   above,  at  pp.  172-­‐5.   72  C.  Crouch  &  H.  Farrell,  'Breaking  the  Path  of  Institutional  Development?  Alternatives  to  the  New  Determinism'   (2004)  16(1)  Rationality  and  Society,  pp.  5-­‐43.   73  See  J.L.  Campbell  Institutional  Change  and  Globalization  (Princeton  University  Press,  2004).     losers.74    In  this  context,  we  expect  to  see  sources  of  private  authority  constructing  governance  arrangements  in   ways  that  explicitly  seek  to  respond  to  public  authority  and/or  to  address  rigidities  or  other  perceived  failures  in   intergovernmental  processes.    Moreover,  in  contrast  to  idea  incubation,  reformulation  of  a  problem  allows  for  the   use  of  different  rules,  modes  of  implementation,  and  approaches  for  monitoring  and  enforcement  to  address  a   problem.       We  note  that  reframing  need  not  be  the  result  of  public  governance  failures;  private  authority  may  offer  an   alternative  frame  for  a  problem  in  the  absence  of  political  gridlock.    However,  following  Stone,  we  believe  that   alternative  presentations  of  a  problem  are  a  baseline  condition  of  all  politics.75  Since  distribution  of  gains  and   losses  depends  on  how  the  problem  is  defined,  framing  is  a  persistent  condition  of  politics.    This  means  that   reframing  is  always  possible.    Nonetheless,  we  focus  on  problem  reformulation  here  as  a  result  of  previous  failures   of  public  governance.       This  mechanism  has  two  observable  implications.    First,  in  cases  where  public  governance  failure  occurs,  we  should   expect  to  see  the  emergence  of  alternative  rules  and  practices  promulgated  by  private  institutions  to  provide   solutions  to  the  same  problem  unsuccessfully  addressed  by  public  governance.  The  private,  alternative  rules  and   practices  should  differ  in  content  and  approach  from  their  publicly  developed  predecessors.  Second,  since  a  public   governance  failure  of  some  sort  has  already  occurred,  we  should  expect  to  see  reformulation  occur  in  the   rulemaking  and  implementation  stages  of  the  public  policymaking  process,  rather  than  in  agenda-­‐setting.       4.4.  Diffusion  of  Public  Authority     The  third  mechanism  through  which  private  authority  may  affect  the  evolution  of  the  regime  complex  is  by  serving   as  a  means  to  diffuse  public  authority.    In  this  view,  private  authority  actors  provide  additional  venues  for  the  use   and  adoption  of  public  rules.    Private  rule-­‐makers  may  voluntarily  adopt  public  rules,  and  apply  them  to  their  own   targets  of  regulation,  thus  indirectly  expanding  the  scope  of  public  authority.  Alternatively,  they  may  build  on   public  authority  by  coupling  their  rules  with  public  ones,  and  expanding  the  overall  scope  of  authority  in  the   regime  complex.    Through  this  re-­‐appropriation,  private  authority  may  serve  to  diffuse  and  reinforce  public   authority.76       Unlike  delegation,  where  the  state  grants  authority  to  private  actors  to  undertake  specific  activities,  diffusion   captures  situations  where  private  actors  work  autonomously  to  deepen  the  institutionalization  of  public  authority.     For  example,  Tarrow  suggests  that  IOs  serve  a  ‘coral  reef’  function,  attracting  advocates  to  the  locus  of  political   activity,  where  they  can  then  form  connections  among  themselves.77    In  our  version,  forms  of  public  authority   attract  private  actors,  who  in  turn  build  on  extant  public  rules.    Through  their  use  and  appropriation  of  public   authority,  private  actors  build  off  and  build  up  the  coral  reef,  potentially  strengthening  and  expanding  its  effects.     The  observable  implication  of  this  mechanism  is  the  substantive  overlap  between  public  and  private  rules.    If   private  authority  serves  as  a  diffuser  of  public  authority,  it  should  adopt  public  rules,  and  then  modify  them  in   ways  that  serve  their  goals.                                                                                                                                           74  On  strategic  approaches  to  problem  definition  in  the  policy  process,  see  D.A.  Rochefort  &  R.W.  Cobb,  The  Politics   of  Problem  Definition:  Shaping  the  Policy  Agenda    (University  Press  of  Kansas,  1994);  D.A.  Stone,  Policy  Paradox   and  Political  Reason    (Scott  Foresman  and  HarperCollins,  1988).   75  Stone,  n.  74  above.     76  For  similar  mechanisms,  see  Perez,  n.  16  above.  For  a  preliminary  application  of  this  model  to  the  interaction  of   public  and  private,  see:  O.  Perez,  ‘International  Environmental  Law  as  a  Field  of  Multi-­‐Polar  Governance:  The  Case   of  Private  Transnational  Environmental  Regulation’  (2012)  10  Santa  Clara  Journal  of  International  Law,  pp.  285-­‐ 296.   77  S.G.  Tarrow,  The  new  transnational  activism    (Cambridge  University  Press,  2005).   4.5  Incorporation  by  Reference   Incorporation  by  reference  is  the  final  mechanism  for  public-­‐private  interaction.78    It  refers  to  ‘the  practice  of   codifying  material  published  elsewhere  by  simply  referring  to  it  in  the  text  of  a  regulation’.79    Incorporation  by   reference  occurs  when  public  regulations  adopt  or  build  upon  private  rules.    We  view  this  as  a  strong  interaction,   in  the  sense  that  incorporation  by  reference  provides  a  new  institutional  framework  for  private  authority.           If  incorporation  by  reference  has  occurred,  then  we  should  expect  to  find  the  'fingerprints'  of  some  or  all  of  private   rules  in  public  regulations.    In  some  cases,  this  may  entail  specific  protocols,  but  in  others,  it  may  be  the  principles   upon  which  rules  are  based.         5.  EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS     In  order  to  explore  the  plausibility  of  our  suggested  mechanisms,  this  final  section  traces  the  development  of   private  authority  in  three  regime  complexes:  climate  change,  tropical  commodities,  and  fisheries.  These  have  been   selected  because  they  all  are  characterized  by  dense  institutional  landscapes  and  the  presence  of  private  authority.     Dense  landscapes  provide  more  opportunities  for  interaction  and,  obviously,  the  presence  of  private  authority  is  a   requirement  for  public-­‐private  interactions.  Thus  we  have  chosen  three  “most-­‐likely”  cases  to  develop  our   arguments  and  illustrate  how  the  mechanisms  function.    We  acknowledge  the  limitations  of  such  an  approach,  and   underscore  the  need  for  future  work  in  other  issue  areas  to  evaluate  the  robustness  of  our  arguments.       The  empirical  discussion  proceeds  in  two  steps.    We  first  focus  on  the  multilateral  institutions  that  serve  as  the   central  public  nodes  of  each  regime  complex  and  describe  the  ways  in  which  public  authority  has  failed  to  achieve   its  desired  outcomes.    We  offer  a  brief  assessment  of  the  shortcomings  of  the  public  node  of  each  regime  complex.     This  is  not  meant  to  be  a  rigorous  analysis  of  institutional  processes  or  outcomes.  Rather,  our  aim  is  to  identify   opportunities  for  private  authority  to  contribute  to  the  problem-­‐solving  capacity  of  the  regime  complex.  We  then   turn  to  the  interactions  of  private  authority  with  each  major  public  node,  since  these  are  the  focal  point  for  rule-­‐ making  activities  within  a  given  regime  complex.    If  private  authority  serves  as  an  idea  incubator,  it  should  provide   policies  or  proposals  that  constitute  the  basis  for  experimentation  in  the  public  realm.    If  it  provides  a   reformulation  of  the  problem,  private  regimes  will  try  to  circumvent  public  focal  points  by  creating  alternative   rules  to  address  the  problem.    In  the  diffusion  mechanism,  we  should  expect  to  see  private  authority  adopting,  and   then  amending  public  rules.    Finally,  in  instances  of  incorporation  by  reference,  we  expect  that  public  regulations   will  appropriate  parts  of  private  rules.         5.1  The  Cases   Climate  Change.    The  UN  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change  (UNFCCC)80  provides  the  international  legal   foundation  for  the  current  climate  regime  complex.    Parties  agree  to  track  and  report  their  greenhouse  gas  (GHG)   emissions  and,  in  the  case  of  developed  nations,  to  create  domestic  policies  to  reduce  emissions.    The  Kyoto   Protocol81  is  the  second  major  public  node  at  the  centre  of  the  regime  complex.    It  required  developed  countries  to   meet  specific  reduction  targets,  which  they  could  achieve  through  domestic  measures  as  well  as  international   market  mechanisms.    Although  it  has  waned  in  political  importance,  the  Protocol  casts  a  long  shadow  over  the                                                                                                                                       78  We  gratefully  acknowledge  the  input  of  an  anonymous  reviewer  in  this  discussion.   79  E.  Bremer,  ‘Incorporation  by  Reference  in  an  Open-­‐Government  Age’  (2013)  36(1)  Harvard  Journal  of  Law  Public   Policy,  133-­‐210  at  p.  131.   80  New  York,  NY  (US),  9  May  1992,  in  force  21  Mar.  1994,  available  at:  http://unfccc.int.   81  Kyoto  Protocol  to  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change,  Kyoto  (Japan),  11  Dec.   1997,  in  force  16  Feb.  2005,  available  at:  http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.   current  and  future  climate  regime.    The  recent  Paris  Agreement82  has  broken  down  the  longstanding  division   between  developed  and  developing  countries,  though  the  main  provisions  of  the  UNFCCC  still  hold.     The  critiques  of  the  Kyoto  Protocol  are  numerous:  the  required  reductions  were  too  small  to  have  any  measurable   effect  on  climate  change,  the  compliance  mechanism  was  arcane  and  counterintuitive,  and  the  Clean  Development   Mechanism  (CDM)  fundamentally  unworkable.83    In  short,  the  Protocol  failed  to  achieve  even  its  own  modest   goals.     The  recent  Paris  Agreement  has  been  hailed  as  a  breakthrough  in  climate  politics.84    It  has  erased  the  longstanding   division  between  the  developed  and  developing  world.    It  has  adopted  a  weak  legal  form,  which  counter-­‐intuitively   has  allowed  for  more  ambitious  goals.    Indeed,  collectively,  states  have  pledged  to  limit  temperature  increase  to   well  below  2  degrees  Celsius.    It  has  also  institutionalized  a  platform  for  ongoing  non-­‐state  actor  involvement.     Pessimists  maintain  that  despite  state  commitments  to  reduce  GHG  emissions  and  adopt  other  climate-­‐friendly   policies,  the  gap  between  proposed  national  actions  (as  set  out  in  Nationally  Determined  Contributions  (NDCs))   and  the  2-­‐degree  goal  is  considerable—and  rising.85     Tropical  Commodities.  The  set  of  institutions  arising  to  deal  with  terms  of  trade  for  basic  commodities  is  more   fragmented  than  in  the  case  of  climate  change,  though  it  centres  around  the  UN  Conference  on  Trade  and   Development  (UNCTAD).    UNCTAD  supplanted  the  earlier  Interim  Coordination  Committee  for  International   Commodity  Agreements,  and  focuses  on  promoting  development  by  emphasizing  market  regulations  to  control   commodity  supplies  and  prices  to  enhance  export  earnings  for  developing  countries.86    This  approach  was   reinforced  in  1976  when  UNCTAD  established  the  Integrated  Programme  for  Commodities  (IPC)  charged  with   overseeing  the  negotiation  of  commodity  agreements  for  18  goods,  including  tropical  timber.87         Efforts  to  negotiate  and  maintain  commodity  agreements  met  with  varied  success.    Sugar  and  tin  agreements  were   adopted  in  1954.    A  coffee  agreement  was  adopted  in  1962,  and  cocoa  and  natural  rubber  agreements  were   adopted  in  1980  and  1981  respectively.    Tropical  timber  followed  in  1983.88    But  just  as  the  International  Tropical   Timber  Agreement  (ITTA)89  emerged,  the  other  agreements  diminished  in  scope  or  broke  down  completely.  By   1999,  all  major  commodities  agreements  had  either  collapsed  or  they  had  been  redirected  away  from  regulating   commodity  markets  through  quotas  to  focusing  on ...
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Hey, Please view the attached file.Thanks again, it has been nice working with you, hope to interact more. In case of anything, please do ask.Warm regards, Kennethrichie.

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Article name reference is:
Green, J. F., & Auld, G. (2016). Unbundling the Regime Complex: The Effects of Private
Authority. Transnational Environmental Law, 1-26.

This summary is one that is helpful in the identification and the explanation of the patterns
that are quite less crucial when conducting studies concerning the single regimes.

1. Private authorities are normally put in place when there are gaps in the public
authorities (Green & Auld, 2016).
2. ...


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