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5
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Feminist
Theory
http://fty.sagepub.com/
A phenomenology of whiteness
Sara Ahmed
Feminist Theory 2007 8: 149
DOI: 10.1177/1464700107078139
The online version of this article can be found at:
http://fty.sagepub.com/content/8/2/149
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What is This?
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149
FT
A phenomenology of whiteness
Sara Ahmed Goldsmiths College, University of London
Feminist Theory
Copyright © 2007
SAGE Publications
(London, Los Angeles,
New Delhi, and
Singapore)
vol. 8(2): 149–168.
1464–7001
DOI: 10.1177/1464700107078139
http://fty.sagepub.com
Abstract The paper suggests that we can usefully approach whiteness
through the lens of phenomenology. Whiteness could be described as an
ongoing and unfinished history, which orientates bodies in specific
directions, affecting how they ‘take up’ space, and what they ‘can do’.
The paper considers how whiteness functions as a habit, even a bad
habit, which becomes a background to social action. The paper draws
on experiences of inhabiting a white world as a non-white body, and
explores how whiteness becomes worldly through the noticeability of
the arrival of some bodies more than others. A phenomenology of
whiteness helps us to notice institutional habits; it brings what is
behind to the surface in a certain way.
keywords bodies, habits, institutions, orientations, phenomenology,
space, whiteness
The field of critical whiteness studies is full of an almost habitual anxiety
about what it means to take up the category of ‘whiteness’ as a primary
object of knowledge. Richard Dyer for instance admits to being disturbed
by the very idea of what he calls white studies: ‘My blood runs cold at the
thought that talking about whiteness could lead to the development of
something called “White Studies”’ (1997: 10). Or as Fine, Weis, Powell and
Wong describe: ‘we worry that in our desire to create spaces to speak, intellectually or empirically, about whiteness, we may have reified whiteness
as a fixed category of experience; that we have allowed it to be treated as
a monolith, in the singular, as an “essential something”’ (1997: xi). Does
speaking about whiteness allow it to become an ‘essential something’? If
whiteness gains currency by being unnoticed, then what does it mean to
notice whiteness? What does making the invisible marks of privilege more
visible actually do? Could whiteness studies produce an attachment to
whiteness by holding it in place as an object? Such questions are addressed
by scholars not in order to suspend the project of whiteness studies, but to
consider what it means for a project of critique to be complicit with its
object.
We could say that any project that aims to dismantle or challenge the
categories that are made invisible through privilege is bound to participate
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Feminist Theory 8(2)
in the object of its critique. We might even expect such projects to fail, and
be prepared to witness this failure as productive. And yet, we can get stuck
in this position, endlessly caught up in describing what we are doing to
whiteness, rather than what whiteness is doing. In this paper I want to
consider whiteness as a category of experience that disappears as a
category through experience, and how this disappearance makes whiteness
‘worldly’. To put this simply, what I offer here is a vocabulary for redescribing how whiteness becomes ‘worldly’. Whiteness describes the very
‘what’ that coheres as a world. My aim is not to bypass the risk of reifying
the category of whiteness, but to re-locate that risk, so that it is not seen as
originating with ‘our desire to create spaces to speak, intellectually or
empirically to speak about whiteness’ (Fine et al., 1997: xi), which is not
in any way to dismiss this concern. We can consider how whiteness
becomes worldly as an effect of reification. Reification is not then something we do to whiteness, but something whiteness does, or to be more
precise, what allows whiteness to be done.
In this paper, I re-pose the question of whiteness as a phenomenological
issue, as a question of how whiteness is lived as a background to experience.
In so doing, I will consider what ‘whiteness’ does without assuming whiteness as an ontological given, but as that which has been received, or become
given, over time. Whiteness could be described as an ongoing and unfinished history, which orientates bodies in specific directions, affecting
how they ‘take up’ space. In formulating my argument, I follow from the
work of Frantz Fanon, and also philosophers who have sought to offer a
‘phenomenology of race’, such as David Macey (1999), Linda Martin Alcoff
(1999) and Lewis R. Gordon (1995, 1999). Within this literature, a starting
point is the refutation of nominalism and the idea that race does not exist,
or is not real. Such philosophers would certainly accept that race is
‘invented’ by science as if it were a property of bodies, or of groups. But they
also show that it does not follow from such a critique that race does not exist.
Phenomenology helps us to show how whiteness is an effect of racialization, which in turn shapes what it is that bodies ‘can do’. In this paper, I
offer a phenomenology of whiteness as a way of exploring how whiteness
is ‘real’, material and lived. I will draw on experiences of inhabiting a white
world as a non-white body, and explore how whiteness becomes worldly
through the noticeability of the arrival of some bodies more than others.
Orientations
We can begin by considering how whiteness involves a form of orientation.
If we start with the point of orientations, we find that orientations are about
starting points. As Husserl describes in the second volume of Ideas:
If we consider the characteristic way in which the Body presents itself and do
the same for things, then we find the following situation: each Ego has its own
domain of perceptual things and necessarily perceives the things in a certain
orientation. The things appear and do so from this or that side, and in this mode
of appearing is included irrevocably a relation to a here and its basic directions.
(1989: 165–6)
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Ahmed: A phenomenology of whiteness
Orientations are about how we begin, how we proceed from ‘here’. Husserl
relates the questions of ‘this or that side’ to the point of ‘here’, which he
also describes as the zero-point of orientation, the point from which the
world unfolds, and which makes what is ‘there’ over ‘there’. It is from this
point that the differences between ‘this side’ and ‘that side’ matter. It is
only given that we are ‘here’ at this point, that near and far are lived as
relative markers of distance. Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann also
describe orientation as a question of one’s starting point: ‘The place in
which I find myself, my actual “here”, is the starting point for my orientation in space’ (1974: 36). The starting point for orientation is the point
from which the world unfolds: the ‘here’ of the body, and the ‘where’ of its
dwelling. Given this, orientations are about the intimacy of bodies and
their dwelling places.
If orientations are about how we begin from ‘here’, then they involve
unfolding. At what point does the world unfold? Or at what point does
Husserl’s world unfold? Let’s start where he starts, in his first volume of
Ideas, which is with the world as it is given ‘from the natural standpoint’.
Such a world is the world we are ‘in’, where things take place around me,
and are placed around me: ‘I am aware of a world, spread out in space
endlessly’ (1969: 101). Phenomenology asks us to be aware of the ‘what’
that is ‘around’. The world that is ‘around’ has already taken certain
shapes, as the very form of what is ‘more and less’ familiar. As Husserl
describes:
For me real objects are there, definite, more or less familiar, agreeing with what
is actually perceived without being themselves perceived or even intuitively
present. I can let my attention wander from the writing-table I have just seen or
observed, through the unseen portions of the room behind my back to the
veranda into the garden, to the children in the summer house, and so forth, to
all the objects concerning which I precisely ‘know’ that they are there and
yonder in my immediate co-perceived surroundings. (1969: 101)
The familiar world begins with the writing table, which is in ‘the room’.
We can name this room as Husserl’s study, as the room in which he writes.
It is from here that the world unfolds. He begins with the writing table, and
then turns to other parts of this room, those which are, as it were, behind
him. We are reminded that what he can see in the first place depends on
which way he is facing. In Husserl’s writing the familiar slides into the
familial; the home is a family home as a residence that is inhabited by
children. In a way, the children who are ‘yonder’ point to what is made
available through memory, or even habitual knowledge: they are sensed as
being there, behind him, even if they are not seen by him at this moment
in time. The family home provides, as it were, the background against
which an object (the writing table) appears in the present, in front of him.
The family home is only ever co-perceived, and allows the philosopher to
do his work.
By reading the objects that appear in Husserl’s writing, we get a sense of
how being directed towards some objects and not others involves a more
general orientation towards the world. The direction you face is not simply
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casual: the fact that Husserl faces the writing table is a sign of his occupation.1 So Husserl’s gaze might fall on the paper, which is on the table,
given that he is sitting at the desk, the writing table, and not at another
kind of table, such as the kitchen table. Such other tables would not,
perhaps, be the ‘right’ kind of tables for the making of philosophy. The
writing table might be the table ‘for him’, the one that would provide the
right kind of horizontal surface for the philosopher. As Ann Banfield
observes, ‘Tables and chairs, things nearest to hand for the sedentary
philosopher, who comes to occupy chairs of philosophy, are the furniture
of that “room of one’s own” from which the real world is observed’ (2000:
66). Tables are ‘near to hand’, along with chairs, as the furniture that
secures the very ‘place’ of philosophy. The use of tables shows us the very
orientation of philosophy in part by showing us what is proximate to the
body of the philosopher, or ‘what’ the philosopher comes into contact
‘with’.
What you come into contact with is shaped by what you do: bodies are
orientated when they are occupied in time and space. Bodies are shaped
by this contact with objects. What gets near is both shaped by what bodies
do, and in turn affects what bodies can do. The nearness of the philosopher to his paper, his ink and his table is not simply about ‘where’ he
does his work, and the spaces he inhabits, as if the ‘where’ could be separated from ‘what’ he does. The ‘what’ that he does is what puts certain
objects within reach, just as it keeps other things in the background. What
comes into view, or what is within our horizon, is not a matter of what we
find here or there, or even where we find ourselves, as we move here, or
there. What is reachable is determined precisely by orientations we have
already taken. Or we could say that orientations are about the directions
we take that put some things and not others in our reach.
Whiteness as an orientation
How then does whiteness involve orientation? We can turn to Frantz
Fanon’s work, which directly addresses the question of the relation
between phenomenology and race. Take the following description:
And then the occasion arose when I had to meet the white man’s eyes. An
unfamiliar weight burdened me. The real world challenged my claims. In the
white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his
bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity. It is a
third-person consciousness. The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain
uncertainty. I know that if I want to smoke, I shall have to reach out my right
arm and take the pack of cigarettes lying at the other end of the table. The
matches, however, are in the drawer on the left, and I shall have to lean back
slightly. And all these movements are made not out of habit, but out of implicit
knowledge. (Fanon, 1986: 110–11)
Fanon is describing what seems to be a casual scene. By speculating on
what he would have to do if he wants to smoke, Fanon describes his body
as ready for action. The feeling of desire, in this case, the desire to smoke,
leads the body to reach towards ‘the other end of the table’, in order to
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Ahmed: A phenomenology of whiteness
grasp an object. Such a performance is an orientation towards the future,
insofar as the action is also the expression of a wish or intention. As Fanon
suggests, bodies do this work, or they have this capacity to work, only
given the familiarity of the world they inhabit: to put it simply, they know
where to find things. ‘Doing things’ depends not so much on intrinsic
capacity, or even upon dispositions or habits, but on the ways in which the
world is available as a space for action, a space where things ‘have a certain
place’ or are ‘in place’.
And yet, Fanon implies that this scene is far from casual. Sure, he might
find the cigarettes, and the matches, although as we can see, he does not
simply happen upon them. This example is not really about a happening.
It follows, after all, an extraordinary claim. The claim takes the form of an
argument with phenomenology. As he puts it later on this page:
Below the corporeal schema I had sketched out a historic-racial schema. The
elements that I used had been provided for me not by ‘residual sensations and
perceptions primarily of a tactile, vestibular, kinaesthetic, and visual character,’
but by the other, the white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details.
(Fanon, 1986: 111)2
In other words, Fanon is suggesting that attending to the corporeal schema
is not sufficient as it is not made up of the right kind of elements. Where
phenomenology attends to the tactile, vestibular, kinaesthetic and visual
character of embodied reality, Fanon asks us to think of the ‘historic-racial’
schema, which is ‘below it’. In other words, the racial and historical dimensions are beneath the surface of the body described by phenomenology,
which becomes, by virtue of its own orientation, a way of thinking the body
that has surface appeal.
For the black man, Fanon implies, we have to look beyond the surface.
He writes: ‘I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were
legends, stories, history, and above all historicity, which I had learnt about
from Jaspers. Then, assailed at various points, the corporeal schema
crumbled, its place taken by the racial epidermal schema’ (1986: 112,
second emphasis mine). Clearly, then, Fanon’s example of what he would
do if he wanted to smoke, which is an example of being orientated towards
an object, is a description of a body-at-home. Such a body extends into
space through how it reaches towards objects that are already ‘in place’.
Fanon’s example shows the body before it is racialized, or made black
by becoming the object of the hostile white gaze. In this sense, for Fanon,
race ‘interrupts’ the corporeal schema. Alternatively, we could say that ‘the
corporeal schema’ is already racialized; in other words, race does not just
interrupt such a schema, but structures its mode of operation. The
corporeal schema is of a ‘body-at-home’. If the world is made white, then
the body-at-home is one that can inhabit whiteness. As Fanon’s work
shows, after all, bodies are shaped by histories of colonialism, which
makes the world ‘white’, a world that is inherited, or which is already
given before the point of an individual’s arrival. This is the familiar world,
the world of whiteness, as a world we know implicitly. Colonialism makes
the world ‘white’, which is of course a world ‘ready’ for certain kinds of
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bodies, as a world that puts certain objects within their reach. Bodies
remember such histories, even when we forget them. Such histories, we
might say, surface on the body, or even shape how bodies surface (see
Ahmed, 2004a). Race then does become a social as well as bodily given, or
what we receive from others as an inheritance of this history.
It is useful to recall that inheritance is crucial to the Marxist conception
of history. For Marx, although we ‘make history’, this making is shaped by
inheritance: ‘Human beings make their own history, but they do not make
it arbitrarily in conditions chosen by themselves, but in conditions alwaysalready given and inherited from the past’ (cited in Balibar, 2002: 8). If the
conditions in which we live are inherited from the past, they are ‘passed
down’ not only in blood or in genes, but also through the work or labour
of generations. If history is made ‘out of’ what is passed down, then history
is made out of what is given not only in the sense of that which is ‘alwaysalready’ there before our arrival, but in the active sense of the gift: as a gift,
history is what we receive upon arrival.
Such an inheritance can be re-thought in terms of orientations: we inherit
the reachability of some objects, those that are ‘given’ to us, or at least made
available to us, within the ‘what’ that is around. I am not suggesting here
that ‘whiteness’ is one such ‘reachable object’, but that whiteness is an
orientation that puts certain things within reach. By objects, we would
include not just physical objects, but also styles, capacities, aspirations,
techniques, habits. Race becomes, in this model, a question of what is
within reach, what is available to perceive and to do ‘things’ with.
The world too is inherited as a dwelling. Whiteness might be what is
‘here’, as a point from which the world unfolds, which is also the point of
inheritance. If whiteness is inherited, then it is also reproduced. Whiteness
gets reproduced by being seen as a form of positive residence: as if it were
a property of persons, cultures and places. Whiteness becomes, you could
even say, ‘like itself’, as a form of family resemblance. It is no accident that
race has been understood through familial metaphors in the sense that
‘races’ come to be seen as having ‘shared ancestry’ (Fenton, 2003: 2). Race
in this model ‘extends’ the family form; other members of the race are ‘like
a family’, just as the family is defined in racial terms. The analogy works
powerfully to produce a particular version of race and a particular version
of family, predicated on ‘likeness’, where likeness becomes a matter of
‘shared attributes’.
What does it mean for attributes to be shared? Whilst sharing is often
described as participation in something (we share this or that thing, or we
have this or that thing in common), and even as the joy of taking part,
sharing also involves division, or the ownership of parts. To have a share
in something is to be invested in the value of that thing. The word itself
we might note comes from the Old English word scearu, which refers to
cutting or division. So the word ‘share’ which seems to point to commonality depends on both cutting and division, where things are cut up and
distributed amongst others.
In everyday talk about such family connections, likeness is a sign of
inheritance; to look like a family is to ‘look alike’. I want to suggest another
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Ahmed: A phenomenology of whiteness
way of thinking about the relationship between inheritance and likeness:
we inherit proximities (and hence orientations), as our point of entry into
a familial space, as ‘a part’ of a new generation. Such an inheritance in turn
generates ‘likeness’. This argument builds upon my claim in The Cultural
Politics of Emotion (2004a), where I suggest that likeness is an effect of
proximity or contact, which is then ‘taken up’ as a sign of inheritance.
Here, I would also argue that likeness is an effect of proximity, rather than
its cause, with an additional claim: we inherit proximities, although this
is an inheritance that can be refused, and which does not fully determine
a course of action. To suggest that we inherit proximities is also to point
to how that past that is ‘behind’ our arrival restricts as well as enables
human action: if we are shaped by ‘what’ we come into contact with, then
we are also shaped by what we inherit, which de-limits the objects that we
might come into contact with.
I would not wish to dismiss the discourse of ‘family resemblance’, but
to offer a different account of its powerful function as a legislative device.
One of the sayings that has always spoken to me is ‘like two peas in a pod’.
Anyone who has shelled peas would know of course that peas are not only
alike and that seeing them as being alike is already to overlook some
important differences. But it’s the pod and not the peas that interests me
here. This saying suggests for me that likeness is as an effect of the proximity of shared residence. This is not just an argument about nurture over
nature (that the pod is a nurturing device), as this way of thinking relies
on an overly simple logic of causality (the pod causes the peas). Rather the
very proximity of pea-to-pea, as well as the intimacy of the dwelling, which
surrounds them like a skin, shapes the very form of the peas. Likeness is
not then ‘in’ the peas, let alone ‘in’ the pod, but is an effect of their contiguity, of how they are touched by each other and envelop each other. Or if
we say that the peas ‘share’ the pod, then we can immediately see how the
‘pod’ does not simply generate what is ‘shared’ in the sense of what is in
common, but also what gets divided or distributed into parts.
In the case of race, we would say that bodies come to be seen as ‘alike’,
as for instance ‘sharing whiteness’ as a ‘characteristic’, as an effect of such
proximities, where certain ‘things’ are already ‘in place’. The familial is in
a way like the ‘pod’, as a shared space of dwelling, in which things are
shaped by their proximity to other things. ‘The familial’ is after all about
‘the familiar’: this is the world we implicitly know, as a world that is organized in specific ways. It is the world Fanon speaks of when he describes
the ‘implicit knowledge’ we might have of ‘where things are’, as a knowledge that is exercised by orientations towards objects. Objects are familiar,
for sure, but familiarity is also about our capacity to use objects, how they
are within reach as objects we do things with. To think of this implicit
knowledge as inherited is to think about how we inherit a relation to place
and to placement: at home, things are not done a certain way, but the
domestic ‘puts things’ in their place. Whiteness is inherited through the
very placement of things.
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Habit worlds
But how does whiteness hold its place? In this section I explore how whiteness ‘holds’ through habits. Public spaces take shape through the habitual
actions of bodies, such that the contours of space could be described as
habitual. I turn to the concept of habits to theorize not so much how bodies
acquire their shape, but how spaces acquire the shape of the bodies that
‘inhabit’ them. We could think about the ‘habit’ in the ‘in-habit’.
We need to examine not only how bodies become white, or fail to do so,
but also how spaces can take on the very ‘qualities’ that are given to such
bodies. In a way, we can think about the habitual as a form of inheritance.
It is not so much that we inherit habits, although we can do so: rather the
habitual can be thought of as a bodily and spatial form of inheritance.
As Pierre Bourdieu (1977) shows us, we can link habits to what is unconscious, and routine, or what becomes ‘second nature’.3 To describe
whiteness as a habit, as second nature, is to suggest that whiteness is what
bodies do, where the body takes the shape of the action. Habits are not
‘exterior’ to bodies, as things that can be ‘put on’ or ‘taken off’. If habits are
about what bodies do, in ways that are repeated, then they might also shape
what bodies can do. For Merleau-Ponty, the habitual body is a body that
acts in the world, where actions bring other things near. As he puts it:
my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or
possible task. And indeed its spatiality is not, like that of external objects or like
that of ‘spatial sensations’, a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation.
If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are
stressed and the whole of the body trails behind them like the tail of a comet. It
is not that I am unaware of the whereabouts of my shoulder or back, but these
are simply swallowed up in the position of my hands, and my whole posture
can be read so to speak in the pressure they exert on the table. (2002: 114–5,
emphasis in original)
Here, the directedness of the body towards an action (which we have
discovered also means an orientation towards certain kinds of objects) is
how the body ‘appears’.4 The body is ‘habitual’ not only in the sense that
it performs actions repeatedly, but in the sense that when it performs such
actions, it does not command attention, apart from at the ‘surface’ where
it ‘encounters’ an external object (such as the hands that lean on the desk
or table, which feel the ‘stress’ of the action). In other words, the body is
habitual insofar as it ‘trails behind’ in the performing of action, insofar as
it does not pose ‘a problem’ or an obstacle to the action, or is not ‘stressed’
by ‘what’ the action encounters. For Merleau-Ponty, the habitual body does
not get in the way of an action: it is behind the action.
I want to suggest here that whiteness could be understood as ‘the behind’.
White bodies are habitual insofar as they ‘trail behind’ actions: they do not
get ‘stressed’ in their encounters with objects or others, as their whiteness
‘goes unnoticed’. Whiteness would be what lags behind; white bodies do not
have to face their whiteness; they are not orientated ‘towards’ it, and this
‘not’ is what allows whiteness to cohere, as that which bodies are orientated
around. When bodies ‘lag behind’, then they extend their reach.
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Ahmed: A phenomenology of whiteness
It becomes possible to talk about the whiteness of space given the very
accumulation of such ‘points’ of extension. Spaces acquire the ‘skin’ of the
bodies that inhabit them. What is important to note here is that it is not just
bodies that are orientated. Spaces also take shape by being orientated
around some bodies, more than others. We can also consider ‘institutions’
as orientation devices, which take the shape of ‘what’ resides within them.
After all, institutions provide collective or public spaces. When we describe
institutions as ‘being’ white (institutional whiteness), we are pointing to
how institutional spaces are shaped by the proximity of some bodies and
not others: white bodies gather, and cohere to form the edges of such spaces.
When I walk into university meetings that is just what I encounter. Sometimes I get used to it. At one conference we organize, four black feminists
arrive. They all happen to walk into the room at the same time. Yes, we do
notice such arrivals. The fact that we notice such arrivals tells us more about
what is already in place than it does about ‘who’ arrives. Someone says: ‘it
is like walking into a sea of whiteness’. This phrase comes up, and it hangs
in the air. The speech act becomes an object, which gathers us around.
So yes they walk into the room, and I notice that they were not there
before, as a retrospective reoccupation of a space that I already inhabited.
I look around, and re-encounter the sea of whiteness. As many have argued,
whiteness is invisible and unmarked, as the absent centre against which
others appear only as deviants, or points of deviation (Dyer, 1997;
Frankenberg, 1993). Whiteness is only invisible for those who inhabit it,
or those who get so used to its inhabitance that they learn not to see it,
even when they are not it (see Ahmed, 2004b). Spaces are orientated
‘around’ whiteness, insofar as whiteness is not seen. We do not face whiteness; it ‘trails behind’ bodies, as what is assumed to be given. The effect of
this ‘around whiteness’ is the institutionalization of a certain ‘likeness’,
which makes non-white bodies feel uncomfortable, exposed, visible,
different, when they take up this space.
The institutionalization of whiteness involves work: the institution
comes to have a body as an effect of this work. It is important that we do
not reify institutions, by presuming they are simply given and that they
decide what we do. Rather, institutions become given, as an effect of the
repetition of decisions made over time, which shapes the surface of institutional spaces. Institutions involve the accumulation of past decisions
about how to allocate resources, as well as ‘who’ to recruit. Recruitment
functions as a technology for the reproduction of whiteness. We can recall
that Althusser’s model of ideology is based on recruitment:
ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the
individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it
transforms them all) by the very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most
commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey you there.’ (1971: 163,
emphasis in original)
The subject is recruited by turning around, which immediately associates
recruitment with following a direction, as the direction that takes the line
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of an address. To recruit can suggest both to renew and to restore. The
act of recruitment, of bringing new bodies in, restores the body of the
institution, which depends on gathering bodies to cohere as a body.
Becoming a ‘part’ of an institution, which we can consider the demand
to share in it, or even have a share of it, hence requires not only that one
inhabits its buildings, but also that we follow its line: we might start by
saying ‘we’; by mourning its failures and rejoicing in its successes; by
reading the documents that circulate within it, creating vertical and horizontal lines of communication; by the chance encounters we have with
those who share its grounds. To be recruited is not only to join, but to
sign up to a specific institution: to inhabit it by turning around as a return
of its address.
Furthermore, recruitment creates the very ego ideal of the institution,
what it imagines as the ideal that working ‘at’ the institution means
working towards or even what it imagines expresses its ‘character’. As
scholars in critical management studies have shown us, organizations tend
to recruit in their own image (Singh, 2002). The ‘hey you’ is not just
addressed to anybody: some bodies more than others are recruited, those
that can inherit the ‘character’ of the organization, by returning its image
with a reflection that reflects back that image, what we could call a ‘good
likeness’. It is not just that there is a desire for whiteness that leads to white
bodies getting in. Rather whiteness is what the institution is orientated
‘around’, so that even bodies that might not appear white still have to
inhabit whiteness, if they are to get ‘in’.
Institutions too involve orientation devices, which keep things in place.
The affect of such placement could be described as a form of comfort. To
be orientated, or to be at home in the world, is also to feel a certain comfort:
we might only notice comfort as an affect when we lose it, when we
become uncomfortable. The word ‘comfort’ suggests well-being and satisfaction, but it can also suggest an ease and easiness. Comfort is about an
encounter between more than one body, which is the promise of a ‘sinking’
feeling. To be comfortable is to be so at ease with one’s environment that
it is hard to distinguish where one’s body ends and the world begins. One
fits, and by fitting the surfaces of bodies disappears from view. White
bodies are comfortable as they inhabit spaces that extend their shape. The
bodies and spaces ‘point’ towards each other, as a ‘point’ that is not seen
as it is also ‘the point’ from which we see.
In other words, whiteness may function as a form of public comfort by
allowing bodies to extend into spaces that have already taken their
shape. Those spaces are lived as comfortable as they allow bodies to fit
in; the surfaces of social space are already impressed upon by the shape
of such bodies. We can think of the chair beside the table. It might
acquire its shape by the repetition of some bodies inhabiting it: we can
almost see the shape of bodies as ‘impressions’ on the surface. So spaces
extend bodies and bodies extend spaces. The impressions of the surface
function as traces of such extensions. The surfaces of social as well as
bodily space ‘record’ the repetition of acts, and the ‘passing by’ of some
and not others.
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It can be problematic to describe whiteness as something we ‘pass
through’: such an argument could make whiteness into something
substantive, as if whiteness has an ontological force of its own, which
compels us, and even ‘drives’ action. It is important to remember that
whiteness is not reducible to white skin, or even to ‘something’ we can
have or be, even if we pass through whiteness. When we talk about a ‘sea
of whiteness’ or ‘white space’ we are talking about the repetition of the
passing by of some bodies and not others, for sure. But non-white bodies
do inhabit white spaces; we know this. Such bodies are made invisible
when we see spaces as being white, at the same time as they become hypervisible when they do not pass, which means they ‘stand out’ and ‘stand
apart’. You learn to fade into the background, but sometimes you can’t or
you don’t. The moments when the body appears ‘out of place’ are moments
of political and personal trouble. As Nirmal Puwar shows us, when bodies
arrive who seem ‘out of place’ in such institutional worlds we have a
process of disorientation: people blink, and look again. The proximity of
such bodies makes familiar spaces seem strange: ‘People are “thrown”
because a whole world view is jolted’ (Puwar, 2004: 43).
Bodies stand out when they are out of place. Such standing re-confirms
the whiteness of the space. Whiteness is an effect of what coheres rather
than the origin of coherence. The effect of repetition is not then simply
about a body count: it is not simply a matter of how many bodies are ‘in’.
Rather, what is repeated is a very style of embodiment, a way of inhabiting space, which claims space by the accumulation of gestures of ‘sinking’
into that space. If whiteness allows bodies to move with comfort through
space, and to inhabit the world as if it were home, then those bodies take
up more space. Such bodies are shaped by motility, and may even take the
shape of that motility.
It is here that we can begin to complicate the relationship between
motility and what I call ‘institutional lines’. Some bodies, even those that
pass as white, might still be ‘out of line’ with the institutions they inhabit.
After all, institutions are meeting points, but they are also where different
lines intersect, where lines cross with other lines, to create and divide
spaces. We can recall here the importance of ‘intersectionality’ to black
feminist theory. Given that relationships of power ‘intersect’, how we
inhabit a given category depends on how we inhabit others (Lorde, 1984:
114–23; Brewer, 1993; Collins, 1998; Smith, 1998). There are ‘points’ in
such intersections, as the ‘points’ where lines meet. A body is such a
meeting point. To follow one line (say whiteness) will not necessarily get
you too many points, if you do not or cannot follow others. How you can
move along institutional lines is affected by other lines that you follow.
What happens in these ‘points’ of intersection – whether we are knocked
off course if we do not follow a given line – might not be determined before
we arrive at that point, and might also depend on what else is behind us.
In a way, whiteness itself is a straightening device: bodies disappear into
the ‘sea of whiteness’ when they ‘line up’. This is not to make ‘the fit’
between bodies and spaces natural: white bodies can line up, only if they
pass, by approximating whiteness, by ‘being like’. To say that all bodies
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have to pass as white is not to neutralize the difference between bodies.
Whiteness is also a matter of what is behind, as a form of inheritance,
which affects how bodies arrive in spaces and worlds. We accumulate
behinds, just as what is behind is an effect of past accumulations. Some of
us have more behind us than others at the very moment in which we arrive
into the world. If you inherit class privilege, for instance, then you have
more resources behind you, which can be converted into capital, into what
can ‘propel’ you forward and up. Becoming white as an institutional line
is closely related to the vertical promise of class mobility: you can move
up only by approximating the habitus of the white bourgeois body (see
Skeggs, 2003). Moving up requires inhabiting such a body, or at least
approximating its style, whilst your capacity to inhabit such a body
depends upon what is behind you. Pointing to this loop between the
‘behind’ and the ‘up’ is another way of describing how hierarchies get
reproduced over time.
We could say that bodies ‘move up’ when their whiteness is not in
dispute. And yet, whiteness does not always lag behind in the temporality of a life course. When someone’s whiteness is in dispute, then they
come under ‘stress’, which in turn threatens bodily motility, or what the
body ‘can do’. We could consider, for instance, how Husserl’s phenomenology seems to involve an ease of movement, of being able to occupy the
space around the table. Perhaps we could also see this mobile body as a
body that ‘can do’ things, in terms of whiteness. This is not to locate such
whiteness in the body of the philosopher. Husserl’s biography might
indeed help us here. For when Husserl’s whiteness came into dispute,
when he was read as being Jewish, he literally lost his chair: he temporarily lost the public recognition of his place as a philosopher.5 It is no
accident that such recognition is symbolically given through an item of
furniture: to take up space is to be given an object, which allows the body
to be occupied in a certain way. The philosopher must have his seat, after
all. If we said that phenomenology is about whiteness, in the sense that it
has been written from this ‘point of view’, as a point that is ‘forgotten’, then
what phenomenology describes is not so much white bodies, but the ways
in which bodies come to feel at home in spaces by being orientated in this
way and that, where such bodies are not ‘points’ of stress or what we can
call stress points. To make this point very simply: whiteness becomes a
social and bodily orientation given that some bodies will be more at home
in a world that is orientated around whiteness. If we began instead with
disorientation, with the body that loses its chair, then the descriptions we
offer will be quite different.
Being not
We might say that Frantz Fanon begins with a body that loses its chair, as
a loss that precedes a relationship of having (being chaired). Rather than
objects securing his place, his body becomes an object alongside other
objects. The experience is one of nausea and the crisis of losing one’s place
in the world, as a loss of something that you have not been given. For the
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black man, consciousness of the body is ‘third person consciousness’ and
the feeling is one of negation (Fanon, 1986: 110). To feel negated is to feel
pressure upon your bodily surface; your body feels the pressure point, as
a restriction in what it can do. As Lewis R. Gordon suggests in his critique
of Hegel, ‘White people are universal, it is said and Black people are not’
(1999: 34). If to be human is to be white, then to be not white is to inhabit
the negative: it is to be ‘not’. The pressure of this ‘not’ is another way of
describing the social and existential realities of racism.
If classical phenomenology is about ‘motility’, expressed in the hopefulness of the utterance ‘I can’, Fanon’s phenomenology of the black body
would be better described in terms of the bodily and social experience of
restriction, uncertainty and blockage, or perhaps even in terms of the
despair of the utterance ‘I cannot’. The black man, in becoming an object,
no longer acts or extends himself; instead, he is amputated, losing his body
(Fanon, 1986: 112). Husserl and Merleau-Ponty describe the body as
‘successful’, as being ‘able’ to extend itself (through objects) in order to act
on and in the world. Fanon helps us to expose this ‘success’ not as a
measure of competence, but as the bodily form of privilege: the ability to
move through the world without losing one’s way. To be black in ‘the white
world’ is to turn back towards itself, to become an object, which means
not only not being extended by the contours of the world, but being diminished as an effect of the bodily extensions of others.
For bodies that are not extended by the skin of the social, bodily
movement is not so easy. Such bodies are stopped, where the stopping is
an action that creates its own impressions. Who are you? Why are you
here? What are you doing? Each question, when asked, is a kind of stopping
device: you are stopped by being asked the question, just as asking the
question requires that you be stopped. A phenomenology of ‘being
stopped’ might take us in a different direction than one that begins with
motility, with a body that ‘can do’ by flowing into space.
To stop involves many meanings: to cease, to end, and also to cut off, to
arrest, to check, to prevent, to block, to obstruct or to close. Black activism
has shown us how policing involves a differential economy of stopping:
some bodies more than others are ‘stopped’, by being the subject of the
policeman’s address. The ‘hey you’ is not here addressed to the body that
can inherit the ego ideal of an organization, or who can be recruited to
follow a given line, but to the body who cannot be recruited, to the body
that is ‘out of place’ in this place. In other words, the ‘unrecruitable’ body
must still be ‘recruited’ into this place, through the very repetition of the
action of ‘being stopped’. The ‘stop and search’ is of course a technology
of racism, as we know. The stop and search does not stop there: the search
itself can be extended by practices of indefinite detention. Stopping is both
a political economy, which is distributed unevenly between others, and an
affective economy, which leaves its impressions, affecting those bodies that
are subject to its address.
How does it feel to be stopped? Being stopped is not just stressful: it
makes the ‘body’ itself the ‘site’ of social stress. Let me use a recent
example of being stopped:
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I arrive in New York, clutching my British passport. I hand it over. He looks at
me, and then looks at my passport. I know what questions will follow. ‘Where
are you from?’ My passport indicates my place of birth. ‘Britain’, I say. I feel like
adding, ‘can’t you read. I was born in Salford’, but I stop myself. He looks down
at my passport, not at me. ‘Where is your father from?’ It was the same last time
I arrived in New York. It is the question I get asked now, which seems to locate
what is suspect not in my body, but as that which has been passed down the
family line, almost like a bad inheritance. ‘Pakistan’, I say, slowly. ‘Do you have
a Pakistani passport.’ No, I say. Eventually, he lets me through. The name
‘Ahmed’, a Muslim name, slows me down. It blocks my passage, even if only
temporarily. I get stuck, and then move on. When I fly out of New York later that
week, I am held up again. This time it is a friendlier encounter. I find out I am
now on the ‘no fly list’, and they have to ring to get permission to let me through.
It takes time, of course. ‘Don’t worry,’ he says, ‘my mother is on it too.’ I feel
some strange comradeship with his mother. I know what he is saying: he means
‘anyone’ could be on this list, almost as if to say ‘even my mother’, whose
innocence of course would be beyond doubt. I know it’s a way of saying, ‘it’s not
about you. Don’t take it personally.’ It isn’t about me of course. And yet it
involves me. My name names me after all. It might not be personal, but nor is it
about ‘anyone’. It is my name that slows me down.
In the encounter I describe at the borders of New York City, I become a
stranger, again, made strange by the name I have been given. In everyday
language, a stranger would be anybody we do not know. When we don’t
recognize someone, then they are a stranger. In Strange Encounters, I
suggested an alternative model: I suggest that we recognize some people as
strangers, and that ‘some bodies’ more than others are recognizable as
strangers, as bodies that are ‘out of place’ (Ahmed, 2000). The stranger has
a place by being ‘out of place’ at home.
Not all those at the borders, such as tourists, migrants, or foreign nationals, are recognized as strangers; some will seem more ‘at home’ than others,
some will pass through, with their passports extending physical motility
into social mobility. There is no question posed about their origin. The
stranger’s genealogy in contrast is always suspect. The stranger becomes a
stranger because of some trace of a dubious origin. Having the ‘right’
passport makes no difference if you have the wrong body or name: and
indeed, the stranger with the ‘right’ passport might cause particular
trouble, as the one who risks passing through. The discourse of ‘stranger
danger’ reminds us that danger is often posited as originating from what is
outside the community, or as coming from outsiders, those people who are
not ‘at home’, and who themselves have come from ‘somewhere elsewhere’
(where the ‘where’ of this ‘elsewhere’ always makes a difference). The
politics of mobility, of who gets to move with ease across the lines that
divide spaces, can be re-described as the politics of who gets to be at home,
who gets to inhabit spaces, as spaces that are inhabitable for some bodies
and not others, insofar as they extend the surfaces of some bodies and not
others.
Those who get stopped are moved in a different way. I have suggested
that my name slows me down. A Muslim name. If we do inherit habits, we
can also inherit what fails to become habitual: to inherit a Muslim name,
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in the West, is to inherit the impossibility of a body that can ‘trail behind’,
or even to inherit the impossibility of extending the body’s reach. For the
body recognized as ‘could be Muslim’, which translates into ‘could be
terrorist’ (Ahmed, 2004a), the experience begins with discomfort: spaces
we occupy do not ‘extend’ the surfaces of our bodies. But our actions
anticipate more. Having been singled out in the line, at the borders, we
become defensive; we assume a defensive posture, as we ‘wait’ for the line
of racism, to take our rights of passage away. If we inherit the failure of
things to be habitual, then we might also acquire a tendency to look
behind us.
To be not white is to be not extended by the spaces you inhabit. This is
an uncomfortable feeling. Comfort is a feeling that tends not to be
consciously felt, as I have suggested. You sink. When you don’t sink, when
you fidget and move around, then what is in the background becomes in
front of you, as a world that is gathered in a specific way. Discomfort, in
other words, allows things to move by bringing what is in the background,
what gets over-looked as furniture, back to life. In a way, the experience of
not being white in a white world not only gives us a different viewing
point, but it disorientates how things are arranged. This ‘not’ does not
always feel negative. Every experience I have had of pleasure and excitement about a world opening up has begun with such ordinary feelings of
discomfort, of not quite fitting in a chair, of becoming unseated, of being
left holding onto the ground. So yes, if we start with the body that loses its
chair, the world we describe will be quite different.
Conclusion: on arrival
The experience of negation, of being stopped or feeling out of place, or
feeling uncomfortable, does not ‘stop’ there. When the arrival of some
bodies is noticed, when an arrival is noticeable, it generates disorientation
in how things are arranged. But does this disorientation involve disorientating whiteness? Is arriving enough? Of course, our arrival did not just
happen. It took collective work, and painstaking labour. For me, now, here,
based as I am in higher education in Britain, I receive an alternative
inheritance from this history of collective action, and I receive it every day,
simply by walking on this ground, which has been cleared by such action.
Our arrival at British universities was only possible given the history of
black activism, both in the UK and transnationally, which has cleared this
ground.
And yet, we can arrive, and things can stay in place. Organizations can
recover from disorientation, and they can use disorientation to recover. I
am giving a paper about whiteness to a very white audience.6 I can feel the
discomfort, perhaps. It is hard to know sometimes whether feelings are in
the room or are a matter of our orientation; the impressions we have of the
room by virtue of the angle at which we are placed. I feel uncomfortable,
let’s say that. Someone struggles to ask a question. Basically he asks, ‘but
you are a professor now. How does that fit?’ The question can be rephrased: ‘how can what you say about whiteness be true, given that you
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can become a professor?’ The discomfort, we can see, exposes the very
failure to fit.
The very fact of our arrival can be used as evidence that the whiteness
of which we speak is no longer in place. I was appointed to teach ‘the race
course’, I reply. I am the only person of colour employed on a full-time
permanent basis in the department, I say. It becomes too personal. The
argument is too much to sustain when your body is so exposed, when you
feel so noticeable. I stop, and do not complete my answer to the question.
When our appointments and promotion are taken up as signs of organizational commitment to equality and diversity, we are in trouble. Any
success is read as a sign of an overcoming of institutional whiteness.
‘Look, you’re here!’, ‘Look, look!’ Our talk about racism is read as a form
of stubbornness, paranoia, or even melancholia, as if we are holding onto
something (whiteness) that our arrival shows has already gone. Our talk
about whiteness is read as a sign of ingratitude, of failing to be grateful
for the hospitality we have received by virtue of our arrival. It is this very
structural position of being the guest, or the stranger, the one who receives
hospitality, which keeps us in certain places, even when you move up.7
So, if you ‘move up’, then you come to embody the social promise of
diversity, which gives you a certain place. It is the very use of black bodies
as signs of diversity that confirms such whiteness, premised on a conversion of having to being: as if by having us, the organization can ‘be’
diverse.
Diversity in this world becomes then a happy sign, a sign that racism has
been overcome. In a research project into diversity work,8 I encounter what
I call ‘an institutional desire for good practice’. This desire takes the form
of an expectation that publicly funded research on race, diversity and
equality should be useful, and should provide techniques for achieving
equality and challenging institutional racism. In actual terms, this involves
a desire to hear ‘happy stories of diversity’ rather than unhappy stories of
racism. We write a report about how good practice and anti-racist tool kits
are being used as technologies of concealment, displacing racism from
public view. Anti-racism even becomes a new form of organizational pride.
The response to our final report: too much focus on racism, we need more
evidence of good practice. The response to your work is symptomatic of
what you critique. They don’t even notice the irony. You have been funded
to ‘show’ their commitment to diversity and are expected to return their
investment by giving evidence of its worth.
Within academic fields, I would argue, we can also witness this desire
for happy stories of diversity, although the desire takes different form.
When I give papers on whiteness I am always asked about resistance, as a
sign of how things can be otherwise. Some of these questions take the form
of ‘what can white people do?’ The sheer solipsism of this response must
be challenged. We can recall Adrienne Rich’s description of white solipsism: ‘to speak, imagine and think as if whiteness described the world’
(1979: 299). To respond to accounts of institutional whiteness with the
question ‘what can white people do?’ is not only to return to the place of
the white subject, but it is also to locate agency in this place. It is also to
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Ahmed: A phenomenology of whiteness
re-position the white subject as somewhere other than implicated in the
critique.
Other questions do not re-centre on the agency of white bodies, but just on
the need for some kind of understanding of power that shows that things
don’t always hold; that shows the cracks, the movement, the instabilities and
that appreciates how much things have changed, even whilst recognizing
that there is much left to do. So one response to my considering of whiteness
has been ‘is there any sense that resistance is possible in this account?’ And,
‘if whiteness is a bad habit, what might it be replaced with?’ You become
obliged to give evidence of where things can be undone; to locate the point
of undoing, somewhere or another, even if that location is not in the world,
but in the very mode of your critique. What does it mean if we assume that
critiques have to leave room for resistance, as room-making devices? This
desire to make room is understandable – if the work of critique does not
show that its object can be undone, or promise to undo its object, then what
is the point of that critique? But this desire can also become an object for
us to investigate. The desire for signs of resistance can also be a form for
resistance to hearing about racism. If we want to know how things can be
different too quickly, then we might not hear anything at all.
The desire for resistance is not the same as the desire for good practice.
And yet, both desires can involve a defence against hearing about racism
as an ongoing and unfinished history that we have yet to describe fully. We
still need to describe how it is that the world of whiteness coheres as a
world, even as we tend to the ‘stresses’ in this coherence, and the uneven
distribution of such stress. A phenomenology of whiteness helps us to
notice institutional habits; it brings what is behind, what does not get seen
as the background to social action, to the surface in a certain way. It does
not teach us how to change those habits and that is partly the point. In not
being promising, in refusing to promise anything, such an approach to
whiteness can allow us to keep open the force of the critique. It is by
showing how we are stuck, by attending to what is habitual and routine in
‘the what’ of the world, that we can keep open the possibility of habit
changes, without using that possibility to displace our attention to the
present, and without simply wishing for new tricks.
Notes
1. The signs of occupation are also signs of gender. In other words,
philosophy can be described as a gendered form of occupation, which is
not to say that only men do philosophy, but rather that ‘doing philosophy’
has historically been a masculine form of work. For an exploration of
gender and orientation see Young (2005). See Ahmed (2006) for an
extension of these arguments.
2. This quote within the quote is drawn from Jean Lhermitte’s L’Image de
notre corps.
3. For work that uses Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, to explore the racialized
body see Wicker (1997), Hage (1998) and Puwar (2004).
4. It is worth noting here that the word ‘habit’ comes from the Latin for
condition, appearance and dress.
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5. Thanks to Imogen Tyler for encouraging me to think about the significance
of Husserl’s loss of a chair for my argument about whiteness, and to Mimi
Sheller for her insights into the politics of mobility.
6. I am very indebted here to Audre Lorde who described so well the
dynamics of resistance to hearing the force of critique implicit in black
women’s anger about racism. Lorde gives us accounts of her interactions
with white academics at conferences to show the subtle and not so subtle
mechanisms of defence against hearing black women’s arguments about
racism (see 1984: 124–6).
7. For papers on the continued marginalization of black women in British
higher education institutions see Mirza (2006) and Jones (2006).
8. I was involved in a project assessing the turn to diversity within the
learning and skills sector (including adult and community and learning,
and further education), as well as higher education between 2004–6. I was
co-director of this project with Elaine Swan, and the project team included
Shona Hunter, Sevgi Kilic and Lewis Turner. My own study was based in
higher education, and involved 20 interviews with diversity practitioners
in Australia (Ahmed, 2007a) and the UK (Ahmed, 2007b).
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Dyer, Richard (1997) White. London: Routledge.
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Fenton, Steve (2003) Ethnicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fine, M., L. Weis, L. C. Powell and L. Mun Wong, eds (1997) Off-White:
Readings on Race, Power and Society. New York: Routledge.
Frankenberg, Ruth (1993) White Women, Race Matters: The Social
Construction of Whiteness. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Gordon, Lewis R. (1995) Bad Faith and AntiBlack Racism. Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
Gordon, Lewis R. (1999) ‘Fanon, Philosophy, Racism’, pp. 32–49 in Susan E.
Babbitt and Sue Campbell (eds) Racism and Philosophy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Hage, Ghassan (1998) White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a
Multicultural Society. Annandale, PA: Pluto Press.
Husserl, Edmund (1969) Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,
trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Husserl, Edmund (1989) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy, second book, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and
André Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Jones, Cecily (2006) ‘Falling Between the Cracks: What Diversity Means for
Black Women in Higher Education’, Policy Futures in Education 4(2):
145–59.
Lorde, Audre (1984) Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches. Trumansburg: The
Crossing Press.
Macey, David (1999) ‘Fanon, Phenomenology, Race’, Radical Philosophy 95:
8–14.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (2002) The Phenomenology of Perception, trans.
Colin Smith. London: Routledge.
Mirza, Heidi (2006) ‘Transcendence over Diversity: Black Women in the
Academy’, Policy Futures in Education 4(2): 101–13.
Puwar, Nirmal (2004) Space Invaders: Race, Gender, and Bodies out of Place.
Oxford: Berg.
Rich, Adrienne (1979) On Lies, Secrets and Silence: Selected Prose
1966–1978. New York: W.W. Norton Company.
Schutz, Alfred and Thomas Luckmann (1974) The Structure of the Lifeworld,
trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Engelhardt. London: Heinemann
Educational Books.
Singh, Val (2002) Managing Diversity for Strategic Advantage. London:
Council for Excellence in Management and Leadership.
Skeggs, Beverley (2003) Class, Self, Culture. London: Routledge.
Smith, Valerie (1998) Not Just Race, Not Just Gender: Black Feminist
Readings. New York: Routledge.
Wicker, Hans-Rudolf (1997) ‘From Complex Culture to Cultural Complexity’,
pp. 29–45 in Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood (eds) Debating Cultural
Hybridity: Multicultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism. London:
Zed Books.
Young, Iris Marion (2005) The Female Body Experience. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
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Feminist Theory 8(2)
Sara Ahmed is Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths College,
University of London. She works at the intersection between feminist theory,
critical race studies, postcolonial theory and queer studies. Her publications
include: Differences that Matter: Feminist Theory and Postmodernism (1998),
Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (2000), The Cultural
Politics of Emotion (2004) and Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects,
Others (2006). She is currently writing a book on happiness, as well as a
monograph based on her ethnographic research on diversity work,
provisionally entitled: ‘Doing Diversity: Racism and Educated Subjects’.
Address: Department of Media and Communications, Goldsmiths
College, University of London, New Cross, London SE14 6NW, UK.
Email: s.ahmed@gold.ac.uk
Downloaded from fty.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on November 18, 2013
Whiteness and the Return of the
Black Body
GEORGE YANCY
Duquesne University
It is sometimes advantageous to be unseen, although it is most often rather
wearing on the nerves.
—Ralph Ellison
Blackness embodies the ostracized. Under the duress of racial domination, I undergo the now familiar two-pronged process of externally imposed inferiorization and subsequent internalization of that inferiority. It is
thus probable that in my routine state, I carry White hatred of me within
me as my own property.
—Thomas F. Slaughter
When you’ve made a man [woman] hate himself [herself], you’ve really
got it and gone.
—Malcolm X
I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of
knowledge connected to my “raced” body. Hence, I write from a place of lived
embodied experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we
are taught to “expose” is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone’s “inferior”
reasoning power. The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory,
superfluous and cumbersome in one’s search for truth. It is best, or so we are
told, to reason from nowhere. Hence, the white philosopher/author presumes to
speak for all of “us” without the slightest mention of his or her “raced” identity.
Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes:
Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the “whiteness” of
my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of authority; to
speak (apparently) from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering, though one
wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship
and authority is also pleasurable: it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting or
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2005.
Copyright © 2005 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.
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GEORGE YANCY
apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of
power expressed in the “comprehension” of a range of materials. (1998, 6)
To theorize the Black body one must “turn to the [Black] body as the
radix for interpreting racial experience” (Johnson [1993, 600]).1 It is important
to note that this particular strategy also functions as a lens through which to
theorize and critique whiteness; for the Black body’s “racial” experience is fundamentally linked to the oppressive modalities of the “raced” white body. However, there is no denying that my own “racial” experiences or the social
performances of whiteness can become objects of critical reflection. In this paper, my objective is to describe and theorize situations where the Black body’s
subjectivity, its lived reality, is reduced to instantiations of the white imaginary,
resulting in what I refer to as “the phenomenological return of the Black body.” 2
These instantiations are embedded within and evolve out of the complex social
and historical interstices of whites’ efforts at self-construction through complex
acts of erasure vis-à-vis Black people. These acts of self-construction, however,
are myths/ideological constructions predicated upon maintaining white power.
As James Snead has noted, “Mythification is the replacement of history with a
surrogate ideology of [white] elevation or [Black] demotion along a scale of
human value” (Snead 1994, 4).
How I understand and theorize the body relates to the fact that the body—
in this case, the Black body—is capable of undergoing a sociohistorical process
of “phenomenological return” vis-à-vis white embodiment. The body’s meaning—whether phenotypically white or black—its ontology, its modalities of
aesthetic performance, its comportment, its “raciated” reproduction, is in constant contestation. The hermeneutics of the body, how it is understood, how it is
“seen,” its “truth,” is partly the result of a profound historical, ideological construction. “The body” is positioned by historical practices and discourses. The
body is codified as this or that in terms of meanings that are sanctioned, scripted,
and constituted through processes of negotiation that are embedded within and
serve various ideological interests that are grounded within further power-laden
social processes. The historical plasticity of the body, the fact that it is a site of
contested meanings, speaks to the historicity of its “being” as lived and meant
within the interstices of social semiotics. Hence: a) the body is less of a thing/
being than a shifting/changing historical meaning that is subject to cultural configuration/reconfiguration. The point here is to interrogate the “Black body” as
a “fixed and material truth” that preexists “its relations with the world and with
others”3 ; b) the body’s meaning is fundamentally symbolic (McDowell 2001,
301), and its meaning is congealed through symbolic repetition and iteration
that emits certain signs and presupposes certain norms; and, c) the body is a
battlefield, one that is fought over again and again across particular historical
moments and within particular social spaces. “In other words, the concept of the
body provides only the illusion of self-evidence, facticity, ‘thereness’ for some-
WHITENESS AND THE RETURN OF THE BLACK BODY
217
thing fundamentally ephemeral, imaginary, something made in the image of
particular social groups” (301). On this score, it is not only the “Black body”
that defies the ontic fixity projected upon it through the white gaze, and, hence,
through the episteme of whiteness, but the white body is also fundamentally
symbolic, requiring demystification of its status as norm, the paragon of beauty,
order, innocence, purity, restraint, and nobility. In other words, given the three
suppositions above, both the “Black body” and the “white body” lend themselves to processes of interpretive fracture and to strategies of interrogating and
removing the veneer of their alleged objectivity.
To have one’s dark body invaded by the white gaze and then to have that
body returned as distorted is a powerful experience of violation. The experience
presupposes an anti-Black lived context, a context within which whiteness gets
reproduced and the white body as norm is reinscribed. The late writer, actor, and
activist Ossie Davis recalls that at the age of six or seven two white police officers told him to get into their car. They took him down to the precinct. They kept
him there for an hour, laughing at him and eventually pouring cane syrup over
his head. This only created the opportunity for more laughter, as they looked
upon the “silly” little Black boy. If he was able to articulate his feelings at that
moment, think of how the young Davis was returned to himself: “I am an object
of white laughter, a buffoon.” The young Davis no doubt appeared to the white
police officers in ways that they had approved. They set the stage, created a site
of Black buffoonery, and enjoyed their sadistic pleasure without blinking an
eye. Sartwell notes that “the [white] oppressor seeks to constrain the oppressed
[Blacks] to certain approved modes of visibility (those set out in the template of
stereotype) and then gazes obsessively on the spectacle he has created” (1998,
11). Davis notes that he “went along with the game of black emasculation, it
seemed to come naturally” (Marable 2000, 9). After that, “the ritual was complete” (9). He was then sent home with some peanut brittle to eat. Davis knew at
that early age, even without the words to articulate what he felt, that he had been
violated. He refers to the entire ritual as the process of “niggerization.” He notes:
The culture had already told me what this was and what my reaction to this
should be: not to be surprised; to expect it; to accommodate it; to live with it.
I didn’t know how deeply I was scarred or affected by that, but it was a part of
who I was. (9)
Davis, in other words, was made to feel that he had to accept who he was, that
“niggerized” little Black boy, an insignificant plaything within a system of ontological racial differences. This, however, is the trick of white ideology; it is to
give the appearance of fixity, where the “look of the white subject interpellates
the black subject as inferior, which, in turn, bars the black subject from seeing
him/herself without the internalization of the white gaze” (Weheliye 2005, 42).
On this score, it is white bodies that are deemed agential. They configure “pas-
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GEORGE YANCY
sive” Black bodies according to their will. But it is no mystery; for “the Negro is
interpreted in the terms of the white man. White-man psychology is applied and
it is no wonder that the result often shows the Negro in a ludicrous light”
(Braithwaite 1992, 36). While walking across the street, I have endured the sounds
of car doors locking as whites secure themselves from the “outside world,” a
trope rendering my Black body ostracized, different, unbelonging. This outside
world constitutes a space, a field, where certain Black bodies are relegated. They
are rejected, because they are deemed suspicious, vile infestations of the (white)
social body. The locks on the doors resound: Click. Click. Click. Click. Click.
Click. ClickClickClickClickClickClickClick! Of course, the clicking sounds are
always already accompanied by nervous gestures, and eyes that want to look,
but are hesitant to do so. The cumulative impact of the sounds is deafening,
maddening in their distorted repetition. The clicks begin to function as coded
sounds, reminding me that I am dangerous; the sounds create boundaries, separating the white civilized from the dark savage, even as I comport myself to the
contrary. The clicking sounds mark me, they inscribe me, they materialize my
presence in ways that belie my intentions. Unable to stop the clicking, unable to
establish a form of recognition that creates a space of trust and liminality, there
are times when one wants to become their fantasy, to become their Black monster, their bogeyman, to pull open the car door: “Surprise. You’ve just been
carjacked by a ghost, a fantasy of your own creation. Now, get the fuck out of
the car.” I have endured white women clutching their purses or walking across
the street as they catch a glimpse of my approaching Black body. It is during
such moments that my body is given back to me in a ludicrous light, where I live
the meaning of my body as confiscated. Davis too had the meaning of his young
Black body stolen. The surpluses being gained by the whites in each case are not
economic. Rather, it is through existential exploitation that the surpluses extracted can be said to be ontological—“semblances of determined presence, of
full positivity, to provide a sense of secure being” (Henry 1997, 33).
When I was about seventeen or eighteen, my white math teacher initiated
such an invasion, pulling it off with complete calm and presumably self-transparency. Given the historical construction of whiteness as the norm, his own
“raced” subject position was rendered invisible. After all, he lived in the real
world, the world of the serious man, where values are believed anterior to their
existential founding. As I recall, we were discussing my plans for the future. I
told him that I wanted to be a pilot. I was earnest about this choice, spending a
great deal of time reading about the requirements involved in becoming a pilot,
how one would have to accumulate a certain number of flying hours. I also read
about the dynamics of lift and drag that affect a plane in flight. After no doubt
taking note of my firm commitment, he looked at me and implied that I should
be realistic (a code word for realize that I am Black) about my goals. He said
that I should become a carpenter or a bricklayer. I was exposing myself, telling
a trusted teacher what I wanted to be, and he returned me to myself as some-
WHITENESS AND THE RETURN OF THE BLACK BODY
219
thing that I did not recognize. I had no intentions of being a carpenter or a
bricklayer (or a janitor or elevator operator for that matter).
The situation, though, is more complex. It is not that he simply returned
me to myself as a carpenter or a bricklayer when all along I had this image of
myself as a pilot. Rather, he returned me to myself as a fixed entity, a “niggerized”
Black body whose epidermal logic had already foreclosed the possibility of being anything other than what was befitting its lowly station. He was the voice of
a larger anti-Black racist society that “whispers mixed messages in our ears”
(Marable 2000, 9), the ears of Black people who struggle to think of themselves
as a possibility. He mentioned that there were only a few Black pilots and that I
should be more realistic. (One can only imagine what his response would have
been had I said that I wanted to be a philosopher, particularly given the statistic
that Black philosophers constitute about 1.1% of philosophers in the United
States). Keep in mind that this event did not occur in the 1930s or 1940s, but
around 1979. The message was clear. Because I was Black, I had to settle for an
occupation suitable for my Black body,4 unlike the white body that would no
doubt have been encouraged to become a pilot. As with Davis, having one’s
Black body returned as a source of impossibility, one begins to think, to feel, to
emote: “Am I a nigger?” The internalization of the white gaze creates a doubleness within the psyche of the Black, leading to a destructive process of superfluous self-surveillance and self-interrogation.
This was indeed a time when I felt ontologically locked into my body. My
body was indelibly marked with this stain of darkness. After all, he was the
white mind, the mathematical mind, calculating my future by factoring in my
Blackness. He did not “see” me, though. Like Ellison’s invisible man, I occupied that paradoxical status of “visible invisibility.” Within this dyadic space,
my Black body phenomenologically returned to me as inferior. To describe the
phenomenological return of the Black body is to disclose how it is returned as
an appearance to consciousness, my consciousness. The (negatively) “raced”
manner in which my body underwent a phenomenological return, however, presupposes a thick social reality that has always already been structured by the
ideology and history of whiteness. More specifically, when my body is returned
to me, the white body has already been constituted over centuries as the norm,
both in European and Anglo-American culture, and at several discursive levels
from science to philosophy to religion. In the case of my math teacher, his whiteness was invisible to him as my Blackness was hyper-visible to both of us. Of
course, his invisibility to his own normative here is a function of my hypervisibility. It is important to keep in mind that white Americans, more generally,
define themselves around the “gravitational pull,” as it were, of the Black.5 The
not of white America is the Black of white America. This not is essential, as is
the invisibility of the negative relation through which whites are constituted. All
of embodied beings have their own “here.” My white math teacher’s racist social performances (for example, his “advice” to me), within the context of a
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GEORGE YANCY
white racist historical imaginary and asymmetric power relations, suspends and
effectively disqualifies my embodied here. What was the message communicated? Expressing my desire to be, to take advantage of the opportunities for
which Black bodies had died in order to secure, my ambition “was flung back in
my face like a slap” (Fanon 1967, 114). Fanon writes:
The white world, the only honorable one, barred me from all participation. A
man was expected to behave like a man. I was expected to behave like a black
man—or at least like a nigger. I shouted a greeting to the world and the world
slashed away my joy. I was told to stay within bounds, to go back where I
belonged. (114–15)
According to philosopher Bettina Bergo, drawing from the thought of
Emmanuel Levinas, “perception and discourse—what we see and the symbols
and meanings of our social imaginaries—prove inextricably the one from the
other” (2005, 131). Hence, the white math teacher’s perception, what he “saw,”
was inextricably linked to social meanings and semiotic constructions and constrictions that opened up a “field of appearances” regarding my dark body. There
is nothing passive about the white gaze. There are racist sociohistorical and
epistemic conditions of emergence that construct not only the Black body, but
the white body as well. So, what is “seen” when the white gaze “sees” “my
body” and it becomes something alien to me?
In stream with phenomenology, consciousness is always “consciousnessof.” What was my white math teacher “conscious-of”? The answer to this question, to which I already alluded, can only be given through the acknowledgment
of a culturally and historically sedimented “racialized” consciousness-of structure. Moreover, all acts of consciousness for phenomenology are meaning-giving. However, white racist acts of consciousness vis-à-vis the Black body are
meaning-giving in ways that specifically distort the Black body. After all, they
are acts of meaning-giving that are structured through the white imaginary. Indeed, the construction of the “manners-of-givenness” of the Black body as inferior, for example, is contingent upon white racialized consciousness-of a socially
ordered, and, by phantasmatic extension, naturally ordered world. Conversely,
the construction of the “manners-of-givenness” of the white body is contingent
upon the distortion or negation of the Black through the reactionary value-creating force of whites. But instead of my white teacher self-consciously admitting
to the role that he has played, and continues to play, in the perpetuation of this
white social imaginary (and the racist way in which he is conscious-of my body)
in his everyday social performances, ideologically he “apprehends” the Black
body, my Black body, as pre-given in its constitution as inferior. Of course, he
cannot claim responsibility for the entire stream of white racist consciousness
given the fact that these constructions are part of a larger historical imaginary, a
social universe of white racist discourse that comes replete with long, enduring
WHITENESS AND THE RETURN OF THE BLACK BODY
221
myths, perversions, distorted profiles, and imaginings of all sorts regarding the
non-white body.
African-American philosopher Charles Johnson notes that one can become blind to seeing “other ‘meanings’ or profiles presented by the object if the
perceiver is locked within the ‘Natural Attitude,’ as Husserl calls it, and has
been conditioned culturally or racially to fix himself upon certain ‘meanings’”
(1993, 603). On my reading, within the framework of an anti-Black racist world,
the meaning of the Black body is a synthesis formed through racist distal narratives, narratives that ideologically inform whites of their “natural superiority,”
that enable whites to flee their part in constructing a “racial regional ontology”
fit for Blacks only. Phenomenologically, I experience myself as “the profile that
their frozen intentionality brings forth” (607). After all, whiteness is deemed the
horizon of all horizons, unable to recognize the imaginary “racial” dualism that
it has created. The white gaze has constructed the Black body “as the specular
negative images of itself and that hence, abstracts the white person into an abstract knower” (Sartwell 1998, 45). Hence, the meaning of my lived body is
phenomenologically skewed when white consciousness negatively intends me
as my Black (read: “inferior,” “evil”) body. I become alienated, thrown outward, and assigned a meaning not of my intending. In my everydayness, I live
my body from an existential here. Wherever I go, I go embodied. As Gordon
writes, “Here is where I am located. That place, if you will, is an embodied one:
it is consciousness in the flesh. In the flesh, I am not only a point of view, but I
am also a point that is viewed” (2000, 76). In my phenomenological return,
however, I am reduced to a point that is viewed. My here is experienced as a
there. The experience of being reduced to one’s “Black exteriority,” rendered
thing-like, through processes of meaning-intending acts of white racist intentional consciousness, is insightfully described by Charles Johnson:
I am walking down Broadway in Manhattan, platform shoes clicking on the
hot pavement, thinking as I stroll of, say, Boolean expansions. I turn, thirsty,
into a bar. The dimly-lit room, obscured by shadows, is occupied by whites.
Goodbye, Boolean expansions. I am seen. But, as black, seen as stained body,
as physicality, basically opaque to others. ... Their look, an intending beam
focusing my way, suddenly realizes something larva in me. My world is
epidermalized, collapsed like a house of cards into the stained casement of my
skin. My subjectivity is turned inside out like a shirtcuff. (1993, 603)
In the face of my white teacher’s racism, I could have decided to lose
myself in laughter, but, like Frantz Fanon, I was aware “that there were legends,
stories, histories, and above all historicity” (1967, 112). My dark embodied existence, my lived historical being, becomes a chain of signifiers: inferior, Nigger,
evil, dirty, sullen, immoral, lascivious. As Fanon writes, “In the unconscious,
black = ugliness, sin, darkness, immorality” (192). When phenomenologically
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returned to myself, I appear no longer to possess my body, but a “surrogate”
body whose meaning does not exist anterior to the performance of white
spectatorship. Under the white gaze, “the Black has no ontological resistance in
the eyes of the white man” (110). Again, this involves the asymmetry of representational power. The Black body appears to have no resistance vis-à-vis the
somatic regulatory epistemic regime of whiteness. The Black body becomes
ontologically pliable, just a thing to be scripted in the inverse image of whiteness. Cutting away at the Black body, the Black person becomes resigned to no
longer aspire to his/her own emergence or upheaval (116). Blacks undergo processes of ontological stagnation and epistemological violence while standing
before the one “true” gaze. In very powerful discourse describing how he was
“unmercifully imprisoned,” how the white gaze forced upon him an unfamiliar
weight, Fanon asks, “What else could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that spattered my whole body with black blood?” (112).
The burden of the white gaze disrupts my first-person knowledge, causing “difficulties in the development of [my] bodily schema” (110). The white
gaze constructs the Black body into “an object in the midst of other objects”
(109). The nonthreatening “I” of my normal, everyday body schema becomes
the threatening “him” of the Negro kind/type. Under pressure, the corporeal
schema collapses. It gives way to a racial epidermal schema.6 “Below the corporeal schema,” writes Fanon, “I had sketched a historico-racial schema. The
elements that I used had been provided for me not by ‘residual sensations and
perceptions of a primarily tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic, and visual character,’
but by the other, the white man [woman]” (111). In other words, Fanon began to
“see” himself through the lens of a historico-racial schema. Note that there was
nothing intrinsic to his physiology that forced his corporeal schema to collapse;
it was the “Black body” as always already named and made sense of within the
context of a larger semiotics of privileged white bodies that provided him with
the tools for self-hatred. His “darkness,” a naturally occurring phenomenon,7
became historicized, residing within the purview of the white gaze, a phenomenal space created and sustained by socioepistemic and semiotic communal constitutionality. On this score, the Black body is placed within the space of
constitutionality vis-à-vis the racist white same, the One. Against the backdrop
of the sketched historico-racial (racist) scheme, Fanon’s “darkness” returns to
him, signifying a new genus, a new category of man: A Negro! (116). He inhabits a space of anonymity (he is every Negro), and yet he feels a strange personal
responsibility for his body. He writes:
I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors.
I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness,
my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism,
intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all else,
above all: “sho’ good eaten’.” (112)8
WHITENESS AND THE RETURN OF THE BLACK BODY
223
Fanon writes about the Black body and how it can be changed, deformed,
and made into an ontological problem vis-à-vis the white gaze. Describing an
encounter with a white woman and her son, Fanon narrates that the young boy
screams, “Look at the nigger! . . . Mama, a Negro!” (113).9 Fanon:
My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in
mourning in that white winter day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad,
the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look, a Negro, it’s cold, the Negro is
shivering because he is cold, the little boy is trembling because he is afraid of
the nigger, the nigger is shivering with cold, that cold that goes through your
bones, the handsome boy is trembling because he thinks that the nigger is
quivering with rage, the little white boy throws himself into his mother’s arms:
Mama, the nigger’s going to eat me up. (113–14).
The white imagery of the Black as a savage beast, a primitive and uncivilized
animal, is clearly expressed in the boy’s fear that he is to be eaten by the “cannibalistic” Negro. “The more that Europeans dominated Africans, the more ‘savage’ Africans came to seem; cannibalism represented the nadir of savagery”
(Brantlinger 1985, 203).
Presumably, the young boy does not know that his words will (or how
they will) negatively affect Fanon. However, for Fanon, the young white boy
represents the broader framework of white society’s perception of the Black.
The boy turns to his white mother for protection from the impending Black
doom. The young white boy, however, is not simply operating at the affective
level, he is not simply being haunted, semi-consciously, by a vague feeling of
anxiety. Rather, he is operating both at the affective and the discursive level. He
says, “Mama, the nigger’s going to eat me up.” This locutionary act carries a
perlocutionary force of effecting a phenomenological return of Fanon to himself as a cannibalistic threat, as an object to be feared. Fanon, of course, does not
“want this revision, this thematization.”10 African-American philosopher Robert Gooding-Williams notes:
For Fanon, the boy’s view of the Negro (of Fanon himself in this case) as an
object of fear is significant, as it suggests (1) that the image (racial epidermal
schema) of the Negro posited by the boy’s verbal performance has a narrative
significance and (2) that such images are available to the boy as elements of a
socially shared stock of images that qualify the historicity (the historical
situatedness) both of the boy and of the Negro he sees. (1993, 165)
One is tempted to say that the young white boy sees Fanon’s Black body
“as if ” it was cannibal-like. The “seeing as if,” however, is collapsed into a
“seeing as is.” In Fanon’s example, within the lived phenomenological transversal context of white racist behavior, the “as if ” reads too much like a process
of “conscious effort.” On my reading, “youngwhiteboyexperiencesniggerdark-
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bodycannibalevokestrepidation” is what appears in the uninterrupted lived or
phenomenological flow of the young white boy’s racist experience. There is no
experience of the “as if.” Indeed, the young white boy’s linguistic and
nonlinguistic performance is indicative of a definitive structuring of his own
self-invisibility as: “whiteinnocentselfinrelationshiptothedarkniggerself.” This
definitive structuring is not so much remembered or recollected as it is always
present as the constitutive imaginary background within which the white boy is
both the effect and the vehicle of white racism; indeed, he is the orientation of
white epistemic practices, ways of “knowing” about one’s (white) identity visà-vis the Black Other. The “cultural white orientation” is not an “entity” whose
origin the white boy needs to grasp or recollect before he performs whiteness.
He is not a tabula rasa, one who sees the Black body for the first time and
instinctively says, “Mama, the nigger’s going to eat me up.” On this score, the
boy does indeed undergo an experience of the dark body as frightening, but
there is no concealed meaning, as it were, inherent in the experience qua experience of Fanon’s body as such. Rather, the fright that he experiences vis-à-vis
Fanon’s dark body is always already “constructed out of ... social narratives
and ideologies” (Henze 2000, 238). The boy is already discursively and
affectively acculturated through micro-processes of “racialized” learning (short
stories, lullabies, children’s games,11 prelinguistic experiences, and so forth) to
respond “appropriately” in the presence of a Black body. The gap that opens up
within the young white boy’s perceptual field as he “sees” Fanon’s Black body
has already been created while innocently sitting on his mother’s lap.12 His
mother’s lap constitutes a “raced” zone of security. This point acknowledges the
fundamental “ways the transactions between a raced world and those who live
in it racially constitute the very being of those beings” (Sullivan 2001, 89). The
association of Blackness with “nigger” and cannibalism is no mean feat. Hence,
on my view, he is already attending to the world in a particular fashion; his
affective and discursive performances bespeak the (ready-to-hand) inherited white
racist background according to which he is able to make “sense” of the world.
Like moving my body in the direction of home, or only slightly looking
as I reach my hand to retrieve my cup of hot tea that is to the left of my computer
screen, the young white boy dwells within/experiences/engages the world of
white racist practices in such a way that the practices qua racist practices have
become invisible. The young boy’s response is part and parcel of an implicit
knowledge of how he gets around in a Manichean world. Being-in a racist world,
a lived context of historicity, the young boy does not “see” the dark body as
“dark” and then thematically proceed to apply negative value predicates to it,
where conceivably the young boy would say, “Yes, I ‘see’ the dark body as
existing in space, and I recognize the fact that it is through my own actions and
intentions that I predicate evil of it.” “In order even to act deliberately,” as philosopher Hubert L. Dreyfus maintains, “we must orient ourselves in a familiar
world” (1991, 85).
WHITENESS AND THE RETURN OF THE BLACK BODY
225
My point here is that the young white boy is situated within a familiar
white racist world of intelligibility, one that has already “conceded” whiteness
as “superior” and Blackness as “inferior” and “savage.” Involved within the
white racist Manichean world, the young boy has found his orientation, he has...
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