Read the Gallup article: “Do Employees Really Know What’s Expected of Them?” (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. Min 4 pages follow the rubics for max points. 1. Briefly comment on the question - do you know what is expected of you at work? 2. Discuss the benefits to companies from increased employee morale and loyalty. How can company volunteer programs help in engaging employees? 3. Find two examples of companies, which have been successful in engaging employees. What are the means by which these companies are engaging employees? What are some of the incentives these firms are using (financial or non-financial) in order to engage employees? What are some approaches to measure employee engagement? Business Journal September 27, 2016 • Print • Share • Share on Facebook • Share on Twitter • Share on LinkedIn • Share on FacebookShare on TwitterShare on LinkedInDo Employees Really Know What's Expected of Them? by Brandon Rigoni and Bailey Nelson Story Highlights • Setting expectations is a foundational element of employee engagement • Companies should collaborate with workers on role expectations • Tie employees' expectations to their innate strengths Only about one-third of U.S. workers are engaged at work -- and that figure has barely budged in more than a decade. Worse, just 13% of employees worldwide are engaged. These figures should be concerning to business leaders and anyone else who worries about the state of the American and global economies. Companies everywhere have opportunities for greater productivity -- and are leaving money on the table. Gallup's latest meta-analysis shows that business units in the top quartile of employee engagement are 21% more profitable, are 17% more productive, have 10% better customer ratings, experience 41% less absenteeism and suffer 70% fewer safety incidents compared with business units in the bottom quartile. Given the inherent challenges associated with engaging workers, executives have asked, "If we were to reduce this massive problem to a single element of employee engagement, which would be most important?" It's not that simple. Among the 12 elements of employee engagement, no single element is of chief importance because each organization or workgroup continuously changes and -- depending on current circumstances -- can benefit from emphasizing different elements. Nonetheless, Gallup research suggests that setting clear expectations may be the most foundational element. Only about half of all workers strongly indicate that they know what is expected of them at work. Expectations -- or a lack thereof -- have the power to make or break worker engagement. Even if employees feel energized and motivated, those who lack clear expectations and spend too much time working on the wrong things can't advance key initiatives to create value for an organization. Workers of All Generations Need Clear Expectations The desire for clear expectations is a shining example of a shared need across generations, from millennials to traditionalists. All workers, regardless of age or stage in their career, want to know what's expected of them in the workplace. And the lack of clear expectations can cause anxiety and confusion in workers. But with clear expectations, employees thrive. For example, Gallup finds that 72% of millennials who strongly agree that their manager helps them establish performance goals are engaged. And across all generations, individuals who strongly agree that their manager helps them set performance goals are nearly eight times more likely to be engaged than if they strongly disagree with the statement. Best Practices for Establishing Expectations Having studied the engagement of more than 31 million employees over the past four decades, Gallup has learned a thing or two about how to set clear expectations with workers. When setting expectations, leaders and managers should ensure they are: Developed collaboratively. Companies need to get workers' input, collaborating with them to agree on role expectations. With this approach, workers will be more likely to own their expectations and succeed. Articulated clearly. Managers shouldn't make workers guess. With each employee, managers should talk openly about expectations and be crystal clear about what they expect. Aimed at excellence. Workers aren't inspired by minimum job standards such as showing up on time or submitting time sheets using the proper process. Instead, managers can bring out the very best in each worker by talking about what top performers do differently and then setting expectations based on those best-in-class behaviors. Individualized to strengths. Employees do not want to spend the majority of their time on tasks they lack interest or proficiency in. When managers help workers better understand what comes naturally to them -- their innate strengths -- and then position them to use those talents more at work, employee performance and engagement both skyrocket. A Strengths Focus Drives Results To better understand the effects that strengths interventions have on employee performance, Gallup recently studied 49,495 business units with 1.2 million employees across 22 organizations in seven industries and 45 countries. We found that 90% of workgroups that applied strengths interventions had performance increases at or above the following ranges: • 10% to 19% increase in sales • 14% to 29% increase in profit • 3% to 7% higher customer engagement • 6% to 16% lower turnover (low-turnover organizations) • 26% to 72% lower turnover (high-turnover organizations) • 22% to 59% fewer safety incidents • 9% to 15% increase in engaged employees When it comes to building employee engagement and accelerating business outcomes, focusing on strengths is one of managers' sharpest tools. After zeroing in on the right targets with clear expectations, managers can unleash employees' greatest performance by focusing on their strengths. Brandon Rigoni, Ph.D., is Associate Director for Selection and Development at Gallup. Bailey Nelson is a writer and editor at Gallup. * Academy o/ Management Review 1999. Vol. 24. No. 2. 191^205. STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE STRATEGIES JEFF FROOMAN University of Pittsburgh When seeking to iniluence firm decision making, what types oi influence strategies do stakeholders have available, and what determines which type the stakeholders choose to use? In this article I use resource dependence theory to investigate these two questions. I propose that the resource relationship (who is dependent on whom) determines which of the four types of strategies identified in this article will be used: direct withholding, direct usage, indirect withholding, or indirect usage. Freeman's (1984) Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach brought stakeholder theory into the mainstream of management literature. As clearly expressed in the title of the book, one central purpose of stakeholder theory has been to enable managers to understand stakeholders and strategically manage them. As Freeman states, "The stakeholder approach is about groups and individuals who can affect the organization, and is about managerial behavior taken in response to those groups and individuals" (1984: 48). In developing such response strategies, it seems that we need to answer three general questions about stakeholders: this missing part of stakeholder theory and ultimately enable managers to better understand and manage stakeholder behavior. Specifically, in this article I seek to investigate these two research questions regarding stakeholder influence strategies: 3a. What are the different types of influence strategies? 3b. What are the determinants of the choice of influence strategy? In investigating these two questions, I merge stakeholder theory with resource dependence theory to propose that the types of influence strategies can be understood in terms of resources and that a determinant of the choice of strategies will be the type of resource relationship the firm and stakeholder have and where the balance of power lies within that relationship. 1. Who are they? (This question concerns their attributes.) 2. What do they want? (This question concerns their ends.) 3. How are they going to try to get it? (This question concerns their means.) Here, I intend to suggest that although researchers have been addressing the first two questions, they have given the third question, regarding stakeholder means-—or stakeholder influence strategies—only piecemeal attention. Nowhere in the literature have scholars made any systematic attempt to treat stakeholder influence strategies in the broadest sense—that is, as phenomena that can be categorized and built into a descriptive model. That is the objective of this article—to build a model of stakeholder influence strategies that will address MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS ARTICLE Throughout much of this article, I use Freeman's (1984) work on stakeholders as my point of departure. Although almost 15 years old now, no one can underestimate this work's effect on the management literature or undervalue its worth today. In the work Freeman presents the stakeholder model as a map in which the firm is the hub of a wheel and stakeholders are at the ends of spokes around the wheel. This conceptualization has become the convention from which stakeholder theory has developed. However, in this hub-and-spoke conceptualization, relationships are dyadic, independent of one another, viewed largely from the firm's vantage point, and defined in terms of actor attributes. In presenting my theory of stakeholder influence strat- I thank the following for their helpful comments during the development of this work: Gaurab Bwardwaj, Craig Caldwell, Ray Jones, Tim Rowley, Alyssa Sankey, and three anonymous reviewers. I especially thank Barry M. Mitnick for the guidance and insight he has provided me throughout this project. 191 192 Academy oi Management Review egies. I expand the stakeholder model in each of these respects. For example, in this article I discuss a conflict involving StarKist, its consumers, and the Earth Island Institute (EII). I argue that the StarKistconsumer relationship was not independent of the StarKist-EII relationship; in reality, the two dyadic relationships were imbedded in a triadic one. To be meaningful for a firm intent on managing its stakeholders, then, stakeholder theory needs to be able to place firms in their proper context—that of multiactor relationships, like the one StarKist had with its consumers and the EII. In this article I incorporate strategies of stakeholders acting through allies to influence firms, thereby explicitly introducing triads consisting of nonindependent relationships and suggesting that the same approach will work for higher-order stakeholder combinations. Regarding the theory's prevailing directionality— or the vantage point from which things are viewed—Freeman's original definition, which is still widely used, provides insight. His definition labels a stakeholder as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives" (1984: 25). Goodpastor (1991) has observed that this definition implies two types of stakeholders—strategic and moral—and so one way to view the stakeholder literature, broadly speaking, is in terms of two branches. With the strategic stakeholder (the one who can affect a firm), there is a managing of interests; these stakeholders and their interests must be "dealt with" (Freeman, 1984: 126) so that the firm may still achieve its interests. Here, the stakeholder literature intersects the strategy literature (e.g., Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Hill & Jones, 1992; Huse & Eide, 1996; Rowley, 1997). The emphasis on managing the stakeholder makes this approach unidirectional in nature, with relationships viewed from the firm's vantage point. With the moral stakeholder (the one who is affected by the firm), stakeholder theorists seek some balancing of interests. Here, the stakeholder literature intersects the ethics literature and gives a more bidirectional account of the firm and its stakeholders (e.g.. Burton & Dunn. 1996; Cohen. 1995; Donaldson & Preston. 1995; Evan & Freeman. 1988; Freeman & Evan. 1990; Phillips. 1997; Wicks. Gilbert. & Freeman. 1994). April Missing from the theory, then, has been an account of how stakeholders manage a firm to enable them to achieve their interests, possibly at the expense of the firm's. Such an account is unidirectional in nature, although with relationships viewed from the stakeholder's vantage point. For anyone building theory, this should be interesting in its own right, but even from a pragmatic managerial standpoint, this has to be of interest. After all, if firms such as StarKist do exist in a stakeholder context, how such firms act to achieve their interests must be, in part, dependent on how they expect their stakeholders will act (Brenner & Cochran, 1991). And, if what a firm should do is partly determined by what its stakeholders will do, we need an account of what its stakeholders will do. Therefore, to be really useful to a firm trying to manage its stakeholders, stakeholder theory must provide an account of how stakeholders try to manage a firm. Again, that is the central purpose of this article: to provide an account of how stakeholders try to act to influence the firm's decision making and, ultimately, the firm's behavior. Finally, stakeholder theory's emphasis, to date, has been on the individuals in the relationships—not on the relationships themselves. Consider the simplest variant of a stakeholder analysis: a firm with only one stakeholder. In general, only the firm and the stakeholder have been brought under the lens. There is, however, common in the organization theory literature a way to view a firm and a stakeholder so that there is a third component to gain insight from: the relationship between the two actors. In other words, just as two actors have attributes, their relationship does too. Indeed, the relationship may tell as much or more about how the actors will interact as the individual attributes of the actors will. In this article I consider the resource dimension of a relationship and the power that stems from it, viewing power, then, as an attribute of the relationship between the actors—not of the actors themselves. This differs from previous accounts of power in the stakeholder literature (e.g.. Freeman. 1984; Mitchell, Agle. & Wood. 1997), where power has been treated as an attribute of the individual. In short, considering the relationship between two actors means including a structural component in stakeholder analysis that so far has been lacking, except in Jones's (1995) work involving contracts and Row- 1999 Frooman ley's (1997) work on networks, and that may hold further promise for future work in stakeholder theory. LITERATURE REVIEW Three research streams of strategic stakeholder theory suggest themselves in the form of the three general questions stated earlier: (1) a stream devoted to identifying stakeholder attributes, to answer the question "Who are they?" (2) a stream focused on stakeholder ends, or interests, to answer the question "What do they want?" and (3) a stream directed toward stakeholder influence strategies, to answer the question "How are they going to try to get it?" I discuss each of the three streams in the paragraphs that follow. Many of the answers to the question "Who are they?" have taken the form of lists of stakeholders and categorization schemes of stakeholders (e.g., generic versus specific: Carroll, 1989; primary versus secondary: Clarkson, 1995). In recent years, however, stakeholder attributes have received increasing attention. The most comprehensive work to date is probably that of Mitchell et al. (1997). The authors, in that article, identify urgency, legitimacy, and power as the three key attributes of a stakeholder, arguing that in their various combinations these attributes are indicators of the amount of attention management needs to give a stakeholder. Although urgency has received little prior attention in the stakeholder literature, controversy has surrounded the importance of legitimacy as a stakeholder attribute. From a firm's strategic planning standpoint, does it matter whether society deems appropriate a stakeholder's claims? The appropriateness of a stakeholder's claim may not matter nearly as much as the ability of the stakeholder to affect the direction of the firm. As Freeman (1984) notes, strategies for dealing even with groups well beyond the fringe will be put in place if those groups pose a threat to the firm. What this debate suggests is that although disagreement may exist regarding the importance of legitimacy as an attribute, most scholars probably agree that power is an important one. Various taxonomies have been suggested to serve as the means of categorizing the types of power, including formal, economic, and political (Freeman & Reed. 1983). as well as coercive. 193 utilitarian, and normative (Etzioni. 1964; Mitchell et al.. 1997). Rowley (1997) recently has defined stakeholder power in terms of network structure and position. In addition. Carroll (1989) has suggested that size in terms of budget and staff, as well as amount of and source of funding, could serve as measures of the degree of stakeholder power. In this article I give another account of power—one yet untapped in the stakeholder literature—suggesting that resource dependence theory gives a useful account of stakeholder power, although not in the form of a stakeholder attribute but, rather, as a structural component. In response to "What do they want?" authors have generated numerous lists of stakeholder interests, one of the most comprehensive appearing in Frederick, Post, and Davis's book (1992). Wood (1994) has suggested various categorization schemes for these stakeholder interests, including concrete versus symbolic, economic versus social, and local versus domestic versus international. There is no doubt that the lists and sorting schemes are important. I suggest, however, that although simple in concept, the mere recognition that stakeholder and firm interests do diverge is as important a step toward managing stakeholders as is identifying and classifying those interests. In other words, I wish to surface here an assumption that I believe underlies all of stakeholder theory: stakeholder theory is about managing potential conflict stemming from divergent interests. Although this does not seem to be discussed much in the stakeholder literature. Freeman does note that an early stakeholder scholar. Dill (1975), was the first to extend the stakeholder concept beyond such groups as shareholders and customers to "groups who are usually thought of as having adversarial relationships with the firm," and that in doing so Dill "set the stage for the use of the stakeholder concept as an umbrella for strategic management" (Freeman. 1984: 38). In other words, it was upon applying the stakeholder concept to groups where the potential for conflict existed that the stakeholder model became meaningful. I suggest, then, that if the potential for conflict did not exist—that is, if the firm and all its stakeholders were largely in agreement—managers would have no need to concern themselves with stakeholders or stakeholder theory. In short, conflict, resulting from the opposition of firm and stake- Academy of Management Review 194 holder interests, is an unstated premise of the theory. I want to make this assumption explicit and an integral part of the theory, because this article can give an account of how that conflict plays out, at least in terms of how stakeholders exert their influence in accordance with their interests. In addition, part of this article draws on the bargaining literature, which is an appropriate approach for resolving some conflicts, and, therefore, belongs in the stakeholder literature, from which it has been missing. Finally, answers to the question "How are they going to try to get it?" have always taken the form of analyses of particular stakeholder influence strategies. The first such analysis was probably Vogel's (1978) work, which focused on such strategies as proxy resolutions and boycotts. In recent years stockholder resolutions (Davis & Thompson. 1994). boycotts (Paul & Lydenberg. 1992), and modified vendettas (Corlett, 1989; Shipp, 1987) have all been subject to theoretical treatment. Researchers have performed empirical studies on many of these same stakeholder influence strategies. In these empirical studies scholars generally have considered the effectiveness of the strategies, or the market's reaction to such strategies, and have included examinations of boycotts (Garrett. 1987; Pruitt. Wei, & White, 1988), divestitures (Davidson, Worrell, & El-Jelly, 1995), and letter-writing campaigns (Smith & Cooper-Martin, 1997). As already noted, however, nowhere has anyone attempted to go beyond the listing and discussion of particular influence strategies to construct a model of those strategies. In this article I aim to do just that, presenting a model that will specify the types of stakeholder influence strategies available and identify one determinant of the choice amongst those strategies. As a first step toward a more comprehensive answer to how stakeholders go about getting what they want from management, this model develops the third research stream of strategic stakeholder theory, which, to date, has been left largely unattended. THE ARGUMENT The argument of this article proceeds as follows. First. I propose that open systems theories may be a sensible starting point for understanding stakeholder influence strategies, and I jus- April tify my choice of resource dependence theory from among those. Because power is a central theme in the argument. I review that construct as it exists within resource dependence theory and distinguish that theory's conceptualization of power from the closely related, but different, conceptualization that exchange theory takes. Second, I use resource dependence theory to generate four types of stakeholder influence strategies: withholding, usage, direct, and indirect. This section. Types of Influence Strategies, then, provides an answer to the first research question: "What are the different types of influence strategies?" Third. I derive four types of firm-stakeholder relationships from resource dependence theory: firm power, high interdependence, low interdependence, and stakeholder power. Fourth, then. I demonstrate how resource dependence theory provides an argument for mapping the types of influence strategies onto the types of relationships, thereby suggesting that the type of relationship is a determinant of the choice of influence strategy. These two sections combined provide an answer to the second research question: "What are the determinants of the choice of influence strategy?" Last (and fifth). I put forward propositions and discuss empirical methods for testing them. The article ends with a concluding section summarizing the article's key points. The example I refer to throughout this article is the clash that took place between the EII, an environmental organization, and StarKist. The confrontation between the two had been simmering throughout much of the 1980s, because the foreign tuna fishing industry, from whom StarKist purchased much of its tuna, was using a very efficient method of netting tuna, called "purse-seining." This method was also trapping and killing over 100,000 dolphins yearly. As a result, the United States had banned this method of catching tuna, so the domestic fleet was using other methods of netting tuna. In January of 1988, the EII announced its intention of ending StarKist's practice of canning purse-seined tuna purchased from the foreign tuna fishing fleet. First, the EII called upon consumers to boycott StarKist. In conjunction with this call, the EII produced an 11-minute video full of gruesome scenes of half-drowned dolphins being mangled in a ship's net-hauling machinery and then being heaved overboard as 1999 frooman shark bait. The video ended with the call for the boycott. In March of 1988, the video was aired in parts or in its entirety on all the major networks. The EII then mass produced the video and began distributing it to schools around the country. During the rest of 1988 and 1989, first the environmental media and then, gradually, the general media began reporting on the story. By March of 1990, 60 percent of the public was aware of the issue and the call for a boycott of StarKist tuna (Ramirez, 1990). In the following month. StarKist announced it would purchase only tuna caught by methods other than purseseining and would insist that foreign tuna boats carry on-board impartial observers (from the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission) to monitor the methods the crews were using. THE POWER TO EXTERNALLY CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS The questions this article addresses, regarding available influence strategies and selection amongst them, constitute a narrowed version of a broader question in the management literature: How can external entities influence an organization's behavior? This framing of the question suggests looking to the open-systems (Katz & Kahn, 1966) theories as a possible approach for understanding influence strategies, because these theories examine how the environment affects organizations. Among these theories, agency and resource dependence (and, to some degree, network) focus more on how particular social actors within the environment affect a focal organization and assume that the focal organization can actively respond to those social actors (Donaldson, 1995; Nohria & Gulati, 1994; Oliver, 1991). Although agency theory (Hill & Jones, 1992) and network theory (Rowley, 1997) have been shown to be productive approaches to developing stakeholder theory, in this article I have chosen the yet untapped theory of resource dependence as a framework, for as Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have argued. Because organizations are not self-contained or self-sufficient, the environment must be relied upon to provide support. For continuing to provide what the organization needs, the external groups or organizations may demand certain actions from the organization in return. It is the fact 195 of the organization's dependence on the environment that makes the external constraint and control of organizational behavior both possible and almost inevitable (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 43). In short, it is the dependence of firms on environmental actors (i.e.. external stakeholders) for resources that gives those actors leverage over a firm. Because those situations where the interests of a stakeholder and a firm are in conflict form the more interesting class of stakeholder-firm interactions, and because, as already argued, they seem to lie at the core of stakeholder theory. I focus on them. Now, in those cases where interests diverge and the firm is unwilling to change its behavior to accommodate a stakeholder, power is likely to decide the outcome (Pfeffer, 1981, 1992, 1997). Of course, there are many treatises on power; however, exchange theory (e.g., Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962, 1972, 1981) and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) have focused on power in the context of resource exchange and dependence; thus, their perspectives on the sources of power are the most relevant to this article. Exchange theory and resource dependence theory are closely related. The latter is essentially a customized version of the former, designed largely to explain the external control of organizations, which is why it is the more suitable theory of the two for this article's purposes. The theories are similar in how they define a resource and how they define dependence: a resource is essentially anything an actor perceives as valuable, whereas dependence is a state in which one actor relies on the actions of another to achieve particular outcomes (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer, 1992). Operationalized, resource dependence is said to exist when one actor is supplying another with a resource that is marked by (1) concentration (suppliers are few in number), (2) controllability, (3) nonmobility, (4) nonsubstitutability (Barney. 1991; Emerson, 1962; Jacobs. 1974; Pfeffer & Salancik. 1978), or (5) essentiality. Essentiality of a resource is itself a function of two factors: (1) relative magnitude of exchange and (2) criticality. The relative magnitude of exchange has to do with the percent of inputs/outputs accounted for by an exchange. In other words, if organization A supplies a large proportion of inputs to organization B. or absorbs a large proportion of outputs from B. then B will be depen- 196 Academy of Management Review dent on A. The criticality of a resource has to do with whether an organization can exist without it. if the resource is an input, or exist without a market for it, if the resource is an output Jacobs, 1974; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Power in both theories could be defined as "the structurally determined potential for obtaining favored payoffs in relations where interests are opposed" (Wilier, Lovaglia, & Markovsky, 1997: 573). Power is structurally determined in the sense that the nature of the relationship—that is. who is dependent on whom and how much—determines who has power. However, although exchange and resource dependence theorists may agree on this definition of power, they disagree on how to operationalize it. Proponents of exchange theory, the earlier of the two theories, state that the power of agent A over agent B is "equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A" (Emerson. 1962: 33). Power, then, is stated in absolute terms; to find if A has power over B, one need only look to see if B is dependent on A. However, proponents of resource dependence theory operationalize power as follows: "For the dependence between two organizations to provide one organization with power over the other, there must be asymmetry in the exchange relationship" (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 53). So. in order to know if A has power over B. one must verify both that B is dependent on A and that A is not dependent on B. Power, thus, is defined in relative terms—that is, A has power over B if B is more dependent on A relative to A's dependence on B (Lawler & Yoon, 1995). Because I feel that resource dependence theory is customized for the purposes of this article, I draw upon its notion of relative power later in the article when characterizing the types of relationships organizations can have. TYPES OF INFLUENCE STRATEGIES Central to resource dependence theory is the notion that a firm's need for resources provides opportunities for others to gain control over it. In discussions of resources, a simple input-output model can be a useful way to conceptualize the flow of resources. That resources flow into a firm and are then converted by that firm into outputs suggests that there are two ways in which others can exert control over a firm: (1) in determining whether the firm gets the resources and (2) in April determining whether it can use them in the way it wants. These I term resource control strategies, which I consider to be one type of influence strategy. In addition, because I seek to expand stakeholder theory beyond the simple hub-and-spoke conceptualization with its independent dyadic ties, and to recognize that resource relationships can be and often are embedded in other relationships, I assert that there may be more than one route of influence for a stakeholder to follow: direct, or indirect via another stakeholder. These I term pathways of influence, which I consider to be a second type of influence strategy. Both resource control strategies and pathway strategies are detailed in the sections below. Types of Resource Control As indicated above, actors providing resources to a firm are said to have two general means of control over a firm: (1) determining whether the firm gets the resources it needs and (2) determining whether the firm can use the resources in the way it wants. These two ways of manipulating resources were characterized as discretion over resource allocation and discretion over resource use by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Pfeffer (1992). I refer to them in this article as withholding and usage strategies. In the exchange theory literature, my withholding and usage strategies differ mainly in terms of emphasis from the hostile and conciliatory tactics found in Lawler and Bacharach (1987) and Lawler (1992). Their terminology tends to refer to the emotive quality of the tactics (e.g., Lawler & Yoon, 1993, 1995, 1996), whereas my terminology focuses more on the means of leverage the stakeholder has over the firm. Withholding strategies. Discretion over allocation translates to a stakeholder influence strategy only if a stakeholder chooses not to allocate—that is, it withholds—its resource. In other words, a stakeholder with discretion over allocation only has power if it has the "ability to articulate a credible threat of withdrawal" of those resources (Pfeffer & Leong, 1977: 779). Withholding strategies are defined quite simply, then, as those where the stakeholder discontinues providing a resource to a firm with the intention of making the firm change a certain behavior. Of course, every stakeholder providing a resource to a firm has a method of withholding 1999 Frooman it. and a different term is used to label the method of practically every stakeholder. For example, employees withhold labor by striking, and creditors withhold debt financing by nonrenewal of loans. In the StarKist-EII example, it was a consumer boycott—customers withholding their dollars—that influenced StarKist's decision to confront the foreign tuna fishing industry over its practices. I should probably note that the mere threat of using withholding (or any of the influence strategies) may be as effective a tool for influencing firm behavior as the actual use of the strategy. In this article, however, I do not really examine the factors determining effectiveness but, rather, the factors determining choice of strategy. For the purposes of this article, then, it really does not matter whether the stakeholder actually ever withholds or simply threatens to do so. Usage strategies. Usage strategies are those in which the stakeholder continues to supply a resource, but with strings attached. In the StarKist-EII example, StarKist employed a usage strategy against the foreign tuna fishing industry: while StarKist continued to purchase tuna, it did so with the conditions that the industry use other types of nets besides purse-seins and that observers be on board tuna boats to assure this. So, in short, withholding strategies determine whether a firm obtains a resource, whereas usage strategies seek to attach conditions to the continued supply of that resource. Now, in either case (withholding or usage strategies), the stakeholder demands that the firm change some behavior. In either case, the stakeholder uses its resource relationship with the firm to leverage that demand. And, in either case, if the stakeholder is successful in employing its strategy, the firm will change its behavior. From the firm's point of view. then, withholding and usage strategies may appear to amount to the same thing. From the stakeholder's point of view, however, withholding and usage strategies differ markedly: they differ in their approach, they differ in what ultimately makes them credible threats (Schelling. 1956; Williamson. 1983), and they differ in terms of the provisions they include regarding who pays the costs that may accrue to a firm if the firm is to change its behavior according to the stakeholder's demands. 197 Quite simply, in terms of approach, a stakeholder that employs a withholding strategy is prepared to shut off the flow of resources to a firm, whereas a stakeholder that employs a usage strategy is not. Clearly, what will make the threat of withholding credible is the ability of the stakeholder to simply walk away from the relationship with no harm to itself. This will occur when the firm is unilaterally dependent on the stakeholder. In other situations, however, such as one in which there is reciprocal exposure—that is. when the stakeholder and firm are mutually dependent—the stakeholder will not be in a position to walk away from the relationship (Lawler & Bacharach, 1987; Williamson. 1979. 1983). In such a scenario the welfare of each will be linked to the other, so each will do well only by attending to the needs of the other. In the StarKist-EII scenario, for example, the sales of the foreign tuna fishing industry were linked to the sales of StarKist. That industry knew that if a boycott were to begin affecting StarKist's sales, the fleet's sales to StarKist eventually would have to be affected too. Thus, the industry could do well only by acceding to StarKist's demands regarding choice of netting and on-board observers. Finally, provisions for which party pays costs is also a distinguishing characteristic between withholding and usage strategies. If we assume that a firm seeks profits and, therefore, chooses efficient actions, then a stakeholder that requests a change in firm behavior is implicitly asking the firm to choose a less efficient means to its end. Economic costs, thus, will presumably be involved in a change of firm behavior. Indeed, in the StarKist-EII case, the reason the foreign tuna fishing industry purse-seined was that it was the most efficient method of netting tuna, so any deviation from that practice was going to be costly to that industry. Similarly, the reason StarKist canned purse-seined tuna was that from an efficiency standpoint, as the lowest-costing tuna, it was the preferred tuna to can, so any deviation from that practice was going to be costly to that company. In addition to economic costs, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcement costs also could be involved. Costs of changing behavior, then, will be a major issue in any given stakeholder-firm dispute; in fact, from the firm's point of view. 198 Academy oi Management Review again assuming that firms are first and foremost profit maximizers, it will be the major issue. Authors of the social exchange literature that pertains to bargaining (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Lawler, 1986, 1992; Lawler & Bacharach, 1987) would predict that with withholding strategies, it would typically be the firm that would be expected to pay the greatest portion of the costs, whereas with usage strategies, costs would tend more to be shared. As will be demonstrated later in this article, this is because withholding strategies are used when the balance of power lies on the side of the stakeholder. In other words, when the firm is more dependent on the stakeholder than the stakeholder is on the firm, the stakeholder can afford to withhold and try to push costs onto the firm. Usage strategies, however, are used when power lies more evenly between the two, and, thus, costs are more evenly divided. Types of Influence Pathways A second source of power that exists in resource dependence is the one that arises from relationships with others who supply resources to a focal firm. In other words, withholding and usage do not have to be performed by a stakeholder but, instead, could be performed by an ally of the stakeholder with whom the focal firm has a dependence relationship. The existence of such allies determines the pathway of influence the stakeholder can use to exercise resource control. Gargiulo (1993) has divided these pathways into "direct" and "multistep" and has demonstrated that they do exist as interorganizational power strategies and do occur within the context of resource dependence theory. In this article I refer to the pathways as direct and indirect. Direct strategies. Direct strategies I define simply as those in which the stakeholder itself manipulates the flow of resources to the firm (again, either by withholding or usage). In the StarKist-EII example, when the consumers did choose to boycott StarKist tuna, they were exercising a direct strategy against that firm. Indirect strategies. Indirect action against a target organization is a notion that exists elsewhere in the open systems theories. For example, in agency theory Mahon (1993) has used the term manufactured agents to refer to indirect agents—those that work in concordance with a April principal, although there is no formal agency relationship between them. In network theory Rowley (1997) has used the term indirect stakeholders to refer to influential agents of a focal organization that do not have direct relationships with that organization, but still work in the focal firm's interests. In the context of resource dependence theory. I define indirect strategies as those in which the stakeholder works through an ally, by having the ally manipulate the flow of resources to the firm (by either withholding or usage). Taking an ongoing resource relationship and embedding into it a new relationship is the essence of the indirect strategy. The purpose of adding this new relationship is to shift the balance of power to favor the weaker actor. This is akin to both the process described by Granovetter (1985), where organizations gain control over economic transactions by embedding them in social relationships, and the social structure analysis approach of Burt (1982, 1992), where constraint results from dependence on coordinated actors. As indicated, in the StarKist-EII controversy, the EIFs efforts to organize consumers to boycott StarKist was an example of a stakeholder group (the EII) using an indirect strategy against a firm. Of course, the first step in any indirect strategy has to be a communication strategy, which the stakeholder directs at the ally. Specifically, communication strategies are those where the stakeholder informs a potential ally about (1) a firm's behavior, (2) why the stakeholder perceives that behavior to be undesirable, and (3) what the ally ought to do (i.e., initiate a resource strategy against the firm or a communication strategy directed at an ally of the ally). In the StarKist-EII example, the 11-minute video EII filmed on the Panamanian tuna boat formed the center of the Ell's communication strategy. Aired on all of the major television networks and then mass produced and distributed, the video was the primary vehicle by which the EII communicated its request for a boycott to consumers. In short, the indirect strategy employed by the EII against StarKist entailed a communication strategy between the EII and consumers and a direct strategy (the boycott) between consumers and StarKist. 1999 Frooman TYPES OF RESOURCE RELATIONSHIPS To begin to address the second research question posed in this article's introduction, "What are the determinants of the choice of influence strategy?" I introduce, in this section, a typology of stakeholder-firm relationships based on resource dependence theory. As already suggested, power will be a central determinant of outcomes in those situations where a stakeholder and a firm find their interests opposed. In the resource and exchange literature, power stems from the dependencies of the two parties on one another; in other words, power is structural in nature, arising from the relationship between the two parties. How, then, can the different types of resource relationships be characterized in terms of dependencies? Pfeffer and Salancik posit that "when the net exchange between organizational entities is asymmetrical, some net power accrues to the less dependent organization. This power may be employed in attempting to influence or constrain the behavior of the other more dependent organization" (1978: 53). However, if the net exchange is symmetrical, so that the two organizations are equally dependent on each other, neither "possesses a particular power advantage, reducing the likelihood that one organization will dominate interorganizational influences" (1978: 53). This argument suggests a typology of the possible relationships, based on dependencies, between two organizations (e.g., between a stakeholder and a firm). Pfeffer and Salancik never presented such a typology, but the one that appears in Table 1 stems directly from their work (1978: 52-54). Each axis has to do with dependence, which, of course, can range from low to high. For simplification purposes, however, dependence is treated as a dichotomous variable here, such TABLE 1 Typology of Resource Relationships Is the stakeholder dependent on the firm? c2 II •£ Yes ~c n O No Yes Low interdependence Firm power Stakeholder power High interdependence 199 that each party either is or is not dependent on the other. The horizontal axis has to do with dependence of the stakeholder on the firm and the vertical axis with dependence of the firm on the stakeholder. Two quadrants along one diagonal (northeast and southwest) capture Pfeffer and Salancik's notion of asymmetry in the exchange relationship leading to power. I label these stakeholder power and firm power. The former, for example, occurs when the stakeholder is less dependent on the firm than the firm is on the stakeholder. The other two quadrants along the other diagonal illustrate Pfeffer and Salancik's conception of interdependence, which occurs when there is symmetry in the exchange relationship—either both parties are highly dependent on one another, or both parties are not very dependent on each other. I label these high interdependence and low interdependence, accordingly. In the StarKist-EII example, using the essentiality of a resource as a criterion for determining dependency, I argue that the relationships between the adversaries were as follows. First, between the EII and StarKist, neither was dependent on the other for a resource, so this indicates that a low-interdependence relationship existed between them. Second, in the relationship between consumers and StarKist, StarKist was highly dependent on tuna consumers for sales revenues, because StarKist's only business line is tuna products. Consumers, however, were not dependent on tuna, and many appeared to be happy doing without it for months at a time. This combination of dependencies suggests a relationship that can be characterized as one of stakeholder power. Third and last, between StarKist and the foreign tuna fishing industry, I believe a high-interdependence relationship existed. At the time, StarKist was the largest tuna canner in the world—canning 35 percent of the tuna consumed in the United States (Lancaster, 1990)—so StarKist was the primary customer of the foreign tuna fishing industry. The foreign tuna fishing industry, in turn, was the primary supplier to StarKist, providing it with 70 percent of its tuna (Oceans, 1988). This suggests a high level of interdependence because, given the huge volume of business moving between the two parties, neither could have replaced the other easily or quickly. Academy oi Management 200 CHOICE OF STRATEGY The second research question posed in this article, "What are the determinants of the choice of influence strategy?" remains unanswered at this point. The preceding two sections, however, have laid the groundwork for an answer by first defining the types of influence strategies that exist and then defining the types of resource relationships that exist. In this section I demonstrate how resource dependence theory suggests that relationship drives the choice of strategyLevel of Firm Dependence Determines Type of Pathway Chosen First, as Pfeffer notes, organizations will be responsive to others in their environment who provide them with valuable resources: Resource dependence theory suggests that organizational behaviors become externally influenced because the focal organization must attend to the demands of those in its environment that provide resources necessary and important for its continued survival. . .organizations will (and should) respond more to the demands of those organizations or groups in the environment that control critical resources (Pfeffer, 1982: 193). Put another way, a low level of dependence of a firm on a stakeholder implies that the firm does not need to be responsive to the stakeholder. The firm, then, is somewhat impervious to stakeholder influence. Thus, the stakeholder will tend to use indirect strategies (i.e., act through an ally on whom the firm is more dependent and, therefore, more responsive to) to influence the firm. Level of Stakeholder Dependence Determines Type of Resource Control Chosen Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) also note that when resource dependence exists, it means that the welfare of the focal firm is linked to the organization providing key resources. As the degree of dependence increases, the more tightly the focal firm's outcomes become tied to its resource providers. Therefore, a high level of dependence of the stakeholder on the firm means that the welfare of the stakeholder is closely tied to the welfare of the firm. The stakeholder, then, will not wish to see the firm's success threatened and, therefore, will not choose to withhold a Review April critical resource from the firm; rather, the stakeholder will tend to focus on usage strategies as its means of influence. Typology of Influence Strategies and Resource Relationships Using these two assumptions regarding strategy choices, one can construct a simple two-bytwo typology of strategies of the four possible strategies and the circumstances under which each will be chosen (see Table 2). The high-interdependence cell is of particular interest. As already noted, the foreign tuna fishing industry and StarKist were in this category. Their relationship was a mixture of mutual dependence and conflict: they were partners in that neither could do well without the other and that both stood to lose by a successful consumer boycott, and, yet, as firms in the same valueadded chain, they were adversaries—each trying to extract from the chain as much profit as possible at the expense of the other. Schelling (1960) labels actors in such situations as "mixedmotive" (mixed, that is, in their relationship to one another—half-partner, half-competitor—not in terms of their clarity of mind regarding preferences). Common sense would suggest that such mixed-motive players would negotiate and find a mutually acceptable solution regarding behaviors they engage in jointly, in order to avoid mutual disaster. Recent empirical studies in the social exchange literature on bilateral deterrence (Lawler, 1992; Lawler & Bacharach, 1987; Lawler & Yoon, 1995, 1996) support this intuition about mixed-motive players. Common sense might also suggest that in high-interdependence relationships the costs that accompany behavioral changes will be shared by both parties. Game theory literature TABLE 2 Typology of Influence Strategies I8 the stakeholder dependent on the firm? IIax 0) o TI J« No E 2 --E m ^ Yes £ ~ m O No Indirect/withholding (low interdependence) Direct/withholding (stakeholder power) Yes Indirect/usage (firm power) Direct/usage (high interdependence) 1999 Fiooman supports this intuition: in game theory the highinterdependence relationship would be characterized as a two-person, non-zero-sum, explicitbargaining game (Lawler, 1992; Schelling, 1960; Straff in, 1993). Researchers have shown, in such games, that in any round of bargaining, the player with the lower ratio of cost of concession to cost of exit must rationally concede to the other (Zeuthen. 1930/1968) and that, after enough rounds, players eventually will move away from all-or-nothing solutions and arrive at a compromise point. Where, theoretically, this point exists is a matter of controversy (e.g., Gauthier, 1986; Hampton, 1991; Harsanyi, 1977; Nash, 1953)! What everyone agrees on, however, is that a compromise solution does exist and that rational players will seek it. In short, two actors finding themselves in a high-interdependence relationship can be expected to bargain over the costs involved and eventually to agree to share those costs in some manner. StarKist-EII Example As an illustration of the theory, consider the StarKist-EII confrontation again. Given the relationships among the players, does the theory account for what strategies the players chose to try? Consider the first pair of adversaries—the EII and StarKist—which, I have argued, was an example of a low-interdependence relationship. Accordingly, the theory would predict that the EII would try indirect withholding. The EII sought out consumers as an ally and communicated to them (via its video) its desire for a boycott—an indirect withholding strategy. The second pair of adversaries—consumers and StarKist—was engaged in a relationship marked by stakeholder power. The theory would predict, then, the use of a direct withholding strategy by the consumers. The consumers, in large numbers, did boycott tuna—a direct withholding strategy. Finally, consider StarKist versus the foreign tuna fishing industry, which were in a highinterdependence relationship—one we have observed is marked by both partnership and competition. The theory would predict a direct usage strategy here. StarKist, never once threatening to withhold its business, informed the foreign tuna fishing industry that it wanted tuna netted by methods other than purse-seining and that it 201 wanted observers on the boats to verify the practices the boats were using. This is a direct usage strategy: StarKist attached strings to its business with the foreign tuna fishing industry. Foremost among the costs associated with the above change in behaviors by StarKist and the foreign tuna fishing industry would be the economic costs involved with the switch to netting methods less efficient than purse-seining and the monitoring costs associated with the maintenance of on-board observers. These costs were split roughly evenly between StarKist and the foreign tuna fishing industry. (The cost per ton of tuna at the dock increased only slightly, even though it cost the industry more to catch it, and the cost per tin of tuna on the supermarket shelf remained the same, even though it was costing StarKist slightly more to purchase it at the dock.) So, where StarKist was the target of a withholding strategy by consumers, the balance of power lay with the stakeholder (the consumers), and the costs of behavioral change fell on the firm—StarKist. When StarKist turned on the foreign tuna fishing industry, however, and made it the target of a usage strategy, the balance of power lay more evenly between the two, owing to the nature of the relationship (high interdependence); thus, the costs were ultimately split between the two, as would be predicted in a two-person, non-zero-sum, explicit-bargaining game. PROPOSITIONS In this article I have been arcfuing that who is dependent on whom and by how much determines the type of influence strategy that will be chosen. The questions "Is the stakeholder dependent on the firm?" and "Is the firm dependent on the stakeholder?" determine the independent variable: the type of resource relationship. The dependent variable is the choice of influence strategy. Corresponding, then, to each of the four cells in the second typology (Table 2) is a testable proposition. Each proposition identifies the relationship between the stakeholder and firm in terms of their dependence on one another (the independent variable) and then states which strategy the stakeholder would choose to influence the firm's decision making (the dependent variable): 202 April Academy oi Management Review Proposition 1: When the relationship is one of low interdependence, the stakeholder will choose an indirect withholding strategy to influence the firm. Proposition 2: When the relationship is marked by firm power, the stakeholder will choose an indirect usage strategy to influence the firm. Proposition 3: When the relationship is marked by stakeholder power, the stakeholder will choose a direct withholding strategy to influence the firm. Proposition 4: When the relationship is one of high interdependence, the stakeholder will choose a direct usage strategy to influence the firm. In an empirical test of this article's four propositions, the dependent variable could be categorical—withholding, usage, direct, or indirect—or could be, in part, numeric, with a proportion of the cost of behavioral change bome by the firm serving as a proxy for withholding and usage strategies. In other words, we can distinguish between withholding and usage operationally by determining whether almost all of the costs involved are absorbed by the firm (withholding) or whether the costs are more evenly split between the firm and stakeholder (usage). Most of the methodological issues, then, would probably revolve around the independent variable. Although determining who is dependent on whom may not be problematic, determining the extent of that dependence may be. The simplest way of addressing this problem would be through a laboratory study in which the level of dependence could be manipulated straightforwardly. For example, games similar to the prisoner's dilemma have been devised, where the level of dependence of each party on the other is varied systematically across four versions of the conflict scenario (Ford & Blegan, 1992; Lawler & Yoon, 1993). Many have questioned the generalizability of results garnered from such laboratory experiments (Gilbert, 1996), and several have performed studies using business data (Pfeffer. 1972; Randall. 1973; Salancik. 1979). In one study Pfeffer and Leong (1977) examined allocations to members of local United Ways to see if allocations were a function of dependence. Depen- dence of the members on the United Way was measured in terms of the proportion of the member's own budget received from the United Way, whereas dependence of the United Way on the members was a function of the size of the member. These studies all make use of nonprofit and public sector data, presumably because they are publicly available. Resource dependence studies with for-profit data are lacking, however, except at the industry level (e.g., Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976), despite criticism that resource dependence theory is an organization theory and, therefore, should not be tested at the industry level (Davis & Powell, 1990; Nohria & Gulati, 1994). A better approach, then, might be to look at the work done on wholesaler-sponsored voluntary chains (Kotler, 1997), such as True Value hardware stores. Retailers join such voluntary chains to achieve buying economies and to standardize their products. Within these chains, each store carries national brands, in addition to the wholesaler's private label, and the owner of each store decides that mix. Although there is effort at standardization, special deals and advertising arrangements may be negotiated between a retailer and the wholesaler on a caseby-case basis, and participation in wholesalerorganized advertising, for example, may vary from store to store. Given the existence of such chains, the influence strategies used by the wholesaler to enforce initiatives (e.g., use of advertisements picturing minorities) could be examined. The dependence of the wholesaler on any given retailer could be measured by the proportion of the wholesaler's revenues provided by that retailer (note that some individuals own two or more retail stores), whereas the dependence of the retailer on the wholesaler could be measured by the percentage of total purchases the retailer obtains from the wholesaler. In short, the approach would be similar to that taken by Pfeffer and Leong (1977), except the researcher would use data from the for-profit sector as opposed to the nonprofit sector. CONCLUSION When stakeholders seek to influence corporate behavior, what types of influence strategies do they have available and what factors can 1999 Frooman explain which strategies they choose to use? The theory in this article suggests the following: (1) that four types of stakeholder influence strategies— direct withholding, indirect withholding, direct usage, and indirect usage—exist; (2) that four types of resource relationships—stakeholder power, high interdependence, low interdependence, and firm power—exist; and (3) that the balance of power implied by the relationship determines which of the types of strategy a stakeholder will use. High dependence of the stakeholder on the firm implies the stakeholder will employ usage strategies; low dependence implies the use of withholding. High dependence of the firm on the stakeholder implies the use of direct strategies; low dependence implies indirect ones. The theory, then, provides one possible answer to the question regarding how stakeholders go about trying to get what they want from firms—one of three key questions this article's introduction suggested lay at the heart of strategic stakeholder theory. As I have argued in this article, putting the focus on the influence strategies of stakeholders instead of on the response strategies of firms (Oliver, 1991) may, at first, seem a counterintuitive approach to strategic stakeholder theory. After all, if stakeholder theory is managerial in orientation (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), it seems that articles ought to focus on firm actions—not stakeholder actions. However, knowing how stakeholders may try to influence a firm is critical knowledge for any manager. After all. for managers to act strategically and plan the actions they intend their firm to take presupposes that they have some idea of how others in their environment will act. In short, I have contended in this article that understanding the actions of those one may need to respond to is a part of good management and, thus, is rightfully part of stakeholder theory. I believe this approach to strategic stakeholder theory holds promise for the ongoing development of stakeholder theory. REFERENCES 203 Brenner, S. N., & Cochran, P. 1991. The stakeholder theory of the firm: Implications for business and society theory and research. In J. F. Mahon (Ed.), Proceedings of the second annual meeting of the International Association for Business and Society: 449-467. Burt, R. S. 1982. Toward a structural theory of action. New York: Academic Press. Burt, R. S. 1992. Structural holes: The social structure of competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Burton, B. K., & Dunn, C. P. 1996. Feminist ethics as moral grounding for stakeholder theory. Business Ethics Quarterly, 6: 133-148. Carroll, A. B. 1989. Business and society: Ethics and stakeholder management. Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing. Clarkson, M. B. E. 1995. A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social performance. Academy of Management Review, 20: 92-117. Cohen, S. 1995. Stakeholders and consent. Business & Professional Ethics, 14(1): 3-16. Corlett, J. A. 1989. The "modified vendetta sanction" as a method of corporate collective punishment. Journal of Business Ethics, 8: 937-942. Davidson, W. N., Worrell, D. L., & El-Jelly, A. 1995. Influencing managers to change unpopular corporate behavior through boycotts and divestitures: A stock market test. Business & Society, 34: 171-196. Davis, G. F., & Powell, W. W. 1990. Organization-environment relations. In M. D. Dunnette & L. M. Hough (Eds.), Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology, vol. 3: 316-375. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Davis, G. F., & Thompson, T. A. 1994. A social movement perspective on corporate control. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39: 141-173. Dill, W. 1975. Public participation in corporate planning: Strategic management in a kibitzer's world, iong Aange Planning, 8(1): 57-63. Donaldson, L. 1995. American anti-management theories of organizations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. 1995. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications. Academy of Management Review, 20: 65-91. Emerson, R. M. 1962. Power-dependence relations. American Socio/ogical Review, 27: 31-41. Emerson, R. M. 1972. Exchange theory: Part II. Exchange relations in networks. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch, & B. Anderson (Eds.), Sociological theories in progress, vol. 2: 58-87. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Bacharach, S. B., & Lawler, E. J. 1981. Bargaining: Power, tactics, and outcomes. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Emerson, R. M. 1981. Social exchange theory. In M. Rosenberg & R. H. Turner (Eds.), Sociai psychology: Sociological perspectives: 30-65. New York: Basic Books. Barney, J. B. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17: 99-120. Etzioni, A. 1964. Modem organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Blau, P. 1964. Exchange and power in social life. New York: Wiley. Evan, W. M., & Freeman, R. E. 1988. A stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: Kantian capitalism. In 204 Academy oi Management Review April T. Beauchamp & N. Bowie (Eds.), Ethical theory in business; 75-93. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Lancaster, J. 1990. Three tuna firms move to save dolphins. The Washington Post. April 13: Al, 14. Ford, R., & Blegan, M. A. 1992. Offensive and defensive use of punitive tactics in explicit bargaining. Social Psychology Quarterly, 55: 351-362. Lawler, E. J. 1986. Bilateral deterrence and conflict spiral: A theoretical analysis. In E. J. Lawler (Ed.), Advances in group processes: 107-130. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Frederick, W. C, Post, J. E., & Davis, K. 1992. Business and society: Corporate strategy, public policy, ethics (7th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. Lawler, E. J. 1992. Power processes in bargaining. The Sociological Quarterly, 33: 17-34. Freeman, R. E. 1984. Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman Publishing. Lawler, E. J., & Bacharach, S. B. 1987. Comparison of dependence and punitive forms of power. Social Forces, 66: 446-462. Freeman, R. E., & Evan, W. M. 1990. Corporate governance: A stakeholder interpretation. Journal oi Behavioral Economics, 19: 337-359. Lawler, E. J., & Yoon, J. 1993. Power and the emergence of commitment behavior in negotiated exchange. American Sociological Review. 58: 465-481. Freeman, R. E., & Reed, D. L. 1983. Stockholders and stakeholders: A new perspective on corporate governance. California Management Review, 25(3): 88-106. Lawler, E. J., & Yoon, J. 1995. Structural power and emotional processes in negotiation: A social exchange approach In R. M. Kramer & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Negotiation as a social process: 143-165. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Gargiulo, M. 1993. Twro-step leverage: Managing constraint in organizational politics. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38: 1-19. Garrett, D. E. 1987. The effectiveness of marketing policy boycotts. Journal oi Marketing, 51: 46-57. Gauthier, D. 1986. Morals by agreement. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Gilbert, D. R. 1996. The prisoner's dilemma and the prisoners of prisoner's dilemma. Business Ethics Quarterly, 6: 165-178. Goodpastor, K. 1991. Business ethics and stakeholder analysis. Business Ethics Quarterly, 1: 53—71. Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American Journal oi Sociology. 91: 481-510. Hampton, J. 1991. Equalizing concessions in the pursuit of justice: A discussion of Gauthier's bargaining solution. In P. Vallentyne (Ed), Contractarianism and rational choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement: 149-161. New York: Cambridge University Press. Harsanyi, J. 1977. Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Hill, C. W. L., & Jones, T. M. 1992. Stakeholder-agency theory. Journal oi Management Studies, 29: 131-154. Huse, M., & Eide, D. 1996. Stakeholder management and the avoidance of corporate control. Business & Society. 35: 211-243. Jacobs, D. 1974. Dependency and vulnerability: An exchange approach to the control of organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 19: 45-59. Jones, T. M. 1995. Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and econometrics. Academy oi Management Review, 20: 404-437. Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. 1966. The social psychology oi organizations. New York: Wiley. Kotler, P. 1997. Marketing management: Analysis, planning, implementation, and control. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Lawler, E. J., & Yoon, J. 1996. Commitment in exchange relations: Test of a theory of relational cohesion. American Sociological Review. 61: 89-108. Mahon, J. F. 1993. Shaping issues/manufacturing agents: Corporate political sculpting. In B. M. Mitnick (Ed), Corporate political agency: The construction oi competition in public aiiairs: 187-212. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. 1997. Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy oi Management Review, 22: 853-886. Nash, J. 1953. Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica, 21: 128-140. Nohria, N., & Gulati, R. 1994. Firms and their environments. In N. J. Smelser & R. Swedberg (Eds.), Handbook oi economic sociology: 529-555. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Oceans. 1988. Setting on dolphins. 21 (October): 69. Oliver, C. 1991. Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management Review, 16: 145-179. Paul, K., & Lydenberg, S. D. 1992. Applications of corporate social monitoring systems. Journal oi Business Ethics, 11: 1-10. Pfeffer, J. 1972. Interorganizational influence and managerial attitudes. Academy oi Management Journal 15: 317-330. Pfeffer, J. 1981. Power in organizations. Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing. Pfeffer, J. 1982. Organizations and organization theory. Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing. Pfeffer, J. 1992. Managing with power: Politics and influence in organizations. Boston: Harvard University Press. Pfeffer, J. 1997. New directions for organization theory: Problems and prospects. New York: Oxford University Press. Pfeffer, J., & Leong, A. 1977. Resource allocations in United funds: Examination of power and dependence. Social forces. 55: 775-790. Pfeffer, J., & Nowak, P. 1976. Joint venture and interorganiza- 1999 frooman tional dependence. Administrative 21:98-118. 205 Science Quarterly Shipp, S. 1987. Modified vendettas as a method of punishing corporations. Journal of Business Ethics, 6: 603-612. Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The external control of organizations. New York: Harper & Row. Smith, N. C, & Cooper-Martin, E. 1997. Ethics and target marketing: The role of product harm and consumer vulnerability. Journal oi Marketing, 61: 1-20. Phillips, R. A. 1997. Stakeholder theory and a principle of fairness. Business Ethics Quarterly. 7: 51-66. Pruitt, S. W., Wei, K. C , & White, R. E. 1988. The impact of union-sponsored boycotts on the stock prices of target firms. Journal of Labor Research. 9: 285-289. Ramirez, A. 1990. "Epic debate" led to Heinz tuna plan. New York Times. April 16: Dl, 6. Randall, R. 1973. Influence of environmental support and policy space on organizational behavior. Administrative Science Quarterly. 18: 236-247. Rowley, T. J. 1997. Moving beyond dyadic ties: A network theory of stakeholder influences. Academy of Management Review. 22: 887-910. Straffin, P. D. 1993. Game theory and strategy. Washington, DC: Mathematical Association of America. Vogel, D. 1978. Lobbying the corporation: Citizen challenges to business authority. New York: Basic Books. Wicks, A. C, Gilbert, D. R., & Freeman, R. E. 1994. A feminist reinterpretation of the stakeholder concept. Business Ethics Quarterly, 4: 475-497. Wilier, D., Lovaglia, M. J., & Markovsky, B. 1997. Power and influence: A theoretical bridge. Social Forces, 76- 571603. Williamson, O. E. 1979. Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law & Economics, 22: 233-261. Salancik, G. R. 1979. Interorganizational dependence and responsiveness to affirmative action: The case of women and defense contractors. Academy of Management Journal, 22: 375-394. Williamson, O. E. 1983. Credible commitments: Using hostages to support exchange. American Economic Review, 73: 519-540. Schelling, T. C. 1956. An essay on bargaining. American Economic Review, 46: 281-306. Wood, D. J. 1994. Business and society (2nd ed.). New York: Harper Collins. Schelling, T. C. 1960. The strategy of conflict. London: Oxford University Press. Zeuthen, F. 1930. (Reprinted in 1968.) Problems of mono-poly and economic warfare. New York: Augustus M. Kelley. Jeff Frooman is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Pittsburgh. His current research interests include business ethics, corporate social performance, stakeholder theory, and interorganizational relations. Rubric for Case Studies - MBA Elizabethtown College Criteria Identification of the main issues and/or problems. Requirements 3-5 issues and/or problems. Weight 10% Literature research Majority (at least 60% or higher) of & review. articles and/or references must be within last 10 years. 15% Analysis of the key All issues must be analyzed. issues. 25% Provide method of comparison between alternatives. Include short-term Observations and long-term and/or recommendations recommendations; Included should be on effective realistic time solutions. frames, designation of roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders and an appropriate evaluation program. Includes overall Writing Skills/Professional composition, structure, grammar, Presentation. spelling, and punctuation. 20% Alternative solutions and/or options. Score Distinguished/ Excellent (4) Proficient/Good (3) Identifies and understands Identifies and all the main issues in the understands most of the case study. main issues in the case study. Excellent research with Good research and clearly documented documented associations between associations between problems or questions and problems or questions key course concepts and and key course concepts good (3 or more) use of and some (2 or more) corroborating sources. use of corroborating sources. Insightful and thorough Insightful and thorough analysis of all the key analysis of most of the issues. key issues. Alternatives cover all the Alternatives cover most key issues with method to of the key issues with method to evaluate. evaluate all equally. 20% Well-reasoned, logical, relevant observations and recommendations on effective solutions to most of the problems/issues. Solid, well-thought out observations and recommendations on effective solutions to many of the problems/issues. 10% Writing is totally free of grammar and spelling errors. Clear, concise and creative presentation of ideas and properly referenced. There are few spelling or grammatical errors. Most ideas are clearly presented and references are used. Basic/Fair (2) NonPerformance/Poor (0) Identifies and Identifies and understands some of understands few of the the main issues in the main issues in the case case study. study. Limited research and Incomplete research associations between and associations the problems or between the problems questions and key or questions and key course concepts and course concepts and little (1 or more) use no use of of corroborating corroborating sources. sources. Insightful and thorough Incomplete analysis of analysis of some of the key issues. the key issues. Alternatives cover Incomplete analysis of some of the key alternatives with no issues with method to evaluation method. evaluate. Shallow observations Superficial and recommendations observations and on effective solutions recommendations on effective solutions to a to some of the few of the problems/issues. problems/issues. There are several spelling or grammatical errors. Some ideas are clearly presented. References are sporadic or not used. There are many spelling errors and grammatical mistakes. Ideas are hard to follow. References are not used. Total Weight Total Assignment (Case Study) Points Case Study Final Score: Criteria Identification of the main issues and/or problems. Literature research & review. Analysis of the key issues. Alternative solutions and/or options. Observations and/or recommendations on effective solutions Writing Skills 100% 0 Comments
Purchase answer to see full attachment