NON-WESTERN
EDUCATIONAL
TRADITIONS
TIMOTHY REAGAN
1
An Introduction to the Study of
Non-Western and Indigenous Educational
Traditions: A Philosophical Starting Point
We find it pedagogically tragic that various indigenous knowledges of
how action affects reality in particular locales have been dismissed from
academic curricula. Such ways of knowing and acting could contribute
so much to the educational experiences of all students; but because of the
rules of evidence and the dominant epistemologies of Western knowledge
production, such understandings are deemed irrelevant by the academic
gatekeepers.. . . Our intention is to challenge the academy and its "normal science" with the questions indigenous knowledges raise about the
nature of our existence, our consciousness, our knowledge production,
and the "globalized" future.
—Semali and Kincheloe (1999, p. 15)
I fully concur with the sentiments expressed so clearly by Ladislaus Semali
and Joe Kincheloe, and this book is a result of roughly the same impetus that
drove them to produce their book, What Is Indigenous Knowledge? Voices
from the Academy. Most books and courses that deal with the history and
philosophy of education include few, if any, references to indigenous educational ideas and practices in Africa and the Americas, and relatively few references to those of Asia. Although for some time now there have been calls for
the inclusion of the perspectives of women and people of color in studies of
the history and philosophy of education, such efforts, where they have taken
place, have often entailed little more than the addition of vignettes indicating
the contributions of members of such groups to the Western tradition. In
other words, the idea that there might be valuable insights to be gained from a
serious examination of non-Western educational traditions themselves—indeed, that these traditions might be fully comparable to the Western tradition
in their unique richness and diversity—is one that rarely has been voiced.
Furthermore, where non-Western educational ideas and practices have been
discussed, they are often subjected to a treatment roughly comparable to the
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Chapter 1
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Ik PMImphloil Starting Point
i
"Orientalism" discussed by the late Edward Said with regard to the Western
(and specifically, Anglo-French-American) response to Islam and the Islamic
world. According to Said:
i uni ci us "are Muslims dangerous or not?"—than by a serious effort to
st.tnd Islam and the place of toleration and moral decency in its conception ui ,i proper human life.''
Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution
for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in
short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having
authority over the Orient... . European culture gained in strength and identity
by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.
Hilt It 'iiinplislic misunderstandings and misrepresentations remain all too
ttllllliinn -is we seek to understand the Other, and it is as a challenge to such
flllilliideistandings,
in part, that this book has been written.
Tin- same, of course, can be argued with respect to Western treatment of
(|UllH '"
educational ideas and practices i n Asia, the Americas, and else1nr. In short, when we speak of the history of educational thought and
" M i I lit*, what we have actually meant in the past has been the history f WesrI nliUiitiniuil thought and practice, and the effect of our meaning has been,
I fini'iiu , to dismiss, or at the very least to delegitimatize, the many alternaHVM In I he Western tradition that have developed, evolved, and thrived elsein (I - world. In other words, it is discourse itself—the way that one
|lk«. thinks about, and conceptualizes educational thought and practice—
M l U ill issue. As Stephen Ball noted in a discussion of the work of the French
philosopher Michel Foucault, "Discourse is a central concept i n Foucault's
iHnlylii al framework. Discourses are about what can be said and thought, but
itliout who can speak, when, and with what authority. Discourses emuly miMiiing and social relationships, they constitute both subjectivity and
Wfi relations."
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,,lls
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In other words, when scholars do try to examine non-Western educational
thought and practice, all too often they tend to do so through a lens that not
only colors what they see, but also one that reifies the object of study—making it, in essence, part of "the Other" and hence alien. Reification results not
only in the distortion of what one is trying to understand, but also in its subjugation to one's own preexisting values and norms. This problem is not, of
course, unique to the study of educational thought and practice; it is a common criticism of Western scholarship about the non-Western world in general. For example, in his discussion of the study of indigenous African religions by Western scholars, the Ugandan poet Okot p'Bitek wrote of the'
"systematic and intensive use of dirty gossip" i n place of solid and sensitive
scholarship. In a similar vein, the anthropologist Adam Kuper wrote of The
Invention of Primitive Society by 19th- and 20th-century anthropologists and
social theorists in the West. In terms of traditional African educational practices, A . Babs Fafunwa commented that "because indigenous education failed
to conform to the ways of the Westernised system, some less well-informed
writers have considered it primitive, even savage and barbaric. But such contentions should be seen as the product of ignorance and due to a total misunderstanding of the inherent value of informal education." A t the present
time, there is perhaps no better place to see this tendency at work than in the
examination and treatment of the M u s l i m world and Islamic tradition in the
West. As Joshua Cohen and Ian Lague noted i n their "Preface" to Kaled Abou
El Fadl's recent book, The Place of Tolerance in Islam:
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Since September 11, Western discussions of Islam have typically been conducted through a contest of caricatures. Some analysts present Islamic extremism as a product of a "clash of civilizations" that pits Eastern despotism against
Western individualism. Others see such extremism as a grim "blowback" of
America's cold-war foreign policy. Engagement with the Muslim faith commonly takes the form of simplistic pronouncements about [the] "essence" of
Islam: Osama bin Laden either represents the true message of the Prophet or
corrupts a "religion of peace" . . . . These discussions are driven more by West-
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The underlying purpose of this book, then, is to begin the process by
Whhli I lie existing discourse in the history of educational thought and pracf | l f inn he expanded in such a way as to provide a starting point for the de'Vflnpnu'iil of a more open and diverse view of the development of various
[iprtitiches to educational thought and practice. Needless to say, this work
lllleiuled to be only a beginning. If the study of the various educational
fUlllllons discussed here is to be taken seriously, then these traditions (and
"(liy others as well) will require, and are certainly entitled to, the same sort
COIK
that has long been accorded the Western tradition. Furthermore,
IJVfll their differences from the Western tradition, it is essential that we all
IfHill to invite and listen to the "multiple voices" and perspectives that can
fnll||lilfii
understanding of these traditions, just as we must learn to
ftVMtylii/.c that different groups may, as a consequence of their sociocultural
UltUexIs and backgrounds, possess ways of knowing that, although different
our own, may be every bit as valuable and worthwhile as those to
Which we are accustomed. As Carol Gilligan suggested with respect to
"Woiniin's place i n man's life cycle" i n In a Different Voice: Psychological
f / l W y and Women's Development:
o
u
r
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Al « lime when efforts are being made to eradicate discrimination between the
lexett in the search for social equality and justice, the differences between the
Chapter t
4
sexes are being rediscovered in the social sciences. This discovery occurs when
theories formerly considered to be sexually neutral in their scientific objectivity
are found instead to reflect a consistent observational and evaluative bias. Then
the presumed neutrality of science, like that of language itself, gives way to the
recognition that the categories of knowledge are human constructions. The
fascination with point of view that has informed the fiction of the twentieth
century and the corresponding recognition of the relativity of judgment infuse
our scientific understanding as well when we begin to notice how accustomed
we have become to seeing life through men's eyes.
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A very similar kind of argument can be made with respect to the differences in perspective and worldview in various non-Western cultural and historic traditions. To be sure, at the present time, this argument remains largely
speculative i n nature with respect to many of the traditions to be discussed in
this book, although in the case of women there is now a growing body of fairly
compelling empirical evidence. M y hope would be that others, from a wide
array of different backgrounds, would challenge, modify, and add to the base
that is offered here, and someday the study of the Aztec calmecac and telpochcalli, of the imperial Chinese examination system and its content, and the
role of various African initiation schools, among others, might be as commonly taught in courses in the history of educational thought as the study of
Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey is today. Having said this, I also want to stress
that I am not arguing that Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey (among others)
should be eliminated; they, and many others, are important figures i n the development of our own historical tradition, and certainly merit serious study.
M y focus here is not on replacing the Western tradition, but rather on trying
to expand our understanding of education, broadly conceived, through the
examination and study of other approaches to educational thought and practice with which many of us tend to be less familiar. Ultimately, of course, as
we better understand the educational traditions of other societies and cultures, we will also be forced to reexamine and to reflect on our own tradition
in somewhat different ways—and this will be immensely beneficial to our understanding of our own traditions.
A Phllotophiotl Starting Point
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ever, in contemporary scholarly discourse, one seldom comes across such
blatant ethnocentrism. Rather, what is far more common is simply the practice of using one's own society and sociocultural practices as the n o r m by
which other societies are viewed, measured, and evaluated. Ethnocentrism
of this kind takes two somewhat distinct forms: cultural ethnocentrism and
epistemological ethnocentrism.
Cultural ethnocentrism refers to manifestations of ethnocentrism i n individual scholars and their work, as well as to the sociocultural context that
has helped to form and support such individual and idiosyncratic biases. In
other words, we see examples of cultural ethnocentrism when writers and
scholars allow common biases, prejudices, and assumptions to color their
work i n various ways. Racism, sexism, linguicism, ageism, and so on, all
contribute to cultural ethnocentrism, most often i n ways that are unconscious. Thus, the topics that a scholar chooses to explore, the questions that
are asked about the topic, the framework within which hypotheses are constructed, how conflicting evidence is weighed, and even what counts as evidence, can all be affected by personal biases.
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This brings us to the second sort of ethnocentrism, epistemological ethnocentrism, which deals not so much with individual assumptions and biases,
but rather with those common to an entire field of study. W i t h epistemological ethnocentrism, we are concerned with what the philosopher of science
Thomas K u h n called the dominant "paradigm" in our own field of study. A
paradigm, on Kuhn's account, is far more than merely a model or a theory. As
Patton explained:
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A paradigm is a world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking down the
complexity of the real world. As such, paradigms are deeply embedded in the
socialization of adherents and practitioners: paradigms tell them what is important, legitimate, and reasonable. Paradigms are also normative, telling the
practitioner what to do without the necessity of long existential or epistemological consideration. But it is this aspect of paradigms that constitutes both
their strength and their weakness—their strength in that it makes action possible, their weakness in that the very reason for action is hidden in the unquestioned assumptions of the paradigm.
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THE CHALLENGE OF ETHNOCENTRISM
-J
As we begin the process of trying to broaden our perspectives on the history
of educational thought and practice, it is important for us to understand that
the activity in which we are engaged will inevitably involve challenging both
our own ethnocentrism and the ethnocentrism of others. Basically, ethnocentrism refers to the tendency to view one's own cultural group as superior
to others—a tendency common to most, i f not all, human societies. H o w -
Thus, the dominant paradigm in a field of study at any given point in time
essentially establishes the parameters within which "legitimate" discourse
may take place. K u h n explained the significance and power of the dominant
paradigm i n a field of study as follows:
Scientists work from models acquired through education and through subsequent exposure to the literature often without quite knowing or needing to
know what characteristics have given these models the status of community
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Chapter t
paradigms
That scientists do not usually ask or debate what makes a particular problem or solution legitimate tempts us to suppose that, at least intuitively, they know the answer. But it may only indicate that neither the question
nor the answer is felt to be relevant to their research. Paradigms may be prior
to, more binding, and more complete than any set of rules for research that
could be unequivocally abstracted from them.
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In the case of the study of the history and philosophy of education, the
dominant paradigm has focused almost entirely on a single educational tradition (albeit one with many branches), to the exclusion of virtually all others,
as was mentioned earlier i n this chapter. The study of traditional, indigenous
educational practices has been reduced to the study of "socialization" and
"acculturation," and has been left to anthropologists and others. Because
scholars have tended to equate "education" with "schooling," and because
they have consistently focused on the role of literacy and a literary tradition,
many important and interesting—indeed, fascinating—traditions have been
seen as falling outside of the parameters of "legitimate" study in the history
and philosophy of education. Furthermore, even in the study of the Western
educational tradition itself, scholars have been somewhat remiss i n examining aspects of the traditions that seem to fall outside the bounds of their expectations. For example, even recent works concerned with educational
thought and practice i n classical antiquity generally ignore the formidable
work of Martin Bernal, who has, since the early 1980s, been arguing that the
civilization of classical Greece has deep and important roots i n Afroasiatic
cultures. Similarly, until fairly recently, the contributions of women to the
Western educational tradition were largely ignored, i n part as a result of overlooking the contributions of specific individual women, but even more, by
defining education in such a way as to eliminate from discussion what might
be called the "reproductive" (as opposed to the "productive") aspects of education. Thus, although throughout virtually all of the Western historical tradition women have played the central role in raising children and in educating them, this was largely ignored in formal studies of the development of the
Western educational tradition.
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Although dangerous and pernicious, cultural ethnocentrism is actually
somewhat easier to challenge than epistemological ethnocentrism, because
individual scholars in a particular field at the same point in time may differ to
a considerable degree with respect to issues related to cultural ethnocentrism.
Thus, many scholars today are far more sensitive to issues of gender, race, and
ethnicity than others, while nonetheless working within the same epistemologically ethnocentric paradigm.
A n example in which both cultural and epistemological ethnocentrism can
be clearly seen was written i n the mid-1970s by H . M . Phillips, and is presented here:
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A Phlloiophleal Starting Point
In Africa, education was extremely limited and associated with the very small
numbers who were in contact with Islam over the land routes and later with
Iluropeans in the ports or administrative centres already starting to be set up in
those parts of Africa which were colonized. But basically the continent as a
whole was still completely underdeveloped and tribal. African potential,
though great, was late in being mobilized.
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The epistemological ethnocentrism of this passage can be seen, for instance,
in its conflation of "education" with "formal schooling" to the obvious detrituent of traditional education i n Africa, which has been informal i n nature
.itid closely tied to the social life of the community(5?By assuming, as Phillips
i l i i M i i a t "education" or>A "crhnnHnj" oro cynr.nymnn
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