THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION WASHINGTON, D. C. July 2004 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION by Robert A. Fein, Ph.D. Director National Violence Prevention and Study Center Bryan Vossekuil Director National Violence Prevention and Study Center William S. Pollack, Ph.D. Director, National Violence Prevention and Study Center Assistant Clinical Professor Harvard Medical School / McLean Hospital Randy Borum, Psy.D. Associate Professor University of South Florida William Modzeleski Associate Deputy Under Secretary Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools U. S. Department of Education Marisa Reddy, Ph.D. Chief Research Psychologist and Research Coordinator National Threat Assessment Center U. S. Secret Service Washington, D. C. July 2004 i THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE Disclaimer The findings, conclusions, and opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Education or the U.S. Department of the Treasury. PREFACE Joint message from the Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, and from the Director, U.S. Secret Service Since June 1999, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret Service have been working as a team to try to better understand–and ultimately help prevent–school shootings in America. When we began this collaboration nearly three years ago, we did not know what information we might uncover in the course of our joint study on targeted violence in schools, known as the Safe School Initiative. However, throughout our collaboration, our two agencies have focused on one common goal: to develop accurate and useful information about prior school attacks that could help prevent some future ones from occurring. We believe the results of this effort have given schools and communities real cause for hope. Through the Safe School Initiative, staff from the U.S. Department of Education’s Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program and the U.S. Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center have found that some school attacks may be preventable. The companion report to this document, The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States, details findings from the Safe School Initiative and includes several key findings relevant to prevention efforts. In particular, the Safe School Initiative findings indicate that incidents of targeted violence in school were rarely impulsive; that the students who perpetrated these attacks usually planned out the attack in advance–with planning behavior that was oftentimes observable; and that, prior to most attacks, other children knew that the attack was to occur. Taken together, these findings suggest that it may be possible to prevent some future school attacks from occurring–and that efforts to identify, assess, and manage students who may have the intent and capacity to launch an attack may be a promising strategy for prevention. This document, Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates, takes these findings one step further by setting forth a process for identifying, assessing, and managing students who may pose a threat of targeted violence in schools. This process–known as threat assessment–was first pioneered by the U.S. Secret Service as a mechanism for investigating threats against the president of the United States and other protected officials. The Secret Service threat assessment approach was developed based upon findings from an earlier Secret Service study on assassinations and attacks of public officials and public figures. This Guide represents a modification of the Secret Service threat assessment process, based upon findings from the Safe School Initiative. It is intended for use by school personnel, law enforcement officials, and others with protective responsibilities in our nation’s schools. This Guide includes suggestions for developing a threat assessment team within a school or school district, steps to take when a threat or ii iii THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS other information of concern comes to light, consideration about when to involve law enforcement personnel, issues of information sharing, and ideas for creating safe school climates. We applaud all of you working to keep children safe in school. We hope that the information in this Guide, and the companion Final Report, assist you in your continued efforts to do so. Rod Paige Secretary U.S. Department of Education May 2002 W. Ralph Basham Director United States Secret Service ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors of this Guide are grateful to many agencies and individuals for their assistance in planning and carrying out the Safe School Initiative and for assistance in the development and writing of this Guide. First and foremost, the authors owe a debt of gratitude to the representatives of the numerous law enforcement and criminal justice agencies that permitted Secret Service personnel to review investigative files on the school attacks in their respective communities; provided other key information and materials about these attacks; and assisted and supported Secret Service personnel in seeking permission to interview 10 attackers. Moreover, the authors are grateful to the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs’ National Institute of Justice for providing critical financial support that helped make the study possible. This Guide would not have been possible without the support and assistance that the authors received from several key officials and personnel at the Department of Education and the Secret Service. Absent the significant contributions of these individuals, the Secret Service’s experience in researching and preventing targeted violence could not have been translated into a useful guide about threat assessment and targeted school violence. At the Department of Education, these individuals are: Secretary of Education Rod Paige, Assistant Secretary for Office of Elementary and Secondary Education Susan B. Neuman, and Connie Deshpande. Secret Service officials who provided guidance and support for this project include: Director Brian Stafford, Special Agent in Charge George Luczko, Assistant Special Agent in Charge Matt Doherty, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Cindy Rubendall, and Resident Agent in Charge John Berglund. The authors extend special thanks to Assistant Director Barbara Riggs, Office of Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service for her support of the Safe School Initiative and the National Threat Assessment Center. The Guide benefited from the thoughtful comments of a focus group of education and law enforcement leaders that was organized by the Department of Education. Participants in the group included: Ahndrea Blue, James Campain, Marilyn Copeland, Melissa DeRosier, Steve Edwards, David Friedberg, Jeff Heller, Liz Karnes, James Kelly, Wesley Mitchell, Lawrence Porte, Frank Sanchez, Jr., Kate Stetzner, Melorra Sochet, Betsy Thompson, and John Van Dreal. Finally, the authors acknowledge the contributions of Mary Rowe, Paul Gebicke, Gwen Holden and several anonymous reviewers from the Department of Education, whose observations and comments helped to shape the Guide. Special thanks go out to Gwen Holden and Paul Kelly, who helped edit the Guide. iv Robert Fein Bryan Vossekuil William Pollack Randy Borum William Modzeleski Marisa Reddy Washington, D.C. May 2002 v THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I: Introduction: Threat Assessment and the Prevention of Targeted School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Chapter II: Creating Climates of School Safety: A Foundation for Reducing School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Chapter III: Key Findings of the Safe School Initiative’s Study of Targeted School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Chapter IV: Implementing a School Threat Assessment Process . . . . . . . . . . .27 Chapter V: Conducting a School Threat Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Chapter VI: Managing a Threatening Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61 Chapter VII: Action Plans for School Leaders: Creating a Safe and Connected School Climate and Implementing a Threat Assessment Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Chapter VIII: Conclusion: Threat Assessment as a Decision-Making Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Appendix: Annotated Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 Author Brief Bios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87 vi vii THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE viii CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: THREAT ASSESSMENT AND THE PREVENTION OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION The vast majority of the nation’s students will complete their schooling without ever being touched by peer violence. Nevertheless, recent school attacks carried out by students have shaken the image of schools as reliably safe and secure environments in which the qualifications of teachers and the efficacy of the educational curricula are the most pressing concerns of educators and parents. Televised images of frightened and injured students fleeing school grounds have imprinted themselves on the American consciousness. "Columbine," the Littleton, Colo. high school that on April 20, 1999, was the scene of the most violent of the school attacks recorded to date in the United States, has entered contemporary vocabulary as a national symbol of the violence that claimed the lives of 14 students and a teacher on that day. Incidents of targeted school violence1 occurred in 37 communities across the country between December 1974 and May 2000. Compared to the other types of violence and crime children face both in and outside of school, school-based attacks are rare. While the Department of Education reports that 60 million children attend the nation’s 119,000 schools, available statistics indicate that few of these students will fall prey to serious violence in school settings.2 However, highly publicized school shootings have created uncertainty about the safety and security of this country’s schools and generated fear that an attack might occur in any school, in any community. Increased national attention to the problem of school violence has prompted educators, law enforcement officials, mental health professionals, and parents to press for answers to two central questions: "Could we have known that these attacks were being planned?" and, if so, "What could we have done to prevent these attacks from occurring?" For example, what should happen when a student comes to attention for saying something or behaving in a manner that causes concern, as in the following instances? • "The kids are saying that Johnny told his friends not to go to the cafeteria at noon on Tuesday because something big and bad is going to happen." • Marty, who has appeared withdrawn and irritable the past few weeks, handed in a story about a student putting a bomb in an empty school. • Sandy brought bullets to school to show friends. • Rafael, who got pushed around again after gym class, stormed out in tears, shouting "You’re all going to pay!" 1 “Targeted violence” is defined as any incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to their violent attack. See Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B. & Holden, G. "Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence." Research in Action. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice: Washington, D.C. (September, 1995), at 1-7. NCJ 155000 2 U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics (2000). Digest of Education Statistics 2000. Washington, D.C.: Authors 3 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE • Casey, who was suspended last year for bringing a knife to school, left a "hit list" on his desk. • Terry submitted an essay in which an assassin blew up the school, attacked the governor, and then killed himself. Given the enormous concern about targeted school violence, these reported statements and behaviors cannot be ignored. But how should school officials and other responsible adults respond? This publication, Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates, is the product of an ongoing collaboration between the U. S. Secret Service and the U. S. Department of Education to begin to answer these questions. Its focus is on the use of the threat assessment process pioneered by the Secret Service as one component of the Department of Education’s efforts to help schools across the nation reduce school violence and create safe climates. As developed by the Secret Service, threat assessment involves efforts to identify, assess, and manage individuals and groups who may pose threats of targeted violence. Development of the School Threat Assessment Process This Guide is an outgrowth of the joint Secret Service/Department of Education Safe School Initiative. This initiative, begun in June 1999, was undertaken to explore the potential for adapting the threat assessment investigative process developed by the Secret Service to the problem of targeted school violence. The Safe School Initiative, implemented through the Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center and the Department of Education’s Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program, combined the Department of Education’s expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through the creation of safe environments for students, faculty, and staff, and the Secret Service’s experience in studying and preventing targeted violence. The Safe School Initiative began with a study of the thinking, planning, and other preattack behaviors engaged in by students who carried out school shootings.3 That study examined 37 incidents of targeted school violence that occurred in the United States from December 1974 through May 2000 when researchers concluded their data collection. 3 Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W. The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States. U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education: Washington, D. C. (May 2002), at 15. [hereinafter The Safe School Initiative Final Report]. For a fuller discussion of the Safe School Initiative, its methodology, and findings, please refer to this report. 4 CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION The Safe School Initiative was patterned after the Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP), the Secret Service’s earlier five-year study of the thinking and behavior of individuals who carried out or attempted lethal attacks on public officials or prominent individuals in the United States since 1949.4 The purpose of the ECSP was to generate a better understanding of attacks against public officials that, in turn, would inform Secret Service agents’ investigations of threats against the president and other Secret Service protectees, and the development of strategies to prevent harm to these public officials. In July 1998, the Secret Service and the Justice Department’s National Institute of Justice released the publication, Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, in an effort to make the Service’s threat assessment protocols available to a wider law enforcement audience. That publication offers state and local police officials guidance in carrying out and evaluating the findings of threat assessment investigations.5 The Safe School Initiative study reinforced the findings of the Secret Service’s ECSP study concerning the thinking and behavior of attackers. In particular, like the ECSP, the Safe School Initiative concluded that most attackers did not threaten their targets directly, but did engage in pre-attack behaviors that would have indicated an inclination toward or the potential for targeted violence had they been identified. Findings about the pre-attack behaviors of perpetrators of targeted violence validated the "fact-based" approach of the threat assessment process. This process relies primarily on an appraisal of behaviors, rather than on stated threats or traits, as the basis for determining whether there is cause for concern. These findings argue favorably for pursuing adaptation of this threat assessment process for use by school administrators and law enforcement officials in responding to the problem of targeted school violence. The Guide is intended to provide school administrators and law enforcement officials guidance in incorporating the threat assessment process for investigating, evaluating, and managing targeted violence into strategies to prevent school violence. The purpose of the Guide is to contribute to achieving the broader goal of creating safe and secure school environments by helping school and law enforcement officials respond responsibly, prudently, and effectively to threats and other behaviors that raise concern about potential violence. Effective threat assessment can only occur in a larger context of school safety. Cultures and climates of safety, respect, and emotional support can help diminish the 4 Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. "Assassination in the United States: An Operational Study of Recent Assassins, Attackers, and Near-Lethal Approachers." Journal of Forensic Sciences, 44 (1999), at 321-333. 5 Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials. U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice: Washington, D. C. (July 1998). 5 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE possibility of targeted violence in schools. Environments in which students, teachers and administrators pay attention to students’ social and emotional needs–as well as their academic needs–will have fewer situations that require formal threat assessments. In an educational setting where there is a climate of safety, adults and students respect each other. This climate is defined and fostered by students having a positive connection to at least one adult in authority. In such a climate, students develop the capacity to talk and openly share their concerns without fear of shame and reprisal. They try to help friends and fellow students who are in distress, bringing serious concerns to the attention of adults. A young man who brought a rifle into school, killing two students, and wounding several others, told us from his prison cell: "I was really hurting. I didn’t have anybody to talk to. They just didn’t care." Ideally when this climate of safety is created, students experience a sense of emotional "fit" and of respect. Problems are raised and addressed before they become serious. As a result, the potential for school violence diminishes. When a member of the school community shows personal pain that might lead them to harm themselves or others, someone is available. Young people can find an adult to trust with this information, so that it does not remain "secret" until it is too late. CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION threat assessment inquiry or investigation.6 Chapter VI addresses the issue of managing threatening situations. Chapter VII presents an action plan for creating safe school cultures and climates and an action plan to help school leaders implement a threat assessment program. In the final chapter of the Guide, Chapter VIII, the authors reassert the importance of the threat assessment process as a component of broader school safety and violence prevention strategies. In addition, the authors offer some concluding observations on the efficacy of the threat assessment process as a tool that can help school administrators, law enforcement officials, and others to make critical decisions about responding to situations involving the threat of targeted school violence. Readers will find additional resources to inform the development and implementation of school threat assessment processes in the appendix that is included at the end of the Guide. The appendix provides an annotated list of publications and other resources on threat assessment and related topics. A young man who brought a rifle into school, killing two students, and wounding several others, told us from his prison cell: "I was really hurting. I didn’t have anybody to talk to. They just didn’t care." Organization of the Guide The remainder of this Guide is organized into seven chapters. Chapter II of the Guide discusses characteristics of safe school climates. Chapter III presents the key findings of the Safe School Initiative and discusses the implications of these findings for the prevention of targeted school violence. Chapter IV describes the principles underlying the threat assessment approach to preventing targeted violence, and outlines the central elements of a threat assessment process. Chapters V and VI will be of particular interest to school administrators, law enforcement officials, and others who wish to pursue the development of a threat assessment process as a component of a broader school violence prevention strategy. Chapter V outlines the approach to identifying students whose behavior may suggest the potential for targeted school violence, and discusses the steps in carrying out a 6 6 This Guide distinguishes between a threat assessment inquiry and a threat assessment investigation. Threat assessment inquiries are initiated, conducted, and controlled by school officials (often with input or participation from law enforcement professionals), while threat assessment investigations are initiated, conducted, and controlled by law enforcement officials. Each school system or community should decide where to place the line between an "inquiry" and an "investigation." For further discussion, please see Chapter V. 7 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE 8 CHAPTER II - CREATING CLIMATES OF SCHOOL SAFETY CHAPTER II CREATING CLIMATES OF SCHOOL SAFETY: A FOUNDATION FOR REDUCING SCHOOL VIOLENCE CHAPTER II - CREATING CLIMATES OF SCHOOL SAFETY "What I hate about this school is that I'm being picked on in the halls and just about everywhere else"–A 14-year-old student "School has always been hard for me, literally from the first day I started elementary school. People saw me as a … good target. They just started picking on me for no reason … they made fun of me [and, now] I'm going through self-esteem issues because of the 11 years I was a target."–An 18-year-old student. "They want me to open up, express myself. Quite a funny notion, ironic! If someone had helped me do that several years ago, I probably would have turned out okay."–Comment in a diary by a 17year-old student who attacked others at school, then killed himself. The threat assessment process described in this Guide is presented as an approach to addressing the problem of targeted school violence. Incidents of targeted school violence are extreme and, thankfully, rare events. However, targeted school violence is arguably only the tip of the iceberg of pain, loneliness, desperation, and despair that many students in this nation’s schools deal with on a daily basis. Threat assessment should be looked upon as one component in an overall strategy to reduce school violence. The threat assessment process by itself is unlikely to have a lasting effect on the problem of targeted school violence unless that process is implemented in the larger context of strategies to ensure that schools offer their students safe and secure learning environments. The principal objective of school violence-reduction strategies should be to create cultures and climates of safety, respect, and emotional support within educational institutions. Fostering a Culture of Respect In educational settings that support climates of safety, adults and students respect each other. A safe school environment offers positive personal role models in its faculty. It provides a place for open discussion where diversity and differences are respected; communication between adults and students is encouraged and supported; and conflict is managed and mediated constructively. Cultures and climates of safety support environments in which teachers and administrators pay attention to students’ social and emotional needs as well as their academic needs. Such environments emphasize "emotional intelligence" as well as educational or intellectual pursuits.7 Students experience a sense of emotional "fit" 7 Goleman, D. Emotional Intelligence. New York: Bantam Books, (1995). 11 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE and of respect within the school body and may be less likely to engage in or be victimized by harmful behavior.8 A culture of safety creates "shame-free zones" in which daily teasing and bullying is not accepted as a normal part of the adolescent culture.9 School environments characterized by bullying and meanness can lead to student isolation and fear. At best, school environments that turn a blind eye to bullying and teasing inhibit the work of school–learning and growth. At the worst, such environments allow behavior that fosters fear and fury that stunts the healthy development of the victims of that behavior, and may lead to psychological and physical violence. Creating Connections Between Adults and Students Connection through human relationships is a central component of a culture of safety and respect. This connection is the critical emotional glue among students, and between students and adults charged with meeting students’ educational, social, emotional, and safety needs.10 In a climate of safety, students have a positive connection to at least one adult in authority. Each student feels that there is an adult to whom he or she can turn for support and advice if things get tough, and with whom that student can share his or her concerns openly and without fear of shame or reprisal. Schools in which students feel able to talk to teachers, deans, secretaries, coaches, custodians, counselors, nurses, school safety officers, bus drivers, principals, and other staff support communication between students and adults about concerns and problems. Schools that emphasize personal contact and connection between school officials and students will take steps to identify and work with students who have few perceptible connections to the school. For example, during staff meetings in a school in a California School District, the names of students are posted, and school faculty members are asked to put stars next to the names of those students with whom they have the closest relationships. Faculty members then focus on establishing relationships with those students with few stars next to their names. 8 See, for example, Resnick,M.D., Bearman,P.S., Blum, R.W. et. al., (1997) "Protecting Adolescents from Harm," JAMA, 278(10) pp. 823-832. See also www.allaboutkids.umn.edu. 9 See Pollack, W. Real Boys: Rescuing Our Sons from the Myths of Boyhood. New York: Henry Holt, Inc., (1998).; Pollack, W., & Shuster, T. Real Boys’ Voices. New York: Random House, (2000).; Pollack, W., & Cushman, K. Real Boys Workbook. New York: Villard, (2001). 10 Pollack, W. Real Boys. (1998). See note #9. 12 CHAPTER II - CREATING CLIMATES OF SCHOOL SAFETY Breaking the "Code of Silence" In many schools there is a pervasive sense among students and some adults that telling grownups that another student is in pain or may pose a threat violates an unwritten, but powerful, "code of silence." A code of silence has the potentially damaging effect of forcing students to handle their pain and problems on their own, without the benefit of adult support. These codes also suggest that a student should not bring any concerns that he or she may have about a peer’s behavior to the attention of responsible adults. The findings of the Safe School Initiative suggest that silence is far from golden. In fact, study findings indicate that silence may be downright dangerous. The study found that most school shooters shared their potentially lethal plans with other students, but that students who knew of planned attacks rarely told adults. In a climate of safety, students are willing to break the code of silence. Students are more likely to turn to trusted adults for help in resolving problems. Moreover, students are more willing to share their concerns about the problem behavior of peers with their teachers and other adults in positions of authority within the school without feeling that they are "snitching" or "ratting" on a buddy or friend. As a result of responsible bystander behavior, serious problems come to adult attention earlier, before these problems lead to violence. Problems are raised and addressed before they become serious, and the potential for school violence arguably is diminished. In an environment that encourages communication between students and adults, information does not remain "secret" until it is too late. In fact, it is considered good citizenship or even heroic to go to a teacher to share the fact that a fellow student is in trouble and may be contemplating a dangerous act. Major Components and Tasks for Creating a Safe/Connected School Climate The major components and tasks for creating a safe school climate include: • Assessment of the school’s emotional climate; • Emphasis on the importance of listening in schools; • Adoption of a strong, but caring stance against the code of silence; • Prevention of, and intervention in, bullying; • Involvement of all members of the school community in planning, creating, and sustaining a school culture of safety and respect; • Development of trusting relationships between each student and at least one adult at school; and • Creation of mechanisms for developing and sustaining safe school climates. Discussion of these components and tasks may be found in Chapter VII of this Guide. 13 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE 14 CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS CHAPTER III KEY FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE’S STUDY OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS This chapter summarizes the Safe School Initiative and the findings that support a threat assessment process to identify, assess, and manage threatening situations in schools. The Safe School Initiative examined incidents of targeted school violence from the time of the incident backward, to identify the attackers’ pre-incident behaviors and communications and to explore whether such information might aid in preventing future attacks. The findings of the Safe School Initiative suggest that there are productive actions that educators, law enforcement officials, and others can pursue in response to the problem of targeted school violence. Specifically, Initiative findings suggest that these officials may wish to consider focusing their efforts to formulate strategies for preventing these attacks in two principal areas: • developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable information that might indicate that there is a risk of a targeted school attack; and • employing the results of these risk evaluations, or "threat assessments," in developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring. Support for these suggestions is found in the 10 key findings of the Safe School Initiative: • Incidents of targeted violence at school are rarely sudden, impulsive acts. • Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to attack. • Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack. • There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engage in targeted school violence. • Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused concern or indicated a need for help. • Most attackers were known to have difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Many had considered or attempted suicide. • Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack. • Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack. • In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity. • Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention. An overview of these findings, and their implications for the use of threat assessment protocols to identify, assess, and manage possible targeted school violence, follows. 17 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS Implications of Key Findings for the Use of Threat Assessment Protocols Explanation Key Finding 1 In most cases, other young persons–friends, schoolmates, and/or siblings–knew about the attacker’s idea or plan for a possible attack on the school before that attack occurred. However, this information rarely made its way to an adult. Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts. Explanation Students who engaged in school-based attacks typically did not "just snap" and engage in impulsive or random acts of targeted school violence. Instead, the attacks examined under the Safe School Initiative appeared to be the end result of a comprehensible process of thinking and behavior–behavior that typically begins with an idea, progresses to the development of a plan, moves on to securing the means to carry out the plan, and culminates in an attack. Example: One attacker asked his friends to help him get ammunition for one of his weapons; sawed off the end of a rifle to make it easier to conceal beneath his clothes; shopped for a long trench coat with his mother; and cut the pockets out of the coat so that he could conceal the weapon within the coat while holding it through one of the cut-out pockets. This same attacker had a well-known fascination with weapons and frequently told his friends that he thought about killing certain students at school. Implications The process of thinking and planning that leads up to an attack potentially may be knowable or discernible from the attacker’s behaviors and communications. To the extent that information about an attacker’s intent and planning is knowable and may be uncovered before an incident, some attacks may be preventable. However, the Safe School Initiative found that the time span between the attacker’s decision to mount an attack and the actual incident may be short. Consequently, when indications that a student may pose a threat to the school community arise in the form of information about a possible planned attack, school administrators and law enforcement officials will need to move quickly to inquire about and intervene in that possible plan. Key Finding 2 Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to attack. 18 Example: One attacker had planned to shoot students in the lobby of his school prior to the beginning of classes. He told two friends exactly what he had planned and asked three other students to meet him in the mezzanine overlooking the school lobby the morning of the planned attack, ostensibly so that these students would be out of harm’s way. On most mornings, few students would congregate in the mezzanine before the school day began. However, on the morning of the attack, word about what was going to happen spread to such an extent that, by the time the attacker opened fire in his school lobby, 24 students had gathered in the mezzanine waiting for the attack to begin. One student who knew about the attacker’s plans brought a camera so that he could take pictures of the event. Implications First and foremost, this finding suggests that students can be an important part of prevention efforts. A friend or schoolmate may be the first person to hear that a student is thinking about or planning to harm someone. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, those who have information about a potential incident of targeted school violence may not alert an adult on their own. Schools can encourage students to report this information in part by identifying and breaking down barriers in the school environment that inadvertently may discourage students from coming forward with this information. Schools also may benefit from ensuring that they have a fair, thoughtful, and effective system to respond to whatever information students do bring forward. If students have concerns about how adults will react to information that they bring forward, they may be even less inclined to volunteer such information. In addition, this finding highlights the importance in a threat assessment inquiry of attempts to gather all relevant information from anyone who may have contact with the student. Efforts to gather all potentially relevant pieces of information, however innocuous they may appear on their own, from all individuals with whom the student has contact may help to develop a more comprehensive picture of the student’s ideas, activities, and plans. In the end, investigators likely will find that different people in the student’s life may have different pieces of the puzzle. 19 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS Key Finding 3 Implications Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack. The use of profiles to determine whether a student is thinking about or planning a violent attack is not an effective approach to identifying students who may pose a risk for targeted violence at school or–once a student has been identified–for assessing the risk that a particular student may pose a risk for targeted school violence. Reliance on profiles to predict future school attacks carries two substantial risks: (1) the great majority of students who fit any given profile of a "school shooter" actually will not pose a risk of targeted violence; and, (2) using profiles will fail to identify some students who in fact pose a risk of violence, but share few if any characteristics with prior attackers. Explanation The Safe School Initiative found that most attackers in fact did not threaten their target directly and some made no threat at all. Instead, other behaviors and communications that may prompt concern, such as hearing that a young person is talking about bringing a gun to school, are indicators of a possible threat and therefore should prompt the initiation of efforts to gather information. Implications This finding underscores the importance of not waiting for a threat before beginning an inquiry. School administrators, of course, should respond to all students who make threats because the lack of response could be taken by the threatener as permission to proceed with carrying out the threat. In the end, however, it is important to distinguish between someone who makes a threat–tells people they intend to harm someone–and someone who poses a threat–engages in behaviors that indicate an intent, planning, or preparation for an attack. Those conducting threat assessment inquiries should focus particular attention on any information that indicates that a student poses a threat, regardless of whether the student has told a potential target he or she intends to do them harm. Rather than trying to determine the "type" of student who may engage in targeted school violence, an inquiry should focus instead on a student’s behaviors and communications to determine if that student appears to be planning or preparing for an attack. Rather than asking whether a particular student "looks like" those who have launched school-based attacks before, it is more productive to ask whether the student is on a path toward a violent attack, if so how fast the student is moving toward attack, and where intervention may be possible. Key Finding 5 Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others concern or indicated a need for help. Key Finding 4 Explanation There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engage in targeted school violence. Several key findings point to the fact that young people send signals–both direct and indirect–to others regarding their problems. The boys and young men who engaged in the targeted school violence examined by the Safe School Initiative were not "invisible" students. In fact, nearly all of these students engaged in behaviors that caused concern to at least one person, usually an adult–and most concerned at least three people. Explanation The demographic, personality, school history, and social characteristics of the attackers varied substantially. Moreover, knowing that an individual shares characteristics, behaviors, features, or traits with prior school shooters does not help in determining whether a particular student is thinking about or planning for a violent act. Example: In one case, the dean of students had commended a student for improving his grades and behavior a few weeks before that student carried out an attack at his school. 20 Implications This finding highlights the range of behaviors in a student’s life that may be noticeable to adults and that could prompt some additional probing by a caring adult. As was true in some of the incidents covered in the Safe School Initiative’s study, individuals in contact with the attacker each may have observed something of concern about that student’s behavior, but not of sufficient concern for them to notify anyone in a position to respond. 21 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE Educators and other adults can learn how to pick up on these signals and make appropriate referrals. By inquiring about any information that may have prompted some concern, an investigator may be able to develop a more comprehensive picture of the student’s past and current behavior, and identify any indications that the student is intent on or planning to attack. However, discretion should be exercised in determining whom to talk to about the student, so as not to alienate or stigmatize the student of concern. Key Finding 6 Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Many had considered or attempted suicide. Explanation Many students, not just those who engaged in school-based attacks, experience or perceive major losses in their lives. Most students who face a significant loss, or who have difficulty coping with such a loss, are not going to be at risk for a school-based attack. However, information that indicates a student is facing or having trouble dealing with a significantly difficult situation may indicate a need to refer the student to appropriate services and resources. In addition, more than three-quarters of school shooters had a history of suicidal thoughts, threats, gestures, or attempts. Most of these students were known to have been severely depressed or desperate at some point before their attacks. Example: One school shooter submitted a series of poems describing his thoughts of suicide and homicide to his English teacher. One poem read: Am I insane To want to end this pain To want to end my life By using a sharp knife Am I insane Thinking life is profane Knowing life is useless Cause my emotions are a mess Am I insane Thinking I’ve nothing to gain Considering suicide Cause love has died Am I insane Wanting to spill blood like rain Sending them all to Hell From humanity I’ve fell 22 CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS The teacher became concerned and recommended that the student receive help. Help, however, was not offered. After failing to kill himself, this student killed two adults at school. He hoped to be convicted of capital murder and executed by the state. Implications In cases where there is concern about the possibility that a student may engage in targeted violence, an inquiry or investigation should include attention to any indication that a student is having difficulty coping with major losses or perceived failures, particularly where these losses or failures appear to have prompted feelings of desperation and hopelessness. An inquiry or investigation also should anticipate changes in the life of a troubled student, and consider whether these changes might increase–or decrease–the threat that the student poses. Key Finding 7 Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack. Explanation Bullying was not a factor in every case, and clearly not every child who is bullied in school will pose a risk for targeted violence in school. Nevertheless, in a number of the incidents of targeted school violence studied, attackers described being bullied in terms that suggested that these experiences approached torment. These attackers told of behaviors that, if they occurred in the workplace, likely would meet legal definitions of harassment and/or assault. Example: In one situation, most of the attacker’s schoolmates described the attacker as "the kid everyone teased." In witness statements from that incident, schoolmates described how virtually every child in the school had at some point thrown the attacker against a locker; tripped him in the hall; held his head under water in the pool; or thrown things at him. Several schoolmates had noted that the attacker acted differently in the days preceding the attack in that he seemed more annoyed by and less tolerant of the teasing than usual. Implications The prevalence of bullying found by the Safe School Initiative’s examination of targeted school violence and in other recent studies should strongly support ongoing efforts to reduce bullying in American schools. Educators can play an important role in ensuring that students are not bullied in schools and that schools not only do not permit bullying, but also empower other students to let adults in the school know if students are being bullied. 23 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS Key Finding 8 Implications Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack. This finding highlights the importance of considering what prompting or encouragement a student may receive from others in his life that influences any intent, planning, or preparations for a potential attack. Any inquiry or investigation of potential targeted school violence should include attention to the role that a student’s friends or peers may be playing in that student’s thinking about and preparations for an attack. It is possible that feedback from friends or others may help to move a student from an unformed thought about attacking to developing and advancing a plan to carry out the attack. Explanation Almost two-thirds of attackers used a handgun in their attack. Almost half used a rifle. Most attackers acquired weapons from their home or the home of a relative. Approximately two-thirds of attackers had a history of using guns prior to the attack. Implications Access to weapons among some students may be common. However, when the idea of an attack exists, any effort to acquire, prepare, or use a weapon or ammunition, including bomb-making components, may be a significant move in the attacker’s progression from idea to action. Any inquiry should include investigation of and attention to weapons access and use and to communications about weapons. The large proportion of attackers who acquired their guns from home points to the need for schools and law enforcement officials to collaborate on policies and procedures for responding when a student is thought to have a firearm in school. In particular, schools should be aware of the provisions of the Federal Gun-Free Schools Act, which generally requires a minimum one-year expulsion of students who bring a gun to school and that all violations be reported to local law enforcement officials. Key Finding 9 In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity. Explanation The Safe School Initiative found that in over half of the incidents, others assisted in the planning or execution of the attack by actively encouraging the attacker to shoot others at school, or even helping to select targets and train the shooter in how to use a weapon. Example: One attacker’s original idea had been to bring a gun to school and let other students see him with it. He wanted to look tough, so that the students who had been harassing him would leave him alone. When the attacker shared this idea with two friends, however, they convinced him that he could not just show up with a gun, but actually had to shoot at people at the school in order to get the other students to leave him alone. It was after this conversation that he decided to mount his school attack. 24 This finding speaks to the importance of school officials paying attention to the "settings" and climates of their schools. Peers exert enormous influence over their friends and schoolmates. And principals, teachers, counselors, coaches, and other adults at school may make all the difference in preventing violence. An environment in which it is clear that violence doesn’t solve problems, but only makes them worse, may help prevent tragedy. A climate in which a young person is seen as a "snitch" or a "rat" for telling an adult about a student in distress differs from one in which young people know that they can call on adults to help students who are in pain. Key Finding 10 Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention and most were brief in duration. Explanation Law enforcement authorities responded quickly to almost all calls from schools about attacks. However, most attacks were resolved within minutes, without law enforcement intervention. Implications The short duration of most incidents of targeted school violence argues for the importance of developing preventive measures in addition to any emergency planning for a school or school district. The preventive measures should include protocols and procedures for responding to and managing threats and other behaviors of concern. In summary, the findings of the Safe School Initiative suggest that some future school attacks may be preventable. The fact that most attackers engaged in pre-incident planning behavior and shared their intentions and plans with others, suggests that those conducting threat assessment inquiries or investigations could uncover these types of information. The remainder of this Guide sets forth how to develop a capacity for and conduct a threat assessment process. 25 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE 26 CHAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A PROCESS CHAPTER IV IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS CHAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS The primary purpose of a threat assessment is to prevent targeted violence. The threat assessment process is centered upon on analysis of the facts and evidence of behavior in a given situation. The appraisal of risk in a threat assessment focuses on actions, communications, and specific circumstances that might suggest that an individual intends to mount an attack and is engaged in planning or preparing for that event. In a situation that becomes the focus of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation, appropriate authorities gather information, evaluate facts, and make a determination as to whether a given student poses a threat of violence to a target. If an inquiry indicates that there is a risk of violence in a specific situation, authorities conducting the threat assessment collaborate with others to develop and implement a plan to manage or reduce the threat posed by the student in that situation. Six principles form the foundation of the threat assessment process. These principles are: • Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and oftentimes discernible, process of thinking and behavior. • Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the individual, the situation, the setting, and the target. • An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful threat assessment. • Effective threat assessment is based upon facts rather than on characteristics or "traits." • An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat assessment inquiries and investigations. • The central question in a threat assessment inquiry or investigation is whether a student poses a threat, not whether the student has made a threat. In addition, three elements guide the development and operation of an effective school threat assessment program. These elements are: • authority to conduct an assessment; • capacity to conduct inquiries and investigations; and, • systems relationships. These principles and elements are discussed below. Principles of the Threat Assessment Process This Guide is about the systematic use of threat assessment as a central component in preventing targeted school violence. The threat assessment process involves 29 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE identifying, assessing, and managing individuals who might pose a risk of violence to an identified or identifiable target. Implementation of a threat assessment process is informed by six underlying principles. Principle 1: Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and oftentimes discernible, process of thinking and behavior. Findings of the Safe School Initiative indicate that students and former students who committed targeted attacks at schools almost always thought about their attacks in advance and did not "just snap" suddenly. These findings suggest that students who carry out school attacks may consider possible targets; talk with others about their ideas and intentions; and record their thinking in diaries and journals or on a Web site. They may seek out weapons to use in the attack, and they may practice with these weapons in preparation for the attack. The actions of these attackers may be deliberate and occur over days and weeks, months or years. Principle 2: Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the person, the situation, the setting, and the target. Understanding and preventing acts of targeted violence require a focus on these four component parts and their interaction: the person, the situation, the setting, and the target. • The potential attacker: To determine the risk of targeted violence, a threat assessor must gather information about the potential attacker. In a threat assessment inquiry or investigation, a major question is: How has this student dealt with situations that have led him or her to see life as unbearably stressful? Individuals who in times of great stress have considered or acted upon ideas of suicide or violence toward others, or both, should be considered persons of increased concern. • The situation: Investigators should examine circumstances and significant events in the life of the individual, especially recent events that have been overwhelmingly stressful. For students who engaged in school-based attacks, those events included having been bullied and humiliated, especially in public; loss of significant relationships; and perceived failures or loss of status. Almost all school shooters experienced some major situational stress at some point before their attack.11 • The setting: The third factor to consider is the specific setting at the time that the student came to authorities’ attention as possibly posing a threat of 11 It should be emphasized again that many young people experience losses, failures, humiliations, and other kinds of situational stressors and that few become school shooters. CHAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS targeted school violence. Do fellow students, friends, or others say–directly or indirectly–that violence is not a solution to problems? Do these people suggest ways to get help and assistance? In a school, are there respectful connections among students and adults, networks of trusting relationships, that facilitate non-violent problem-solving? Or is the idea of violence proposed, supported, accepted, or ignored by those who know the potential attacker? In many school shootings, other young persons knew about the shooter’s interest in mounting an attack. In some cases, clear warnings were dismissed or ignored. In others, friends and fellow students of the shooter encouraged or helped the attacker in his pursuit of violence. Messages about the acceptability of violence that are communicated directly or subtly to a potential attacker by students and/or adults in his or her environment may facilitate, or alternatively help to prevent, an attack. • The target: When assessing the risk of an attack at school, investigators and others with protective responsibilities also must pay attention to the individual’s choice of a potential target. The attacker may target a particular individual or group of individuals over some perceived injury or loss. In some cases, attackers chose a specific target, such as a particular student or teacher. In other instances, the target was more general: the school itself, "jocks," or "kids in the cafeteria." Principle 3: An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful threat assessment. An investigative mindset is central to successful application of the threat assessment process. Threat assessment requires thoughtful probing; viewing information with healthy skepticism; and paying attention to key points about pre-attack behaviors. Authorities who carry out threat assessments must strive to be both accurate and fair. The investigative mindset and Moreover, threat assessors should question the perspective also rely on information in front of them continuously. Ideally, there common sense. Threat should be credible verification of all essential "facts." assessors working to Information about a potential attacker’s interests, understand a given situation statements, and actions should be corroborated, should step back periodically wherever possible. from the individual details of an inquiry or investigation The investigative mindset and perspective also rely on and ask whether information common sense. Threat assessors working to understand gathered makes sense and a given situation should step back periodically from the supports any hypothesis individual details of an inquiry or investigation and ask developed concerning the whether information gathered makes sense and supports risk posed by the subject of any hypothesis developed concerning the risk posed by the threat assessment inquiry. the subject of the threat assessment inquiry. 30 31 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE CHAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS Principle 4: Effective threat assessment is based on facts rather than characteristics or "traits." Principle 6: The central question of a threat assessment is whether a student poses a threat, not whether the student made a threat. A major principle of threat assessment is that each investigation stands on its own. Inferences and conclusions about risk should be guided by an analysis of facts and behaviors specific to the person of concern and the given situation. Any student with the motive, intent, and ability potentially is capable of mounting a targeted attack at school. Judgments about a student’s risk of violence should be based upon analysis of behaviorally relevant facts, not on "traits" or "characteristics" of a given individual or of a class of individuals. Although some individuals who threaten harm may pose a real threat of targeted violence, many do not. The Safe School Initiative found that fewer than 20 percent of school shooters communicated a direct or conditional threat to their target before the attack. By contrast, individuals who are found to pose threats of violence frequently do not make threats to their targets. The study found that in more than 80 percent of the cases, school shooters did not threaten their targets directly, but they did communicate their intent and/or plans to others before the attack. In the climate of fear that followed recent attacks, students in high schools across the country who appeared angry and wore trench coats were marked as possible school attackers. They were so labeled because of appearance and demeanor. Blanket characterizations, or student "profiles," do not provide a reliable basis for making judgments of the threat posed by a particular student.12 Even worse, the use of profiles can shift attention away from more reliable facts and evidence about a student’s behavior and communications. These findings underscore the importance of making judgments in threat assessment investigations based upon a student’s behaviors and communications, rather than upon whether or not that student threatened his or her target. Authorities conducting threat assessment investigations must distinguish between making a threat, e.g., telling a potential target that he or she may or will be harmed, and posing a threat, e.g., engaging in behavior that indicates furthering a plan or building capacity for a violent act. Principle 5: An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat assessment investigations. In a threat assessment, bits of information might be viewed as pieces of a puzzle. Each bit may appear inconsequential or only slightly worrisome by itself. But, when the pieces are put together–as oftentimes has occurred in "after the fact" analyses of school attacks–the behaviors and communications of a student may coalesce into a discernible pattern that indicates a threat of violence. In many school attacks, information existed within the school and community that might have alerted authorities to the risk of attack posed by a particular student. Relationships with agencies and service systems within the school and the surrounding community are critical to identifying, assessing, and managing students who are on a path toward carrying out a school attack. An integrated systems approach recognizes the necessity of cooperation and partnerships between schools and systems outside of the school. These may include law enforcement, social services and mental health providers, the courts, community agencies, families, worksites, religious organizations, and others. Nevertheless, threats of violence should not be dismissed out of hand. Students may make threats with a variety of intents and for a wide range of reasons, e.g., to get attention; to express anger or frustration; to frighten or coerce their peers; as a part of joking or "playing around;" or, in some cases, to communicate intent to attack. Authorities conducting threat assessment investigations must distinguish between making a threat, e.g., telling a potential target that he or she may or will be harmed, and posing a threat, e.g., engaging in behavior that indicates furthering a plan or building capacity for a violent act. Consequently, every threat should receive prompt attention. Although voicing a threat should not be used as the principal determinant in making judgments about the likelihood of a school attack, it likewise would be a mistake to assume that individuals who make threats in every instance are unlikely to follow through on those communications. Elements of a School Threat Assessment Process Authorities involved in carrying out a threat assessment inquiry or investigation should gather and analyze information about the behavior and communications of the student of concern. This information, in turn, will permit these authorities to make reasonable judgments about whether the student of concern is moving along a path toward an attack on an identifiable target. Three elements are essential to the development and operation of an effective school safety threat assessment program.13 12 Please refer to Reddy, et. al. (2001), "Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, Threat Assessment, and Other Approaches," for a discussion of the use and limitations of profiling as a tool for assessing the risk of targeted school violence. The full citation for the article is provided in the Appendix, Annotated Resources, of this Guide. 32 13 See Chapter VII, Action Plans for School Leaders, for further guidance in creating school threat assessment programs. 33 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE 1. Authority to Conduct an Assessment A teacher comes to the principal’s office to report "the kids are saying that Johnny told his friends not to go to the cafeteria at noon on Tuesday because something big and bad is going to happen." What did Johnny mean by that statement? Is Johnny planning to attack the school? Perhaps Johnny is engaging in idle talk. Perhaps the report of Johnny’s statement is inaccurate. Perhaps Johnny is planning an attack on the school or has knowledge about other students’ plans. Clearly, this information cannot be ignored. How, then, should the principal respond to this report? Should the principal call Johnny to the office and ask him about the report? Should other students be queried about the report? What if Johnny denies making the statement that has been reported, while other students assert otherwise? Schools should have in place clear policies on collecting and reacting to information on potentially threatening situations and determining whether this information merits further attention through a threat assessment inquiry and investigation. Threat assessment inquiry and investigation should be initiated if there is credible information that passes a critical threshold of concern. In creating these policies, school administrators should be aware of and consult with the school’s legal counsel about legal issues related to the conduct of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation. These legal issues include the effects of laws pertaining to: (1) access to and sharing of information, and (2) searches of a student’s person or property. Each of these issues should be discussed with the school’s legal counsel. Establishing Authority to Conduct an Inquiry or Investigation A formal policy authorizing school officials to conduct a threat assessment should cover the following topics: • the purpose and scope of the policy; • the role of educators and the threat assessment team in relation to the role of law enforcement; • the identity of, and delegation of authority to, school officials concerning determination that a threat assessment inquiry or investigation should be pursued; • the definition of the threshold of concern for initiating a threat assessment inquiry or investigation, i.e., a description of the nature and extent of behavior or communication that would trigger a threat assessment inquiry or investigation; • the description of the types of information that may be gathered during the assessment; 34 CHAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS • the designation of the individuals or group of individuals who would be responsible for gathering and analyzing information; and • the steps and procedures to be followed from initiation to conclusion of the threat assessment inquiry or investigation. Information-Sharing in Support of the School Threat Assessment Process Much emphasis in this Guide is placed upon the importance of sharing information about a student who may pose a risk of violence. In most previous school shootings, there was information available prior to the incident that suggested that the student was planning an attack at school. However, when conducting an inquiry or investigation regarding a potential threat, the inquirer or investigator will find that different people in the student’s life may have different–and possibly small–pieces of the puzzle. It is the responsibility of the threat assessment team to gather this information from what may be multiple sources–teachers, parents, friends, guidance counselors, after-school program staff, part-time employers, and others. Once information is gathered from the various sources contacted during a threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment team may wish to explore options for storing this information in an accessible format. The team likewise may wish to consider keeping the information in a central location. Legal Considerations in Developing Information-Sharing Policies and Procedures Although the need to gather information about a student who may pose a threat of violence is clear, the ability to share this information requires some advance consideration. Laws, rules, regulations, and policies, for example, may place limitations on access to student records and restrict the use of accessible information in conjunction with investigations. In formulating information-sharing policies and procedures, threat assessment teams should consult with their respective school’s–or school district’s–legal counsel to ensure that team members are well-briefed on existing laws and regulations and their implications for the development of policies and procedures for accessing and disclosing student information. In particular, threat assessment teams should examine provisions of these laws and regulations to identify opportunities for including threatening situations in schools as exceptions to constraints on the disclosure of information contained in education records. Two principal areas of law–federal statutes and state statutes–may affect access to and sharing of information about a particular student. An overview of the implications of these areas of law for conducting threat assessment investigations is provided in the following. 35 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE Federal Statutes Under existing federal law, a school’s authority to release information about a student is governed by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).14 The intent of FERPA is to protect the privacy of "education records," a term that is defined as any records that contain information directly related to a student and that are maintained by the educational agency or institution or by a person acting for the agency or institution. Under provisions of FERPA, a school may not disclose personally identifiable information about a student from any education records without the prior written consent of the student’s parent or, in the case of students who are 18 or older, the consent of the student. FERPA does allow for various exceptions to privacy protections covering access to student records, specifying situations and conditions under which a school may disclose information from a student’s education records without consent. A detailed analysis of these exceptions is beyond the scope of this Guide. However, there are two exceptions that are worth noting because of their specific relevance to accessing and sharing information for threat assessment inquiries: • Health and Safety Emergencies: FERPA provides that schools may disclose information from a student’s education records in situations where there is an immediate need to share that information in order to protect the health or safety of the student or others.15 Under this exception, schools must define the term "health or safety emergency" narrowly and are permitted to disclose information from education records only to those individuals who need the information in order to protect the student and others. • Law Enforcement Unit Records: FERPA regulations draw a distinction between records created by a school law enforcement unit for law enforcement purposes, such as the enforcement of a local, state, or federal law, and records created by a school law enforcement unit for non-law enforcement purposes, such as the enforcement of school policies concerning behavior or disciplinary actions. FERPA also distinguishes between student information that school law enforcement unit officials gathered from education records and student information that unit officials obtained from other sources. With respect to disclosure of student information contained in school law enforcement unit records, FERPA provides that: - Personally identifiable information about a student may be disclosed by school officials if that information is held in a school law enforcement unit record that was created to enforce a federal, state, or local law. - Information in school law enforcement unit records that was not obtained from a student’s education records may also be disclosed without the consent of the student’s parents or the student. 20 U.S. C. 1232g. See "Information Sharing" in the Appendix, Annotated Resources, of the Guide for referral to additional sources of information on FERPA. 15 34 CFR 99.31(a)(10). 14 36 CHAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS It is important to note that FERPA regulations govern the disclosure of student information from education records and any information about the student that is based upon information contained in education records. FERPA regulations do not restrict the authority of school officials to share other information about a student that is not contained in education records. For example, information such as a school official’s personal observations about or interactions with a student that is not contained in education records may be disclosed. State Law and Access to Student Records State laws governing access to and sharing of information about students vary from state to state. Moreover, in the wake of highly publicized school shootings in the 1990s, several states enacted laws that revise restrictions on disclosure of information contained in student records. In some states, these amendments, in effect, make it easier to share this information among schools, law enforcement agencies, and others in furtherance of protecting the safety of students at school.16 2. Capacity to Conduct Inquiries and Investigations Proactive planning is a critical element in the implementation of a school threat assessment program. School administrators should consider creating a multidisciplinary threat assessment team that is based in the school or the school district. Schools should not wait until a crisis occurs to establish a threat assessment team. Many schools across the country already have established teams to respond to a wide range of situations, from suicides to meeting special education needs. The expertise and knowledge of any existing teams may be useful in developing a threat assessment team. The roles and responsibilities of the team as a whole, and of members of that team individually, should be clearly defined. The information gathering and assessment procedures to be used by the team should be formalized. Team members should be trained together in the threat assessment process. Multidisciplinary training sessions provide opportunities for professionals in different systems to build relationships and to consider how to address issues before a crisis arises. Training that uses practical exercises–"what should we do if …"–can enhance threat assessment and management programs and processes. The multidisciplinary threat assessment team’s principal responsibility is to guide the assessment and management of situations of concern. A senior school administrator should chair the team. Regular members of the team ideally should include: 1) a respected member of the school faculty or administration; 2) an investigator, such as 16 See "Information Sharing" in the Appendix, Annotated Resources, of the Guide for references that review some of the more recent changes to state laws that affect access to and disclosure of student information contained in education records. 37 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE a school resource officer or other police officer assigned to the school; 3) a mental health professional, such as a forensic psychologist, a clinical psychologist, or a school psychologist; and 4) other professionals, such as guidance counselors, teachers, coaches, and others, who may be able to contribute to the threat assessment process. In addition, the chair of the threat assessment team may wish to consider including as an ad hoc member of the team someone who knows the student of concern in the threat assessment inquiry. This ad hoc position might be held by an individual from the school community, such as a teacher, counselor, coach, nurse, other school employee, or someone from the community who may know or have knowledge of the student, such as a probation officer, member of the clergy, or a social service worker. If the student of concern is being provided services under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), a representative from the team that developed or manages that student’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP) also should be brought onto the threat assessment team as an ad hoc member for the inquiry regarding this particular student. CHAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS relationships can help the team acquire and use information about a given situation, and aid those with protective responsibilities in developing strategies to prevent targeted school violence. Ideally, community systems concerned with education, safety, and child welfare would have well-established policies and procedures for cooperation and collaboration. In practice, these systems oftentimes are large and overburdened and tend to carry out their functions independently. In a well-functioning threat assessment program, effective systems relationships are most likely to occur between individuals, not institutions. Individuals who build and maintain these relationships across disciplines and agencies are called "boundary spanners."17 They serve as a formal link or liaison between various systems and meet regularly with them. Boundary spanners have credibility, respect, and strong interpersonal skills. In addition, they should understand the needs and operation of other systems. This understanding helps in integrating ongoing interagency relationships, in developing written protocols, and in facilitating the resolution of conflicts. Skills and Training Developing the capacity to conduct school threat assessments involves recruiting, training, and supporting professionals with special skills. The qualifications, skills, knowledge and experience of the members of the threat assessment team should include: • a questioning, analytical, and skeptical mindset; • an ability to relate well to parents, colleagues, other professionals, and students; • familiarity with childhood and adolescent growth and development, the school environment, the need for safe schools, and the community; • a reputation within the school and the community for fairness and trustworthiness; • training in the collection and evaluation of information from multiple sources; • discretion, and an appreciation for the importance of keeping information confidential, and of the possible harm that may result in the inappropriate release of information; and • cognizance of the difference between harming and helping in an intervention. 3. Integrated Systems Relationships In order to identify, assess, and manage students who might pose threats of targeted violence, a threat assessment program must build relationships among individuals and organizations both within the school and external to the school. These 38 17 Steadman, H., "Boundary Spanners: A Key Component for the Effective Interactions of the Justice and Mental Health Systems." Law and Human Behavior. 16 (February, 1992): 75-87. 39 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE 40 CHAPTER V - CONDUCTING AN ASSESSMENT CHAPTER V CONDUCTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT CHAPTER V - CONDUCTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT This chapter focuses specifically on carrying out the threat assessment process. The sections that follow address the issue of identifying threatening situations; describe the information that should be sought in a threat assessment; identify potential sources of information; and set out 11 key questions that may provide members of the threat assessment team guidance in making judgments about whether a student of concern poses a threat. The approach presented is highly detailed but should not be read as suggesting that most, or even many, threat assessments will require extensive or elaborate gathering and analysis of information. Threat assessments may be brief and limited, or extensive and complex. The facts of a situation, together with information developed about a student of concern, will determine the scope of the threat assessment process. Many situations can be understood and resolved after initial informationgathering and evaluation. The Threat Assessment Process as a Continuum In previous chapters of this Guide, the terms "threat assessment inquiry" and "threat assessment investigation" generally have been used interchangeably. In this chapter, threat assessment inquiries and threat assessment investigations will be addressed as two complementary parts of a threat assessment continuum. Under this model of the threat assessment process, evaluation of a threatening situation proceeds from a threat assessment inquiry, carried out by the school threat assessment team, to a threat assessment investigation, carried out by a law enforcement agency, if the initial inquiry determines that there is a valid threat of targeted school violence. There may be several "right ways" to designate responsibility for conducting a threat assessment. One community or school system may decide to give primary responsibility to specially trained law enforcement professionals. Another may keep responsibility for most threat assessment and management within the school system. Still other communities develop "blended" systems. School, law enforcement, and community leaders should consider the principles of threat assessment, the functions needed for a successful program, and local resources and relationships before deciding what delineation of responsibilities makes the most sense. The threat assessment process is being presented in this manner as a means of underscoring the proposition that not all situations that become the focus of school threat assessment inquiries will require referral to and follow-up threat assessment investigations by law enforcement officials. For example, some preliminary inquiries by members of the school threat assessment team will find that information about a student was false or unfounded, or that the behavior of the student who is the subject of this inquiry does not present a risk of targeted violence and can be managed by school administrators and other officials on an informal basis. The situations examined in these inquiries do not pose threats to the school, the student body, or 43 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE CHAPTER V - CONDUCTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT the community, and therefore generally would not be referred to law enforcement agencies. By contrast, threat assessment inquiries that conclude that a valid threat of targeted school violence exists will require referral to law enforcement officials for further investigation. Nevertheless, in developing policies and procedures for carrying out a threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment program should establish a general threshold for initiating inquiries and referring threatening situations to law enforcement agencies. Central Distinctions Between Threat Assessment Inquiries and Investigations Identifying Students of Concern The primary objective of both a threat assessment inquiry and an investigation is to determine whether a particular student poses a threat of targeted school violence. The central distinctions between a threat assessment inquiry and a threat assessment investigation are defined by the management of these two parts of the threat assessment continuum. The primary objective of both a threat assessment inquiry and an investigation is to determine whether a particular student poses a threat of targeted school violence. Both an inquiry and an investigation ask "Is there information to suggest that this student is on the path to an attack? What is the risk of targeted violence?" A threat assessment inquiry is initiated and controlled by school authorities (often with law enforcement consultation and participation). Information is gathered at the school and by persons known to the school. If information collected suggests that the student of concern is considering mounting an attack at school, it may be appropriate to refer the situation to law enforcement for an investigation. Also, if information gathered in a threat assessment inquiry suggests that it is likely that a violation of law has occurred, it may be appropriate to refer the situation to law enforcement. A threat assessment investigation also asks: "Does this student pose a threat of targeted violence?" In addition, investigators may ask: "Has this student violated a law?" With respect to their management, the threat assessment inquiry and the threat assessment investigation differ as follows: • threat assessment inquiries are initiated, conducted, and controlled by the school threat assessment team; • threat assessment investigations are initiated, conducted, and controlled by law enforcement agencies. The line between a threat assessment inquiry and a threat assessment investigation–the point along the threat assessment continuum at which a school threat assessment team decides that a threatening situation must be referred to a law enforcement agency for investigation–will be determined by the school threat assessment team in consultation with school administrators and law enforcement officials. These determinations, in turn, will be made on a case-by-case basis. 44 As discussion of the threat assessment process in this Guide indicates, that process is not about the wholesale examination of the student body to identify students who may be at risk of committing acts of targeted school violence. Instead, threat assessment is a tool for responding to threatening situations in which there is concern about a particular student who has come to the attention of school administrators or other authorities. Students who become the focus of threat assessment inquiries and investigations may come to the attention of authorities in a number of ways. Circumstances That Bring a Student to Official Attention Some students may bring themselves to the attention of authorities by engaging in communications that cause concern: • A student submits a story for an English assignment about a character that shoots other students in his school. • Two students in a video class make a movie about kids who bring bombs to school. • A dean receives an e-mail stating, "I’m going to kill everyone in this asylum." • A seventh-grader, who is known to be feared by his classmates, cocks a finger at another boy on the playground and says "you’re gonna die." • The personal Web page of a high-achieving student has links to Web pages with information about cyanide. In each of the situations described above, a student has behaved in a manner that causes concern to school administrators and other authorities. Each situation requires some kind of follow-up inquiry or investigation. In each case, the identity of the student is known or potentially knowable. In some cases, the student’s communication is a direct threat. In other cases, the communication is ambiguous. Other students of concern come to the attention of authorities through second or third parties: • A school bus driver tells the principal of a school that a group of students has been overheard whispering about bringing a gun to school. • A ninth-grader reports that he has been threatened by another student and warned not to tell anybody about the threat. 45 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE • A student reports overhearing a lunchroom conversation between two other students in which one of the students says that he "isn’t going to take it any more. I’m going to get even for good." • A neighbor of a student calls the school to report suspicions that the student is experimenting with bomb-making materials. In still other cases, students come to the attention of authorities through anonymous communications: • A parent anonymously calls a tip line to report concerns about the behavior of a student. • The school district superintendent’s office receives an anonymous call stating that a bomb will go off in one of the middle schools at 1:45 p.m. • An anonymous letter signed "Fans of Eric and Dylan Club" arrives at a high school. The letter states "Remember Columbine" and warns that "Judgment Day" is coming. Information provided anonymously requires careful evaluation by the school threat assessment team. Some information may be accurate. Some information may be partial or incomplete. Some may be false and/or fabricated with malicious intent. In situations where a student is not easily identifiable from an anonymous communication, more sophisticated identification techniques may be required. These methods and techniques may necessitate involvement of law enforcement organizations, particularly in situations where there are anonymous warnings of imminent danger, such as bomb threats. Managing Communications about Students of Concern Policies regarding the handling of communications that raise concerns about students should address the following topics: • Establishing low barriers for reporting for those who may have information of concern.18 • Advising students and adults of the kinds of information that should be brought forward: threats; weapon-seeking and weapon-using behavior; homicidal and suicidal behaviors; behaviors suggesting that a young person is contemplating, or planning, an attack. • Ensuring that a thoughtful process is put in place in the school or school district to assess information that is brought forward about a potential attacker. This process should be perceived as credible by students and adults. 18 There is a growing body of literature on lowering barriers for persons with concerns and on integrated conflict management systems that may be of interest to school administrators. See for example Designing Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines for Practitioners and Decision Makers in Organizations, Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, 2001, http://www.spidr.org/article/icmsD.html 46 CHAPTER V - CONDUCTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT • Recognizing that what is reported may often be different than what actually was said or occurred. • Establishing and continually reinforcing a policy that it is everyone’s responsibility to help develop and maintain a respectful, safe school environment. • Reinforcing positive behaviors by teachers, students, and staff in the school. • Building linkages to individuals, groups, and organizations that can offer support and assistance to students and to the school. Sometimes these persons and groups may provide information that can help prevent targeted violent attacks. Creating a Central Point of Contact Individuals who have information about students that is cause for concern should know how to refer this information and to whom. The threat assessment team should designate a member of the team to serve as the initial point of contact for information of possible concern. The availability of this point of contact should be made known community-wide. An anonymous tip line may be of use if there is a process in place to carefully evaluate the information that is received by means of this approach. The threat assessment team member who serves as initial point of contact will screen information and determine whether to initiate a threat assessment inquiry or to consult other members of the team. Schools should publicize the name of the designated point of contact to faculty, staff, parents, and students as the person to contact with any information of potential concern. Students, faculty, staff, and parents should be instructed and encouraged to bring forward information about any activity that evokes concern about possible targeted violence. Information of interest includes threatening statements and writings; behavior that indicates that an attack is being planned; and attempts to acquire weapons. Individuals who provide information concerning a student should receive follow-up acknowledgments of their communications from the central point of contact, such as: "We have carefully considered the information you shared with us" or "We appreciate your bringing this situation to our attention." A follow-up acknowledgment can be made without revealing confidential or inappropriate information, and it reinforces the proposition that individuals in the community can play an important role in alerting school officials and other authorities of suspected threatening situations. The Threat Assessment Inquiry This section describes the process for conducting a threat assessment inquiry. The information developed during the inquiry will inform the threat assessment team’s analysis of a potentially threatening situation and provide the basis for deciding whether that situation should be referred to a law enforcement agency for a threat assessment investigation. 47 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE CHAPTER V - CONDUCTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT In the event that a threatening situation is referred to a law enforcement agency, the information gathered and analyzed by the threat assessment team during the threat assessment inquiry will be forwarded to the investigative law enforcement agency. That information will provide direction to police officials’ more in-depth examination of the behaviors and communications of the student of concern. Individuals who report information about possible threatening situations may have multiple motives. Alleged accounts of behaviors may be inaccurate and may be subjective interpretations of events. Careful attention to the facts–with corroboration wherever possible–will help determine whether the situation warrants scrutiny. When should a threat assessment inquiry be initiated? 2. Information about the student Upon receiving information concerning a potentially threatening situation, the threat assessment team must first consider: "How much time do we have?" An inquiry should be initiated immediately (within hours of notification) in any situation of concern. When information about a student’s behavior and communications passes an agreed-upon threshold of concern, school officials should initiate a threat assessment inquiry. Upon receiving information concerning a potentially threatening situation, the threat assessment team must first consider: "How much time do we have?" An inquiry should be initiated immediately (within hours of notification) in any situation of concern. If information concerning a threatening situation suggests that violence is imminent–for example, a student has acquired a weapon and is on his way to the school with the intention of shooting another student–that matter of course should be referred immediately to police. When information is received concerning a potentially threatening situation, the safety of the school and the community is the priority consideration. The threat assessment team therefore should consider how to handle a student of concern while an inquiry or investigation is being conducted. In making decisions about how to handle a student pending the outcome of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation, care should be exercised to ensure that a student of concern is not treated inappropriately, since any allegations regarding the behavior or perceived dangerousness of the student may be unfounded. What information should be sought in an inquiry? Once a decision has been made to conduct an inquiry, the threat assessment team should develop an information plan. A school threat assessment inquiry should seek information in five areas: 1. The facts that drew attention to the student, the situation, and possibly the targets The first area of inquiry concerns how the student came to the attention of school officials. What behaviors and/or communications were reported, and by whom? What was the situation? Who, if anyone, witnessed the reported behavior of concern? What was the context for the reported behavior, i.e., what else was going on at the time of the reported behavior? 48 Three kinds of general information about a student should be gathered: identifiers, background information, and information about the student’s current life situation and circumstances. A. Identifying information: • name; • physical description; • date of birth; and • identification numbers (e.g., Social Security number, student ID, etc.). B. Background information: • residences; • family/home situation; • academic performance; • social networks; • history of relationships and conflicts; • history of harassing others or of being harassed by others; • history of violence toward self and others; • history of having been a victim of violence or bullying; • known attitudes toward violence; • criminal behavior; • mental health/substance abuse history; • access to and use of weapons; and • history of grievances and grudges. C. Current life information: • present stability of living and home situations; • nature and quality of current relationships and personal support; • recent losses or losses of status (shame, humiliation, recent breakup or loss of significant relationship); • current grievances or grudges; • perceptions of being treated unfairly; • known difficulty coping with a stressful event; • any "downward" progression in social, academic, behavioral, or psychological functioning; 49 THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE • recent hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair, including suicidal thoughts, gestures, actions, or attempts; and • pending crises or change in circumstances. Of particular note is whether the student has any trusting relationships with adults who are emotionally available to him or her, or whether the student is known to be consistently respectful to any adult. If there is an adult who is "connected" to the student, that adult may have useful information about the student’s thinking and behavior. In addition, such an adult may be able to help the student if he or she appears to be on a path toward mounting a targeted school attack. CHAPTER V - CONDUCTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT For example, a student who feels he has been treated wrongly and unfairly by a teacher or an administrator and who is thinking about "revenge" may be offered or taught non-violent ways to address his concerns and problems. Mediation; personal support; clarification about the disciplinary process; education about how to write a letter of concern to authorities who might intervene in the student’s problems; or other dispute resolution efforts might turn that student away from a potentially violent co...
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