Running head: GENDER PAY GAP
1
An Ethical Insight on Gender Pay Gap
Kendran Thornton
PHI 208 Ethics and Moral Reasoning
Prof. Whitney Easton
August 14, 2017
GENDER PAY GAP
2
An Ethical Insight on Gender Pay Gap
One of the most important challenges that women in the United States still face is gender
pay gap, as men earn on average around 20 percent less than man. Even when the gap is adjusted
by taking into account differences such as occupations chosen, hours works, education, and job
experience women still make almost 10 % less than men (Tharenou, 2013). In a society that
seeks to achieve gender equality, the existence of a pay gap between men and women is clearly
an ethical problem. While paying women less than men is unlawful, one might wonder whether
it is unethical. The purpose of the present paper is to analyze whether the ethical theory of
utilitarianism can be used to determine whether gender pay gap is an ethical dilemma and antigender discrimination laws can be defended by appealing to ethics. By analyzing the principles
of utilitarianism, it is shown that gender pay gap is indeed an ethical dilemma because it
produces both short- and long-term negative consequences that impact society as a whole.
Theory Explanation
According to the consequentialist perspective on ethics, moral values serve to the purpose
of producing the right type of general consequences. In other words, consequentialism seeks to
determine the moral value of an action by looking into the consequences of the action. For
example, if the purpose of morality is to bring happiness, actions that seek to produce happiness
for the highest number of people will be regarded as ethical actions. One well-known
consequentialist approach is the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham (Haines,
n.d.). In the perspective of John Stuart Mill “the basis of morals is utility or the greatest
happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness,
wrong in proportion as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (Mill, n.d.). Mill
GENDER PAY GAP
3
conceptualizes happiness as pleasure and the absence of pain; unhappiness obviously refers to
pain in the absence of pleasure. In other words, John Stuart and other utilitarianists believe that
pleasure and freedom from pain are the only desirable ends from any actions, which means
actions are only ethically valid if they lead to general pleasure and freedom to pain. For example,
if someone makes a charitable act through which fewer people are hungry, the action will be
regarded as ethical by utilitarianists because it produces more happiness and less pain. On the
other hand, if an individual obtains pleasure and frees himself or herself from pain at the expense
of others, the action will not be regarded as ethical by utilitarianists because both pleasure and
pain were produced as the result of the action. Utilitarianism can be differentiated into two
categories: Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism. According to Act Utilitarianism,
determining whether an act of ethical or not will require looking at the consequences of a
specific act. According to Rule Utilitarianism, on the other hand, one must look at “the bigger
picture” in order to determine whether the consequences of an act are desirable or not (Tharenou,
2013).
Theory Application
Considering that the principles of utilitarianism promote actions that are based on
consequences and that the desired consequences are those where the greatest happiness occurs, it
can be inferred that the theory can be applied to determine whether the consequences that result
from gender pay gap are ethical or not. For instance, if a company discriminates against an
individual due to its gender, it risks losing a competent employee. This example can be analyzed
from the perspective of Act utilitarianism by looking at the specific consequences of the
discriminatory act. More specifically, if a company pays women less than men for the same job
GENDER PAY GAP
4
through specific strategies that allows them to avoid being legally sanctioned, many female
employees might decide searching job in a company that does not practice discrimination
policies, for which the company will lose many valuable employees. In other words, such an
action will not be beneficial for the company and it will likely lower the happiness of
stakeholders. More so, the action will also lower the happiness of the employees who will have
to leave their work and search for an employee. Considering that this particular action (paying
female employees less) leads to specific negative consequences (lowering the level of happiness
of stakeholders and many employees) it can be asserted that the company from the example will
have committed an ethical violation from the Act utilitarianism perspective. From the Rule
Utilitarianism perspective, on the other hand, it is necessary to look at the bigger picture in order
to determine if discriminating female employees at work are ethical or not. For example, it can
be argued that if companies continue to pay women less than men, there are long-term economic
and social impacts of discrimination. Long-term consequences could include less educational and
work opportunities for women and a generally less prepared workforce for an increasingly
complex economy. In other words, practicing double standards at the workplace could also be
considered unethical from the Rule Utilitarianism perspective.
Objection
Those who object to the validity of utilitarianism in ethically justifying anti-gender
discrimination laws might point out several weak elements of the arguments presented above.
For instance, from the perspective of Act Utilitarianism, it was argued that if a company pay
women less than men this will bring negative consequences for both the company’s stakeholders
and the employees. While this might be true in many circumstances, it is difficult to prove that
GENDER PAY GAP
5
companies could not at times benefit from practicing employee discrimination. On the other
hand, it is more difficult to argue against the positions which can be taken from the Rule
Utilitarianism perspective. Even if individual companies could benefit from practicing
discrimination based on gender (or other demographic variables), the society as a whole would
not, as discriminatory practices benefit those who practice them for their own interests. For this
reason, utilitarianism, especially when understood from the Rule perspective, can provide strong
arguments against gender pay gap.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the present paper shows that gender pay gap is indeed an ethical dilemma
when taken from an Utilitarianist perspective, as such a gap produces both short- and long-term
negative consequences that impact society as a whole. From the perspective of Act
Utilitarianism, it has been shown that discriminating female employees is unethical because such
an action will harm the company and the employees. Such a discrimination is also unethical from
the perspective of Rule Utilitarianism, as it can produce long-term economic and social problems
for the society as a whole. Since utilitarianism can be used to show that gender discrimination at
work in unethical, it can also be used to defend laws that seek to eliminate the gender pay gap.
GENDER PAY GAP
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References
Haines, W. (n.d.). Consequentialism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from
http://www.iep.utm.edu/conseque/
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism, in the original version in the textbook, or in the version by
Jonathan Bennett. Retrieved from www.earlymoderntexts.com
Tharenou, P. (2013). The work of feminists is not yet done: The gender pay gap—a stubborn
anachronism. Sex roles, 68(3-4), 198-206.
61
Traditional
of Ethics
IntroducingTheories
Philosophy
Federico©Terry
Caputo/iStock/Thinkstock
Why/ Getty Images
You have your way. I have my way. As for
“It is the mark of an educated mind
the right way, the correct way, and the only
to be able to entertain a thought
way, it does not exist.
without accepting it”
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra
—Aristotle
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CHAPTER 6
Section 6.1 How Should One Act?
Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to:
1. Characterize the classical theories of ethics—utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics.
2. Identify some of the problems these theories confront.
3. Describe other metaethical views, such as relativism and egoism.
4. Apply ethical theories to problems that affect both individuals and larger groups, including
environmental challenges.
What We Will Discover
• Philosophers have developed theories to provide support for our claims about right and
wrong.
• Other theories such as egoism and relativism offer alternatives to traditional theories of
ethics.
• Ethics has many specific applications to our lives, from the very personal and specific to
those that affect everyone in society.
6.1 How Should One Act?
E
thics, or moral philosophy, investigates how we
can evaluate our behavior in terms of right and
wrong, good and bad—in other words, how we
determine what we should do, what we should not
do, and how to tell the difference. After looking at
the three classical ethical views that philosophers have
presented and some of the problems with these theories, we will explore some alternative approaches.
Utilitarianism
Suppose you and five of your friends are hanging out
one night and decide to order a pizza. You are all
equally hungry and decide to order two pizzas, each
of which has six slices. Thus, when the pizzas are
delivered, it is pretty easy to determine how to divide
the pizzas in a way that is the fairest: Everyone gets
two slices. It may be that one person wanted a third
slice, and someone else may have only wanted one.
Yet without knowing anything else, this arrangement, more than any other, will be the most beneficial to the greatest number of people.
Photos.com/© Getty Images/Thinkstock
Jeremy Bentham is associated with the
founding of utilitarianism, which states
that given a choice between two acts,
the one that creates greater happiness
for the greatest number of people should
be chosen.
This simple example demonstrates the basic notion at
the heart of the ethical doctrine known as utilitarianism. Often associated with the philosophers Jeremy Bentham (1748–1822) and John Stuart Mill, utilitarianism offers a very straightforward and
direct way to evaluate behavior. When given a choice between two acts, utilitarianism states that
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the act that should be chosen is the one that creates the greatest amount of happiness for
the greatest number of people. Philosophers (and economists) often use the term utility
to express this quality. Utility is the satisfaction one gets from something. For instance, if
you like chocolate ice cream more than vanilla ice cream, we can say that chocolate ice
cream has a higher utility for you, relative to vanilla ice cream. In theory, at least, each of
us can rank all of our choices according to a scale that indicates our relative preferences.
Some philosophers, such as Bentham, even attempted to assign numbers to these preferences. If someone likes chocolate ice cream five times as much as vanilla ice cream, that
person would presumably be willing to accept five vanilla ice cream cones as a substitute
for one chocolate ice cream cone. It should also be noted that utility is regarded in terms
of net utility: The correct moral choice is that which generates the greatest good and also
minimizes unhappiness.
Read more of
John Stuart
Mill’s ideas
on this topic
in his work
Utilitarianism
in the
Chapter
Readings
section of the
Appendix.
Because utilitarianism considers an act’s consequences in assessing its morality, utilitarianism is also regarded as a consequentialist theory. The basic idea in consequentialism is
to consider the consequences that will result from the choices one confronts: If the consequences of one act produce the greatest net good—or the highest utility—for the greatest number of people, this is the act one should carry out. Many people find this to be a
rather obvious ethical viewpoint; clearly if we had decided to give all the pizza slices to just
three people and no slices to the other three, this would seem rather unfair. It should also
be clear that utilitarianism offers an approach to scenarios other than distributing pizza
and ice cream. Imagine Mary really loves to dance, but she does not get to go dancing
very often. Mary has three children, with whom she enjoys spending time and who enjoy
spending time with her. One night she is given the option of staying home and spending
time with her children or going dancing. What should she do? The utilitarian might argue
that, on the one hand, the pleasure Mary gets from dancing is greater than staying with
her children. Yet on the other hand, her children will receive great pleasure if she does not
go dancing. Therefore, the “utility calculation” is that the net happiness of Mary and her
three children will be higher if she stays home, even though Mary’s individual happiness
might be slightly lower than it would have been if she had chosen to go dancing.
Utility is often described in terms of pleasure, which can be problematic for utilitarianism. Imagine someone finds pleasure in playing video games and drinking beer all day
long. Given a choice between, say, helping out in a homeless shelter or drinking and
playing the newest video game, a person may well choose the latter, which suggests to
some that utilitarianism has no way to distinguish between different kinds of pleasures.
Presumably, we want our theory to be able to make a distinction between hedonistic and
nobler pleasures. Mill saw this as a potential problem and insisted that pleasure should be
considered not just in terms of quantity but also quality: that certain kinds of pleasures,
or certain ways of satisfying desires, are simply better than others. A pig may be happy
rolling around in the mud and eating garbage, but Mill insisted that people who take that
approach to pleasure fail to develop their potential as human beings (relative to pigs, at
least). According to Mill, it is better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied pig. This is
not to say that one should always choose something less pleasurable; rather, it is simply an
indication that pleasures themselves can, or perhaps should, be distinguished from each
other. It is not always easy to say that one pleasure is “superior” to another, and certainly
people have long argued about this issue. However, these kinds of examples indicate a
problem utilitarianism confronts if we evaluate acts solely in terms of their pleasurable
consequences (Mill, 1909).
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Many people find utilitarianism to be an easy and useful approach to making ethical decisions.
When distributing goods, services, or even time, it would seem to be a “no-brainer” to choose
the option that would satisfy or please as many people as possible, compared to any other available choice. However, philosophers have raised a number of problems in response to utilitarianism, which may make it a less plausible ethical theory than it first appears.
Problems With Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism has what philosophers call an intuitive appeal: It seems to be relatively obvious,
and just plain common sense, to evaluate our actions based on the results those actions produce. If all we know about a situation is that four kids in a sandbox have one toy, the best option
would be for the children to share that toy, even if each child is quite sure he or she would get
the most pleasure from playing with it alone.
However, many philosophers have objected to utilitarianism, and for a number of reasons. As
we have seen, distinguishing different kinds of pleasures from each other can be difficult. Does
utilitarianism have any way to address the situation of a person who gets pleasure from staring
at the wall or doing something else that most people would find quite unpleasant (something
often called masochism)? Mill (1863) suggests there are “higher” or “more refined” pleasures
and that they should be preferred, but who is to say which is a “higher” pleasure? Is reading
poetry somehow better than watching soap operas? What if someone gains pleasure by sleeping all the time or hitting his thumb over and over with a hammer?
More significant objections to utilitarianism have been posed on the basis of calculating the outcome, or consequences, of a choice. Suppose you are on a cruise ship that catches fire; you and
19 others are lucky enough to survive on a lifeboat. There is enough water to last for a week or
more, but you have no food and do not know whether you will be rescued. Everyone is aware
of how grim the future looks; as the boat drifts, everyone gets hungrier. It becomes apparent
that everyone is going to die unless your group finds food. The utilitarian in the group poses
the following options: All 20 people die, or 19 people live if one person is killed and eaten! To
justify his position, he cites historical examples of similar cases in which cannibalism helped the
majority survive. However, while this scenario may appear to result in the greatest good for the
greatest number, do we really want an ethical theory that not only allows cannibalism, but actually endorses it as the fairest and most ethical decision?
Few of us are likely to experience a situation this extreme, but we may find ourselves in situations
where the basic utilitarian calculation actually leads to results that are very unfair and unjust. This
is particularly threatening anytime individuals find themselves in a minority, whether because
of their sex, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or any of the other ways in which society categorizes people. For example, suppose a local grade school must decide if it should use
taxpayer money to build ramps to make the building accessible to students in wheelchairs. This
tax will likely decrease the pleasure of each taxpayer and may only be used by a few individuals
throughout the year. In this way it would result in a net utility that would favor a decision not to
build the ramps. Would you consider this a fair outcome?
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Great Ideas: The Trolley Problem
A very famous challenge to our ethical intuitions, originated by Philippa Foot, is easy to describe but
more problematic to solve. In Foot’s 1967 essay “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the
Double Effect,” she posed the following scenario known as the trolley problem:
Imagine a runaway trolley hurtling toward five workers on the track. The driver must choose between
staying the course, which would result in the death of the five workers, or divert the trolley to a spur
where just one worker on the track would be killed. Most would say that diverting the trolley to save
five lives while killing only one would be the better of the two options.
Now imagine a similar scenario: What if a doctor could save the lives of five people who needed organ
donations by killing one patient and distributing his organs? Would that be considered a moral act?
If not, why would it be moral to kill the one track worker, but not the one patient? There are many
variations on this basic scenario, which has generated a great deal of debate and discussion.
Reflection Questions:
With this in mind, consider the following questions:
1. Try to posit a situation where it would seem moral to kill (or allow to die) one person in
order to save five people’s lives.
2. What is the relevant moral difference—if there is one—between killing someone and allowing someone to die?
3. Does it make a difference if one could save twenty people by sacrificing one person’s life?
One hundred? One thousand? At what point might our views change due to the relationship between the one person sacrificed and the number of people saved?
Tyranny of the Majority
Dating as far back as Plato, political philosophers have often cited the tyranny of the majority,
which is when the interests of the majority are placed above the interests of the minority, and
to their detriment. American history is littered with such stories, whether the minority groups
be African Americans, Native Americans, Jews, homosexuals, or many others. In the original,
Protestant-dominated colonies, for example, Roman Catholics were not allowed to vote or hold
public office. Despite the obvious injustice, this would seem to fit the utilitarian calculation,
because Catholics were a minority at that time. This kind of calculation has been used to justify a wide range of policies that seem wrong, from slavery to refusing to sell houses in certain
neighborhoods to ethnic and racial minorities. Interestingly, women have also suffered for similar
reasons on the basis of this kind of calculation, despite the fact that they actually make up the
majority of the population.
Mill’s Response
John Stuart Mill and other utilitarians recognized the flaws in an ethical system that had such
unethical and oppressive results. One popular way of addressing these flaws has been to distinguish between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism simply involves a
judgment of the act’s consequences: Given a set of choices, which act generates the greatest net
good for the greatest number? Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, involves an evaluation
of the types of acts involved and proposes that, when followed as a general rule, the act should
produce the greatest net good, or the greatest amount of happiness, for the greatest number.
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Consider the following example: Bob is taking an important physics test that he needs to pass
to get into medical school. He considers the possibility that if he cheats “successfully,” he gains
a great deal and thus achieves his greatest happiness, or “maximizes his utility” (we will ignore
any feelings of guilt Bob may have). The act utilitarian would suggest that, in this case, cheating
produces the greatest amount of good. The rule utilitarian would offer a different analysis. Bob
may gain the most by cheating, but in general, we could not promote the rule that one should
cheat. If we endorse a rule that says it is okay to cheat to get into medical school, then the rest of
society would be considerably less confident that physicians were trustworthy and deserved their
credentials. This would fail to generate the greatest good for the greatest number; therefore, the
rule utilitarian would tell Bob not to cheat.
Rule utilitarianism seems to have a better chance of dealing with some of the more obvious
objections we have seen, although it is not entirely clear whether it can successfully treat the
problem of a minority being oppressed by a majority. Mill (1909) seemed to advocate a system
of “proportionate representation,” so minorities would be at least represented, but it is not clear
how this solves the problem. Other objections have also been raised against both act and rule
utilitarianism. For instance, when measuring pleasure, or utility, what time frame should be used:
days, years, decades? Who is included in the idea of the “greatest number”—our family, our
community, our country, our planet? How can one compare one person’s amount of pleasure
with another person’s? Can we really even measure pleasure, or happiness, or utility in a way
that allows us to make these utilitarian calculations?
These are difficult questions to answer, and many philosophers have seen this as a reason to look
elsewhere for a moral theory, one that does not evaluate acts in terms of consequences and does
not measure such things as happiness and utility. The most famous alternative to utilitarianism is
deontology, which is a nonconsequentialist theory.
Deontology
Deontological ethics is usually associated with the philosopher Immanuel Kant. Deontology
comes from the Greek word for “obligation” (or “duty”). In contrast to consequentialist theories, Kant, and more generally the deontologist, ignores an act’s consequences when evaluating
whether it is a good, bad, or morally neutral act. It is important to remember that deontologists
do not deny that acts have consequences; their point is that those consequences should not
play a role in evaluating the act’s morality. Rather, deontological ethics focuses on the will of the
person acting, the person’s intention in carrying out the act, and particularly, the rule according
to which the act is carried out. Deontology focuses on the duties and obligations one has in carrying out actions rather than on the consequences of those actions.
In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant (1997) claimed that certain kinds of rules established
what he called a categorical imperative. This is a requirement or demand (imperative), and it
has no exceptions (it is categorical). We might contrast this kind of imperative with what Kant
calls a hypothetical imperative, which is illustrated by supposing you are hungry and decide to
eat something; in this case the action (eating) is designed to achieve a goal (making you less
hungry). Yet there is no obligation or demand that you eat; it is just what you do in this specific
situation. Similarly, if you want to pass a course, a hypothetical imperative might tell you to
study. In short, if someone adopts a certain goal, then actions that help achieve that goal are to
be adopted. The categorical imperative, on the other hand, has no exceptions and is something
one must do. As part of the categorical imperative, Kant assumes that being a moral person is a
requirement; it is not merely a goal people may choose to strive for.
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Kant offers several versions of the categorical imperative. We will look at the first two,
which will give us a rough idea of what kind of rule it is.
1. Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time want that
it should become a universal law. That is, if you choose to do something, would
you desire that everyone in that same circumstance do exactly the same thing?
2. Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a
means to an end. In other words, all people—including you—deserve respect. It
would always be wrong to treat people as objects, or as a way of achieving some
goal, or in another way that does not show respect. (Kant 1997, 1998)
These rules may sound similar to that very famous and old Golden Rule: “Do unto others
as you would have them do unto you.” The Golden Rule can be found in many different
civilizations, beginning with the ancient Egyptians and the ancient Greeks, as well as in
many religions, including Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Yet there is a crucial
distinction that Kant notes between the Golden Rule and the categorical imperative. Kant
insists that rational agents should act in such a way that the rule they adopt can be followed universally, or by all rational agents. Otherwise, someone who might enjoy pain (a
masochist) or enjoys inflicting pain (a sadist) might well be following the Golden Rule by
treating others as he or she would like to be treated.
Read
Immanuel
Kant’s
Fundamental
Principles
of the
Metaphysics
of Morals in
the Chapter
Readings
section of the
Appendix.
Despite the distinction, there are many circumstances in which the categorical imperative
and the Golden Rule lead to similar results. You do not want to be treated by others as
some kind of “thing,” so you yourself should not treat others that way. This last claim is
essentially what Kant provides as the second version of the categorical imperative.
As we have seen, a simple utilitarian calculation has an intuitive appeal in that it seems
fairly obvious to evaluate an act in terms of whether it produces the greatest net good for
the greatest number. An indication that universal rules of behavior have their own intuitive
appeal is borne out by the number of parents who use such rules with their children. For
example, suppose a mother observes her daughter not sharing a toy with several other
children; she is likely to take her daughter aside and ask, “How would you like it if no
one shared toys with you?” The daughter, of course, would not like it, and—the mother
hopes—the little girl will begin to understand that if she does not like to be treated in a
certain way, then she should not treat others in that way. This question—”How would you
like it if others treated you that way?”—is probably something all of us have heard before
and is indicative of how familiar we are with this version of deontological ethics.
Despite their differences, utilitarianism and deontology often come to the same conclusion, but from alternate directions. In the example of a group of children having one toy
among them, the utilitarian would argue that the greatest net good for the greatest number is achieved by sharing the toy. The deontologist, on the other hand, would argue that
people should treat others with the same respect they expect to be given, and that is best
achieved by sharing the toy. They both conclude that the children should share, but one
draws this conclusion by looking at the results, whereas the other draws the same conclusion by looking at the rule that should be followed. At the same time, other actions may
generate conflicts between the two perspectives. For instance, a deontologist may adopt
as the universal rule “Never steal.” Yet imagine a family that has no food; the deontologist
may be forced to conclude that it would be wrong for the father to steal food to feed his
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family. The utilitarian, in contrast, calculates that the unhappiness of the person from whom the
food was stolen is not as great as the happiness achieved by the family getting food. Thus, the
utilitarian may well argue that in this case stealing is not wrong because it produces the greatest
good for the greatest number.
Both utilitarianism and deontology have certain advantages. Utilitarian calculations are, at least
at first glance, fairly easy to devise and provide a quick way to evaluate the moral worth of an
act. Deontology, on the other hand, has the appeal of being easily explained and develops rules
that seem to make sense and are also widely applied. We have already seen that utilitarianism
confronts certain problems that expose how it may lead to results that appear unfair and unjust;
we can now look at some similar kinds of problems that face the deontologist.
Problems With Deontology
Traditionally, critics of deontology have focused on two specific but related issues. First, deontology—particularly the Kantian version—seems too sterile and fails to capture some of the complex issues that arise when we confront ethical problems in real life. The second issue (which may
be a result of the first) is that deontology may require one to act in a way that seems obviously
wrong and unethical. As we saw with utilitarianism, any ethical theory that leads to potentially
unethical results is problematic.
We have seen the best known versions of Kant’s categorical imperative: That is, you should
never treat others only as a means to achieve your goals, and you should only do something if
everyone in that same situation would act the same way. The repeated use of the word should
indicates these are normative demands, or moral claims.
In some scenarios, the right course of action seems obvious. Just because you are late for a
movie, you should not run over someone with your car on your way to the theater. No one in a
similar situation should do so either. Following the Golden Rule would lead to the same result;
after all, you would not want to be run over by someone rushing to get to the movies, so you
should not run over someone to do so. Yet are there situations in which these kinds of rules
result in actions that are wrong or even immoral?
The most famous objection to the deontologist’s approach—specifically Kant’s—is the problem
posed by lying. Lying is, of course, intentionally misleading someone to think something is true
when it is false, or false when it is true. Children are taught at an early age never to lie, and most
moral systems prohibit or at least discourage lying. Often, the Ninth Commandment given in
the book of Exodus, “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour” (Exodus 20:16),
is interpreted to mean that lying is always wrong. Lying also seems to be a clear example of the
categorical imperative: To lie to someone is to treat them with insufficient respect as a human
being, and since we presumably do not want to be lied to, we should not lie to others.
Still, people lie to each other quite a lot, and often to achieve goals that seem to be appropriate
and moral (or at least not immoral). Consider the following four examples:
1. A husband buys a new shirt that he likes very much and asks his wife if it makes him
look fat. In truth, the shirt does make him look fat. Should the wife tell her husband
the truth? (The wife might avoid lying by not answering, but this may itself indicate her
opinion.)
2. Dan and his friends are throwing an elaborate surprise party for Jody. Jody gets suspicious and asks Dan, “Are you throwing me a surprise party?” If Dan tells the truth, the
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surprise party is ruined, and all their efforts will have been wasted. Should Dan lie to
Jody?
3. Parents in the United States often tell their children made-up stories, not just about a
jolly fat man who brings them presents at Christmastime, but also about a rabbit that
brings candy at Easter and even a fairy who “buys” the teeth they have lost. Should
parents always tell their children the truth about Santa Claus, the Easter bunny, and
the tooth fairy?
4. Sarah comes to your door and asks you to hide her from an ax-wielding stalker. You
agree without hesitation. Shortly thereafter, a wild-eyed man, holding an ax, asks you
if you have hidden Sarah. Do you tell him the truth? (It is important to note that you
are not being threatened; the man holding the ax asks about Sarah in a very polite and
respectful manner.)
We started with what seemed to be a good, widely accepted rule: “Never lie.” Yet the preceding examples illustrate the complexity of applying this rule. Do the people who lie in the above
examples act immorally? The wife does not want to make her husband feel bad; Dan wants to
make sure Jody enjoys her surprise; parents want their children to be captivated by Santa Claus
and provide incentive for good behavior; and lying to an ax-wielding stalker might save Sarah’s
life.
Kant’s stern rule about never lying, then, seems to force everyone in the above cases to do
something they would prefer not to do. Perhaps the husband, Jody, the children, and the stalker
would prefer to be lied to? One might tinker with Kant’s rule, or suggest that one should not ask
questions unless one expects to be told the truth. One might also say that children are special
cases and have not reached the age where we are always honest with them. Yet this logic results
in a rule that is even more convoluted: “Never lie,” morphs into something like, “Never lie to
those over a certain age, and hope no one asks you questions they really would prefer not be
answered truthfully.” Even this variation on the rule may be problematic; we can probably think
of examples where lying seems to be the right thing to do. Formulating a rule that allows for
those examples is a difficult task.
We have seen the advantages of utilitarianism and deontology, as well as some of their problems. One other classical, or traditional, theory remains; it does not look at the consequences of
our acts (as in utilitarianism, or consequentialism) or at the acts themselves and the rules that
guide those acts (as in deontology, or nonconsequentialism). Rather, it looks at the character of
the person acting. This is a theory known as virtue ethics.
Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is an approach to moral and ethical questions that focuses on a person’s character.
Some discussion of this concept can be found in the writings of Plato, as well as in the teachings
of Chinese philosophers such as Confucius (551–479 bce). However, the classic conception of
virtue ethics in Western philosophy is attributed to Aristotle. For Aristotle, the virtuous person,
or the person of virtuous character, is someone who has admirable characteristics and displays
them in a way that is balanced and harmonious. This person seeks to have an ideal character,
and the virtues that contribute to this goal will all be appropriately related to each other. Ultimately, the person with practical or moral wisdom—what Aristotle calls phronesis—will have
the appropriate virtues, will know how to use them, and will possess moral excellence. Such a
person will achieve the specific kind of happiness Aristotle describes as human flourishing.
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Section 6.1 How Should One Act?
Read more
about virtue
ethics in
Aristotle’s
Nicomachean
Ethics in
the Chapter
Readings
section of the
Appendix.
CHAPTER 6
Some of these virtues are traditional characteristics that we still use to describe a good,
moral, or virtuous person, including courage, generosity, and being a good friend. According to Aristotle, a person may have too little courage, which we would call cowardice.
Another person may have too much courage, resulting in rash behavior. A soldier who
runs from the field of battle when first confronting the enemy might not have enough
courage, whereas the soldier who runs straight into machine-gun fire may have too much.
Aristotle insists that the virtuous person will have the right amount of courage and will
aim at what he calls the golden mean between having too little and having too much
of a given characteristic. Thus, someone who displays little generosity will fall on one end
of the spectrum (miserly); someone who is much too generous will fall on the opposite
end (wasteful); and a moderately generous person falls in the middle and is virtuous. The
person who has the requisite moral wisdom, or phronesis, will know how to act in a given
situation, and those acts will be in harmony with the other virtues that make up this person’s character.
Aristotle also describes two virtues that are a bit more complex. One of these he calls
temperance, or sophrosunë (Aristotle, 2002). A temperate person is moderate and has
self-control. This person is able to control his or her emotions through reason and does not
indulge in the extreme. When it comes to drinking wine, the intemperate person will drink
too much of it, whereas the person who rejects it entirely, in spite of finding it enjoyable,
is regarded as insensible. Temperance, then, is a middle ground between the two excesses
of insensibility and intemperance.
Aristotle also describes a virtue he calls magnanimity, which is how we see ourselves and
how we are regarded by others (Aristotle, 2002). This can involve the respect others give
us and also the kinds of rewards and honors we can receive. Along with justice, Aristotle
considered this to be the highest virtue. Magnanimity is translated from the Greek word
megalopsuchia, which literally means “great soul” or “great mind.” This is a person who
represents excellence, is worthy of being honored by others, and knows that he or she
is worthy. Neither arrogant nor falsely modest, the virtuous person demonstrates magnanimity, and as a virtue, it is possessed in a reasonable amount. People who think too
highly of themselves or who think they deserve more recognition than they actually do
are considered vain. On the other hand, those who believe they deserve no recognition
or appreciation when the opposite is likely true have too little magnanimity, a characteristic Aristotle calls “low-minded.” We might call such a person too self-effacing, or falsely
modest. The truly magnanimous person has this virtue in its proper proportion; such a person will be appropriately modest while appropriately proud of his or her accomplishments.
To see how virtues might interact with and balance against one another, consider the following example. Suppose Nick likes to go to parties, but he drinks too much and acts as if
he is everyone’s best friend. One night a fight breaks out, and Nick tries to stop it by fighting with everyone involved in the original fight. Nick is unable to keep his desires in check
by practical reason; does not live in accordance with the golden mean, and he indulges in
excess. In contrast, Ted never goes to parties; he stays home alone and never has any fun.
Once, when he saw someone steal an elderly woman’s purse, he ran in the opposite direction. Ted also does not have his desires by reason, does not live in accordance with the
golden mean, and disproportionately deprives himself. Neither Nick nor Ted would qualify
as having a virtuous character. Jennifer, on the other hand, is a good friend; she is courageous; she is modest but takes pride in what she does and accepts the legitimate praise
of others; and she is generous, honest, and moderate. She has what the Greeks called
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Section 6.1 How Should One Act?
CHAPTER 6
eudaimonia, which can be translated in a variety of ways, including happiness, flourishing, and
well-being. Aristotle would say that because Jennifer’s virtues are in their proper balance and
proportion, she has eudaimonia.
It is easy to get lost in Aristotle’s technical vocabulary, but his basic point is that the person who
makes the right moral choices, or behaves ethically, is a virtuous person and is the kind of person
we admire for that reason. We object to those who are deficient in one or more of the characteristics we have mentioned, but we also object to those who display one or more of these
attributes excessively. The person who has eudaimonia is the person who has acquired the correct conception of the virtues, individually and as a whole, and as such, offers us an example of
what kinds of moral choices should be made. We may not actually know of such a person, and
indeed such a person may not actually exist. However, the conception of such a virtuous person
helps us examine our own choices and behavior to see where we are doing the right thing and
where we may need improvement.
As is often the case with ethical theories, virtue ethics initially sounds clear, obvious, and easy to
apply. But just as challenges exist to both utilitarianism and deontology, certain problems arise
for proponents of virtue ethics.
Problems With Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics differs from utilitarianism and deontology in that it examines not what a person
does, but what kind of character he or she has. In addition to the virtues, this theory provides us
with a spectrum on which to moderate our own behavior, as well as an ideal for which to strive.
Applying these notions in real-world examples is more difficult than it would initially appear,
however.
For example, consider one of Aristotle’s specific virtues, courage. While it is easy to imagine
plenty of scenarios in which someone has an excess of courage or a lack of sufficient courage,
it is difficult to determine what the appropriate amount of courage would be for more nuanced
situations. Imagine Steve is a prisoner of war, kept in very brutal conditions with a number of his
fellow soldiers. He knows he has a fairly good chance of escaping, but if he is caught, the guards
will torture and execute him. He also knows that if a prisoner successfully escapes, the guards
will choose another prisoner at random, torture him, and then execute him. To escape under
these conditions requires a certain degree of courage; but choosing not to escape also requires
some courage. Under these circumstances, how should Steve be appropriately courageous? It
is not clear that there is a golden mean to which Steve can appeal, and it is therefore not clear
which, if either, of the possible actions is virtuous. In this specific case then, it seems that virtue
ethics lacks sufficient guidance for how to act. Similar problems confront the other virtues. Is
there an “appropriate amount” of lying one should do in order to be virtuous? Should one be
willing to break some promises but keep others? Even if we think there may be solutions to various individual ethical dilemmas, virtue ethics seems to fail to offer the kind of general solution
offered by utilitarianism and deontology.
Another problem with virtue ethics is that Aristotle and many virtue ethicists seem to think that
certain terms are well understood and that everyone shares the same general conception of the
virtues. But do we? We may think that friendship, for example, is universally understood. Yet
imagine Carl, who thinks of himself as a very good friend to Charles and Kate, the couple that
lives next door. Carl discovers that Charles has been having an affair with Kate’s best friend. Presumably, friends tell each other the truth, but friends also do not want to see their friends hurt,
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CHAPTER 6
Section 6.1 How Should One Act?
Read
Alasdair
MacIntyre’s
work After
Virtue in
the Chapter
Readings
section of the
Appendix.
their marriages broken, and so on. It is not at all clear what Carl should do in this case.
More importantly, people would likely disagree over what Carl should do if he is actually
to be a good friend. Thus, we all may not share the same general conception of “friendship.” Such problems multiply because each virtue will confront this kind of problem and
will encounter further problems upon trying to determine the appropriate amount of each
virtue and how they should be balanced with each other. It is for this reason that some
philosophers have rejected virtue ethics entirely. For example, in his text After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre (2007) dismisses the concept and possibly even the existence of virtues.
One other traditional problem for virtue ethics is that of relativity, or when one culture
views an act as a virtue but another regards that very same act as a vice. Consider two
communities, A and Z. A is a culture of warriors that insists its members be fierce and
respond violently to threats. Z is a culture of pacifists that insists its members always “turn
the other cheek” and respond to threats with nonviolence and negotiation. A group of
outsiders, X, sets up camp outside of both A’s and Z’s land. X appears to have a great number of weapons and may well pose a threat. Accordingly, A reacts to X’s presence violently,
while Z reacts to X’s presence nonviolently. Virtue ethics does not seem to offer a wholly
adequate way of determining whether A’s violent response or Z’s nonviolent response
is appropriate. A will regard Z’s pacifism as immoral, just as Z will regard A’s violence as
immoral. The point is not so much to determine whether A or Z (or neither) is doing the
virtuous thing. Rather, it is that virtue ethics does not seem to offer enough guidance to
make this determination. Or it ends up saying that both responses, for the respective culture, are virtuous. But if all our moral evaluations must be made relative to a given culture,
then virtue ethics cannot address actions that have different value in different cultures. In
other words, if evaluations are relativized, then virtue ethics does nothing more than say
some things are right and some are wrong, but no one can really object when someone
from another culture does something wrong so long as they act within their culture’s
moral parameters. There are those who do indeed support this view, which is known as
ethical relativism. (See Table 6.1 for a review of ethical theories and theorists.)
Table 6.1: Concept review: Theories and theorists
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Ethical theory
Key figure
Basic idea
Utilitarianism
John Stuart Mill
An act (or rule) is good or right if it produces the
greatest net good for the greatest number.
Deontology
Immanuel Kant
An act is good or right if it is done because it
is the right thing to do, in accordance with a
justified moral rule or rules.
Virtue ethics
Aristotle
Morality is determined on the basis of specific
virtues, exemplified by a person of noble or
virtuous character.
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Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics
CHAPTER 6
Great Ideas: Different Cultures, Different Ethics?
In ancient China emperors were known to have several wives. They also had dozens, even thousands,
of concubines, women who functioned as “secondary wives” in many ways, including sexually. For
example, Emperor Taizong (599–649) of the Tang Dynasty was reputed to have 3,000 concubines.
With this in mind, consider the following questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
How might a utilitarian argue that Emperor Taizong was acting immorally?
How might a deontologist argue that Emperor Taizong was acting immorally?
How might a virtue ethicist argue that Emperor Taizong was acting immorally?
Is there an argument that justifies Emperor Taizong’s behavior? What would such an argument look like?
5. Do you think ethical values change over time? Would this affect how we might judge this
situation today, and how we might have judged this situation in the 7th century?
6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics
E
ach of the three classic ethical theories—utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics—has
advantages and disadvantages, and none offers an obvious or easily applied solution to the
question, “What should I do?” In this section, we will look at alternatives that have been
developed in contrast to these three classic theories. Technically, these are regarded as “metaethical” views, in contrast to normative ethics. Normative ethics provides a way of evaluating
acts as moral or determining whether a given act is right or wrong. Metaethics, as employed
here, is the attempt to understand what ethics is and how we can and should understand moral
questions and evaluations.
Ethical Egoism
Ego comes from the Greek word for “I.” Most readers probably know at least a few people
who could be described as having a big ego; that is, people with an exaggerated sense of their
abilities, talents, accomplishments, or qualities. Egoism, then, means to have a focus on one’s
self, and ethical egoism is the idea that one’s conception of right and wrong, good and evil,
and other moral terms are determined by one’s own sense of value. To return to the notion of
utility, we could describe this position as advocating that one should do what maximizes one’s
own utility. In short, I should do what is in my own self-interest. Thus, in the most literal sense,
this theory is selfish. Yet unlike more traditional moral theories, selfishness, or self-interest, is not
seen as wrong or immoral, but the preferred way for one to act.
Let us return to the example of the group of children playing in a sandbox with access to only
one toy. Sally, the ethical egoist—who we will just call the egoist from now on—determines
that what makes her happiest, or maximizes her utility, is to have the toy to herself. Thus, it is in
Sally’s self-interest to get the toy, keep the toy, and play with they toy all by herself. This is not,
however, the only result possible. It may be that she decides that she would get more out of it
if everyone shared, or for that matter, if only one other person got to play with the toy. If she
concludes that some other option is in her self-interest, then she should adopt that choice. So
we can see that the crucial factor in this case is not that Sally gets the toy to herself; it is that
what she perceives as most beneficial to herself will be what she should do.
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Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics
Read Joel
Feinberg’s
“Psychological
Egoism” in
the Chapter
Readings
section of the
Appendix.
CHAPTER 6
Now let us revisit the example of Mary, who is trying to decide whether to go dancing
or stay home with her three children. Factoring in the happiness of Mary and the three
children, the utilitarian argued that everyone would be best off if Mary stayed home—that
this scenario would produce the greatest net good for the greatest number. The egoist
might conclude otherwise: If Mary sees her greatest happiness achieved by going out
dancing, then she should go out dancing. Again, Mary may conclude that it would make
her happiest to stay home. The egoist’s position is that what Mary should do is whatever
Mary sees as in her self-interest.
We saw that the classic theories of ethics—utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics—
all had problems when we tried to apply them to real life. Egoism, however, seems not
to have that problem. People determine what is in their self-interest. They do what they
think will make them best off, and according to this theory, that is what they should do.
Suppose Joe is a retired billionaire investment banker. He has several houses, cars, and
servants and can take vacations whenever and wherever he wants. One day Joe sees Mike,
an old friend from high school who has become homeless. Mike asks Joe for $10. For Joe,
this amount is almost nothing; but Joe considers whether he would be better off giving
the money to Mike or keeping it himself. Joe decides he would be happier keeping his
money; egoism tells us that is what he should do. Traditional ethical theories and religious
views may regard Joe as being selfish, greedy, and more generally, acting immorally. Egoism, however, does not; traditional conceptions of selfishness are not regarded by egoism
as immoral. It may turn out, of course, that Joe decides that it is in his self-interest to give
Mike the $10; it might make him feel better to help out an old friend, and after all, it is
not much of a sacrifice for Joe. But egoism leaves that decision up to Joe, and what Joe
perceives to be in his own self-interest is what Joe should do.
Many economists have argued that this is in fact how economic exchanges work in free
markets. Buyers want to get as much as they can as cheaply as they can; sellers want to
sell as much as they can for the highest price. Individuals, then, want to maximize their
utility by getting as much as they can out of the exchange. In the traditional views, this
sounds not just selfish, but greedy. Yet we assume everyone has, more or less, the same
amount of information about the product involved, and we also assume that everyone
knows that everyone else is trying to maximize his or her self-interest. In this way the market will in theory be most efficient and create more goods and more wealth for everyone
if everyone acts in ways that maximize his or her self-interest.
Recognizing that greed was traditionally regarded as sin, political economist Bernard
Mandeville (1670–1733) claimed that great benefits would be produced if everyone were
greedy. He described this arrangement as “private vices, public benefits”: That is, the private vice of selfishness would actually end up making society wealthier than it would have
been otherwise, which is a public benefit. Joel Feinberg (1926–2004) is another philosopher who considered the role of selfishness in human actions. Feinberg, however, argues
against psychological egoism, the idea that humans are internally driven to do all acts by
selfish motives. He demonstrates logical inconsistencies in this position and ultimately
claims that it is an unsound judgment about human motives in ethical judgment.
Problems With Ethical Egoism
Ethicists, religious leaders, and many others protest against ethical egoism because it
seems to promote selfishness. The objection is fairly obvious: Being selfish is wrong, either
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CHAPTER 6
because it is immoral, a sin, or both; so too must be an ethical theory that promotes it. However, another more subtle question might trouble the ethical egoist: How do we determine our
self-interest?
Ethical egoism assumes that any individual can identify what is in his or her self-interest, but
that may not always be the case. When considering what action to take, do I evaluate my selfinterest in the short term, the long term, or something in between? Perhaps I think it is in my
short-term self-interest to eat an entire blueberry pie because it is delicious; this will be against
my self-interest, however, if I have a long-term goal of losing weight. Perhaps we could adopt
the principle that my long-term interest should always override my short-term interest. Yet can
I really be sure what my long-term interest is and that it will not change? Even if the question
of what I know about my self-interest can be answered, a bigger problem may then arise: Can I
ever be wrong about my self-interest? If whatever I do is defined as having been done in my selfinterest, then how could I ever do something against my self-interest? The egoist maxim “One
should do whatever one does” does not seem to offer much in the way of guidance.
An example further illustrates this. Suppose Emma decides it is in her self-interest to become,
over time, very wealthy. Despite her love of shopping, taking nice vacations, and going out to
expensive dinners with her friends, she resists doing so and becomes very frugal. She only buys
the cheapest things and has to actively resist her friends’ invitations to do all her favorite activities. She puts all the money she saves into the stock market and other investments and slowly
starts to generate a substantial amount of money. She sees her friends less and less often and
becomes somewhat of a hermit. After several years she realizes that she is very lonely, does not
have much fun, and is generally unpleasant to be around. Even though she has met her goal of
becoming wealthy, she realizes that she sacrificed too much to reach that goal. She decides to
give all of her money away to charity and focuses on doing volunteer work to help others.
The ethical egoist would have offered Emma little guidance. By choosing her long-term goals
over her short-term goals, Emma presumably maximized her utility. However, had she decided
otherwise—to continue shopping, vacationing, and eating at expensive restaurants—she would
have maximized her utility as well. This is because she would have made either choice in her own
self-interest. Worse yet, her long-term goals changed, so she gave up not just her short-term
pleasures but also her original long-term goal when she adopted a new one. Whatever Emma
determines is in her self-interest is what she should do, but she clearly was not able to determine
what that long-term self-interest really was.
Great Ideas: Short-Term and Long-Term Interests
Mark graduated from college six months ago. He has $5,000 in student loans and $1,000 in savings.
He has been looking for a job for several weeks, with no luck.
Reflection Questions:
With this in mind, consider the following questions:
1. Which of the following should Mark pursue if he wants to maximize his short-term
interests?
2. Which of the following should Mark pursue if he wants to maximize his long-term
interests?
(continued)
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Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics
CHAPTER 6
Great Ideas: Short-Term and Long-Term Interests
(continued)
3. How confident should Mark be about these decisions? In other words, can he distinguish
with a very high degree of certainty between his short-term and long-term interests?
A. Mark borrows more money to buy an expensive guitar he has wanted for several years,
in order to become a professional musician.
B. Mark invests $500 and pays $500 on his student loans.
C. Mark pays $1,000 on his student loans.
D. Mark invests $1,000 in a speculative stock offering, having been told by a friend that
the stock will go up 100% in the next year.
E. Mark buys $1,000 in lottery tickets.
Like utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, ethical egoism also falls short on the ethical
issue of lying. The classical theories all had guidance for when or if one should lie, but their
results were unsatisfactory and occasionally led to strange or even wrong outcomes. An egoist
would be even less helpful on this subject. If Carolyn asks Bob to go to the movies but Bob does
not want to go, should he lie and say he is busy? Should he tell the truth and say he does not
want to go? The advice ethical egoism seems to offer is that it is all right for him to lie if he does
so out of self-interest; the same is true if he tells the truth out of self-interest. It is unclear how
this reasoning can help Bob make an ethical decision, however.
Relativism
We have now examined a number of theories and also acknowledged that each has its problems.
One might be tempted to abandon the search for an ethical theory at this point, at least one
that tells people what they should do and how they should live. Rather than taking this course
of action, however, we should recognize that there are no universal or general ethical standards;
that a person’s ethical view is relative to his or her culture, society, tradition, religion, worldview,
and even individual values. Because moral claims are said to be relative to something else, this is
a metaethical view known as relativism. Even though philosophers distinguish between different
kinds of relativism, we will generally use the term to mean that any ethical claim is relative to a
set of beliefs and that any such ethical claim is true, or consistent with, that set of beliefs. To take
a simple example: Suppose you like comedies and your best friend likes action films. It is not too
problematic here to reject the suggestion that comedies are better than action films or to reject
the suggestion that action films are better than comedies; each claim is relative to one’s beliefs,
desires, and preferences. Although it may make things more difficult when you and your friend
go see a movie together, neither of you is determined to convince the other that there is some
true, objective, or factual claim being ignored about the merits of comedies and action films.
Moral Relativism
Moral relativism extends this idea to the area of ethics. Ethical evaluations—saying some act is
right or wrong—are made in terms of the context of that act and therefore are relative to the
actor’s culture and values. For example, some cultures bury their dead; some cremate their dead;
some allow them to be exposed to the elements and scavengers; some mummify their dead (at
least their important dead, such as Egyptian pharaohs); some cultures have even been reported
to eat their dead. Which is right? Are any of these wrong? Some religions require the cremation
of the dead, whereas other religions prohibit it. What is the relativist response to these issues?
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The relativist simply says that the practice a given culture adopts as correct determines what
should be done. Let culture A be a society that cremates, or ritually burns, its dead, while culture
B is a society that prohibits cremation. The relativist says A’s tradition is correct for A and not
for B; in the same way, B’s tradition is correct for B and not for A. Just as important for the view
we are calling moral relativism is that those who live in culture A cannot say that cremating is
right and not cremating is wrong; they can only say it is right for them. In the same way, those
in culture B cannot say that cremating is wrong and not cremating is right; they can only say it
is wrong for them. The opinion of cremation, then, is relative to the given culture, and there is
no objective ethical standard to appeal to for determining whether cremating one’s dead is right
or wrong.
Many people find this position very attractive. It seems to eliminate the need, or desire, to
provide objective evaluations for all people and all societies. It allow us to simply “agree to disagree,” in that if some culture or society or religion does something that our society would deem
as immoral, we are free to say it is wrong for our society but not for others.
Moral relativism is often characterized in terms of cultures, and cultural anthropologists have
identified many practices that contrast, and even conflict, with some of the standard Western
traditions. There are numerous rituals and ceremonies relating to birth, achieving adult status,
marrying, and dying, to name a few, that reflect a wide range of beliefs and values.
We saw that Aristotle recommended generosity, within its appropriate limits, as one of the chief
qualities a virtuous person would possess. Imagine a society in which people who are deemed
good or virtuous are those who have the greatest wealth; in this society people would gain virtuous status by accumulating as much as they can and keeping it all to themselves. In contrast,
consider a society in which people are deemed good or virtuous if they give all of their wealth
away. Aristotle regarded a moderate amount of generosity as universally virtuous. Here we see
that the moral relativist might regard a deficiency of generosity (keeping everything for oneself)
as a virtue, relative to a society’s values; an excess of generosity (giving everything away) can
also be seen as virtue, relative to a society’s values. The moral relativist concludes that the claim
“generosity is a virtue” can only be evaluated in terms of a specific society’s values.
Great Ideas: Cultural Relativism
Consider some of the following activities that involve cultural practices and traditions. Can you imagine a version of one or more of these practices that you would find objectionable? What does cultural
relativism tell us about your objection? If you cannot imagine any practice that is objectionable, does
that mean absolutely everything is morally permissible? If so, what are the implications of this idea?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Dating
Marriage
Health care
How the elderly are treated
What foods one can eat
Raising children
Education
Encountering strangers
Death
Adultery
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CHAPTER 6
Just as we considered the perspective of the other moral theories on this subject, what would
the moral relativist have to say on the topic of lying? Is it wrong to lie? Is it okay to lie? Is it sometimes wrong to lie and sometimes right to lie? The moral relativist would likely say, “It depends.”
If your society rewards lying, or at least does not punish it, then lying might well be okay. If your
society, on the other hand, has strict penalties against lying (whether legal, official, or informally
enforced by community members), then lying will be wrong. “Lying is right” or “lying is wrong”
are the kinds of claims avoided by the moral relativist, who would advocate statements more
along the lines of, “Lying is right relative to a society that permits or encourages lying” and
“Lying is wrong relative to a society that prohibits lying.”
Extreme Relativism
So far we have discussed relativism in terms of societies and cultures. However, it is worth pointing out there is an extreme, or radical, kind of relativism, often associated with the ancient Greek
philosopher Protagoras (ca. 490–420 bce). This kind of relativism is said to hold true for individuals: If a person says something is true or false, right or wrong, then it is true or false and right
or wrong for that person. We saw an example of this when you and your friend discussed your
preferences for movies: For you it was true that comedies were best; for your friend, it was true
that action films were best. Protagorean, or extreme, relativism extends this idea to all claims,
including ethical ones. Presumably, this means if you think shoplifting is wrong but another person says shoplifting is not wrong, there is no “fact” we can point to in order to determine who
is correct. Shoplifting is wrong for you, but not wrong (or even right) for the other person. That
is about all there is to say about such disagreements.
This kind of relativism is often attractive in ethics because it allows us to avoid judging or criticizing other people and cultures. This is especially true when we are considering cultures and traditions with which we are not very familiar. However, similar to the other moral theories, issues
have been raised with relativism as well.
Problems With Relativism
One problem with relativism is that some acts or traditions seem wrong not just in relation to
a culture, but simply wrong on their own. For example, an ancient Hindu practice called suttee
requires a woman whose husband has recently died to commit suicide by throwing herself on
his funeral pyre. This can be done voluntarily, or she might be forced to do so. (The practice has
been outlawed but occasionally still occurs.) Some societies continue to practice slavery. Others
make child pornography widely available. Some societies practice infanticide, or the killing (or
allowing to die) of an infant after birth if it lacks desired characteristics (frequently if it is a girl).
Some societies have executed prisoners—often on flimsy or inadequate charges and with little
legal protection—in order to take their organs and sell them on the black market. Of course, the
20th century offered many examples of leaders—Joseph Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Adolf Hitler,
to name a few—who caused the deaths of millions under their reign.
The relativist would seem to say that such examples are wrong only relative to a specific culture
or worldview. Perhaps we are from a culture that views infanticide or slavery as wrong; we would
then say that, for us, these things are wrong. Yet from the perspective of a culture that does not
share our views, perhaps infanticide or slavery—or both—are not wrong or are even right. The
extreme cases tend to make people uncomfortable, which is the point. Do we want to say that
a government policy that results in family members eating each other is only wrong relative to
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a given value system, or that such a policy is simply, fundamentally, universally, and obviously
wrong? To be consistent, the relativist has to say that no matter how wrong something seems
to be, the idea of “wrong” is still relative. This suggestion may make you as uncomfortable as it
makes some ethical theorists.
Reformer’s Dilemma
A second, more sophisticated objection to relativism, known as the “Reformer’s Dilemma” (Feldman, 1978, p. 166), has been provided by the philosopher Fred Feldman (b. 1941). Imagine
Sarah lives in a society that values boys but not girls. To keep the society going, some number
of girls is needed, but parents are allowed to kill a third, female child if they already have a girl.
Furthermore, if a couple already has three children, girls or boys, they are required to kill all
subsequent female children. Sarah thinks this is wrong; perhaps she just feels it is wrong, or
perhaps she has substantial arguments for her position. Yet moral relativism says that her society determines what is wrong or right, and it has determined that killing girls is right. So Sarah
must be wrong to object to this policy. More generally, anyone who objects to any of a society’s
policies must be wrong. Thus, by this logic, Martin Luther King Jr. would have been wrong to
object to oppressive and racist American practices in the 1960s; Nelson Mandela would have
been wrong to object to the oppressive and racist South African system of apartheid. In fact,
anyone who wished to change society could never be correct. This seems problematic, given
that many of history’s most admired people were critical of their societies. Worse, this seems to
suggest that if criticizing social values always puts a person in the wrong, then society cannot
ever be improved, and thus must be perfect. Yet as Feldman observes, this poses a challenge to
the absolute relativist.
Remembering What We Agree On
Perhaps the most sophisticated response to relativism can be found in the work of American
philosopher Donald Davidson, who expanded upon the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Davidson
(1974) argues that radical relativism is incoherent, for several reasons. First, assume that the
relativist is right and that a person’s beliefs are relative to his or her society. However, we must
recall that within any society, a person can “belong” to many different kinds of groups, based
on ethnicity, class, income level, language, gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, and so on.
Consider Jafari, who has lived for most of his life in France but was born in Egypt. His native
language is Arabic and he is Muslim. From which group does he derive his values? What if one
group to which Jafari belongs approves of, say, restricting women from working outside the
home, whereas another group to which he belongs disapproves of such a prohibition? How
does Jafari figure out whether it is right or wrong? To take the idea to its extreme, does a poor
White 50-year-old Lutheran heterosexual woman from Texas have moral values in common with
an 18-year-old wealthy Chinese lesbian or with a homosexual middle-class 50-year-old White
Unitarian male from Pennsylvania? It seems that the many factors that constitute culture pose a
problem for the relativist who argues that culture determines our values.
Second, Davidson points out that when discussing ethical viewpoints, politics, religion, and other
controversial topics, we almost always focus on the areas over which we disagree. Yet in order
to reach a point of disagreement, there are actually numerous issues and ideas upon which we
actually agree. Consider a debate over gun control between Jim and John. Jim thinks no one
should be able to own a handgun; John thinks everyone should be required to own a handgun.
Their disagreement seems substantial, yet imagine if they started their disagreement by listing
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the points on which they agree, the points that make their disagreement possible—such as that
guns do not speak Japanese, guns do not make good hats, guns are not an appropriate filling for
sandwiches, guns cannot fly, and so on. This exercise hardly makes our disagreements disappear,
yet it highlights how people’s agreements typically outnumber their disagreements. As Davidson
puts it, disagreements—even between two people from dramatically different cultures—can
only occur within the context of massive agreement, or on the assumption of an enormous background of shared ideas. Relativists would likely purport that two people from different cultures
would agree on very little. However, in order to disagree, Davidson argues that they must agree
on an awful lot even to reach the point of disagreement.
Nietzsche’s Challenge
Relativism seems to place ethical problems on a scale of “difficult to solve” to “unsolvable.”
As Davidson indicates, this may be the consequence of focusing exclusively on what divides us
rather than what unites us. Others have challenged even more fundamentally the values of society as a whole, including traditional political and religious structures. Perhaps the most powerful
such challenge came from the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche.
Nietzsche’s father, uncle, and grandfathers were all Lutheran pastors, but Nietzsche’s father
died when he was 4 years old, and his brother died a few months later. Nietzsche was raised by
his mother and sister, was sent to a highly prestigious boarding school in Germany, and at the
age of just 24 accepted a position to teach classical philology (the study of classical Greek and
Latin texts) at the University of Basel in Switzerland. Nietzsche taught there for 10 years, but his
job was interrupted by military service, during which he received a serious injury. His health in
general was not good, and he had to resign from his teaching post. He spent much of the rest
of his life wandering around Italy, France, Switzerland, and Germany. In 1889 Nietzsche had a
mental breakdown and collapsed in Turin, Italy. He spent the remaining years of his life unable
to communicate, not realizing that the many books he had produced had begun to make him a
world-famous philosopher.
Übermensch
Nietzsche’s influence on 20th-century philosophy is difficult to overstate. He presented, and still
represents, a radical challenge to traditional ethical viewpoints. His position called for a reevaluation of all values; that is, a criticism and scrutiny of all the various things that traditional morality
and religion had said were good or wrong. In doing so Nietzsche determined that much of traditional morality was fundamentally wrong. He declared that “God is dead” (and had been killed
by human beings) and defended atheism. Nietzsche thought that Judaism and Christianity had
adopted the ancient ideas of the Greeks and Romans and perverted them. Before Christianity,
the “good” was identified as the strong, the powerful, the courageous, the noble, and the creative; the “bad” was that which was weak, timid, small-minded, and cowardly. Nietzsche argued
that Christianity turned this upside down. He suggested that people had been convinced by “the
priests”—those who control a society’s moral, cultural, political, and religious values—that what
had been good was now evil and what had been bad was now good. Hence, he saw the prevailing morality as preventing those who were noble, creative, and bold from being recognized as
superior to the masses. He also argued that the masses—who were timid and weak—could be
easily controlled by those in power, like sheep by a shepherd. He thought both Christianity and
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democracy (a democracy being of a mass of people who were kept ignorant and did what
they were told) held back society’s very few exceptional individuals who were capable of
achieving greatness. Such an individual was called by Nietzsche an Übermensch, which is
usually translated as “superman” or “overman” (Nietzsche, 1973). This overman creates
his (or her; Nietzsche’s issues with women are notorious, but very complex) own values,
and his own morality, as an expression of his power to overcome the values people around
him have tried to force upon him. In this way the overman becomes a free and independent spirit, risking everything in his unwillingness to accept social conventions. Ultimately,
Nietzsche (1974) suggests a view he calls “eternal recurrence” as the goal of the truly
noble soul: People should seek a life that they would be happy living if they were to have
to live exactly that way for eternity.
Read
Friedrich
Nietzsche’s
Beyond Good
and Evil in
the Chapter
Readings
section of the
Appendix.
Critiques of Nietzsche
Those who have resisted Nietzsche’s ideas (and there are many) do so for a number of reasons. Unlike Nietzsche, they think moral and religious traditions express important truths
and values, and certainly disagree that “God is dead.” Most Nietzsche scholars reject the
idea that he was the type of extreme relativist discussed previously in this chapter; however, it is easy to see why some might regard him that way. After all, if one creates one’s
own values, then those values would seem relative to that person. Some critics regard
Nietzsche as elitist because of his suggestion that just a few “great souls” were allowed
full access to freedom and independence, but the great masses who did not so qualify
were relegated to mediocrity, following rules they did not understand and more or less
doing what they were told.
Oronoz/SuperStock
Friedrich Nietzsche called for intense
scrutiny and criticism of all of what
traditional morality and religion had
deemed as good and bad.
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However, there is no denying that in the history
of ethics, Nietzsche presents a serious challenge
to a number of different moral and religious
traditions. He requires us to examine our moral
values and see how we use them to justify our
actions. Has Christianity been used to promise
people a true reward that will come after death
to make it easier to control them while alive?
Have Western societies often punished people
who are unwilling to go along with their overriding values? Interestingly enough, at times
Nietzsche identified Jesus as a person whom
society punished for being brave and independent enough to raise profound objections to
the values imposed upon him, but Nietzsche
(1968) also remarked that the “last true Christian died on the cross” (sec. 39). Have societies that officially or unofficially regarded themselves as Christian acted in ways that violate
the very Christian principles they are said to
embrace? These and many of Nietzsche’s other
questions are important reminders that people
often say one thing but do another. Nietzsche’s
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willingness to expose this hypocrisy has continued to confront Western philosophy, specifically its development of moral theories. He has, therefore, demanded that philosophers and all
those interested in moral questions carefully consider whether what we do actually conforms to
what we believe. Demanding we make this critical and uncomfortable self-examination is the
very thing that makes those demanding it unpopular; many think this was precisely the reason
Socrates was executed. At the same time, most of us recognize that it is to our benefit to see
if there are any contradictions between what we believe, why we believe it, and how we treat
others.
Tolerance and Diversity
We may well reject Nietzsche’s scathing critique of society and its hypocrisy. We may also resist
what seem to be Nietzsche’s elitism and his lack of tolerance. At the same time, given the
increasing global interdependence and the diversity of societies, philosophers have also worried
about whether we can determine what an appropriate amount of tolerance is. The United States
is a diverse country, with people from a vast number of backgrounds who represent numerous ethnic groups, religious traditions, and countries of origin. Some 80% of Americans speak
English, but according to the 2010 U.S. Census, more than 350 other languages are spoken (or
signed) in the United States (although some of these are spoken by a very small groups). Some
estimate there are more than 200 different religious denominations in the United States. There is
even more diversity globally, of course: The planet’s 7 billion people speak thousands of different
languages, practice thousands of different religious traditions and denominations, and are composed of thousands of different ethnic groups. In India alone, for example, some 350 different
languages are spoken by a substantial number of people, even though its official state language
is Hindi (and its secondary “official” language is English).
Assuming that differences in culture, religion, ethnicity, and other value systems generate disagreement, this degree of diversity would indicate a good deal of disagreement. It would be nice
to think that ethicists—or anyone else, for that matter—could come up with a recipe for preventing, or at least minimizing, these disagreements and thereby minimize the military invasions,
terrorism, and various other violence caused by these disagreements. That may seem a bit optimistic, but it is worth thinking about how the study of ethics could move us closer to this goal.
Extreme Tolerance and Intolerance
We can start by identifying two positions on opposite ends of the spectrum: extreme tolerance and extreme intolerance. The extremely tolerant person will accept all cultures, perspectives, views, and ethical values expressed by any society, anywhere, and at any time. In short an
extremely tolerant person tolerates everything. Extreme intolerance, on the other hand, involves
tolerating nothing but one’s own view. Thus, the extremely intolerant culture Z rejects all other
cultures from A through Y. One and only one position is acceptable to Z, and Z regards all
other cultures as wrong. The extremely tolerant society, on the other hand, never considers
another view to be wrong and never challenges or criticizes it. Thus, it would never need to
engage another culture or society militarily. The extremely intolerant society may always be at
war, however, for it always sees any culture with distinct views as being incorrect.
It is likely that few, if any, cultures qualify as either extremely tolerant or extremely intolerant.
Most fall between these two extremes. Considering the polar opposites is useful, however,
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because it gives us a sense of the limits involved in describing the various ways one might
endorse, or advocate, tolerance. For even though many agree that “tolerance” is generally a
good thing, we can see that too much tolerance could be as bad as too much intolerance. Imagine you are sitting quietly at home, watching a baseball game with a friend. Someone comes in,
shoots your friend, and takes everything you own. An extremely tolerant person would have no
objections to this scenario. More generally, extreme tolerance may lead to what one might call
the paradox of tolerance, for the extremely tolerant person cannot object to the extremely intolerant person, and ends up tolerating the most vicious, dogmatic, and violent kind of intolerant
behavior. Even if tolerance is a virtue, Aristotle would tell us that too much tolerance can be bad.
However, a look around indicates that threats are more likely to stem from intolerance. A government may ban free speech or a particular religion. Two countries may go to war over a piece
of land not because they each want it, but rather they each want to prevent the other from
acquiring it. Terrorists may kill people who practice a different religion or those who simply hold
different values. A town may practice informal discrimination against people regarded by the
majority as “different,” whether because they are a different race, religion, sexual orientation,
or have another minority identity. A person may decide that abortion is so immoral that it is
acceptable to murder a doctor who performs abortions. Do philosophers, specifically ethicists,
have tools to question these and other intolerant acts?
Reflective Equilibrium
In his extremely influential 1971 book A Theory of Justice, the philosopher John Rawls
(1921–2002) puts forth a strategy he calls reflective equilibrium. While the full theory is quite
complex, Rawls’s fundamental ideas help make clear our sense of fairness. Rawls believes any
plausible conception of justice must be one that is regarded by all who participate in a society’s
decisions as fair, and thus he is famous for characterizing justice as fairness (Rawls, 1971).
Rawls describes a thought experiment where people come together to design a society in which
they will at some point live. He puts a crucial condition on those designing this society: They
are behind what he calls a “veil of ignorance” (1971). That is, they do not know what kind of
person they will be in this future society: They do not know their gender, race, religion (if any),
class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, physical handicaps, and so on. Thus, what the participants
determine to be fair must express what each thinks would be fair for all. For instance, a man
would not describe a society that discriminates against women, for he might discover that in this
future society, he is one.
Part of Rawls’s discussion requires the notion of reflective equilibrium, where individuals with
various moral and political views discuss the moral and political views of others, in order to see
what agreement can be reached. As Rawls describes the idea, “adopting the role of observing
moral theorist, we investigate what principles people would acknowledge and accept the consequences of when they have an opportunity to consider other plausible conceptions and to assess
their supporting grounds” (Rawls, 1971).
To illustrate the idea further, consider the following example. John and Mary, who come from
very different backgrounds, compare their notions of a just and fair society. They both are willing
to consider the other’s viewpoint and recognize that some adjustment to their own notion may
have to be made. Perhaps John is suspicious of religions other than his own, whereas Mary is
an agnostic and thus has no religion. Through reflective equilibrium, John adjusts his beliefs to
accept others who may not share his religious views, and Mary adjusts her beliefs to allow more
tolerance for those who cherish their religious commitments. After much give and take, they
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come to a position they both accept. In a certain sense Rawls offers a sophisticated account of
precisely what many people do all the time: compromise. In doing so he suggests a nonviolent
way of solving our disputes, and thus provides us with another way to think about making our
diverse and often contentious planet more harmonious.
6.3 Individual Issues in Ethics
W
e have seen some of the best known ethical theories and some of the challenges they
confront. We have also seen some of the alternatives to these traditional theories and
some of their weaknesses. We will now look at more specific ethical issues, describe
the problems they present, and examine how ethical theories might be used to resolve them. We
will begin with personal or individual ethical issues before turning to more general social ethical issues, although there is often overlap between these. We will see that many ethical issues
require us to think about the relationship between the individual and his or her society and how
one influences the other. (See Table 6.2 for a list of topics to be explored in ethics.)
Table 6.2: Concept review: Topics to be explored
Individual issues in ethics
Promises
Free speech
Greed
Vegetarianism
Euthanasia
Social issues in ethics
Animal rights
Plato’s critique of democracy
Rawls’s conception of fairness
The environment
The personal and the political
Libertarianism
Victimless crimes
Promises
We all make promises, and for the most part we expect promises to be kept. Since I expect others to keep their promises, deontological ethics insists that this means I should keep the promises
I make. The utilitarian takes a different approach; perhaps there are situations in which the greatest number achieves the greatest net good by breaking a promise. We probably also think that
promises have a certain context, or set of conditions. For example, we should not make promises
we know we cannot keep. Yet it may not be unethical to make a promise, try our best to fulfill
it, yet end up breaking it. Various kinds of examples bear out these ideas further.
Imagine you promise to pay Smith $5 next week if he loans it to you today (you are friends, so he
does not charge you interest). Smith may think that in addition to being paid back, if he loans you
money, you might return the favor some day if he is in need. Similarly, you do not want Smith to
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regard you as someone who does not meet his obligations; or perhaps you might need to borrow
money again in the future, so you want to be sure to pay it back this time. One might look at this
from the point of view of ethical egoism: You and Smith are both looking out for your self-interest,
now and in the future. So Smith loans you the money, and you promise to pay it back (and do).
On the one hand, your self-interest is best met by getting the money and ensuring the potential to borrow more. Smith’s self-interest is best met by loaning the money and ensuring his
potential to borrow from you. The deontologist, on the other hand, says that you have made a
promise to Smith—to pay him back—and that one should keep one’s promises; not out of selfinterest, but because it is the right thing to do. (We can determine that it is the right thing to do
by looking at it from the perspective of the Golden Rule or from the perspective of Kant, who
would suggest that morality requires that promises be kept.) Meanwhile, the utilitarian might
say there are various outcomes, but paying back the loan will certainly create a utility calculation that would not be lower than any of the other outcomes. Presumably, being honest and
keeping one’s promises are virtues—at least if done appropriately and in moderation—so the
virtue ethicist will also insist that the money be paid back. As we see, then, the ethical egoist,
the deontologist, the utilitarian, and the virtue ethicist all agree that the promise should be kept,
but they arrive at that conclusion from very different directions.
However, these theories may not always agree so nicely. Consider marriage vows, in which
partners promise to love, cherish, honor, and obey, among other things, “till death do us part.”
Despite the fact this promise is binding and often made before God, it is not always kept. Presumably, people make this promise fully intending to keep it, but circumstances change. Assuming one or both members of a marriage are sufficiently miserable to end it, the utilitarian would
probably conclude that doing so would lead to the greatest good for the greatest number. The
deontologist might say that although promises should never be made lightly, the Kantian “universality requirement”—that we act in such a way that it would always be the right thing to
do in those circumstances—could be taken to mean that ending the marriage is the right thing
to do. The virtue ethicist would probably argue that keeping a promise to remain married, if it
makes one or both of those people miserable, is immoderate and fails to recognize that it is
sometimes appropriate to break promises. In this case, however, one can also see that others
might argue that a utility calculation, an application of the categorical imperative, or the virtue
of honesty might require the marriage to continue.
Thus, ethical theories might not only conflict with each other, but may even conflict with common sense. For instance, if one interprets Kant as saying that promises must never be broken,
then it would violate his ethical principle to dissolve the marriage, even if it condemns both
people to abject misery for the rest of their lives. This also shows that ethical theories are not
really “recipes” that guarantee a certain and reliable ethical outcome. Instead, they can offer
guidance for ascertaining right and wrong, so long as we understand that their application may
change depending on a situation’s specifics.
Free Speech
In the United States specifically, a number of political and ethical questions arise from how one
interprets the Constitution. It will be helpful to see a specific example of this from the Bill of
Rights. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
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The questions this raises about religion—whether what is known is the “establishment” clause
or the “free exercise” clause—are pretty well known. However, the questions of the freedom of
speech and of the press raise issues that are also worth looking at, in terms of constitutionally protected rights, and what our ethical theories might say about when those rights might be violated.
As we saw with the issue of promises, we probably start with an assumption that free speech, for
individuals and for the media (or press), cannot be prohibited without a very good reason. In other
words, free speech is always assumed to be protected unless legitimate reasons can be provided.
Yelling “Fire!”
The most famous example of when free speech can be prohibited comes from the Supreme
Court case Schenck v. United States (1919), in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that
one should not be allowed to yell “Fire!” in a crowded theatre. The reason is that falsely indicating there is a fire could cause panic and put people in danger as they all rush toward the exits.
Holmes’s reasoning sounds utilitarian: Even if the person yelling “Fire!” gets some degree of
pleasure from doing so, everyone else is at risk of psychological trauma and physical injury. Thus,
the greatest good for the greatest number demands prohibiting this kind of speech. The deontologist, who rejects lying on principle, would agree with Holmes’s conclusion, pointing out that
falsely yelling “Fire!” is a lie. As we have seen before, two different ethical theories come to the
same conclusion, though for different reasons.
Even those who advocate the greatest amount of free speech recognize that in this specific case,
the harm caused outweighs the right to say whatever one wishes. There are other such restrictions recognized in the law: One cannot threaten the life of the president, for example, nor freely
joke about bombs or hijacking while in an airport. Most people recognize these as legitimate
restrictions to the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.
Freedom for Speech We Do Not Like
Real life presents many situations in which one person’s right to say something may violate
another person’s right not to hear (or see) it. For instance, there are various laws that regulate
pornography’s production, distribution, and sale. Should adults be able to take whatever kind
of pictures they want and sell them to another adult? Some argue that to prevent them from
doing so is a restriction on free speech; others argue that pornography objectifies women (treating them solely as a means to an end, not as ends in themselves, in Kantian language) in ways
that can lead to violence, sexual abuse, rape, and other i...
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