Essay on the Exploitation of People in Sierra Leone ADMIN TEST, DO NOT BID

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Demonstrate that the exploitation of resources has resulted in mostly negative environmental, sociopolitical, and economic consequences for the people of Sierra Leone

6 pages. Need to use at least 4 sources. Due tomorrow at midnight.

Attached are my notes / general outline. Most important thing is timing, I can do edits if I get this by 10 pm tomorrow, but would prefer to get before then. If I can edit and get to an A/A- I'll throw him some extra money. Attached a word doc that's one of my friends papers from last year he can use as a guide for structure. 3 pdf's attached are sources. Let me know if you need anything else.

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1 Commodities and Conflict in Africa Professor Ochuno 4 February 2016 Blood Oil in Nigeria Nigeria is a country rich in natural resources with an extensive network of federal and corporate relationships that bring in billions of dollars of revenue each year. Yet, the local communities lack access to clean water, electricity, and other basic infrastructures. Furthermore, the Nigerian Oil industry is consistently ranked as one of the least transparent and corrupt entities in the world. As such, I argue that the initial discovery and subsequent extraction of Oil in the 1950’s is largely responsible for the country’s extreme poverty, environmental contamination, and ultimate failure as a democratic state. Nigeria was initially colonized by the British because of its strategic geographic location and its resource-rich landscape. However, it wasn’t until nearly half a century after its colonization that commercially viable quantities of oil were discovered by the Shell-British Petroleum Company in 1956. At this time, Shell had already been granted a monopoly in oil exploration in the region by the British Crown. Still, numerous international oil companies sought to exploit the untapped oil reserves and flocked to Nigeria bringing massive quanitities of international investment to the undeveloped country. In 1860 Nigeria was granted Independence from Britain and officially established the Republic of Nigeria. However, intense ethnic regionalism and competition made it difficult to unite Nigeria’s people under a unified constitution. The early development of Nigeria as a independent country was characterized by numerous military coup d’etats that shifted federal power from one region to another. (Klieman 2012) 2 It wasn’t until the first oil boom in 1964-1965 that regional tensions rose to a level that could conceivably lead to civil war. The majority of the oil reserves during this time were located in the Niger Delta in the eastern region of the country. Early on, the federal government tried to stay out of the oil industry. Their only point of contract was the collection of revenue by the means of royalties and profit taxes. Those revenues were then allocated in this fashion: 50% to the region of origin, 20% to the federal government, and 30% to the remaining regions in proportion to their population (Klieman 2012). Consequently, the eastern region was poised to accrue large increases in revenue compared to its regional competitors. Many of the early military coups were the direct result of Northern mistrust of the eastern region and its successful economic prospects. They feared that oil revenues in the eastern region could give them too much authority in the federal government and cause ethnic and regional supremacy. In 1967 the ethnic and economic competition among the regions led to a Nigerian Civil war between the federal government and secessionist eastern region, renamed Biafra. But the civil war wasn’t simply a result of civil unrest and was later found to be largely caused by corporate greed and decent on behalf of the oil industry. (Klieman 2012) As ethnic tensions were rising pre-civil war, the Oil companies in Nigeria were in the midst of a six-month battle with the Petroleum Profits Tax Ordinance (PPTO) of 1966-1967 (Klieman 2012). The ordinance included contracts with the Nigerian federal government that outlined a “most favored African nation” clause, which established that if better terms were negotiated with another country on the continent, Nigeria would receive those same terms with its oil industry conglomerates. In 1965, Libya passed a tax policy that if adopted by the Nigerian government would increase federal revenue from oil by at least 50% (Klieman 2012). According to the allocation system, the majority of the revenue increase would go back to the already 3 prosperous oil-producing eastern region. Minority share oil companies believed that this was a measure brought upon by Shell in an effort to get rid of competition in the area. They were correct; Shell had been negotiating with the federal government for over a year to get the new profit tax law passed. The minority oil companies immediately sought out high Nigerian Government officials to rationalize that this law would discourage international investment and cause numerous oil wells to dry up (Klieman 2012). In 1966, the Libyan Tax Policy was adopted by Nigeria, but unlike the claims of Gulf, Tenneco, and other minority oil companies, foreign investment and oil production steadily continued to climb. But the Oil companies didn’t stop there. In early 1967 numerous articles appeared in Nigerian newspapers making the tax policy public news. Articles such as “Review That Tax Law Please: Oil Monopoly in Nigeria – A question of Time” published under an alias reported inaccurate information to the public stating that the new profit tax law would only benefit the eastern region and even proclaimed that it could, “lead to the closure of many oil wells, accelerate unemployment difficulties, … and create unrest in the Rivers and Mid-West areas.” These public statements spread rapidly throughout the country and surged mistrust in the North and Midwest, while simultaneously creating a sense of self-sufficiency in the East (Ista Man 1968). In July of the same year Biafra officially seceded from Nigeria and kick started the three-year civil war (Khan 1994). So it wasn’t only civil unrest that caused the unitary government to crumble, but the combination of the corporate tax lobby, and blind politics by the political elite. In fact, General Ojukwu of Biafra later admitted that the key motivation for pursuing secession and ultimately civil war was solely to determine the recipient of oil revenues. In 1973, after over 2 million deaths, the Nigerian Military defeated Biafra and readmitted the eastern regions back under its rule (Khan 1994). In an effort to join the Organization of the 4 Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), from 1971 to 1979 Nigeria underwent intense nationalization of the Oil industry. To be admitted into OPEC a country must have over 51% ownership of all oil production. Nationalization occurred simultaneously with the 1970’s global oil boom. The federal government incrased its investments in oil related infrastructure and divested other economic sectors such as agriculture, creating a crippling dependence on federal oil revenue. During the course of oil nationalization, Gowon, head of the Military Government, and his predecessors established the beginning of political patronage systems tied to federal oil revenue (Soyinka 1996). But as corruption increased, the people of Nigeria disconnected themselves from the military regime and called for democratic elections. In 1979, the military head of state was replaced with Shehu Shagari, the candidate of the National Part of Nigeria and the Second Republic of Nigeria was born (Soyinka 1996). When the Second Republic was created in 1979, oil revenue accounted for 96% of the federal government’s revenue from exports, but only made up 27% of Nigeria’s GDP (Manby 1999). The over investment in oil and divestment from other key economic sectors by the federal government set the tone for prebendalism to curse Nigerian Society. Prebendalism is the term coined by Richard Joseph which refers to the Nigerian phenomenon in which officials in all levels of public office used their positional authority to gain access to public resources to service their own material needs and the needs of their subordinates (Joseph 2013). This criminal misallocation of public funds had three different lasting consequences on the country. First, it created a large economic gap between the minute political elite and the common man. No longer was the federal government funding programs for local farmers and agricultural subsidiaries. In turn, the rich were getting richer, and the already poor sustenance farmers were becoming poorer. Second, it created a large national debt. Public officials were siphoning oil revenue into 5 private bank accounts, meaning that little of the money was being churned back into the development of future oil extraction and the federal government was forced into large contracts with the oil companies such as Shell (Khan 1994). Third, it created a corrupt and unhealthy competition for public office that made stability and democracy unattainable. This kind of dysfunctional governance and entitlement by the Nigerian political elite mirrored that of the lords of feudal Europe. (Joseph 2013) A number of practices by both the Oil companies and the federal government facilitated the existence of prebendalism. It all started in the 1960s when the first oil boom occurred. In an effort to downplay the speculation of oil revenues by the Nigerian people, oil companies purposefully undershot projections of production. They then reported these low projections to the Nigerian govenrment. At the same time the Nigerian government wanted to be conservative in their own projections that were to be released as public data, so they also released artificially low projections too Thus, the data for oil numbers was both inconsistent and severely lower than it should been. This practice of opacity, or lack of transparency, allowed for the first political elite to start taking public funds for themselves. (Klieman 2012) Evolving from these prebendal practices was a desperate sense of mistrust, abuse, and helplessness on behalf of the Nigerian people. Their communities are the homes of hundreds of oil wells and extraction facilities that produce millions of barrels of oil each day, yet they have no roads, access to clean water or electricity, their children are starving to death, and those who survive early life will likely die due to contaminated water from oil spills. Furthermore, because of the environmental pollution from oil spills, local farmers and fishers can no longer rely on their trade and must either work in the oil wells or face unemployment. Since the 1990’s their have been numerous conflicts between ethnic militant groups and both the federal government 6 and oil companies (Soyinka 1996). Violence and kidnappings have been tactics widely used by the militant groups in an effort to change institutionalized exploitation by the oil companies. No matter how much of a fight the locals have put up, they simply can’t compete with the unlimited monetary resources of the oil tycoons. Many have taken matters into their own hands by stealing oil from pipes in the Niger River and refining the stolen oil in makeshift refineries in the Nigerian jungle. It is believed that nearly 400,000 barrels are stolen each day (Hanson, D’Alessandro, & Owusu 2014). And the money that comes from the black market trade of refined oil goes directly into funding the ethnic militant groups of the Niger Delta. It is undeniable that the oil industry has profoundly affected the development and growth of Nigeria as a nation. Since its initial discovery in 1956, the black gold in the Niger Delta generated a competition for oil wealth that perpetuated Nigeria’s economic dependence on the oil industry and crushed other economic sectors, particularly agriculture. Prebendal practices by the members of the political class in Nigeria produced a fundamental disconnect between the local farmers, the political elite, and the oil industry, leaving the majority of the country in extreme poverty. Lack of regulation and transparency has allowed for environmental contamination from oil spills and oil vandalism in the Niger Delta. Lastly, by exploiting identity politics and the value of the commodity the oil industries increased regional and ethnic tensions amongst the Nigerian people to further their own economic agendas. Reckless behavior on behalf of both the oil companies and the Nigerian government meant civil war was unavoidable and political instability the norm. 7 Works Cited Hanson, K. T., D'Alessandro, C., & Owusu, F. (2014). Managing Africa's natural resources: Capacities for development. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Manby, B. (1999). The price of oil: Corporate responsibility and human rights violations in Nigeria's oil producing communities. New York: Human Rights Watch. Joseph, R. (2013). Prebendalism and Dysfunctionality in Nigeria. Retrieved February 04, 2016, from https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2013/07/26/prebendalism-and-dysfunctionality-innigeria/ Klieman, K. A. (2012). U.S. Oil Companies, the Nigerian Civil War, and the Origins of Opacity in the Nigerian Oil Industry. Journal Of American History, 99(1), 155-165. Khan, S. A. (1994). Nigeria: The political economy of oil. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Soyinka, W. (1996). The open sore of a continent: A personal narrative of the Nigerian crisis. New York: Oxford University Press. [Ista Man], “Review That Tax Law Please: Oil Monopoly in Nigeria—A Question of Time,” West African Pilot (Lagos), Jan. 17, 1968. Getting to the heart of the matter: Sierra Leone, diamonds, and human security Smillie, Ian Social Justice; Winter 2000; 27, 4; ProQuest pg. 24 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Privatizing war in Sierra Leone Reno, William Current History; May 1997; 96, 610; ProQuest pg. 227 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone 1930 to 2010: a resource curse? Author(s): Sigismond Ayodele Wilson Source: GeoJournal, Vol. 78, No. 6, Special Issue on Theorizing the GeoWeb (2013), pp. 9971012 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24432639 Accessed: 12-09-2017 21:41 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to GeoJournal This content downloaded from 129.59.122.21 on Tue, 12 Sep 2017 21:41:29 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms GeoJournal (2013) 78:997-1012 DOI 10.1007/sl0708-013-9474-1 Diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone 1930 to 2010: a resource curse? Sigismond Ayodele Wilson Published online: 24 February 2013 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Abstract This paper uses the resource curse hypoth Keywords Diamond exploitation · esis to explore diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone Resource curse hypothesis · Resource blessing ■ during the period 1930-2010. Focusing on national Patrimonial politics · Diamond governance · and local level analysis, it examines whether theSierra net Leone impact of diamond exploitation was a 'resource curse' or 'blessing' during four time periods: colonial and early post-independence era, the APC era, the civil war period, and post-war era. The paper argues thatIntroduction the net impact of diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone has Diamond exploitation has been an essential facet of not been constant; rather it has changed between Sierra Leone's economic and political life since the resource blessing and curse over different major of diamond extraction in the 1930s. How periods of Sierra Leone's history and at local inception and ever, it also fuelled a civil war (1991-2001). Struggles national scales since inception of diamond exploita over access, control and utilization of diamonds have tion. This paper illustrates that during the period been evident since the start of diamond mining (Reno 1968-1992 patrimonial politics undermined official 1995). diamond exploitation and significantly contributed to While the net impact of diamond exploitation was generally positive at the onset of mining, a a pendulum shift in the net effects of diamond of resource blessing; it was later trans exploitation from resource blessing to curse. manifestation The formed into a resource curse. For the purpose of this study shows that the net effect of diamond exploitation paper, 'resource blessing' refers to the prudent utili was: a resource blessing (especially at the national zation of diamond revenues for socioeconomic devel level) prior to 1968; more of a resource curse during opment at national (the state) and local (mining the APC era; a full blown manifestation of the curse levels; while resource curse refers to a during the civil war period; and that governance ofcommunity) the negative paradoxical relationship between natural diamond sector has improved sufficiently in post-civil resource wealth and socioeconomic performance war Sierra Leone to start the gradual transformation of (Ross 1999; Auty 2001). Issues such as patrimonial diamonds to resource blessing, at national and local politics, informal diamond mining and smuggling, and levels. rampant corruption, especially during the reign of the All People's Congress (APC) from 1968 to 1992, S. A. Wilson (Η) Rogers State University, Claremore, OK, USA e-mail: swilson@rsu.edu significantly contributed to a declining role of dia monds in economic development (Reno 1995; Rosen Ô Springer This content downloaded from 129.59.122.21 on Tue, 12 Sep 2017 21:41:29 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 998 GeoJournal 1973). In other manifestation (2013) 78:997-1012 words, such practice of a resource curse post-war period has witnessed diamond exploitation towards national and local levels. diamond exploitation change over time in relation to a a a t r Diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone has been given resource curse or blessing? The paper utilize considerable scholarly attention. Numerous works have significant eras namely: the colonial and early p examined how diamond exploitation fuelled and pro- colonial periods; the APC era (1968-1992); the civil longed Sierra Leone's civil war, a manifestation of the period; and the post-war era. These four periods 'resource curse' (Davies 2000; Kabia 2008; Le Billon selected because they signify major changes in d 2008), while others have pinpointed mechanisms to governance that resulted in resource curse or blessin mitigate the 'curse' in post-war Sierra Leone and to national and/or local levels. Such analysis is importa utilize 'diamonds for development' (Le Billon and in that it demonstrates a nuanced understand Levin 2009; Maconachie 2009; Temple 2008). Earlier resource curse or blessing over time that can studies such as Van der Laan (1965), Reno (1995), and future change in diamond management in Sierra L Zack-Williams (1995) utilized political economic The study utilizes secondary data (including gov frameworks to examine diamond exploitation in Sierra ment reports and documents) to examine te Leone. Van der Laan (1965) underscored the economic variation between primarily 'resource curse o reasons for, and effects of a number of policies and ing' impacts of diamond exploitation in Sierra action of actors during the period 1952-1961. Reno over the past 80 years. (1995) discussed how corruption, patron-client net- The paper argues that the net impact of di works of state and non-state actors as regards control and exploitation in Sierra Leone has not been con utilization of diamond resources, and informalization of rather it has changed between resource blessin the economy led to the creation and perpetration of a curse over different major periods of Sierra Leon 'shadow state' and ultimately state collapse. Zack- history and at local and national scales since in Williams (1995) underlined how merchant capital and of diamond exploitation. This paper will illustrate capitalist relations and mode of production benefited during the period 1968-1992 patrimonial po immensely from artisanal mining [described as pre- undermined official diamond exploitation and capitalist modes of production] to the disadvantage of icantly contributed to a pendulum shift in artisanal miners. effects of diamond exploitation from resource blessing Although a number of frameworks have been used to curse, and that governance of t to investigate diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone, has improved sufficiently in especially the recourse curse, hardly any attempts have Leone to start the gradual transf utilized the 'resource curse' hypothesis to critically to resource blessing, at nationa examine temporal changes between pre-dominantly The organization of the rest 'curse' or 'blessing' impacts of diamond exploitation follows. The next section disc in Sierra Leone, over an extended period (nearly a tion and the resource curse. T century). This can also inform potential future changes. assessment of diamond exploita Unlike other studies in which the resource curse is niai and early post-colonial pe usually portrayed as a uniform acting politico-eco- predominantly resource blessi nomic phenomenon at the national scale (Lujala et al. and local levels. Next the pap 2005; Sachs and Warner 2001 ), or as unchanging over exploitation during the reign of time (Le Billon 2005; Ross 1999), this study examines to show that the net effect of dia spatially differentiated processes and impacts of dia- more of a resource curse, especial mond exploitation at multiple scales including This is followed by diamond national, regional and local levels over four major eras ultimate manifestation of resour within an 80-year history of diamond exploitation. diamond management in post-c This paper therefore adopts the resource curse reveal the gradual transformatio hypothesis to examine its historical and contemporary tation to resource blessing, and £) Springer This content downloaded from 129.59.122.21 on Tue, 12 Sep 2017 21:41:29 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms GeoJournal (2013) Minerals and 78:997-1012 the 999 resource precious cu minerals i Extensive scholarly work on the demonstrated that developing co natural resources (especially oil and tend to have poor economic grow compared to resource-poor countri Humphreys et al. 2007; Sachs an Through quantitative analysis of country data, studies found that e of mineral-dependent countries countries fell. Proponents of this p this negative association to mec revenue volatility, and the 'Dut 2001). The 'Dutch disease' is a slu ofthe country's economy followi from natural resource exports (L is so because countries divert their dence to these few rich natural r expense reason, of the other Dutch sectors disease of the appears a of the resource curse, not an alt In addition to economic issues, p perhaps a more significant role in resource curse, especially for diam demand make them less vulnerable to some of the conflict zone double the conflict duration. Collier and economic uncertainty (price volatility) of other minerals Hoeffler (2000) advanced economic explanations for (Bannon and Collier 2003; Mehlum et al. 2006). While the onset of civil war by suggesting that natural robust institutions can mitigate the perverse incentives resources serve as economic attraction for belligerents that resource booms create, considerable amount of who mainly out of greed (and less so of grievance) cross-national literature demonstrates that natural may decide to challenge the state to access, control and resources can be a curse, rather than a blessing, for manage resources. Other scholars pinpoint gover countries that lack strong governing institutions nance issues (including state strength and capacity) as (Robinson et al. 2006; Ross 1999; 2001). Indeed, mineral major mechanisms associating oil/mineral exploita rents "may create dysfunctional patronage and rent- tion and violent conflict (Ron 2005; Fearon 2005). seeking behavior, political and private capture, which While there are divergent views as to whether precious significantly reduce development prospects" (Kolstad minerals are primarily responsible for the cause of and Wiig 2009:5321). Moreover, few political and war, there is consensus amongst scholars that they economic elites amass economic wealth, while a majority played a dominant role in the protraction of violent of the population does not, thereby creating high levels of conflicts as was the case in Sierra Leone (Le Billon inequity between the rich and poor (Ross 2007; Zulu and 2008; Lujala et al. 2005). Yet for a more nuanced Wilson 2012). In general resource-curse studies focus on understanding of the causal linkages it is necessary to political dysfunction at the cross country/national level, also discuss processes that led to resource curse yet it is necessary to also examine resource governance at impacts at the local (mining community) level the local level to determine whether a micro aspect of the (Arellano-Yanguas 2011 ). resource curse is evident (Arellano-Yanguas 2011; Despite an apparent consensus about the resource Maconachie and Binns 2007b). curse hypothesis, it has come under scrutiny. It is The political geography of the resource is another argued that the notion of the resource curse is flawed dimension of the resource curse debate. Le Billon due to methodological problems, especially the fact £) Springer This content downloaded from 129.59.122.21 on Tue, 12 Sep 2017 21:41:29 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 1000 Geo Journal (2013) 78:997-1012 Exports £ 000 that much of the literature is based on J cross-country cooo 5000 — Exports — » data, and the use of inadequate p resource endowment (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008; 4ooo Ross 2006). There are also problems of identifying causal mechanisms linking resources to outcomes due to the large sample of countries investigated and complexities surrounding resource abundance and negative socioeconomic outcomes. Although the natural resource curse is prevalent in 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 ^ ^4 ^4 ^ fP' ^ 4^ 4^4^4 ^4 ^ SSA it is not ubiquitous as a few countries ^ have 4 4 4 4 ^4 ^ 4 4 4 Year utilized mineral exploitation to enhance economic Year growth. Botswana and Namibia exemplify Fig. 1 Sub-SahValue of diamond Fig 1 production Value ofindiamond the colonialproduct era. aran African (SSA) countries where minerals Source·. are Saylor a Source·. (1967). Note·, Saylor no data (1967). available Note·, for the no period data 1941-1945 (World1941-1945 War Π) resource blessing. Good governance, an efficient (World War Π) regulatory system, a joint corporate-government ven ture, and the geographic concentration of diamond deposits (point resource) are primarily responsible for smooth exploitation of diamonds Botswana's success (Taylor and Mokhawa 2003).1 economic interests (Greenh The aforementioned discussion elucidates nuanced discovery of diamonds in Kon understanding of the resource curse with regards CGOSL granted exclusive minin economic, social, political, and spatial explanations Leone Selection Trust (SLST), associated with the resource curse/blessing. In general British-owned Consolidated it is difficult to definitively determine cause and effect (CAST). CAST was to pay 27.5 % of resource curse, thus many of the studies show (later increased to 45 %) and a associations. The challenges of measuring the mineral rent to the Protectorate M resource curse at national/cross-national level under- (Saylor 1967; Van der Laan scores the need to also exam felt impacts at local levels tation was economically benefic where resource extraction takes place. Moreover, accounted for 56 % of the cou resource curse/blessing is not constant: it is subject anc^ transformed state s bud to temporal change. Such an understanding of the surplus up to World War II (S resource curse enhances the analysis of how diamond 'n ^'8· ' > va'ue °f diamond e exploitation in Sierra Leone has demonstrated pre- million from 1949, fluctuated dominantly 'resource blessing' or 'curse' impacts at rose s^arP'y from 1959 to 19 national and/or local levels during four eras, within a 1948-1952 the SLST paid the period of 80 years. (van dm Laan 1965). In 1960, the company paid £1.139 million as taxation to the government and also made indirect contribution to the national economy by Diamond exploitation in colonial and early spending about £720,000 on salaries and wages a postcolonial periods, a resource curse? £670,000 on local purchases (SLST 1961). Thus, fr a macroeconomic perspective, diamond exploitation Diamond exploitation during colonial rule: 1930 was a resource blessing to the CGOSL. to 1960 Moreover, due to mounting political pressure from the first set of elected indigenes to the From the onset the colonial government of Sierra council a revised mining Leone (CGOSL) enacted legislation geared towards *ax 'ncreases on SL industry profit tax amounted to 60 % 11Botswana' Botswana's s diamonds diamonds are minedare by Debswana—a mined bypartnership Debswana—a partnership 2 The Mineral between between De Beers De Beers and theand government the government of Botswana inof which Botswana in Ordinance which of 1927 vested control of all minerals each has 50% shares. each has 50% shares. in the Crown (Laws in the of Crown Sierra (Laws Leone of Sierra 1946). Leone 1946). Ô Springer This content downloaded from 129.59.122.21 on Tue, 12 Sep 2017 21:41:29 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms GeoJournal (2013) 78:997-1012 1001 Government's additional revenues w the period 1951-1953 (Van der Laan annual mining rent payable to the P Benefits Trust Fund increased from £ and Kono and Lower Bambara Chief District received annual grant of £1 respectively (SLST 1966). These poli resulted in mineral revenue increas socioeconomic development at natio levels. in Though national the mid-1950s. corporate mining was very level, it also contributed to development employment, in mining communitie infrastructure, and social number of local employees increased 1942 to 3,500 in 1960 (Saylor 1967). members also benefited from health 56,000 patients (of which 42 % were workers) were treated annually at th hospital (SLST 1966). With regards ro ment, the SLST stated that "company opened up large areas in Kono and Lo (SLST 1966:4). Although it can been company concentrated on roads that mining activities, primary responsibilities it assisted included the the C d physical infrastructure. In the area o company offered scholarships to st grants were used to build seven prim corporate mining towns (SLST 1966). Th mining was regarded as a blessing f communities. most license plots (Rosen 1973). Consequently, many Mining communities and non-local counterparts natives interesting in mining had to also derived economic benefit from an informal license holders with modicum b channel—illicit diamond exploitation. Illicit diamond though the CMS was estab exploitation was aided by influx of West Africans and economic opportunities for loca entrepreneurial Lebanese referred to as strangers, in contracts to indigenes to mi the early 1950s that acted mainly as buyers and sion (areas with marginal proven financiers of illicit mining activities (Leighton 1974). to the company, some chief Although local people initially received five shillings sions. The scheme stipulated that per stone, higher outputs resulted in meaningful of the mining area nominate c earnings (Hayward 1972). Illicit mining boosted local 1966). However, such provisi economies of towns and villages in diamondiferous avenues for paramount chie areas, especially in Kono, Kenema and Bo Districts awarded contracts to relatives a (Greenhalgh 1985). It was also aided by rent seeking 3 Only thosethat belonging the Kono ethnic group were regarded activities of chiefs who permitted more strangers 3 to 0nly those belonging to the Kono e as natives. paid them significant sums of money for permission to Μ natiVes. trade (Rosen 1973). This was in spite of the4 The fact that 4 council xhe was elected council was giv elected district given the district task of administer ingof the MADA program. ing the MADA program. the SLST paid chiefs £50 to ensure control migrants Ô Springer This content downloaded from 129.59.122.21 on Tue, 12 Sep 2017 21:41:29 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 1002 GeoJournal ('supporters') exorbitant (2013) who amount 78:997-1012 subsequently (Rosen 1973). s Th cases elucidate how corruption amongst district To summarize, although the socioeconomic bene authorities and weak and/or inept local institutions fits of diamond exploitation were unevenly distrib undermined significant economic impact of diamond uted, the net effect of diamond exploitation was more exploitation on a majority of locals. of a blessing than a curse, especially at the national At the national level, policy changes following the level. At the national level, the government benefited establishment of the Diamond Corporation of West immensely from mineral revenues, except for the mid Africa (DICORWAF), a subsidiary of DeBeers, aug- 1950s when official diamond revenues fell due t mented official diamond sales. DICORWAF stabi- massive illicit exploitation. The SLST and diamond lized diamond prices and reduced export duty from 7.5 dealers (mainly Lebanese and West Africans) a to 4 % (Van der Laan 1965). Diamond traders and acquired considerable wealth from diamonds. How diggers found out that the price paid by the central ever, mining communities (with the exception buying office was influenced by price changes in the chiefs) derived moderate socioeconomic benefit international market and therefore sold most diamonds the form of social services, infrastructure and incom to the buying office. Consequently, smuggling was reduced to about £1-2 million per year since 1959 unlike the £10-15 million worth of diamonds smug- Diamond exploitation during the APC era: 1968 gled between 1954 and 1959.5 This is an illustration to 1992, a resource curse? that with proper policies, smuggling can be reduced to low acceptable levels and resource revenue can be a Diamond exploitation under Stevens' patrimonial 'blessing' at the national level. rule Diamond production and revenue utilization The inception of Sia during the initial years of independence about policy changes in d which were detrimental to the national Increasing production and value of diamond exports at the embryonic stage o independence in 1961 within extant policy framework threatened as he faced enhanced national economic performance. Official chiefs and their clie Diamond production valued at £15.9 million in 1961 Leone Peoples Party rose to £21.8 million in 1964.6 During the period Province. A number of 1968/69, carats purchased by the GDO increased from acquired wealth from 863,804.00 valued at £11.7 million to 1,102,884.50 the status quo. Yet, th valued at £15.6 million (Government of Sierra Leone in order to consoli 1970). Corporate payment to the government was ment of diamond expl significant. In 1963, SLST paid about £2.5 million as the local to the natio income tax and diamond industry profit tax. It also ment maintained de invested and spent about £2.2 million annually on the military junta i other fields of economic development in Sierra Leone, shifted the level of co including physical infrastructure food subsidies for the local to the national workers, and medical and health services (Golfa of assigning mining li 1989). In the late 1960s official diamond exports Ministry of Mines (A peaked with average production valued at $250 1995). This change al million (1995 dollars) constituting 20 % of GDP and structure of land t 60 % of foreign exchange earnings (Davies 2008). additional revenue from While this centralization of diamond con 55 Report Report of the Mines of Department, the Mines Sierra Leone,Department, 1962, pp. 4-5. Sierra Leone, 1962, pp. 4-5. expected to b 66Report Report of the Mines of Department, the Mines 1932-1963, Department, Sierra Leone; 1932-1963, Sierra Leone; growth and develop and Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, No. 3 (1964). and Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, No. 3 (1964). the pre-Stevens e â Springer This content downloaded from 129.59.122.21 on Tue, 12 Sep 2017 21:41:29 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms GeoJournal (2013) 78:997-1012 1003 governance, overt patrimonial rule, decline and ultimate collapse of cor resulted in a precipitous economic d 1978, the APC stage managed a so-cal which transformed Subsequently, it the country suppressed into a and/or tion politicians. The government's uno of smuggling resulted in the theft of of SLST diamond. For instance, on Nov the company's entire monthly produ $3.4 million was stolen, allegedly on Stevens and his close ally Jamil Said influential Lebanese businessman (S 2000). Such actions deprived the stantial official mineral revenues political and negative private capture implications on of cou and diam national (Kolstad and Wiig 2009). negative implications for development. Nonetheless, the APC government transformed the At the local level, Stevens' patrimonial rule SLST to a quasi-national company, the National mined local development goals of the 1973 Coo Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) in 1970 in order five Contract Mining Scheme (CCMS). This s to ensure that the country obtained the greatest allowed the setting up of private mining ope economic benefits from corporate mining. Total taxes within the NDMC concession (Fithen 19 from NDMC (income tax, surtax, and diamond initiative was presented as a concession to local m industry profits tax) constituted 70 % of net profits. In practice the diamond fields opened up were la The government also obtained 51 % of the remaining shared among APC elite and their allies as a profit as a form of dividend (Golfa 1989). Therefore, compensation for unflinching party loyalty. Ben the quasi-national mining parastatal was a major ties included pro-APC chiefs in diamond prod contributor to fiscal revenues accounting for $60 areas and government officials such as perm million dollars (3.6 % of GDP) in 1974 (Davies 2008). secretaries, ministers and members of parliament, While such financial gains from nationalization of of whom owned plots in other persons' nam corporate mining could be regarded as a resource Williams 1990). While rezoning of land for CC blessing as they boosted government coffers at the economically beneficial to top APC stalwarts a national level, Stevens' ulterior motive was to find associates and strengthened Stevens' under avenues for compensation of his senior stalwarts and economy; it was a liability to ordinary peo cronies. Stevens therefore established a network of lacked political connections to be an entrepre informal markets, the 'shadow state' in order to control the CCMS. Such practices are what Kolstad an the diamondiferous districts, especially Kono (Reno (2009) refer to as dysfunctional patronage a 1995; Zack-Williams 1999). By reconfiguring the seeking behavior. Furthermore, the governmen patronage network, Stevens gained control of diamond military rigorously suppressed diamond poachin revenues and greater political security which were two common illicit outlet thereby worsened e essential ingredients for his patron-client (patrimonial) opportunity for the ordinary miner (Levin 20 form of governance. Patrimonialism is 'a form of the CCMS program benefited APC party st political order where power is concentrated in the while many ordinary miners were increasing personal authority of one individual ruler.... The State is ginalized due to deprivation of access to legal an their private property, and the act of ruling is conse- alluvial mining. quently arbitrary'(Thompson 2004:115). Mismanagement of diamond corporations An essential element of his patrimonial rule was the 1980s led to ultimate collapse of corporate mini patron-client relationship in which APC politicians and significant national economic implicatio Ô Springer This content downloaded from 129.59.122.21 on Tue, 12 Sep 2017 21:41:29 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 1004 GeoJournal (2013) 78:997-1012 «•«Sales Sales(Le (Lemillion million Lebanese with the support of a few highly influential HiHTaxation "•«Taxation (Le (Lemillion million political figures in government was very lucrative in
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Exploitation of Resources in Sierra Leone
Abstract
Sierra Leone, located on the tip of tropical West Africa, has a population of about 4 million
people and is endowed with such resources as diamonds. The country is famous for its valuable
minerals that first world industries have vastly demanded since the post-colonial era due to their
vast uses. The other most common resource from the country demanded by the developed world
is bauxite, which is a component of the alloy Aluminum. Besides these luxurious minerals,
Sierra Leone is home to one of the world’s largest and purest deposits of natural rutile. Rutile is
an invaluable mineral due to its wide range industrial uses including as a constituent of titanium.
Nevertheless, the country barely derives substantial financial benefit from her Rutile deposits
due to inadequate financial outlay for the acquisition of the expensive inputs for rutile’s
exploitation (Maconachie, 17). This goes hand in hand with the country’s poor technical knowhow on mineral exploitation. Sierra Leone is well known for her indiscriminate farming practices
that serve as a berth for the overexploitation of forest resources. Mismanagement of the
country’s resources accounts for the imbalanced production compared to the populace.
Nonetheless, recently achieved pacification and political stability will possibly facilitate a
growing economy by attracting foreign investments into the country’s infant mining industry
that, if skillfully managed, may usher a new era of economical growth characterized by equitable
resources distribution and controlled exploitation.

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Introduction
According to former Sierra Leone government officials, current exploitation of resources is one
sided as a result of various unfavorable agreements between the country and various foreign
investors. Despite being well endowed with minerals, agricultural and marine resources, runaway
corruption prevent the people of Sierra Leone from enjoying their country’s resources as few
gluttonous government officials strike deals that benefit them at the expense of the rest of the
country. Consequently, previously the government spent quintessential sums of money on
enterprises and wasteful prestige as opposed to the health and education sectors. Sierra Leon was
once rat...


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