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Organizational
Change
Management
Dr. Charles Poplos, PMP
Organizational Change Management
• Organized, systematic application of
– Knowledge
– Tools
– Resources of change
• To provide organizations with a key process to
achieve their business strategy
Difference Between Project and
Change Management
• Project Management focus is on specific
project activities and deliverables
• Change Management focus is on the impact
the project will have on the organization
Thus
• Project Management – the change
• Change Management – getting the change
accepted
Essential Components
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Sponsor Management
End-user Communication
Readiness
Training
Coaching
Transition Planning
Resistance Management
Sponsor Management
• Sponsor is key
• CM team works to produce
the Sponsor Roadmap
– Let the sponsor know about
expectations, and
– How the sponsor can help
achieve success
End-user Communication
• Permeate the gaining organization’s hierarchy
with change information
– Keep them informed
– Get them ready for the impact
– Make them comfortable
Readiness
• Readiness involves
• Analyzing an organization to identify
– The current state
– The future desired state,
– What is required to move from one state to the other
• Organizations need to understand
– The specific impacts the new system will have on their own internal
operations
– To prepare proactively for those impacts
Training
• Training plays a critical role in
helping the gaining organization
adapt the new processes,
hardware, software, etc. into
their operations
• CM Team performs training
needs analysis
– Determines the training strategy
– Helps manage the training plan
– Identifies the skill gaps of the
affected end-user community
Coaching
• The CM team works with
supervisors to ensure they are
aware of the
– Project or what is being changed
– Impacts
– Expectations of them
• The coaching effort can range from
– Coaching info sheets to
– Formal meetings with
managers/supervisors to advise
them on how best to coach their
staff
Transition Planning
• Transition Planning involves
– Preparing the organization to support the new system once the change is
completed
– The team
• Reviews the skills necessary to support the new system
• Works with individuals on the production side to develop transition plans
to successfully support the new application
– Users may
•
•
•
•
Require Training
Require remedial training in related skill sets
Need to acquire entirely new skill sets
Will have job reclassification issues
Resistance Management
• A resistance management plan is a proactive
approach to managing resistance
• It is important to identify potential resistance
points by defining
– What resistance may look like
– How to identify resistance
– How to mitigate the impact of resistance
In General
• Change Management
– Manages change as a process
– Recognizes that projects deal with people
– Helps people through the change with open and
honest communication
– Provides awareness of the new environment
– Ensuring readiness to function competently
Preparation For Major Change
• It is important for
organizations to
understand
– Impacts the
implementation will have
on their own internal
operations
• And to
– Prepare proactively for
those impacts
Concerns
• Organizational Change
Management is
concerned with:
– Managing change as a
process and recognizing
that people are the focus
– Providing direct,
knowledgeable, and
frequent communication
The Change Problem
• Change problem is
– Some future state to be
realized
– Some current state to be left
behind
– A some structured, organized
process for getting from the
one to the other
Change Answers Three Questions
• How do we make the change?
• What needs to be changed?
• Why is it being changed?
How Do We Make The Change?
• How do we get people to
– Be more open?
– Assume more responsibility?
– Be more creative?
What Needs To Be Changed?
•
•
•
•
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What are we trying to accomplish?
What changes are necessary?
What indicators will signal success?
What standards apply?
What measures of performance are we trying
to affect?
Why Is It Being Changed?
• Frequently chains and networks of business
must be traced out before one finds the “true”
reason for a change effort
• CM wants to find the ultimate purposes of
functions and find new and better ways of
performing them
– Why do we do what we do?
– Why do we do it the way we do it?
The Theories
•
•
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•
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Satir’s Change Process Model
Kubler-Ross Stages of Change Model
Kotter’s Phases of Change Model
Lewin’s Dynamic Stability Model
Prosci Change Management Model
Satir’s Change Process Model
• Satir’s change model is one of many tools
she invented to enhance communication
and encourage growth
– “Change” is the project announcement which
leads to a period of uncertainty, chaos, and
productivity decreases
– As people learn more and receive
training/coaching, their productivity begins to
rise
– There is a period of flux until the new system
becomes the status quo.
Kubler-Ross Stages of Change Model
• Describes the process
by which people deal
with grief
– Significant changes in
the working
environment can bring
about a form of grief
Kubler-Ross Stages of Change Model
• Five stages
– Denial: The initial stage: "It can't be happening."
– Anger: "Why ME? It's not fair?!" Recognition of changes in the day-today routine, perceived (or real) loss of prestige, power, knowledge,
movement to the new state where things are unfamiliar and
uncomfortable.
– Bargaining: "Just let me live to see my son graduate." A sense of “just
leave me alone”, or “just don’t change this one particular thing too”.
Sometimes expressed as “as long as I don’t lose anything”, or “just
make sure I get the training I need”.
– Depression: "I'm so sad, why bother with anything?" When a system
first implements feelings like “this is too hard”, “this is too slow”, “this
takes too much work”, and “this is stupid” are not uncommon.
– Acceptance: "It's going to be OK." Once people get used to the new
system, they begin to accept it, and in time will defend it as strongly as
they defended the old system.
Kotter
• Kotter’s change
phases model
deals with the
phases of change
Lewin’s Dynamic Stability Model
• Refers to “unfreezing, changing, and
refreezing”
– It gives rise to thinking about a staged approach to
changing things. Looking before you leap is usually
sound practice.
• Using Lewin’s approach as a starting point
– Most change associated with projects comes from
the envisioning of some future state yet to be
realized
– To arrive at the “to be” state, it is important to
understand the “as is” state.
Prosci Change Management Model
• Prosci
– Is a nationally recognized research
and development company that
specializes in bench-marking change
management best practices
– Has made a significant step forward in
the integration of organizational
change management and project
management
– Released its Change Management
Process
• Following eight years of
research with over 1000
organizations
Prosci Change Management Model
• Built into the process are scalable and
flexible components for customizing OCM
activities to the specific organizational
change being implemented
– ADKAR (Awareness, Desire, Knowledge,
Ability, Reinforcement) system for
working through change
• Includes
– Tools to perform organizational analysis
– Templates which can be customized to
aid the process of preparing
organizations for change
Selecting a Change Strategy
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Degree of resistance
Target population
The stakes
Time frame
Expertise
Dependency
Organizational Strategy
Funding
Basic Change Management Steps
• Provide awareness of the change that is going to occur
• Ensure there is understanding about why the change needs to happen and
the benefits of that change
• Facilitate acceptance of the change
• Act as someone who cares, listens, and responds to individual needs and
concerns
• Manage people and expectations
• Assist people to use their insights, skills, and sense of values to move
forward with organization/team efforts.
In Summary
• Organizational Change Management is an important part of any process
implementation
• Getting the people to accept the change is essential in project success
• Organizational change management is made up of seven essential
components
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Sponsor management
End-user communication
Readiness
Coaching
Training
Transition Planning
Resistance Management
In Summary
• Change Management
– helps answer the question “how are we going to move from this
current state to the future state?”
– is drawn from the fields of psychology, sociology, business
administration, economics, industrial engineering, systems
engineering, and the study of human and organizational behavior
• Change Management and Project Management must work
together to ensure project success and acceptance of the
change brought about by new systems
An Improvisational Model of Change
Management: The Case of Groupware
Technologies
Wanda J. Orlikowski and J. Debra Hofman
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge
MA 02142-1347
Sloan Management Review, January 1997
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Abstract
Introduction
An Improvisational Model for Managing Change
Case Example: Zeta
Summary of Zeta Case
Enabling Conditions
Aligning Key Change Dimensions
Dedicating Resources for Ongoing Support
Conclusions
Footnotes
References
Figures
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the editor and reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version
of this manuscript. We gratefully appreciate the research support of MIT's Center for
Coordination Science and Center for Information Systems Research.
An Improvisational Model of Change Management:The Case of Groupware Technologies
Abstract
In this paper, we present an alternative way of thinking about technological change in
organizations. This alternative approach is motivated by a recognition that traditional models for
managing technological change - in which the major steps of the change are defined in advance
and the organization then strives to implement these changes as planned in a specified period of
time - are not particularly useful given the more turbulent, flexible, and uncertain organizational
situations that many companies face today. Traditional models are also not particularly useful for
helping the implementation of technologies such as groupware whose unprecedented, openended, and context-specific nature make it difficult to predefine the exact changes to be realized
and to predict their likely organizational impact.
We suggest an alternative model of managing technological change, one that reflects the
dynamic and variable nature of contemporary organizations and technologies, and which
accommodates iterative experimentation, use, and learning over time. We label such a model of
managing technological change "improvisational," and suggest that it may enable organizations
to take advantage of the evolving capabilities, emerging practices, and unanticipated outcomes
that accompany use of new technologies in contemporary organizations.
Introduction
In the preface to her discussion of technology design, Suchman (1987: vii) refers to two different
approaches to open sea navigation -- the European and the Trukese:
The European navigator begins with a plan -- a course -- which he has charted according to
certain universal principles, and he carries out his voyage by relating his every move to that plan.
His effort throughout his voyage is directed to remaining "on course." If unexpected events
occur, he must first alter the plan, then respond accordingly. The Trukese navigator begins with
an objective rather than a plan. He sets off toward the objective and responds to conditions as
they arise in an ad hoc fashion. He utilizes information provided by the wind, the waves, the tide
and current, the fauna, the stars, the clouds, the sound of the water on the side of the boat, and he
steers accordingly. His effort is directed to doing whatever is necessary to reach the objective.
(Berreman 1966, p.347)
Like Suchman, we too find this contrast in approaches instructive, and will use it here to
motivate our discussion of managing technological change. In particular, we suggest that how
people think about managing change in organizations most often resembles the European
approach to navigation. That is, they believe they need to start with a plan for the change, charted
according to certain general organizational principles, and that they need to relate their actions to
that plan, ensuring throughout that the change remains on course.
However, when we examine how change actually occurs in practice, we find that it much more
closely resembles the voyage of the Trukese. That is, people end up responding to conditions as
they arise, often in an ad hoc fashion, doing whatever is necessary to implement change. In a
manner similar to Argyris and Schon's (1978) contrast between espoused theories and theoriesin-use, we suggest that there is a discrepancy between how people think about technological
change and how they do it. Moreover, we suggest that this discrepancy significantly contributes
to the difficulties and challenges that contemporary organizations face as they attempt to
introduce and effectively implement technology-based change.
Traditional ways of thinking about technological change have their roots in Lewin's (1952) threestage change model of "unfreezing," "change," and "refreezing" (Kwon and Zmud, 1987).
According to this model, the organization prepares for change, implements the change, and then
strives to regain stability as soon as possible. Such a model, which treats change as an event to be
managed during a specified period (Pettigrew, 1985), may have been appropriate for
organizations that were relatively stable, bounded, and whose functionality was sufficiently fixed
to allow for detailed specification. Today however, given more turbulent, flexible, and uncertain
organizational and environmental conditions, such a model is becoming less appropriate; hence,
the discrepancy.
This discrepancy is particularly pronounced when the technology being implemented is openended and customizable, as in the case of the new information technologies that have come to be
known as groupware.[1] Groupware technologies provide electronic networks that support
communication, coordination, and collaboration through facilities such as information exchange,
shared repositories, discussion forums, and messaging. Such technologies are typically designed
with an open architecture that is adaptable by end users, allowing them to customize existing
features and create new applications (DeJean and DeJean, 1991; Malone et al., 1992). Rather
than automating a predefined sequence of operations and transactions, these technologies tend to
be general-purpose tools which are used in different ways across various organizational activities
and contexts. Organizations need the experience of using groupware technologies in particular
ways and in particular contexts to better understand how they may be most useful in practice. In
such a technological context, the traditional change model is thus particularly discrepant.
The discrepancy is also evident when organizations are using information technologies to
attempt unprecedented and complex changes such as global integration or distributed knowledge
management. A primary example of this is the current attempt by many companies to redefine
and integrate global value chain activities which were previously managed independently. While
there is typically some understanding up front of the magnitude of such a change, the depth and
complexity of the interactions among these activities is only fully understood as the changes are
implemented. For many organizations, such initiatives represent a new ball game, not only
because they haven't played the game before but because most of the rules are still evolving. In a
world with uncertain rules, the traditional model for devising and executing a game plan is very
difficult to enact. And as recent strategy research has suggested (Mintzberg, 1994; McGrath and
McMillan, 1995), planning in such circumstances is more effective as an ongoing endeavor,
reflecting the changing and unfolding environments with which organizations interact.
In many situations, therefore, predefining the technological changes to be implemented and
accurately predicting their organizational impact is not feasible. Hence, the models of planned
change that often inform implementation of new technologies are less than effective. We suggest
that what would be more appropriate is a way of thinking about change that reflects the
unprecedented, uncertain, open-ended, complex, and flexible nature of the technologies and
organizational initiatives involved. Such a model would enable organizations to systematically
absorb, respond to, and even leverage unexpected events, evolving technological capabilities,
emerging practices, and unanticipated outcomes. Such a model for managing change would
accommodate -- indeed, encourage -- ongoing and iterative experimentation, use, and learning.
Such a model sees change management more as an ongoing improvisation than a staged event. In
this paper, we propose such an alternative model. After presenting the model, we describe a case
study of groupware implementation in a customer support organization to illustrate the value of
this alternative model in practice. We conclude by discussing the conditions under which such an
improvisational model may be a powerful way of managing the implementation and use of
advanced technologies.
An Improvisational Model for Managing Change
The improvisational model for managing technological change is based on research we have
done into the implementation and use of open-ended information technologies. The model rests
on two major assumptions which differentiate it from traditional models of change: first, that the
changes associated with technology implementations constitute an ongoing process rather than
an event with an end point after which the organization can expect to return to a reasonably
steady state; and second, that the various technological and organizational changes made during
the ongoing process cannot, by definition, all be anticipated ahead of time.
Given these assumptions, our improvisational change model recognizes three different types of
change: anticipated, emergent, and opportunity-based. These change types are elaborations on
Mintzberg's (1987) distinction between deliberate and emergent strategies. Here, we distinguish
between anticipated changes -- changes that are planned ahead of time and occur as intended -and emergent changes -- changes that arise spontaneously out of local innovation and which are
not originally anticipated or intended. An example of an anticipated change would be the
implementation of electronic mail software which accomplishes its intended aim to facilitate
increased and quicker communication among organizational members. An example of an
emergent change would be the use of the electronic mail network as an informal grapevine
disseminating rumors throughout an organization. This use of e-mail is typically not planned or
anticipated when the network is implemented, but often emerges tacitly over time in particular
organizational contexts.
We further differentiate these two types of changes from opportunity-based changes -- changes
that are not anticipated ahead of time but are introduced purposefully and intentionally during the
change process in response to an unexpected opportunity, event, or breakdown. For example, as
companies gain experience with the World Wide Web, they are finding opportunities to apply
and leverage its capabilities in ways that were not anticipated or planned before the introduction
of the Web. Both anticipated and opportunity-based changes involve deliberate action, in
contrast to emergent changes which arise spontaneously and usually tacitly out of people's
practices with the technology over time (Orlikowski, 1996).
These three types of change build on each other over time in an iterative fashion (see Figure 1).
While there is no predefined sequence in which the different types of change occur, the
deployment of new technology often entails an initial anticipated organizational change
associated with the installation of the new hardware/software. Over time, however, use of the
new technology will typically involve a series of opportunity-based, emergent, and further
anticipated changes, the order of which cannot be determined in advance because the changes
interact with each other in response to outcomes, events, and conditions arising through
experimentation and use.
One way of thinking about this model of change is to consider, as an analogy, a jazz band. While
members of a jazz band, unlike members of a symphony orchestra, do not decide in advance
exactly what notes each is going to play, they do decide ahead of time what musical composition
will form the basis of their performance. Once the performance begins, each player is free to
explore and innovate, departing from the original composition. Yet, the performance works
because all members are playing within the same rhythmic structure and have a shared
understanding of the rules of this musical genre. What they are doing is improvising -- enacting
an ongoing series of local innovations which embellish the original structure, respond to
spontaneous departures and unexpected opportunities, and iterate and build on each other over
time. Using our earlier terminology, the jazz musicians are engaging in anticipated, opportunitybased, and emergent action during the course of their performance to create an effective and
creative response to local conditions.
Similarly, an improvisational model for managing technological change in organizations is not a
predefined program of change charted by management ahead of time. Rather, it recognizes that
technological change is an iterative series of different changes, many unpredictable at the start,
that evolve out of practical experience with the new technologies. Using such a model to manage
change requires a set of processes and mechanisms to recognize the different types of change as
they occur and to respond effectively to them. The illustrative case presented below suggests that
where an organization is open to the capabilities offered by a new technological platform and
willing to embrace an improvisational change model, innovative organizational changes can be
achieved.
Case Example: Zeta
Zeta is one of the Top 50 software companies in the US, with $100 million in revenues and about
1000 employees. It produces and sells a range of powerful software products providing
capabilities such as decision support, executive information, and marketing analysis. Zeta is
headquartered in the Midwest, with sales and client service field offices throughout the world.
Specialists in the Customer Service Department (CSD) at Zeta provide technical support via
telephone to clients, consultants, value-added resellers, Zeta client service representatives in the
field, and other Zeta employees who use the products. This technical support can be quite
complex. Specialists typically devote several hours of research to each problem, often searching
through reference material, attempting to replicate the problem, and/or reviewing program source
code. Some incidents require interaction with members of other departments such as quality
assurance, documentation, and product development. The CSD employs approximately fifty
specialists and is headed by a director and two managers.
In 1992, the CSD purchased the Lotus Notes groupware technology within which they developed
a new Incident Tracking Support System (ITSS) to help them log customer calls and keep a
history of progress towards resolving the customers' problems. Following a successful pilot of
the new system, the CSD decided to commit to the Notes platform and to deploy ITSS
throughout its department. The acquisition of new technology to facilitate customer call tracking
was motivated by a number of factors. The existing tracking system was a home-grown system
which had been developed when the department was much smaller and Zeta's product portfolio
much narrower. The system was not real-time, entry of calls was haphazard, information
accuracy was a concern, and performance was slow and unreliable. It provided little assistance
for reusing prior solutions and no support for the management of resources in the department.
The volume and complexity of calls to the CSD had increased in recent years due to the
introduction of new products, the expanded sophistication of existing products, and the extended
range of operating platforms supported. Such shifts had made replacement of the tracking system
a priority, as CSD managers were particularly concerned that the home-grown system provided
no ability to track calls, query the status of particular calls, apprehend the workload, balance
resources, identify issues and problems before they became crises, and obtain up-to-date and
accurate documentation on work in progress and work completed. In addition, calls would
occasionally be lost, as the slips of paper on which they were recorded would get mislaid or
inadvertently thrown away.
The initial introduction of the new ITSS system was accompanied by anticipated changes in the
nature of both the specialists' and managers' work. In contrast to the previous system, which had
been designed to only capture a brief description of the problem and its final resolution, ITSS
was designed to allow specialists to document every step they took in their process of resolving a
particular incident. That is, it was designed to enable the capture of a full incident history. As
specialists began to use ITSS this way, the focus of their work shifted from primarily research-solving problems--to both research and documentation--solving problems and documenting work
in progress.
The ITSS database quickly began to grow as each specialist documented his/her resolution
process in detail. While documenting calls took time, it also saved time by providing a rich
database of information which could be searched for potential resolutions. Moreover, this new
database of rich information served as an unexpected and informal learning mechanism by
providing the specialists with exposure to a wide range of problems and solutions. As one
specialist noted: "If it is quiet, I will check on my fellow colleagues to see what ... kind of calls
they get, so I might learn something from them. ... just in case something might ring a bell when
someone else calls." At the same time, however, using the ITSS database as a sole source of
information did pose some risk, since there were no guarantees as to the accuracy of the
information. To minimize this risk, the specialists tacitly developed a set of informal quality
indicators to help them distinguish between reliable and unreliable data. For example, resolutions
that were comprehensively documented, documented by certain individuals, or verified by the
customer were considered more reliable sources of information.
In addition to these changes in specialists' work, use of the new system by the CSD managers
improved their ability to control the department's resources. Specialists' use of ITSS to document
calls provided managers with detailed workload information, which was used to justify increased
headcount and adjust work schedules and shift assignments on a dynamic and as-needed basis.
ITSS also supplied managers with more accurate information on specialists' work process, for
example, the particular steps followed to research and resolve a problem, the areas in which
specialists sought advice or were stalled, and the quality of their resolutions. As managers began
to rely on the ITSS data to evaluate specialists' performance, they expanded the criteria they used
to do this evaluation. For example, quality of work-in-progress documentation was included as
an explicit evaluation criterion and documentation skills became a factor in the hiring process.
As the CSD gained experience with and better understood the capabilities of the groupware
technology, the managers opportunistically introduced a change in the structure of the
department to further leverage these capabilities. This change had not been planned prior to the
implementation of ITSS, but the growing reliance on ITSS and an appreciation of the capabilities
of the groupware technology created an opportunity for the CSD to redistribute call loads. In
particular, "first line" and "second line" support levels were established, with junior specialists
being assigned to the first line, and senior specialists to the second line. Partnerships were
created between the less experienced, junior specialists and the more experienced, senior
specialists. Front line specialists now took all incoming calls, resolved as many of these as they
could, and then electronically transferred calls to their second line partners when they were
overloaded or had calls which were especially difficult. In addition to handling calls transferred
to them, senior specialists were expected to proactively monitor their front line partners' progress
on calls and to provide assistance as needed.
While this partnership idea was conceptually sound, it regularly broke down in practice. Junior
specialists were often reluctant to hand off calls, fearing that such transfers would reflect poorly
on their competence or that they would be overloading their more senior partners. Senior
specialists, in turn, were usually too busy resolving complex incidents to spend much time
monitoring their junior partners' call status or progress. In response to this unanticipated
breakdown in the partnership idea, CSD managers introduced another opportunity-based
structural change. They created a new role, that of an intermediary, which was filled by a senior
specialist whose job it was to mediate between the first and second lines, regularly monitoring
junior specialists' call loads and work in progress, and dynamically reassigning calls as
appropriate. The new intermediary role served as a buffer between the junior and senior
specialists, facilitating the transfer of calls and relieving senior specialists of the responsibility to
constantly monitor their front line partners. With these structural changes, ITSS in effect
changed the prior undifferentiated and fixed division of labor within the department to a dynamic
distribution of work reflecting different levels of experience, various areas of expertise, and
shifting workloads. In response to the new distribution of work, managers adjusted their
evaluation criteria to reflect the changed responsibilities and roles within the CSD.
Another change which emerged over time was a shift in the nature of collaboration within the
CSD from a primarily reactive mode of collaboration to one that was more proactive. Because all
specialists now had access to the database of calls being worked on in the department, they
began to browse through each others' calls to see which ones they could provide help on. Rather
than waiting to be asked if they had a solution to a particular problem (which is how they had
solicited and received help in the past), specialists actively browsed through the database of calls
seeking problems for which they could offer help. This shift from solicited to unsolicited
assistance was facilitated by the capabilities of the groupware technology, the complex nature of
the work, existing evaluation criteria that stressed teamwork, and the long-standing cooperative
and collegial culture in the CSD. Consider the following specialists' comments: "Everyone
realizes that we all have a certain piece of the puzzle ... I may have one critical piece, and Jenny
may have another piece. ... And if we all work separately, we're never going to get the puzzle
together. But by everybody working together, we have the entire puzzle"; "Here I don't care who
grabs credit for my work ... this support department does well because we're a team, not because
we're all individuals" (Orlikowski, 1995). Managers responded to this shift in work practices by
adjusting specialists' evaluation criteria to specifically take unsolicited help giving into account.
As one manager explained: "When I'm looking at incidents, I'll see what help other people have
offered, and that does give me another indication of how well they're working as a team."
After approximately one year of using ITSS, the CSD implemented two further organizational
changes around the groupware technology. Both of these had been anticipated in the initial
planning for ITSS, although the exact timing for their implementation had been left unspecified.
First, the ITSS application was installed in three overseas support offices, with copies of all the
ITSS databases replicated regularly across the four support sites (US, UK, Australia, and
Europe). This provided all support specialists with a more extensive knowledge base on which to
search for possibly helpful resolutions. The use of ITSS in all the support offices further allowed
specialists to transfer calls across offices, essentially enacting a global support department within
Zeta.
Second, the CSD initiated and funded the development of a number of bug tracking systems
which were implemented within groupware and deployed in Zeta's departments of product
development, product management, and quality assurance. These bug tracking applications,
which were modeled on the ITSS application, were linked into ITSS and enabled specialists to
enter any bugs they had discovered in their problem resolution activities directly into the relevant
product's bug tracking system. Previously, the reporting of bugs by the CSD to other departments
was done manually, took many weeks, and involved minimal communication. With the new bug
tracking applications and linkages to ITSS, specialists could also directly query the status of
particular bugs, and even change their priority if customer calls indicated that such an escalation
was needed. Specialists in particular found this change very valuable. For the other departments,
the link with ITSS allowed users such as product managers and developers to access the ITSS
records and trace the particular incidents that had uncovered certain bugs or uncovered certain
use problems. Only the developers had some reservations about the introduction of the bug
tracking application, reservations that were associated with the severe time constraints under
which they worked to produce new releases of Zeta products.
In addition to the improved coordination and integration achieved with other departments and
offices, the CSD also realized further opportunity-based innovations and emergent changes
within their own practices. For example, as the number of incidents in ITSS grew, some of the
senior specialists began to realize that the information in the system could be used to help train
newcomers. By extracting certain records from the ITSS database, these specialists
opportunistically created a training database of sample problems with which newly hired
specialists could work. Using the communication capabilities of the groupware technology, these
senior specialists could monitor their trainees' progress through the sample database and
intervene to educate when necessary. As one senior specialist noted: "So we can kind of keep up
to the minute on their progress. ... If they're on the wrong track, we can intercept them and say,
'Go check this, go look at that.' But it's not like we have to actually sit with them and review
things. It's sort of an on-line, interactive thing." As a result of this new training mechanism, the
time that it took for new specialists to begin taking customer calls was reduced from eight weeks
to about five weeks.
An emergent change realized during this time related to access control. An ongoing issue for the
CSD was who (if anybody) outside of the CSD should be given access to the ITSS database with
its customer call information and specialists' work-in-progress documentation. This issue was not
one that had been anticipated prior to the acquisition of the technology. While the managers were
worried about how to respond to the increasing demand for access to ITSS as the database
became more valuable and word about its content spread throughout the company, they
continued to handle each access request as it came up. Over time, they had used a variety of
control mechanisms ranging from giving limited access to some "trusted" individuals, generating
summary reports of selected ITSS information for others, and refusing any access to still others.
As one of the managers explained, it was only after some time that they realized that their
various ad hoc responses to different access requests amounted to, in essence, a set of rules and
procedures about access control. By responding locally to a variety of requests and situations
over time, an implicit access control policy for the use of ITSS had evolved and emerged.
Summary of Zeta Case
Figure 2 represents the change model around the groupware technology followed by Zeta in its
CSD. Along with the introduction of the new technology and the development of the ITSS
application, the CSD first implemented some planned organizational changes, expanding the
specialists' work to include work-in-progress documentation and adjusting the managers' work to
take advantage of the real-time access to workload information. These changes were anticipated
prior to introducing the new technology. As specialists and managers began to work in new ways
with the technology, a number of changes emerged in practice, such as the specialists developing
norms to determine the quality and value of prior resolutions, and managers paying attention to
documentation skills in hiring and evaluation decisions.
Building on these anticipated and emergent changes, the CSD introduced a set of opportunitybased changes, creating junior-senior specialist partnerships to take advantage of the shared
database and communication capabilities of the technology, and then adding the new role of
intermediary in response to the unexpected problems that arose around partnership and work
reassignment. These changes were not anticipated at the start, nor did they simply emerge
spontaneously in working with the new technology. Rather, they were conceived of and
implemented in situ and in response to the opportunities and issues which arose as the CSD
gained experience and developed a deeper understanding of the new technology and their
particular use of it. This change process around the groupware technology continued through the
second year at Zeta when some anticipated organizational changes were followed by both
emergent and opportunity-based changes associated with unfolding events and the learning and
experience gained by using the new technology in practice.
Overall, what we see here is an iterative and ongoing series of anticipated, emergent, and
opportunity-based changes which allowed Zeta to learn from practical experience, respond to
unexpected outcomes and capabilities, and adapt both the technology and the organization as
appropriate. In effect, Zeta's change model cycles through anticipated, emergent, and
opportunity-based organizational changes over time. It is a change model which explicitly
recognizes the inevitability, legitimacy, and value of ongoing learning and change in practice.
Enabling Conditions
Clearly, there were certain aspects of the CSD and the Zeta organization which enabled it to
effectively adopt an improvisational change model to implement and use the groupware
technology. Our research at Zeta and other companies suggests that at least two sets of enabling
conditions are critical: aligning key dimensions of the change process, and dedicating resources
to provide ongoing support for the ongoing change process. We will consider each in turn.
Aligning Key Change Dimensions
An important influence on the effectiveness of any change process is the interdependent
relationship among three dimensions: the technology, the organizational context (including
culture, structure, roles and responsibilities), and the change model used to manage change (see
Figure 3). Ideally, the interaction among these three dimensions is compatible, or at a minimum,
not in opposition.
First, consider the relation of the change model and the technology being implemented. When
the technology has been designed to operate like a "black box," allowing little adaptation by
users, an improvisational approach may not be more effective than the traditional approach to
technology implementation. Similarly, where the technology is well-established and its impacts
are reasonably well understood, a traditional planned change approach may be effective.
However, when the technology being implemented is new and unprecedented, and additionally
has an open-ended and customizable nature, an improvisational model providing the flexibility
for organizations to adapt and learn through use becomes more appropriate. Such is the case, we
believe, with the groupware technologies available today.
Second, the relation of the change model to organizational context is also relevant. A flexible
change model, while likely to be problematic in a rigid, control-oriented or bureaucratic culture,
is well-suited to a more informal and cooperative culture such as the one characterizing the CSD.
In another study (Gallivan et al., 1994), we examined the MidCo organization's successful
adoption and implementation of CASE (Computer-Aided Software Engineering) tools within its
IS organization. While MidCo, a multi-national chemical products company with revenues of
over $1.5 billion, was a relatively traditional organization in many ways, key aspects of its
culture--a commitment to total quality management, a focus on organizational learning and
employee empowerment, as well as a long-term time orientation--were particularly compatible
with the improvisational model it used to manage ongoing organizational changes around the
new software development technology.
Finally, there is the important relationship between the technology and the organizational
context. At Zeta, the CSD's cooperative, team-oriented culture was compatible with the
collaborative nature of the new groupware technology. Indeed, CSD's existing culture allowed it
to take advantage of the opportunity for improved collaboration afforded by the groupware
technology. Moreover, when existing roles, responsibilities, and evaluation criteria became less
salient, the CSD managers expanded or adjusted these to reflect new uses of the technology.
Compare these change efforts to those of Alpha, a professional services firm which introduced
the Notes groupware technology to leverage knowledge sharing and to coordinate distributed
activities (Orlikowski, 1992). While the physical deployment of groupware grew very rapidly,
anticipated benefits were realized much more slowly. Key to the reluctance to use groupware for
knowledge sharing was a perceived incompatibility between the collaborative nature of the
technology and the individualistic and competitive nature of the organization. As in many
professional services firms, Alpha rewarded individual rather than team performance, and
promoted employees via an "up or out" set of evaluation criteria. In such an environment,
knowledge sharing via a global Notes network was seen to threaten status, distinctive
competence, and power. In contrast to Zeta, managers at Alpha did not adjust policies, roles,
incentives, and evaluation criteria to better align their organization with the intended use and
capabilities of the technology they had invested in.
Dedicating Resources for Ongoing Support
An ongoing change process requires dedicated support over time to adapt both the organization
and the technology to changing organizational conditions, use practices, and technological
capabilities. Opportunity-based change, in particular, depends on the ability of the organization
to notice and recognize opportunities, issues, breakdowns, and unexpected outcomes as they
arise. This requires attention on the part of appropriate individuals in the organization to track
use of the technology over time and to implement or initiate organizational and/or technological
adjustments which will mitigate or take advantage of the identified problems or opportunities. At
Zeta, it was the managers and technologists who primarily played this role, incorporating it into
their other responsibilities. So, for example, the managers adjusted the structure of their
department by introducing first line/second line partnerships to facilitate a dynamic division of
labor, and then made further adaptations by introducing an intermediary role to overcome some
unanticipated difficulties associated with the initial change. Similarly, the technologists working
with the CSD incorporated enhancements to the ITSS system as they realized ways of improving
ease of use and access time. The CSD's commitment to noticing and responding to changes when
appropriate did not end after the implementation of the technology. The managers clearly
realized that the change process they had embarked on with the use of groupware was an
ongoing one, as one manager noted: "We've had ITSS for two years. I'm surprised that the
enthusiasm hasn't gone away. ... I think it's because it's been changed on a regular
basis....Knowing that [the changes are going to get implemented keeps you wanting to think
about it, and keep going."
Ongoing change around the use of groupware technology also requires ongoing adjustments to
the technology itself as users learn and gain experience with the new technology's capabilities
and their uses of it over time. Without dedicated technology support to implement these
adaptations and innovations, the continued experimentation and learning in use central to an
improvisational change model may be stalled or thwarted. At Zeta, the CSD's use of groupware
and ITSS was supported by a dedicated technology group. Initially consisting of one developer,
this group grew over time as use of the technology expanded. After two years of technology use,
the group included four full-time technologists who provided technology support for the various
systems that had been deployed within Zeta via the Notes platform. The group also maintained
strong ties with all their users through regular meetings and communications with them. This
dedicated and ongoing technical support ensured that the technology would continue to be
updated, adjusted, and expanded as appropriate.
The value of ongoing support to enable ongoing organizational and technological change was
similarly important in another organization we studied, the R&D division of a large Japanese
manufacturing firm (Orlikowski et al., 1995). A newly-formed product development team within
the R&D division installed its own groupware technology, the Usenet news-system (a computer
conferencing system). Similar to Zeta, the team's use of this new technology also iterated among
anticipated, emergent, and opportunity-based changes over time. Here, a small group of users
who had previously used the groupware technology took on the responsibility to manage and
support its ongoing use for themselves and their colleagues. They tracked technology usage and
project events as they unfolded, responded as appropriate with adjustments to communication
policies and technology functionality, and proactively made changes to the team's use of the
conferencing system to leverage opportunities as they arose.
Conclusions
Global, responsive, team-based, networked--these are the watchwords for organizations of the
nineties. As managers redesign and reinvent organizations in a new image, many are turning to
information technologies to enable more flexible processes, greater knowledge sharing, and
global integration. At the same time, effectively implementing the organizational changes
associated with these technologies remains difficult in a turbulent, complex, and uncertain
environment. We believe that a significant factor contributing to these challenges is the growing
discrepancy between the way people think about technological change and the way they actually
do it.
We have proposed here that people's assumptions about technology-based change and the way it
is supposed to happen are based on models which are no longer appropriate. Traditional models
for managing technology-based change treat change as a sequential series of predefined steps
which are bounded within a specified period of time. With these models as a guide, it makes
sense -- as the European navigator does -- to define a plan of action in advance of the change and
track events against the plan, striving throughout the change to remain on track. Deviations from
the intended course -- the anticipated versus the actual -- then require explanation, the subtle (and
sometimes not-so-subtle) implication being that there has been some failure, some inadequacy in
planning, that has led to this deviation. Indeed, many organizational mechanisms such as
budgeting and resource planning are based on these notions. The problem is that change as it
actually occurs today more closely resembles the voyage of the Trukese navigator, and the
models and mechanisms most commonly used to think about and manage change do not
effectively support the experience of change in practice.
In this paper, we have offered an improvisational change model as a different way of thinking
about managing the introduction and ongoing use of information technologies to support the
more flexible, complex, and integrated structures and processes demanded by organizations
today. In contrast to traditional models of technological change, this improvisational model
recognizes that change is typically an ongoing process made up of opportunities and challenges
which are not necessarily predictable at the start. It defines a process which iterates among three
types of change -- anticipated, emergent and opportunity-based -- and which allows the
organization to experiment and learn as it uses the technology over time. Most importantly, it
offers a systematic approach with which to understand and better manage the realities of
technology-based change in organizations today.
Because such a model requires a flexible and responsive environment, adopting it implies that
managers relinquish what is often an implicit paradigm of "command and control" (Zuboff,
1995). An improvisational model, however, is not anarchy and neither is it a matter of "muddling
through." We are not implying that planning is an activity which is unnecessary or should be
abandoned. We are suggesting, instead, that a plan is a guide rather than a blueprint (Suchman,
1987), and that deviations from the plan, rather than being seen as a symptom of failure, are to be
expected and actively managed.
Rather than pre-defining each step to be taken and then controlling events to fit the plan, the idea
is to create an environment which facilitates improvisation. In such an environment, management
provides, supports, and nurtures a set of expectations, norms, and resources which guide the
ongoing change process. Malone (1996) refers to such a style of managing as "cultivation."
Consider again the jazz band. While each member of the band is free to improvise during the
performance, the result is typically not discordant. Rather, it is harmonious because each player
operates within an overall framework, conforms to a shared set of values and norms, and has
access to a known repertoire of rules and resources. Similarly, while many of the changes at
Zeta's CSD were not pre-planned, they were compatible with the overall objectives and
intentions of the department's members, their shared norms and team orientation, and the designs
and capabilities of the technology at hand.
Effectively executing an improvisational change model also requires aligning the technology and
the organizational context with the change model. Such alignment does not happen
automatically. It requires explicit and ongoing examination and adjustment, where and when
necessary, of the technology and the organization. As such, mechanisms and resources allocated
to ongoing support of the change process are critical. Tracking and noticing events and issues as
they unfold is a responsibility that needs to be owned by appropriate members of the
organization. Along with the responsibility, these organizational members require the authority,
credibility, influence, and resources to implement the ongoing changes. Creating the
environment, aligning the technology, context, and change model, and distributing the
appropriate responsibility and resources are critically important in the effective use of an
improvisational model, particularly as they represent a significant (and therefore challenging)
departure from the standard practice in effect in many organizations today.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that an improvisational model of change will not apply
to all situations. As we have noted, it is most appropriate for open-ended, customizable
technologies or for complex and unprecedented change. In addition, as one of our reviewers
noted, "jazz is not everyone's 'cup of tea'... some people are incapable of playing jazz much less
able to listen to what they consider to be 'noise.'" We noted above that some cultures do not
support experimentation and learning. As a result, they are probably not receptive to an
improvisational model, and are less likely to succeed with it. However, as these organizations
attempt to implement new organizational forms, they too may find an improvisational model to
be a particularly valuable approach to managing technological change in the 21st century.
References
Argyris, C. and Schon, D.A. Organizational Learning, Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1978.
DeJean, D. and DeJean, S.B. Lotus Notes at Work, New York: Lotus Books: 1991.
Gallivan, M.J., Hofman, J.D., and Orlikowski, W.J. "Implementing Radical Change: Gradual
Versus Rapid Pace," Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Information
Systems, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, December 14-17, 1994: 325-339.
Kwon, T.K. and Zmud, R.W. "Unifying the Fragmented Models of Information Systems
Implementation," in R.J. Boland Jr. and R.A. Hirschheim (Eds.) Critical Issues in Information
Systems Research, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987: 227-251.
Lewin, K. "Group Decision and Social Change," in Newcombe, E. and Harley, R. (Eds.)
Readings in Social Psychology, New York: Henry Holt, 1952: 459-473.
Malone, T.W., Lai, K.Y. and Fry, C. "Experiments with OVAL: A Radically Tailorable Tool for
Cooperative Work, Proceedings of the Third Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative
Work, Toronto, Canada, November 1992: 289-297.
Malone, T.W. Private communication. 1996.
McGrath, R.G. and MacMillan, I.C. "Discovery-Driven Planning," Harvard Business Review,
72, 1, 1995: 44-54.
Mintzberg, H. "The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning," Harvard Business Review, 72, 1, 1994:
107-114.
Orlikowski, W.J. "Learning from Notes: Organizational Issues in Groupware Implementation,"
Proceedings of the Third Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, Toronto,
November 1992: 362-369.
Orlikowski, W.J. "Evolving with Notes: Organizational Change around Groupware
Technology," Sloan School of Management Working Paper #3823, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1995.
Orlikowski, W.J. "Improvising Organizational Transformation over Time: A Situated Change
Perspective," Information Systems Research, 7, 1, 1996: 63-92.
Orlikowski W.J., Yates, J., Okamura, K. and Fujimoto, M. "Shaping Electronic Communication:
The Metastructuring of Technology in Use," Organization Science, 6, 1995: 423-444.
Pettigrew, A.M. The Awakening Giant. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1985.
Suchman, L. Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human Machine Communication.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Zuboff, S. In the Age of the Smart Machine, New York: Basic Books, 1988
Footnotes
[1] Not all goupware technologies are flexible and customizable (e.g., fixed-function electronic
mail systems). We are interested here only in those that are (e.g., Lotus Notes).
Leading Change:
Why Transformation
Efforts Fail
by John P. Kotter
Harvard Business Review
Reprint 95204
HarvardBusinessReview
MARCH-APRIL 1995
Reprint Number
JOHN P. KOTTER
LEADING CHANGE: WHY TRANSFORMATION EFFORTS FAIL
95204
NOEL M. TICHY
AND RAM CHARAN
THE CEO AS COACH: AN INTERVIEW
WITH ALLIED SIGNAL’S LAWRENCE A. BOSSIDY
95201
ROBERT SIMONS
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF EMPOWERMENT
95211
JOHN POUND
THE PROMISE OF THE GOVERNED CORPORATION
95210
B. JOSEPH PINE II, DON PEPPERS,
AND MARTHA ROGERS
DO YOU WANT TO KEEP YOUR CUSTOMERS FOREVER?
95209
A. CAMPBELL, M. GOOLD,
AND M. ALEXANDER
CORPORATE STRATEGY:
THE QUEST FOR PARENTING ADVANTAGE
95202
GEOFFREY OWEN
AND TREVOR HARRISON
WHY ICI CHOSE TO DEMERGE
95207
REGINA FAZIO MARUCA
HBR CASE STUDY
HOW DO YOU GROW A PREMIUM BRAND?
95205
SIMON JOHNSON
AND GARY LOVEMAN
WORLD VIEW
STARTING OVER: POLAND AFTER COMMUNISM
95203
RICHARD O’BRIEN
BOOKS IN REVIEW
WHO RULES THE WORLD’S FINANCIAL MARKETS?
95206
PERSPECTIVES
REDRAW THE LINE BETWEEN THE BOARD AND THE CEO
JOHN G. SMALE • ALAN J. PATRICOF • DENYS HENDERSON •
BERNARD MARCUS • DAVID W. JOHNSON
95208
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M A R C H - A P R I L
1 9 9 5
Leading Change:
Why Transformation Efforts Fail
by John P. Kotter
Over the past decade, I have watched more than
100 companies try to remake themselves into significantly better competitors. They have included
large organizations (Ford) and small ones (Landmark Communications), companies based in the
United States (General Motors) and elsewhere
(British Airways), corporations that were on their
knees (Eastern Airlines), and companies that were
earning good money (Bristol-Myers Squibb). These
efforts have gone under many banners: total quality
management, reengineering, right sizing, restructuring, cultural change, and turnaround. But, in almost every case, the basic goal has been the same:
to make fundamental changes in how business is
conducted in order to help cope with a new, more
challenging market environment.
A few of these corporate change efforts have been
very successful. A few have been utter failures.
Most fall somewhere in between, with a distinct
DRAWINGS BY KURT VARGO
tilt toward the lower end of the scale. The lessons
that can be drawn are interesting and will probably
be relevant to even more organizations in the increasingly competitive business environment of
the coming decade.
The most general lesson to be learned from the
more successful cases is that the change process
goes through a series of phases that, in total, usually require a considerable length of time. Skipping
steps creates only the illusion of speed and never
produces a satisfying result. A second very general
John P. Kotter is the Konosuke Matsushita Professor of
Leadership at the Harvard Business School in Boston,
Massachusetts. He is the author of The New Rules: How
to Succeed in Today’s Post-Corporate World (New York:
Free Press, 1995), Corporate Culture and Performance,
coauthored with James L. Heskett (New York: Free Press,
1992), and A Force for Change: How Leadership Differs
from Management (New York: Free Press, 1990).
Copyright © 1995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved.
LEADING CHANGE
lesson is that critical mistakes in any of the phases
can have a devastating impact, slowing momentum
and negating hard-won gains. Perhaps because we
have relatively little experience in renewing organizations, even very capable people often make at
least one big error.
Error #1: Not Establishing a Great
Enough Sense of Urgency
Most successful change efforts begin when some
individuals or some groups start to look hard at a
company’s competitive situation, market position,
technological trends, and financial performance.
They focus on the potential revenue drop when an
important patent expires, the five-year trend in declining margins in a core business, or an emerging
market that everyone seems to be ignoring. They
then find ways to communicate this information
broadly and dramatically, especially with respect to
crises, potential crises, or great opportunities that
are very timely. This first step is essential because
just getting a transformation program started requires the aggressive cooperation of many individuals. Without motivation, people won’t help and the
effort goes nowhere.
Compared with other steps in the change process, phase one can sound easy. It is not. Well
over 50% of the companies I have
watched fail in this first phase. What
are the reasons for that failure?
Sometimes executives underestimate how hard it can be to drive
people out of their comfort zones.
Sometimes they grossly overestimate how successful they have already been in increasing urgency.
Sometimes they lack patience:
“Enough with the preliminaries;
let’s get on with it.” In many cases, executives become paralyzed by the downside possibilities. They
worry that employees with seniority will become
defensive, that morale will drop, that events will
spin out of control, that short-term business results
will be jeopardized, that the stock will sink, and
that they will be blamed for creating a crisis.
A paralyzed senior management often comes
from having too many managers and not enough
leaders. Management’s mandate is to minimize risk
and to keep the current system operating. Change,
by definition, requires creating a new system,
which in turn always demands leadership. Phase
one in a renewal process typically goes nowhere until enough real leaders are promoted or hired into
senior-level jobs.
Transformations often begin, and begin well,
when an organization has a new head who is a good
leader and who sees the need for a major change. If
the renewal target is the entire company, the CEO
is key. If change is needed in a division, the division
general manager is key. When these individuals are
not new leaders, great leaders, or change champions, phase one can be a huge challenge.
Bad business results are both a blessing and a
curse in the first phase. On the positive side, losing
money does catch people’s attention. But it also
gives less maneuvering room. With good business
results, the opposite is true: convincing people of
the need for change is much harder, but you have
more resources to help make changes.
But whether the starting point is good performance or bad, in the more successful cases I have
witnessed, an individual or a group always facilitates a frank discussion of potentially unpleasant
facts: about new competition, shrinking margins,
decreasing market share, flat earnings, a lack of
revenue growth, or other relevant indices of a declining competitive position. Because there seems
to be an almost universal human tendency to shoot
the bearer of bad news, especially if the head of the
organization is not a change champion, executives
in these companies often rely on outsiders to bring
unwanted information. Wall Street analysts, custom-
One chief executive officer
deliberately engineered the
largest accounting loss in the
history of the company.
60
ers, and consultants can all be helpful in this regard. The purpose of all this activity, in the words of
one former CEO of a large European company, is
“to make the status quo seem more dangerous than
launching into the unknown.”
In a few of the most successful cases, a group has
manufactured a crisis. One CEO deliberately engineered the largest accounting loss in the company’s
history, creating huge pressures from Wall Street in
the process. One division president commissioned
first-ever customer-satisfaction surveys, knowing
full well that the results would be terrible. He then
made these findings public. On the surface, such
moves can look unduly risky. But there is also risk
in playing it too safe: when the urgency rate is not
pumped up enough, the transformation process
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
March-April 1995
Eight Steps to Transforming Your Organization
Establishing a Sense of Urgency
Examining market and competitive realities
Identifying and discussing crises, potential crises, or major opportunities
Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition
Assembling a group with enough power to lead the change effort
Encouraging the group to work together as a team
Creating a Vision
Creating a vision to help direct the change effort
Developing strategies for achieving that vision
Communicating the Vision
Using every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategies
Teaching new behaviors by the example of the guiding coalition
Empowering Others to Act on the Vision
Getting rid of obstacles to change
Changing systems or structures that seriously undermine the vision
Encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions
Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins
Planning for visible performance improvements
Creating those improvements
Recognizing and rewarding employees involved in the improvements
Consolidating Improvements and Producing Still More Change
Using increased credibility to change systems, structures, and policies that don’t fit the vision
Hiring, promoting, and developing employees who can implement the vision
Reinvigorating the process with new projects, themes, and change agents
Institutionalizing New Approaches
Articulating the connections between the new behaviors and corporate success
Developing the means to ensure leadership development and succession
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
March-April 1995
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
61
LEADING CHANGE
cannot succeed and the long-term future of the organization is put in jeopardy.
When is the urgency rate high enough? From
what I have seen, the answer is when about 75% of
a company’s management is honestly convinced
that business-as-usual is totally unacceptable. Anything less can produce very serious problems later
on in the process.
Error #2: Not Creating a Powerful
Enough Guiding Coalition
Major renewal programs often start with just one
or two people. In cases of successful transformation
efforts, the leadership coalition grows and grows
over time. But whenever some minimum mass is
not achieved early in the effort, nothing much
worthwhile happens.
It is often said that major change is impossible
unless the head of the organization is an active supporter. What I am talking about goes far beyond
that. In successful transformations, the chairman
or president or division general manager, plus another 5 or 15 or 50 people, come together and develop a shared commitment to excellent performance
through renewal. In my experience, this group never includes all of the company’s most senior executives because some people just won’t buy in, at least
not at first. But in the most successful cases, the
coalition is always pretty powerful – in terms of
titles, information and expertise, reputations and
relationships.
In both small and large organizations, a successful guiding team may consist of only three to five
people during the first year of a renewal effort. But
in big companies, the coalition needs to grow to the
20 to 50 range before much progress can be made in
phase three and beyond. Senior managers always
form the core of the group. But sometimes you find
board members, a representative from a key customer, or even a powerful union leader.
Because the guiding coalition includes members
who are not part of senior management, it tends to
operate outside of the normal hierarchy by definition. This can be awkward, but it is clearly necessary. If the existing hierarchy were working well,
there would be no need for a major transformation.
But since the current system is not working, reform
generally demands activity outside of formal boundaries, expectations, and protocol.
A high sense of urgency within the managerial
ranks helps enormously in putting a guiding coalition together. But more is usually required. Someone needs to get these people together, help them
develop a shared assessment of their company’s
problems and opportunities, and create a minimum
level of trust and communication. Off-site retreats,
for two or three days, are one popular vehicle for accomplishing this task. I have seen many groups of 5
to 35 executives attend a series of these retreats
over a period of months.
Companies that fail in phase two usually underestimate the difficulties of producing change and
thus the importance of a powerful guiding coalition. Sometimes they have no history of teamwork
at the top and therefore undervalue the importance
of this type of coalition. Sometimes they expect the
team to be led by a staff executive from human resources, quality, or strategic planning instead of a
key line manager. No matter how capable or dedicated the staff head, groups without strong line
leadership never achieve the power that is required.
In failed transformations, you often find plenty of plans and programs, but no vision.
62
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
March-April 1995
Efforts that don’t have a powerful enough guiding
coalition can make apparent progress for a while.
But, sooner or later, the opposition gathers itself together and stops the change.
Error #3: Lacking a Vision
In every successful transformation effort that I
have seen, the guiding coalition develops a picture
of the future that is relatively easy to communicate
and appeals to customers, stockholders, and employees. A vision always goes beyond the numbers
that are typically found in five-year plans. A vision
says something that helps clarify the direction in
which an organization needs to move. Sometimes
the first draft comes mostly from a single individual. It is usually a bit blurry, at least initially. But
after the coalition works at it for 3 or 5 or even 12
months, something much better emerges through
their tough analytical thinking and a little dreaming. Eventually, a strategy for achieving that vision
is also developed.
In one midsize European company, the first pass
at a vision contained two-thirds of the basic ideas
that were in the final product. The concept of
global reach was in the initial version
from the beginning. So was the idea
of becoming preeminent in certain
businesses. But one central idea in
the final version – getting out of low
value-added activities – came only
after a series of discussions over a
period of several months.
Without a sensible vision, a transformation effort can easily dissolve into a list of
confusing and incompatible projects that can take
the organization in the wrong direction or nowhere
at all. Without a sound vision, the reengineering
project in the accounting department, the new 360degree performance appraisal from the human resources department, the plant’s quality program,
the cultural change project in the sales force will
not add up in a meaningful way.
In failed transformations, you often find plenty of
plans and directives and programs, but no vision. In
one case, a company gave out four-inch-thick notebooks describing its change effort. In mind-numbing detail, the books spelled out procedures, goals,
methods, and deadlines. But nowhere was there a
clear and compelling statement of where all this
was leading. Not surprisingly, most of the employees with whom I talked were either confused or
alienated. The big, thick books did not rally them
together or inspire change. In fact, they probably
had just the opposite effect.
In a few of the less successful cases that I have
seen, management had a sense of direction, but it
was too complicated or blurry to be useful. Recently, I asked an executive in a midsize company to describe his vision and received in return a barely
comprehensible 30-minute lecture. Buried in his
answer were the basic elements of a sound vision.
But they were buried – deeply.
A useful rule of thumb: if you can’t communicate
the vision to someone in five minutes or less and
get a reaction that signifies both understanding
and interest, you are not yet done with this phase
of the transformation process.
Error #4: Undercommunicating the
Vision by a Factor of Ten
I’ve seen three patterns with respect to communication, all very common. In the first, a group actually does develop a pretty good transformation
vision and then proceeds to communicate it by
holding a single meeting or sending out a single
communication. Having used about .0001% of the
yearly intracompany communication, the group is
startled that few people seem to understand the
A vision says something that
clarifies the direction in which
an organization needs to move.
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
March-April 1995
new approach. In the second pattern, the head of
the organization spends a considerable amount
of time making speeches to employee groups, but
most people still don’t get it (not surprising, since
vision captures only .0005% of the total yearly
communication). In the third pattern, much more
effort goes into newsletters and speeches, but some
very visible senior executives still behave in ways
that are antithetical to the vision. The net result is
that cynicism among the troops goes up, while belief in the communication goes down.
Transformation is impossible unless hundreds or
thousands of people are willing to help, often to the
point of making short-term sacrifices. Employees
will not make sacrifices, even if they are unhappy
with the status quo, unless they believe that useful
change is possible. Without credible communication, and a lot of it, the hearts and minds of the
troops are never captured.
This fourth phase is particularly challenging if
the short-term sacrifices include job losses. Gain63
LEADING CHANGE
ing understanding and support is tough when
downsizing is a part of the vision. For this reason,
successful visions usually include new growth possibilities and the commitment to treat fairly anyone who is laid off.
Executives who communicate well incorporate
messages into their hour-by-hour activities. In a
routine discussion about a business problem, they
talk about how proposed solutions fit (or don’t fit)
into the bigger picture. In a regular performance appraisal, they talk about how the employee’s behavior helps or undermines the vision. In a review of
a division’s quarterly performance, they talk not
only about the numbers but also about how the
division’s executives are contributing to the transformation. In a routine Q&A with employees at
a company facility, they tie their answers back to
renewal goals.
In more successful transformation efforts, executives use all existing communication channels to
broadcast the vision. They turn boring and unread
company newsletters into lively articles about the
vision. They take ritualistic and tedious quarterly
management meetings and turn them into exciting
discussions of the transformation. They throw out
much of the company’s generic management education and replace it with courses that focus on
business problems and the new vision. The guiding
principle is simple: use every possible channel, es-
kept reminding him of the desired behavior, and all
the feedback from his peers and subordinates,
which helped him see when he was not engaging in
that behavior.
Communication comes in both words and deeds,
and the latter are often the most powerful form.
Nothing undermines change more than behavior
by important individuals that is inconsistent with
their words.
Error #5: Not Removing Obstacles to
the New Vision
Successful transformations begin to involve large
numbers of people as the process progresses. Employees are emboldened to try new approaches, to
develop new ideas, and to provide leadership. The
only constraint is that the actions fit within the
broad parameters of the overall vision. The more
people involved, the better the outcome.
To some degree, a guiding coalition empowers
others to take action simply by successfully communicating the new direction. But communication
is never sufficient by itself. Renewal also requires
the removal of obstacles. Too often, an employee
understands the new vision and wants to help make
it happen. But an elephant appears to be blocking
the path. In some cases, the elephant is in the person’s head, and the challenge is to convince the individual that no external obstacle exists. But in most cases, the blockers
are very real.
Sometimes the obstacle is the organizational structure: narrow job
categories can seriously undermine
efforts to increase productivity or
make it very difficult even to think
about customers. Sometimes compensation or performance-appraisal
systems make people choose between the new vision and their own self-interest.
Perhaps worst of all are bosses who refuse to change
and who make demands that are inconsistent with
the overall effort.
One company began its transformation process
with much publicity and actually made good
progress through the fourth phase. Then the change
effort ground to a halt because the officer in charge
of the company’s largest division was allowed to
undermine most of the new initiatives. He paid lip
service to the process but did not change his behavior or encourage his managers to change. He did not
reward the unconventional ideas called for in the
vision. He allowed human resource systems to remain intact even when they were clearly inconsis-
Worst of all are bosses who
refuse to change and who make
demands that are inconsistent
with the overall effort.
pecially those that are being wasted on nonessential information.
Perhaps even more important, most of the executives I have known in successful cases of major
change learn to “walk the talk.” They consciously
attempt to become a living symbol of the new corporate culture. This is often not easy. A 60-year-old
plant manager who has spent precious little time
over 40 years thinking about customers will not
suddenly behave in a customer-oriented way. But
I have witnessed just such a person change, and
change a great deal. In that case, a high level of urgency helped. The fact that the man was a part of
the guiding coalition and the vision-creation team
also helped. So did all the communication, which
64
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
March-April 1995
Too often, an employee understands the new vision and wants to help make it happen.
But something appears to be blocking the path.
tent with the new ideals. I think the officer’s motives were complex. To some degree, he did not believe the company needed major change. To some
degree, he felt personally threatened by all the
change. To some degree, he was afraid that he could
not produce both change and the expected operating profit. But despite the fact that they backed
the renewal effort, the other officers did virtually
nothing to stop the one blocker. Again, the reasons
were complex. The company had no history of
confronting problems like this. Some people were
afraid of the officer. The CEO was concerned that
he might lose a talented executive. The net result
was disastrous. Lower level managers concluded
that senior management had lied to them about
their commitment to renewal, cynicism grew, and
the whole effort collapsed.
In the first half of a transformation, no organization has the momentum, power, or time to get rid of
all obstacles. But the big ones must be confronted
and removed. If the blocker is a person, it is important that he or she be treated fairly and in a way that
is consistent with the new vision. But action is essential, both to empower others and to maintain
the credibility of the change effort as a whole.
Error #6: Not Systematically Planning
For and Creating Short-Term Wins
Real transformation takes time, and a renewal effort risks losing momentum if there are no shortterm goals to meet and celebrate. Most people
won’t go on the long march unless they see compelling evidence within 12 to 24 months that the
journey is producing expected results. Without
short-term wins, too many people give up or activeHARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
March-April 1995
ly join the ranks of those people who have been resisting change.
One to two years into a successful transformation effort, you find quality beginning to go up on
certain indices or the decline in net income stopping. You find some successful new product introductions or an upward shift in market share. You
find an impressive productivity improvement or
a statistically higher customer-satisfaction rating.
But whatever the case, the win is unambiguous.
The result is not just a judgment call that can be
discounted by those opposing change.
Creating short-term wins is different from hoping for short-term wins. The latter is passive, the
former active. In a successful transformation, managers actively look for ways to obtain clear performance improvements, establish goals in the yearly
planning system, achieve the objectives, and reward the people involved with recognition, promotions, and even money. For example, the guiding
coalition at a U.S. manufacturing company produced a highly visible and successful new product
introduction about 20 months after the start of its
renewal effort. The new product was selected about
six months into the effort because it met multiple
criteria: it could be designed and launched in a relatively short period; it could be handled by a small
team of people who were devoted to the new vision;
it had upside potential; and the new product-development team could operate outside the established
departmental structure without practical problems.
Little was left to chance, and the win boosted the
credibility of the renewal process.
Managers often complain about being forced to
produce short-term wins, but I’ve found that pressure can be a useful element in a change effort.
65
When it becomes clear to people that major change
will take a long time, urgency levels can drop.
Commitments to produce short-term wins help
keep the urgency level up and force detailed analytical thinking that can clarify or revise visions.
Error #7: Declaring Victory Too Soon
While celebrating a win is fine, declaring the war won
can be catastrophic.
66
After a few years of hard work, managers may be
tempted to declare victory with the first clear performance improvement. While celebrating a win is
fine, declaring the war won can be catastrophic.
Until changes sink deeply into a company’s culture, a process that can take five to ten years, new
approaches are fragile and subject to regression.
In the recent past, I have watched a dozen change
efforts operate under the reengineering theme. In
all but two cases, victory was declared and the expensive consultants were paid and thanked when
the first major project was completed after two to
three years. Within two more years, the useful
changes that had been introduced slowly disappeared. In two of the ten cases, it’s hard to find any
trace of the reengineering work today.
Over the past 20 years, I’ve seen the same sort
of thing happen to huge quality projects, organizational development efforts, and more. Typically,
the problems start early in the process: the urgency
level is not intense enough, the guiding coalition is
not powerful enough, and the vision is not clear
enough. But it is the premature victory celebration that kills momentum. And then the powerful
forces associated with tradition take over.
Ironically, it is often a combination of change
initiators and change resistors that creates the premature victory celebration. In their enthusiasm over
a clear sign of progress, the initiators go overboard.
They are then joined by resistors, who are quick to
spot any opportunity to stop change. After the celebration is over, the resistors point to the victory as
a sign that the war has been won and the troops
should be sent home. Weary troops allow themselves to be convinced that they won. Once home,
the foot soldiers are reluctant to climb back on the
ships. Soon thereafter, change comes to a halt, and
tradition creeps back in.
Instead of declaring victory, leaders of successful
efforts use the credibility afforded by short-term
wins to tackle even bigger problems. They go after
systems and structures that are not consistent with
the transformation vision and have not been confronted before. They pay great attention to who is
promoted, who is hired, and how people are developed. They include new reengineering projects that
are even bigger in scope than the initial ones. They
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
March-April 1995
LEADING CHANGE
understand that renewal efforts take not months
but years. In fact, in one of the most successful
transformations that I have ever seen, we quantified the amount of change that occurred each year
over a seven-year period. On a scale of one (low) to
ten (high), year one received a two, year two a four,
year three a three, year four a seven, year five an
eight, year six a four, and year seven a two. The
peak came in year five, fully 36 months after the
first set of visible wins.
Error #8: Not Anchoring Changes
in the Corporation’s Culture
In the final analysis, change sticks when it becomes “the way we do things around here,” when it
seeps into the bloodstream of the corporate body.
Until new behaviors are rooted in social norms and
shared values, they are subject to degradation as
soon as the pressure for change is removed.
Two factors are particularly important in institutionalizing change in corporate culture. The first is
a conscious attempt to show people how the new
approaches, behaviors, and attitudes have helped
improve performance. When people are left on their
own to make the connections, they sometimes create very inaccurate links. For example, because results improved while charismatic Harry was boss,
the troops link his mostly idiosyncratic style with
those results instead of seeing how their own improved customer service and productivity were instrumental. Helping people see the right connections requires communication. Indeed, one company
was relentless, and it paid off enormously. Time
was spent at every major management meeting
to discuss why performance was increasing. The
company newspaper ran article after article showing how changes had boosted earnings.
The second factor is taking sufficient time to
make sure that the next generation of top management really does personify the new approach. If the
requirements for promotion don’t change, renewal
rarely lasts. One bad succession decision at the top
of an organization can undermine a decade of hard
work. Poor succession decisions are possible when
boards of directors are not an integral part of the renewal effort. In at least three instances I have seen,
the champion for change was the retiring executive, and although his successor was not a resistor,
he was not a change champion. Because the boards
did not understand the transformations in any detail, they could not see that their choices were not
good fits. The retiring executive in one case tried
unsuccessfully to talk his board into a less seasoned
candidate who better personified the transformation. In the other two cases, the CEOs did not resist
the boards’ choices, because they felt the transformation could not be undone by their successors.
They were wrong. Within two years, signs of renewal began to disappear at both companies.
There are still more mistakes that people make,
but these eight are the big ones. I realize that in a
short article everything is made to sound a bit too
simplistic. In reality, even successful change efforts
are messy and full of surprises. But just as a relatively simple vision is needed to guide people through a
major change, so a vision of the change process can
reduce the error rate. And fewer errors can spell the
difference between success and failure.
Reprint 95204
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1995
67
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Managing Organizational Change
By Michael W. Durant, CCE, CPA
The increased pace of change that many of us have encountered over the past ten years
has been dramatic. During the late 1980s, many of us were grappling with issues that we
had never encountered. The accelerated use of leverage as a means of increasing
shareholder wealth left the balance sheet of some of America’s finest organizations in
disarray. Many of our largest customers, that for years represented minimal risk and
required a minimum amount of time to manage, consumed most of our energy. By the end
of 1993, many of these organizations had either resolved their financial troubles in
bankruptcy court or no longer existed.
Just as we began to think the external environment would settle down and our
professional lives would return to a normal pace, many of our organizations initiated
efforts to improve operating efficiency to become more competitive in the world
marketplace.
Competition has heated up across the board. To succeed, the organization of the future
must serve customers better, create new advantages and survive in bitterly contested
markets. To stay competitive, companies must do away with work and processes that
don’t add value.
This hypercompetition has invalidated the basic assumptions of sustainable markets.
There are few companies that have escaped this shift in competitiveness. Entry barriers,
which once exerted a stabilizing force on competition, have fallen in the face of the rapid
changes of the information age. These forces have challenged our capacity to cope with
organizational life.
Permanent White Water
Things are not going to settle down. Many things we used to take for granted are
probably gone forever. We cannot predict with any certainty what tomorrow will be like,
except to say that it will be different than today.
Peter Vaill has captured the essence of the problem of a continuously changing context in
a compelling image - “permanent white water.” In the past, many of us believed that by
using the means that were under our control we could pretty much accomplish anything
we set out to do. Sure, from time to time there would be temporary disruptions. But the
disruptions were only temporary, and things always settled back down. The mental image
generated by these thoughts is that of a canoe trip on a calm, still lake.
However, Vaill explains, in today’s environment, we never get out of the rapids. As soon
as we digest one change, another one comes along. Usually there are many changes
occurring simultaneously. We have limited control over the environment, but to navigate
the rapids we must exercise skill. The “permanent white water” image has a strong visual
appeal, conveying as it does a sense of energy and providing a visual sense of navigating
on an unpredictable wild river.
Creating the Vision
Vision and leadership drive successful change. As the change agent, first you must create a
vision of the future that is capable of focusing the group’s energy. The vision should
contrast what is with what can be and it must be comprehensive enough to direct
attention at how to bridge the gap to the future.
Change must become a core organizational value using customer feedback, internally
developed organizational improvements and other external feedback. Change initiatives
should also be linked to efforts to improve overall performance and profitability.
Commitment from senior management at the earliest stages of the change process is
required. Managing change effectively requires an understanding of the variables at play,
and adequate time must be allowed for implementation.
Three Stages of Change
To thrive in the chaotic world we live in, we must embrace strategies that have been
developed to successfully manage change. The theory and practice of organizational
change contains elements of both behaviorist and cognitive learning theories. An
investigation into change within an organizational setting reveals a three-stage process of
unfreezing, change and refreezing.
Unfreezing is the first stage of the change process and consist of unlearning past behavior.
The change process begins when the organization experiences disconfirmation.
Disconfirmation is experienced in the form of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance
is a concept taken from the field of psychology that refers to incompatibility between
two or more attitudes or between behavior and attitudes. Inconsistencies from the desired
state are uncomfortable and we try to reduce the dissonance and thus the discomfort.
Disconfirmation may be caused by external pressures or convincing data from within the
organization. An external example might occur due to pressure applied to senior
management by shareholders to increase the return on their investment. Dissonance may
be generated by internal benchmarking research that reveals areas in the organization that
require attention. If the factors creating the dissonance are relatively important the
pressure to correct the imbalance will be high.
Once a potential problem surfaces an information search begins to determine what action
is required to resolve the issue. If a problem exists, creative solutions are developed.
Support for unlearning develops when existing systems are challenged. Unfreezing
involves dismantling past learning.
The second stage of the change process consist of incorporating new behaviors into
organizational processes. Behavior and ideas that are embedded in the corporate culture
must be replaced. Redirecting people’s attention is an essential part of change. The
development of skills to enable people to do things differently is required. Training must
be provided to insure that employees understand their roles in making change happen.
Processes and people must be aligned to support change. Skills and competencies to
enable people to do things differently must be developed. Employees must understand
the dynamics of the change process and also the functional requirements of the job.
New rules and policies that reinforce the desired ways of operating must be created and
documented. Old customs and norms that reinforce the old ways of doing things must be
replaced with norms that reinforce the new ways. For example, if the organization is
developing teams and moving away from functional departments, then team work across
departmental boundaries should be emphasized. Rewards should be specific to the change
goals that have been set.
Refreezing is the final stage of the change process. It is comprised of reinforcing and
measuring behavior change. After the training requirements are defined, the reward
system, reporting relationships and other systems can be designed to reinforce the new
behavior.
If the change process requires certain behaviors from employees, then performance
appraisals, promotions and bonuses should be based on the desired performance
outcomes. Creating objective measures for performance will demonstrate your
commitment to the change initiative.
Emotional Phases of Change
Organizational change has an element of loss inherent in the process, and it is a loss that is
often deeply felt by employees. The Kubler - Ross Grief Model addresses the emotional
issues associated with change. The four emotional states experienced throughout the
change process may be expressed by employees in behaviors that are obstacles to the
process of change. By understanding the emotions employees often encounter during
change, you will be better prepared to facilitate the change process.
Kubler - Ross Grief Model
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
Denial
Resistance
Exploration
Commitment
The first emotional state experienced during change is denial. For example, employees
encountering a change initiative might be saying to themselves, “I can’t believe this is
happening to us.” Unresolved fears about the change initiative need to be addressed during
this phase. Fear and mistrust need to be replaced by acceptance. To be an effective change
agent, you should encourage acceptance to change by initiating trust-building activities.
The second emotional state is resistance to the change process. It is common for
employees to begin to resist the change initiative. During this phase, employees attempt
to slow down or derail the change initiative. You must be able to spot resistance when it
occurs and formulate sound strategies for overcoming it.
Resistance is a natural reaction to change, and it can take many forms. The easiest form of
resistance to recognize is those who loudly indicate their dissatisfaction with the changes
taking place in the organization. Soliciting feedback from these individuals lets you know
where they stand, so that you can overcome their objectives.
Employees often resist change through denial. These individuals refuse to acknowledge
that a problem exists. For example, competition might force a business to organize work
around processes to improve operating efficiencies. Functional departments involved in
these processes would be combined. Employees might not see a need for this change. The
reasons for change must be fully explained so that employees understand why it is
necessary to embrace the change.
Another common resistance is exhibited by individuals who willingly embrace the change,
but when they realize that it takes additional time and effort, they begin to undermine the
change process. It is best to slow down and allow people to absorb change gradually
before forging ahead.
Sometimes employees use confusion to postpone change. After explaining the changes
repeatedly, employees ask the same questions over and over again. They may truly be
confused or they may be using confusion as a form of resistance to avoid accepting
change.
The most dangerous form of resistance is referred to as malicious compliance. Employees
enthusiastically support change, but covertly undermine the effort. For example, during
presentations, the questions are polite and employees seem accepting. As you move
forward they act as though they are implementing the new program. Months later you
find out nothing has changed.
How we respond to resistance is very important. Forcing compliance may increase
resistance. Th...