Creating an Audit Plan

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Week 3 Worksheet 2: Creating an Audit Plan Course Learning Outcome(s) • Develop IT compliance audit plans. . When establishing an audit program, the auditing committee or auditor will select those items or controls, within an organization’s IT infrastructure that will be audited. Referring back to NIST SP 800-53 and NIST SP 800-53A, controls are selected and those items which need to be reviewed are selected. Enterprises provide services to their customers in the forms of operating systems, applications, hardware, Internet, VoIP and security. These services are provided through internal hardware you would find in a server room such as an application server, data storage, web servers, email servers, call-managers, firewalls, and security appliances that provide network based security and monitoring. Often, there are services that are provided to an enterprise by a third party vendor or other organization such as SaaS, cloud based storage, telephony, security, web hosting, connectivity, routing and switching. Though these services are not inherent to the enterprise, there are still controls that are auditab le. When developing an audit plan, we first have to identify those items that are to be audited. Each audit looks at controls that are derived from internal and external sources. Items or controls that are internal to the enterprise are known as internal controls. These are controls that are implemented and managed locally within the organization and the enterprise. Often, services are provided by outside vendors or third parties. Compliance is usually managed through the use of service level agreements (SLA). An SLA is a contractual agreement that the vendor or third party will adhere to a predefined set of requirements. These requirements should fall within the organizations compliance requirements. The services an organization receives from an external agency are known as inherited controls. A key component in developing an audit plan is to identify those controls that are internal and inherited to an organization. As an auditor, you are responsible to ensure those controls that are both internal and inherited are within compliance of accrediting the system. Those items not meeting SLA requirements that may or may not be injecting any level of risk into accreditation should be reported to the client or contracting official within your organization. An audit plan consists of various components as you have learned in your reading and lessons. A fundamental document that is the foundation of any audit is to clearly define what it is that’s going to be audited. When that’s know, the auditor can review those items to determine which controls are internal and which are inherited so that the right resources can be assigned to validating those controls. Review the following scenario and determine if the control is internal or inherited; XYZ Corporation has retained you to audit their enterprise and validate their compliance requirements. XYZ Corporation has a staff of 200 employees and an IT staff of three personnel. Internal to XYZ Corp, the organization has a server room which houses network storage for proprietary data, an application server to manage applications and licenses, a web server which hosts the company’s internal and external websites, hardware firewalls and security appliances to manage and protect inbound and outbound services. The organization has contracted Python LLC to provide email, VoIP, SaaS and cloud storage services for non-proprietary data for XYZ Corp. Based on the scenario above, determine whether the following controls are internal or inherited. Control Name Use of External Control AC-21(1).1 Assessment Objective Determine if the information system Internal / Inherited Information Systems Content of Audit Records AU-3(2).1 Information Systems Connections CA-3.1 Incident Monitoring IR-5(1) employs automated mechanisms to enable authorized users to make information-sharing decisions based on access authorizations of sharing partners and access restrictions on information to be shared. Determine if: the organization defines the information system components for which the content of audit records generated is centrally managed; and the organization centrally manages the content of audit records generated by organization-defined information system components. Determine if the organization identifies connections to external information systems (i.e., information systems outside of the authorization boundary); the organization authorizes connections from the information system to external information systems through the use of Interconnection Security Agreements; the organization documents, for each connection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, and the nature of the information communicated; and the organization monitors the information system connections on an ongoing basis to verify enforcement of security requirements. Determine if the organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the tracking of security incidents; the organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the collection of security incident information; and the organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the analysis of security incident information. The audit and auditor are also auditable and considered a control within the NIST framework. Referring to the NIST SP-53 and 53A, Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures, explain what the assessment objective is based on the control number it’s associated to: Control Number: Description: When an auditor develops an audit plan, the size or scope of the audit must be defined so that redundant audits are avoided and that time can be applied to those controls within the domains that are needed. In the chart below, list the seven domains that are auditable: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Archived NIST Technical Series Publication The attached publication has been archived (withdrawn), and is provided solely for historical purposes. It may have been superseded by another publication (indicated below). Archived Publication Series/Number: Title: NIST Special Publication 800-53A Revision 1 Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations: Building Effective Security Assessment Plans Publication Date(s): June 2010 Withdrawal Date: December 11, 2015 Withdrawal Note: SP 800-53A Rev. 1 is withdrawn one year after the publication of SP 800-53A Rev. 4 (December 2014), and is superseded in its entirety. Superseding Publication(s) The attached publication has been superseded by the following publication(s): Series/Number: Title: Author(s): NIST Special Publication 800-53A Revision 4 Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations: Building Effective Assessment Plans Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Publication Date(s): December 2014 URL/DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53Ar4 Additional Information (if applicable) Contact: Latest revision of the Computer Security Division (Information Technology Laboratory) SP 800-53A Rev. 4, updated 12-18-2014 (as of December 11, 2015) attached publication: Related information: Withdrawal announcement (link): http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/assessment.html N/A Date updated: December 11, 2015 NIST Special Publication 800-53A Revision 1 Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations Building Effective Security Assessment Plans JOINT TASK FORCE TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE INFORMATION SECURITY Consistent with NIST SP 800-53, Revision 3 Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 June 2010 U.S. Department of Commerce Gary Locke, Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology Patrick D. Gallagher, Director Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ Reports on Computer Systems Technology The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. PAGE ii Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ Authority This publication has been developed by NIST to further its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), Public Law (P.L.) 107-347. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Section 8b(3), Securing Agency Information Systems, as analyzed in Circular A-130, Appendix IV: Analysis of Key Sections. Supplemental information is provided in Circular A-130, Appendix III, Security of Federal Automated Information Resources. Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST. NIST Special Publication 800-53A, Revision 1, 399 pages (June 2010) Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. All NIST publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications. Comments on this publication may be submitted to: National Institute of Standards and Technology Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory 100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 Electronic mail: sec-cert@nist.gov PAGE iii Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ Compliance with NIST Standards and Guidelines In accordance with the provisions of FISMA,1 the Secretary of Commerce shall, on the basis of standards and guidelines developed by NIST, prescribe standards and guidelines pertaining to federal information systems. The Secretary shall make standards compulsory and binding to the extent determined necessary by the Secretary to improve the efficiency of operation or security of federal information systems. Standards prescribed shall include information security standards that provide minimum information security requirements and are otherwise necessary to improve the security of federal information and information systems. • Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) are approved by the Secretary of Commerce and issued by NIST in accordance with FISMA. FIPS are compulsory and binding for federal agencies.2 FISMA requires that federal agencies comply with these standards, and therefore, agencies may not waive their use. • Special Publications (SPs) are developed and issued by NIST as recommendations and guidance documents. For other than national security programs and systems, federal agencies must follow those NIST Special Publications mandated in a Federal Information Processing Standard. FIPS 200 mandates the use of Special Publication 800-53, as amended. In addition, OMB policies (including OMB Reporting Instructions for FISMA and Agency Privacy Management) state that for other than national security programs and systems, federal agencies must follow certain specific NIST Special Publications.3 • Other security-related publications, including interagency reports (NISTIRs) and ITL Bulletins, provide technical and other information about NIST's activities. These publications are mandatory only when specified by OMB. • Compliance schedules for NIST security standards and guidelines are established by OMB in policies, directives, or memoranda (e.g., annual FISMA Reporting Guidance).4 1 The E-Government Act (P.L. 107-347) recognizes the importance of information security to the economic and national security interests of the United States. Title III of the E-Government Act, entitled the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), emphasizes the need for organizations to develop, document, and implement an organization-wide program to provide security for the information systems that support its operations and assets. 2 The term agency is used in this publication in lieu of the more general term organization only in those circumstances where its usage is directly related to other source documents such as federal legislation or policy. 3 While federal agencies are required to follow certain specific NIST Special Publications in accordance with OMB policy, there is flexibility in how agencies apply the guidance. Federal agencies apply the security concepts and principles articulated in the NIST Special Publications in accordance with and in the context of the agency’s missions, business functions, and environment of operation. Consequently, the application of NIST guidance by federal agencies can result in different security solutions that are equally acceptable, compliant with the guidance, and meet the OMB definition of adequate security for federal information systems. Given the high priority of information sharing and transparency within the federal government, agencies also consider reciprocity in developing their information security solutions. When assessing federal agency compliance with NIST Special Publications, Inspectors General, evaluators, auditors, and assessors consider the intent of the security concepts and principles articulated within the specific guidance document and how the agency applied the guidance in the context of its mission/business responsibilities, operational environment, and unique organizational conditions. 4 Unless otherwise stated, all references to NIST publications in this document (i.e., Federal Information Processing Standards and Special Publications) are to the most recent version of the publication. PAGE iv Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ Acknowledgements This publication was developed by the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency Working Group with representatives from the Civil, Defense, and Intelligence Communities in an ongoing effort to produce a unified information security framework for the federal government. The National Institute of Standards and Technology wishes to acknowledge and thank the senior leaders from the Departments of Commerce and Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Committee on National Security Systems, and the members of the interagency technical working group whose dedicated efforts contributed significantly to the publication. The senior leaders, interagency working group members, and their organizational affiliations include: U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Director of National Intelligence Cheryl J. Roby Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer Honorable Priscilla Guthrie Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer Gus Guissanie Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber, Identity, and Information Assurance Sherrill Nicely Deputy Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer Dominic Cussatt Senior Policy Advisor Mark J. Morrison Deputy Associate Director of National Intelligence for IC Information Assurance Roger Caslow Lead, C&A Transformation National Institute of Standards and Technology Committee on National Security Systems Cita M. Furlani Director, Information Technology Laboratory Dave Wennergren Acting Chair, CNSS William C. Barker Cyber Security Advisor, Information Technology Laboratory Eustace D. King CNSS Subcommittee Co-Chair (DoD) Donna Dodson Chief, Computer Security Division Peter Gouldmann CNSS Subcommittee Co-Chair (DoS) Ron Ross FISMA Implementation Project Leader Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency Working Group Ron Ross NIST, JTF Leader Gary Stoneburner Johns Hopkins APL Terry Sherald Department of Defense Kelley Dempsey NIST Patricia Toth NIST Esten Porter The MITRE Corporation Peter Gouldmann Department of State Arnold Johnson NIST Bennett Hodge Booz Allen Hamilton Karen Quigg The MITRE Corporation Jonathan Chiu Booz Allen Hamilton Christian Enloe NIST In addition to the above acknowledgments, a special note of thanks goes to Peggy Himes and Elizabeth Lennon of NIST for their superb technical editing and administrative support. The authors also wish to recognize Jennifer Fabius Greene, James Govekar, Terrance Hazelwood, Austin Hershey, Laurie Hestor, Jason Mackanick, Timothy Potter, Jennifer Puma, Matthew Scholl, Julie Trei, Gail Tryon, Ricki Vanetesse, Cynthia Whitmer, and Peter Williams for their exceptional contributions in helping to improve the content of the publication. And finally, the authors gratefully acknowledge and appreciate the significant contributions from individuals and organizations in the public and private sectors, nationally and internationally, whose thoughtful and constructive comments improved the overall quality and usefulness of this publication. PAGE v Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ DEVELOPING COMMON INFORMATION SECURITY FOUNDATIONS COLLABORATION AMONG PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES In developing standards and guidelines required by FISMA, NIST consults with other federal agencies and offices as well as the private sector to improve information security, avoid unnecessary and costly duplication of effort, and ensure that NIST publications are complementary with the standards and guidelines employed for the protection of national security systems. In addition to its comprehensive public review and vetting process, NIST is collaborating with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) to establish a common foundation for information security across the federal government. A common foundation for information security will provide the Intelligence, Defense, and Civil sectors of the federal government and their contractors, more uniform and consistent ways to manage the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation that results from the operation and use of information systems. A common foundation for information security will also provide a strong basis for reciprocal acceptance of security authorization decisions and facilitate information sharing. NIST is also working with public and private sector entities to establish specific mappings and relationships between the security standards and guidelines developed by NIST and the International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 27001, Information Security Management System (ISMS). PAGE vi Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY .................................................................................................. TARGET AUDIENCE.................................................................................................................. RELATED PUBLICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT PROCESSES ........................................................... ORGANIZATION OF THIS SPECIAL PUBLICATION .......................................................................... 1 3 4 5 CHAPTER TWO THE FUNDAMENTALS ................................................................................... 6 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 ASSESSMENTS WITHIN THE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE ................................................. STRATEGY FOR CONDUCTING SECURITY CONTROL ASSESSMENTS ............................................. BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE ASSURANCE CASE .............................................................................. ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES .................................................................................................... 6 7 8 9 CHAPTER THREE THE PROCESS........................................................................................ 13 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 PREPARING FOR SECURITY CONTROL ASSESSMENTS .............................................................. DEVELOPING SECURITY ASSESSMENT PLANS .......................................................................... CONDUCTING SECURITY CONTROL ASSESSMENTS .................................................................. ANALYZING SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT RESULTS............................................................ 13 15 22 24 APPENDIX A REFERENCES.............................................................................................. A-1 ................................................................................................. B-1 ACRONYMS ................................................................................................. C-1 ASSESSMENT METHOD DESCRIPTIONS ......................................................... D-1 PENETRATION TESTING ............................................................................... E-1 ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE CATALOG ............................................................F-1 SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORTS ............................................................... G-1 ASSESSMENT CASES ................................................................................... H-1 APPENDIX B GLOSSARY APPENDIX C APPENDIX D APPENDIX E APPENDIX F APPENDIX G APPENDIX H PAGE vii Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ Prologue “…Through the process of risk management, leaders must consider risk to U.S. interests from adversaries using cyberspace to their advantage and from our own efforts to employ the global nature of cyberspace to achieve objectives in military, intelligence, and business operations… “ “…For operational plans development, the combination of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts must be evaluated in order to identify important trends and decide where effort should be applied to eliminate or reduce threat capabilities; eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities; and assess, coordinate, and deconflict all cyberspace operations…” “…Leaders at all levels are accountable for ensuring readiness and security to the same degree as in any other domain…" -- THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PAGE viii Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ Preface Security control assessments are not about checklists, simple pass-fail results, or generating paperwork to pass inspections or audits—rather, security controls assessments are the principal vehicle used to verify that the implementers and operators of information systems are meeting their stated security goals and objectives. Special Publication 800-53A, Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations, is written to facilitate security control assessments conducted within an effective risk management framework. The assessment results provide organizational officials with: • Evidence about the effectiveness of security controls in organizational information systems; • An indication of the quality of the risk management processes employed within the organization; and • Information about the strengths and weaknesses of information systems which are supporting organizational missions and business functions in a global environment of sophisticated and changing threats. The findings produced by assessors are used to determine the overall effectiveness of the security controls associated with an information system (including system-specific, common, and hybrid controls) and to provide credible and meaningful inputs to the organization’s risk management process. A well-executed assessment helps to: (i) determine the validity of the security controls contained in the security plan and subsequently employed in the information system and its environment of operation; and (ii) facilitate a cost-effective approach to correcting weaknesses or deficiencies in the system in an orderly and disciplined manner consistent with organizational mission/business needs. Special Publication 800-53A is a companion guideline to Special Publication 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Each publication provides guidance for implementing specific steps in the Risk Management Framework (RMF).5 Special Publication 800-53 covers Step 2 in the RMF, security control selection (i.e., determining what security controls are needed to manage risks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation). Special Publication 80053A covers RMF Step 4, security control assessment, and RMF Step 6, continuous monitoring, and provides guidance on the security assessment process. This guidance includes how to build effective security assessment plans and how to analyze and manage assessment results. Special Publication 800-53A allows organizations to tailor and supplement the basic assessment procedures provided. The concepts of tailoring and supplementation used in this document are similar to the concepts described in Special Publication 800-53. Tailoring involves scoping the assessment procedures to more closely match the characteristics of the information system and its environment of operation. The tailoring process gives organizations the flexibility needed to avoid assessment approaches that are unnecessarily complex or costly while simultaneously meeting the assessment requirements established by applying the fundamental concepts in the RMF. Supplementation involves adding assessment procedures or assessment details to adequately meet the risk management needs of the organization (e.g., adding organizationspecific details such as system/platform-specific information for selected security controls). Supplementation decisions are left to the discretion of the organization in order to maximize 5 Special Publication 800-37 provides guidance on applying the RMF to federal information systems. PAGE ix Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ flexibility in developing security assessment plans when applying the results of risk assessments in determining the extent, rigor, and level of intensity of the assessments. While flexibility continues to be an important factor in developing security assessment plans, consistency of assessments is also an important consideration. A major design objective for Special Publication 800-53A is to provide an assessment framework and initial starting point for assessment procedures that are essential for achieving such consistency. In addition to the assessment framework and initial starting point for assessment procedures, NIST initiated an Assessment Case Development Project.6 The purpose of the project is fourfold: (i) to actively engage experienced assessors from multiple organizations in the development of a representative set of assessment cases corresponding to the assessment procedures in Special Publication 80053A; (ii) to provide organizations and the assessors supporting those organizations with an exemplary set of assessment cases for each assessment procedure in the catalog of procedures in this publication; (iii) to provide a vehicle for ongoing community-wide review of the assessment cases to promote continuous improvement in the assessment process for more consistent, costeffective security assessments of federal information systems; and (iv) to serve as a basis for reciprocity among various communities of interest. The Assessment Case Development Project is described in Appendix H. In addition to the assessment case project supporting this publication, NIST also initiated the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) 7 project that supports and complements the approach for achieving consistent, cost-effective security control assessments. The primary purpose of the SCAP is to improve the automated application, verification, and reporting of information technology product-specific security configuration settings, enabling organizations to identify and reduce the vulnerabilities associated with products that are not configured properly. As part of this initiative, an Open Checklist Interactive Language (OCIL)8 provides the capability to express the determination statements in the assessment procedures in Appendix F in a framework that will establish interoperability with the validated tool sets supporting SCAP. 6 An assessment case represents a worked example of an assessment procedure that provides specific actions that an assessor might carry out during the assessment of a security control or control enhancement in an information system. 7 Special Publication 800-126 provides guidance on the technical specification of the SCAP. Additional details on the SCAP initiative, as well as freely available SCAP reference data, can be found at http://nvd.nist.gov. 8 OCIL is a framework for expressing security checks that cannot be evaluated without some human interaction or feedback. It is used to determine the state of a system by presenting one or more questionnaires to its intended users. The language includes constructs for questions, instructions for guiding users towards an answer, responses to questions, artifacts, and evaluation results. PAGE x Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ CAUTIONARY NOTES Organizations should carefully consider the potential impacts of employing the assessment procedures defined in this Special Publication when assessing the security controls in operational information systems. Certain assessment procedures, particularly those procedures that directly impact the operation of hardware, software, or firmware components of an information system, may inadvertently affect the routine processing, transmission, or storage of information supporting organizational missions or business functions. For example, a critical information system component may be taken offline for assessment purposes or a component may suffer a fault or failure during the assessment process. Organizations should also take necessary precautions during security assessment periods to ensure that organizational missions and business functions continue to be supported by the information system and that any potential impacts to operational effectiveness resulting from the assessment are considered in advance. PAGE xi Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION THE NEED TO ASSESS SECURITY CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS T oday’s information systems9 are complex assemblages of technology (i.e., hardware, software, and firmware), processes, and people, working together to provide organizations with the capability to process, store, and transmit information in a timely manner to support various missions and business functions. The degree to which organizations have come to depend upon these information systems to conduct routine, important, and critical missions and business functions means that the protection of the underlying systems is paramount to the success of the organization. The selection of appropriate security controls for an information system is an important task that can have major implications on the operations and assets of an organization as well as the welfare of individuals.10 Security controls are the management, operational, and technical safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information system to protect the confidentiality, integrity (including non-repudiation and authenticity), and availability of the system and its information. Once employed within an information system, security controls are assessed to provide the information necessary to determine their overall effectiveness; that is, the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for the system. Understanding the overall effectiveness of the security controls implemented in the information system and its environment of operation is essential in determining the risk to the organization’s operations and assets, to individuals, to other organizations, and to the Nation resulting from the use of the system. 1.1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY The purpose of this publication is to provide guidelines for building effective security assessment plans and a comprehensive set of procedures for assessing the effectiveness of security controls employed in information systems supporting the executive agencies of the federal government. The guidelines apply to the security controls defined in Special Publication 800-53 (as amended), Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. The guidelines have been developed to help achieve more secure information systems within the federal government by: • Enabling more consistent, comparable, and repeatable assessments of security controls with reproducible results; • Facilitating more cost-effective assessments of security controls contributing to the determination of overall control effectiveness; • Promoting a better understanding of the risks to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the operation and use of federal information systems; and 9 An information system is a discrete set of information resources organized expressly for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information. 10 When selecting security controls for an information system, the organization also considers potential impacts to other organizations and, in accordance with the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, potential national-level impacts. CHAPTER 1 PAGE 1 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ • Creating more complete, reliable, and trustworthy information for organizational officials to support risk management decisions, reciprocity of assessment results, information sharing, and FISMA compliance. This publication satisfies the requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and meets or exceeds the information security requirements established for executive agencies11 by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in Circular A-130, Appendix III, Security of Federal Automated Information Resources. The guidelines in this publication are applicable to all federal information systems other than those systems designated as national security systems as defined in 44 U.S.C., Section 3542. The guidelines have been broadly developed from a technical perspective to complement similar guidelines for national security systems and may be used for such systems with the approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. State, local, and tribal governments, as well as private sector organizations are encouraged to consider using these guidelines, as appropriate.12 Organizations use this publication in conjunction with an approved security plan in developing a viable security assessment plan for producing and compiling the information necessary to determine the effectiveness of the security controls employed in the information system. This publication has been developed with the intention of enabling organizations to tailor and supplement the basic assessment procedures provided. The assessment procedures are used as a starting point for and as input to the security assessment plan. In developing effective security assessment plans, organizations take into consideration existing information about the security controls to be assessed (e.g., results from organizational assessments of risk, platform-specific dependencies in the hardware, software, or firmware, and any assessment procedures needed as a result of organization-specific controls not included in Special Publication 800-53).13 The selection of appropriate assessment procedures and the rigor, intensity, and scope of the assessment depend on three factors: • The security categorization of the information system;14 • The assurance requirements that the organization intends to meet in determining the overall effectiveness of the security controls; and 11 An executive agency is: (i) an executive department specified in 5 U.S.C., Section 101; (ii) a military department specified in 5 U.S.C., Section 102; (iii) an independent establishment as defined in 5 U.S.C., Section 104(1); and (iv) a wholly owned government corporation fully subject to the provisions of 31 U.S.C., Chapter 91. In this publication, the term executive agency is synonymous with the term federal agency. 12 In accordance with the provisions of FISMA and OMB policy, whenever the interconnection of federal information systems to information systems operated by state/local/tribal governments, contractors, or grantees involves the processing, storage, or transmission of federal information, the information security standards and guidelines described in this publication apply. Specific information security requirements and the terms and conditions of the system interconnections, are expressed in the Memorandums of Understanding and Interconnection Security Agreements established by participating organizations. 13 For example, detailed test scripts may need to be developed for the specific operating system, network component, middleware, or application employed within the information system to adequately assess certain characteristics of a particular security control. Such test scripts are at a lower level of detail than provided by the assessment procedures contained in Appendix F (Assessment Procedures Catalog) and are therefore beyond the scope of this publication. Additional details for assessments are provided in the supporting assessment cases described in Appendix H. 14 For national security systems, security categorization is accomplished in accordance with CNSS Instruction 1253. For other than national security systems, security categorization is accomplished in accordance with FIPS 199 and Special Publication 800-60. CHAPTER 1 PAGE 2 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ • The selection of security controls from Special Publication 800-53 as identified in the approved security plan.15 The assessment process is an information-gathering activity, not a security-producing activity. Organizations determine the most cost-effective implementation of this key element in the organization’s information security program by applying the results of risk assessments, considering the maturity and quality level of the organization’s risk management processes, and taking advantage of the flexibility in the concepts described in this publication. The use of Special Publication 800-53A as a starting point in the process of defining procedures for assessing the security controls in information systems and organizations, promotes a consistent level of security and offers the needed flexibility to customize the assessment based on organizational policies and requirements, known threat and vulnerability information, operational considerations, information system and platform dependencies, and tolerance for risk.16 The information produced during security control assessments can be used by an organization to: • Identify potential problems or shortfalls in the organization’s implementation of the Risk Management Framework; • Identify information system weaknesses and deficiencies; • Prioritize risk mitigation decisions and associated risk mitigation activities; • Confirm that identified weaknesses and deficiencies in the information system have been addressed; • Support continuous monitoring activities and information security situational awareness; • Facilitate security authorization decisions; and • Inform budgetary decisions and the capital investment process. Organizations are not expected to employ all of the assessment methods and assessment objects contained within the assessment procedures identified in this publication for the associated security controls deployed within or inherited by organizational information systems. Rather, organizations have the inherent flexibility to determine the level of effort needed for a particular assessment (e.g., which assessment methods and assessment objects are deemed to be the most useful in obtaining the desired results). This determination is made on the basis of what will accomplish the assessment objectives in the most cost-effective manner and with sufficient confidence to support the subsequent determination of the resulting mission or business risk. 1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE This publication is intended to serve a diverse group of information system and information security professionals including: • Individuals with information system development and integration responsibilities (e.g., program managers, information technology product developers, information system developers, systems integrators, information security architects); 15 The security controls for the information system are documented in the security plan after the initial selection, tailoring, and supplementation of the controls as described in NIST Special Publication 800-53 and CNSS Instruction 1253. The security plan is approved by the authorizing official with recommendations from other appropriate organizational officials prior to the start of the security control assessment. 16 In this publication, the term risk is used to mean risk to organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. CHAPTER 1 PAGE 3 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ • Individuals with information security assessment and continuous monitoring responsibilities (e.g., system evaluators/testers, penetration testers, security control assessors, independent verifiers and validators, auditors, information system owners, common control providers); • Individuals with information system and security management and oversight responsibilities (e.g., authorizing officials, senior information security officers,17 information security managers); and • Individuals with information security implementation and operational responsibilities (e.g., information system owners, common control providers, information owners/stewards, mission owners, systems administrators, information system security officers). 1.3 RELATED PUBLICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT PROCESSES Special Publication 800-53A is designed to support Special Publication 800-37, Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach. In particular, the assessment procedures contained in this publication and the guidelines provided for developing security assessment plans for organizational information systems directly support the security control assessment and continuous monitoring activities that are integral to the risk management process. This includes providing near real-time information to organizational officials regarding the ongoing security state of their information systems. Organizations are encouraged, whenever possible, to take advantage of the assessment results and associated assessment-related documentation and evidence available on information system components from previous assessments including independent third-party testing, evaluation, and validation.18 Product testing, evaluation, and validation may be conducted on cryptographic modules and general-purpose information technology products such as operating systems, database systems, firewalls, intrusion detection devices, Web browsers, Web applications, smart cards, biometrics devices, personal identity verification devices, network devices, and hardware platforms using national and international standards. If an information system component product is identified as providing support for the implementation of a particular security control in Special Publication 800-53, then evidence produced during the product testing, evaluation, and validation processes (e.g., security specifications, analyses and test results, validation reports, and validation certificates)19 is used to the extent that it is applicable. This evidence is combined with the assessment-related evidence obtained from the application of the assessment procedures in this publication, to cost-effectively produce the information necessary to determine whether the security controls are effective in their application. 17 At the agency level, this position is known as the Senior Agency Information Security Officer. Organizations may also refer to this position as the Chief Information Security Officer. 18 Assessment results can be obtained from many activities that occur routinely during the system development life cycle. For example, assessment results are produced during the testing and evaluation of new information system components during system upgrades or system integration activities. Organizations can take advantage of previous assessment results whenever possible, to reduce the overall cost of assessments and to make the assessment process more efficient. 19 Organizations review the available information from component information technology products to determine: (i) what security controls are implemented by the product; (ii) if those security controls meet the intended control requirements of the information system under assessment; (iii) if the configuration of the product and the environment in which the product operates are consistent with the environmental and product configuration stated by the vendor and/or developer; and (iv) if the assurance requirements stated in the developer/vendor specification satisfy the assurance requirements for assessing those controls. Meeting the above criteria provides a sound rationale that the product is suitable and meets the intended security control requirements of the information system under assessment. CHAPTER 1 PAGE 4 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THIS SPECIAL PUBLICATION The remainder of this special publication is organized as follows: • Chapter Two describes the fundamental concepts associated with security control assessments including: (i) the integration of assessments into the system development life cycle; (ii) the importance of an organization-wide strategy for conducting security control assessments; (iii) the development of effective assurance cases to help increase the grounds for confidence in the effectiveness of the security controls being assessed; and (iv) the format and content of assessment procedures. • Chapter Three describes the process of assessing the security controls in organizational information systems and their environments of operation including: (i) the activities carried out by organizations and assessors to prepare for security control assessments; (ii) the development of security assessment plans; (iii) the conduct of security control assessments and the analysis, documentation, and reporting of assessment results; and (iv) the postassessment report analysis and follow-on activities carried out by organizations. • Supporting appendices provide detailed assessment-related information including: (i) general references; (ii) definitions and terms; (iii) acronyms; (iv) a description of assessment methods; (v) penetration testing guidelines; (vi) a master catalog of assessment procedures that can be used to develop plans for assessing security controls; (vii) content of security assessment reports; and (viii) the definition, format, and use of assessment cases. CHAPTER 1 PAGE 5 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER TWO THE FUNDAMENTALS BASIC CONCEPTS ASSOCIATED WITH SECURITY CONTROL ASSESSMENTS T his chapter describes the basic concepts associated with assessing the security controls in organizational information systems including: (i) the integration of assessments into the system development life cycle; (ii) the importance of an organization-wide strategy for conducting security control assessments; (iii) the development of effective assurance cases to help increase the grounds for confidence in the effectiveness of the security controls; and (iv) the format and content of assessment procedures. 2.1 ASSESSMENTS WITHIN THE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE Security assessments can be effectively carried out at various stages in the system development life cycle20 to increase the grounds for confidence that the security controls employed within or inherited by an information system are effective in their application. This publication provides a comprehensive set of assessment procedures to support security assessment activities throughout the system development life cycle. For example, security assessments are routinely conducted by information system developers and system integrators during the development/acquisition and implementation phases of the life cycle to help ensure that the required security controls for the system are properly designed and developed, correctly implemented, and consistent with the established organizational information security architecture. Assessment activities in the initial system development life cycle phases include, for example, design and code reviews, application scanning, and regression testing. Security weaknesses and deficiencies identified early in the system development life cycle can be resolved more quickly and in a much more cost-effective manner before proceeding to subsequent phases in the life cycle. The objective is to identify the information security architecture and security controls up front and to ensure that the system design and testing validate the implementation of these controls. The assessment procedures described in Appendix F can support these types of assessments carried out during the initial stages of the system development life cycle. Security assessments are also routinely conducted by information system owners, common control providers, information system security officers, independent assessors, auditors, and Inspectors General during the operations and maintenance phase of the life cycle to ensure that security controls are effective and continue to be effective in the operational environment where the system is deployed. For example, organizations assess all security controls employed within and inherited by the information system during the initial security authorization. Subsequent to the initial authorization, the organization assesses the security controls (including management, operational, and technical controls) on an ongoing basis. The frequency of such monitoring is based on the continuous monitoring strategy developed by the information system owner or common control provider and approved by the authorizing official.21 Finally, at the end of the life cycle, security assessments are conducted as part of ensuring that important organizational information is purged from the information system prior to disposal. 20 There are typically five phases in a generic system development life cycle: (i) initiation; (ii) development/acquisition; (iii) implementation; (iv) operations and maintenance; and (v) disposition (disposal). 21 Special Publication 800-37 provides guidance on the continuous monitoring of security controls. CHAPTER 2 PAGE 6 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2.2 STRATEGY FOR CONDUCTING SECURITY CONTROL ASSESSMENTS Organizations are encouraged to develop a broad-based, organization-wide strategy for conducting security assessments, facilitating more cost-effective and consistent assessments across the inventory of information systems. An organization-wide strategy begins by applying the initial steps of the Risk Management Framework to all information systems within the organization, with an organizational view of the security categorization process and the security control selection process (including the identification of common controls). Categorizing information systems as an organization-wide activity taking into consideration the enterprise architecture and the information security architecture helps to ensure that the individual systems are categorized based on the mission and business objectives of the organization. Maximizing the number of common controls employed within an organization: (i) significantly reduces the cost of development, implementation, and assessment of security controls; (ii) allows organizations to centralize security control assessments and to amortize the cost of those assessments across all information systems organization-wide; and (iii) increases overall security control consistency. An organization-wide approach to identifying common controls early in the application of the RMF facilitates a more global strategy for assessing those controls and sharing essential assessment results with information system owners and authorizing officials. The sharing of assessment results among key organizational officials across information system boundaries has many important benefits including: • Providing the capability to review assessment results for all information systems and to make organization-wide, mission/business-related decisions on risk mitigation activities according to organizational priorities, the security categorization of the information systems supporting the organization, and risk assessments; • Providing a more global view of systemic weaknesses and deficiencies occurring in information systems across the organization; • Providing an opportunity to develop organization-wide solutions to information security problems; and • Increasing the organization’s knowledge base regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and strategies for more cost-effective solutions to common information security problems. Organizations can also promote a more focused and cost-effective assessment process by: (i) developing more specific assessment procedures that are tailored for their specific organizational environments of operation and requirements (instead of relegating these tasks to each security control assessor or assessment team); and (ii) providing organization-wide tools, templates, and techniques to support more consistent assessments throughout the organization. While the conduct of security control assessments is the primary responsibility of information system owners and common control providers with oversight by their respective authorizing officials, there is also significant involvement in the assessment process by other parties within the organization who have a vested interest in the outcome of assessments. Other interested parties include, for example, mission/business owners, information owners/stewards (when those roles are filled by someone other than the information system owner), information security officials, and the risk executive (function). It is imperative that information system owners and common control providers coordinate with the other parties in the organization having an interest in security control assessments to help ensure that the organization’s core missions and business functions are adequately addressed in the selection of security controls to be assessed. CHAPTER 2 PAGE 7 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2.3 BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE ASSURANCE CASE Building an effective assurance case22 for security control effectiveness is a process that involves: (i) compiling evidence from a variety of activities conducted during the system development life cycle that the controls employed in the information system are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements of the system; and (ii) presenting this evidence in a manner that decision makers are able to use effectively in making risk-based decisions about the operation or use of the system. The evidence described above comes from the implementation of the security controls in the information system and inherited by the system (i.e., common controls) and from the assessments of that implementation. Ideally, the assessor is building on previously developed materials that started with the specification of the organization’s information security needs and was further developed during the design, development, and implementation of the information system. These materials, developed while implementing security throughout the life cycle of the information system, provide the initial evidence for an assurance case. Assessors obtain the required evidence during the assessment process to allow the appropriate organizational officials to make objective determinations about the effectiveness of the security controls and the overall security state of the information system. The assessment evidence needed to make such determinations can be obtained from a variety of sources including, but not limited to, information technology product and system assessments. Product assessments (also known as product testing, evaluation, and validation) are typically conducted by independent, third-party testing organizations. These assessments examine the security functions of products and established configuration settings. Assessments can be conducted against industry, national, or international information security standards as well as developer/vendor claims. Since many information technology products are assessed by commercial testing organizations and then subsequently deployed in millions of information systems, these types of assessments can be carried out at a greater level of depth and provide deeper insights into the security capabilities of the particular products. System assessments are typically conducted by information systems developers, systems integrators, information system owners, common control providers, assessors, auditors, Inspectors General, and the information security staffs of organizations. The assessors or assessment teams bring together available information about the information system such as the results from individual component product assessments, if available, and conduct additional system-level assessments using a variety of methods and techniques. System assessments are used to compile and evaluate the evidence needed by organizational officials to determine how effective the security controls employed in the information system are likely to be in mitigating risks to organizational operations and assets, to individuals, to other organizations, and to the Nation. The results from assessments conducted using information system-specific and organizationspecific assessment procedures derived from the guidelines in this publication contribute to compiling the necessary evidence to determine security control effectiveness in accordance with the assurance requirements documented in the security plan. 22 An assurance case is a body of evidence organized into an argument demonstrating that some claim about an information system holds (i.e., is assured). An assurance case is needed when it is important to show that a system exhibits some complex property such as safety, security, or reliability. Additional information can be obtained at https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/daisy/bsi/articles/knowledge/assurance/643.html. CHAPTER 2 PAGE 8 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2.4 ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES An assessment procedure consists of a set of assessment objectives, each with an associated set of potential assessment methods and assessment objects. An assessment objective includes a set of determination statements related to the security control under assessment. The determination statements are linked to the content of the security control (i.e., the security control functionality) to ensure traceability of assessment results back to the fundamental control requirements. The application of an assessment procedure to a security control produces assessment findings. These assessment findings reflect, or are subsequently used, to help determine the overall effectiveness of the security control. Assessment objects identify the specific items being assessed and include specifications, mechanisms, activities, and individuals. Specifications are the document-based artifacts (e.g., policies, procedures, plans, system security requirements, functional specifications, and architectural designs) associated with an information system. Mechanisms are the specific hardware, software, or firmware safeguards and countermeasures employed within an information system.23 Activities are the specific protection-related pursuits or actions supporting an information system that involve people (e.g., conducting system backup operations, monitoring network traffic, exercising a contingency plan). Individuals, or groups of individuals, are people applying the specifications, mechanisms, or activities described above. Assessment methods define the nature of the assessor actions and include examine, interview, and test. The examine method is the process of reviewing, inspecting, observing, studying, or analyzing one or more assessment objects (i.e., specifications, mechanisms, or activities). The purpose of the examine method is to facilitate assessor understanding, achieve clarification, or obtain evidence. The interview method is the process of holding discussions with individuals or groups of individuals within an organization to once again, facilitate assessor understanding, achieve clarification, or obtain evidence. The test method is the process of exercising one or more assessment objects (i.e., activities or mechanisms) under specified conditions to compare actual with expected behavior. In all three assessment methods, the results are used in making specific determinations called for in the determination statements and thereby achieving the objectives for the assessment procedure. A complete description of assessment methods and assessment objects is provided in Appendix D. The assessment methods have a set of associated attributes, depth and coverage, which help define the level of effort for the assessment. These attributes are hierarchical in nature, providing the means to define the rigor and scope of the assessment for the increased assurances that may be needed for some information systems. The depth attribute addresses the rigor of and level of detail in the examination, interview, and testing processes. Values for the depth attribute include basic, focused, and comprehensive. The coverage attribute addresses the scope or breadth of the examination, interview, and testing processes including the number and type of specifications, mechanisms, and activities to be examined or tested and the number and types of individuals to be interviewed. Similar to the depth attribute, values for the coverage attribute include basic, focused, and comprehensive. The appropriate depth and coverage attribute values for a particular assessment method are based on the assurance requirements specified by the organization.24 As assurance requirements increase with regard to the development, implementation, and operation 23 Mechanisms also include physical protection devices associated with an information system (e.g., locks, keypads, security cameras, fire protection devices, fireproof safes, etc.). 24 For other than national security systems, organizations meet minimum assurance requirements specified in Special Publication 800-53, Appendix E. CHAPTER 2 PAGE 9 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ of security controls within or inherited by the information system, the rigor and scope of the assessment activities (as reflected in the selection of assessment methods and objects and the assignment of depth and coverage attribute values), tend to increase as well. Appendix D provides a detailed description of assessment method attributes and attribute values. While flexibility continues to be an important factor in developing security assessment plans, consistency of assessments is also an important consideration. A major design objective for Special Publication 800-53A is to provide an assessment framework and initial starting point for assessment procedures that are essential for achieving such consistency. In addition to the assessment framework and initial starting point for assessment procedures, Appendix H describes the Assessment Case Development Project. The purpose of this project is fourfold: (i) to actively engage experienced assessors in the development of a representative set of assessment cases corresponding to the assessment procedures in Appendix F; (ii) to provide organizations and the assessors supporting those organizations with an exemplary set of assessment cases for each assessment procedure in the catalog of procedures in Appendix F; (iii) to provide a vehicle for ongoing community-wide review of the assessment cases to promote continuous improvement in the assessment process for more consistent, cost-effective security assessments of federal information systems; and (iv) to serve as a basis of reciprocity among various communities of interest. Appendix H contains several examples of assessment cases. AN EXAMPLE ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE SECURITY CONTROL CP-2 CONTINGENCY PLAN Control: The organization: a. Develops a contingency plan for the information system that: - Identifies essential missions and business functions and associated contingency requirements; - Provides recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics; - Addresses contingency roles, responsibilities, assigned individuals with contact information; - Addresses maintaining essential missions and business functions despite an information system disruption, compromise, or failure; - Addresses eventual, full information system restoration without deterioration of the security measures originally planned and implemented; and - Is reviewed and approved by designated officials within the organization; b. Distributes copies of the contingency plan to [Assignment: organization-defined list of key contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; c. Coordinates contingency planning activities with incident handling activities; d. Reviews the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]; e. Revises the contingency plan to address changes to the organization, information system, or environment of operation and problems encountered during contingency plan implementation, execution, or testing; and f. Communicates contingency plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined list of key contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]. CHAPTER 2 PAGE 10 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ SECURITY CONTROL CP-2 CONTINGENCY PLAN Supplemental Guidance: Contingency planning for information systems is part of an overall organizational program for achieving continuity of operations for mission/business operations. Contingency planning addresses both information system restoration and implementation of alternative mission/business processes when systems are compromised. Information system recovery objectives are consistent with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, standards, or regulations. In addition to information system availability, contingency plans also address other security-related events resulting in a reduction in mission/business effectiveness, such as malicious attacks compromising the confidentiality or integrity of the information system. Examples of actions to call out in contingency plans include, for example, graceful degradation, information system shutdown, fall back to a manual mode, alternate information flows, or operating in a mode that is reserved solely for when the system is under attack. Related controls: AC14, CP-6, CP-7, CP-8, IR-4, PM-8, PM-11. The first assessment objective for CP-2 is derived from the basic control statement. Potential assessment methods and objects are added to the assessment procedure. ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE CP-2.1 ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE: Determine if: (i) the organization develops a contingency plan for the information system that: - identifies essential missions and business functions and associated contingency requirements; - provides recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics; - addresses contingency roles, responsibilities, assigned individuals with contact information; - addresses maintaining essential missions and business functions despite an information system disruption, compromise, or failure; and - addresses eventual, full information system restoration without deterioration of the security measures originally planned and implemented; and - is reviewed and approved by designated officials within the organization; (ii) the organization defines key contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements designated to receive copies of the contingency plan; and (iii) the organization distributes copies of the contingency plan to organization-defined key contingency personnel and organizational elements. POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT METHODS AND OBJECTS: Examine: [SELECT FROM: Contingency planning policy; procedures addressing contingency operations for the information system; contingency plan; security plan; other relevant documents or 25 records]. Interview: [SELECT FROM: Organizational personnel with contingency planning and plan implementation responsibilities]. 25 Although not explicitly noted with each identified assessment method in the assessment procedure format in Appendix F, the attribute values of depth and coverage described in Appendix D are assigned by the organization and applied by the assessor/assessment team in the execution of the assessment method against an assessment object. CHAPTER 2 PAGE 11 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ In a similar manner, the second assessment objective and potential assessment methods and objects for CP-2 are established. ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE CP-2.2 Determine if: (i) the organization coordinates contingency planning activities with incident handling activities: (ii) the organization defines the frequency of contingency plan reviews; (iii) the organization reviews the contingency plan for the information system in accordance with the organization-defined frequency; (iv) the organization revises the contingency plan to address changes to the organization, information system, or environment of operation and problems encountered during contingency plan implementation, execution or testing; and (v) the organization communicates contingency plan changes to the key contingency personnel and organizational elements as identified in CP-2.1 (ii). POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT METHODS AND OBJECTS: Examine: [SELECT FROM: Contingency planning policy; procedures addressing contingency operations for the information system; contingency plan; security plan; other relevant documents or records]. Interview: [SELECT FROM: Organizational personnel with contingency planning and plan implementation responsibilities; organizational personnel with incident handling responsibilities]. The assessment objectives within a particular assessment procedure are numbered sequentially (e.g., CP-2.1,…, CP-2.n). If the security control has any enhancements, assessment objectives are developed for each enhancement using the same process as for the base control. The resulting assessment objectives within the assessment procedure are numbered sequentially (e.g., CP-2(1).1 indicating the first assessment objective for the first enhancement for security control CP-2). CHAPTER 2 PAGE 12 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER THREE THE PROCESS CONDUCTING EFFECTIVE SECURITY CONTROL ASSESSMENTS T his chapter describes the process of assessing the security controls in organizational information systems including: (i) the activities carried out by organizations and assessors to prepare for security control assessments; (ii) the development of security assessment plans; (iii) the conduct of security control assessments and the analysis, documentation, and reporting of assessment results; and (iv) post-assessment report analysis and follow-on activities carried out by organizations. 3.1 PREPARING FOR SECURITY CONTROL ASSESSMENTS Conducting security control assessments in today’s complex environment of sophisticated information technology infrastructures and high-visibility, mission-critical applications can be difficult, challenging, and resource-intensive. Success requires the cooperation and collaboration among all parties having a vested interest in the organization’s information security posture, including information system owners, common control providers, authorizing officials, chief information officers, senior information security officers, chief executive officers/heads of agencies, Inspectors General, and the OMB. Establishing an appropriate set of expectations before, during, and after the assessment is paramount to achieving an acceptable outcome—that is, producing information necessary to help the authorizing official make a credible, risk-based decision on whether to place the information system into operation or continue its operation. Thorough preparation by the organization and the assessors is an important aspect of conducting effective security control assessments. Preparatory activities address a range of issues relating to the cost, schedule, and performance of the assessment. From the organizational perspective, preparing for a security control assessment includes the following key activities: • Ensuring that appropriate policies covering security control assessments are in place and understood by all affected organizational elements; • Ensuring that all steps in the RMF prior to the security control assessment step, have been successfully completed and received appropriate management oversight;26 • Ensuring that security controls identified as common controls (and the common portion of hybrid controls) have been assigned to appropriate organizational entities (i.e., common control providers) for development and implementation;27 • Establishing the objective and scope of the security control assessment (i.e., the purpose of the assessment and what is being assessed); 26 Conducting security control assessments in parallel with the development/acquisition and implementation phases of the life cycle permits the identification of weaknesses and deficiencies early and provides the most cost-effective method for initiating corrective actions. Issues found during these assessments can be referred to authorizing officials for early resolution, as appropriate. The results of security control assessments carried out during system development and implementation can also be used (consistent with reuse criteria) during the security authorization process to avoid system fielding delays or costly repetition of assessments. 27 Security control assessments include common controls that are the responsibility of organizational entities other than the information system owner inheriting the controls or hybrid controls where there is shared responsibility among the system owner and designated organizational entities. CHAPTER 3 PAGE 13 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ • Notifying key organizational officials of the impending security control assessment and allocating necessary resources to carry out the assessment; • Establishing appropriate communication channels among organizational officials having an interest in the security control assessment;28 • Establishing time frames for completing the security control assessment and key milestone decision points required by the organization to effectively manage the assessment; • Identifying and selecting a competent assessor/assessment team that will be responsible for conducting the security control assessment, considering issues of assessor independence; • Collecting artifacts to provide to the assessor/assessment team (e.g., policies, procedures, plans, specifications, designs, records, administrator/operator manuals, information system documentation, interconnection agreements, previous assessment results); and • Establishing a mechanism between the organization and the assessor and/or assessment team to minimize ambiguities or misunderstandings about security control implementation or security control weaknesses/deficiencies identified during the assessment. Security control assessors/assessment teams begin preparing for the assessment by: • Obtaining a general understanding of the organization’s operations (including mission, functions, and business processes) and how the information system that is the subject of the security control assessment supports those organizational operations; • Obtaining an understanding of the structure of the information system (i.e., system architecture); • Obtaining a thorough understanding of the security controls being assessed (including system-specific, hybrid, and common controls); • Identifying the organizational entities responsible for the development and implementation of the common controls (or the common portion of hybrid controls) supporting the information system; • Establishing appropriate organizational points of contact needed to carry out the security control assessment; • Obtaining artifacts needed for the security control assessment (e.g., policies, procedures, plans, specifications, designs, records, administrator/operator manuals, information system documentation, interconnection agreements, previous assessment results); • Obtaining previous assessment results that may be appropriately reused for the security control assessment (e.g., Inspector General reports, audits, vulnerability scans, physical security inspections, prior assessments, developmental testing and evaluation, vendor flaw remediation activities , ISO/IEC 15408 [Common Criteria] evaluations); • Meeting with appropriate organizational officials to ensure common understanding for assessment objectives and the proposed rigor and scope of the assessment; and • Developing a security assessment plan. 28 Typically, these individuals include authorizing officials, information system owners, common control providers, mission and information owners/stewards (if other than the information system owner), chief information officers, senior information security officers, Inspectors General, information system security officers, users from organizations that the information system supports, and assessors. CHAPTER 3 PAGE 14 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ In preparation for the assessment of security controls, the necessary background information is assembled and made available to the assessors or assessment team.29 To the extent necessary to support the specific assessment, the organization identifies and arranges access to: (i) elements of the organization responsible for developing, documenting, disseminating, reviewing, and updating all security policies and associated procedures for implementing policy-compliant controls; (ii) the security policies for the information system and any associated implementing procedures; (iii) individuals or groups responsible for the development, implementation, operation, and maintenance of security controls; (iv) any materials (e.g., security plans, records, schedules, assessment reports, after-action reports, agreements, authorization packages) associated with the implementation and operation of security controls; and (v) the objects to be assessed.30 The availability of essential documentation as well as access to key organizational personnel and the information system being assessed are paramount to a successful assessment of the security controls. Organizations consider both the technical expertise and level of independence required in selecting security control assessors. Organizations ensure that security control assessors possess the required skills and technical expertise to successfully carry out assessments of systemspecific, hybrid, and common controls. This includes knowledge of and experience with the specific hardware, software, and firmware components employed by the organization. An independent assessor is any individual or group capable of conducting an impartial assessment of security controls employed within or inherited by an information system. Impartiality implies that assessors are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest with respect to the development, operation, and/or management of the information system or the determination of security control effectiveness.31 The authorizing official or designated representative determines the required level of independence for security control assessors based on the results of the security categorization process for the information system and the ultimate risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. The authorizing official determines if the level of assessor independence is sufficient to provide confidence that the assessment results produced are sound and can be used to make a risk-based decision on whether to place the information system into operation or continue its operation. Independent security control assessment services can be obtained from other elements within the organization or can be contracted to a public or private sector entity outside of the organization. In special situations, for example when the organization that owns the information system is small or the organizational structure requires that the security control assessment be accomplished by individuals that are in the developmental, operational, and/or management chain of the system owner, independence in the assessment process can be achieved by ensuring that the assessment results are carefully reviewed and analyzed by an independent team of experts to validate the completeness, consistency, and veracity of the results.32 29 Information system owners and organizational entities developing, implementing, and/or administering common controls (i.e., common control providers) are responsible for providing needed information to assessors. 30 In situations where there are multiple security assessments ongoing or planned within an organization, access to organizational elements, individuals, and artifacts supporting the assessments is centrally managed by the organization to ensure a cost-effective use of time and resources. 31 Contracted assessment services are considered independent if the information system owner is not directly involved in the contracting process or cannot unduly influence the independence of the assessor(s) conducting the assessment of the security controls. 32 The authorizing official consults with the Office of the Inspector General, the senior information security officer, and the chief information officer to discuss the implications of any decisions on assessor independence in the types of special circumstances described above. CHAPTER 3 PAGE 15 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 3.2 DEVELOPING SECURITY ASSESSMENT PLANS The security assessment plan provides the objectives for the security control assessment and a detailed roadmap of how to conduct such an assessment. The following steps are considered by assessors in developing plans to assess the security controls in organizational information systems or inherited by those systems: • Determine which security controls/control enhancements are to be included in the assessment based upon the contents of the security plan and the purpose/scope of the assessment; • Select the appropriate assessment procedures to be used during the assessment based on the security controls and control enhancements that are to be included in the assessment; • Tailor the selected assessment procedures (e.g., select appropriate assessment methods and objects, assign depth and coverage attribute values); • Develop additional assessment procedures to address any security requirements or controls that are not sufficiently covered by Special Publication 800-53; • Optimize the assessment procedures to reduce duplication of effort (e.g., sequencing and consolidating assessment procedures) and provide cost-effective assessment solutions; and • Finalize the assessment plan and obtain the necessary approvals to execute the plan. 3.2.1 Determine which security controls are to be assessed. The security plan provides an overview of the security requirements for the information system and describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements. The assessor starts with the security controls described in the security plan and considers the purpose of the assessment. A security control assessment can be a complete assessment of all security controls in the information system or inherited by the system (e.g., during an initial security authorization process) or a partial assessment of the security controls in the information system or inherited by the system (e.g., during system development, during continuous monitoring where controls are assessed on an ongoing basis and as a result of changes affecting the controls, or where controls were previously assessed and the results accepted in the reciprocity process).33 For partial assessments, information system owners and common control providers collaborate with organizational officials having an interest in the assessment (e.g., senior information security officers, mission/information owners, Inspectors General, and authorizing officials) to determine which security controls are to be assessed. The selection of the security controls depends on the continuous monitoring strategy established by the information system owner or common control provider to ensure that: (i) all controls are assessed during the authorization period established by federal legislation, policies, directives, standards, and guidelines; (ii) items on the plan of action and milestones receive adequate oversight; (iii) controls with greater volatility or importance to the organization are assessed more frequently; and (iv) control implementations that have changed since the last assessment are reevaluated.34 33 Partial assessments of security controls can be conducted in the initial phases of system development life cycle to promote early detection of weakness and deficiencies and a more cost-effective approach to risk mitigation. 34 Special Publication 800-37 provides guidance on continuous monitoring as part of the risk management process. CHAPTER 3 PAGE 16 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 3.2.2 Select appropriate procedures to assess the security controls. Special Publication 800-53A, Appendix F, provides an assessment procedure for each security control and control enhancement in Special Publication 800-53. For each security control and control enhancement in the security plan to be included in the assessment, assessors select the corresponding assessment procedure from Appendix F. The selected assessment procedures vary from assessment to assessment based on the current content of the security plan and the purpose of the security assessment (e.g., complete security control assessment, partial security control assessment). 3.2.3 Tailor assessment procedures. In a similar manner to how the security controls from Special Publication 800-53 are tailored for the organization’s mission, business functions, characteristics of the information system and operating environment, organizations tailor the assessment procedures listed in Appendix F to meet specific organizational needs. Organizations have the flexibility to perform the tailoring process at the organization level for all information systems, at the individual information system level, or using a combination of organization-level and system-specific approaches. Security control assessors determine if the organization provides additional tailoring guidance prior to initiating the tailoring process. Assessment procedures are tailored by: • Selecting the appropriate assessment methods and objects needed to satisfy the stated assessment objectives; • Selecting the appropriate depth and coverage attribute values to define the rigor and scope of the assessment; • Identifying common controls that have been assessed by a separately-documented security assessment plan, and do not require the repeated execution of the assessment procedures; • Developing information system/platform-specific and organization-specific assessment procedures (which may be adaptations to those procedures in Appendix F); • Incorporating assessment results from previous assessments where the results are deemed applicable; and • Making appropriate adjustments in assessment procedures to be able to obtain the requisite assessment evidence from external providers. Assessment method and object-related considerations— It is recognized that organizations can specify, document, and configure their information systems in a variety of ways and that the content and applicability of existing assessment evidence will vary. This may result in the need to apply a variety of assessment methods to various assessment objects to generate the assessment evidence needed to determine whether the security controls are effective in their application. Therefore, the assessment methods and objects provided with each assessment procedure are termed potential to reflect the need to be able to choose the methods and objects most appropriate for a specific assessment. The assessment methods and objects chosen are those deemed as necessary to produce the evidence needed to make the determinations described in the determination statements. The potential methods and objects in the assessment procedure are provided as a resource to assist in the selection of appropriate methods and objects, and not with the intent to limit the selection. Organizations use their judgment in selecting from the potential assessment methods and the list of assessment objects associated with each selected method. Organizations select those methods and objects that most cost-effectively contribute to CHAPTER 3 PAGE 17 Special Publication 800-53A Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________ making the determinations associated with the assessment objective.35 The measure of the quality of assessment results is based on the soundness of the rationale provided, not the specific set of methods and objects applied. It will not be necessary, in most cases, to apply every assessment method to every assessment object to obtain the desired assessment results. And for certain assessments, it may be appropriate to employ a method not currently listed in the set of potential methods. Depth and coverage-related considerations— In addition to selecting appropriate assessment methods and objects, each assessment method (i.e., examine, interview, and test) is associated with depth and coverage attributes that are described in Appendix D. The attribute values identify the rigor and scope of the assessment procedures executed by the assessor. The values selected by the organization are based on the characteristics of the information system being assessed (including assurance requirements) and the specific determinations to be made. The depth and coverage attribute values are associated with the assurance requirements specified by the organization (i.e., the rigor and scope of the assessment increases in direct relationship to the assurance requirements). Common control-related considerations— Assessors note which security controls (or parts of security controls) in the security plan are designated as common controls.36 Since the assessment of common controls is the responsibility of the organizational entity that developed and implemented the controls (i.e., common control provider), the assessment procedures in Appendix F used to assess these controls incorporate assessment results from that organizational entity. Common controls may have been previously assessed as part of the organization’s information security program or as part of an information system providing common con...
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Issue Date

September 27, 2002
Audit Case Number

2002-DP-0002

TO: Vickers B. Meadows, Assistant Secretary for Administration, A
//SIGNED//
FROM: Mark C. Kaskey, Acting Director, Information Systems Audit Division, GAA
SUBJECT: Audit Memorandum Report - Review of Departmental IT Security Plans
INTRODUCTION
We have completed a review of security plans prepared for HUD’s mission critical
systems. This review was made in conjunction with the OIG’s FY 2001 Financial
Statement Audit and as part of the OIG’s annual independent evaluation of the overall
effectiveness of HUD’s security program as required by the Government Information and
Security Reform Act (GISRA). The objective was to determine whether security plans
prepared for HUD’s critical information systems were compliant with OMB Circular A130 and consistent with National Institute of Standards Technology Publication (NIST)
800-18. We performed our audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Government
Auditing Standards (GAGAS). We limited the scope of review to evaluating security
plans for five HUD mission critical financial application systems out of 54 mission
critical systems identified. These five application systems were selected because they
represent the major financial systems for the Department. The five systems selected for
review were HUD’s Centralized Accounting and Program System (HUDCAPS), Letter of
Credit Control System (LOCCS), Program Accounting System (PAS), Loan Accounting
System (LAS), and Community Planning and Development (CPD) Integrated
Disbursement and Information System (IDIS) and were selected as a result of work
performed during the annual financial statement audit. We also obtained and reviewed
relevant documentation to include contractor review reports, HUD Critical Systems’ Plan
of Action & Milestones Report Summary, and applicable guidance and directives. We
met with key personnel and conducted interviews to determine the extent of their
involvement in the security planning process and the development of security plans. We
performed our audit fieldwork in November 2001 and from February to May 2002.
We have received your response to the recommendations in the draft report (See Appendix
A). Your office has reviewed the findings and recommendations and concurs with each

recommendation in the report. We have reviewed the proposed corrective actions and
determined that they have adequately addressed our recommendations and, therefore, no
further response is required. In accordance with HUD Handbook 2000.06 REV-3, we will
record management decisions for the recommendations, and their respective target
completion dates, in the Departmental Automated Audits Management System
(DAAMS) effective September 27, 2002. We plan to monitor the progress of the
implementation of these recommendations as part of our audit follow-up process.
We appreciate the assistance your staff has provided to us during the course of the review.
Should you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at 202-708-0614,
extension 8148.
SUMMARY
Our review found that the security plans for mission critical systems did not meet the
requirements or guidelines of either OMB Circular A-130 or NIST Publication 800-18.
Also, HUD has not updated the Department’s information security policies and
procedures for preparing security plans to conform to current OMB Circular A-130 and
NIST Publication 800-18 guidelines. Additionally, the Office of the Chief Information
Officer (OCIO) was not coordinating and sharing with the responsible Program Area
Officials the results of a contractor’s review of the Department’s security plans for
appropriate corrective action. Without adequate security plans and proper coordination
between the OCIO and the Program Areas, the Department is at risk that critical
information systems will not be adequately protected against waste, loss, and
unauthorized use.
BACKGROUND
The Department of Housing and Urban Development is responsible for mission critical
information systems that collectively process billions of dollars worth of transactions.
Additionally, these systems are part of a network which HUD employees and contractors
are dependent on to accomplish the Department’s mission of insuring loans, processing
subsidies and grants, and monitoring performance of its business partners. Because of
the criticality of these systems it is especially important to ensure that they are properly
protected through adequate security planning. Every Federal agency is required to
implement and maintain a security program that ensures that all information collected,
processed, transmitted and, or disseminated is protected commensurate with the harm that
could result if the data was lost or misused. OMB Circular A-130 Transmittal
Memorandum 4 dated November 2000, Security of Federal Automated Information
Resources, requires that agencies incorporate a security plan that is compliant with
Appendix III of the circular and that the plans be consistent wit...


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