Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?
Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged
APA “Flip-Flop”
Laurence Steinberg
Elizabeth Cauffman
Jennifer Woolard
Sandra Graham
Marie Banich
The American Psychological Association’s (APA’s) stance
on the psychological maturity of adolescents has been
criticized as inconsistent. In its Supreme Court amicus
brief in Roper v. Simmons (2005), which abolished the
juvenile death penalty, APA described adolescents as developmentally immature. In its amicus brief in Hodgson v.
Minnesota (1990), however, which upheld adolescents’
right to seek an abortion without parental involvement,
APA argued that adolescents are as mature as adults. The
authors present evidence that adolescents demonstrate
adult levels of cognitive capability earlier than they evince
emotional and social maturity. On the basis of this research, the authors argue that it is entirely reasonable to
assert that adolescents possess the necessary skills to make
an informed choice about terminating a pregnancy but are
nevertheless less mature than adults in ways that mitigate
criminal responsibility. The notion that a single line can be
drawn between adolescence and adulthood for different
purposes under the law is at odds with developmental
science. Drawing age boundaries on the basis of developmental research cannot be done sensibly without a careful
and nuanced consideration of the particular demands
placed on the individual for “adult-like” maturity in different domains of functioning.
Keywords: adolescents, abortion, juvenile death penalty,
Supreme Court, APA
I
n its landmark 2005 decision abolishing the juvenile
death penalty (Roper v. Simmons, 2005), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the inherent immaturity of adolescents relative to adults mitigated teenagers’ criminal
responsibility to the extent that it barred the imposition of
capital punishment for crimes committed under the age of
18, regardless of their heinousness. Prior to this decision, in
the United States, individuals could be executed for capital
crimes committed at the age of 16 or older. By a 5-to-4
vote, the Court ruled that this age boundary should be set at
18, rather than 16.
Developmental science was front and center in the
Court’s ruling, which drew extensively on an amicus curiae
brief submitted by the American Psychological Association
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
© 2009 American Psychological Association 0003-066X/09/$12.00
Vol. 64, No. 7, 583–594
DOI: 10.1037/a0014763
Temple University
University of California, Irvine
Georgetown University
University of California, Los Angeles
University of Colorado
(APA, 2004) and was informed by a recent summary of
relevant research on psychological development during
adolescence that was published in this journal (Steinberg &
Scott, 2003). Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony
Kennedy drew attention to three specific aspects of adolescents’ immaturity that diminished their criminal culpability: their underdeveloped sense of responsibility (and difficulty controlling their impulses), their heightened
vulnerability to peer pressure, and the unformed nature of
their characters. As Justice Kennedy wrote,
First, as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological
studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, “[a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found
in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and
ill-considered actions and decisions.” . . . The second area of
difference is that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure. . . . The third broad difference is that the character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality
traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed. . . . These differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among
the worst offenders. (Roper v. Simmons, 2005, pp. 15–16)
The position taken by APA in its brief—that adolescents are inherently less blameworthy than adults as a
consequence of their developmental immaturity—was
noteworthy not only because it proved so influential to the
Court’s decision but because it appeared, on its face, to
contradict a stance taken by APA in a previous U.S. SuEditor’s note. June P. Tangney served as the action editor for this article.
Author’s note. Laurence Steinberg, Department of Psychology, Temple
University; Elizabeth Cauffman, Department of Psychology and Social
Behavior, University of California, Irvine; Jennifer Woolard, Department
of Psychology, Georgetown University; Sandra Graham, Psychological
Studies in Education, University of California, Los Angeles; Marie
Banich, Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry, University of Colorado.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Laurence Steinberg, Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122. E-mail: lds@temple.edu
583
Ultimately, Simmons wants the Court to declare that [drawing the
age boundary for purposes of death penalty eligibility at 16] is
now “without penological justification” not based on research that
uniformly reaches that conclusion, but based on inconsistent
research, viewed through the lense [sic] of a stereotype that the
American Psychological Association decried in Hodgson: “[T]he
assumption that adolescents as a group are less able than adults to
understand, reason and make decisions about intellectual and
social dilemmas is not supported by contemporary psychological
theory and research.” (Roper, 2004, p. 11)
Laurence
Steinberg
preme Court case, Hodgson v. Minnesota (1990). In that
case, which concerned a minor’s right to obtain an abortion
without parental notification, APA had argued that because
adolescents had decision-making skills comparable to those
of adults, there was no reason to require teenagers to notify
their parents before terminating a pregnancy (APA, 1987,
1989). Thus, in Roper, APA argued that science showed
that adolescents were not as mature as adults, whereas in
Hodgson, it argued that the science showed that they were.
The apparent contradiction in these views did not go
unnoticed. Justice Kennedy explicitly asked at oral argument in Roper if the APA had “flip-flopped” between 1989
(when its final amicus brief was filed in the abortion case)
and 2004 (when its brief was filed in the juvenile death
penalty case). The flip-flop issue also was raised by those
who disagreed with the Court’s decision to abolish the
juvenile death penalty. Indeed, in his dissenting opinion in
Roper v. Simmons (2005), Justice Antonin Scalia drew
unambiguous attention to this issue:
[T]he American Psychological Association (APA), which claims
in this case that scientific evidence shows persons under 18 lack
the ability to take moral responsibility for their decisions, has
previously taken precisely the opposite position before this very
Court. In its brief in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417 (1990),
the APA found a “rich body of research” showing that juveniles
are mature enough to decide whether to obtain an abortion without parental involvement. . . . The APA brief, citing psychology
treatises and studies too numerous to list here, asserted: “[B]y
middle adolescence (age 14 –15) young people develop abilities
similar to adults in reasoning about moral dilemmas, understanding social rules and laws, [and] reasoning about interpersonal
relationships and interpersonal problems.” (Justice Scalia, dissenting, pp. 11–12)
The petitioner in Roper, the State of Missouri, made a
similar point in its brief:
584
Concerns about reconciling the scientific arguments
offered in the two cases were also raised by abortion rights
advocates, but in a different context. Indeed, after Laurence
Steinberg met with the Executive Committee of the Society
for Research on Adolescence, asking for the organization’s
endorsement of the APA stance in Roper, the committee
decided not to sign on to the APA brief, fearing that the
argument that adolescents were not as mature as adults (and
thus ineligible for capital punishment) would come back to
haunt those who had worked so hard to secure the abortion
rights of young women. As it turns out, these worries were
not unfounded. Within two years of the Roper decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court heard Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
Northern New England (2006), which, like Hodgson, concerned minors’ access to abortion without parental involvement. Opponents of adolescents’ autonomous abortion
rights had taken the Court’s characterization of adolescent
immaturity in the juvenile death penalty case and used it to
argue in favor of parental involvement requirements. Citing
the Roper decision, they argued,
Parental involvement is critical to ensure not only that the adolescent’s choice is informed, but that it is freely made and not the
result of coercion or duress. . . . These concerns are heightened for
adolescents who, as this Court has recently observed, are more
susceptible than adults to “outside pressure” and other “negative
influences,” and more likely than adults to make decisions that are
“impetuous and ill-considered.” Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct.
1183, 1195 (2005). (Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern
New England, 2006, p. 15)
It is easy to see why many criticized the APA for its
apparently contradictory positions. On the face of it, the
APA position in the juvenile death penalty case was in
direct opposition to the stance it took in Hodgson. In its
amicus brief arguing for adolescents’ abortion rights, for
example, APA stated,
[B]y age 14 most adolescents have developed adult-like intellectual and social capacities [italics added] including specific abilities outlined in the law as necessary for understanding treatment
alternatives, considering risks and benefits, and giving legally competent consent. (APA, 1989, p. 20)
However, in its amicus brief arguing against the juvenile
death penalty, APA stated,
Given that 16- and 17-year-olds as a group are less mature
developmentally than adults [italics added], imposing capital punishment on such adolescents does not serve the judicially recognized purposes of the sanction. (APA, 2004, p. 13)
APA responded to accusations that developmental
psychologists were trying to have their scientific cake and
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
Elizabeth
Cauffman
eat it too—spinning the science for the sake of youth
advocacy— by pointing out that the type of decision under
consideration in Roper was not the same as that at issue in
Hodgson:
We [APA] took note of the Hodgson brief in the approval process
for APA’s brief in [Roper] but concluded that the two cases were
distinguishable in several respects. [Roper] and Hodgson, while
both dealing with adolescent decision-making, involved very different legal issues and different types of decisions. Therefore the
research, which was different in each of the two cases, addressed
distinct aspects of adolescent behavior and attributes. (Gilfoyle,
2005, p. 1)
There is no question that the legal issues in Hodgson
and Roper differed. The abortion rights case was a 14th
Amendment case involving the amendment’s due process
clause. The central question considered in Hodgson was
whether the state had a compelling interest in mandating
that an adolescent seeking an abortion be required to first
notify both her parents. Several legal issues were relevant,
including whether the notification requirement placed an
undue burden on adolescents (especially those whose parents were divorced or estranged) and whether providing for
a judicial hearing as an alternative to parental notification
(known as a “judicial bypass”) was acceptable, but the
most relevant for the present discussion concerned the
competence of adolescents to make informed and sound
health care decisions on their own. If it could be concluded
that adolescents were sufficiently competent to make an
informed decision about whether to terminate a pregnancy,
the state’s interest in requiring parental notification would
be rendered less compelling. Ultimately, the Court ruled
that requiring parental notification was constitutional so
long as a bypass provision was part of the law.
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
The juvenile death penalty case was an 8th Amendment case involving the amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishments clause. A central issue in Roper was whether
adolescents were mature enough to be held to adult levels
of criminal blameworthiness and, in particular, to a level of
blameworthiness that potentially warranted capital punishment; if they were not, the juvenile death penalty was
excessively cruel. Under a bedrock principle of American
criminal law known as “penal proportionality,” the punishment a guilty party receives should be in proportion to his
or her culpability for the criminal act, and certain factors
are accepted as mitigating the actor’s culpability. These
mitigating factors include diminished decision-making capability (e.g., decision making that is impulsive or shortsighted), exposure to coercion, and evidence of the offender’s otherwise good character (Steinberg & Scott, 2003).
As noted earlier, the Court ruled that the inherent immaturity of adolescents, with respect to the impetuousness of
their decision making, their susceptibility to coercion, and
their unformed characters, made them categorically less
blameworthy than the average criminal and therefore not
eligible for a punishment that was reserved for only the
most culpable offenders.
Whether APA in fact “flip-flopped” or, worse yet,
tried to have it both ways, as its critics have contended, is
an exceedingly important question, both with respect to the
decisions about where to draw legal boundaries between
adolescents and adults for various purposes and with respect to APA’s scientific credibility more generally. As
some of us have written elsewhere, “scientists’ authority to
enter the policy arena rests largely on the credibility of their
research findings” (Grisso & Steinberg, 2005, p. 620). If
APA’s statements about the state of scientific knowledge
are seen as advocacy masquerading as research, the integrity of the Association’s scientific mission is threatened.
After all, in both Hodgson and Roper, APA took a position
that could be fairly characterized as, at the very least,
friendly to youth advocates. It is crucial, therefore, to
examine the issue empirically. That is the focus of the
present article.
For the past several years, as members of the
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent
Development and Juvenile Justice, we have been studying
age differences in many of the cognitive and psychosocial
capacities that have been at issue in the Supreme Court
cases discussed above. We have been studying basic intellectual abilities, such as working memory and verbal fluency, but also aspects of psychosocial development, including impulse control (Steinberg et al., 2008), future
orientation (Steinberg et al., 2009), reward sensitivity
(Cauffman et al., in press), sensation seeking (Steinberg et
al., 2008), and susceptibility to peer influence (Steinberg &
Monahan, 2007). To our knowledge, ours is the first study
to include both cognitive and psychosocial measures administered to the same sample, to include an ethnically and
socioeconomically diverse group of individuals, and to
span the period from preadolescence through young adulthood.
585
Jennifer
Woolard
On the basis of this work, some of which we summarize in the pages that follow, we believe that APA’s seemingly contradictory positions in Hodgson and Roper are in
fact quite compatible with research on age differences in
cognitive and psychosocial capacities. More specifically,
our findings, as well as those of other researchers, suggest
that whereas adolescents and adults perform comparably on
cognitive tests measuring the sorts of cognitive abilities
that were referred to in the Hodgson brief—abilities that
permit logical reasoning about moral, social, and interpersonal matters—adolescents and adults are not of equal
maturity with respect to the psychosocial capacities listed
by Justice Kennedy in the majority opinion in Roper—
capacities such as impulse control and resistance to peer
influence. Not only were the legal issues different in the
two cases, but so are the circumstances surrounding abortion decisions and criminal behavior, and therefore, the
relevant dimensions along which adolescents and adults
should be compared differ as well. Unlike adolescents’
decisions to commit crimes, which are usually rash and
made in the presence of peers, adolescents’ decisions about
terminating a pregnancy can be made in an unhurried
fashion and in consultation with adults.
We recognize that not all abortion decisions are deliberative, rational, and autonomous and that not all criminal decisions are impulsive, emotional, and influenced by
others. After all, any decision about whether to abort a
pregnancy or carry it to term has an emotional component,
involves both immediate and long-term consequences, and
may be influenced by the opinions of family and friends.
By the same token, adolescents’ crimes are occasionally
strategic, planned in advance, and executed alone. In general, though, when contemplating an abortion, an adolescent has time to deliberate before making a final choice and
586
has an opportunity to consult with an adult expert, whereas
the circumstances leading up to the typical adolescent
criminal offense—robbing a convenience store, for instance—are characterized by heightened emotional arousal,
time pressure, and peer influence.
For example, studies indicate that about half of all
pregnant adolescents contemplating an abortion whose parents are unaware of the situation consult with a nonparental
adult other than medical staff (e.g., a teacher, school counselor, clergyperson, older relative, or adult friend of the
family); this figure is the same among younger (under age
16) and older adolescents (Henshaw & Kost, 1992). Moreover, 35 states require all women seeking an abortion to
receive some type of counseling from the abortion provider
before the procedure is performed, usually including information about the specific procedure as well as the health
risks of abortion and pregnancy (Guttmacher Institute,
2009). Twenty-four states mandate a waiting period of at
least 24 hours between the counseling and the medical
procedure (Guttmacher Institute, 2009). Thus, it does not
appear as if a high proportion of pregnant teenagers decide
to terminate a pregnancy under circumstances that are
rushed or in the absence of adult advice. In contrast, studies
indicate that adolescents’ crimes are more often than not
impulsive and unplanned (Farrington, 2003) and typically
committed with peers (Reiss & Farrington, 1991). Thus,
while some of the capabilities relevant to both decisionmaking contexts no doubt overlap, the circumstances that
define “mature” behavior in each are clearly different.
Resisting peer influence, thinking before making a decision, and considering the future consequences of one’s
actions are clearly more important in criminal decision
making than abortion decision making, in part because
society structures the latter context to promote consultation
with adults and avoid hasty decision making.
The importance of maintaining a distinction between
cognitive and psychosocial maturity in discussions of the
legal status of adolescents is supported by other research
that has examined age differences in each of these domains.
Studies that have examined logical reasoning abilities in
structured situations and basic information-processing
skills, for instance, have found no appreciable differences
between adolescents age 16 and older and adults; any gains
that take place in these domains during adolescence occur
very early in the adolescent decade, and improvements
after this age are very small (Hale, 1990; Kail, 1997;
Keating, 2004; Overton, 1990). The results of the
MacArthur Foundation Research Network’s earlier study
of age differences in competence to stand trial, which
depends on individuals’ ability to understand facts about a
court proceeding and to reason with those facts in a rational
fashion, also were consistent with these findings. We found
significant differences between the competence-related
abilities of adults and those of adolescents who were 15 and
younger, but no differences between the abilities of adults
and those of adolescents who were 16 and older (Grisso et
al., 2003). This general pattern, indicating that adolescents
attain adult levels of competence to stand trial somewhere
around age 15, has been reported in similar studies of
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
Sandra
Graham
decision making across a wide variety of domains (e.g.,
Grisso, 1980; Jacobs-Quadrel, Fischhoff, & Davis, 1993)
and in many studies of age differences in individuals’
competence to provide informed consent (Belter & Grisso,
1984; Grisso & Vierling, 1978; Gustafson & McNamara,
1987; Weithorn & Campbell, 1982).
In contrast, the literature on age differences in psychosocial characteristics such as impulsivity, sensation
seeking, future orientation, and susceptibility to peer pressure shows continued development well beyond middle
adolescence and even into young adulthood (Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996),
although few studies have gone much beyond adolescence
(but see Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000, for an exception).
Consistent with this literature, and in contrast to the pattern
of age differences seen in the information-processing, logical reasoning, and informed consent literatures, studies of
age differences in the sorts of risky behavior likely to be
influenced by the psychosocial factors listed above—such
as reckless driving, binge drinking, crime, and spontaneous
unprotected sex—indicate that risky behavior is significantly more common during late adolescence and early
adulthood than after (Steinberg, 2007). In other words,
although adolescents may demonstrate adult-like levels of
maturity in some respects by the time they reach 15 or 16,
in other respects they show continued immaturity well
beyond this point in development.
The MacArthur Juvenile Capacity
Study
Participants
The MacArthur Juvenile Capacity Study was designed to
examine age differences in a variety of cognitive and
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
psychosocial capacities that are relevant to debates about
the relative maturity of adolescents and adults, especially
as they affect judgments of criminal blameworthiness.
There were five data collection sites in the study: Los
Angeles; Irvine, CA; Denver; Philadelphia; and Washington, DC. Data for the present study come from 935 individuals ranging in age from 10 to 30 years (M ! 17.84
years). Participants were recruited via newspaper advertisements and flyers posted at community organizations, Boys
& Girls Clubs, churches, community colleges, and local
places of business in neighborhoods targeted to have an
average household education level of “some college” according to 2000 U.S. Census data. Because we were interested in characterizing the capacities of “average” adolescents and adults, we did not target individuals on the basis
of their involvement with the legal system but sought
instead to survey an ethnically and socioeconomically diverse sample of individuals in the age range of interest.
Individuals who were interested in the study were
asked to call the research office listed on the flyer. Members of the research team described the nature of the study
to prospective participants over the telephone and invited
those interested to participate. Given this recruitment strategy, it is not possible to know how many potential participants saw the advertisements, what proportion responded,
and whether those who responded were different from
those who did not, although the education level of the
sample is comparable to that of the people in the neighborhoods from which it was drawn.
Data collection took place either at one of the participating university’s offices or at a convenient location in
the community. Before beginning, participants were provided verbal and written explanations of the study, their
confidentiality was assured, and their written consent or
assent was obtained. For participants who were under the
age of 18, informed consent was obtained from either a
parent or a guardian.
Procedure
Prior to data collection, all site project directors and research assistants met at one location for several days of
training. The project coordinators and research assistants
conducted on-site practice protocol administrations prior to
enrolling participants. Participants took part in a two- to
two-and-one-half-hour interview that included three sets of
measures: (a) a series of computerized tasks designed to
assess a range of executive functions (not discussed in this
report); (b) a series of questionnaires designed to measure
a variety of psychosocial capacities relevant to discussions
of how adolescents should be treated by the legal system;
and (c) tests of basic intellectual functioning. The tasks and
questionnaires were administered on a laptop computer in
individual interviews. Research assistants were present to
monitor the participant’s progress, reading aloud the instructions as each new task was presented and providing
assistance as needed. To keep participants engaged in the
computer tasks, we told the participants that they would
receive $35 for participating in the study and that they
could obtain up to a total of $50 (or, for participants who
587
Marie Banich
were under 14, an additional prize) depending on their
performance. In actuality, we paid all participants ages
14 –30 the full $50, and all participants ages 10 –13 received $35 plus a prize (approximately $15 in value). This
strategy was used to increase the motivation to perform
well on the tasks but also to ensure that no participants
were penalized for their performance. All procedures were
approved by the institutional review board of the university
associated with the data collection site.
Measures
Of interest in the present report are the demographic measures and IQ (which were used to ensure that the various
age groups had comparable social and intellectual backgrounds), the measures of psychosocial capacities, and the
tests of basic intellectual functioning.
Demographic variables. Participants provided information about their age, gender, ethnicity, and
highest level of education within their household. For
youths 17 years of age and younger, household education
was based on parents’ level of education, as research has
indicated that parental education may be the most stable
component of a family’s social class (Steinberg, Mounts,
Lamborn, & Dornbusch, 1991). For participants 18 years of
age and older, their own educational attainment was used to
index this construct. In order to have cells with sufficiently
large and comparably sized subsamples for purposes of
data analysis, we created age groups as follows: 10 –11,
12–13, 14 –15, 16 –17, 18 –21, 22–25, and 26 –30 years.
The age groups did not differ with respect to gender or
ethnicity but did differ, albeit modestly, with respect to
household education. Accordingly, all subsequent analyses
controlled for this variable. Demographic characteristics of
the sample are presented in Table 1.
588
IQ. The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(WASI) Full-Scale IQ Two-Subtest (FSIQ-2) (Psychological Corporation, 1999) was used to produce an estimate of
general intellectual ability based on two (Vocabulary and
Matrix Reasoning) of the four subtests. The WASI can be
administered in approximately 15 minutes and is correlated
with the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (r ! .81)
and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (r ! .87). It has
been normed for individuals between the ages of 6 to 89
years. Because there were small but significant differences
between the age groups in mean IQ, this variable was
controlled for in all subsequent analyses.
Psychosocial maturity. The battery of instruments contained self-report measures of five capacities
frequently mentioned in discussions about age differences
in maturity and their relevance to legal policy. Table 2 lists
these measures and provides sample items from each.
Three widely used and well-validated Likert-scaletype instruments were used to assess risk perception (the
extent to which one perceives a potentially dangerous or
harmful activity as risky), sensation seeking (the extent to
which one actively seeks experiences that provide thrills),
and impulsivity (the extent to which one acts without thinking or has difficulty controlling impulses). Risk perception
was assessed using a modified version of a widely used
measure developed by Benthin, Slovic, and Severson
(1993). The respondent is presented with eight potentially
dangerous activities (e.g., riding in a car with a drunk
driver, having unprotected sex) and asked to indicate how
risky the activity is (" ! .82).1 Sensation seeking was
assessed using a subset of six items (" ! .70) from the
Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978).2 Impulsivity was assessed using all 18 items
(" ! .73) from three six-item subscales of the Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995):
Motor Impulsivity, Inability to Delay Gratification, and
Lack of Perseverance. All three self-report measures have
been shown to be significantly correlated with behavioral
indices of their associated constructs. In our sample, scores
on the impulsivity self-report measure were significantly
negatively related to the amount of time participants waited
before making their first move on a Tower of London task,
and scores on the sensation-seeking questionnaire were
significantly correlated with sensation-seeking behavior in
a video driving game (Steinberg et al., 2008). In addition,
individuals who were less likely to perceive potentially
risky behaviors as risky were more likely to report engaging in high-risk behavior.
1
The original Benthin et al. (1993) measure also contains an item
concerning alcohol use. Our analyses indicated that including this item in
the scale’s construction adversely differentiated the reliability of the scale
among the younger and older participants, most likely because the use of
alcohol is risky for minors but not necessarily for adults. As a consequence, we dropped that item from our scale computation.
2
Many of the items on the full Zuckerman et al. (1978) scale appear
to measure impulsivity, not sensation seeking (e.g., “I often do things on
impulse.”) Because we have a separate measure of impulsivity in our
battery, we used only the Zuckerman et al. items that clearly indexed thrill
or novelty seeking (see Table 2).
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample (N ! 935)
Characteristic
Percentage
Age (in years)
10–11
12–13
14–15
16–17
18–21
22–25
26–30
Gender
Male
Female
Ethnicity
African American
Asian American
Hispanic
White
Other/biracial
Household education
High school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Postcollege
12.5
14.7
13.8
15.2
15.9
14.6
13.2
49.2
50.8
29.2
15.1
21.2
24.0
9.9
11.9
22.8
34.1
21.4
9.7
Two additional psychosocial capacities, resistance to
peer influence and future orientation, were assessed using
new self-report measures developed for this program of
work. Each used a response format introduced by Harter
(1982) in which respondents are presented with two oppos-
ing statements that are both phrased in a socially acceptable
fashion, asked to indicate which best describes them, and
then asked whether the descriptor is “very true” or “sort of
true.” (This format is presumed to reduce social desirability
bias.) Resistance to peer influence (Steinberg & Monahan,
2007) was assessed using a 10-item scale (" ! .76) designed to measure the extent to which individuals change
their behavior or opinions in order to follow the crowd. We
have no data on the validity of this measure in the current
sample, but we do in analyses of data from a large study of
serious juvenile offenders. There we found that the presence of antisocial peers in an individual’s network is more
highly correlated with the individual’s own criminal behavior among those who report a low ability to resist peer
influence on this measure than among those who have
equally antisocial peers but score high in self-reported
resistance to peer influence (Monahan, Steinberg, & Cauffman, 2007). Studies of the neural underpinnings of resistance to peer influence using this measure have found
neurobiological differences between same-age individuals
who vary in their resistance to peer influence in ways
consistent with the notion that higher scores on this instrument reflect better coordination of affect and thinking
(Grosbras et al., 2007; Paus et al., 2008), a key component
of psychosocial maturity in our conceptualization of the
construct. Future orientation was assessed using a 15-item
scale (" ! .80) that measures the anticipation of future
consequences, planning ahead, and thinking about the future. The validity of this measure is supported by our
finding that individuals who score high on this scale are
more likely to choose a larger delayed reward over an
immediate smaller one in a delay discounting task (Steinberg et al., 2009).
A composite measure of psychosocial maturity was
formed by reverse-scoring the measures of impulsivity and
Table 2
Indices of Psychosocial Maturity
Construct
Measure
Risk perception
Benthin et al., 1993
Sensation seeking
Impulsivity
Resistance to peer influence
Zuckerman et al., 1978
Patton et al., 1995
Steinberg & Monahan, 2007
Future orientation
Steinberg et al., 2009
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
Sample item
“If you did this activity (e.g., had unprotected sex), how
much are you at risk for something bad happening?”
“I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening.”
“I do things without thinking.”
“Some people think it’s better to be an individual even if
people will be angry at you for going against the
crowd.
BUT
Other people think it’s better to go along with the crowd
than to make people angry at you.”
“Some people take life one day at a time without
worrying about the future.
BUT
Other people are always thinking about what tomorrow
will bring.”
589
sensation seeking so that higher scores indicated greater
maturity (i.e., more impulse control and less thrill seeking),
standardizing all five measures, and averaging the standardized scores. Thus, individuals who score relatively
lower on the composite characterize themselves as less
likely to perceive dangerous situations as risky, more impulsive, more thrill seeking, more oriented to the immediate, and more susceptible to peer influence. This is very
similar to the portrait of adolescents described by Justice
Kennedy in his majority opinion in the juvenile death
penalty case. A confirmatory factor analysis indicated that
the composite model fit the data well (comparative fit
index ! .95, root mean square error of approximation !
.075). The five indicators are modestly, but significantly,
intercorrelated (rs range from .14 to .38; average r ! .26).
Cognitive capacity. The test battery included
several widely used tests of basic cognitive skills, including
a test of resistance to interference in working memory
(Thompson-Schill et al., 2002), a digit-span memory test,
and a test of verbal fluency. The resistance to interference
in working memory test was one in which participants saw
four probe letters on the screen and then a target. They
were then asked whether the target was among the four
probes. On test trials, two of the four letters presented had
appeared in the previous trial, providing interference with
recall on the present trial. An overall accuracy score was
computed by averaging the number of correct responses
across all test trials. The digit-span memory test was similar to that in the Wechsler scales. Participants heard a
series of 13 sequences of digits (beginning with two digits
and increasing to eight) that they were asked to recall
forwards and 13 sequences that they were asked to recall
backwards. A memory score was computed by averaging
the total number of forward trials and backward trials
recalled correctly. Finally, the measure of verbal fluency
asked participants to generate, in one minute, as many
words as possible that either began with a specific letter
(three trials) or were members of a category (e.g., fruits;
three trials). A verbal fluency score was computed by
averaging the number of words generated for each of the
six lists.
Because the composite consisted of only three items,
it was not possible to derive a reliable estimate of internal
consistency. However, after examining the intercorrelations among the tests, we found them to be significant
(fluency and working memory, r ! .29; working memory
and digit span, r ! .39; digit span and verbal fluency, r !
.40). Accordingly, scores on each of the measures were
standardized, and the standard scores were averaged to
create an index of general cognitive capacity. Not surprisingly, our composite measure of general cognitive capacity
is significantly correlated with IQ (r ! .46, p # .001).
Unlike IQ scores, however, which are adjusted for chronological age, the measure of cognitive capacity is not. More
important, because we controlled for IQ in all analyses, any
observed age differences in general cognitive capacity are
not due to age differences in intelligence.
In its original amicus brief in Hodgson, the APA
(1987) made reference to the “cognitive capacity” (p. 6) of
590
adolescents and cited sources that referred to both information-processing abilities (Keating, 1980) and logical reasoning (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) in support of its argument
that adolescents are as cognitively competent as adults. We
acknowledge that our index, which tilts heavily toward
measuring how many pieces of information an individual
can process or produce, does not measure logical or moral
reasoning and as such is an incomplete measure of cognitive capacity as conceptualized in the APA Hodgson brief.
Our measure assesses cognitive ability in a highly structured manner and as such does not tap aspects of executive
function that may be important in novel situations. It is also
important to note that our measure of general cognitive
capacity does not include tests of higher order executive
functioning, such as comparing short- versus long-term
consequences, coordinating affect and cognition, or balancing risk and reward. Many such executive functions have
both cognitive and psychosocial aspects to them, however,
and given that our interest was in maintaining a distinction
between general cognitive and psychosocial capacities so
as to better examine their distinct developmental timetables, it was important not to conflate the two. The measures
of psychosocial maturity and cognitive capacity are very
modestly correlated once age is controlled, r(922) ! .15,
p # .001. Although our operationalization of general cognitive capacity is not identical to that used by APA in its
argument, it is very clear that the authors of the Hodgson
brief (APA, 1987) were referring to cognitive abilities and
not psychosocial maturity and that the authors of the Roper
brief (APA, 2004) were referring to psychosocial maturity
and not cognitive capacity.
Results
Two analyses of covariance were conducted in order to
examine age patterns in psychosocial maturity and general
cognitive capacity; as noted earlier, both analyses controlled for IQ and household education.
The results of the two analyses are shown in Figures
1 and 2. Each figure presents the age group means for the
standardized composites, with a value of 1.0 added to each
Figure 1
Psychosocial Maturity (Standardized Composite
Scores) as a Function of Age (in Years)
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
Figure 2
General Cognitive Capacity (Standardized Composite
Scores) as a Function of Age (in Years)
Figure 3
Proportion of Individuals in Each Age Group Scoring at
or Above the Mean for 26- to 30-Year-Olds on Indices
of Cognitive Capacity and Psychosocial Maturity
group’s mean for ease of presentation (i.e., to make all
values positive numbers). The analysis of age differences
in psychosocial maturity indicates a significant age effect,
F(6, 900) ! 12.577, p # .001. As Figure 1 indicates, age
differences in psychosocial maturity, as assessed in this
study, did not emerge until mid-adolescence but were present
throughout late adolescence and early adulthood. Indeed, pairwise comparisons, using a Bonferroni correction, revealed no
significant differences in psychosocial maturity among the
first four age groups (10 –11, 12–13, 14 –15, and 16 –17 years)
but significant differences between the 16 –17-year-olds and
those 22 and older, and between the 18 –21-year-olds and
those 26 and older. In neither case was there a significant
interaction between age and gender, indicating that the patterns were the same among males and females.
The analysis of age differences in cognitive capacity
shows a very different pattern. As with psychosocial maturity, there is a highly significant age effect, F(6, 901) !
58.246, p # .001. However, as Figure 2 indicates, age
differences in cognitive capacity were evident during the
first part of adolescence but not after age 16 —just the
opposite from the pattern seen with respect to psychosocial
maturity. Pairwise comparisons using a Bonferroni correction indicated significant differences in general cognitive
capacity between each of the first four age groups but no
age differences after age 16.
Figure 3 presents these data in a somewhat different way.
Here we show the proportion of individuals in each age group
who scored at or above the mean level of the 26- to 30-yearolds in our sample on the psychosocial and cognitive composites, graphed in the same figure. As the figure indicates,
general cognitive capacity reaches adult levels long before the
process of psychosocial maturation is complete.
Although our measure of cognitive capacity included
several of the information-processing skills noted in the
APA (1987) Hodgson brief but did not include indices of
the sort of reasoning to which APA referred, it is important
to ask whether the pattern of age differences we found on
this measure resembles that observed using measures of
more sophisticated cognitive abilities of the sort believed to
influence abortion decision making. As we noted earlier, in
addition to the present study, the MacArthur Network also
conducted a study of age differences in capacities related to
competence to stand trial (Grisso et al., 2003). The main
instrument used to assess these capacities was the
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool—Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT–CA), a standardized interview that
measures respondents’ understanding of and reasoning
about their legal situation (Poythress et al., 1999). Although the abilities necessary for competence to stand trial
are not identical to those necessary for competent decision
making about abortion, they are conceptually similar in that
both involve being able to understand and reason with facts
and appreciate the nature of one’s situation.
Figure 4 presents data from the present study alongside data from the Grisso et al. (2003) study in a way
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
Figure 4
Proportion of Individuals in Each Age Group Scoring
at or Above the Mean for 22- to 24-Year-Olds on
Index of Cognitive Capacity and on a Measure of
Abilities Relevant to Competence to Stand Trial
Note. MacCAT–CA ! MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool—Criminal
Adjudication, Understanding and Reasoning subscales. MacCAT–CA data are
from Grisso et al (2003).
591
comparable to that used in Figure 3, that is, in terms of the
proportion of individuals of different ages who performed
at or above the mean level of the adults in the sample. The
Grisso et al. study included participants ages 11 to 24,
drawn equally from the community and the justice system.
In order to make the appropriate comparison of these data
to those of the present study, we excluded the justice
system subsample from the analyses (the average IQ of that
subsample was 85, substantially lower than that of the
present study), categorized individuals into chronological
age groups that paralleled those used in the present study
(11, 12–13, 14 –15, 16 –17, 18 –21, and 22–24 years), and
used the oldest group as the adult reference category.
Similarly, we reanalyzed the cognitive capacity data from
the present study after dropping the 10-year-olds, excluding individuals who were older than 24, and using 22- to
24-year-olds as the adult reference category.
As Figure 4 illustrates, the pattern of age differences
in abilities relevant to competence to stand trial is virtually
identical to the pattern seen with respect to general cognitive capacity as assessed in the present study. On both
indices, scores increased between ages 11 and 16 and then
leveled off, with no improvement after this age. This gives
us greater confidence that the absence of age differences in
cognitive capacity after age 16 observed in our study is not
merely a function of the fact that our index included only
measures of basic information-processing abilities. Rather,
our reanalysis of the Grisso et al. (2003) data supports the
argument that adolescents reach adult levels of cognitive
maturity several years before they reach adult levels of
psychosocial maturity.
Discussion
Developmental psychologists with expertise in adolescence
are frequently called on to provide guidance about the
appropriate treatment of young people under the law and
about the proper placement of legal age boundaries between those who should be treated as adults and those who
should not. The results of the present study suggest that it
is not prudent to make sweeping statements about the
relative maturity of adolescents and adults, because the
answer to the question of whether adolescents are as mature
as adults depends on the aspects of maturity under consideration. By age 16, adolescents’ general cognitive abilities
are essentially indistinguishable from those of adults, but
adolescents’ psychosocial functioning, even at the age of
18, is significantly less mature than that of individuals in
their mid-20s. In this regard, it is neither inconsistent nor
disingenuous for scientists to argue that studies of psychological development indicate that the boundary between
adolescence and adulthood should be drawn at a particular
chronological age for one policy purpose and at a different
one for another.
Whether and how these findings should inform decisions about adolescents’ treatment under the law depends
on the specific legal issue under consideration. To varying
degrees, such decisions rely on value judgments (e.g.,
about what aspects of maturity are relevant to a particular
decision or about what is mature “enough” to warrant
592
autonomy and/or culpability), which science alone cannot
dictate. Nevertheless, the legal treatment of adolescents
should at the very least be informed by the most accurate
and timely scientific evidence on the nature and course of
psychological development. On the basis of the present
study, as well as previous research, it seems reasonable to
distinguish between two very different decision-making
contexts in this regard: those that allow for unhurried,
logical reflection and those that do not. This distinction is
also in keeping with our emerging understanding of adolescent brain maturation, which suggests that brain systems
responsible for logical reasoning and basic information
processing mature earlier than those that undergird more
advanced executive functions and the coordination of affect
and cognition necessary for psychosocial maturity (Steinberg, 2008).
When it comes to decisions that permit more deliberative, reasoned decision making, where emotional and social influences on judgment are minimized or can be mitigated, and where there are consultants who can provide
objective information about the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, adolescents are likely to be just as
capable of mature decision making as adults, at least by the
time they are 16. Three domains of decision making that
would seem to fit into this category are medical decision
making (where health care practitioners can provide information and encourage adolescents to think through their
decisions before acting), legal decision making (where
legal practitioners, such as defense attorneys, can play a
comparable role), and decisions about participating in research studies (where research investigators, guided by
institutional review boards, can function similarly). Although adults in these positions cannot and should not
make the decision for the adolescent, they surely can take
steps to create a context in which adolescents’ decisionmaking competence will be maximized. The position taken
by APA in Hodgson v. Minnesota (1990), in favor of
granting adolescents’ access to abortion without the necessity of parental involvement, therefore seems to us to be
consistent with the available scientific evidence, so long as
youngsters under the age of 16 have the opportunity to
consult with other, informed adults (e.g., health care practitioners, counselors).
In contrast, in situations that elicit impulsivity, that are
typically characterized by high levels of emotional arousal
or social coercion, or that do not encourage or permit
consultation with an expert who is more knowledgeable or
experienced, adolescents’ decision making, at least until
they have turned 18, is likely to be less mature than adults’.
This set of circumstances likely characterizes the commission of most crimes perpetrated by adolescents (which are
usually committed in groups and are seldom premeditated;
Farrington, 2003; Zimring, 1998) and may also be typical
of other situations where adolescents are emotionally
aroused, in groups, absent adult supervision, and facing
choices with apparent immediate rewards and few obvious
or immediate costs—the very conditions that are likely to
undermine adolescents’ decision-making competence
(Steinberg, 2007). These conditions often prevail in situaOctober 2009 ● American Psychologist
tions involving the purchase of alcohol and tobacco, driving, and other potentially health-compromising behaviors,
such as having unprotected sex. In these cases, adolescents’
relative immaturity should be acknowledged either by imposing greater restraints on their behavior than are imposed
on adults (e.g., prohibiting the purchase of alcohol, restricting driving to certain hours of the day or certain conditions)
or by providing added protections (e.g., prohibiting capital
punishment, making condoms easily accessible). Thus,
APA’s argument that adolescents should not be subject to
capital punishment owing to their impulsivity and susceptibility to peer pressure is consistent with the results of our
own research and with other scientific studies of psychosocial development that show continued maturation of
these capacities well into young adulthood (Steinberg &
Scott, 2003).
In our view, then, the seemingly conflicting positions
taken by APA in Roper v. Simmons (2005) and Hodgson v.
Minnesota (1990) are not contradictory. Rather, they simply emphasize different aspects of maturity, in accordance
with the differing nature of the decision-making scenarios
involved in each case. The skills and abilities necessary to
make an informed decision about a medical procedure are
likely in place several years before the capacities necessary
to regulate one’s behavior under conditions of emotional
arousal or coercive pressure from peers.
Science alone cannot dictate public policy, although it
can, and should, inform it. Our data can neither “prove” nor
“disprove” the appropriateness of requiring parental involvement before a teenager can obtain an abortion, but
they do inform the debate. Nor do our data “prove” or
“disprove” whether it is appropriate to apply the death
penalty to individuals who are inherently more impulsive
than adults and whose characters are not yet fully formed—
although, again, they are informative. But our findings do
demonstrate how the positions taken by APA in Hodgson v.
Minnesota (1990) and in Roper v. Simmons (2005) are
compatible with each other and consistent with the rapidly
growing body of scientific evidence indicating that intellectual maturity is reached several years before psychosocial maturity.
Developmental science can and should contribute to
debates about the drawing of legal age boundaries, but
research evidence cannot be applied to this sort of policy
analysis without a careful and nuanced consideration of the
particular demands placed on the individual for “adult-like”
maturity in different domains of functioning. Jurists, politicians, advocates, and journalists seeking a uniform answer to questions about where we should draw the line
between adolescence and adulthood for different purposes
under the law need to consider the asynchronous nature of
psychological maturation, especially during periods of dramatic and rapid change across multiple domains of functioning.
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October 2009 ● American Psychologist
Narrow Assessments Misrepresent Development and
Misguide Policy
Comment on Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, Graham, and Banich (2009)
Kurt W. Fischer, Zachary Stein, and Katie Heikkinen
Harvard Graduate School of Education
Intellectual and psychosocial functioning develop along
complex learning pathways. Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, Graham, and Banich (2009) measured these two
classes of abilities with narrow, biased assessments that
captured only a segment of each pathway and created
misleading age patterns based on ceiling and floor effects.
It is a simple matter to shift the assessments to produce the
opposite pattern, with cognitive abilities appearing to develop well into adulthood and psychosocial abilities appearing to stop developing at age 16. Their measures also
lacked a realistic connection to the lived behaviors of
adolescents, abstracting too far from messy realities and
thus lacking ecological validity and the nuanced portrait
that the authors called for. A drastically different approach
to assessing development is required that (a) includes the
full age-related range of relevant abilities instead of a
truncated set and (b) examines the variability and contextual dependence of abilities relevant to the topics of murder
and abortion.
Keywords: adolescence, assessment, cognitive development, learning pathway, maturity
C
hildren develop many different capabilities along
multiple pathways, and they gradually learn to use
those capabilities across many situations and in
many different emotional states. Steinberg, Cauffman,
Woolard, Graham, and Banich (2009, this issue) oversimplified development by dividing it into two categories—
cognitive and psychosocial—and measuring behavior in a
few tasks that did not capture the full range of capabilities
and contexts relevant to the issues of abortion and murder.
Within the full range, children develop many cognitive and
psychosocial capabilities long before age 16, and they
continue to develop others in both areas long after age 16.
The simplifications in the research by Steinberg and colleagues omit consideration of the breadth of cognitive and
psychosocial capabilities pertinent to decisions about abortion and murder and thus lead to conclusions about policy
that are misleading.
Consider Sally, a 17-year-old adolescent who has
lived with her mother since she was 7, when her father
moved out after a divorce. Her behavior illustrates the
range of capabilities relevant to the actions of children and
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
© 2009 American Psychological Association 0003-066X/09/$12.00
Vol. 64, No. 7, 595– 600
DOI: 10.1037/a0017105
adolescents as well as the importance of contexts for shaping those actions. At age 17, Sally’s relationship with her
mother has become strained. She struggles to control herself around her mother. Outbursts and arguments are almost daily occurrences. Sally knows that these irrational
arguments typically end in tears and frustration, but she
cannot seem to control herself. She wonders why she
cannot control her emotions at home the way that she did
when she was younger, when during her parents’ divorce
she could “hold herself together” and handle difficult situations when her mother was in distress.
Sally’s situation at school is different from the one at
home. During her parents’ divorce, when she was 6 and 7
years old, she struggled in school, and teachers suggested
that she be held back a year so her skills could develop to
the appropriate level. But now in high school, she excels in
many classes and serves as a peer mediator, volunteering
her time to help her classmates resolve their conflicts. Sally
wonders how she can be so together at school now when
she feels so out of control at home. She finds it curious that
years ago she was a mess in school but was more capable
of holding herself together at home.
Sally’s story exemplifies the variability and complexity of cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal development
during childhood and adolescence. In some respects, Sally
can be viewed as more emotionally mature and psychosocially capable at the age of 7—when the situation demanded it—than she is now at the age of 17. On the other
hand, her cognitive capabilities seem to display the opposite trend, changing from below average in grade school to
excellent in high school. In other words, her interpersonal
capabilities—as well as her cognitive and emotional
ones—vary or fluctuate drastically depending on context,
as she indulges in emotionally charged, irrational arguments at home while serving as a peer mediator at school.
Kurt W. Fischer, Zachary Stein, and Katie Heikkinen, Dynamic Development Laboratory, Human Development & Psychology, Harvard Graduate School of Education.
The writing of this article was supported by grants from the Harvard
University Graduate School of Education.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kurt
W. Fischer, Harvard Graduate School of Education, Larsen Hall 702,
Appian Way, Cambridge, MA 02138. E-mail: kurt_fischer@harvard.edu
595
measures to specific ages a priori. They conceptualized the
development of capabilities in essentialist and nondynamic
terms, ignored the radical importance of context, and assumed a static picture in which a capability, once it has
been displayed, is taken as simply present.
We examine their perspective on the development of
capabilities in adolescence in terms of two basic research
issues: construct validity (Did they conceive and measure
their basic constructs in a psychologically meaningful
way?) and ecological validity (Were they measuring constructs that are meaningfully related to the real lives of
adolescents, especially the complex issues related to abortion and murder?). It is important to note that people
develop differently in separate domains on the basis of their
experiences and interests, and their development continues
far into adulthood in domains on which they focus (Dawson-Tunik, 2004; Fischer, Yan, & Stewart, 2003; Kitchener, Lynch, Fischer, & Wood, 1993; Kohlberg, 1984).
Kurt W.
Fischer
Embracing the Complexity of
Development
This is how development looks during childhood and
adolescence. Capabilities develop with age and experience,
and they also fluctuate over time and across contexts and
domains. Most broad capabilities— cognitive, emotional,
and interpersonal— begin to develop during infancy and
are dynamically constructed well into adulthood. Development of new capabilities continues far beyond the age of
16. At all ages, development of new capabilities is marked
by discontinuities, spurts, and regressions and can unfold
along diverse pathways as various lines of development
interact. For over a century, psychologists and theorists
have attempted to embrace and explain the complexity and
diversity of human development (Baldwin, 1894, 1906;
Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Piaget, in Gruber & Voneche,
1977; Wilber, 1999).
When the full complexity of human development is
considered, it is hard to make simple arguments and offer
clear-cut advice. Steinberg and colleagues (2009) chose to
jettison this complexity— both conceptually and methodologically—in order to make a simple argument and offer
clear-cut advice for policy. They measured capabilities by
using tasks that are known to have ceiling effects at specific
ages and that have limited ecological validity (little relation
to the everyday lives of adolescents). Thus, they did not
capture the broad spectrum of related and lived abilities
that constitute cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal development—assessing instead only part of the pathways for
“intellectual” and “psychosocial” development. For intellectual capabilities, they assessed skills that develop early,
while for psychosocial capabilities, they focused on skills
that develop later, although they did not intend to tie their
596
Measuring Development in Childhood
and Adolescence: Construct Validity
Steinberg and colleagues (2009) sought to justify the “flipflop” in which the American Psychological Association
maintained that teens are mature enough to make reasonable decisions about abortion but not mature enough to be
treated as adults in death penalty cases. They argued that
this apparent flip-flop is justified by research findings that
teens attain adult-like capabilities at different ages in different domains. Specifically, they argued that adolescents’
cognitive capabilities develop earlier than their capacity for
emotional self-regulation and impulse control. To support
this claim, they reported research using a battery of tasks to
measure the proposed differential distribution of capabilities.
Cognitive Capabilities
To assess cognitive maturity, Steinberg et al. (2009) administered “tests of basic intellectual functioning” (p. 587),
which included tests of working memory interference, digit
span memory, and verbal fluency. We discuss these tests’
construct validity and their relevance to the larger construct
of “cognitive capacity,” or “cognitive maturity.” Although
the authors acknowledged that theirs was an “incomplete
measure of cognitive capacity” (p. 590), they nonetheless
made the bold claim that general cognitive capacity plateaus around age 16. This claim is spurious on at least two
grounds: (a) These tasks do not adequately represent general cognitive capacity, and (b) cognitive capacity, when
more carefully defined, does not plateau around age 16 or
17. The authors used tasks with ceiling effects.
Attempts to measure something like general cognitive
capacity with a single metric or composite go back to
Binet’s laboratory in Paris at the turn of the 20th century,
where intelligence testing was invented. Although Steinberg and colleagues (2009) separately assessed IQ in order
to control for it, their measures of “basic intellectual functioning” are quite close to traditional measures of intelligence. Even the best tests of intelligence do not capture
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
Zachary
Stein
everything about intelligence (Gardner, 1983), let alone a
broader construct like cognitive capacity. Working-memory interference tasks, digit-span memory tasks, and tests
of verbal fluency—the tasks used by Steinberg et al.—are
known to peak or plateau in the teenage years, and they
constitute only a few of the skills involved in cognitive
development (Horn, 1982).
Cognitive development includes many interrelated
and complex skills, such as logical reasoning (Inhelder &
Piaget, 1958), reflective judgment (Kitchener et al., 1993),
conceptual complexity (Case, 1992; Fischer & Bidell,
2006), and emotion regulation (Benes, Turtle, Khan, &
Farol, 1994; Dawson-Tunik, 2004; Fischer et al., 2003;
Vaillant, 1977). These skills all begin to develop early in
life, continue to develop well into adulthood, and vary as a
function of learning, context, and maturation. In contrast,
the standard tests of working memory and verbal fluency
are simpler tasks that plateau early. More complex skills
such as reflective judgment, logical reasoning, and even
working memory for sophisticated concepts such as conservation of energy, evolution by natural selection, and the
role of community in development do not plateau in the
teenage years.
The evidence is substantial that cognitive development continues for years beyond the ages of 15 or 16
(Dawson-Tunik, 2004; Fischer et al., 2003), and likewise
brain development continues well into adulthood (Benes et
al., 1994). Steinberg and colleagues (2009) were not justified in claiming that “by age 16, adolescents’ general
cognitive abilities are essentially indistinguishable from
those of adults” (p. 592). Their research indicators of
working memory and verbal fluency may have reached
adult levels by that age, but complex and important cognitive capabilities continue to develop long afterward. Even
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
vocabulary continues to increase throughout adulthood,
especially for educated people (Horn, 1982). The measures
used by Steinberg et al. fail to capture the broader developmental patterns that characterize adolescent and adult
cognition.
An accurate portrait of development requires assessment of a diverse set of skills that begin early in life and
move along learning pathways into adulthood (Case, 1992;
Fischer & Bidell, 2006). Some of these skills, such as
standard assessments of object permanence and working
memory, develop quickly and plateau early, while others,
such as reflective judgment, start early but do not plateau
until well into adulthood (Kitchener et al., 1993). Skillspecific learning sequences develop at different rates depending on a variety of factors, including education (Dawson-Tunik, 2004), contextual support (Fischer & Bidell,
2006), and motivation (Fink, 2007). The development of
cognitive maturity thus varies depending on what is measured and how it is measured. Simpler skills such as working memory for common words or numbers and understanding of the basic requirements of participation in a trial
(testifying honestly, sitting quietly, etc.) may peak by adolescence, but complex conceptual skills such as reflective
judgment, understanding how laws and courts function in
society, and taking perspectives across different cultures do
not peak until the 20s or 30s or later—and even then only
in the context of optimal contextual support and education.
Psychosocial Capabilities
The same problems hold for Steinberg et al.’s (2009)
approach to psychosocial capabilities. The measures in
their research represent only a small segment of social
and emotional skills and thus distort the picture for
development of these capabilities. To assess “psychosocial maturity” (p. 588), Steinberg et al. collected selfreport questionnaires on risk perception, sensation seeking, impulsivity, peer influence, and future orientation.
All measures assessed self-descriptions—not self-regulation, understanding about legal processes, moral judgment, or other capabilities relevant to abortion and murder.
With these instruments, they observed essentially
no change in psychosocial scores, on average, between
the ages of 10 and 17 years and then significant growth
to ages 18 –21 and age 26 and beyond. The problem,
again, is that the measurement tasks truncate the construct and thus drastically constrain the age range in
which development is observable. Different measures of
psychosocial maturity display significant and important
developmental changes at early ages, such as basic sociomoral perspective taking (Kohlberg, 1984; Selman &
Schultz, 1990) and basic interpersonal attunement and
attachment (Cassidy & Shaver, 1999). Children construct their understanding of self and others starting at
birth and show richly textured developmental pathways
for psychosocial skills from infancy through adulthood
(Fischer & Bidell, 2006). Self-reports about risk, impulsivity, peer influence, and so forth represent a limited set
of behaviors and do not capture fundamental capabilities
597
Katie
Heikkinen
for thinking and feeling that are relevant to the issues of
abortion and murder.
Depending on what is measured, the developmental
pattern for psychosocial maturity will differ greatly. Selfreport measures like those used in the Steinberg et al.
(2009) study will show a late onset for psychosocial maturity. On the other hand, standard measures for development of attachment relationships or social perspective taking will show major transformations of psychosocial
maturity at early ages. Infants in the first two years develop
skills for self-regulation with their mothers or other caregivers. Grade-school children come to grasp the need for
abstract norms and rules and the reasons for controlling
their behavior to follow those norms and rules. These skills
lay the foundation for understanding about abortion and
murder, although sophisticated understanding certainly
awaits development of higher capabilities.
The claim by Steinberg et al. (2009) that “psychosocial maturity” sets in later than “cognitive maturity” is
dependent on the selective use of specific measures. Using
a different set of measures could yield the opposite picture.
For example, the development of abstract reasoning capabilities such as reflective judgment, understanding the legal
system, and taking diverse cultural perspectives lags behind the development of rich emotional and interpersonal
attunements and rule following evident in early childhood.
This comparison would lead to the opposite conclusion
from that reached by Steinberg et al.: Psychosocial capabilities develop richly in childhood and early adolescence
(and continue to develop well into adulthood).
Dynamic Webs of Development
Development in any domain—for example, cognitive or
psychosocial—moves at a varying pace along multiple
598
strands in a dynamic web across the life course (Fischer et
al., 2003). In addition, a capability is not fixed across
contexts, but varies dynamically. Perspective taking with
your mother is different from perspective taking with your
friend, your classmate, or your lawyer. The idea is simply
wrong that once a capability has been displayed at a certain
level in a certain context it will be displayed at that same
level across a variety of contexts. Development unfolds
along diverse pathways and is radically sensitive to variations in context. Skills mastered in one context can fall
apart in another, needing to be rebuilt to meet the unique
task demands of new situations. Factors that drive such
variation include stress (Ayoub & Fischer, 2006), novelty
(Granott, 2002), and recalibration/self-organization (Van
Geert, 1994).
This kind of sensitivity to context is particularly significant in the two examples given by Steinberg and colleagues (2009) because the contexts are so vastly different,
as they noted. Reasoning about abortion, where a doctor or
health-care worker can support the teen’s thinking over a
length of time, is very different from acting violently in the
heat of the moment. Teenagers’ capabilities are tied to
contexts and emotional states. Teenagers are not simply
cognitively mature and psychosocially immature. Context
is radically implicated in the nature of capabilities, and the
two cannot be realistically disentangled. Depending on
context and support, the same individual can function in
drastically different ways, and there is not one condition
that represents the true capability.
How does this argument apply to Sally’s story? Is she
cognitively mature or immature? Is she emotionally and
socially mature or immature? Is she more mature cognitively or psychosocially? These kinds of questions are
predicated on a simple and essentialist notion of what
capabilities are. Sally is both immature and mature depending on both the context she is in and the measuring instruments used. At school, Sally scores high on some measures
of cognitive capability, as reflected in her strong performance in her courses; but she is still years away from
sophisticated reasoning about reflective judgment (the
bases of knowledge about complicated issues). At home
during the heat of an argument with her mother, Sally does
not take multiple perspectives, as she does during school,
but focuses primarily on her own immediate feelings. But
when she is serving as a peer mediator, she effectively
takes her peers’ perspective. What is required is a rich
portrait of her capabilities in different contexts and for
different goals.
Sally’s story is typical, not unusual. Variability is the
norm at all ages and especially in adolescence. The way
that development and capability are measured can distort as
much as it can reveal. Steinberg and colleagues (2009)
systematically misrepresented the development of the
broad capabilities they studied because of their selection of
measures and their framing of capabilities as fixed and
stable, as opposed to variable and context dependent. With
these oversimplifications, they have created a simple story
for policymakers, but the story is wrong.
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
Measuring Things That Are Worth
Measuring: Ecological Validity
Because of the many strands of the web of development,
scientists need to be careful about the measures they use
and the claims they make about the implications of their
findings. One way of increasing the likelihood that research
will connect to practical questions and policies is to ask
about the ecological validity of measures and methods.
How do they relate to the everyday lives and behaviors of
adolescents, especially in contexts relevant to the practical
questions?
The real-world behaviors of children and adolescents
such as Sally are not merely the expression of certain
general capabilities functioning at certain age-specific levels. They arise from the complex and unique lives of
individual people, rich with emotion, diverse relationships,
and novel challenges. What is the relation between the
assessment tasks that Steinberg et al. (2009) used and the
dilemmas of adolescent life they are meant to illuminate?
How can performances of working memory interference,
digit span memory, and verbal fluency indicate the capacity
to make a reasoned decision about abortion? Likewise, how
can self-report of risk perception, sensation seeking, impulsivity, resistance to peer influence, and future orientation indicate the capacity to make decisions about criminal
behavior? Measures should assess the capabilities that are
involved in those kinds of decisions.
Unfortunately, the kinds of tasks and research paradigms used in the Steinberg et al. (2009) research are
common in psychology. They truncate and oversimplify
the range and variability of behaviors while lending themselves to neat statistical analyses and simple stories that
distort understanding of real children in living contexts.
They lead to the mistaken belief that capabilities develop in
lockstep, age-fixed sequences and show no variability from
child to child or from context to context. They are divorced
from the lived experiences, behaviors, and challenges that
real people face.
The alternative to these forms of psychological research and measurement (and the essentialist constructs
they engender) is the use of dynamic methods for studying
the development of behaviors in medias res (Fischer &
Bidell, 2006; Mascolo & Fischer, in press). (For more on
these methods and the measures that facilitate them, see
also http://www.lectica.info/; Dawson & Stein, 2008; Fischer & Dawson, 2002.) In real life, people cope with the
many complexities of life “in the middle of things.” They
display their behaviors and reasoning capabilities across a
variety of situations and conditions, dealing with difficult
decisions and situations such as those involved in abortion
and murder. Dynamic structural methods can detect pathways for learning and action in these situations and in
related domains such as making sociomoral decisions and
analyzing oneself and others in important relationships.
These methods begin with a common scale (a general ruler)
that captures the ways that people build skills and concepts
in any domain. They analyze activities that relate to the key
domains of interest, such as dilemmas, stories, and situaOctober 2009 ● American Psychologist
tions that deal with abortion or murder. They depict learning pathways and limits on capabilities that are based on
people’s activities in the domains of interest. They do not
assume that people have general capabilities that somehow
apply effortlessly across situations and contexts. This kind
of research can uncover the variety of adolescent developmental pathways and the patterns of variability across
different contexts.
Conclusion: Narrow Assessments
Create Results That Flip-Flop
The ways in which Steinberg and colleagues (2009) measured cognitive capacities and psychosocial maturity led
directly to their results and to misleading conclusions. A
simple shift in the assessments used would reverse the
pattern, so that cognitive capacities would seem to develop
during adulthood while psychosocial abilities would seem
to develop during childhood, ending at age 15 or 16.
Simply put, the measures in the study made the results
come out in favor of the hypothesis. Moreover, the measures lacked a realistic connection to the lived behaviors of
adolescents and thus lacked ecological validity. From a
broad perspective of the full range of capabilities, both
cognitive and psychosocial, development involves many
skills that develop along complex pathways from infancy
through adulthood, with many capabilities developing both
before age 16 and afterward during early adulthood. These
capabilities can be measured by observations of activities
in relevant contexts and placed within developmental pathways that capture the full range of skills for those contexts
and eliminate problems with ceiling effects. This dynamic
perspective on developmental science starts with the variability of skills and finds the principles of order within that
variability, which contrasts with the traditional view of
abilities as fixed and static.
If psychology tells richer, more accurate stories, then
its relation to policy needs to be reframed. Psychologists
cannot draw simple lines in the sand, after which a developing person can be confidently assigned a full cognitive or
psychosocial capability. Development is more complex and
variable than that. Similar problems have surfaced in the
emerging field of mind, brain, and education, where many
people want to use neuroscience and genetics to shape and
define education policy (Stein & Fischer, in press). Admitting the true complexity of human developmental processes
means that, following Habermas (1996) and others, scientists and disciplinary experts should not claim that research
results require a certain policy. Instead, they need to help
inform the public debate about a policy by presenting
relevant evidence that can illuminate the ultimately evaluative decisions about what policies to set, all perspectives
considered and given the facts in hand. This approach is
consistent with Steinberg et al.’s (2009) argument for “a
careful and nuanced consideration of the particular demands placed on the individual for ‘adult-like’ maturity in
different domains of functioning” (p. 593).
599
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October 2009 ● American Psychologist
Reconciling the Complexity of Human Development
With the Reality of Legal Policy
Reply to Fischer, Stein, and Heikkinen (2009)
Laurence Steinberg
Elizabeth Cauffman
Jennifer Woolard
Sandra Graham
Marie Banich
The authors respond to both the general and specific concerns raised in Fischer, Stein, and Heikkinen’s (2009)
commentary on their article (Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, Graham, & Banich, 2009), in which they drew on
studies of adolescent development to justify the American
Psychological Association’s positions in two Supreme
Court cases involving the construction of legal age boundaries. In response to Fischer et al.’s general concern that
the construction of bright-line age boundaries is inconsistent with the fact that development is multifaceted, variable
across individuals, and contextually conditioned, the authors argue that the only logical alternative suggested by
that perspective is impractical and unhelpful in a legal
context. In response to Fischer et al.’s specific concerns
that their conclusion about the differential timetables of
cognitive and psychosocial maturity is merely an artifact of
the variables, measures, and methods they used, the authors argue that, unlike the alternatives suggested by Fischer et al., their choices are aligned with the specific
capacities under consideration in the two cases. The authors reaffirm their position that there is considerable
empirical evidence that adolescents demonstrate adult levels of cognitive capability several years before they evince
adult levels of psychosocial maturity.
Keywords: policy, science, adolescent development, chronological age
I
n our article (Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, Graham,
& Banich, 2009, this issue), we asked whether there
was scientific justification for the different positions
taken by the American Psychological Association (APA) in
two related Supreme Court cases—Hodgson v. Minnesota
(1990; a case concerning minors’ competence to make
independent decisions about abortion, in which APA argued that adolescents were just as mature as adults) and
Roper v. Simmons (2005; a case about the constitutionality
of the juvenile death penalty, in which APA argued that
adolescents were not as mature as adults). On the basis of
our reading of the extant literature in developmental psychology, as well as findings from a recent study of our own,
October 2009 ● American Psychologist
© 2009 American Psychological Association 0003-066X/09/$12.00
Vol. 64, No. 7, 601– 604
DOI: 10.1037/a0017246
Temple University
University of California, Irvine
Georgetown University
University of California, Los Angeles
University of Colorado
we concluded that the capabilities relevant to judging individuals’ competence to make autonomous decisions
about abortion reach adult levels of maturity earlier than do
capabilities relevant to assessments of criminal culpability,
and that it was therefore reasonable to draw different age
boundaries between adolescents and adults in each instance.
In their commentary on our article, Fischer, Stein, and
Heikkinen (2009, this issue) raised both general and specific objections to our conclusions. The general issue concerns how developmental evidence may or may not inform
the construction and analysis of legal age boundaries. The
specific issues involve the conclusions we drew from our
analysis of data on age differences in cognitive capabilities
and psychosocial maturity. We appreciate the opportunity
to reply to both of these concerns.
When psychologists agree to provide guidance on
matters of law, they must be able and willing to simultaneously plant their feet in two worlds—that of social science and that of legal policy and practice. These worlds
operate on different principles and with different expectations. Social scientists are accustomed to providing complicated answers to seemingly simple questions, whereas
legal professionals typically want simple answers to complicated ones. Social scientists avoid casting things in black
and white, whereas legal professionals are often forced to
do so.
The question at hand is whether developmental scientists can provide meaningful guidance that can help legal
Editor’s note. June P. Tangney served as the action editor for this article.
Authors’ note. Laurence Steinberg, Department of Psychology, Temple
University; Elizabeth Cauffman, Department of Psychology and Social
Behavior, University of California, Irvine; Jennifer Woolard, Department
of Psychology, Georgetown University; Sandra Graham, Psychological
Studies in Education, University of California, Los Angeles; Marie
Banich, Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry, University of Colorado.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Laurence Steinberg, Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122. E-mail: lds@temple.edu
601
professionals decide where to draw reasonable age boundaries. Fischer et al. (2009) implied that this is not possible.
They characterized our attempt to address this reality as a
failure to appreciate the complexity of the issues at hand.
Yet their own approach, as we shall argue, can only lead to
the conclusion that the science of developmental psychology should not inform the construction of chronological
boundaries under the law. In contrast, our position is that
legal lines will be drawn whether social scientists weigh in
or not. We believe that using science to inform the law—
even in the form of educated guesses—is better than using
no science at all.
In theory, Hodgson and Roper both raise interesting
and broad philosophical issues about the essential nature of
development in general and maturity in particular. But
these were not the issues before the Supreme Court in these
cases. Indeed, the legal question before the court in each
case was very narrowly drawn. In Hodgson, the question
was whether someone under 18 should be required to notify
her parents before obtaining an abortion. In Roper, the
question was even narrower: Should individuals be eligible
for the death penalty for crimes they committed at the age
of 16, as it was at the time of Roper, or should the
minimum age be raised to 18? The commentary provided
by Fischer et al. (2009) did not attempt to answer either of
these questions.
According to Fischer et al.’s (2009) view, development is far too multifaceted, variable across individuals,
and contextually conditioned to warrant generalizations
about age differences in maturity. From this perspective,
making legal decisions on the basis of chronological age
makes no sense at all. Imagine their answer to the central
question posed in Roper—whether the minimum age for the
death penalty should be left at 16 or raised to 1...
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