Due 11/28
Max opgs
Philosophy 17 - Fall, 2017
Prof. Smith
Second Paper Assignment
In sequential order, explicate and discuss premises 1 - 13 of “The Ontological Argument of St. Anselm”.
Be sure to identify each inferential step made in the argument. Also, you must pay some attention to
the plausibility (or the lack thereof) of premise 6, the so-called, Principle of Plentitude.
Feel free to use the relevant passage in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as an aid to your discussion.
Supplement, if needed, with Gaunilo's parody of Anselm's argument.
Philosophy 17 - Fall, 2017
Prof. Smith
THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT OF ST. ANSELM
1) Let X = df A being a greater than which than is not possible.
2) X exists or it is not the case that X exists. (LEM)
3) For all y, if Y is the object of thought, then Y exists only in the mind, or Y exists in the mind as well as
in reality. [Brentano's Principle of the Intentionality of Consciousness]
4) X is the object of thought. [From 1]
5] X exists only in the mind, or X exists in the mind as well as in reality. (From 3, 4, and LEM]
6) To exist in reality, as well as in the mind, is greater than to exist in the mind alone; to exist (in
reality) is greater than not to exist (in reality). [Principle of Plentitude)
7) X does not exist; X exists only in the mind, but not in reality. [Assumption for reductio]
8) Since ex hypothesi, X exists only in the mind, then there is a being that is greater than X; a
being Z, which is a being a greater than which than is not possible, and which exists in the mind
and in reality.
9) Z is a greater being than X.
[From 1, 7, 8. Contradiction.]
10) It is not the case the X does not exist.
[Reductio, from 7 - 9]
11) X exists in reality, and in the mind. [From 10]
12) X = God
(Theological assumption]
13) Therefore, God exists.
[From 11, 12]
IMMANUEL KANT: "EXISTENCE IS NOT A PREDICATE"
Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the concept
of a thing. It is merely the positing" of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves. In the
logical use it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition 'God is omnipotent contains
two concepts that have their objects -- God and omnipotence; the little word "is" is not a
predicate in it, but only that which posits the predicate in relation to the subject. Now if we take
the subject (God) together with all his predicates (among which omnipotence belongs), and say
God is, or there is a God, then I add no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the
subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit the object in relation to my concept.
Both must contain exactly the same, and hence when I think this object as given absolutely
(through the expression, "it is"), nothing is thereby added to the concept, which expresses merely
its possibility. Thus the actual contains nothing more than the merely possible. A hundred actual
dollars do not contain the least bit more than a hundred possible ones. For since the latter
signifies the concept and the former its object and its positing in itself, then, in case the former
contained more than the latter, my concept would not express the entire object and thus would
not be the suitable concept of it. But in my financial condition there is more with a hundred
actual dollars than with the mere concept of them (i.e., their possibility). For with actuality the
object is not merely included in my concept analytically, but adds synthetically to my concept
(which is a determination of my state); yet the hundred dollars themselves that I am thinking of
are not in the least increased through this being outside my concept. Thus when I think a thing,
through whichever and however many predicates I like (even in its thoroughgoing
determination), not the least bit gets added to the thing when I posit in addition that this thing is.
For otherwise what would exist would not be the same as what I had thought in my concept, but
more than that, and I could not say that the very object of my concept exists. Even if I think in a
thing every reality except one, then the missing reality does not get added when I say the thing
exists but it exists encumbered with just the same defect as I have thought in it; otherwise
something other than what I thought would exist. Now if I think of a being as the highest reality
(without defect), the question still remains whether it exists or not. For although nothing at all is
missing in my concept of the possible real content of a thing in general, something is still
missing in the relation to my entire state of thinking, namely that the cognition of this object
should also be possible a posteriori. And here the cause of the predominant difficulty shows
itself. If the issue were an object of sense, then I could not confuse the existence of the thing
with the mere concept of the thing. For through its concept, the object would be thought only as
in agreement with the universal conditions of a possible empirical cognition in general, but
through its existence it would be thought as contained in the context of the entirety of
experience; thus through connection with the content of the entire experience the concept of the
object is not in the least increased, but our thinking receives more through it, namely a possible
perception. If, on the contrary, we tried to think existence through the pure category alone, then it
is no wonder that we cannot assign any mark distinguishing it from mere possibility.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Pt II, Div. II. Bk II, Ch. III (Paul Guyer translation)
Saint Anselm
The Classical Ontological Argument
Anselm (1033-1109) argues that we understand God as a being than which we cannot con-
ceive a greater. Yet, if we conceive of such a being as existing only in the understanding, a
greater being could be conceived, namely, one that also exists in reality. But this would be
contradictory. Hence, God, as the being than which we cannot conceive a greater, must exist.
Anselm's strategy, then, is to move from the admission that we have the concept of the being
than which we cannot conceive a greater to the conclusion that God cannot be understood
not to exist. Those who already believe that God exists now have a better understanding of
God's existence.
For I do not seek to understand in order to believe;
I believe in order to understand. For I also believe that
"Unless I believe, I shall not understand."
CHAPTER 2. THAT GOD TRULY EXISTS
Therefore, Lord, you who grant understanding to
faith, grant that, insofar as you know it is useful for
me, I may understand that you exist as we believe you
exist, and that you are what we believe you to be. Now
we believe that you are something than which noth-
ing greater can be thought. So can it be that no such
nature exists, since "The fool has said in his heart,
"There is no God” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1)? But when this
same fool hears me say "something than which noth-
ing greater can be thought," he surely understands
what he hears; and what he understands exists in his
understanding, even if he does not understand that
it exists (in reality). For it is one thing for an object
to exist in the understanding and quite another to
understand that the object exists (in reality). When a
painter, for example, thinks out in advance what he is
going to paint, he has it in his understanding, but he
does not yet understand that it exists, since he has not
yet painted it. But once he has painted it, he both has
it in his understanding and understands that it exists
because he has now painted it. So even the fool must
From Monologion and Proslogion, with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, trans. Thomas Williams. Copyright © 1995. Reprinted
by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. All rights reserved.
134 ARGUMENTS ABOUT GOD'S EXISTENCE
most truly, and therefore most greatly. Whatever else
exists has existence less truly, and therefore less greatly.
So then why did "the fool say in his heart, 'There is no
God," when it is so evident to the rational mind that
you among all beings exist most greatly? Why indeed,
except because he is stupid and a fool
admit that something than which nothing greater
can be thought exists at least in his understanding,
since he understands this when he hears it, and what-
ever is understood exists in the understanding. And
surely that than which a greater cannot be thought
cannot exist only in the understanding. For if it exists
only in the understanding, it can be thought to exist
in reality as well, which is greater. So if that than
which a greater cannot be thought exists only in the
understanding, then that than which a greater cannot
be thought is that than which a greater can be
thought. But that is clearly impossible. Therefore,
CHAPTER 4. HOW THE FOOL SAID
in His HEART WHAT CANNOT BE
THOUGHT
there is no doubt that something than which a greater
cannot be thought exists both in the understanding
and in reality.
CHAPTER 3. THAT HE CANNOT BE
THOUGHT Not To Exist
This [being] exists so truly that it cannot be thought
not to exist
. For it is possible to think that something
exists that cannot be thought not to exist, and such a
being is greater than one that can be thought not to
exist. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot
be thought can be thought not to exist, then that than
which a greater cannot be thought is not that than
which a greater cannot be thought; and this is a con-
But how has he said in his heart what he could not
think? Or how could he not think what he said in his
heart, since to say in one's heart is the same as to
think? But if he really-or rather, since he really-
thought this, because he said it in his heart, and did
not say it in his heart, because he could not think it,
there must be more than one way in which some-
thing is "said in one's heart” or “thought." In one
sense of the word, to think a thing is to think the
word that signifies that thing. But in another sense, it
is to understand what exactly the thing is. God can be
thought not to exist in the first sense, but not at all in
the second sense. No one who understands what God
is can think that God does not exist, although he may
say these words in his heart with no signification at
all, or with some peculiar signification. For God is
that than which a greater cannot be thought. Who-
ever understands this properly, understands that his
being exists in such a way that he cannot, even in
thought, fail to exist. So whoever understands that
God exists in this way cannot think that he does not
Thanks be to you, my good Lord, thanks be to you
tradiction. So that than which a greater cannot be
thought exists so truly that it cannot be thought not
to exist
And this is you, O Lord our God. You exist so
truly, O Lord my God, that you cannot be thought not
to exist. And rightly so, for if some mind could think
something better than you, a creature would rise
above the Creator and sit in judgment upon him,
which is completely absurd. Indeed, everything that
exists, except for you alone, can be thought not to
exist. So you alone among all things have existence
exist.
understand through your illumination, so that evell
For what I once believed through your grace, I now
if I did not want to believe that you exist, I could not
you
exist.
fail to understand that
1. In your own words, explain how Anselm argues for God's existence.
2. What does Anselm think allows the fool to persist in his claimi
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