Annotated Bibliography

User Generated

Zvxlfbhyff1

Humanities

Description

2 pages, double spaced chicago style. Summarize the articles and criticize the writer, five sentences for each source. Make sure to cite the articles too.

Unformatted Attachment Preview

Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197 brill.nl/hima Plato’s The Republic, Book XI Editorial Introduction Mario Vegetti Professor Emeritus in Ancient Philosophy, University of Pavia mariovegetti@tin.it Abstract In this newly edited Book XI of Plato’s Republic, to be considered as the authentic conclusion of the dialogue, Socrates meets a Stranger from Trier, and discusses with him the questions of social reform, power and future revolutions. Keywords Plato, Republic, Socrates, Karl Marx 1. History of the text The scanty ancient evidence regarding the existence of Book XI of the Republic, reported in Byzantine (Phontius, Biblioth. XXXIII.33) and Arabic sources (IbnAl-Ragù, Book of Admirable and Portentous Things in Praise of Allah, XVI.16), has always been considered as a result of copyists’ errors, given that the Greek tradition consistently presents Plato’s Politeia as a work which comprises ten books. In 1937, the Soviet scholar Josiph Vissarionovich announced the discovery of an ancient manuscript in an Armenian monastery, consisting of the text of an apparently Platonic dialogue that the scholar interpreted as an appendix of the Republic and entitled Epipoliteia; the scholarly community received this announcement with incredulity. During the War, the manuscript was luckily transported to Berlin, where it was studied and published by the great German philologist Fritz Derselbe, who confijirmed its Platonic origin and that it was part of the Republic on the basis of accurate stylometric evaluations.1 The 1. Plato und Karl Marx, ‘Zukunftphilologie’, 0, 1943, pp. 1–103. Derselbe maintains that the Stranger should be identifijied with a certain Karolus Marx, who is mentioned in the Chronacæ Trevirienses by Scribonius Strictus. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI: 10.1163/156920612X634744 192 M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197 manuscript was subsequently lost and vainly sought by the Soviet army after the invasion of Berlin. A few years later, however, the Greek scholar Aphrodisios Oinotes announced that he had seen the manuscript in a monastery on Mount Athos, although the monks unfortunately did not let him transcribe or take pictures of it (an absurd ban that is still enforced today, which would legitimise an intervention, possibly of military nature, by the international community). Despite these authoritative studies, the authenticity of the text and its identifijication as Book XI of the Republic are still disputed by many scholars, especially Anglo-Saxon ones (see, for example, Annas Julias),2 on the basis of three main arguments: the fact that the Greek tradition reports only ten Books; the historical implausibility of Socrates’s new interlocutor, the ‘Stranger of Trier’; and the philosophical content of the text. Two solutions have been offfered with regard to the fijirst objection. The most convincing one is that the book had been censured and therefore condemned to oblivion by the immediately post-Platonic Academy since the time of Speusippus, due to its ideologically embarrassing content: the theological and conservative attitude of this phase of the Platonic Academy would have largely preferred that the dialogue end with the myths of the afterlife expounded in Book X. The second hypothesis is that the original version of the Republic actually contained ten Books, the last of which contained the text presented in this edition. It would have been substituted with what is currently regarded as Book X, so as to allow a mythico-religious interpretation of the whole dialogue, rather than a political one. This hypothesis has the advantage of explaining the presence of an anomalous book, such as the current Book X, tracing it back to an academic forgery. Still, the opening section of Book XI must be explained, as it is openly polemical against Book X: perhaps it could be a later addition by a minoritarian strand of the Academy that opposed the expunction of our text and its substitution with the bigotry of the new text? The other two objections will be analysed in the following sections. 2. The interlocutors: the Stranger and the young Aristotle The character of the Stranger is introduced by means of the typical features of Platonic irony: the language attributed to him is extremely interesting, often interwoven with barbarisms à la Aristophanes. The interpretation of the expression Trieretes Xenos seems to be more problematic (cf. note 2 to the translation). It seems possible, however, that the Germanic city of Trier had 2. A Communist Fiction: The So-Called Book XI of the Republic, ‘Anoia’ 99, 2004, pp. 1–2. M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197 193 cultural exchanges with the Greek world, by means of the fluvial ways represented by the Rhine and the Danube, as well as the commercial routes connecting the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. It is conceivable, therefore, that this character was a wise man of Germanic origins, perhaps educated in the Greek environment of Marseille, who was enslaved and subsequently set free from his chains; alternatively, he could have been a trader (possibly working for a rich German known as Federikos Anghelos,3 who exported textiles and metals) and may have had a commercial relationship with Cephalus’s industries – an aspect that would explain his presence in Piræus at the time of the dialogue. In addition, it is well attested that the Thracian festival of Bendis attracted many barbarians of northern origins to Athens.4 The choice of an unknown, barbarian interlocutor is clearly due to the Platonic wish to introduce in the dialogue and its fijictional dimension some new theoretical developments that were unrelated to the Athenian political tradition of the time, in order to highlight their ground-breaking nature; at the same time, however, they are not entirely alien to the spirit of the dialogue (similar cases are often attested, such as in the case of the ‘Eleatic stranger’ or Timæus of Locri). At any rate, it is not possible to exclude entirely that, in the course of the long compositional process of the Republic, Plato may actually have been influenced by non-Greek currents of thought, which arrived in the Hellenic area during the lively exchanges that took place in the fijirst half of the fourth century: these currents were subsequently marginalised and silenced by the progressive prevalence of reactionary, monarchical and authoritarian attitudes, and by the increasing ‘Asiatic’ influence on Greek culture, with its mystical and despotic features. Some remarks must be made regarding the other character introduced in the text, the young Aristotle. His presence in, and precocious influence on, the debates of the Academy has been underlined for a long time in scholarly literature: undisputable testimonies on this question are represented by the critiques of the Republic expounded in Book II of the Politics. His rôle seems to have been so influential that some scholars argue that Plato wrote the Laws in order to respond to these criticisms.5 Plato’s decision to include Aristotle as a 3. An epistolary exchange between the two individuals is attested to and collected in MAGA (Marx und Anghelos Gesammelte Werke), vol. XXX. Giuseppe Mucca, Marx pseudoepigraphus, in ‘Quaderni histerici’ 13, 1913, pp. 13–31, however, regards the correspondence as a forgery (as well as the actual existence of Marx and Anghelos). 4. Cf. on this question S. Pastaldi-Gambese, Bendidie, in M. Vecchietti (ed.) Platone. Repubblica, libro 1, Francopolis, Napoli 1998, pp. 6372–7277. 5. Cf. R. Godéus, Pourquoi Platon a-t-il compose les Lois?, ‘Revue phantastique de Philosophie’, 99, 1999, pp. 9–90. 194 M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197 character in the last book of the dialogue, and let him express his criticisms in nuce, could be due to the intention to show their one-sidedness even before they were systematically argued by the author, as happened a few decades later. Still, this would not be the only case in which the Academic discussion is represented in the dialogues: the same kind of scenario is undoubtedly presented in the Parmenides and the Sophist.6 3. The development of the argument The appearance on scene of the Stranger, with his radical and provocative criticism, allows Plato to reconsider from a diffferent point of view all the ethico-political questions discussed in the dialogue, which are evoked and questioned in detail. a) In the fijirst place, there is a clarifijication of the meaning of the content presented in Book X, which seems anomalous in relation to the previous developments of the dialogue that analysed the relationship between happiness and justice without resorting to religious-oriented considerations on awards or punishments in the afterlife. The pungent critique of the Stranger, seconded by Thrasymachus as well as timidly by Adeimantus and Glaucon, forces Socrates to clarify that it represented just a rhetorical device exploited in order to convince the ignorant masses to follow justice, even though they are unable to understand the rational reasons to do so; in addition, it provides some consolation for the sorrows sufffered by just men in their worldly life. This educational and consolatory function is harshly defijined by the Stranger as a sort of ‘opium of the people’, as opposed to the need to give to the masses an active and conscious rôle in the process of their own liberation. From here stem two crucial lines of enquiry that re-examine some of the fundamental theoretical tenets of the dialogue: the relation between education and revolution and the question of power. b) While Plato, in the whole dialogue, insisted on the need to educate appropriately the ruling class of the new city, assigning them the task to reform the existing society and rule the future one, the Stranger applies a diametrically opposite approach. The process should not start from the summit but from the base, from the workers on whom the production of social richness depends and whose exploitation permits the enrichment of the ruling class. In this context the Stranger introduces, in his barbaric language, the concept of ‘class’, which was alien to ancient Greek political thought; Socrates is seen to have 6. Cf., with regard to this, F. Testarotta, Mentexis, Scuola normale [sic!] Superiore, 2002, pp. 613–890. M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197 195 difffijiculties in understanding it, given his habit of considering workers diffferentially on the basis of their professions and technical skills. From this point of view, the educational project on which Plato had insisted so much in the dialogue appears now to be a pale and inefffective ‘reformist’ strategy, which is destined to leave society substantially unaltered and provide only mere appearances of improvement. The Stranger opposes to this scenario the concept of ‘revolution’, indicated by the Greek term neoterismos: a radical upheaval of the social relationships featuring the working class as the protagonist of its own liberation, fijinally able to regain possession of the fruits of their labour and also to be the interpreters of the universal interests of humankind. Only in this way, the Stranger argues, will the ‘evils’ of the city and of the men, whose therapy Plato entrusted exclusively to the philosophers, come to an end. c) From here stems one of the most signifijicant themes of the dialogue, in the context of which the Stranger appears to be in a difffijicult position: this is due to the diffferent, but also somehow convergent, criticisms exposed by Socrates and Thrasymachus, criticisms that focus on the relationship between masses and élites.7 He acknowledges that popular masses – that is, the legitimate subject of the revolution – need to be guided by a minority capable of interpreting its needs and aspirations, a minority that he indicates in his language as a Partei – a ‘party’, imperfectly rendered in Greek by the expression oligon meros.8 Thrasymachus, with the roughness proper to his style, has no difffijiculty in foreseeing that this ‘party’ may turn into an oligarchic tyranny under the influence of the pleonexia of the ‘stronger’ individuals. For his part, Socrates wonders whether there actually would be a substantial diffference between the ‘party’, assuming that its members are exempt from that kind of pleonexia due to their moral and intellectual qualities, and the small group [oligon genos] of the philosophers that he had been describing in Books VI and VII. These philosophers, one should remark, possess those dialectical skills, which exert a defijinite sort of fascination on the Stranger, probably due to his plausible discipleship to Hegelos, a radical innovator of this science in Germanic territories.9 7. On this theme, see the important contribution by L. Naftalina, Comunismo o élitismo?, in ‘Quinterni di Storia’ 2, 2002, p. 2. 8. This thesis argued by the Stranger may be traced back to the influence of the Scythe Vladimiros Leninos, better known under the pseudonyms Abaris or Anakarsis. 9. On the relationship between the Treviranus and the Rhenish wise man, see the fundamental contribution by D. Lomuto, The Book of Truths that Are Incontrovertible and Irrefutable Even by the Most Pernicious Critics, Coricella, Ischia s.d. 196 M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197 The Stranger has some difffijiculties, as we have seen, in replying to these objections. He accepts that, for a transitory phase, the dictatorship of the people must be structured as a dictatorship of the ‘party’, which however, contrary to Thrasymachus’s observation, is made of a minority of just and virtuous men. Against Socrates, the Stranger refuses to admit a drastic separation between this minority and the masses that they lead, however temporary; on the other hand he does not seem to be able to indicate clearly the relationship between the ‘party’, the government of the city (or state) and the working masses, as is also confijirmed by his shaky references to analogous experiences in Gallic and Scythian areas. However, he must Socratically admit that the question remains open and that the enquiry must continue. d) Much more resolute is the Stranger’s attitude towards the delicate question of the limits of ‘communism’, which is rendered with the pseudoGreek term koinonismos that he coins specifijically for this occasion. In Book V, Plato had famously limited the community of goods and familial relationship to the ruling class, but doubtless the question had been the object of lively discussions within the Academy. According to an extreme collectivistic position that is reported by the Anonymous Athenian (the protagonist of the Laws) in order to rule it out as desirable but impossible,10 this form of communism should have been extended to the whole community of citizens; on the contrary, according to the opposite view maintained by the Academic ‘right wing’ and represented in this text by the fijigure of the young Aristotle, all forms of communism are both impossible and undesirable, as they go against the allegedly fundamental principle of human nature that is the instinct of property. With regard to this point, the Stranger attacks Socrates’s uncertainties and limits expressed in Book V, but does not deny his fundamental sympathy for its basic inspiration, although he argues for a bolder extension of this collectivism to the whole social body. Clearly, his perspective is that of an extreme and radical emancipation of men, and specifijically of workers, from all the bonds of economic and social subordination; this position difffers from the platonic one in that it assumes as its fundamental ground not an ethico- 10. This passage shows how Plato was aware of the objections formulated in his own school against the partial ‘communism’ theorised in the Republic, objections that were communicated abroad by some of his disciples, as demonstrated by the Cretan reference mentioned by the Stranger. According to M. Vecchietti, the leader of this opposition was the Pythagorean conservative Philip of Opus, well-known for his theocratic leanings; the very composition of the Laws should be attributed to him, as in that text the Platonic thesis of a collectivism that could potentially be extended to all citizens is mentioned only to be discarded. Allegedly Philip was also close to Aristotle, who not by chance considered the Laws much more preferable to the Republic. On the whole question, see M. Vecchietti, Unwritten and Extravagant Pages, Levanto s.d. M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197 197 political theory but an economic interpretation of history and society as a struggle between working class and owners. e) The great myth of the ‘ghost’ (or ‘spectre’) of communism is certainly formulated by the Stranger as an ironic reply to the Socratic myths, especially to that of the afterlife presented in Republic, Book X. It contains and expresses, more efffectively than theoretical analyses, the perspectives and wishes of liberation evoked by the Treviranus and, in a sense, represents the summary and manifesto of his thought.11 The mythical form employed by the Stranger obtains, perhaps exactly due to its formal characteristics, one of his most signifijicant achievements: Socrates expresses his consensus [homologia] on the contents of the myth and expresses his hope of employing, one day, Thrasymachus’s theory of power to the benefijit of a project of universal liberation, rather than to that of tyrannical oppression. This perspective of reconciliation, in a utopian fashion, represents an adequate conclusion of the great dialogue: it remains a ‘one-thousand-year journey’, as in the conclusion of Book X – but in this case the journey is not one between this world and the afterlife but, rather, one leading towards a better world for the history of humankind. Translated by Tosca Lynch 11. A critical analysis of this myth is formulated by G. Blush and T. Bliar, Ghost-stories and Ghost-busters, Hollywood-Baghdad 2004. Lively replies to these critiques have been recently discussed in an international forum hosted in a clandestine location (I want to express my gratitude to the organisers, with regard to whose identity I am bound to maintain silence, for having confijidentially sent me the Proceedings of the meeting). Copyright of Historical Materialism is the property of Brill Academic Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. Copyright of Historical Materialism is the property of Brill Academic Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. The Dialogues as Dramatic Rehearsal: Plato's Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor ALBERT R. SPENCER Portland State University IN JOHN DEWEY & MORAL IMAGINATION, Steven Fesmire blames "Plato's low estimation of imagination in tbe Republic and Ion" for tbe denigration of imagination's role in moral deliberation (6i). He argues tbat Jobn Dewey's dramatic rehearsal better integrates imagination into the process of moral deliberation. His treatment of Plato represents a babit among pragmatists to reduce Dewey's reading of Plato to tbe polemics present in major works, sucb as The Quest for Certainty. In fact, Plato was Dewey's favorite philosopher, and be claimed tbat "[n]otbing could be more belpful to present pbilosopbizing tban a 'Back to Plaro' movement" (LW 5:154).' Following tbe scbolarsbip of Jobn Herman Randall and Henry Wolz reveals Plato as a moral artist enga^ged in a project of social reconstruction wbo wrote tbe dialogues as dramatic rebearsals of particular bistorical and cultural problems, specifically Atbenian begemony and Sophistic education. From tbis perspective. Republic Book I dramatizes tbe inadequacy of tbe moral accounting metaphor critiqued by George Lakoff and Mark Jobnson and experiments witb metapbors sympatbetic to Fesmire's construal of moral imagination. According to Fesmire, Dewey contends all inquiry requires imagination and tbat moral deliberation demands attention to tbe aestbetic dimension of imagination because of tbe affective nature of moral value. Tbis places Dewey in company witb Adam Smitb and David Hume wbo accepted tbe role of imagination and sentiment, and at odds witb Immanuel Kant and Plato wbo suspected emotions and imagination as barriers to rational inquiry: Imagination, on tbis view, is usually a trusty crafter of images but is given to miscbief Tbus Kant's suspicion. Imagination as reflective free play is essential to aesthetic judgment, for Kant, but in morals it is too self-indulgent. It may sap moral strength, usurping Reason and yielding THE PLURALIST Volume 8, Number 2 Summet 2013 : pp. 26-35 ©2013 by the Board of Trustees of che University of Illinois SPENCER : Plato's Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor 27 victory to Feeling. If a person "surrenders authority over himself, his imagination has free play," Kant claims. "He cannot discipline himself, but his imagination carries him away by the laws of association; he yields willingly to his senses, and, unable to curb them, he becomes their toy." Doing one's duty, on Kant's view, requires little imagination; therefore "its cultivation is at best a luxury, at worst a danger." Despite eulogizing of imagination by Adam Smith and David Hume, Enlightenment faculty psychology, following the lead of Plato's low estimation of imagination in the Republic and Ion, is responsible for imagination's being ignored even by those who urge that moral theories must be psychologically plausible. As a limited capacity prone to frivolous fancy and opposed to reason, imagination has little relevance to practical issues. So it can be dismissed altogether as a prescientific relic or, transfigured by Romanticism, admired on a pedestal as a "godlike power that enters into the world on the wings of intuition, free of the taint of contingency and history." (Fesmire 61-62) Instead, Fesmire prefers Dewey's concept of dramatic rehearsal because it properly values imagination and better coheres with our experience of moral deliberation. Rather than committing to a specific normative theory and always acting in accordance with it, Dewey argues that deliberation works best when we actively use our imagination to rehearse and evaluate a variety of responses and possible outcomes (70). Fesmire also references the four most common modes of dramatic rehearsal that Dewey mentions in his 1900—1901 lectures on ethics, specifically dialogue, visualization of results, visualization of their performance, and imagination of possible criticism (74). By consciously recognizing the role of imagination in the process of deliberation and flexing among the various phases and modes of rehearsal, Fesmire and Dewey believe that we can reconstruct "frustrated habits" that perpetuate moral problems and scenarios that seem intractable (78). Fesmire suggests that the moral artist provides opportunities to practice dramatic rehearsal through the creation of works of art that engage our imagination. He lists the characteristics of the successful moral artist as follows. First, she must perceive "relations that otherwise go unnoticed." Second, she must create works that "transform cultural perceptions" through "an ongoing experiment with novel possibilities." Third, she must coherently express moral experience in a manner that presents "overall character rather than blindly giving way to either custom or fleeting impulse," thus "such acts become role models." Fourth, she possesses "delicately refined skills [emphasis added]" judged not by the "quantity of possibilities available to imagination. 28 THE PLURALIST 8 : 2 2OI3 but their fittedness to the situation for wise deliberation." Finally, the moral artist communicates with an audience by anticipating their reception of a work in a way that "enables a dialectical interaction that gives point and focus to art" (115-18). At flrst blush, tne dialogues and Plato meet the criteria of both Dewey's four modes of dramatic rehearsal and Fesmire's characteristics of the moral artist. The dialogues use conversation as a means of exploring moral problems, and Plato uses dramatic irony to highlight the consequences of specific moral opinions as represented by the fate of recognizable interlocutors. His ability to create works of art that continue to challenge cultural perceptions should qualify Plato as a moral artist. Fesmire does highlight two points of continuity between Plato and Dewey. He suggests that the Statesman reveals Plato's awareness that rigid moral laws cannot keep up with the pace of constant social change. This awareness parallels Dewey's arguments in Human Nature and Conduct that moral habits, like laws, emerge from human interaction with our social environment and must adapt to changing social conditions (17). Fesmire also concedes that Dewey and Plato agree on the intrinsic value of justice, but distinguishes Dewey as conceiving "right action as cooperative social interaction and inclusive of growth, not in terms of a harmonious soul in which reason rules appetites" (99). By contrast, the majority of Fesmire references to Plato are usually critical. He acknowledges that Plato was the first to address the "moral power of art" to "directly and literally contribute to the moral imagination and character," but he criticizes Plato's understanding of this relationship as "psychologically simplistic" and as the source of Socrates's infamous arguments supporting censorship in Books II and III of the Republic.^ Furthermore, Plato fails to use art as a metaphor for moral experience. Fesmire cites George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's criticism of the "dominant moral accounting metaphor, in which moral interactions are understood as business transactions" and he agrees with their claim that Dewey provides a "wealth of alternative metaphors," specifically "organic growth, evolutionary adaptation, scientific experimentation, technological innovation, and art (no)."' Lakoff and Johnson correctly condemn Western philosophy's overdependence on the moral accounting metaphor. Furthermore, Fesmire provides a much needed alternative to contemporary ethics by re-introducing Dewey's concept of dramatic rehearsal, but must Plato be a foil to contemporary pragmatism or can we imagine a different relationship with the first author of philosophy? Fesmire correctly diagnoses the denigration of imagination as originating with Platonism, but this denigration originates from a literal SPENCER : Plato's Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor 29 analysis of the arguments presented by Socrates in the dialogues. It stems from an inability to imagine Plato as an artist, rather than a theorist, and Dewey struggled to overcome this lack of imagination throughout his entire career. One of the first essays to examine Dewey's complex reading of Plato is John P. Anton's "John Dewey and Ancient Philosophies." Anton focuses on three aspects of Dewey's relation to Greek philosophy: the "polemic," the "historico-contextual," and the "cumulative aspect" (477).'' According to Anton, the "sustained historical analyses he presented in his Questfor Certainty and Reconstruction in Philosophy are so dominated by a central philosophical and ethical concern of his social pragmatism as to mislead the reader into concluding that this is all he had to offer by way of understanding and appreciating the classical heritage." Because Dewey's most explicit commentary on Greek philosophy attempts to overcome barriers to philosophical inquiry, specifically the misapplication of ancient theories to contemporary problems, one is tempted to reduce Dewey's criticism only to its polemic aspect. Anton argues that a more accurate treatment of Dewey's approach accepts his admonishment of dualism and leisure class theory, without ignoring his "avowed sympathy with Plato" as a fellow social reformer (477-79). On one hand, Dewey was impressed by the degree of social awareness expressed in the dialogues and Plato's commitment to and aptitude for social reform. On the other hand, Dewey was cautious and skeptical of "the static features he read into Plato's ideals," what one might refer to as the Plato of Platonism. Anton points out other areas of kinship between Dewey and Plato, specifically seeing "art as imitation," seeing "intelligence as a method rather than a collection of finished outcomes," and seeing "philosophy in a wider meaning of a critique of institutions and a fundamental way of hfe." Thus, while key differences exist, specifically "on issues of metaphysics, ethics, logic, or aesthetics," the two philosophers are united by their desire for social reform and similar temperament (487—91). Ultimately, Anton's assessment of Dewey's approach to Greek philosophy is unsympathetic. He claims that while Dewey had the potential to offer a fruitful pragmatic analysis of ancient thought, his obsession with contemporary problems prevented him from developing an accurate picture of classical philosophy. Essentially, the polemic aspect of Dewey's approach hinders his attempts to produce a valid historico-cultural account of ancient thought and obscures the continuity between Plato and Dewey (Anton 498—99). Frederick M. Anderson offers a more charitable assessment when he suggests that Dewey uses polemics so that ancient philosophy might disclose itself in its 3O THE PLURALIST 8 : 2 2OI3 original richness free of received, modern interpretations. He argues that Dewey sees the problems of Greek philosophy as emerging from specific historicoctiltural influences and that modern philosophers misinterpreted as necessary and intractable. Dewey believed the topics discussed by the ancients are not perennial; they are reflections of specific human concerns embodied within the fabric of Athenian intellectual culture (Anderson 87-88). In summation, both Anton and Anderson agree that Dewey sees the authentic Plato as an expression of the cultural need for reform. A more useful middle view can be distilled from Anton's and Anderson's commentaries. The polemics against the Greeks in Dewey's major works border on the hyperbolic because he wanted to dislodge interpretations of Plato that overemphasized metaphysical dualisms and leisure class values as necessary to present inquiry. Using Dewey's own words, a convenient label for this interpretation would be Plato as the "original university professor," however, he preferred the "dramatic, restless, cooperatively inquiring Plato of the Dialogues, trying one mode of attack after another to see what it might yield . . . the Plato whose highest flights of metaphysics always terminated with a social and practical turn" (LW 5:155). Thus, the dramatic Plato uses the drama of the dialogues to experiment with different lines of inquiry in relation to specific practical problems, whereas Professor Plato invents abstract theories relevant to perennial, yet imagined philosophical problems. Sadly, Dewey never fully articulated his interpretation of the dramatic Plato. He wrote only two essays that provided extended commentaries on the dialogues. "The Ethics of Democracy" (1888) rebuts Sir Henry Maine's Platoesque critique of democracy as a "numerical aggregate" and "The Socratic Dialogues of Plato" (1925) presents an interesting, but quirky treatment of the Socratic problem. Both essays demonstrate Dewey's affinity for Plato, but neither presents a developed hermeneutical approach to the dialogues for which Dewey longs. He delivers his final word on the matter in "Experience, Knowledge, and Value: A Rejoinder" (1939) when he states in response to John Herman Randall's "Dewey's Interpretation of the History of Philosophy" that "I believe the factors of the existing cultural situation . . . are such that philosophical theories which in effect, . . . are products of pre-scientific and pre-technological, dominantly leisure class conditions, are now as obstructive as they are unnecessary" (LW 14:11) Given the phase of his career, Dewey probably decided to focus on more pressing concerns rather than fully articulate his affinity for Plato, and instead delivered a final warning against the spectator theory of knowledge, but Dewey does not directly dispute Randall's claim that the history of philosophy can be SPENCER : Plato's Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor 31 used instrumentally "as an arsenal, or as a warning" (Randall, Philosophy offohn Dewey 79). In Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason, Randall develops tbe tbree cbaracteristics of tbe dramatic Plato (drama, experiment, and practice) tbat Dewey outlines. Randall contends tbat Plato is not a bistorical pbilosopber, but "a poet and a dramatist," wbicb be explains as follows: "Plato is a pbilosopber because be is a poet. True pbilosopby is poetry—poetic insigbt and vision, tbe imaginative enbancement of life." In tbe dialogues, Plato dramatically depicts tbe "qualities of man's tbinking, tbe play and conflict of bis ideas, tbe spectacle of bis mind" as embodied in tbe "discourse of men" or "tbe drama of tbe Life of Reason." Tbe dialogues do not defend or analyze pbilosopbical tbeories. Tbey convert individuals to tbe pbilosopbical life (Randall, Plato: Dramatist-^-4). Tbe dialogues are not meant to be an accurate bistorical snapsbot of ancient Greece, but a presentation of "Greece in Plato's own perspective, Greece as be understood it, bow Greece and Greek culture looked to bim" (Randall, Plato: Dramatist •^6-46). Randall prefers to speak in terms of "Tbe Greek Heritage of Plato," tbat is, tbe patterns of tbougbts and values tbat be inberited from Greek culture, early Greek pbilosopbers, tbe Sophists, Socrates, and Plato's audience. Randall believes tbat Plato's use of drama captures tbis combination of curiosity and bumanism to recruit nom as a means of orienting buman nature toward tbe Good Life. Drama allows Plato to express bow tbese tbemes sbape tbe life of reason. Tbus, "tbe dialogues emerge, not as programs of action, but as dramatic portrayals of tbe life of tbe mind—of tbe follies, contradictions, entbusiasms, and greatness of buman tbinking, as bebeld by a detacbed and ironic intelligence—by nous. Dramatic Reason" (Randall, Plato: Dramatist 54). Plato bopes to impart tbe value of tbe pbilosopbical life and to inspire bis audience to participate in it so tbat tbey migbt improve tbemselves in tbe bope of finding fulfillment. Tbe dialogues are not presentations of pbilosopbical tbeories; tbey are invitations to engage in tbe betterment of bumanity tbrougb inquiry and conversation. Randall continues by explaining bow Plato uses drama to respond to tbe social and cultural cballenges of tbe Periclean Age (Randall, Plato: Dramatist 58-65). During tbe century preceding Plato's career, Atbens experienced optimism in tbe form of imperial expansion and begemony. Tbis expansion enabled social mobility, and tbe Sophists met tbe aristocracy's desire to maintain power and the need of tbe new rieb to access greater political privileges by teacbing arete or success. Wbile some of tbe original Sopbists advocated "bigb ideals" like "professional standards" or tbe improvement of "social con- 32 THE PLURALIST 8 : 2 2OI3 dirions," they quickly became "commercialized" and began to teach methods of gaining political advantage. Randall argues that Plato and Socrates saw the cynicism underneath this veneer of careerism and start teaching and writing as a response to the Sophists (Randall, Plato: Dramatist 81-84). Randall contrasts them with Socrates. He suggests that Socrates's actual teachings were broader than a set of dogmas and that his purpose for engaging in philosophy was not to know the Good in a systematic way.^ Socrates teaches his students how to philosophize; he does not teach a philosophy. He postulates the Forms and the Good for the purpose of revealing to his students the bias and prejudices that prevent them from thinking better about the practical challenges they face. Students gain excellence, areté, not through skillful rhetoric or seeking personal advantage, but through a love of wisdom and the practice of critical reflection—through imitating the life that Socrates leads, loving wisdom for its own sake—rather than teaching it for profit. Plato uses the character of Socrates dramatically to demonstrate how his readers can benefit from philosophical reflection and to initiate critical reflection within the reader. Henry Wolz elaborates on Randall's conception of the dialogues as philosophical drama. Wolz sees two phases at work in the dialogues: the destructive phase in which the interlocutor becomes aware of his ignorance, w.iich then initiates the constructive phase of inquiry that gives birth to new insights. In both phases, Socrates avoids presenting his own views because doing so would undermine his students' attempts at philosophy. Thus, the goal of the Socratic Method is to empower the student to engage in philosophy, and by dramatizing philosophical inquiry, Plato's dialogues empower his readers to engage in philosophy. Wolz cites Crito as an example of how the dialogues stimulate reflection rather than indoctrination. It presents the philosophical conflict between "radical freedom and unconditional submission" that "reside in the same mind [Socrates]" (Wolz 238—48).'' Good citizenship requires the ability to negotiate these two demands and by depicting their conflict within the character of Socrates; rather than in separate characters, the reader witnesses a single character dramatically rehearse the problem. By extension, the drama of the situation inspires the reader to think critically about the place of citizenship between radical freedom and submission. Thus, dialogues allow Plato to dramatize moral deliberation within a practical context. He teaches readers how to perceive their situations and imagine multiple solutions in response to a particular problem. Socrates might recommend a specific solution, but Plato depicts a variety of strategies and allows the reader to evaluate all of them critically. He does not present them dogmatically SPENCER : Plato's Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor 33 In fact. Republic Book I dramatically critiques the dominance of the moral accounting metaphor. Plato sets the dialogue at the height of Athens's imperial hegemony in the city of Piraeus, the base of the commercial and military navy. The subsequent conversation occurs at the home of Cephalus, a foreigner from Syracuse who became one of the wealthiest members of Athenian society through the manufacture of shields. Plato frames this discussion of justice with a setting symbolic of a society dominated by the moral accounting metaphor. Furthermore, Athens will soon overextend itself in the 2nd Peloponnesian War and be conquered by Sparta. As an artist, Plato chooses the temporal and spatial setting of the dialogue to reflect the failure of this metaphor to provide moral guidance for individuals and the city-state. The opening conversation between Cephalus and Socrates directly calls the moral accounting metaphor into question. The aged Cephalus has spent the day sponsoring sacrifices, which Adeimantus will later describe as an economic transaction with the gods for the purpose of atonement (Plato 364c). Ever the gadfly, Socrates asks Cephalus three probing questions: What is it like to be old? How did you become so wealthy? and What is the greatest benefit of wealth? (328e-33od). Cephalus takes Socrates's philosophical bait when he answers that wealth removes some of the temptation to "cheat or deceive someone against our will" and allows us to die without the fear of owing a "sacrifice to a god or money to a person" (331b). This reference to sacrifice as a means of easing one's conscience before death foreshadows and alludes to the final words of Socrates in the Phaedo and a subtle contrast emerges between Cephalus and Socrates as potential role-models for different life paths. Cephalus models the metaphor of moral accounting whereas Socrates models the metaphor of the love of wisdom. Glaucon reinforces this contrast when he contrasts between the perfecdy unjust man, Gyges, who uses a ring of invisibility to privately commit injustice while publicly maintaining a reputation for justice, and the perfecdy just man who lives ethically, but is publicly reviled (Plato 36oc-36id). Cephalus could be a candidate for the perfecdy unjust man who commits injustice to achieve his ends but dies without moral debts through a life of shrewd moral transaction, and Socrates's execution for impiety by the state certainly qualifies him as a candidate for the perfecdy just man. When we consider Cephalus and Socrates at the end of their lives, Socrates dies content and peaceful, confident in a life well lived, whereas Cephalus has achieved everything he wanted, but approaches death desperately trying to ease a guilty conscience.^ This segue into the dialogue is thick with references to the moral accounting metaphor and links them to the discussion of justice and ethics. Socrates critiques the metaphor 34 THE PLURALIST 8 : 2 2OI3 directly when he refutes the claim that justice is "to give to each what is owed to him," a definition presented by Cephalus but quickly bequeathed to his heir Polemarchus (33idc). By implying this contrast without direct comment, Plato undermines the moral accounting metaphor, and the remainder of the dialogue is an exploration of other possible metaphors for moral deliberation. The key metaphor of the Republic is the city-soul analogy, that is, that a link exists between public justice and personal morality (Plato 369a). Ultimately, Socrates supports this connection through an appeal to the metaphysical unity of the forms, but a more Deweyan interpretation would see Socrates as insisting that the "individual and society are organic to each other" (EW 1:237). Clearly, Dewey believes that the metaphors of democracy are superior to the metaphors of aristocracy, but Dewey always admired Plato's dialogues as works of moral imagination. He claimed that "if they had no value for philosophical reasons," and the harshest interpretation of Dewey's polemics might reach that conclusion, "the Republic would be immortal as the summary of all that was best and most permanent in Greek life, of its ways of thinking and feeling, and of its ideals" (EW 1:240). Dewey designed his polemics against Plato to demolish specific entrenched interpretations that buried the novelty of Plato's reconstruction of his historical context. Now those polemics should be set aside, lest they become barriers to future inquiry. By appropriating Plato as a moral artist, rather than a theorist, and reading the dialogues as dramatic rehearsals of moral problems, rather than philosophical arguments, we can connect with the Plato that inspired Dewey and use the dialogues to broaden our own imaginations. NOTES I. It should be noted that the publication of Dewey's lost manuscript. Unmodern and Modem Philosophy, occurred during the editing of this article. In this work, Dewey fleshes out his mature assessment of Greek philosophy, and it confirms that Dewey's reading of the Greeks, particularly Plato, is rich and nuanced. According to its editor, Phillip Deen, the manuscript would have been written between 1941-1943, which is immediately after Dewey's response to John Herman Randall's "Dewey's Interpretation of the History of Philosophy" in 1939. Thus, the manuscript stands as Dewey's final words on the subject. However, incorporating the manuscript into the debate between John Anton and Frederick Anderson or comparing the genealogy of Greek philosophy that Dewey presents to either Randall's genealogy of Plato's dialogues in Plato: Dramatist ofthe Life ofReason or Henry Wolz's reading ofthe dialogues as philosophical drama merit separate articles. With regard to the present inquiry, the manuscript supports this article's thesis that Dewey scholarship has underappreciated Dewey's affinity for the Platonic dialogues, and their influence on his work should be reassessed. SPENCER : Plato's Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor 35 2. See also Plato, Republic 378cd, 380c, 401a, and 4Oide. 3. See also LakofFand Johnson 141. 4. See also Betz. 5. See also Wallach. 6. Wolz also notes the Greek convention of using drama as moral education, for example, Sophocles's Antigone, and contends that Plato's dialogues are another example of this convention. 7. Consider Socrates's final words in the Phaedo: "Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; make this offering to him and do not forget" (Plato ii8a) in comparison to Cephalus's statement "that when someone thinks his end is near, he becomes frightened and concerned about things he didn't fear before" (33od). Socrates greets death peacefully and asks his students to offer a single and meager final sacrifice to the god of healing, whereas Cephalus hints that he has troubled dreams and quickly exits the dialogue to continue the sacrifices he has already been performing throughout the day. Given these last words and behaviors, it appears that Socrates goes to his grave with a clearer conscience than Cephalus. Also, Phaedo and Republic are conventionally considered to be ftom the same phase of Plato's career and address similar philosophical themes. See Ruprecht. REFERENCES Anderson, Frederick M. "Dewey's Experiment with Greek Philosophy." Intemational Philosophical Quarterly 7.1 (1967): 86-100. Anton, John P. "John Dewey and Ancient Philosophies." Philosophy andPhenomenological Research 25.4 (1965): 477-99. Betz, Joseph. "Dewey and Socrates." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 16.4 (1980): 329-56. Dewey, John. The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Electronic Edition. Ed. Larry A. Hickman. Charlottesville, VA: Intelex Corporation, 1996. [cited in text as Early Works (EW), Middle Works (MW), or Later Works (LW), followed by volume:page number] Fesmire, Steven./oÄ« Dewey & Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2003. LakofF, George, and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: U oFGhicago P, 1980. Plato. Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. [cited in text using Stephanus pagination by number and section] Randall, John Herman. "Dewey's Interpretation of the History of Philosophy." The Philosophy of John Dewey. Ed Paul Arthur Schlipp. New York: Tudor, 1951. jj—ioz. . Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason. New York: Columbia UP, 1970. Ruprecht, Louis A., Jr. Symposia: Plato, the Erotic, and Moral Value. Albany: State U of New York P, 1999. Wallach, John R. The Platonic Political Art: A Study of Critical Reason and Democracy. University Park: Penn State UP, 2001. Wolz, Henry G. "Philosophy as Drama: An Approach to the Dialogues of Plato." International Philosophical Quarterly 3.2 (1963): 236-70. Copyright of Pluralist is the property of University of Illinois Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws Robert Prus University of Waterloo, Canada Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws Abstract Plato may be best known as a philosopher, but his depictions of people’s involvements in religion are important for social scientists not only because of the transcultural and transhistori- A lthough Plato (420-348 BCE) is widely ac- as well as Islamic theology.3 Still, of much greater knowledged as a philosopher and frequently consequence for our immediate purposes are (a) is referenced as an idealist as well as a theologian, the linkages that Plato develops between religion Plato’s texts are only marginally known to sociol- and social order (as in notions of justice, morality, ogists and most others in the social sciences. As virtue, and government), (b) people’s interrelated part of the task of reconnecting Greek and contemporary scholarship in a broader study of the development of Western social thought,1 the present paper focuses on Plato’s contributions to the study cal resources that they offer those in the sociology of religion, but also because of their more of human knowing and acting by using religion as general pragmatist contributions to the study of human group life. a more sustained point of reference.2 Thus, although Plato (a) exempts religion from a more thorough going dialectic analysis of the sort to which he subjects many other realms of human knowing and acting (e.g., truth, Whereas the more distinctively theological materi- justice, courage, rhetoric), (b) explicitly articulates and encourages theological viewpoints in als that Plato introduces in Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, some of his texts, and (c) sometimes writes as though things can be known only as ideal types or pure forms in an afterlife existence, Plato also (d) engages a number of consequential pragmatist (also pluralist, secular) aspects of people’s experiences with religion. In developing his materials on religion, Plato rejects the (popular) notions of the Olympian thagoras (580-500 BCE), our interests are much more directly related to Plato’s considerations of divinity to be mindful of Plato’s notions of divinity when considering the more distinctively socio- as a community experienced phenomenon than his logical matters he addresses (as in the problematics of promoting and maintaining religious notions of religion per se. religion, morality, and deviance). Still, each of the four texts introduced here assume significantly different emphases and those interested in the study of human group life should be prepared to adjust accordingly as they examine these statements. All four texts are consequential for a broader “sociology of religion,” but Timaeus and Phaedo are notably more theological in emphases whereas Republic and Laws provide more extended insight into religion as a humanly engaged realm of endeavor. The paper concludes with an abbreviated comparison of Plato’s notions of religion with Chicago-style symbolic interactionist (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus and Grills 2003) approaches to the study of religion. Addressing some related matters, an epilogue briefly draws attention to some of the affinities of Emile Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life with Plato’s analysis of religion. Herbert Mead; Morality; Deviance; Republic; Laws; Timaeus; Phaedo is a sociologist at the University of losophy and its sociological offshoot, symbolic inter- Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. A symbolic in- actionism, with Classical Greek, Roman, and interim teractionist, ethnographer, and social theorist, Robert European scholarship. Prus has been examining the conceptual and meth- email address: odological connections of American pragmatist phi©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1 Many of the conceptions of religion that Plato introduces are strikingly parallel with notions of divinity developed within Judaic and Christian, This paper represents part of a larger pragmatist study of human knowing and acting from the classical Greek era (700-300 BCE) to the present time. The larger project traverses a wide array of scholarly endeavors including poetics, rhetoric, theology, history, education, politics, and philosophy (see Prus 2003a; 2004; 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2009a; 2009b; 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d; 2011e; 2012; Puddephatt and Prus 2007; Prus and Burk 2010; Prus and Camara 2010). 1 While this paper focuses on Plato’s analysis of religion, Plato’s contributions to the study of human knowing and acting are much more extensive than suggested herein. Thus, readers are referred to interactionist considerations of Plato’s works as these pertain to causality, agency, and reality (Puddephatt and Prus 2007), poetics (i.e., fiction; Prus 2009a), love and friendship (Prus and Camara 2010), education and scholarship (Prus 2011a), morality, deviance, and regulation (Prus 2011c). This is not to deny Plato’s structuralist, idealist, and moralist emphases, but to acknowledge his much overlooked contributions to pragmatist scholarship. Plato’s considerations of the human condition are less consistently pluralist, secular, and pragmatist than those of his pupil Aristotle (384-322 BCE), but Plato’s work remains foundational to pragmatist thought in a great many respects. 2 Keywords Plato; Religion; Pragmatism; Sociology; Symbolic Interactionism; Emile Durkheim; George 6 gious viewpoints of Socrates (469-399 BCE) and Py- gods described by Homer and Hesiod as mythical as well as sacrilegious. Still, it is instructive viewpoints on both collective and individual levels and discussions of the interlinkages of Robert Prus and Laws have been developed mindfully of the reli- prus@uwaterloo.ca prus007@gmail.com involvements in religion, deviance and control, education and scholarship, and poetics and entertainment, and (c) Plato’s more pervasive philosophic (and sociological) conceptions of human knowing and acting (including people’s multiple and shifting perspectives on religion). Thus, while acknowledging the more specific religious beliefs that Plato introduces in these texts,4 Because Plato’s works predate Christian and Islamic theology, as well as much of the recorded Judaic text, one can make the case that all three of these theologies were influenced by Greek thought in the broader eastern Mediterranean arena. 3 As a more general caveat, it should be recognized that while Plato often appears to adhere to the theological position he assigns to Socrates and his kindred speakers in Timaeus, Phaedo, and Republic and to the Athenian speaker in Laws, Plato’s texts are characterized by a broader set of tensions. Thus, in addition to some of the (a) idealist, (b) skepticist, (c) poetical, and (d) pragmatist viewpoints that Plato introduces in his considerations of religion in these texts, Plato’s (Socratic) notions of religion are presented in the midst of concerns with (e) establishing a functional political order, (f) placing philosophers in governing positions in these states, and (g) intensifying human quests for justice, virtue, and wisdom on both community and more individual levels. Plato clearly rejects the images of the gods developed by the Greek poets Homer and Hesiod, but his speakers generally profess clear notions of divinity. Likewise, Plato’s speakers appear adamant about the pragmatist value of religion as a mechanism for generating social order. Still, in his dialogues more generally, Plato (via Socrates) often questions human abilities to know anything. Although this latter position presumably would include (and would invalidate) Socratic, as well as any other claims regarding a divine essence(s), Plato clearly does not subject religion to the same sort of dialectic analysis with which he addresses other features of, or claims about, community life. It is mindful of these contradictions that Nietzsche (Zuckert 1996) argues that Plato primarily uses religion as a means of seeking personal prominence in the political arena (i.e., as a cloak of authority in the “lust for power”). We do not know if Nietzsche (who more openly craves for power) is correct in his claims about Plato, but there are many points at which Plato seems much more concerned about the pragmatic/integrative features of religion for the community than promoting any particular set of beliefs. It also may be the case that Plato had mixed views on religion. Thus, whereas Plato (a) may have followed Socrates in 4 Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org 7 Robert Prus Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws Timaeus 6 the emphasis is on issues such as: (a) the ways that style of presentation and about the importance of fol- Plato appears concerned about articulating viable people deal with the unknown; (b) when and how lowing the flows of his texts in more patient ways. conceptions of divinity in all four of these texts and people invoke, formulate, promote, question, defend, Thus, whereas Plato’s student Aristotle (384-322 BCE) has developed various aspects of his philosophy and reject notions of divinity; (c) how people incor- writes in a particularly direct and exceptionally com- around this objective. Nevertheless, to his “socio- porate religion into their life-worlds ‒ as in routines, pacted analytic style, Plato develops his analyses in logical” credit, Plato also recognizes the problemat- identities, relationships, emotionalities, and the like; conversational formats. Nevertheless, Plato’s texts are ic, socially engaged nature of community life within and (d) how people manage notions of religion, mo- still remarkably systematic and offer extraordinary which people’s notions of divinity take shape. find much in Timaeus that is consistent with Stoic rality, and deviance on a day to day basis. conceptual depth. Timaeus and Phaedo Christian, and Islamic theology also are apt to find For those less familiar with Plato’s works, it may be In developing this paper, I have tried to stay close to observed that his texts are presented as dialogues in the specific conversational flows that Plato develops Although not intended as a set, Timaeus and Phaedo sequential aspects of these religions. which his speakers (of whom Socrates [469-399 BCE] in each of these texts, referencing his materials in provide instructive introductions to Plato’s notions often assumes the central role) engage wide ranges “chapter and verse.” This way, readers might bet- of religion. Further, prior to the Renaissance (1400- of topics pertinent to one or another aspect of hu- ter appreciate the overall ordering of his dialogues, 1600 CE), Timaeus provided the primary source of man existence. In dealing with their subject matters, as well as more readily locate particular sections of contact for Western scholars with Plato’s texts (see Plato’s speakers typically introduce and consider these texts for further examination. Plato: The Collected Works 1997:1224-1225). Even now, conceptually diverse sets of standpoints on the matters at hand. As well, although much of the analysis may seem delayed in the present paper, it is important to es- many who read Timaeus are apt not to have read Republic and often focus instead on the creation story and the related notions of divinity addressed within tablish Plato’s position in some detail before devel- ers typically leave questions unresolved in the end. oping an analytic commentary. This way, by treat- Nevertheless, Plato’s speakers are concerned about ing Plato’s texts as ethnohistorical documents, read- Nevertheless, Timaeus contains a mixture of theologi- defining their terms of reference and generally pur- ers will be better able to participate in, assess, and cal and philosophical materials. Relatedly, while the sue topics in highly reflective terms. As well, be- possibly extend the analysis. Relatedly, because of theological matters are clearly more speculatively in cause his speakers often engage their subject matters the claims I make in this paper, it is Plato’s analysis quality and some other “claims of fact” are clearly in extended, discerning, and comparative analytic of human group life rather than my commentary unsubstantiated, some of the philosophic concepts manners, those who are patient and thoughtful can that is central here. introduced in Timaeus are notably sophisticated and dressed by attending the subtopics that the speakers To put Plato’s “sociology of religion” in context, it is consider along the way. instructive to examine the theological position Plato Before we engage these texts more directly, it also a humanly engaged process. After addressing some may be instructive to caution readers about Plato’s of the more central features of Plato’s theology as matters of theology, it is possible that he also (b) was skeptical of theology as a scholar/dialectician, and yet (c) as a social theorist recognized that religion was a consequential feature of community life and (d) as a community planner and moralist valued the integrative features of any religion. While more overtly writing as a theologian, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) also appears to have struggled with somewhat parallel matters as both a highly astute dialectician and a most exceptional student of Aristotle’s texts. 8 ©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1 represents prior to his broader analysis of religion as Timaeus. are apt to have contributed to a distinctively pluralist, dialectic or inquisitive emphasis on the nature of existence and the matters of human knowing and acting on the part of theologians as well as secular scholars over the centuries. expressed in Timaeus and Phaedo, this statement fo- As will become apparent later, the emphasis in Pha- cuses on Plato’s depictions of people’s involvements edo is notably different than that of Timaeus. Still, in in religious matters in Republic and Laws.5 addition to providing some insight into the charac- Given the references that Plato makes to Republic within Timaeus, Timaeus appears to have been written after Republic, but Republic and Laws more fully address religion as a humanly engaged process. 5 ences to several of Plato’s philosophic notions, it also represents Plato’s most focused theological statement. Those familiar with Stoic theology will religion.7 However, readers familiar with Judaic, many congruities between Plato’s Timaeus and con- To the frustration of many readers, Plato’s speak- glean much insight into the overarching issues ad- Whereas Timaeus [TS] contains important refer- ter of Socrates that Plato establishes for his readers, Phaedo deals with another popular Western religious theme ‒ the immortality of the soul. The present statement is based on the translation of Timaeus developed by Benjamin Jowett (1937). 6 Stoicism (from Zeno of Citium [334-262 BCE]) ‒ no preserved text remains; emerged as a philosophic position in Athens (circa 300 BCE), but later achieved considerable popularity in Rome. Cicero (106-43 BCE) provides a particularly lucid review of Stoic philosophy in On the Nature of the Gods. Although placing particular emphases on sense-based knowledge and logic, the Stoics also argue that the universe is governed by a natural, divinely inspired source (god/gods). Albeit an extension of Pythagorean and Socratic thought, Stoic philosophy also assumes some consequential divergences. Perhaps most notably the current history, circumstances, and experiences of human life are seen as but a temporary phase in an endless set of repetitions or reoccurring cycles of development and (re)birth of the universe as the gods recreate and regulate the processes of nature throughout eternity. Because they envision humans to be immensely indebted to the gods both for their creations of all things and their unending dedication to all of nature, the Stoics encourage people to accept things as the gods would intend. Thus, the Stoic emphasis is on pursuing an honorable or virtuous life-style in which the gods are revered. From a Stoic viewpoint, as well, community order is fostered through people’s subservience to the divine ordering of nature. The Stoics not only argue for the existence of god(s) that regulate all of nature, but also presume that human experiences are divinely fated or predestined. Relatedly, it is posited that by reading signs provided by the gods, people may foresee and adjust to future developments. Still, while human outcomes are predetermined in more general terms, people are thought to have some freedom of choice and are explicitly encouraged (through instruction, dedication, and careful, logical reasoning) to pursue virtuous avenues of action that would put them in closer alignment with their natural godly intended destinies. Whereas the Stoics, like Aristotle, insist on the importance of sensory perceptions (distinctions) for knowing and appear attentive to a more logical (vs. emotional) rhetoric, the Stoics’ emphases on divine life-worlds and fatalism take them some distance from Aristotle’s secular scholarship. For a notably extended analysis of Stoic and Epicurean conceptions of divinity and related notions of human knowing, acting, and destiny, see Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods (also see Prus 2011e). 7 Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org 9 Robert Prus Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws Although Socrates, Critias, and Hermocrates also are in Republic. Thus, Socrates (TS:20) says that he would ions have yet more to offer. Thus, after calling on see the mortal bodies of people and the lower ani- involved in the dialogue, Timaeus emerges as the like to provide an account of the origins of his city- the gods for assistance and understanding, Timaeus mal species. Thus, whereas God would provide the principle speaker. The dialogue opens with Socrates state, one that would give the citizens a sense of (TS:27) develops a creation story intended not just souls for all beings, his lesser gods were given the (TS:17-19) providing a very brief review of Republic. pride in its struggles and accomplishments. for the city, but also for the entire universe and all responsibility of preparing mortal bodies in which inhabitants of the earth. these divine souls would reside. Despite the many references to religion that Socrates While contending that he is unable to devise a wor- makes in Plato’s Republic, his references to Republic in thy statement on his own, Socrates also dismisses the Acknowledging that a world (i.e., universe) that is In addition to being the most religious of all earthly Timaeus focus almost entirely on the nature and well poets and the sophists as adequate authors for this amenable to the senses, Timaeus (TS:27-29) says that beings, people also were to possess capacities for being of the (secular) state. Somewhat ironically, as project. Describing the poets as imitators, he sees an eternal creator, without beginning or end, was the sensation and emotional experience (as in pain and well, Socrates (in Timaeus) largely disregards Repub- the challenge as beyond their abilities. Defining the cause or initiator of the world. Thus, God created the pleasure, fear and anger). Recognizing that people lic’s emphasis on justice, virtue, and philosophy. sophists as travelers who lack roots, loyalties, and universe as a likeness to himself by giving the uni- knowledge of local matters, Socrates also considers verse a soul or spiritual intelligence that comprehends them inappropriate for this task. It is in this spirit that all components and features of its organic (animal- Socrates seeks assistance from Timaeus, Critias, and like) whole (TS:30-33). Observing that the universe Hermocrates, each of whom is held in high repute in also has a material or corporeal existence, Timaeus matters of philosophy and statesmanship. says that all matter consists of fire, earth, water and air. Critias (TS:20-27) engages Socrates’ objective by re- While shaping the universe in the form of a globe or telling a story told to him by his grandfather. His sphere (TS:33-37), the creator had first created the in- grandfather had heard it from Solon who, in turn, visible soul that would reside at the center. After stat- had learned about the glories of a much earlier Ath- ing that notions of existence and being are problem- ens from an Egyptian priest. Noting that Greece had atic in more comprehensive terms, Timaeus (TS:38) been subject to numerous deluges or natural disasters contends that time came into being at the instant of over the millennia, the priest informed Solon that the creation and, likewise, would be dissolved if ever the Egyptians have records showing that Athens was products of creation cease to exist. For now, however, once home to the greatest of all nation states. Eventu- time represents a moving image of existence. Following a quick reference to the division of labor (as in farmers, trades people, soldiers and guardians) necessary for a viable state, Socrates focuses on those who would serve as guardians or administrators of the state he envisions. The guardians are to be highly dedicated, well educated, wise, and noble. As well, the guardians are to live in modest lifestyles in a setting in which all goods are communally owned. Their female companions are to participate in the activities of the male guardians, including warfare. To avoid more specific ties of kinship and to encourage the guardians to envision themselves as one family, the wives and children of the guardians are to be shared in common. Then, discussing the state somewhat more generally, Socrates also discusses the desirability of selective breeding ally, however, it was overcome by earthquakes and floods as, likewise, was the island of Atlantis. Following a commentary on the solar system, Ti- would struggle with their sensations and emotions, God intended to reward those who lived honorable earthly lives with a blessed existence. Those who did not would (in subsequent lives) pass into continually lowered states of animal life until they overcame their earthly failings. Having developed things thusly, God then turned matters over to the younger gods that God had created. God left them to deal with human bodies and souls as best they could (TS:42). After noting that the sensations that people encounter can affect their bodies in intense manners, Timaeus (TS:43-44) also observes that people are born without intelligence. Nevertheless, with nurturing and education, people can develop more extended intellectual capacities.8 maeus (TS:39-40) identifies four sets of living entities Later, Timaeus (TS:49-52) considers some of the in the community. Relatedly, he stresses the impor- Affirming that he has been accurate in his render- that God created: the gods of heaven; the creatures tance of insuring that children of the best citizens ing of the account of the lost ancient city of Athens, problematic features of human knowing. Recogniz- of the air; the species of the water; and the animals are well educated while still being mindful of the Critias also observes that the features of Socrates’ ing that the (basic) elements of fire, earth, air, and value of moving those who show potential to higher (humans included) that live on land. Republic correspond with those of the perfect Greek water are continually changing, he says that it is levels and assigning those with lower qualities to state described by the Egyptian priest. Notably, Noting that their own knowledge of the gods is lim- too, the same goddess Athene was the founder and ited, Timaeus (TS:40) says that they can only rely on guide of both city-states. what has come to them through tradition. as his starting point, Socrates observes the state still Socrates very much appreciates the connections Still, Timaeus (TS:41) continues. He states that God needs something more than what he has provided with the past provided by Critias, but his compan- had instructed the (lesser) gods he created to over- live among the inferior classes. With this highly abbreviated overview of Republic 10 ©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1 inappropriate to say that things “are” or have certain qualities or to make other statements that imply permanence. Viewed thusly, there are three states of nature: that which is in the process of changReaders may appreciate some early pragmatist/constructionist emphases in Timaeus’ (TS:43-63) comments on the nature of human knowing and acting. 8 Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org 11 Robert Prus Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws ing; that in which change takes place; and the other heavy; and rough-smooth), before considering the but the creation of the mortal he committed to While noting that people may be encouraged to things that the (particular) things in the process of emotions and the matters of pain and pleasure more his offspring. And they, imitating him, received avoid vices through education and study, Timaeus changing resemble. specifically. Then, positing that pain is the product from him the immortal principle of the soul; and quickly puts these matters aside. Instead, he will Continuing, Timaeus (TS:51) asks if things properly (a) have any inherent qualities or whether (b) things of disturbances to one’s system and that pleasure is dependent on a restoration of one’s natural state, Timaeus (TS:64-68) considers the ways in which hu- around this they proceeded to fashion a mortal body, and made it to be the vehicle of the soul, and constructed within the body a soul [psyche – RP] of another nature which was mortal, sub- exist only to the extent that people, in some way, man sensitivities to taste, odor, sound, and sight are perceive these things through their sense organs? ject to terrible and irresistible affections, first of connected with people’s (sensory enabled) experi- all, pleasure, the greatest incitement to evil; then, Relatedly, he asks (c) if things have existence only ences with pain and pleasure. pain, which deters from good; also rashness and Then, stating that God alone has the capacity to cre- appeased, and hope easily led astray; these they through the names they are given? Pursuing these matters, Timaeus argues for a dis- ate and combine all things of his creation, Timaeus tinction between the things that people might know (TS:68-69) briefly summarizes his position as he through sensate experience and things that may be moves toward the conclusion of his story. Timaeus understood only through reason. Then, focusing states that God not only created the universe and on reason more exclusively, Timaeus argues for the gave order to what otherwise would be chaos, but existence of true ideas that transcend human sensa- also generated a soul for the universe that allowed tions. Further, Timaeus contends, it is these invari- for the intelligent, organic capacity of the universe ant truths (the contemplation of which rests with to comprehend and adjust to all of the entities with- intelligence) that provide testimony to a being that in. Further, while providing people with immortal pre-exists creation. Timaeus (TS:52) subsequently souls, God had given his closest offspring, the newer posits that it was necessary to create space before gods, the task of preparing and tending to the mor- the matters that occupy space could be brought into tal bodies in which people’s souls would be hosted. existence. Process, likewise, needed to exist before It was here, too, that people would be subject to the the heavens could be formed. human weaknesses (and temptations) associated After providing an account of the ways in which the elements of fire, earth, water, and air were configured into the universe, Timaeus (TS:57) observes that things cannot move without a mover or a source of motion. Relatedly, there can be no movement without something to be moved. Next, Timaeus (TS:58- fear, two foolish counsellors, anger hard to be tions both of these sets of people not to neglect the rienced by those who neglect their souls by disregarding the quest for knowledge. Amidst a somewhat extended consideration (TS:7086) of the ways that people’s bodies are (physiologically) prepared for life and disease, Timaeus also makes a brief argument for prophecy as implied in the art of divination.9 Timaeus (TS:77) subsequently notes that trees, plants, and lower animal forms also were provided for man’s existence. Following a discussion of human diseases (TS:7885), Timaeus (TS:86-87) engages the topic of vice Timaeus (TS:89-92) then delineates three aspects of the soul [psyche] to which people should attend: the divine, the mortal, and the intellectual. While acknowledging the divinely-enabled nature of one’s existence and the importance of caring for one’s mortal being, Timaeus particularly stresses the intellectual component. It is here, in questing for knowledge and true wisdom, he says, that people will achieve the greatest affinities with divinity. in more direct terms. He says that people who en- In concluding, Timaeus (TS:90-92) says that the souls counter great pain or pleasure lose their capacities of men who have not lived virtuous lives will as- to reason adequately. Timaeus insists that no one is sume lower forms of existence in subsequent lives. [a]s I said at first, when all things were in disor- voluntarily bad, but that people do bad things be- In this way, Timaeus accounts for the initial devel- der God created in each thing in relation to itself, cause of these and other afflictions that foster anger, with pain, pleasure, and other emotions amidst human capacities for love: and in all things in relation to each other, all the measures and harmonies which they could possibly receive. For in those days nothing had any depression, cowardice, stupidity, disregard, and the like. In addition, Timaeus remarks that people who tings also are prone to vice. ©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1 engrossed in disputation and strife, Timaeus cau- man. (Plato [Timaeus:69]; Jowett trans.) the things which now have names deserve to be 12 on studies and teaching while others are deeply he observes, the greatest of diseases will be expe- water, earth, and air), as well as a variety of forms touch-related sensations (hot-cold; hard-soft; light- Noting that some souls are intensively focused love according to necessary laws, and so framed have poor educations or live in badly governed set- capacities for sensate experience. He focuses on and the body in which it is hosted. care (e.g., exercise) of their mortal bodies. However, proportion except by accident; nor did any of Timaeus (TS:61-63) subsequently discusses human appropriate balance between one’s immortal soul mingled with irrational sense and with all-daring 61) considers the motion of the four elements (fire, that these material essences may assume. concentrate on the importance of maintaining an named at all – as, for example, fire, water, and the rest of the elements. All these the creator first set in order, and out of them he constructed the universe, which was a single animal comprehending in itself all other animals, mortal and immortal. Now of the divine, he himself was the creator, opment of women and human sexuality, the birds, other animals, reptiles, and fishes. This having been said, Timaeus acknowledges God as the creator of all. [Thus concludes the dialogue.] Phaedo10 9 While accepting the viability of divination as a message from the gods, Timaeus (TS:71-72) argues that people are most likely to receive these messages when they are asleep or in demented states (as in mental anguish or spiritual possession). However, because people in these latter states are considered unfit to judge their own experiences, these (messages) are to be interpreted by others who are more accomplished in the art of divination. Well known as an account of Socrates’ last days of his death sentence, Phaedo represents another of PlaIn developing this material I have built extensively on Benjamin Jowett’s (1937) translation of Plato’s Phaedo. 10 Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org 13 Robert Prus Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws to’s more notable theological statements. While em- ful. In response, Socrates says that people are the death provides the true philosopher that which he been lost or neglected overtime. Rather than just phasizing the immortality of the soul (as a spiritual possessions of the gods and have no right to destroy most desires – to be alone with the soul. remembering things, the claim is that people some- essence) and its capacity to know things (in both the things that the gods own. Instead, people are to human and divinely-enabled terms), this text also wait until God summons them. Relatedly, Socrates deals with the matters of people facing death, resist- states that his time has come. are not lovers of wisdom, but lovers of the body. Most likely, as well, they also are lovers of money Instead of assuming that people are born knowing of philosophy, virtue, and divinity. When Cebes and Simmias suggest that Socrates may and power, if not both. Further, Socrates adds, most these things at birth, the more viable argument is be too eager for his own death and perhaps ought people who claim to be temperate merely control that people knew these things from a previous life; Still, in contrast to Timaeus, which has a more distinc- to fear death more, Socrates (Phaedo:63) says that he their pleasures in most areas only because they are though a pre-existent soul that inhabits the present tive theological emphasis (via the creation story that might be more fearful if he did not believe he was in conquered by specific other pleasures of the body. body. Since these ideas existed before people were Timaeus recounts), Phaedo places greater emphasis the care of the gods. Thus, in the afterlife, Socrates True virtue, Socrates proclaims, is inseparable from born, Socrates concludes, the souls also existed be- on philosophy as an idealized (cultic) pursuit. Thus, fully expects to join the earlier departed who had true wisdom. fore birth; conversely, if not the ideas, then not the whereas one finds strong affirmations of a divinity- been wise and good in the sensate world. ing tendencies toward suicide, and the interlinkages enabled immortal soul in Phaedo, the immortal soul is sustained by a virtuous philosophic life that is mindful of the existence of absolute standards rather than through a devout religious life per se. Those who fear death, Socrates (Phaedo:68) insists, times recall things of a higher order than they have ever experienced in their (present) sensate lives. souls. But, Socrates affirms, since notions of absolute While listening to Socrates, Cebes (Phaedo:70) sug- beauty, perfect goodness, and the like, exist, so must Elaborating on his position, Socrates (Phaedo:64) gests that people may still be fearful that their souls exist. states that the real philosopher should be in good souls might dissipate with death and, effectively, spirits when he faces death. While noting that most cease to exist. Encountering some skepticism from Simmias who is not yet convinced that the soul will endure after people would not understand, Socrates says that Saying that he will locate his discussion within the death, Socrates (Phaedo:77-82) asks what is most like- realm of probabilities, Socrates (Phaedo:70-72) ref- ly to break up at the time of death – the simple and Recognizing that the senses are untrustworthy, erences an ancient doctrine that claims that when unchanging soul or the complex and changeable hu- true philosophers (Phaedo:65) are continually at- people die their souls are reborn from the dead. man body? Likewise, he asks, what is more vulner- tempting to separate their souls from their bodies, Thus, Socrates posits, the living come from the souls able to dissolution, the invisible soul or the visible to distance their spiritual essences from the sensu- of those who had earlier died and the souls have an body? Socrates also reminds Simmias that when the al failings of their bodies. Thus, Socrates references existence apart from the body. Socrates follows this body and soul are united, it is the soul that directs In developing his account, Phaedo (Phaedo:58-59) absolute justice, absolute beauty, and absolute good with a commentary on the existence of opposites the body. By this function, as well, Socrates argues first comments on the noble, gracious manner in as elements that are inaccessible to the senses and and concludes that living essences are generated the soul is closer to the divine and therefore more which Socrates dealt with the entire affair. Phaedo that can exist in pure forms only in the clarity of from those that had earlier died. likely to be immortal. Then, insisting that there is also identifies those who had been with Socrates the mind. This dialogue opens with Echecrates asking Phaedo if he had been present when Socrates drank the poison that resulted in his death. Echecrates has heard about Socrates’ trial (see Socrates’ Defense or Apology) and expresses his disbelief and dismay that Socrates had been condemned to death. true philosophers are always engaging death. a true, invisible, noble afterlife, Socrates claims that After Cebes (Phaedo:72) observes that the notion of Then, citing things such as the quest for food, the invisible souls of good people will depart to the souls being born again into other bodies is consistent encounters with diseases, and loves, lusts, fears, invisible world at death. with Socrates’ doctrine of recollection, Simmias asks Inspired by a dream, Socrates had been composing fascinations, and foolishness of all sorts, Socrates Socrates to refresh his own memory on this theory. musical verses while on his own. However, after the (Phaedo:66) says that the body is the source of end- others have arrived, he directs their conversation to less difficulty. Indeed, the soul cannot achieve pure In elucidating his position on recollection (also see earth where they are compelled to undergo pun- the journey he is about to make (Phaedo:61). knowledge while embedded within the body. Thus, Meno [in Plato; Jowett trans.]), Socrates (Phaedo:73- ishment for their past misdeeds. Further, after ap- Socrates (Phaedo:67) states, it is only after death; on 77) says that people may recall things that they have propriate punishment, and because of their earlier While conversing with Socrates (Phaedo:61-62), Cebes the separation of the soul from its earthly host, that never perceived in that manner. He describes recol- human failings, these souls would later occupy the and Simmias ask why suicide is considered unlaw- one’s soul may be purified. Viewed in this manner, lection as a process of recovering notions that had bodies of lower, less worthy animal species. during his last few days and hours. Plato, presumably ill at the time, was absent. 14 ©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1 However, Socrates insists, the souls of evil people would be dragged down to (an invisible world on) Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org 15 Robert Prus Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws Developing his position further, Socrates (Phaedo:82) the body. Socrates assures his listeners that virtuous lesser. Now, however, Socrates questions whether Then, following a consideration of the existence of says that while more virtuous people will be much souls will not become lost. one can understand the concept of causality or even opposites and the impressions they generate, So- whether things exist at all. crates (Phaedo:105-106) says that it is the soul that happier in the afterlife, it is only those souls that both have studied philosophy and are virtuously pure that may be allowed to partake in the company of the gods: [Socrates:] No one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the gods, but the lover of knowledge only. And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy ab- Suspecting that Simmias and Cebes still have doubts, Relatedly, Socrates earlier had hoped that Anaxago- their concerns. Cebes returns to the question of the would never become the opposite of what it is (i.e., ras (500-428 BCE), who said that the mind was the soul surviving the death of the body. Cebes observes die). Defining the immortal as the imperishable, So- source and agent of all things, would provide some that while one person might outwear many coats, crates says that the soul is both immortal and im- answers. However, on reading his texts, Socrates some coats are apt to survive the owner. He asks perishable. Thus, while the mortal body will perish, found that Anaxagoras (a materialist, atomist phi- the soul will survive. whether something of this sort may not occur with the soul. Given the many bodies that the soul occu- stain from all fleshly lusts, and hold out against them pies over time, may the soul not weaken or wear out and refuse to give themselves up to them, not because – so at some point, the soul might expire with its cur- they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the rent body. Past survivals of the soul, Cebes contends, lovers of money and the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and honour, because they dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil deeds. [Instead – RP]… when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her do not guarantee subsequent survivals. In developing his reply, Socrates (Phaedo:89-90) first cautions people about being either hardened skep- influence, and whither she leads they turn and follow. tics about people or haters of ideas. Still, Socrates (Plato [Phaedo:82]; Jowett trans.) (Phaedo:91) says, at this point he is not a philosopher After insisting that it is only through philosophy that people may gain a vision of true existence and escape the bars of their prison,11 Socrates (Phaedo:8384) comments on the particular dangers that sensations of pain and pleasure represent for the soul. Be- gives the body life and that the (life-giving) soul Socrates (Phaedo:84-88) encourages them to express so much as a partisan. Nevertheless, unlike most partisans, Socrates says that his objective is not to convince others of his viewpoint as much as it is to convince himself and, in the interim, to provide something for others to consider in more impartial terms. losopher who preceded Democritus [460-357 BCE] and Epicurus [341-270 BCE]) very much disregarded the mind and instead concentrated on air, water, and other oddities. Assuming that the soul moves to another world after the death of the body and has an immortal quality, Socrates (Phaedo:107-108) stresses the importance of people taking appropriate care of their souls dur- Seemingly after some other unproductive philo- ing their presence on earth. Socrates also states that sophic ventures, Socrates (Phaedo:100) says that he when souls enter the afterlife they will be judged assumed a new methodology. He would pick the and be sanctioned according to the virtues and im- strongest principle he could find and judge the val- purities of their earthly lives. ue of other things mindfully of the correspondence of these other things with that principle. In explaining his method, Socrates (Phaedo:100) says that he holds the position that there is absolute beauty, goodness, and greatness. These being the absolutely most viable standards, all things exist only in reference to these comparison points. Hence, Their consideration of the afterlife is diverted somewhat by a discussion of the earth. [Amongst other things, Socrates (Phaedo:108-111) not only describes the earth as spherical in shape, but also at the center of the universe.] Returning more directly to the plight of the soul, cause people’s experiences with pain and pleasure In the discussion following, Socrates (Phaedo:92- can be so intense, these sensations have a uniquely -95) reminds the others that the soul exists prior compelling presence; one that so completely bonds to the body and that the soul, especially the wise the soul to the body that the soul loses virtually all soul, directs the body. Socrates then reviews Cebes’ sense of its divine origins. Under these conditions, concerns about the soul not outlasting the body in comparisons between two or more (sensate) things there is little hope of these souls grasping aspects of which it is presently situated. (as other people might do), Socrates contends, that after becoming thusly purged of their sins, these these absolute standards provide one with exacting souls, likewise, will be rewarded for the good or perfect reference points. things they have done. true knowing. It is for this reason, Socrates explains, that philosophers must so scrupulously guard themselves against the more intense sensations of Those familiar with Plato’s other works may be reminded of Plato’s “allegory of the cave” (Republic, VII). Readers will also find material in Phaedo (especially pp. 82-84) that may have inspired Boethius’ (480-524 CE) The Consolation of Philosophy. 11 16 ©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1 After noting that Cebes has raised a set of issues pertaining to the processes of generation and decay, Socrates (Phaedo:96-99) informs the others that as a young philosopher he also was eager to learn the causes of things. At this time, too, Socrates felt highly confident in the comparative notions of greater and it is only by reference to absolute beauty or greatness that something else may be considered beautiful or great, for instance. Instead of invoking relative 12 Readers may see the foundations of Socrates’ ideal forms or types in his methodology. Clearly, Aristotle (Categories), who says that nothing has any quality except in reference to that which it is compared, does not accept Socrates’ methodology. Likewise, while Plato seems sympathetic to Socrates’ conception of absolute (especially divinely inspired) truth, Plato also introduces direct challenges to this viewpoint in Parmenides. 12 Socrates (Phaedo:113-114) distinguishes three ways in which people’s souls may be treated in the afterlife, depending on their earthly lives. Those who have lived more moderate lives can expect to undergo punishment for their evil deeds. However, Those judged to have committed particularly heinous offenses are hurled into Tartarus wherein they are subject to unrelenting punishment. After an extended period of punishment, those souls that are Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org 17 Robert Prus Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws deemed salvageable may be given an opportunity the speakers consider mythical, but they are explic- Thus, since Plato envisions human involvements in religion as a highly important mechanism for foster- to appeal to their victims for leniency. Should their itly attentive to the importance of developing shared theology as embedded (being developed, experi- ing the moral order of the community, as well as pro- victims not wish to forgive them, these souls would reference points as sources of meaning and motiva- enced, instructed, resisted, and changing over time) viding direction for individual character and moral be returned to Tartarus. For the souls that are con- tion for citizens in the state. within the broader parameters of community life, well-being, Plato’s speakers are also attentive to the his notions of religion are developed amidst discus- relativist, problematic, enacted, and contested nature sions of education, poetics, wrongdoing and pun- of religion. They are also mindful of the importance ishment, and marketplace activity, as well as within of policies, practices, and even entertainment motifs more encompassing considerations of justice and for sustaining religious viewpoints, along with the the affairs of state. social and personal implications thereof. sidered incurable, there is no other destiny than perpetual punishment in Tartarus. In Phaedo, Plato gives much attention to the “immortality of the soul,” but still shows how people may Those who have lived virtuous lives are allowed to struggle with ambiguity, knowledge and wisdom, live pure, content lives in the afterlife. Still, Socrates and doubt, and virtue and religion in the face of affirms, those virtuous souls who also know philos- one’s own death and those of one’s associates. These ophy will fare even better in the afterlife. sorts of things may seem obvious, but humanly en- It also is important to note that the emphases of Interestingly, as well, although Plato is often dis- gaged matters along these lines have largely been Plato’s Republic and (later) Laws are somewhat dif- missed as an idealist, his analysis of religion, virtue, overlooked in “the sociology of religion.” ferent. Republic addresses the development of a state evil, and regulation exhibits a noteworthy pragma- in which justice and social order are maintained tist attentiveness to human knowing and acting as through the activities of a more elite set of guard- a collectively, community-achieved, adjustive pro- ians (philosopher-kings) who would manage the cess. Thus, in addition to acknowledging the mul- affairs of state in virtuous (as in knowledgeable, tiple viewpoints that people may adopt with respect courageous, wise, temperate, and just) manners. By to the situations in which they find themselves, Pla- contrast, Plato’s Laws focuses on the matter of devel- to’s speakers are also mindful of people’s activities, oping a centralized constitution and an explicit le- identities, emotionality, reflectivity, and persuasive gal code that not only would define the essential pa- interchange (and resistance). After cautioning his listeners that the afterlife that he has described is only a reasonable approximation of what actually exists, Socrates (Phaedo:114) says that there is good reason to be optimistic about the future of his soul. Indeed, he contends, those who have severed themselves from the sensations and trappings of the body and who have lived virtuous life-styles are ready to face death when their time comes. 13 Republic and Laws ‒ Questing for Community In contrast to the more limited scope of Timaeus and Phaedo, Plato’s Republic and Laws are intended as encompas...
User generated content is uploaded by users for the purposes of learning and should be used following Studypool's honor code & terms of service.

This question has not been answered.

Create a free account to get help with this and any other question!

Similar Content

Related Tags