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Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197
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Plato’s The Republic, Book XI
Editorial Introduction
Mario Vegetti
Professor Emeritus in Ancient Philosophy, University of Pavia
mariovegetti@tin.it
Abstract
In this newly edited Book XI of Plato’s Republic, to be considered as the authentic conclusion of
the dialogue, Socrates meets a Stranger from Trier, and discusses with him the questions of social
reform, power and future revolutions.
Keywords
Plato, Republic, Socrates, Karl Marx
1. History of the text
The scanty ancient evidence regarding the existence of Book XI of the Republic,
reported in Byzantine (Phontius, Biblioth. XXXIII.33) and Arabic sources (IbnAl-Ragù, Book of Admirable and Portentous Things in Praise of Allah, XVI.16),
has always been considered as a result of copyists’ errors, given that the Greek
tradition consistently presents Plato’s Politeia as a work which comprises ten
books.
In 1937, the Soviet scholar Josiph Vissarionovich announced the discovery of
an ancient manuscript in an Armenian monastery, consisting of the text of an
apparently Platonic dialogue that the scholar interpreted as an appendix of the
Republic and entitled Epipoliteia; the scholarly community received this
announcement with incredulity. During the War, the manuscript was luckily
transported to Berlin, where it was studied and published by the great German
philologist Fritz Derselbe, who confijirmed its Platonic origin and that it was
part of the Republic on the basis of accurate stylometric evaluations.1 The
1. Plato und Karl Marx, ‘Zukunftphilologie’, 0, 1943, pp. 1–103. Derselbe maintains that the
Stranger should be identifijied with a certain Karolus Marx, who is mentioned in the Chronacæ
Trevirienses by Scribonius Strictus.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012
DOI: 10.1163/156920612X634744
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M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197
manuscript was subsequently lost and vainly sought by the Soviet army after
the invasion of Berlin. A few years later, however, the Greek scholar Aphrodisios
Oinotes announced that he had seen the manuscript in a monastery on Mount
Athos, although the monks unfortunately did not let him transcribe or take
pictures of it (an absurd ban that is still enforced today, which would legitimise
an intervention, possibly of military nature, by the international community).
Despite these authoritative studies, the authenticity of the text and its
identifijication as Book XI of the Republic are still disputed by many scholars,
especially Anglo-Saxon ones (see, for example, Annas Julias),2 on the basis of
three main arguments: the fact that the Greek tradition reports only ten Books;
the historical implausibility of Socrates’s new interlocutor, the ‘Stranger of
Trier’; and the philosophical content of the text.
Two solutions have been offfered with regard to the fijirst objection. The most
convincing one is that the book had been censured and therefore condemned
to oblivion by the immediately post-Platonic Academy since the time of
Speusippus, due to its ideologically embarrassing content: the theological and
conservative attitude of this phase of the Platonic Academy would have largely
preferred that the dialogue end with the myths of the afterlife expounded in
Book X.
The second hypothesis is that the original version of the Republic actually
contained ten Books, the last of which contained the text presented in this
edition. It would have been substituted with what is currently regarded as
Book X, so as to allow a mythico-religious interpretation of the whole dialogue,
rather than a political one. This hypothesis has the advantage of explaining the
presence of an anomalous book, such as the current Book X, tracing it back to
an academic forgery. Still, the opening section of Book XI must be explained, as
it is openly polemical against Book X: perhaps it could be a later addition by a
minoritarian strand of the Academy that opposed the expunction of our text
and its substitution with the bigotry of the new text?
The other two objections will be analysed in the following sections.
2. The interlocutors: the Stranger and the young Aristotle
The character of the Stranger is introduced by means of the typical features of
Platonic irony: the language attributed to him is extremely interesting, often
interwoven with barbarisms à la Aristophanes. The interpretation of the
expression Trieretes Xenos seems to be more problematic (cf. note 2 to the
translation). It seems possible, however, that the Germanic city of Trier had
2. A Communist Fiction: The So-Called Book XI of the Republic, ‘Anoia’ 99, 2004, pp. 1–2.
M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197
193
cultural exchanges with the Greek world, by means of the fluvial ways
represented by the Rhine and the Danube, as well as the commercial routes
connecting the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. It is conceivable, therefore, that
this character was a wise man of Germanic origins, perhaps educated in the
Greek environment of Marseille, who was enslaved and subsequently set free
from his chains; alternatively, he could have been a trader (possibly working
for a rich German known as Federikos Anghelos,3 who exported textiles
and metals) and may have had a commercial relationship with Cephalus’s
industries – an aspect that would explain his presence in Piræus at the time of
the dialogue. In addition, it is well attested that the Thracian festival of Bendis
attracted many barbarians of northern origins to Athens.4
The choice of an unknown, barbarian interlocutor is clearly due to the
Platonic wish to introduce in the dialogue and its fijictional dimension some
new theoretical developments that were unrelated to the Athenian political
tradition of the time, in order to highlight their ground-breaking nature; at the
same time, however, they are not entirely alien to the spirit of the dialogue
(similar cases are often attested, such as in the case of the ‘Eleatic stranger’ or
Timæus of Locri).
At any rate, it is not possible to exclude entirely that, in the course of the
long compositional process of the Republic, Plato may actually have been
influenced by non-Greek currents of thought, which arrived in the Hellenic
area during the lively exchanges that took place in the fijirst half of the fourth
century: these currents were subsequently marginalised and silenced by the
progressive prevalence of reactionary, monarchical and authoritarian attitudes,
and by the increasing ‘Asiatic’ influence on Greek culture, with its mystical and
despotic features.
Some remarks must be made regarding the other character introduced in
the text, the young Aristotle. His presence in, and precocious influence on, the
debates of the Academy has been underlined for a long time in scholarly
literature: undisputable testimonies on this question are represented by the
critiques of the Republic expounded in Book II of the Politics. His rôle seems to
have been so influential that some scholars argue that Plato wrote the Laws in
order to respond to these criticisms.5 Plato’s decision to include Aristotle as a
3. An epistolary exchange between the two individuals is attested to and collected in MAGA
(Marx und Anghelos Gesammelte Werke), vol. XXX. Giuseppe Mucca, Marx pseudoepigraphus, in
‘Quaderni histerici’ 13, 1913, pp. 13–31, however, regards the correspondence as a forgery (as well as
the actual existence of Marx and Anghelos).
4. Cf. on this question S. Pastaldi-Gambese, Bendidie, in M. Vecchietti (ed.) Platone. Repubblica,
libro 1, Francopolis, Napoli 1998, pp. 6372–7277.
5. Cf. R. Godéus, Pourquoi Platon a-t-il compose les Lois?, ‘Revue phantastique de Philosophie’,
99, 1999, pp. 9–90.
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M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197
character in the last book of the dialogue, and let him express his criticisms in
nuce, could be due to the intention to show their one-sidedness even before
they were systematically argued by the author, as happened a few decades
later. Still, this would not be the only case in which the Academic discussion is
represented in the dialogues: the same kind of scenario is undoubtedly
presented in the Parmenides and the Sophist.6
3. The development of the argument
The appearance on scene of the Stranger, with his radical and provocative
criticism, allows Plato to reconsider from a diffferent point of view all the
ethico-political questions discussed in the dialogue, which are evoked and
questioned in detail.
a) In the fijirst place, there is a clarifijication of the meaning of the content
presented in Book X, which seems anomalous in relation to the previous
developments of the dialogue that analysed the relationship between happiness
and justice without resorting to religious-oriented considerations on awards or
punishments in the afterlife. The pungent critique of the Stranger, seconded by
Thrasymachus as well as timidly by Adeimantus and Glaucon, forces Socrates
to clarify that it represented just a rhetorical device exploited in order to
convince the ignorant masses to follow justice, even though they are unable to
understand the rational reasons to do so; in addition, it provides some
consolation for the sorrows sufffered by just men in their worldly life. This
educational and consolatory function is harshly defijined by the Stranger as a
sort of ‘opium of the people’, as opposed to the need to give to the masses an
active and conscious rôle in the process of their own liberation.
From here stem two crucial lines of enquiry that re-examine some of the
fundamental theoretical tenets of the dialogue: the relation between education
and revolution and the question of power.
b) While Plato, in the whole dialogue, insisted on the need to educate
appropriately the ruling class of the new city, assigning them the task to reform
the existing society and rule the future one, the Stranger applies a diametrically
opposite approach. The process should not start from the summit but from the
base, from the workers on whom the production of social richness depends
and whose exploitation permits the enrichment of the ruling class. In this
context the Stranger introduces, in his barbaric language, the concept of ‘class’,
which was alien to ancient Greek political thought; Socrates is seen to have
6. Cf., with regard to this, F. Testarotta, Mentexis, Scuola normale [sic!] Superiore, 2002, pp.
613–890.
M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197
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difffijiculties in understanding it, given his habit of considering workers
diffferentially on the basis of their professions and technical skills.
From this point of view, the educational project on which Plato had insisted
so much in the dialogue appears now to be a pale and inefffective ‘reformist’
strategy, which is destined to leave society substantially unaltered and provide
only mere appearances of improvement. The Stranger opposes to this scenario
the concept of ‘revolution’, indicated by the Greek term neoterismos: a radical
upheaval of the social relationships featuring the working class as the
protagonist of its own liberation, fijinally able to regain possession of the fruits
of their labour and also to be the interpreters of the universal interests of
humankind. Only in this way, the Stranger argues, will the ‘evils’ of the city and
of the men, whose therapy Plato entrusted exclusively to the philosophers,
come to an end.
c) From here stems one of the most signifijicant themes of the dialogue, in
the context of which the Stranger appears to be in a difffijicult position: this is
due to the diffferent, but also somehow convergent, criticisms exposed by
Socrates and Thrasymachus, criticisms that focus on the relationship between
masses and élites.7 He acknowledges that popular masses – that is, the
legitimate subject of the revolution – need to be guided by a minority capable
of interpreting its needs and aspirations, a minority that he indicates in his
language as a Partei – a ‘party’, imperfectly rendered in Greek by the expression
oligon meros.8
Thrasymachus, with the roughness proper to his style, has no difffijiculty in
foreseeing that this ‘party’ may turn into an oligarchic tyranny under the
influence of the pleonexia of the ‘stronger’ individuals. For his part, Socrates
wonders whether there actually would be a substantial diffference between the
‘party’, assuming that its members are exempt from that kind of pleonexia due
to their moral and intellectual qualities, and the small group [oligon genos] of
the philosophers that he had been describing in Books VI and VII. These
philosophers, one should remark, possess those dialectical skills, which exert a
defijinite sort of fascination on the Stranger, probably due to his plausible
discipleship to Hegelos, a radical innovator of this science in Germanic
territories.9
7. On this theme, see the important contribution by L. Naftalina, Comunismo o élitismo?, in
‘Quinterni di Storia’ 2, 2002, p. 2.
8. This thesis argued by the Stranger may be traced back to the influence of the Scythe
Vladimiros Leninos, better known under the pseudonyms Abaris or Anakarsis.
9. On the relationship between the Treviranus and the Rhenish wise man, see the fundamental
contribution by D. Lomuto, The Book of Truths that Are Incontrovertible and Irrefutable Even by the
Most Pernicious Critics, Coricella, Ischia s.d.
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M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197
The Stranger has some difffijiculties, as we have seen, in replying to these
objections. He accepts that, for a transitory phase, the dictatorship of the
people must be structured as a dictatorship of the ‘party’, which however,
contrary to Thrasymachus’s observation, is made of a minority of just and
virtuous men. Against Socrates, the Stranger refuses to admit a drastic
separation between this minority and the masses that they lead, however
temporary; on the other hand he does not seem to be able to indicate clearly
the relationship between the ‘party’, the government of the city (or state) and
the working masses, as is also confijirmed by his shaky references to analogous
experiences in Gallic and Scythian areas. However, he must Socratically admit
that the question remains open and that the enquiry must continue.
d) Much more resolute is the Stranger’s attitude towards the delicate
question of the limits of ‘communism’, which is rendered with the pseudoGreek term koinonismos that he coins specifijically for this occasion. In Book V,
Plato had famously limited the community of goods and familial relationship
to the ruling class, but doubtless the question had been the object of lively
discussions within the Academy. According to an extreme collectivistic
position that is reported by the Anonymous Athenian (the protagonist of the
Laws) in order to rule it out as desirable but impossible,10 this form of
communism should have been extended to the whole community of citizens;
on the contrary, according to the opposite view maintained by the Academic
‘right wing’ and represented in this text by the fijigure of the young Aristotle, all
forms of communism are both impossible and undesirable, as they go against
the allegedly fundamental principle of human nature that is the instinct of
property. With regard to this point, the Stranger attacks Socrates’s uncertainties
and limits expressed in Book V, but does not deny his fundamental sympathy
for its basic inspiration, although he argues for a bolder extension of this
collectivism to the whole social body. Clearly, his perspective is that of an
extreme and radical emancipation of men, and specifijically of workers, from all
the bonds of economic and social subordination; this position difffers from the
platonic one in that it assumes as its fundamental ground not an ethico-
10. This passage shows how Plato was aware of the objections formulated in his own school
against the partial ‘communism’ theorised in the Republic, objections that were communicated
abroad by some of his disciples, as demonstrated by the Cretan reference mentioned by the
Stranger. According to M. Vecchietti, the leader of this opposition was the Pythagorean
conservative Philip of Opus, well-known for his theocratic leanings; the very composition of the
Laws should be attributed to him, as in that text the Platonic thesis of a collectivism that could
potentially be extended to all citizens is mentioned only to be discarded. Allegedly Philip was also
close to Aristotle, who not by chance considered the Laws much more preferable to the Republic.
On the whole question, see M. Vecchietti, Unwritten and Extravagant Pages, Levanto s.d.
M. Vegetti / Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 191–197
197
political theory but an economic interpretation of history and society as a
struggle between working class and owners.
e) The great myth of the ‘ghost’ (or ‘spectre’) of communism is certainly
formulated by the Stranger as an ironic reply to the Socratic myths, especially
to that of the afterlife presented in Republic, Book X. It contains and expresses,
more efffectively than theoretical analyses, the perspectives and wishes of
liberation evoked by the Treviranus and, in a sense, represents the summary
and manifesto of his thought.11
The mythical form employed by the Stranger obtains, perhaps exactly due
to its formal characteristics, one of his most signifijicant achievements: Socrates
expresses his consensus [homologia] on the contents of the myth and expresses
his hope of employing, one day, Thrasymachus’s theory of power to the benefijit
of a project of universal liberation, rather than to that of tyrannical oppression.
This perspective of reconciliation, in a utopian fashion, represents an adequate
conclusion of the great dialogue: it remains a ‘one-thousand-year journey’, as
in the conclusion of Book X – but in this case the journey is not one between
this world and the afterlife but, rather, one leading towards a better world for
the history of humankind.
Translated by Tosca Lynch
11. A critical analysis of this myth is formulated by G. Blush and T. Bliar, Ghost-stories and
Ghost-busters, Hollywood-Baghdad 2004. Lively replies to these critiques have been recently
discussed in an international forum hosted in a clandestine location (I want to express my
gratitude to the organisers, with regard to whose identity I am bound to maintain silence, for
having confijidentially sent me the Proceedings of the meeting).
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copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
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The Dialogues as Dramatic Rehearsal: Plato's
Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor
ALBERT R. SPENCER
Portland State University
IN JOHN DEWEY & MORAL IMAGINATION, Steven Fesmire blames "Plato's
low estimation of imagination in tbe Republic and Ion" for tbe denigration
of imagination's role in moral deliberation (6i). He argues tbat Jobn Dewey's
dramatic rehearsal better integrates imagination into the process of moral
deliberation. His treatment of Plato represents a babit among pragmatists to
reduce Dewey's reading of Plato to tbe polemics present in major works, sucb
as The Quest for Certainty. In fact, Plato was Dewey's favorite philosopher, and
be claimed tbat "[n]otbing could be more belpful to present pbilosopbizing
tban a 'Back to Plaro' movement" (LW 5:154).' Following tbe scbolarsbip of
Jobn Herman Randall and Henry Wolz reveals Plato as a moral artist enga^ged
in a project of social reconstruction wbo wrote tbe dialogues as dramatic rebearsals of particular bistorical and cultural problems, specifically Atbenian
begemony and Sophistic education. From tbis perspective. Republic Book
I dramatizes tbe inadequacy of tbe moral accounting metaphor critiqued by
George Lakoff and Mark Jobnson and experiments witb metapbors sympatbetic to Fesmire's construal of moral imagination.
According to Fesmire, Dewey contends all inquiry requires imagination
and tbat moral deliberation demands attention to tbe aestbetic dimension of
imagination because of tbe affective nature of moral value. Tbis places Dewey
in company witb Adam Smitb and David Hume wbo accepted tbe role of
imagination and sentiment, and at odds witb Immanuel Kant and Plato wbo
suspected emotions and imagination as barriers to rational inquiry:
Imagination, on tbis view, is usually a trusty crafter of images but is
given to miscbief Tbus Kant's suspicion. Imagination as reflective free
play is essential to aesthetic judgment, for Kant, but in morals it is too
self-indulgent. It may sap moral strength, usurping Reason and yielding
THE PLURALIST
Volume 8, Number 2 Summet 2013 : pp. 26-35
©2013 by the Board of Trustees of che University of Illinois
SPENCER : Plato's Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor
27
victory to Feeling. If a person "surrenders authority over himself, his
imagination has free play," Kant claims. "He cannot discipline himself,
but his imagination carries him away by the laws of association; he yields
willingly to his senses, and, unable to curb them, he becomes their toy."
Doing one's duty, on Kant's view, requires little imagination; therefore
"its cultivation is at best a luxury, at worst a danger."
Despite eulogizing of imagination by Adam Smith and David Hume,
Enlightenment faculty psychology, following the lead of Plato's low
estimation of imagination in the Republic and Ion, is responsible for
imagination's being ignored even by those who urge that moral theories
must be psychologically plausible. As a limited capacity prone to frivolous fancy and opposed to reason, imagination has little relevance to
practical issues. So it can be dismissed altogether as a prescientific relic
or, transfigured by Romanticism, admired on a pedestal as a "godlike
power that enters into the world on the wings of intuition, free of the
taint of contingency and history." (Fesmire 61-62)
Instead, Fesmire prefers Dewey's concept of dramatic rehearsal because it
properly values imagination and better coheres with our experience of moral
deliberation. Rather than committing to a specific normative theory and always acting in accordance with it, Dewey argues that deliberation works best
when we actively use our imagination to rehearse and evaluate a variety of
responses and possible outcomes (70). Fesmire also references the four most
common modes of dramatic rehearsal that Dewey mentions in his 1900—1901
lectures on ethics, specifically dialogue, visualization of results, visualization of
their performance, and imagination of possible criticism (74). By consciously
recognizing the role of imagination in the process of deliberation and flexing
among the various phases and modes of rehearsal, Fesmire and Dewey believe
that we can reconstruct "frustrated habits" that perpetuate moral problems
and scenarios that seem intractable (78).
Fesmire suggests that the moral artist provides opportunities to practice
dramatic rehearsal through the creation of works of art that engage our imagination. He lists the characteristics of the successful moral artist as follows.
First, she must perceive "relations that otherwise go unnoticed." Second, she
must create works that "transform cultural perceptions" through "an ongoing experiment with novel possibilities." Third, she must coherently express
moral experience in a manner that presents "overall character rather than
blindly giving way to either custom or fleeting impulse," thus "such acts become role models." Fourth, she possesses "delicately refined skills [emphasis
added]" judged not by the "quantity of possibilities available to imagination.
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THE PLURALIST 8 : 2 2OI3
but their fittedness to the situation for wise deliberation." Finally, the moral
artist communicates with an audience by anticipating their reception of a work
in a way that "enables a dialectical interaction that gives point and focus to
art" (115-18).
At flrst blush, tne dialogues and Plato meet the criteria of both Dewey's
four modes of dramatic rehearsal and Fesmire's characteristics of the moral
artist. The dialogues use conversation as a means of exploring moral problems,
and Plato uses dramatic irony to highlight the consequences of specific moral
opinions as represented by the fate of recognizable interlocutors. His ability
to create works of art that continue to challenge cultural perceptions should
qualify Plato as a moral artist. Fesmire does highlight two points of continuity between Plato and Dewey. He suggests that the Statesman reveals Plato's
awareness that rigid moral laws cannot keep up with the pace of constant
social change. This awareness parallels Dewey's arguments in Human Nature
and Conduct that moral habits, like laws, emerge from human interaction
with our social environment and must adapt to changing social conditions
(17). Fesmire also concedes that Dewey and Plato agree on the intrinsic value
of justice, but distinguishes Dewey as conceiving "right action as cooperative
social interaction and inclusive of growth, not in terms of a harmonious soul
in which reason rules appetites" (99).
By contrast, the majority of Fesmire references to Plato are usually critical.
He acknowledges that Plato was the first to address the "moral power of art"
to "directly and literally contribute to the moral imagination and character,"
but he criticizes Plato's understanding of this relationship as "psychologically
simplistic" and as the source of Socrates's infamous arguments supporting
censorship in Books II and III of the Republic.^ Furthermore, Plato fails to
use art as a metaphor for moral experience. Fesmire cites George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson's criticism of the "dominant moral accounting metaphor, in
which moral interactions are understood as business transactions" and he
agrees with their claim that Dewey provides a "wealth of alternative metaphors," specifically "organic growth, evolutionary adaptation, scientific experimentation, technological innovation, and art (no)."'
Lakoff and Johnson correctly condemn Western philosophy's overdependence on the moral accounting metaphor. Furthermore, Fesmire provides a
much needed alternative to contemporary ethics by re-introducing Dewey's
concept of dramatic rehearsal, but must Plato be a foil to contemporary
pragmatism or can we imagine a different relationship with the first author
of philosophy? Fesmire correctly diagnoses the denigration of imagination
as originating with Platonism, but this denigration originates from a literal
SPENCER : Plato's Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor
29
analysis of the arguments presented by Socrates in the dialogues. It stems
from an inability to imagine Plato as an artist, rather than a theorist, and
Dewey struggled to overcome this lack of imagination throughout his entire
career.
One of the first essays to examine Dewey's complex reading of Plato is
John P. Anton's "John Dewey and Ancient Philosophies." Anton focuses on
three aspects of Dewey's relation to Greek philosophy: the "polemic," the
"historico-contextual," and the "cumulative aspect" (477).'' According to Anton, the "sustained historical analyses he presented in his Questfor Certainty
and Reconstruction in Philosophy are so dominated by a central philosophical
and ethical concern of his social pragmatism as to mislead the reader into
concluding that this is all he had to offer by way of understanding and appreciating the classical heritage." Because Dewey's most explicit commentary
on Greek philosophy attempts to overcome barriers to philosophical inquiry,
specifically the misapplication of ancient theories to contemporary problems, one is tempted to reduce Dewey's criticism only to its polemic aspect.
Anton argues that a more accurate treatment of Dewey's approach accepts
his admonishment of dualism and leisure class theory, without ignoring his
"avowed sympathy with Plato" as a fellow social reformer (477-79).
On one hand, Dewey was impressed by the degree of social awareness
expressed in the dialogues and Plato's commitment to and aptitude for social
reform. On the other hand, Dewey was cautious and skeptical of "the static
features he read into Plato's ideals," what one might refer to as the Plato of
Platonism. Anton points out other areas of kinship between Dewey and
Plato, specifically seeing "art as imitation," seeing "intelligence as a method
rather than a collection of finished outcomes," and seeing "philosophy in a
wider meaning of a critique of institutions and a fundamental way of hfe."
Thus, while key differences exist, specifically "on issues of metaphysics, ethics, logic, or aesthetics," the two philosophers are united by their desire for
social reform and similar temperament (487—91).
Ultimately, Anton's assessment of Dewey's approach to Greek philosophy
is unsympathetic. He claims that while Dewey had the potential to offer a
fruitful pragmatic analysis of ancient thought, his obsession with contemporary problems prevented him from developing an accurate picture of classical
philosophy. Essentially, the polemic aspect of Dewey's approach hinders his
attempts to produce a valid historico-cultural account of ancient thought and
obscures the continuity between Plato and Dewey (Anton 498—99). Frederick M. Anderson offers a more charitable assessment when he suggests that
Dewey uses polemics so that ancient philosophy might disclose itself in its
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THE PLURALIST 8 : 2 2OI3
original richness free of received, modern interpretations. He argues that Dewey sees the problems of Greek philosophy as emerging from specific historicoctiltural influences and that modern philosophers misinterpreted as necessary
and intractable. Dewey believed the topics discussed by the ancients are not
perennial; they are reflections of specific human concerns embodied within
the fabric of Athenian intellectual culture (Anderson 87-88). In summation,
both Anton and Anderson agree that Dewey sees the authentic Plato as an
expression of the cultural need for reform.
A more useful middle view can be distilled from Anton's and Anderson's
commentaries. The polemics against the Greeks in Dewey's major works
border on the hyperbolic because he wanted to dislodge interpretations of
Plato that overemphasized metaphysical dualisms and leisure class values as
necessary to present inquiry. Using Dewey's own words, a convenient label
for this interpretation would be Plato as the "original university professor,"
however, he preferred the "dramatic, restless, cooperatively inquiring Plato of
the Dialogues, trying one mode of attack after another to see what it might
yield . . . the Plato whose highest flights of metaphysics always terminated
with a social and practical turn" (LW 5:155). Thus, the dramatic Plato uses the
drama of the dialogues to experiment with different lines of inquiry in relation to specific practical problems, whereas Professor Plato invents abstract
theories relevant to perennial, yet imagined philosophical problems.
Sadly, Dewey never fully articulated his interpretation of the dramatic
Plato. He wrote only two essays that provided extended commentaries on
the dialogues. "The Ethics of Democracy" (1888) rebuts Sir Henry Maine's
Platoesque critique of democracy as a "numerical aggregate" and "The Socratic Dialogues of Plato" (1925) presents an interesting, but quirky treatment of the Socratic problem. Both essays demonstrate Dewey's affinity
for Plato, but neither presents a developed hermeneutical approach to the
dialogues for which Dewey longs. He delivers his final word on the matter in
"Experience, Knowledge, and Value: A Rejoinder" (1939) when he states in
response to John Herman Randall's "Dewey's Interpretation of the History
of Philosophy" that "I believe the factors of the existing cultural situation
. . . are such that philosophical theories which in effect, . . . are products
of pre-scientific and pre-technological, dominantly leisure class conditions,
are now as obstructive as they are unnecessary" (LW 14:11) Given the phase
of his career, Dewey probably decided to focus on more pressing concerns
rather than fully articulate his affinity for Plato, and instead delivered a
final warning against the spectator theory of knowledge, but Dewey does
not directly dispute Randall's claim that the history of philosophy can be
SPENCER : Plato's Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor
31
used instrumentally "as an arsenal, or as a warning" (Randall, Philosophy
offohn Dewey 79).
In Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason, Randall develops tbe tbree cbaracteristics of tbe dramatic Plato (drama, experiment, and practice) tbat Dewey
outlines. Randall contends tbat Plato is not a bistorical pbilosopber, but "a
poet and a dramatist," wbicb be explains as follows: "Plato is a pbilosopber
because be is a poet. True pbilosopby is poetry—poetic insigbt and vision,
tbe imaginative enbancement of life." In tbe dialogues, Plato dramatically
depicts tbe "qualities of man's tbinking, tbe play and conflict of bis ideas, tbe
spectacle of bis mind" as embodied in tbe "discourse of men" or "tbe drama
of tbe Life of Reason." Tbe dialogues do not defend or analyze pbilosopbical
tbeories. Tbey convert individuals to tbe pbilosopbical life (Randall, Plato:
Dramatist-^-4).
Tbe dialogues are not meant to be an accurate bistorical snapsbot of
ancient Greece, but a presentation of "Greece in Plato's own perspective,
Greece as be understood it, bow Greece and Greek culture looked to bim"
(Randall, Plato: Dramatist •^6-46). Randall prefers to speak in terms of "Tbe
Greek Heritage of Plato," tbat is, tbe patterns of tbougbts and values tbat be
inberited from Greek culture, early Greek pbilosopbers, tbe Sophists, Socrates,
and Plato's audience. Randall believes tbat Plato's use of drama captures tbis
combination of curiosity and bumanism to recruit nom as a means of orienting buman nature toward tbe Good Life. Drama allows Plato to express
bow tbese tbemes sbape tbe life of reason. Tbus, "tbe dialogues emerge, not
as programs of action, but as dramatic portrayals of tbe life of tbe mind—of
tbe follies, contradictions, entbusiasms, and greatness of buman tbinking,
as bebeld by a detacbed and ironic intelligence—by nous. Dramatic Reason"
(Randall, Plato: Dramatist 54). Plato bopes to impart tbe value of tbe pbilosopbical life and to inspire bis audience to participate in it so tbat tbey migbt
improve tbemselves in tbe bope of finding fulfillment. Tbe dialogues are not
presentations of pbilosopbical tbeories; tbey are invitations to engage in tbe
betterment of bumanity tbrougb inquiry and conversation.
Randall continues by explaining bow Plato uses drama to respond to tbe
social and cultural cballenges of tbe Periclean Age (Randall, Plato: Dramatist 58-65). During tbe century preceding Plato's career, Atbens experienced
optimism in tbe form of imperial expansion and begemony. Tbis expansion
enabled social mobility, and tbe Sophists met tbe aristocracy's desire to maintain power and the need of tbe new rieb to access greater political privileges
by teacbing arete or success. Wbile some of tbe original Sopbists advocated
"bigb ideals" like "professional standards" or tbe improvement of "social con-
32
THE PLURALIST 8 : 2 2OI3
dirions," they quickly became "commercialized" and began to teach methods
of gaining political advantage. Randall argues that Plato and Socrates saw the
cynicism underneath this veneer of careerism and start teaching and writing as
a response to the Sophists (Randall, Plato: Dramatist 81-84). Randall contrasts
them with Socrates. He suggests that Socrates's actual teachings were broader
than a set of dogmas and that his purpose for engaging in philosophy was
not to know the Good in a systematic way.^ Socrates teaches his students how
to philosophize; he does not teach a philosophy. He postulates the Forms and
the Good for the purpose of revealing to his students the bias and prejudices
that prevent them from thinking better about the practical challenges they
face. Students gain excellence, areté, not through skillful rhetoric or seeking
personal advantage, but through a love of wisdom and the practice of critical
reflection—through imitating the life that Socrates leads, loving wisdom for
its own sake—rather than teaching it for profit.
Plato uses the character of Socrates dramatically to demonstrate how
his readers can benefit from philosophical reflection and to initiate critical
reflection within the reader. Henry Wolz elaborates on Randall's conception
of the dialogues as philosophical drama. Wolz sees two phases at work in the
dialogues: the destructive phase in which the interlocutor becomes aware
of his ignorance, w.iich then initiates the constructive phase of inquiry that
gives birth to new insights. In both phases, Socrates avoids presenting his
own views because doing so would undermine his students' attempts at philosophy. Thus, the goal of the Socratic Method is to empower the student
to engage in philosophy, and by dramatizing philosophical inquiry, Plato's
dialogues empower his readers to engage in philosophy. Wolz cites Crito as an
example of how the dialogues stimulate reflection rather than indoctrination.
It presents the philosophical conflict between "radical freedom and unconditional submission" that "reside in the same mind [Socrates]" (Wolz 238—48).''
Good citizenship requires the ability to negotiate these two demands and by
depicting their conflict within the character of Socrates; rather than in separate characters, the reader witnesses a single character dramatically rehearse
the problem. By extension, the drama of the situation inspires the reader to
think critically about the place of citizenship between radical freedom and
submission. Thus, dialogues allow Plato to dramatize moral deliberation
within a practical context. He teaches readers how to perceive their situations
and imagine multiple solutions in response to a particular problem. Socrates
might recommend a specific solution, but Plato depicts a variety of strategies
and allows the reader to evaluate all of them critically. He does not present
them dogmatically
SPENCER : Plato's Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor
33
In fact. Republic Book I dramatically critiques the dominance of the
moral accounting metaphor. Plato sets the dialogue at the height of Athens's
imperial hegemony in the city of Piraeus, the base of the commercial and
military navy. The subsequent conversation occurs at the home of Cephalus, a foreigner from Syracuse who became one of the wealthiest members
of Athenian society through the manufacture of shields. Plato frames this
discussion of justice with a setting symbolic of a society dominated by the
moral accounting metaphor. Furthermore, Athens will soon overextend itself in the 2nd Peloponnesian War and be conquered by Sparta. As an artist,
Plato chooses the temporal and spatial setting of the dialogue to reflect the
failure of this metaphor to provide moral guidance for individuals and the
city-state. The opening conversation between Cephalus and Socrates directly
calls the moral accounting metaphor into question. The aged Cephalus has
spent the day sponsoring sacrifices, which Adeimantus will later describe as
an economic transaction with the gods for the purpose of atonement (Plato
364c). Ever the gadfly, Socrates asks Cephalus three probing questions: What
is it like to be old? How did you become so wealthy? and What is the greatest
benefit of wealth? (328e-33od). Cephalus takes Socrates's philosophical bait
when he answers that wealth removes some of the temptation to "cheat or
deceive someone against our will" and allows us to die without the fear of
owing a "sacrifice to a god or money to a person" (331b).
This reference to sacrifice as a means of easing one's conscience before
death foreshadows and alludes to the final words of Socrates in the Phaedo
and a subtle contrast emerges between Cephalus and Socrates as potential
role-models for different life paths. Cephalus models the metaphor of moral
accounting whereas Socrates models the metaphor of the love of wisdom.
Glaucon reinforces this contrast when he contrasts between the perfecdy unjust
man, Gyges, who uses a ring of invisibility to privately commit injustice while
publicly maintaining a reputation for justice, and the perfecdy just man who
lives ethically, but is publicly reviled (Plato 36oc-36id). Cephalus could be a
candidate for the perfecdy unjust man who commits injustice to achieve his
ends but dies without moral debts through a life of shrewd moral transaction,
and Socrates's execution for impiety by the state certainly qualifies him as a
candidate for the perfecdy just man. When we consider Cephalus and Socrates
at the end of their lives, Socrates dies content and peaceful, confident in a life
well lived, whereas Cephalus has achieved everything he wanted, but approaches
death desperately trying to ease a guilty conscience.^ This segue into the dialogue is thick with references to the moral accounting metaphor and links
them to the discussion of justice and ethics. Socrates critiques the metaphor
34
THE PLURALIST 8 : 2 2OI3
directly when he refutes the claim that justice is "to give to each what is owed
to him," a definition presented by Cephalus but quickly bequeathed to his
heir Polemarchus (33idc). By implying this contrast without direct comment,
Plato undermines the moral accounting metaphor, and the remainder of the
dialogue is an exploration of other possible metaphors for moral deliberation.
The key metaphor of the Republic is the city-soul analogy, that is, that
a link exists between public justice and personal morality (Plato 369a). Ultimately, Socrates supports this connection through an appeal to the metaphysical unity of the forms, but a more Deweyan interpretation would see
Socrates as insisting that the "individual and society are organic to each other"
(EW 1:237). Clearly, Dewey believes that the metaphors of democracy are
superior to the metaphors of aristocracy, but Dewey always admired Plato's
dialogues as works of moral imagination. He claimed that "if they had no
value for philosophical reasons," and the harshest interpretation of Dewey's
polemics might reach that conclusion, "the Republic would be immortal as
the summary of all that was best and most permanent in Greek life, of its
ways of thinking and feeling, and of its ideals" (EW 1:240). Dewey designed
his polemics against Plato to demolish specific entrenched interpretations
that buried the novelty of Plato's reconstruction of his historical context.
Now those polemics should be set aside, lest they become barriers to future
inquiry. By appropriating Plato as a moral artist, rather than a theorist, and
reading the dialogues as dramatic rehearsals of moral problems, rather than
philosophical arguments, we can connect with the Plato that inspired Dewey
and use the dialogues to broaden our own imaginations.
NOTES
I. It should be noted that the publication of Dewey's lost manuscript. Unmodern and
Modem Philosophy, occurred during the editing of this article. In this work, Dewey fleshes
out his mature assessment of Greek philosophy, and it confirms that Dewey's reading of
the Greeks, particularly Plato, is rich and nuanced. According to its editor, Phillip Deen,
the manuscript would have been written between 1941-1943, which is immediately after
Dewey's response to John Herman Randall's "Dewey's Interpretation of the History of
Philosophy" in 1939. Thus, the manuscript stands as Dewey's final words on the subject.
However, incorporating the manuscript into the debate between John Anton and Frederick Anderson or comparing the genealogy of Greek philosophy that Dewey presents
to either Randall's genealogy of Plato's dialogues in Plato: Dramatist ofthe Life ofReason
or Henry Wolz's reading ofthe dialogues as philosophical drama merit separate articles.
With regard to the present inquiry, the manuscript supports this article's thesis that Dewey
scholarship has underappreciated Dewey's affinity for the Platonic dialogues, and their
influence on his work should be reassessed.
SPENCER : Plato's Republic and the Moral Accounting Metaphor
35
2. See also Plato, Republic 378cd, 380c, 401a, and 4Oide.
3. See also LakofFand Johnson 141.
4. See also Betz.
5. See also Wallach.
6. Wolz also notes the Greek convention of using drama as moral education, for example, Sophocles's Antigone, and contends that Plato's dialogues are another example of
this convention.
7. Consider Socrates's final words in the Phaedo: "Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius;
make this offering to him and do not forget" (Plato ii8a) in comparison to Cephalus's
statement "that when someone thinks his end is near, he becomes frightened and concerned about things he didn't fear before" (33od). Socrates greets death peacefully and
asks his students to offer a single and meager final sacrifice to the god of healing, whereas
Cephalus hints that he has troubled dreams and quickly exits the dialogue to continue
the sacrifices he has already been performing throughout the day. Given these last words
and behaviors, it appears that Socrates goes to his grave with a clearer conscience than
Cephalus. Also, Phaedo and Republic are conventionally considered to be ftom the same
phase of Plato's career and address similar philosophical themes. See Ruprecht.
REFERENCES
Anderson, Frederick M. "Dewey's Experiment with Greek Philosophy." Intemational
Philosophical Quarterly 7.1 (1967): 86-100.
Anton, John P. "John Dewey and Ancient Philosophies." Philosophy andPhenomenological Research 25.4 (1965): 477-99.
Betz, Joseph. "Dewey and Socrates." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 16.4
(1980): 329-56.
Dewey, John. The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Electronic Edition. Ed. Larry A.
Hickman. Charlottesville, VA: Intelex Corporation, 1996. [cited in text as Early Works
(EW), Middle Works (MW), or Later Works (LW), followed by volume:page number]
Fesmire, Steven./oī Dewey & Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics. Bloomington:
Indiana UP, 2003.
LakofF, George, and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: U oFGhicago P, 1980.
Plato. Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. [cited in
text using Stephanus pagination by number and section]
Randall, John Herman. "Dewey's Interpretation of the History of Philosophy." The
Philosophy of John Dewey. Ed Paul Arthur Schlipp. New York: Tudor, 1951. jj—ioz.
. Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason. New York: Columbia UP, 1970.
Ruprecht, Louis A., Jr. Symposia: Plato, the Erotic, and Moral Value. Albany: State U of
New York P, 1999.
Wallach, John R. The Platonic Political Art: A Study of Critical Reason and Democracy.
University Park: Penn State UP, 2001.
Wolz, Henry G. "Philosophy as Drama: An Approach to the Dialogues of Plato." International Philosophical Quarterly 3.2 (1963): 236-70.
Copyright of Pluralist is the property of University of Illinois Press and its content may not be
copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's
express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.
Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs
in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws
Robert Prus
University of Waterloo, Canada
Representing, Defending, and Questioning
Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs in
Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws
Abstract Plato may be best known as a philosopher, but his depictions of people’s involvements in religion are important for social scientists not only because of the transcultural and transhistori-
A
lthough Plato (420-348 BCE) is widely ac-
as well as Islamic theology.3 Still, of much greater
knowledged as a philosopher and frequently
consequence for our immediate purposes are (a)
is referenced as an idealist as well as a theologian,
the linkages that Plato develops between religion
Plato’s texts are only marginally known to sociol-
and social order (as in notions of justice, morality,
ogists and most others in the social sciences. As
virtue, and government), (b) people’s interrelated
part of the task of reconnecting Greek and contemporary scholarship in a broader study of the development of Western social thought,1 the present
paper focuses on Plato’s contributions to the study
cal resources that they offer those in the sociology of religion, but also because of their more
of human knowing and acting by using religion as
general pragmatist contributions to the study of human group life.
a more sustained point of reference.2
Thus, although Plato (a) exempts religion from a more thorough going dialectic analysis of
the sort to which he subjects many other realms of human knowing and acting (e.g., truth,
Whereas the more distinctively theological materi-
justice, courage, rhetoric), (b) explicitly articulates and encourages theological viewpoints in
als that Plato introduces in Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic,
some of his texts, and (c) sometimes writes as though things can be known only as ideal types
or pure forms in an afterlife existence, Plato also (d) engages a number of consequential pragmatist (also pluralist, secular) aspects of people’s experiences with religion.
In developing his materials on religion, Plato rejects the (popular) notions of the Olympian
thagoras (580-500 BCE), our interests are much more
directly related to Plato’s considerations of divinity
to be mindful of Plato’s notions of divinity when considering the more distinctively socio-
as a community experienced phenomenon than his
logical matters he addresses (as in the problematics of promoting and maintaining religious
notions of religion per se.
religion, morality, and deviance).
Still, each of the four texts introduced here assume significantly different emphases and those
interested in the study of human group life should be prepared to adjust accordingly as they
examine these statements. All four texts are consequential for a broader “sociology of religion,” but Timaeus and Phaedo are notably more theological in emphases whereas Republic and
Laws provide more extended insight into religion as a humanly engaged realm of endeavor.
The paper concludes with an abbreviated comparison of Plato’s notions of religion with Chicago-style symbolic interactionist (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus and
Grills 2003) approaches to the study of religion. Addressing some related matters, an epilogue
briefly draws attention to some of the affinities of Emile Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of
the Religious Life with Plato’s analysis of religion.
Herbert Mead; Morality; Deviance; Republic; Laws; Timaeus; Phaedo
is a sociologist at the University of
losophy and its sociological offshoot, symbolic inter-
Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. A symbolic in-
actionism, with Classical Greek, Roman, and interim
teractionist, ethnographer, and social theorist, Robert
European scholarship.
Prus has been examining the conceptual and meth-
email address:
odological connections of American pragmatist phi©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1
Many of the conceptions of religion that Plato introduces are strikingly parallel with notions of
divinity developed within Judaic and Christian,
This paper represents part of a larger pragmatist study of human knowing and acting from the classical Greek era (700-300
BCE) to the present time. The larger project traverses a wide array of scholarly endeavors including poetics, rhetoric, theology, history, education, politics, and philosophy (see Prus 2003a;
2004; 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2009a;
2009b; 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d; 2011e; 2012; Puddephatt
and Prus 2007; Prus and Burk 2010; Prus and Camara 2010).
1
While this paper focuses on Plato’s analysis of religion, Plato’s
contributions to the study of human knowing and acting are
much more extensive than suggested herein. Thus, readers
are referred to interactionist considerations of Plato’s works as
these pertain to causality, agency, and reality (Puddephatt and
Prus 2007), poetics (i.e., fiction; Prus 2009a), love and friendship (Prus and Camara 2010), education and scholarship (Prus
2011a), morality, deviance, and regulation (Prus 2011c).
This is not to deny Plato’s structuralist, idealist, and moralist emphases, but to acknowledge his much overlooked contributions to
pragmatist scholarship. Plato’s considerations of the human condition are less consistently pluralist, secular, and pragmatist than
those of his pupil Aristotle (384-322 BCE), but Plato’s work remains
foundational to pragmatist thought in a great many respects.
2
Keywords Plato; Religion; Pragmatism; Sociology; Symbolic Interactionism; Emile Durkheim; George
6
gious viewpoints of Socrates (469-399 BCE) and Py-
gods described by Homer and Hesiod as mythical as well as sacrilegious. Still, it is instructive
viewpoints on both collective and individual levels and discussions of the interlinkages of
Robert Prus
and Laws have been developed mindfully of the reli-
prus@uwaterloo.ca
prus007@gmail.com
involvements in religion, deviance and control, education and scholarship, and poetics and entertainment, and (c) Plato’s more pervasive philosophic
(and sociological) conceptions of human knowing
and acting (including people’s multiple and shifting perspectives on religion).
Thus, while acknowledging the more specific religious beliefs that Plato introduces in these texts,4
Because Plato’s works predate Christian and Islamic theology,
as well as much of the recorded Judaic text, one can make the
case that all three of these theologies were influenced by Greek
thought in the broader eastern Mediterranean arena.
3
As a more general caveat, it should be recognized that while
Plato often appears to adhere to the theological position he assigns to Socrates and his kindred speakers in Timaeus, Phaedo,
and Republic and to the Athenian speaker in Laws, Plato’s texts
are characterized by a broader set of tensions.
Thus, in addition to some of the (a) idealist, (b) skepticist, (c)
poetical, and (d) pragmatist viewpoints that Plato introduces
in his considerations of religion in these texts, Plato’s (Socratic)
notions of religion are presented in the midst of concerns with
(e) establishing a functional political order, (f) placing philosophers in governing positions in these states, and (g) intensifying human quests for justice, virtue, and wisdom on both
community and more individual levels.
Plato clearly rejects the images of the gods developed by the
Greek poets Homer and Hesiod, but his speakers generally
profess clear notions of divinity. Likewise, Plato’s speakers appear adamant about the pragmatist value of religion as a mechanism for generating social order.
Still, in his dialogues more generally, Plato (via Socrates) often
questions human abilities to know anything. Although this
latter position presumably would include (and would invalidate) Socratic, as well as any other claims regarding a divine
essence(s), Plato clearly does not subject religion to the same
sort of dialectic analysis with which he addresses other features of, or claims about, community life.
It is mindful of these contradictions that Nietzsche (Zuckert
1996) argues that Plato primarily uses religion as a means of
seeking personal prominence in the political arena (i.e., as
a cloak of authority in the “lust for power”). We do not know if
Nietzsche (who more openly craves for power) is correct in his
claims about Plato, but there are many points at which Plato
seems much more concerned about the pragmatic/integrative
features of religion for the community than promoting any
particular set of beliefs.
It also may be the case that Plato had mixed views on religion. Thus, whereas Plato (a) may have followed Socrates in
4
Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org
7
Robert Prus
Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs
in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws
Timaeus 6
the emphasis is on issues such as: (a) the ways that
style of presentation and about the importance of fol-
Plato appears concerned about articulating viable
people deal with the unknown; (b) when and how
lowing the flows of his texts in more patient ways.
conceptions of divinity in all four of these texts and
people invoke, formulate, promote, question, defend,
Thus, whereas Plato’s student Aristotle (384-322 BCE)
has developed various aspects of his philosophy
and reject notions of divinity; (c) how people incor-
writes in a particularly direct and exceptionally com-
around this objective. Nevertheless, to his “socio-
porate religion into their life-worlds ‒ as in routines,
pacted analytic style, Plato develops his analyses in
logical” credit, Plato also recognizes the problemat-
identities, relationships, emotionalities, and the like;
conversational formats. Nevertheless, Plato’s texts are
ic, socially engaged nature of community life within
and (d) how people manage notions of religion, mo-
still remarkably systematic and offer extraordinary
which people’s notions of divinity take shape.
find much in Timaeus that is consistent with Stoic
rality, and deviance on a day to day basis.
conceptual depth.
Timaeus and Phaedo
Christian, and Islamic theology also are apt to find
For those less familiar with Plato’s works, it may be
In developing this paper, I have tried to stay close to
observed that his texts are presented as dialogues in
the specific conversational flows that Plato develops
Although not intended as a set, Timaeus and Phaedo
sequential aspects of these religions.
which his speakers (of whom Socrates [469-399 BCE]
in each of these texts, referencing his materials in
provide instructive introductions to Plato’s notions
often assumes the central role) engage wide ranges
“chapter and verse.” This way, readers might bet-
of religion. Further, prior to the Renaissance (1400-
of topics pertinent to one or another aspect of hu-
ter appreciate the overall ordering of his dialogues,
1600 CE), Timaeus provided the primary source of
man existence. In dealing with their subject matters,
as well as more readily locate particular sections of
contact for Western scholars with Plato’s texts (see
Plato’s speakers typically introduce and consider
these texts for further examination.
Plato: The Collected Works 1997:1224-1225). Even now,
conceptually diverse sets of standpoints on the matters at hand.
As well, although much of the analysis may seem
delayed in the present paper, it is important to es-
many who read Timaeus are apt not to have read Republic and often focus instead on the creation story
and the related notions of divinity addressed within
tablish Plato’s position in some detail before devel-
ers typically leave questions unresolved in the end.
oping an analytic commentary. This way, by treat-
Nevertheless, Plato’s speakers are concerned about
ing Plato’s texts as ethnohistorical documents, read-
Nevertheless, Timaeus contains a mixture of theologi-
defining their terms of reference and generally pur-
ers will be better able to participate in, assess, and
cal and philosophical materials. Relatedly, while the
sue topics in highly reflective terms. As well, be-
possibly extend the analysis. Relatedly, because of
theological matters are clearly more speculatively in
cause his speakers often engage their subject matters
the claims I make in this paper, it is Plato’s analysis
quality and some other “claims of fact” are clearly
in extended, discerning, and comparative analytic
of human group life rather than my commentary
unsubstantiated, some of the philosophic concepts
manners, those who are patient and thoughtful can
that is central here.
introduced in Timaeus are notably sophisticated and
dressed by attending the subtopics that the speakers
To put Plato’s “sociology of religion” in context, it is
consider along the way.
instructive to examine the theological position Plato
Before we engage these texts more directly, it also
a humanly engaged process. After addressing some
may be instructive to caution readers about Plato’s
of the more central features of Plato’s theology as
matters of theology, it is possible that he also (b) was skeptical of theology as a scholar/dialectician, and yet (c) as a social
theorist recognized that religion was a consequential feature
of community life and (d) as a community planner and moralist valued the integrative features of any religion. While more
overtly writing as a theologian, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
also appears to have struggled with somewhat parallel matters as both a highly astute dialectician and a most exceptional
student of Aristotle’s texts.
8
©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1
represents prior to his broader analysis of religion as
Timaeus.
are apt to have contributed to a distinctively pluralist, dialectic or inquisitive emphasis on the nature
of existence and the matters of human knowing and
acting on the part of theologians as well as secular
scholars over the centuries.
expressed in Timaeus and Phaedo, this statement fo-
As will become apparent later, the emphasis in Pha-
cuses on Plato’s depictions of people’s involvements
edo is notably different than that of Timaeus. Still, in
in religious matters in Republic and Laws.5
addition to providing some insight into the charac-
Given the references that Plato makes to Republic within Timaeus, Timaeus appears to have been written after Republic, but
Republic and Laws more fully address religion as a humanly
engaged process.
5
ences to several of Plato’s philosophic notions, it
also represents Plato’s most focused theological
statement. Those familiar with Stoic theology will
religion.7 However, readers familiar with Judaic,
many congruities between Plato’s Timaeus and con-
To the frustration of many readers, Plato’s speak-
glean much insight into the overarching issues ad-
Whereas Timaeus [TS] contains important refer-
ter of Socrates that Plato establishes for his readers,
Phaedo deals with another popular Western religious
theme ‒ the immortality of the soul.
The present statement is based on the translation of Timaeus
developed by Benjamin Jowett (1937).
6
Stoicism (from Zeno of Citium [334-262 BCE]) ‒ no preserved
text remains; emerged as a philosophic position in Athens
(circa 300 BCE), but later achieved considerable popularity in
Rome. Cicero (106-43 BCE) provides a particularly lucid review of Stoic philosophy in On the Nature of the Gods. Although
placing particular emphases on sense-based knowledge and
logic, the Stoics also argue that the universe is governed by
a natural, divinely inspired source (god/gods).
Albeit an extension of Pythagorean and Socratic thought, Stoic philosophy also assumes some consequential divergences.
Perhaps most notably the current history, circumstances, and
experiences of human life are seen as but a temporary phase
in an endless set of repetitions or reoccurring cycles of development and (re)birth of the universe as the gods recreate and
regulate the processes of nature throughout eternity.
Because they envision humans to be immensely indebted to
the gods both for their creations of all things and their unending dedication to all of nature, the Stoics encourage people to
accept things as the gods would intend. Thus, the Stoic emphasis is on pursuing an honorable or virtuous life-style in
which the gods are revered. From a Stoic viewpoint, as well,
community order is fostered through people’s subservience
to the divine ordering of nature.
The Stoics not only argue for the existence of god(s) that regulate all of nature, but also presume that human experiences
are divinely fated or predestined. Relatedly, it is posited that
by reading signs provided by the gods, people may foresee
and adjust to future developments. Still, while human outcomes are predetermined in more general terms, people are
thought to have some freedom of choice and are explicitly
encouraged (through instruction, dedication, and careful,
logical reasoning) to pursue virtuous avenues of action that
would put them in closer alignment with their natural godly
intended destinies.
Whereas the Stoics, like Aristotle, insist on the importance
of sensory perceptions (distinctions) for knowing and appear
attentive to a more logical (vs. emotional) rhetoric, the Stoics’
emphases on divine life-worlds and fatalism take them some
distance from Aristotle’s secular scholarship. For a notably
extended analysis of Stoic and Epicurean conceptions of divinity and related notions of human knowing, acting, and
destiny, see Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods (also see Prus
2011e).
7
Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org
9
Robert Prus
Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs
in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws
Although Socrates, Critias, and Hermocrates also are
in Republic. Thus, Socrates (TS:20) says that he would
ions have yet more to offer. Thus, after calling on
see the mortal bodies of people and the lower ani-
involved in the dialogue, Timaeus emerges as the
like to provide an account of the origins of his city-
the gods for assistance and understanding, Timaeus
mal species. Thus, whereas God would provide the
principle speaker. The dialogue opens with Socrates
state, one that would give the citizens a sense of
(TS:27) develops a creation story intended not just
souls for all beings, his lesser gods were given the
(TS:17-19) providing a very brief review of Republic.
pride in its struggles and accomplishments.
for the city, but also for the entire universe and all
responsibility of preparing mortal bodies in which
inhabitants of the earth.
these divine souls would reside.
Despite the many references to religion that Socrates
While contending that he is unable to devise a wor-
makes in Plato’s Republic, his references to Republic in
thy statement on his own, Socrates also dismisses the
Acknowledging that a world (i.e., universe) that is
In addition to being the most religious of all earthly
Timaeus focus almost entirely on the nature and well
poets and the sophists as adequate authors for this
amenable to the senses, Timaeus (TS:27-29) says that
beings, people also were to possess capacities for
being of the (secular) state. Somewhat ironically, as
project. Describing the poets as imitators, he sees
an eternal creator, without beginning or end, was the
sensation and emotional experience (as in pain and
well, Socrates (in Timaeus) largely disregards Repub-
the challenge as beyond their abilities. Defining the
cause or initiator of the world. Thus, God created the
pleasure, fear and anger). Recognizing that people
lic’s emphasis on justice, virtue, and philosophy.
sophists as travelers who lack roots, loyalties, and
universe as a likeness to himself by giving the uni-
knowledge of local matters, Socrates also considers
verse a soul or spiritual intelligence that comprehends
them inappropriate for this task. It is in this spirit that
all components and features of its organic (animal-
Socrates seeks assistance from Timaeus, Critias, and
like) whole (TS:30-33). Observing that the universe
Hermocrates, each of whom is held in high repute in
also has a material or corporeal existence, Timaeus
matters of philosophy and statesmanship.
says that all matter consists of fire, earth, water and air.
Critias (TS:20-27) engages Socrates’ objective by re-
While shaping the universe in the form of a globe or
telling a story told to him by his grandfather. His
sphere (TS:33-37), the creator had first created the in-
grandfather had heard it from Solon who, in turn,
visible soul that would reside at the center. After stat-
had learned about the glories of a much earlier Ath-
ing that notions of existence and being are problem-
ens from an Egyptian priest. Noting that Greece had
atic in more comprehensive terms, Timaeus (TS:38)
been subject to numerous deluges or natural disasters
contends that time came into being at the instant of
over the millennia, the priest informed Solon that the
creation and, likewise, would be dissolved if ever the
Egyptians have records showing that Athens was
products of creation cease to exist. For now, however,
once home to the greatest of all nation states. Eventu-
time represents a moving image of existence.
Following a quick reference to the division of labor
(as in farmers, trades people, soldiers and guardians)
necessary for a viable state, Socrates focuses on those
who would serve as guardians or administrators of
the state he envisions. The guardians are to be highly
dedicated, well educated, wise, and noble.
As well, the guardians are to live in modest lifestyles in a setting in which all goods are communally owned. Their female companions are to participate in the activities of the male guardians, including warfare. To avoid more specific ties of kinship
and to encourage the guardians to envision themselves as one family, the wives and children of the
guardians are to be shared in common. Then, discussing the state somewhat more generally, Socrates
also discusses the desirability of selective breeding
ally, however, it was overcome by earthquakes and
floods as, likewise, was the island of Atlantis.
Following a commentary on the solar system, Ti-
would struggle with their sensations and emotions,
God intended to reward those who lived honorable earthly lives with a blessed existence. Those
who did not would (in subsequent lives) pass into
continually lowered states of animal life until they
overcame their earthly failings.
Having developed things thusly, God then turned
matters over to the younger gods that God had created. God left them to deal with human bodies and
souls as best they could (TS:42).
After noting that the sensations that people encounter can affect their bodies in intense manners, Timaeus (TS:43-44) also observes that people are born
without intelligence. Nevertheless, with nurturing
and education, people can develop more extended
intellectual capacities.8
maeus (TS:39-40) identifies four sets of living entities
Later, Timaeus (TS:49-52) considers some of the
in the community. Relatedly, he stresses the impor-
Affirming that he has been accurate in his render-
that God created: the gods of heaven; the creatures
tance of insuring that children of the best citizens
ing of the account of the lost ancient city of Athens,
problematic features of human knowing. Recogniz-
of the air; the species of the water; and the animals
are well educated while still being mindful of the
Critias also observes that the features of Socrates’
ing that the (basic) elements of fire, earth, air, and
value of moving those who show potential to higher
(humans included) that live on land.
Republic correspond with those of the perfect Greek
water are continually changing, he says that it is
levels and assigning those with lower qualities to
state described by the Egyptian priest. Notably,
Noting that their own knowledge of the gods is lim-
too, the same goddess Athene was the founder and
ited, Timaeus (TS:40) says that they can only rely on
guide of both city-states.
what has come to them through tradition.
as his starting point, Socrates observes the state still
Socrates very much appreciates the connections
Still, Timaeus (TS:41) continues. He states that God
needs something more than what he has provided
with the past provided by Critias, but his compan-
had instructed the (lesser) gods he created to over-
live among the inferior classes.
With this highly abbreviated overview of Republic
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©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1
inappropriate to say that things “are” or have certain qualities or to make other statements that imply
permanence. Viewed thusly, there are three states
of nature: that which is in the process of changReaders may appreciate some early pragmatist/constructionist emphases in Timaeus’ (TS:43-63) comments on the nature of
human knowing and acting.
8
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11
Robert Prus
Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs
in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws
ing; that in which change takes place; and the other
heavy; and rough-smooth), before considering the
but the creation of the mortal he committed to
While noting that people may be encouraged to
things that the (particular) things in the process of
emotions and the matters of pain and pleasure more
his offspring. And they, imitating him, received
avoid vices through education and study, Timaeus
changing resemble.
specifically. Then, positing that pain is the product
from him the immortal principle of the soul; and
quickly puts these matters aside. Instead, he will
Continuing, Timaeus (TS:51) asks if things properly
(a) have any inherent qualities or whether (b) things
of disturbances to one’s system and that pleasure
is dependent on a restoration of one’s natural state,
Timaeus (TS:64-68) considers the ways in which hu-
around this they proceeded to fashion a mortal
body, and made it to be the vehicle of the soul,
and constructed within the body a soul [psyche
– RP] of another nature which was mortal, sub-
exist only to the extent that people, in some way,
man sensitivities to taste, odor, sound, and sight are
perceive these things through their sense organs?
ject to terrible and irresistible affections, first of
connected with people’s (sensory enabled) experi-
all, pleasure, the greatest incitement to evil; then,
Relatedly, he asks (c) if things have existence only
ences with pain and pleasure.
pain, which deters from good; also rashness and
Then, stating that God alone has the capacity to cre-
appeased, and hope easily led astray; these they
through the names they are given?
Pursuing these matters, Timaeus argues for a dis-
ate and combine all things of his creation, Timaeus
tinction between the things that people might know
(TS:68-69) briefly summarizes his position as he
through sensate experience and things that may be
moves toward the conclusion of his story. Timaeus
understood only through reason. Then, focusing
states that God not only created the universe and
on reason more exclusively, Timaeus argues for the
gave order to what otherwise would be chaos, but
existence of true ideas that transcend human sensa-
also generated a soul for the universe that allowed
tions. Further, Timaeus contends, it is these invari-
for the intelligent, organic capacity of the universe
ant truths (the contemplation of which rests with
to comprehend and adjust to all of the entities with-
intelligence) that provide testimony to a being that
in. Further, while providing people with immortal
pre-exists creation. Timaeus (TS:52) subsequently
souls, God had given his closest offspring, the newer
posits that it was necessary to create space before
gods, the task of preparing and tending to the mor-
the matters that occupy space could be brought into
tal bodies in which people’s souls would be hosted.
existence. Process, likewise, needed to exist before
It was here, too, that people would be subject to the
the heavens could be formed.
human weaknesses (and temptations) associated
After providing an account of the ways in which the
elements of fire, earth, water, and air were configured into the universe, Timaeus (TS:57) observes that
things cannot move without a mover or a source of
motion. Relatedly, there can be no movement without something to be moved. Next, Timaeus (TS:58-
fear, two foolish counsellors, anger hard to be
tions both of these sets of people not to neglect the
rienced by those who neglect their souls by disregarding the quest for knowledge.
Amidst a somewhat extended consideration (TS:7086) of the ways that people’s bodies are (physiologically) prepared for life and disease, Timaeus also
makes a brief argument for prophecy as implied in
the art of divination.9 Timaeus (TS:77) subsequently
notes that trees, plants, and lower animal forms also
were provided for man’s existence.
Following a discussion of human diseases (TS:7885), Timaeus (TS:86-87) engages the topic of vice
Timaeus (TS:89-92) then delineates three aspects of
the soul [psyche] to which people should attend: the
divine, the mortal, and the intellectual. While acknowledging the divinely-enabled nature of one’s
existence and the importance of caring for one’s
mortal being, Timaeus particularly stresses the
intellectual component. It is here, in questing for
knowledge and true wisdom, he says, that people
will achieve the greatest affinities with divinity.
in more direct terms. He says that people who en-
In concluding, Timaeus (TS:90-92) says that the souls
counter great pain or pleasure lose their capacities
of men who have not lived virtuous lives will as-
to reason adequately. Timaeus insists that no one is
sume lower forms of existence in subsequent lives.
[a]s I said at first, when all things were in disor-
voluntarily bad, but that people do bad things be-
In this way, Timaeus accounts for the initial devel-
der God created in each thing in relation to itself,
cause of these and other afflictions that foster anger,
with pain, pleasure, and other emotions amidst human capacities for love:
and in all things in relation to each other, all the
measures and harmonies which they could possibly receive. For in those days nothing had any
depression, cowardice, stupidity, disregard, and the
like. In addition, Timaeus remarks that people who
tings also are prone to vice.
©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1
engrossed in disputation and strife, Timaeus cau-
man. (Plato [Timaeus:69]; Jowett trans.)
the things which now have names deserve to be
12
on studies and teaching while others are deeply
he observes, the greatest of diseases will be expe-
water, earth, and air), as well as a variety of forms
touch-related sensations (hot-cold; hard-soft; light-
Noting that some souls are intensively focused
love according to necessary laws, and so framed
have poor educations or live in badly governed set-
capacities for sensate experience. He focuses on
and the body in which it is hosted.
care (e.g., exercise) of their mortal bodies. However,
proportion except by accident; nor did any of
Timaeus (TS:61-63) subsequently discusses human
appropriate balance between one’s immortal soul
mingled with irrational sense and with all-daring
61) considers the motion of the four elements (fire,
that these material essences may assume.
concentrate on the importance of maintaining an
named at all – as, for example, fire, water, and the
rest of the elements. All these the creator first set
in order, and out of them he constructed the universe, which was a single animal comprehending
in itself all other animals, mortal and immortal.
Now of the divine, he himself was the creator,
opment of women and human sexuality, the birds,
other animals, reptiles, and fishes. This having been
said, Timaeus acknowledges God as the creator of
all. [Thus concludes the dialogue.]
Phaedo10
9
While accepting the viability of divination as a message from
the gods, Timaeus (TS:71-72) argues that people are most likely
to receive these messages when they are asleep or in demented
states (as in mental anguish or spiritual possession). However,
because people in these latter states are considered unfit to judge
their own experiences, these (messages) are to be interpreted by
others who are more accomplished in the art of divination.
Well known as an account of Socrates’ last days of
his death sentence, Phaedo represents another of PlaIn developing this material I have built extensively on Benjamin Jowett’s (1937) translation of Plato’s Phaedo.
10
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13
Robert Prus
Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs
in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws
to’s more notable theological statements. While em-
ful. In response, Socrates says that people are the
death provides the true philosopher that which he
been lost or neglected overtime. Rather than just
phasizing the immortality of the soul (as a spiritual
possessions of the gods and have no right to destroy
most desires – to be alone with the soul.
remembering things, the claim is that people some-
essence) and its capacity to know things (in both
the things that the gods own. Instead, people are to
human and divinely-enabled terms), this text also
wait until God summons them. Relatedly, Socrates
deals with the matters of people facing death, resist-
states that his time has come.
are not lovers of wisdom, but lovers of the body.
Most likely, as well, they also are lovers of money
Instead of assuming that people are born knowing
of philosophy, virtue, and divinity.
When Cebes and Simmias suggest that Socrates may
and power, if not both. Further, Socrates adds, most
these things at birth, the more viable argument is
be too eager for his own death and perhaps ought
people who claim to be temperate merely control
that people knew these things from a previous life;
Still, in contrast to Timaeus, which has a more distinc-
to fear death more, Socrates (Phaedo:63) says that he
their pleasures in most areas only because they are
though a pre-existent soul that inhabits the present
tive theological emphasis (via the creation story that
might be more fearful if he did not believe he was in
conquered by specific other pleasures of the body.
body. Since these ideas existed before people were
Timaeus recounts), Phaedo places greater emphasis
the care of the gods. Thus, in the afterlife, Socrates
True virtue, Socrates proclaims, is inseparable from
born, Socrates concludes, the souls also existed be-
on philosophy as an idealized (cultic) pursuit. Thus,
fully expects to join the earlier departed who had
true wisdom.
fore birth; conversely, if not the ideas, then not the
whereas one finds strong affirmations of a divinity-
been wise and good in the sensate world.
ing tendencies toward suicide, and the interlinkages
enabled immortal soul in Phaedo, the immortal soul
is sustained by a virtuous philosophic life that is
mindful of the existence of absolute standards rather than through a devout religious life per se.
Those who fear death, Socrates (Phaedo:68) insists,
times recall things of a higher order than they have
ever experienced in their (present) sensate lives.
souls. But, Socrates affirms, since notions of absolute
While listening to Socrates, Cebes (Phaedo:70) sug-
beauty, perfect goodness, and the like, exist, so must
Elaborating on his position, Socrates (Phaedo:64)
gests that people may still be fearful that their
souls exist.
states that the real philosopher should be in good
souls might dissipate with death and, effectively,
spirits when he faces death. While noting that most
cease to exist.
Encountering some skepticism from Simmias who
is not yet convinced that the soul will endure after
people would not understand, Socrates says that
Saying that he will locate his discussion within the
death, Socrates (Phaedo:77-82) asks what is most like-
realm of probabilities, Socrates (Phaedo:70-72) ref-
ly to break up at the time of death – the simple and
Recognizing that the senses are untrustworthy,
erences an ancient doctrine that claims that when
unchanging soul or the complex and changeable hu-
true philosophers (Phaedo:65) are continually at-
people die their souls are reborn from the dead.
man body? Likewise, he asks, what is more vulner-
tempting to separate their souls from their bodies,
Thus, Socrates posits, the living come from the souls
able to dissolution, the invisible soul or the visible
to distance their spiritual essences from the sensu-
of those who had earlier died and the souls have an
body? Socrates also reminds Simmias that when the
al failings of their bodies. Thus, Socrates references
existence apart from the body. Socrates follows this
body and soul are united, it is the soul that directs
In developing his account, Phaedo (Phaedo:58-59)
absolute justice, absolute beauty, and absolute good
with a commentary on the existence of opposites
the body. By this function, as well, Socrates argues
first comments on the noble, gracious manner in
as elements that are inaccessible to the senses and
and concludes that living essences are generated
the soul is closer to the divine and therefore more
which Socrates dealt with the entire affair. Phaedo
that can exist in pure forms only in the clarity of
from those that had earlier died.
likely to be immortal. Then, insisting that there is
also identifies those who had been with Socrates
the mind.
This dialogue opens with Echecrates asking Phaedo
if he had been present when Socrates drank the poison that resulted in his death. Echecrates has heard
about Socrates’ trial (see Socrates’ Defense or Apology)
and expresses his disbelief and dismay that Socrates
had been condemned to death.
true philosophers are always engaging death.
a true, invisible, noble afterlife, Socrates claims that
After Cebes (Phaedo:72) observes that the notion of
Then, citing things such as the quest for food,
the invisible souls of good people will depart to the
souls being born again into other bodies is consistent
encounters with diseases, and loves, lusts, fears,
invisible world at death.
with Socrates’ doctrine of recollection, Simmias asks
Inspired by a dream, Socrates had been composing
fascinations, and foolishness of all sorts, Socrates
Socrates to refresh his own memory on this theory.
musical verses while on his own. However, after the
(Phaedo:66) says that the body is the source of end-
others have arrived, he directs their conversation to
less difficulty. Indeed, the soul cannot achieve pure
In elucidating his position on recollection (also see
earth where they are compelled to undergo pun-
the journey he is about to make (Phaedo:61).
knowledge while embedded within the body. Thus,
Meno [in Plato; Jowett trans.]), Socrates (Phaedo:73-
ishment for their past misdeeds. Further, after ap-
Socrates (Phaedo:67) states, it is only after death; on
77) says that people may recall things that they have
propriate punishment, and because of their earlier
While conversing with Socrates (Phaedo:61-62), Cebes
the separation of the soul from its earthly host, that
never perceived in that manner. He describes recol-
human failings, these souls would later occupy the
and Simmias ask why suicide is considered unlaw-
one’s soul may be purified. Viewed in this manner,
lection as a process of recovering notions that had
bodies of lower, less worthy animal species.
during his last few days and hours. Plato, presumably ill at the time, was absent.
14
©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1
However, Socrates insists, the souls of evil people
would be dragged down to (an invisible world on)
Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org
15
Robert Prus
Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs
in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws
Developing his position further, Socrates (Phaedo:82)
the body. Socrates assures his listeners that virtuous
lesser. Now, however, Socrates questions whether
Then, following a consideration of the existence of
says that while more virtuous people will be much
souls will not become lost.
one can understand the concept of causality or even
opposites and the impressions they generate, So-
whether things exist at all.
crates (Phaedo:105-106) says that it is the soul that
happier in the afterlife, it is only those souls that
both have studied philosophy and are virtuously
pure that may be allowed to partake in the company
of the gods:
[Socrates:] No one who has not studied philosophy and
who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is
allowed to enter the company of the gods, but the lover of knowledge only. And this is the reason, Simmias
and Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy ab-
Suspecting that Simmias and Cebes still have doubts,
Relatedly, Socrates earlier had hoped that Anaxago-
their concerns. Cebes returns to the question of the
would never become the opposite of what it is (i.e.,
ras (500-428 BCE), who said that the mind was the
soul surviving the death of the body. Cebes observes
die). Defining the immortal as the imperishable, So-
source and agent of all things, would provide some
that while one person might outwear many coats,
crates says that the soul is both immortal and im-
answers. However, on reading his texts, Socrates
some coats are apt to survive the owner. He asks
perishable. Thus, while the mortal body will perish,
found that Anaxagoras (a materialist, atomist phi-
the soul will survive.
whether something of this sort may not occur with
the soul. Given the many bodies that the soul occu-
stain from all fleshly lusts, and hold out against them
pies over time, may the soul not weaken or wear out
and refuse to give themselves up to them, not because
– so at some point, the soul might expire with its cur-
they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the
rent body. Past survivals of the soul, Cebes contends,
lovers of money and the world in general; nor like the
lovers of power and honour, because they dread the
dishonour or disgrace of evil deeds. [Instead – RP]…
when philosophy offers them purification and release
from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her
do not guarantee subsequent survivals.
In developing his reply, Socrates (Phaedo:89-90) first
cautions people about being either hardened skep-
influence, and whither she leads they turn and follow.
tics about people or haters of ideas. Still, Socrates
(Plato [Phaedo:82]; Jowett trans.)
(Phaedo:91) says, at this point he is not a philosopher
After insisting that it is only through philosophy
that people may gain a vision of true existence and
escape the bars of their prison,11 Socrates (Phaedo:8384) comments on the particular dangers that sensations of pain and pleasure represent for the soul. Be-
gives the body life and that the (life-giving) soul
Socrates (Phaedo:84-88) encourages them to express
so much as a partisan. Nevertheless, unlike most partisans, Socrates says that his objective is not to convince others of his viewpoint as much as it is to convince himself and, in the interim, to provide something for others to consider in more impartial terms.
losopher who preceded Democritus [460-357 BCE]
and Epicurus [341-270 BCE]) very much disregarded
the mind and instead concentrated on air, water,
and other oddities.
Assuming that the soul moves to another world after the death of the body and has an immortal quality, Socrates (Phaedo:107-108) stresses the importance
of people taking appropriate care of their souls dur-
Seemingly after some other unproductive philo-
ing their presence on earth. Socrates also states that
sophic ventures, Socrates (Phaedo:100) says that he
when souls enter the afterlife they will be judged
assumed a new methodology. He would pick the
and be sanctioned according to the virtues and im-
strongest principle he could find and judge the val-
purities of their earthly lives.
ue of other things mindfully of the correspondence
of these other things with that principle.
In explaining his method, Socrates (Phaedo:100)
says that he holds the position that there is absolute beauty, goodness, and greatness. These being
the absolutely most viable standards, all things exist
only in reference to these comparison points. Hence,
Their consideration of the afterlife is diverted somewhat by a discussion of the earth. [Amongst other
things, Socrates (Phaedo:108-111) not only describes
the earth as spherical in shape, but also at the center
of the universe.]
Returning more directly to the plight of the soul,
cause people’s experiences with pain and pleasure
In the discussion following, Socrates (Phaedo:92-
can be so intense, these sensations have a uniquely
-95) reminds the others that the soul exists prior
compelling presence; one that so completely bonds
to the body and that the soul, especially the wise
the soul to the body that the soul loses virtually all
soul, directs the body. Socrates then reviews Cebes’
sense of its divine origins. Under these conditions,
concerns about the soul not outlasting the body in
comparisons between two or more (sensate) things
there is little hope of these souls grasping aspects of
which it is presently situated.
(as other people might do), Socrates contends, that
after becoming thusly purged of their sins, these
these absolute standards provide one with exacting
souls, likewise, will be rewarded for the good
or perfect reference points.
things they have done.
true knowing. It is for this reason, Socrates explains,
that philosophers must so scrupulously guard
themselves against the more intense sensations of
Those familiar with Plato’s other works may be reminded
of Plato’s “allegory of the cave” (Republic, VII). Readers will
also find material in Phaedo (especially pp. 82-84) that may
have inspired Boethius’ (480-524 CE) The Consolation of Philosophy.
11
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©2013 QSR Volume IX Issue 1
After noting that Cebes has raised a set of issues
pertaining to the processes of generation and decay,
Socrates (Phaedo:96-99) informs the others that as
a young philosopher he also was eager to learn the
causes of things. At this time, too, Socrates felt highly
confident in the comparative notions of greater and
it is only by reference to absolute beauty or greatness that something else may be considered beautiful or great, for instance. Instead of invoking relative
12
Readers may see the foundations of Socrates’ ideal forms or
types in his methodology. Clearly, Aristotle (Categories), who
says that nothing has any quality except in reference to that
which it is compared, does not accept Socrates’ methodology.
Likewise, while Plato seems sympathetic to Socrates’ conception of absolute (especially divinely inspired) truth, Plato also
introduces direct challenges to this viewpoint in Parmenides.
12
Socrates (Phaedo:113-114) distinguishes three ways
in which people’s souls may be treated in the afterlife, depending on their earthly lives. Those who
have lived more moderate lives can expect to undergo punishment for their evil deeds. However,
Those judged to have committed particularly heinous offenses are hurled into Tartarus wherein they
are subject to unrelenting punishment. After an extended period of punishment, those souls that are
Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org
17
Robert Prus
Representing, Defending, and Questioning Religion: Pragmatist Sociological Motifs
in Plato’s Timaeus, Phaedo, Republic, and Laws
deemed salvageable may be given an opportunity
the speakers consider mythical, but they are explic-
Thus, since Plato envisions human involvements in
religion as a highly important mechanism for foster-
to appeal to their victims for leniency. Should their
itly attentive to the importance of developing shared
theology as embedded (being developed, experi-
ing the moral order of the community, as well as pro-
victims not wish to forgive them, these souls would
reference points as sources of meaning and motiva-
enced, instructed, resisted, and changing over time)
viding direction for individual character and moral
be returned to Tartarus. For the souls that are con-
tion for citizens in the state.
within the broader parameters of community life,
well-being, Plato’s speakers are also attentive to the
his notions of religion are developed amidst discus-
relativist, problematic, enacted, and contested nature
sions of education, poetics, wrongdoing and pun-
of religion. They are also mindful of the importance
ishment, and marketplace activity, as well as within
of policies, practices, and even entertainment motifs
more encompassing considerations of justice and
for sustaining religious viewpoints, along with the
the affairs of state.
social and personal implications thereof.
sidered incurable, there is no other destiny than
perpetual punishment in Tartarus.
In Phaedo, Plato gives much attention to the “immortality of the soul,” but still shows how people may
Those who have lived virtuous lives are allowed to
struggle with ambiguity, knowledge and wisdom,
live pure, content lives in the afterlife. Still, Socrates
and doubt, and virtue and religion in the face of
affirms, those virtuous souls who also know philos-
one’s own death and those of one’s associates. These
ophy will fare even better in the afterlife.
sorts of things may seem obvious, but humanly en-
It also is important to note that the emphases of
Interestingly, as well, although Plato is often dis-
gaged matters along these lines have largely been
Plato’s Republic and (later) Laws are somewhat dif-
missed as an idealist, his analysis of religion, virtue,
overlooked in “the sociology of religion.”
ferent. Republic addresses the development of a state
evil, and regulation exhibits a noteworthy pragma-
in which justice and social order are maintained
tist attentiveness to human knowing and acting as
through the activities of a more elite set of guard-
a collectively, community-achieved, adjustive pro-
ians (philosopher-kings) who would manage the
cess. Thus, in addition to acknowledging the mul-
affairs of state in virtuous (as in knowledgeable,
tiple viewpoints that people may adopt with respect
courageous, wise, temperate, and just) manners. By
to the situations in which they find themselves, Pla-
contrast, Plato’s Laws focuses on the matter of devel-
to’s speakers are also mindful of people’s activities,
oping a centralized constitution and an explicit le-
identities, emotionality, reflectivity, and persuasive
gal code that not only would define the essential pa-
interchange (and resistance).
After cautioning his listeners that the afterlife that he
has described is only a reasonable approximation of
what actually exists, Socrates (Phaedo:114) says that
there is good reason to be optimistic about the future
of his soul. Indeed, he contends, those who have severed themselves from the sensations and trappings
of the body and who have lived virtuous life-styles
are ready to face death when their time comes.
13
Republic and Laws ‒ Questing for
Community
In contrast to the more limited scope of Timaeus and
Phaedo, Plato’s Republic and Laws are intended as encompas...