4 Mitigation Introduction Mitigation, sometimes called prevention or risk reduction, is often considered the “cornerstone of disaster management” (FEMA, 2010). While the three other components of the disaster management cycle (preparedness, response, and recovery) are performed either in reaction to hazards or in anticipation of their consequences, mitigation measures seek to reduce the likelihood or consequences of hazard risk before a disaster ever occurs. Mitigation is by no means a simple answer to the hazard problem, however. Because of the numerous difficulties associated with it, only in the last few decades, its full potential at controlling hazard risk has been recognized. Mitigation measures tend to be costly, disruptive, time-consuming, and in some cases socially unpalatable. They almost always carry their own inherent risk and do not always work as intended. Political will for mitigation is hard to come by in many situations, and the public’s attention span tends to be too short to accommodate the significant life changes that may be necessary for mitigation to work. Furthermore, mitigation traditionally has been a luxury of rich nations, with many societies considering it to be something they cannot justify or afford in light of other, more immediate issues. As the practice of mitigation grows throughout the world, in both wealthy and developing nations, it is emerging as a means of measurably reducing the incidence of many types of disasters. The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction and the subsequent International Strategy for Disaster Reduction have proclaimed its value. Following the 2004 tsunami events in Asia that resulted in the deaths of over 120,000 people, it was recognized that a simple, cost-effective early warning system like those currently in use in many nations around the globe could have prevented such a significant loss of life. Clearly, the solutions exist, but the problem lies in implementation. This chapter provides an overview of mitigation and describes its various forms. Insurance as a mitigation option will be detailed. Finally, several of the many obstacles to mitigation will be presented. What Is Mitigation? Mitigation is defined as any sustained effort undertaken to reduce a hazard risk through the reduction of the likelihood and/or the consequence component of that hazard’s risk. In other words, mitigation seeks either to make a hazard less likely to occur or to reduce the negative effects if it were to occur. Each hazard is unique in its effect on humans and the natural and built environments. Likewise, each hazard has a unique set of mitigation options from which disaster managers may choose that have been developed or been conceived but remain to be developed. Each option carries an associated 209 210 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT cost, a level of feasibility based upon several factors, and an expected success rate for actually reducing the risk as designed. What methods, if any, the disaster manager selects will be wholly dependent upon these and a range of other factors, including the amount of funds available, the anticipated social and physical consequences of such actions, and the receptiveness of the geographic environment into which the measure will be applied. Once identified and analyzed, as explained in the preceding chapters, risks can be evaluated to determine methods to handle them. As part of this process, mitigation techniques are identified (or developed, if adequate mitigation does not exist for a specific risk) and considered according to their ability to reduce or eliminate hazard likelihood or consequence. While it is true that most risks can be reduced through proper mitigation, such efforts generally become increasingly expensive as the actual level of risk reduction increases. Therefore, depending on the nature of the risk, several different mitigation alternatives may need to be considered and applied to ensure a comprehensive examination of costs to benefits, as shown in the following sections. Mitigation Goals When considering the mitigation options suitable for treating a hazard risk, several general goals classify the outcome that disaster managers may seek: risk likelihood reduction, risk consequences reduction, risk avoidance, risk acceptance, and risk transfer, sharing, or spreading. Risk Likelihood Reduction It is possible to reduce the chance that many hazards will manifest themselves. For these hazards, risk is reduced through a reduction in likelihood. For some hazards, such as hurricanes, intervention obviously is not yet technically possible (despite many attempts to prove the contrary, including the proposal to detonate a nuclear device in a hurricane’s eye). Other hazards, such as river flooding, have several mitigation options available to disaster managers, including dikes, levees, and buyouts (see the following sections), each with associated benefits and secondary risks. Technological and intentional hazards tend to have a greater overall application of measures that seek to reduce hazard likelihood, simply because the very existence of these hazards is a direct result of human decision. For example, tandem trailers, developed for cargo transport, have been proven to be involved in more accidents than traditional single-trailer rigs. Restricting the use of these vehicles immediately reduces the risk likelihood. While we cannot feasibly “decide” not to have a natural hazard, we can do so with other hazard forms. Mitigation measures that seek to reduce risk likelihood tend to be nonstructural in nature, but not without exception. Risk Consequences Reduction The second primary goal that disaster managers seek through mitigation is a reduction in the impact of a hazard to humans, structures, the environment, or any combination of these. Mitigation measures that address consequences assume that a hazard will occur with an associated intensity or magnitude, and they ensure that the protected structure, population, system, or other subject is able to withstand such an event without negative consequences. Again using the example of hurricane mitigation, we can see that there is a much greater chance of mitigation success with some hazards when disaster managers address those hazards’ consequences. Mechanisms enabling structures to be raised above storm Chapter 4 • Mitigation 211 surge levels and strengthened against wind damage, storm shelters for affected populations, and regulations restricting actions and activities in high-risk areas all work to considerably reduce the consequences from hurricanes. Most hazards have one or more options for disaster consequence reduction, which cannot always be said of likelihood reduction. For natural disasters, these measures tend to be structural and address the hardening of structures and systems and the protection of people. For technological hazards, consequence reduction revolves around the development of primary and redundant safety, containment, and cleanup systems. Consequence reduction for intentional hazards, especially terrorism, is still in the primary stages of development, although the increase in global attention to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) has drastically quickened the pace of such research and development efforts. Risk Avoidance Some hazard risks are so great that even with a partial reduction in either their likelihood or consequence, the outcome is still unacceptable. For these risks, only total avoidance is considered, and so it is deemed necessary to take action to reduce either the likelihood or the consequence factor to absolute zero. One day, future discoveries may allow for manageability of these hazards such that they are tolerated, but current methods of mitigation are either nonexistent or prohibitively expensive. Total risk avoidance for natural hazards usually means removing all people and structures out of the affected area. Such measures are understandably unrealistic for hazards that have a wide geographic range. Civilizations have tended to avoid such high-risk areas as is evident by the historical lack of development in harsh or dangerous climates such as the Antarctic continent. Risk avoidance may be possible for other hazards for which risk is not so all-encompassing and can be mapped within regions. For example, buyout programs seek to physically remove all structures within a floodplain and then restrict all future construction in that reclaimed area. Risk avoidance is used most often in the treatment of technological disasters for which risk acceptability is subject to more critical consideration in society. For example, since the famed 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident, not one new reactor has been approved for construction in the United States (an $8 billion loan guarantee approved in February 2010 by the U.S. government for two new reactors has not resulted in actual construction). In the case of natural disasters, implementing risk avoidance measures in areas that have already been settled can be very difficult due to sociocultural and legal matters. Avoidance mitigation often involves uprooting whole communities, at least a temporary reduction in services and quality of life, and the disruption of cultural and social frameworks. These measures are rarely conducted without resistance, ultimately requiring forced implementation by law enforcement or other government authority figures. Risk Acceptance For certain hazards, disaster managers, as well as societies and individuals, consider a certain risk to be acceptable “as is.” It may be determined that any further reduction in risk is either too expensive or unnecessary. Several reasons might lead to this decision. First, every community, country, or region has a whole range of hazards with which it must contend, and it assuredly has limited funding to treat that range of hazards. Certain risks, shown by their cost-benefit analyses, are better left untreated so that funding that would have been dedicated to that treatment may be applied to other hazards for which risk reduction will have greater value. 212 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT Second, some risk reduction measures will result in one or more undesirable consequences. These secondary consequences may simply be the reduction in an enjoyed benefit that existed because of the hazard, or undesirable consequences may be expected to arise as a direct result of the mitigation measure (in which case, the secondary consequences are considered more damaging or undesirable than the consequences of the hazard risk). A third reason risk acceptance many be practiced relates to sociocultural patterns. Many cultures identify with a certain place or location, and would rather face a certain risk than leave for a “safer” option. Certain religious beliefs cause people to accept risks as the will of some higher power that is beyond their control, not as an avoidable option. These reasons pose especially difficult obstacles to disaster managers, as will be detailed in the section entitled “Obstacles to Mitigation.” Unlike risk avoidance, risk acceptance is rarely considered a luxury. Japan, for instance, spent more than $30 billion on mitigation-related projects in 2003 (UNISDR, 2005). In most cases, risk acceptance is entertained or applied not when risk reduction or avoidance measures are unavailable but when they are unaffordable. Understandably, risk acceptance, even if in a de facto manner, occurs most often in poor nations forced into such decisions by their lack of available funds. Risk Transfer, Sharing, or Spreading The final and most debated goal of mitigation is risk transfer, sharing, or spreading. The concept behind this goal is that the risk is not actually reduced, but its consequence or likelihood is diluted across a large group of people such that each suffers an average consequence (which may in fact be greater or less than what each would have suffered without participation in the measure). The most common forms of risk transfer are insurance coverage and international reinsurance. Insurance reduces the financial consequence of a hazard risk by eliminating the monetary loss of property. Insurers charge a calculated premium, priced according to the hazard’s expected frequency and consequence, which guarantees the repayment of losses in the event that the insured hazard occurs. The cost of the disaster is thereby shared by (or spread across) all customers through the payment of premiums. Victims and nonvictims alike pay the same premium (the consequence), with the common fund collected bearing the brunt of the disaster. Risk sharing, spreading, and insurance schemes appeared as early as 1950 BC when shipping companies began practicing bottomry, the sharing of costs related to maritime risk among all vessels in a fleet (Covello & Mumpower, 1985). Insurance as a mitigation option is not without controversy, and is discussed in further detail in the section entitled “Risk Transfer, Sharing, and Spreading.” Noninsurance forms of risk spreading do exist, including crop diversification and redundancy in lifeline systems. These will also be discussed. More direct risk sharing and spreading measures are common in developing countries, where informal agreements exist within social groups to accommodate the particular needs of victims within those groups. One common practice is food sharing schemes, which ensure that all members of a community have enough to eat despite seasonal or unexpected shortages of their personal crops. Types of Mitigation: Structural and Nonstructural The mitigation measures employed to achieve the first two goals previously listed, a reduction in the likelihood or consequence of a hazard, are grouped into two primary categories: structural and nonstructural. Although these two terms are almost universally used to differentiate between the various Chapter 4 • Mitigation 213 options available to disaster managers, much disagreement exists concerning the actual delineation of what makes something structural or nonstructural. For the purposes of this text, structural mitigation is defined as a risk reduction effort performed through the construction or altering of the physical environment through the application of engineered solutions. Nonstructural mitigation is defined as a measure that reduces risk through modification in human behavior or natural processes without requiring the use of engineered structures. It must be noted that, while there are several mitigation measures that will clearly fit into one category or the other regardless of the definition of the terms, there are also many that could go either way, and may appear as one form in this text and another form elsewhere. These two categories are described in detail in the following sections. Structural Mitigation Structural mitigation measures are those that involve or dictate the necessity for some form of construction, engineering, or other mechanical changes or improvements aimed at reducing hazard risk likelihood or consequence. They often are considered attempts at “man controlling nature” when applied to natural disasters. Structural measures are generally expensive and include a full range of regulation, compliance, enforcement, inspection, maintenance, and renewal issues. Although each hazard has a unique set of structural mitigation measures that may be applied to its risk, these measures may be grouped across some general categories. Each category will be described with examples of how the mitigation type would be applied to one or more individual hazard types. The general structural mitigation groups to be described are l Resistant construction l Building codes and regulatory measures l Relocation l Structural modification l Construction of community shelters l Construction of barrier, deflection, or retention systems l Detection systems l Physical modification l Treatment systems l Redundancy in life safety infrastructure Resistant Construction Clearly, the best way to maximize the chance that a structure is able to resist the forces inflicted by various hazards is to ensure that it is designed in such a way prior to construction to do just that. Through awareness and education, individual, corporate, and government entities can be informed of the hazards that exist and the measures that can be taken to mitigate the risks of those hazards, allowing resistant construction to be considered. As a mitigation option, designing hazard resistance into the structure from the start is the most cost-effective option and the option most likely to succeed. Whether or not builders choose to use hazard-resistant design depends upon whether they have access to the financial resources, the technical expertise necessary to correctly engineer the construction, and the material resources required for such measures. 214 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT FIGURE 4–1 House built on stilts above annual flood levels in Guayas Province, Ecuador. Where cultures have adapted to living with a hazard, construction styles may incorporate hazard-resistant design. This is often seen in areas with annual flooding, where houses are built on stilts (see Figure 4–1). An example of a culturally adjusted hazard-resistant construction style is the houses built by the Banni in India (discussed in Chapter 3), which resist the shaking of earthquakes. Little funding and minimal added effort are required to design these mitigation measures into the construction from the start, but building a standard, nonresistant house and altering it at a later time is both cost- and ability-prohibitive. Building Codes and Regulatory Measures Hazard-resistant construction, as previously explained, is clearly an effective way to reduce vulnerability to select hazards. However, the builder of the house must apply these resistant construction measures for there to be an actual reduction in a population’s overall vulnerability. One way that governments can ensure members of the population apply hazard-resistant construction is by creating building codes to guide construction and passing legislation that requires those codes to be followed. Regulatory structures are one of the most widely adopted structural mitigation measures, used in almost every country of the world in some form. With sufficient knowledge about the hazards likely to affect a region or a country, engineers can develop building codes that guide builders to ensure that their designs are able to resist the forces of the relevant hazards. Although simple in theory, inherent problems with codes and regulations can drastically decrease their effectiveness. Building codes ensure that structure designs include resistance to various forms of external pressure. Each hazard emits a unique set of external pressures on structures, including: l Lateral and/or vertical shaking (earthquakes) l Lateral and/or uplift load pressure (severe storms, cyclonic storms, tornadoes, windstorms) l Extreme heat (structure fires, wildland fires, forest fires) l Roof loading (hailstorms, snowstorms, ash falls) l Hydrological pressure (floods, storm surge) Chapter 4 • Mitigation 215 When properly applied, building codes offer a great deal of protection from a wide range of hazards. They are a primary reason for the drastic drop in the number of earthquake deaths in the developing world during the last century. They are so effective because they completely integrate protection measures into the structure from the design phase onward, rather than applying the measures after construction. Unfortunately, these measures have several negative aspects that prevent them from being used more widely and more effectively. Most countries have building codes, but few use them to their fullest capacity. First, any increase in building resistance increases the subsequent cost of construction. Developers fight the creation of strict building codes because the need to use stronger and additional materials decreases the profit margins of their structures. Second, for building codes to be successful there must be compliance. Compliance can only be ensured through enforcement, which creates a new budgetary expense for government officials. Even when enforcement is possible through building inspections, misconduct is always possible in the form of bribery, neglect, cronyism, and so forth. Inspectors may lack the proper training or expertise to adequately do their job, leaving them unable to correctly identify hazardous conditions or breaches in building codes. Relocation Occasionally, the most sensible way to protect a structure or a people from a hazard is to relocate it or them away from the hazard. Homes and other structures may be disassembled or transported intact. Flooding is the most common reason that structures are relocated. Although destroying the original structure and rebuilding it elsewhere is often less expensive and technically more feasible, in certain circumstances such actions are either impossible or undesirable. For example, the structure in question may be a cultural heritage site that cannot be replaced. The Abu Simbel temple in Egypt, which would have been flooded after the damming of the Nile at Aswan, was moved 90 m from its original location to protect it. In some instances where the hazard area is especially great, moving entire communities may be necessary. One such example is the town of Valdez, Alaska, which was relocated in 1967 after hazard assessments showed that the entire town was built upon unstable soil. Fifty-two of the original structures were moved to a new site 4 miles away, while the rest were destroyed and rebuilt in their new location. Structural Modification Scientific progress and ongoing research continually provide new information about hazards. This new information can reveal that structures in identified risk zones are not designed to resist the forces of a likely hazard. There are three treatment options for these structures. The first is to do nothing. Second, the structure may be demolished and rebuilt to accommodate the new hazard information. Third, often the most appropriate action, is to modify the structure such that it resists the anticipated external forces. This action is often referred to as retrofitting (see Figure 4–2). How the retrofit affects the structure depends on the hazard risk that is being treated. Examples of hazards and their retrofits include: l Cyclonic storms. Wind-resistant shingles; shutters; waterproofing (often called secondary water resistance; SWR); stronger frame connections and joints (including “roof straps,” which help secure the roof to the main structure of the house); structural elevation; lateral support structures; stronger doorways (including garage doors) 216 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT FIGURE 4–2 Mexico City parking garage with external steel frame retrofit. l Earthquakes. Sheer walls, removal of cripple walls, foundation anchor bolts, frame anchor connections, floor framing, chimney reinforcement, base isolation systems, external frames, removal of roof weight, soft-story reinforcement l Floods. Structural elevation, first-floor conversion, “wet” and “dry” floodproofing, foundation flood vents l Wildfire. Replacement of external materials, including decks, gutters, downspouts, paneling, doors, window frames, and roof shingles, with those that are fire-resistant l Hail. Increase roof slope, strengthen roof materials, strengthen load-carrying capacity of flat or shallow-angle roofs l Tornadoes. In addition to the modifications for cyclonic storms, construction of a “safe room” or basement shelter l Lightning. Electrical grounding of the house with lightning rods or other devices l Extreme heat. Air-conditioning systems l Terrorism. Hardening of exterior walls, construction of blast walls, replacement of glass with shatterresistant material, use of a filtered and restricted-access air system, restricted-access entryway Construction of Community Shelters The lives of community residents can be protected from a disaster’s consequences through the construction of shelters designed to withstand a certain type or range of hazard consequences. Shelters are usually constructed when it is either unlikely or unrealistic for all or a majority of Chapter 4 • Mitigation 217 community members to be able to protect themselves from the hazard in their homes or elsewhere. Two systems must be in place for shelters to work. First, there must be an effective early warning system that would enable residents to have enough time to travel to the shelter before the hazard event. This immediately rules out several hazards for which warning is impossible or unlikely, such as earthquakes or landslides. Second, there must be a public education campaign that both raises awareness of the existence of the shelter and teaches residents how to recognize when to travel to the shelter. During the Cold War, many countries built shelters or designated qualified buildings to protect citizens from the dangerous fallout effects of a nuclear attack. Shelters are much more likely to be utilized in poor communities throughout the world, where housing construction is especially deficient. For this reason, it is common for community development projects to design community buildings like schools that double as a shelter in the event of a disaster. Construction of Barrier, Deflection, or Retention Systems The forces that many hazards exert upon man and the built environment can be controlled through specifically engineered structures. These structures fall under three main categories: barriers, deflection systems, and retention systems. Barriers are designed to stop a physical force dead in its tracks. Their job is to absorb the impact of whatever force is being exerted. They are, in other words, blocking devices. Barrier walls can be made of natural materials, such as trees, bushes, or even existing soil, or they can be constructed of foreign materials, such as stone, concrete, wood, or metal. Depending upon the hazard type, barriers may be built on just one side of a structure, or may completely surround it. Examples of barriers and the hazards they are designed to protect against include: l Seawalls (cyclonic storm surges, tsunamis, high waves, rough seas, and coastal erosion) (see Figure 4–3) l Floodwalls, dikes, berms (floods, flash floods) l Natural or synthetic wind and particle movement barriers (strong seasonal winds, sand drift, dune movement, beach erosion, snow drift) l Defensible spaces (wildfires, forest fires) l Mass movement protection walls (landslides, mudslides, rockslides, avalanches) l Security fences, checkpoints (terrorism, civil disturbances) l HAZMAT linings (ground contamination) Deflection systems are designed to divert the physical force of a hazard, allowing it to change course so that a structure situated in its original path escapes harm. Like barriers, deflection systems may be constructed from a full range of materials, both natural and manmade. Examples of deflection systems and the hazards they are designed to protect against include: l Avalanche bridges (snow avalanches) l Chutes (landslides, mudflows, lahars, rockslides) l Lava flow channels (volcanic lava) l Diversion trenches, channels, canals, and spillways (floods; see Figure 4–4) 218 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT FIGURE 4–3 Example of a seawall failure following Hurricane Jeanne in 2004, Melbourne Shores, Florida. (Photo courtesy of USGS, 2004) FIGURE 4–4 Flood spillway in use on Hayes Lake, Roseau River, Minnesota. (Photo courtesy of U.S. NOAA, 2002) Chapter 4 • Mitigation 219 Retention systems are designed to contain a hazard, preventing its destructive forces from ever being released. These structures generally seek to increase the threshold to which hazards are physically maintained. Examples include: l Dams (drought, floods) l Levees and flood walls (floods) l Slit dams (sedimentation, floods) l Landslide walls (masonry, concrete, rock cage, crib walls, bin walls, and buttress walls) l Slope stabilization covers (concrete, netting, wire mesh, vegetation landslides, mudflows, rockfalls; see Figure 4–5) Detection systems are designed to recognize a hazard that might not otherwise be perceptible to humans. They have applications for natural, technological, and intentional hazards. As more funding is dedicated to the research and development of detection systems, their ability to prevent disasters or warn of hazard consequences before disaster strikes increases. With natural disasters, detection systems are primarily used to save lives. With technological and intentional hazards, however, it may be possible to prevent an attack, explosion, fire, accident, or other damaging events. Examples of detection systems are l Imaging satellites (wildfires, hurricanes, volcanoes, landslides, avalanches, floods, fire risk, terrorism, virtually all hazards; see Exhibit 4–1) FIGURE 4–5 Slope covered with concrete and outfitted with drainage pipes to prevent landslides. 220 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT EXHIBIT 4–1: CHINA USES SATELLITES TO MONITOR NATURAL DISASTERS Telecommunication and imagery satellites, launched for a number of reasons independent of disaster management, are being used to an increasing degree to provide advance and assessment information about hazards and disasters. Satellites are a constant source of accurate and up-to-date information about conditions on the ground in all countries of the world. When disasters happen, and access is limited, they may be the only means of understanding what damage has occurred and where. The use of satellite imagery was used extensively in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks to estimate the amount of debris that required removal, and even as early as 1993 when imagery was used to accurately measure the extent of flooding around the Mississippi River in the U.S. Midwest. Satellites have been tracking storms for decades, providing days of advance warning for major cyclonic storms like Hurricane Katrina and Cyclone Nargis. In the aftermath of disasters in the developing world, satellite imagery can be invaluable in assessing both damages and needs. After the Sichuan Earthquake in China in 2008, for instance, nearly 1300 satellite images were processed to monitor and evaluate damage, mitigate additional threats, and guide relief workers through affected areas. China had announced in January of 2008 that it would be developing the capacity to use satellites built to measure environmental resources to monitor natural disasters, and the decision helped considerably. Through imagery normally used for city planning, environmental protection, and land resource surveys, the Chinese government space agency was able to identify areas of greatest need, and even determine the number of structures and infrastructure components that had been damaged or destroyed. Collaborations like the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters offer governments free satellite data, from cooperating space agencies, to help cope with ongoing disasters. But there are still costs for long-term monitoring and predicting risk. Sian Lewis, of SciDev.Net, wrote: Sometimes (but not always), the limited uptake comes from implementation barriers—countries may lack the institutional infrastructure or human expertise to quickly analyze and interpret satellite data, and disseminate it to emergency services. But arguably the most significant barrier in the world’s poorest regions is a lack of political support. Very few politicians—particularly in Africa—have shown interest in remote sensing, or much understanding of how it can help manage natural disasters. Sources: Lewis, 2009; China View, 2008. l Chemical/biological/radiological/explosive detection systems (technological hazards, chemical leaks, pipeline failures, terrorism) l Ground movement monitoring system (seismicity, volcanic activity, dam failure, expansive soils, land subsidence, rail infrastructure failure) l Flood gauges (hydrologic hazards) l Weather stations (severe weather, tornadoes) l Undersea and buoy oceanic movement detection (tsunamis; see Figure 4–6 and Exhibit 4–2) l Information systems (epidemics, WMD terrorism) Chapter 4 • Mitigation 221 FIGURE 4–6 Tsunami buoy being deployed in the Pacific Ocean by the U.S. NOAA ship Ronald H. Brown. (Photo courtesy of NOAA) Physical modification is the group of mitigation measures that alters the physical landscape in such a manner that hazard likelihood or consequence is reduced. This can be performed through simple landscaping measures or through the use of engineered devices. Ground modification examples include: l Slope terracing—landslides, mudflows, erosion (see Figure 4–7) l Slope drainage—landslides, mudflows, erosion l Regrading of steep slopes—landslides, mudflows, rockfalls, erosion, avalanches l Anchors and piling—landslides l Removal and/or replacement of soils—expansive soils l Wetland reclamation—flooding l Dredging rivers and channelization—flooding l Dredging reservoirs—drought l Building culverts—flooding 222 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT EXHIBIT 4–2: THE AUSTRALIAN TSUNAMI ALERT SYSTEM (ATAS) Australia faces extreme tsunami risk given that it is bounded on three sides by approximately 8000 km of seismically active plate boundaries that generate about one-third of all of the world’s earthquakes. This zone is capable of delivering tsunamis to the Australian coast within 2 to 4 hours. After the December 26, 2004, tsunami events, the Australian government wished to increase their ability to warn the Australian population if a tsunami were headed their way, in order to limit the loss of human life. The Australian Tsunami Alert System (ATAS) existed prior to this event, but had limited capabilities in tsunami monitoring and warning. In 2005, the Australian government committed $68.9M over 4 years to establish an Australian tsunami warning system. This effort included: l l l l l Establishment of the Joint Australian Tsunami Warning Centre (JATWC) with 24/7 monitoring and analysis capacity for Australia The upgrade and expansion of sea level and seismic monitoring networks around Australia and in the Indian and Southwest Pacific Oceans Implementation of national tsunami education and training programs Assistance to the Australian Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) in developing the existing Pacific Tsunami Warning & Mitigation System (PTWS) and establishing an Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning & Mitigation System (IOTWS) Technical assistance to help build the capacity of scientists, technicians, and emergency managers in Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean countries The system operates through the existence of an enhanced national network of seismic stations combined with data from international monitoring networks. Government officials are advised of the magnitude, location, and characteristics of seismic events that have the potential to generate a tsunami. Based on this information, the Australian government runs a tsunami model to generate an estimate of the tsunami size, arrival time, and potential impact locations. The existence of a tsunami is verified using information from an enhanced sea level monitoring network. Advice and warnings are then issued as needed on any possible tsunami threat to State and Territory emergency management services, media, and the public. Source: Government of Australia, 2010. Treatment systems seek to remove a hazard from a natural system that humans depend on. These systems may be designed for nonstop use or for use in certain circumstances where a hazard is known to be present. Examples include: l Water treatment systems l HEPA air filtration ventilation systems l Airborne pathogen decontamination systems l Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) decontamination systems Chapter 4 • Mitigation 223 FIGURE 4–7 Slope terracing in Nepal. (Photo courtesy of Sharon Ketchum) One last structural mitigation measure is redundancy in life safety infrastructure. As humans have evolved beyond subsistence living, they have become more dependent upon each other and on societal infrastructure. Today, private and government infrastructure may provide an individual with food, water, sewerage, electricity, communications, transportation, medical care, and more. With such great dependency on these systems, failure in any one could quickly lead to catastrophe. Examples of life safety systems into which redundancy may be built include: l Electricity infrastructure l Public health infrastructure l Emergency management infrastructure l Water storage, treatment, conveyance, and delivery systems l Transportation infrastructure l Irrigation systems l Food delivery Nonstructural Mitigation Nonstructural mitigation, as defined previously, generally involves a reduction in the likelihood or consequence of risk through modifications in human behavior or natural processes, without requiring the use of engineered structures. Nonstructural mitigation techniques are often considered mechanisms where “man adapts to nature.” They tend to be less costly and fairly easy for communities with few financial or technological resources to implement. The following section describes several of the various categories into which nonstructural mitigation measures may be grouped, and provides several examples of each: l Regulatory measures l Community awareness and education programs 224 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT l Nonstructural physical modifications l Environmental control l Behavioral modification Regulatory Measures Regulatory measures limit hazard risk by legally dictating human actions. Regulations can be applied to several facets of societal and individual life, and are used when it is determined that such action is required for the common good of the society. Although the use of regulatory measures is pervasive, compliance is a widespread problem because the cost of enforcement can be prohibitive and inspectors may be untrained, ineffective, or susceptible to bribes. Examples of regulatory mitigation measures include: l Land use management (zoning). This is a legally imposed restriction on how land may be used. It may apply to specific geographic designations, such as coastal zone management, hillside or slope management, floodplain development restrictions, or microclimatic siting of structures (such as placing structures only on the leeward side of a hill). l Open space preservation (green spaces). This practice attempts to limit the settlement or activities of people in areas that are known to be at high risk for one or more hazards. l Protective resource preservation. In some situations, a tract of land is not at risk from a hazard, but a new hazard will be created by disturbing that land. Examples include protecting forests that serve to block wind and wetlands preservation. l Denial of services to high-risk areas. When squatter and informal settlements form on high-risk land despite the existence of preventive regulatory measures, it is possible to discourage growth and reverse settlement trends by ensuring that services such as electricity, running water, and communications do not reach the unsafe settlement. This measure is only acceptable when performed in conjunction with a project that seeks to offer alternative, safe accommodations for the inhabitants (otherwise, a secondary humanitarian disaster may result). l Density control. By regulating the number of people who may reside in an area of known or estimated risk, it is possible to limit vulnerability and control the amount of resources considered adequate for protection from and response to that known hazard. Many response mechanisms are overwhelmed because the number of casualties in an affected area is much higher than was anticipated. l Building use regulations. To protect against certain hazards, it is possible to restrict the types of activities that may be performed in a building. These restrictions may apply to people, materials, or activities. l Mitigation easements. Easements are agreements between private individuals or organizations and the government that dictate how a particular tract of land will be used. Mitigation easements are agreements to restrict the private use of land for the purposes of risk reduction. l HAZMAT manufacture, use, transport, and disposal. Hazardous materials are a major threat to life and property in all countries. Most governments have developed safety standards and procedures to guide the way that these materials are manufactured and used by businesses and individuals, the mechanisms by which they are transported from place to place, and the methods and devices that contain them. Chapter 4 • Mitigation 225 l Safety standards and regulations. Regulations that guide safe activities and practices are diverse and apply to more situations than could be described in this chapter. Safety regulations may apply to individuals (seatbelt laws), households (use of smoke detectors), communities, businesses, and governments. The establishment of building codes, as described in the section Structural Mitigation, is an example of a safety regulation. l Natural resource use regulations. The use of common natural resources, such as aquifers, can be controlled for the purpose of minimizing hazard risk (in this case, drought). l Storm water management regulations. Storm water runoff can be destructive to the areas where it originates (through erosion), and to the areas where it terminates (through silting), pollution, changes to stream flows, and other effects. Development, especially when large amounts of land are covered with impervious materials like concrete, can drastically increase the amount of runoff by decreasing the holding capacity of the land. Regulations on storm water management, imposed on private and public development projects, help to manage those negative effects, reducing both hazard risk and environmental vulnerability. l Environmental protection regulations. Certain environmental features, such as rivers, streams, lakes, and wetlands, play an important part in reducing the vulnerability of a community or country. Preventing certain behaviors, such as dumping or polluting, helps to ensure that these resources continue to offer their risk-reduction benefits. l Public disclosure regulations. Property owners may be required to disclose all known risks, such as flood or earthquake hazard risk, when selling their property. This ensures hazard awareness and increases the chance that purchasers will take appropriate action for those known risks when they begin construction or other activities on that land. l Mitigation requirements on loans. Banks and other lending institutions have much at stake when they lend money to developers. Therefore, lenders can apply mitigation requirements or at the very least require that hazard assessments be conducted, and governments can require that such actions be taken by those lending institutions. Such policies limit the building of unsafe projects. Community Awareness and Education Programs The public is most able to protect itself from the effects of a hazard if it is first informed that the hazard exists, and then educated about what it can do to limit its risk. Public education programs are considered both mitigation and preparedness measures. An informed public that applies appropriate measures to reduce their risk before a disaster occurs has performed mitigation. However, a public that has been trained in response activities has participated in a preparedness activity. Often termed “risk communication,” projects designed to educate the public may include one or more of the following: l Awareness of the hazard risk l Behavior modification • Predisaster risk reduction behavior • Predisaster preparedness behavior l • Postdisaster response behavior • Postdisaster recovery behavior Warning 226 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT A more detailed description is provided in Chapter 5. Warning systems inform the public that a hazard risk has reached a threshold requiring certain protective actions. Depending upon the hazard type and the warning system’s technological capabilities, the amount of time citizens have to act varies. Some warning systems, especially those that apply to technological and intentional hazards, are not able to provide warning until the hazard has already begun to exhibit its damaging behavior (such as a leak at a chemical production facility, or an accident involving a hazardous materials tanker truck). The UN Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning (PPEW, n.d.) states that four separate factors are necessary for effective early warning: 1. 2. 3. 4. Prior knowledge of the risks faced by communities A technical monitoring and warning service for these risks The dissemination of understandable warnings to those at risk Knowledge by people of how to react and the capacity to do so Warning systems, therefore, are dependent upon hazard identification and analysis, effective detection systems (as described in the section Structural Mitigation), dissemination of the message, and public education. A tsunami that occurred in American Samoa in 2009 illustrates the ineffectiveness of a system missing even just one of these components. The tsunami had been detected by the U.S. government and transmitted to the Governor of American Samoa, and that the people of American Samoa were trained in personal response to tsunamis, but the lack of an alert system prevented ample warning and many people who otherwise could have escaped were killed (American Samoa Government, 2009). Early warning systems have been developed to varying capacities for the following hazards: l Drought l Tornadoes/windstorms l Cyclonic storms l Epidemics l Landslides l Earthquakes l Chemical releases l Volcanoes l Floods l Wildfires l Air raids/attacks l Terrorist threats l Tsunamis l Extreme winter weather For an inventory of early warning systems, see http://database.unep.dkkv.org/. Risk mapping involves presenting the likelihood and consequence components in the format of a physical map, with figures based upon a specific hazard or set of hazards. Risk maps are fundamental to disaster management, and are very effective as a mitigation tool. Using risk maps, governments and Chapter 4 • Mitigation 227 High Prairie Fire Risk (SPRING) Low Moderate High Highest Extreme Kinuse Slave Lake Smith Valley view Chisholm Litde Smoky Swan Hills Flatbust Faw cett Fox Creek Fort Assiniboine Whitecourt Sangudo Peers Edson Wildwood St. Alb FIGURE 4–8 Map detailing the likelihood of fire determined by activities and presence of causative agents. (From Alberta Sustainable Resource Development) other entities can most effectively dedicate resources to areas of greatest need, and plan in advance of incidents, so that adequate response resources are able to reach those highest risk areas without unforeseen problems. Risk maps are generally based upon the base maps discussed in Chapter 2, but include the added information acquired through the risk analysis and assessment described in Chapter 3 (see Figure 4–8). Nonstructural Physical Modifications Several different mitigation options, while not structural in nature, involve a physical modification to a structure or to property that results in reduced risk. Examples include: l Securing of furniture, pictures, and appliances, and installing latches on cupboards. In many earthquakes, the majority of injuries are caused by falling furniture and other unsecured belongings. Economic costs also can be reduced significantly through this very inexpensive, simple measure that generally requires little more than connecting items to walls through the use of a specially designed thin metal strap. 228 l INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT Removal or securing of projectiles. During tornadoes, items commonly found outside the house, such as cooking grills, furniture, and stored wood, may become airborne projectiles that cause harm, fatalities, or further property damage. Environmental Control Structural mitigation involves engineered structures that control hazards. It is also possible to control or influence hazards through nonengineered structural means. These nonstructural mechanisms tend to be highly hazard specific, and include: l Explosive detonation to relieve seismic pressure (earthquakes) l Launched or placed explosives to release stored snow cover (avalanches) l Cloud seeding (hail, hurricanes, drought, snow) l Chemical surface treatment (ice and snowstorms) l Controlled burns (wildfires) l Bombing of volcano flows (volcanic eruption) l Dune and beach restoration or preservation (storm surges, tsunamis, erosion) l Forest and vegetation management (landslides, mudflows, flooding, erosion) l Riverine and reservoir sediment and erosion control (flooding) l Removal and replacement of soils (expansive soils) l Hillside drainage (landslides, mudslides, erosion) l Slope grading (landslides, mudslides, rockfalls, erosion) l Disease vector eradication (epidemics; see Figure 4–9 and Exhibit 4–3) Behavioral Modification Through collective action, a community can alter the behavior of individuals; resulting in some common risk reduction benefit. Voluntary behavior modification measures are more difficult to implement than the regulatory measures previously listed, because they usually involve some form of sacrifice. However, through effective public education, behavioral modification is possible. Tax incentives, or subsidies, can help to increase the success of behavioral modification practices. Examples of mitigation measures that involve behavioral modification include: l Rationing. Rationing is often performed prior to and during periods of drought. Because it can be very difficult for governments to limit vital services such as water to citizens, it is up to citizens to limit their individual usage. Electricity rationing is also performed during periods of extreme heat or cold to ensure that electrical climate control systems are able to perform as required. l Environmental conservation. Many practices, in both urban and rural areas, are very destructive to the environment. Once the environmental feature—a body of water, a forest, or a hillside—is destroyed, secondary hazardous consequences may appear that could have been avoided. Through proper education and the offering of alternatives, destructive practices can be halted before too much damage is done. Examples of environmental conservation include Chapter 4 • Mitigation 229 Dengue Risk Areas 1970 2010 FIGURE 4–9 Incidence of dengue fever (in red) showing 1970 levels during a mosquito eradication campaign, and 2010 levels, decades after the eradication campaign was stopped. (From U.S. CDC, 2005) (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this chapter.) environmentally friendly farming practices, wood harvesting that does not cause deforestation, and protecting coral reefs from dynamite fishing and other fishing practices. l Tax incentives, subsidies, and other financial rewards for safe practices. Individuals and businesses can be coaxed into safer practices that reduce overall risk through financial incentives. Examples of schemes that use financial incentives include lower insurance premiums, housing buyout programs to move out of high-risk areas, farm subsidies for allowing land to be used for flood control during emergencies, and environmentally friendly farming practices (no deforestation, responsible grazing practices, flexible farming and cropping). l Strengthening of social ties. When a community strengthens its social ties, it is more likely to withstand a hazard’s stresses. For many reasons, the largest of which is urbanization, these ties break and are not replaced. In Chicago in 1995, a heat wave caused the death of 739 people. It was later determined that weak social structures were primarily to blame for the deaths, which could have been prevented had friends, family, or neighbors checked on the victims. Risk Transfer, Sharing, and Spreading Risk transfer, sharing, and spreading are often considered mitigation measures, although they do absolutely nothing to reduce actual disaster consequences or reduce hazard likelihood. The concept behind these measures is that the financial disaster consequences that do occur are shared by a large group of 230 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT EXHIBIT 4–3: DENGUE FEVER ERADICATION—AN EXAMPLE OF FAILED MITIGATION Dengue fever is caused by four closely related “flavoviruses”: DEN-1, DEN-2, DEN-3, and DEN4. When people are infected with one of these viruses, they gain lifetime immunity if they survive the illness. However, they will not have cross-protective immunity, and people living in dengueendemic areas can actually have four dengue infections during their lifetime. Dengue fever occurs predominantly in the tropics, and is spread through a cycle of infection between humans and the Aedes aegypti mosquito. Infection with dengue fever results in a full range of nonspecific viral symptoms spanning from mild to severe and fatal hemorrhagic disease. Important risk factors for the disease include the strain and serotype of the infecting virus, as well as the age, immune status, and genetic predisposition of the infected person. The emergence of dengue fever has been most dramatic in Latin America. In an effort to eradicate yellow fever, which is also transmitted by the Aedes aegypti mosquito, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) organized a campaign that effectively eradicated the insect from most Central and South American countries during the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, epidemic dengue was also limited, occurring only sporadically in some Caribbean islands during this time. The eradication program was officially discontinued in the United States in 1970, and subsequently stopped elsewhere in the following years. As a result, the species began to re-infest countries from which it had been eradicated, and by 1997, the geographic distribution of Aedis aegypti was wider than its distribution before the eradication program (see Figure 4–9). In 1970, only DEN-2 virus was present in the Americas. DEN-1 was introduced in 1977, resulting in 16 years of major epidemics throughout the region. DEN-4 was introduced in 1981 and caused similar epidemics. Also in 1981, a new strain of DEN-2 from Southeast Asia caused the first major dengue hemorrhagic fever (DHF) epidemic in the Americas. This strain has spread rapidly throughout the region and has caused outbreaks of DHF in Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, French Guiana, Suriname, and Puerto Rico. By 1997, 18 countries in the region had reported confirmed DHF cases, and it is now endemic in many of these countries. The DEN-3 virus reappeared in the Americas after an absence of 16 years, first detected in Nicaragua in 1994. Almost simultaneously, the strain was confirmed in Panama and, in early 1995, in Costa Rica. In Nicaragua, considerable numbers of DHF cases were associated with the epidemic. Gene testing from the DEN-3 strains isolated from Panama and Nicaragua showed that the new American DEN-3 strain likely came from Asia, since it is genetically distinct from the DEN-3 strain found previously in the Americas, but is identical to the DEN-3 virus serotype that caused major epidemics in Sri Lanka and India in the 1980s. As suggested by the finding of a new DEN-3 strain and the susceptibility of the population in the American tropics to it, DEN-3 spread rapidly throughout the region, causing major dengue epidemics in Central America in 1995. As of 1997, dengue was the most important mosquito-borne viral disease affecting humans; its global distribution is comparable to that of malaria, and an estimated 2.5 billion people live in areas at risk for epidemic transmission. Each year, tens of millions of cases of dengue fever occur and, depending on the year, up to hundreds of thousands of cases of DHF. The case-fatality rate of DHF in most countries is about 5%, with most fatalities affecting children and young adults. Source: CDC, 2005. Chapter 4 • Mitigation 231 people, rather than the entire burden falling only on the affected individuals. The result is a calculated average consequence cost, such as an insurance premium. Insurance, which is the most common mitigation measure in this category, is defined as: “A promise of compensation for specific potential future losses in exchange for a periodic payment” (InvestorWords.com, 2003). Insurance is a mechanism by which the financial well-being of an individual, company, or other entity is protected against an incidence of unexpected loss. Insurance can be mandatory (required by law) or optional. Insurance operates through the use of premiums, or payments determined by the insurer. In exchange for premiums, the insurer agrees to pay the policyholder a sum of money (up to an established maximum amount) upon the occurrence of a specifically defined disastrous event. The majority of insurance policies include a deductible, which can be a fixed amount per loss (e.g., the first $1000 of a loss), a percentage of the loss (5% of the total loss), or a combination. The insurer pays the remaining amount, up to the limits established in the original contract. In general, the lower (smaller) the deductible associated with a policy, the higher the premiums. Common examples of insurance include automobile insurance, health insurance, disability insurance, life insurance, flood insurance, earthquake insurance, terrorism insurance, and business insurance. Insurance allows losses to be shared across wide populations. To briefly summarize, insurance works as follows. For example, an auto insurer takes into account all of the policyholders it will be insuring. It then estimates the cost of compensating policyholders for all accidents expected to occur during the time period established in the premiums (usually 6 months to a year.) The company then divides that cost, adding its administrative costs, across all policyholders. The premiums can be further calculated using information that gives more specific definitions of risk to certain individuals. For example, if one policyholder has 10 moving violations (speeding tickets) in a period of 10 years and has been found at fault in 5 accidents during the same period, that policyholder is statistically a greater risk to the insurer than someone who has never had an accident or moving violation. It follows, then, that the first policyholder would be expected to pay a higher premium for equal coverage. Insurance companies make the majority of their profits through investing the premiums collected. To cover losses in case the severity of accidents or disasters is greater than estimated when the policies were created, insurance companies rely on the services of reinsurance companies. Reinsurance companies insure insurance companies and tend to be internationally based to allow the risk to be spread across even greater geographical ranges. Insurance industry researchers Howard Kunreuther and Paul Freemen investigated the insurability of risks, especially those associated with disastrous consequences. They found that two conditions must be satisfied for a risk to be insurable. First, the hazard in question must be identifiable and quantifiable. In other words, the likelihood and consequence factors must be well understood before an insurer can responsibly and accurately set insurance premiums such that they will be able to adequately compensate customers in the event of a disaster. Second, insurers must be able to set premiums for “each potential customer or class of customers” (Kunreuther & Freemen, 1997). Common hazards, such as house fires and storm damage, have a wealth of information available upon which insurers may calculate their premiums. For catastrophic but rare events, such as earthquakes, it can be difficult or impossible to estimate with any degree of precision how often events will occur and what damages would result (see Exhibit 4–4). In the wealthier nations of the world, most property owners and renters have some form of insurance that protects the structure itself, the contents of the structure, or both (see Figure 4–10). However, for the reasons listed earlier, this coverage is often limited to common events, with specific 232 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT EXHIBIT 4–4: FINDINGS OF THE PROVENTION CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE POTENTIAL OF INSURANCE FOR DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CHALLENGES Lack of information needed for underwriting. Many developing countries lack the data and information needed for sound underwriting and product development. The quality and availability of data may vary, such that in a capital city some information may be available, while in rural areas information may be held only locally and in forms that are not easily understood by noncommunity individuals. Insurance services require information about potential losses and client demand, including data on assets at risk and the vulnerability and hazard exposure of those assets. Lack of local insurance expertise. In countries where insurance is not common, there is often a distinct lack of local expertise, ranging from actuarial science, underwriting, and risk assessment to claims management and client support. Lack of awareness and understanding of insurance. It takes time to develop awareness among potential clients about the benefits and costs of insurance, whether the clients are national or local governments, community groups, or low-income individuals. Awareness is important not only for demand development and sales but also because the design of insurance products should be based on client needs. Potential clients need an awareness of basic insurance principles and how these tools could help them before they can articulate their needs and thus generate demand. High opportunity cost of premiums for the poor. It is often asked if insurance is truly a viable option for the very poor, because premiums are not productive (unless a claim is made), and other needs may be more pressing. Paying premiums will generally not be a priority for a poor household if doing so would require foregoing essentials. Lack of legal structure and financial services infrastructure. Many developing countries lack the regulatory framework that makes insurance provision possible. Some micro-insurance services are provided in semi-legal ways because the legal environment in host countries does not allow formal insurance. Community groups may be able to aggregate business and overcome moral hazard, adverse selection, and data needs, but formal insurance providers may not be legally allowed to offer services to these groups. Some developing countries’ legal systems are developing toward market economy standards, but may not yet be mature enough to link with the international capital markets. Also, many developing countries lack the infrastructure to provide insurance services. Inadequate technological infrastructure such as communications may hinder insurance services and claims management. Lack of a culture of risk reduction and mitigation. Insurance functions on the assumption that the underlying risk is reduced as much as possible, with insurance mitigating against the remaining unpreventable and unpredictable events (“residual risk”). Many developing countries lack a culture of predisaster risk reduction, or resources and incentives for action are often inadequate. Without a culture of risk reduction and insurance as forms of mitigation, establishing successful insurance will be challenging. Partner differences in vocabulary, organizational operations, and timelines. Partners in different schemes that provide insurance services might include any mix of national and local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society and the poor, commercial enterprises, and international organizations. Each potential partner may operate with different vocabularies, goals, and methods, and along different timelines. Different operational structures can also be a challenge: While national governments may need to run decisions through complex and time-consuming democratic decision-making processes, commercial entities need to make decisions based on profitability and other strategic concerns. There is the example of a partnership that Chapter 4 • Mitigation 233 fell apart when the involved national government could not provide insurance and reinsurance partners with necessary data by a certain deadline, even though products had been developed and the partnership was ready to move forward. Need to define partner roles clearly. The word “partnership” among international organizations and national governments often signifies a broad willingness to engage in discussions, while in business the term often implies contractual obligations. Further to such basic differences of understanding and interpretation, there are examples of a national government establishing a pattern of “bailing out” disaster victims following earthquakes, thus creating a disincentive to purchase insurance from a scheme that the government supported as mandatory. International organizations have at times acted as reinsurers for client countries, which in many cases is inappropriate. Roles and agreements must be examined carefully and adjusted so that there is no confusion and detraction of the opportunities and responsibilities of each partner. Lack of national stability and thus insurance industry confidence. Developing countries may lack the stability in government, regulatory framework, and economy that is required for the provision of sustainable insurance services. Constantly changing governments and regulatory frameworks make it difficult for the insurance industry to establish itself and develop a viable market. Unstable macroeconomies can affect the ability of potential clients to pay premiums over a long period of time. The insurance industry is aware of these risks and commensurately wary of doing business under such conditions. Source: ProVention Consortium, 2004. Inadequately Insured 0–5 USD Basically Insured 6–25 USD 26–50 USD FIGURE 4–10 Worldwide insurance coverage. (From Munich Re, 2004) Well Insured 51–100 USD 101–500 USD 501–1000 USD >1000 USD 234 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT preclusions against more unlikely natural and technological disasters. These special disasters require the purchase of policies formulated to assume the specific risk for each causative hazard. In the poorer countries, insurance schemes are underutilized given the limitations on disposable income faced by most members of the population. The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, for instance, is expected to amount to only $26 million in insurance payouts because there was so little private insurance that had been purchased by the impoverished Haitian population (News-Insurances.Com, 2010). General homeowner and renter policies cover losses that commonly occur and are not catastrophic in nature, such as fires, wind damage, theft, and plumbing damage. Catastrophic hazards, like earthquakes, landslides, and floods, are often precluded because of the wide spatial damage they inflict. Hazard damages that affect a wide spatial territory present a special problem for insurance companies because of the mechanisms by which insurance functions. For example, in the event of a fire or theft in a single home, the cost of the damages or losses would be easily absorbed by the premiums of the unaffected policyholders. However, in the case of an earthquake, a large number of people will be affected, resulting in a sum total much greater than their collective premiums, such that the total funds collected from the premiums will be less than the capital required to pay for damages. The bankruptcy of insurance companies due to catastrophic losses has been prevalent throughout the history of the insurance industry. Policies for specific catastrophic hazards can often be purchased separately from basic homeowners’ or renters’ insurance policies or as riders to them. However, these entail specific problems that deserve mention. In general, only those people who are likely to suffer the specific loss defined in the policy are likely to purchase that type of policy, creating the need for much higher premiums than if the specific hazard policy were spread across a more general population. This phenomenon, called “adverse selection,” has made the business of hazard insurance undesirable to many insurance companies. Several methods have been adopted to address the problems associated with adverse selection. Examples include: l The inclusion of these disasters in basic/comprehensive homeowners and renters policies, regardless of exposure or vulnerability. This spreads out the risk across the entire population of policyholders in the country, regardless of differential risk between individuals. Additionally, controls are placed upon the minimum spatial zones within which each company can provide policies to ensure that the ratio of policies affected by a disaster to those unaffected are kept as low as possible. l The introduction of government backing on insurance coverage of catastrophic events. In this scenario, the insurers are liable for paying for damages up to an established point, beyond which the government supplements the payments. Terrorism insurance, as discussed later in this section, is an example of government backing on insurance coverage of catastrophic events. l Heavier reliance on international reinsurance companies. Buying reinsurance can spread the local risk to wider areas of coverage, reducing the chance that annual claims exceed collected premiums. Unfortunately, many companies are unable to purchase all the reinsurance they would like to have. Additionally, because many of these policies require the insurers to pay a percentage of total claims placed, the amount they ultimately pay in catastrophic disasters can be massive despite reinsurance coverage. Chapter 4 • Mitigation 235 Several advantages gained through the use of insurance have been identified, including: 1. Victims are guaranteed a secure and predictable amount of compensation for their losses. With this coverage, they do not have to rely on disaster relief, and reliance on government assistance is reduced as well. 2. Insurance allows for losses to be distributed in an equitable fashion, protecting many for only a fraction of the cost each would have incurred individually if exposed to hazards. This can help the economy overall by reducing bankruptcies, reducing reliance on federal government assistance, and increasing the security of small businesses and individuals, often the most severely affected victims of disaster. 3. Insurance can actually reduce hazard impact by encouraging policyholders to adopt certain required mitigation measures. As policyholders reduce their vulnerability to risk, their premiums fall. The owners of automobiles that have airbags, antitheft devices, and passive restraint devices, for instance, will receive a discount on their premiums. Homeowners who develop outside of the floodplain or who install fire suppression systems will also receive these benefits. Additionally, this gives financial/economic disincentives for people or businesses to build in areas that are exposed to hazards. Limitations on hazard insurance exist as well, and include the following issues: 1. Insurance may be impossible to purchase in the highest risk areas if the private insurance companies decide that their risk is too high. This is especially true for hazards like landslides that affect a very specific segment of the population. 2. Participation in insurance plans is voluntary. Although private insurance companies can earn a profit despite overall low participation, benefits in terms of mitigation value become limited by low participation. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for homeowners and renters to save money by purchasing policies that cover less than is needed for catastrophic losses, which increases their potential (although reduced) reliance on government relief. 3. Participation in insurance has been known to encourage people to act more irresponsibly than they may act without such coverage. For instance, if a person knows that his furniture is likely to be replaced if it is damaged in a flood, he is less likely to move that furniture out of harm’s way (such as moving it to a second floor of his home) during the warning phase of the disaster. This phenomenon is termed “moral hazard.” In the long run, this causes damage payouts to increase and, as a result, premiums to increase as well. 4. Many insurance companies are pulling out of specific disaster insurance plans because the probability that they will not be able to cover catastrophic losses is too great. Before 1988, there had never been a single disaster event for which the insurance industry as a whole needed to pay over $1 billion in claims. Since then, there have been over 20 events for which claims have exceeded that threshold (see Table 4–1). Hurricane Katrina has thus far required $45 billion in compensation, and estimates for insured losses in the September 11th terrorist attacks have been as high as $40 billion (International Insurance Society, 2003). 5. Catastrophic losses that cover a wide but specific geographic space within a country may result in inequitable premium increases if coverage areas are too general. For instance, 236 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT Table 4–1 The 10 Most Costly World Insurance Losses, 1970–2005 Insured Loss in 2005 Date Country Event (USD millions)a 1 2 Aug. 29, 2005 Sept. 11, 2001 United States United States Hurricane Katrina 9/11 attacks $45,000 $35,000 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Aug. 23, 1992 Jan. 17, 1994 Sept. 2, 2004 Oct. 15, 2005 Aug. 11, 2004 Sept. 27, 1991 Jan. 25, 1990 United States, Bahamas United States United States, Caribbean United States, Mexico United States, Caribbean Japan Europe: France, UK, etc. Hurricane Andrew Northridge earthquake Hurricane Ivan Hurricane Wilma Hurricane Charley Typhoon Mireille Winter storm Daria $22,300 $18,500 $11,700 $10,300 $8,300 $8,100 $6,900 10 Dec. 25, 1999 Europe: France, Switzerland, etc. Winter storm Lothar Rank $6,800 a Adjusted to 2005 dollars. Source: Kunreuther & Erwann, 2007. the Northridge, California earthquake cost insurers more than $12 billion in claims, but only $1 billion in premiums had been collected in the entire state of California. Therefore, the payment for this event and, likewise, the required increase in premiums were “subsidized” by other states that were not affected and were not at such high risk (Mileti, 1999). Insurance has been denied status as a true mitigation measure by many experts because it is seen as redistributing losses rather than actually eliminating exposure to the hazard (which would effectively limit absolute losses). This is a widely debatable issue, which requires many assumptions. For instance, one must assume that an individual has the ability to move out of a risky situation or has other options that present less risk before stating that the mere presence of insurance encourages him to live in the riskier situation. One also must assume that we would be able to limit all losses, or that we could reach consensus as a society about which hazard risk should be considered insurable and at which level of risk insurance should be limited or prevented. Throughout the world, more than $4.06 trillion was collected in the form of insurance premiums in 2009, representing an almost 13% increase over 2006 when this figure stood at $3.6 trillion, and indicative of the rising recognition of the importance of insurance coverage globally. The United States has the greatest amount of insurance coverage, with over $1.1 trillion in premiums collected, representing more than 28% of the entire world market. The United States is followed, in order, by Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, China, the Netherlands, Canada, and South Korea (Insurance Information Institute, 2009). The International Insurance Institute maintains profiles on the insurance industry in most countries of the world, accessible at www.internationalinsurance.org/international/toc/. The United States has a nationally managed insurance program designed to insure against the risk of flood hazards. Exhibit 4–5 describes this program in detail. Chapter 4 • Mitigation 237 EXHIBIT 4–5: THE U.S. NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM—HISTORY OF THE PROGRAM Up until 1968, federal actions related to flooding were primarily responses to significant events that resulted in using structural measures to control flooding. Major riverine flood disasters of the 1920s and 1930s led to considerable federal involvement in protecting life and property from flooding through the use of structural flood-control projects, such as dams and levees, with the passage of the Flood Control Act of 1936. Generally, the only available financial recourse to assist flood victims was in the form of disaster assistance. Despite the billions of dollars in federal investments in structural flood-control projects, the losses to life and property and the amount of assistance to disaster victims from floods continued to increase. As early as the 1950s, when the feasibility of providing flood insurance was first proposed, it became clear that private insurance companies could not profitably provide such coverage at an affordable price, primarily because of the catastrophic nature of flooding and the inability to develop an actuarial rate structure that could adequately reflect the risk to which flood-prone properties are exposed. The U.S. Congress proposed an experimental program designed to demonstrate the feasibility of the private sector providing flood insurance by enacting the Federal Insurance Act of 1956, but this Act was never implemented. In recognition of increasing flood losses and disaster relief costs, major steps were taken in the 1960s to redefine federal policy and approaches to flood control. In 1965, Congress passed the Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act. The Act was as a result of the extensive damage caused by Hurricane Betsy in the Gulf states. The Act provided financial relief for the flooding victims and authorized a feasibility study of a national flood insurance program. The resulting report was entitled “Insurance and Other Programs for Financial Assistance to Flood Victims.” Shortly thereafter, the Bureau of the Budget Task Force on Federal Flood Control in 1966 advocated a broader perspective on flood control within the context of floodplain development in House Document 465, “A Unified National Program for Managing Flood Losses.” House Document 465 included five major goals: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Improve basic knowledge about flood hazards Coordinate and plan new developments in the floodplain Provide technical services Move toward a practical national program of flood insurance Adjust federal flood control policy to sound criteria and changing needs The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 Congressional Document 465 and the prior feasibility study provided the basis for the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. The primary purposes of the 1968 Act creating the NFIP are to 1. Better indemnify individuals for flood losses through insurance 2. Reduce future flood damages through state and community floodplain management regulations 3. Reduce federal expenditures for disaster assistance and flood control Section 1315 of the 1968 Act is a key provision that prohibits FEMA from providing flood insurance unless the community adopts and enforces floodplain management regulations that meet (Continued) 238 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT EXHIBIT 4–5: THE U.S. NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM—HISTORY OF THE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) or exceed the floodplain management criteria established in accordance with Section 1361(c) of the Act. These floodplain management criteria are contained in 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 60, Criteria for Land Management and Use. The emphasis of the NFIP floodplain management requirements is directed toward reducing threats to lives and the potential for damages to property in flood-prone areas. Over 19,700 communities presently participate in the NFIP. These include nearly all communities with significant flood hazards. In addition to providing flood insurance and reducing flood damages through floodplain management regulations, the NFIP identifies and maps the nation’s floodplains. Mapping flood hazards creates broad-based awareness of the flood hazards and provides the data needed for floodplain management programs and to actuarially rate new construction for flood insurance. When the NFIP was created, the U.S. Congress recognized that insurance for “existing buildings” constructed before a community joined the program would be prohibitively expensive if the premiums were not subsidized by the federal government. Congress also recognized that individuals who did not have sufficient knowledge of the flood hazard to make informed decisions built most of these flood-prone buildings. Under the NFIP, “existing buildings” are generally referred to as PreFIRM (Flood Insurance Rate Map) buildings. These buildings were built before the flood risk was known and identified on the community’s FIRM. Currently about 26% of the 4.3 million NFIP policies in force are Pre-FIRM subsidized, compared to 70% of the policies being subsidized in 1978. In exchange for the availability of subsidized insurance for existing buildings, communities are required to protect new construction and substantially improve structures through adoption and enforcement of community floodplain management ordinances. The 1968 Act requires that full actuarial rates reflecting the complete flood risk be charged on all buildings constructed or substantially improved on or after the effective date of the initial FIRM for the community or after December 31, 1974, whichever is later. These buildings are generally referred to as “Post-FIRM” buildings. Early in the program’s history, the federal government found that providing subsidized flood insurance for existing buildings was not a sufficient incentive for communities to voluntarily join the NFIP or for individuals to purchase flood insurance. Tropical Storm Agnes in 1972, which caused extensive riverine flooding along the East Coast, proved that few property owners in identified floodplains were insured. This storm cost the nation more in disaster assistance than any previous disaster. For the nation as a whole, only a few thousand communities participated in the NFIP and only 95,000 policies were in force. As a result, Congress passed the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973. The 1973 Act prohibits federal agencies from providing financial assistance for acquisition or construction of buildings and certain disaster assistance in the floodplains in any community that did not participate in the NFIP by July 1, 1975, or within 1 year of being identified as flood-prone. Additionally, the 1973 Act required that federal agencies and federally insured or regulated lenders had to require flood insurance on all grants and loans for acquisition or construction of buildings in designated Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) in communities that participate in the NFIP. This requirement is referred to as the Mandatory Flood Insurance Purchase Requirement. The SFHA is that land within the floodplain of a community subject to a 1% or greater chance of flooding in any given year, commonly referred to as the 100-year flood. Chapter 4 • Mitigation 239 The Mandatory Flood Insurance Purchase Requirement, in particular, resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of communities that joined the NFIP in subsequent years. In 1973, just over 2200 communities participated in the NFIP. Within 4 years, approximately 15,000 communities had joined the program. It also resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of flood insurance policies in force. In 1977, approximately 1.2 million flood insurance policies were in force, an increase of almost 900,000 over the number of policies in force in December of 1973. The authors of the original study of the NFIP thought that the passage of time, natural forces, and more stringent floodplain management requirements and building codes would gradually eliminate the number of Pre-FIRM structures. Nevertheless, modern construction techniques have extended the useful life of these Pre-FIRM buildings beyond what was originally expected. However, their numbers overall continue to decrease. The decrease in the number of Pre-FIRM buildings has been attributed to a number of factors, such as severe floods in which buildings were destroyed or substantially damaged, redevelopment, natural attrition, and acquisition of flood-damaged structures, as well as flood control projects. In 1994, Congress amended the 1968 Act and the 1973 Act with the National Flood Insurance Reform Act (NFIRA). The 1994 Act included measures, among others, to l l l l l l Increase compliance by mortgage lenders with the mandatory purchase requirement and improve coverage Increase the amount of flood insurance coverage that can be purchased Provide flood insurance coverage for the cost of complying with floodplain management regulations by individual property owners (Increased Cost of Compliance coverage) Establish a Flood Mitigation Assistance grant program to assist states and communities to develop mitigation plans and implement measures to reduce future flood damages to structures Codify the NFIP’s Community Rating System Require FEMA to assess its flood hazard map inventory at least once every 5 years Funding for the NFIP is through the National Flood Insurance Fund, which was established in the Treasury by the 1968 Act. Premiums collected are deposited into the fund, and losses and operating and administrative costs are paid out of the fund. In addition, the program has the authority to borrow up to $1.5 billion from the Treasury, which must be repaid along with interest. Until 1986, federal salaries and program expenses, as well as the costs associated with flood hazard mapping and floodplain management, were paid by an annual appropriation from Congress. From 1987 to 1990, Congress required the program to pay these expenses out of premium dollars. When expressed in current dollars, $485 million of policyholder premiums were transferred to pay salary and other expenses of the program. Beginning in 1991, a Federal policy fee of $25, which was increased to $30 in 1995, is applied to most policies to generate the funds for salaries, expenses, and mitigation costs. The program currently has three basic components: 1. Identifying and mapping flood-prone communities 2. Enforcing the requirement that communities adopt and enforce floodplain management regulations 3. The provision of flood insurance Source: FEMA and FIMA, 2002. 240 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT Risk-Sharing Pools Claire Reiss of the Public Entity Risk Institute and author of Risk Identification and Analysis: A Guide for Small Public Entities describes an alternative for local governments and other small public entities that are considering purchasing insurance: risk-sharing pools. Reiss wrote: A public entity that is considering purchasing traditional insurance may also consider public risk-sharing pools. These are associations of public entities with similar functions that have banded together to share risks by creating their own insurance vehicles. Pools sometimes structure themselves or their programs as group insurance purchase arrangements, through which individual members benefit from the group’s collective purchasing power. Members pay premiums, which (1) fund the administrative costs of operating the pool, including claims management expenses and (2) pay members’ covered losses. Pools can provide significant advantages to their members. For example, they offer insurance that is specific to public entities at premiums that are generally stable and affordable. Many pools also offer additional benefits and services at little or no extra charge, including advice on safety and risk management; seminars on loss control; updates on changes in the insurance industry; and property appraisal and inspection. Some pools offer members the opportunity to receive dividends for maintaining a good loss record. Some membership organizations for public entities sponsor pools or endorse insurance products that are then marketed to their members. However, sponsorship or endorsement by a membership organization does not guarantee that the insurance is broad enough to meet the needs of a given entity or that the insurance provider is financially stable. A public entity must apply the same due diligence to a consideration of these programs that it would apply to a comparison of available commercial insurance programs. (Reiss, 2001) Obstacles to Mitigation Mitigation is not yet practiced to its fullest extent. The potential exists to reduce hazard risk throughout the world through the various mitigation measures discussed in the previous sections, but formidable obstacles stand in the way. The first and primary obstacle is cost. Mitigation projects can be very expensive. Although governments may have the resources to carry out even very costly mitigation projects, they choose not to in favor of spending money on programs that are perceived to be more pressing. The reality is that governments maintain limited funds to support development, and many consider hazards to be chance events that might not occur. When drafting their budgets, they therefore tend to favor programs requiring regular funding, such as military, educational, economic, or infrastructure projects. The second obstacle is low levels of political support or “buy-in.” It is important for politicians to maintain their high public standing, so they tend to prefer projects that increase their stature over risky endeavors that may not offer a return in the short run. Mitigation, which is often conducted during periods where no imminent threat exists and which may require some level of sacrifice or hardship, may be hard to “sell” to the local politicians. Convincing the local decision-making authority of the need to undertake a mitigation measure is crucial to getting the project off the ground. Sociocultural issues are a third potential obstacle. Mitigation measures almost always result in a change of some sort, whether to a place (location), a practice, or a physical structure. People and cultures Chapter 4 • Mitigation 241 may tie meaning to these factors and resist any project that involves an alteration they find undesirable. Disaster managers unaware of these sociocultural ties are likely to create mitigation measures that do not take these important issues into consideration, dooming their program to failure before it even begins. Risk perception is the fourth major obstacle to mitigation. How people perceive a hazard that threatens them will play a large part in what they do to prevent it, and how much they are willing to sacrifice to avoid it. First, the hazard must be recognized. Second, the two risk components of consequence and likelihood must be accurately perceived. And third, there must be a belief that the hazard risk is reducible. Inaccuracies in any of these three areas can quickly derail a mitigation effort. Assessing and Selecting Mitigation Options Once a comprehensive hazards risk analysis and assessment have been completed, as described in Chapters 2 and 3, and risk mitigation options have been generated for each hazard on the prioritized list, disaster managers can begin assessing their options. Each hazard may have several risk mitigation options to choose from, each option resulting in different impacts upon society. Several factors must be considered when assessing each identified risk mitigation action, including: l The expected impact that each risk mitigation option will have on reducing the identified hazard risks and vulnerabilities l The probability that each action will be implemented l Mechanisms for funding and leveraging of resources necessary to implement each option Impact of Risk Mitigation Options on Community Risk Reduction The most critical issue in assessing a risk mitigation option is determining its impact on reducing the identified risk or vulnerability in the community. Several factors must be considered when assessing the risk reduction to be accomplished through individual mitigation options or groups of mitigation options. These factors, each of which is analyzed according to the six categories of mitigation listed earlier, include: l Reduced number of deaths and injuries l Reduced property damage l Reduced economic loss Probability That Each Action Will Be Implemented Determining the probability that an individual mitigation action or a group of mitigation actions will be implemented is critical in determining feasibility. Numerous factors impact the probability that an individual mitigation action or a group of mitigation actions will be implemented, including: 1. Political support. Without sufficient political support, it is difficult or impossible to implement mitigation actions. Strong political support, developed over the course of the planning process, increases the probability of implementation. Weak political support, as a result of limited or even no understanding of the risk management strategy, decreases the probability of implementation. 2. Public support. Support from the public is critical, especially when such support is needed to pass funding bills and regulatory restrictions to enable the implementation of particular 242 3. 4. 5. 6. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT mitigation actions. Public support is most easily acquired through public participation throughout the entire disaster management process, including the implementation phase. Support from the business sector. Business owners play a key role in their communities, and so their support for a community risk management strategy is critical for successful implementation. Businesses may have much to gain, but also have much to lose, from the consequences of a particular mitigation option. The business community generally plays a large role in any community in generating funding and public support for risk management actions and, likewise, is a good partner in mitigation. Support from nonprofit and interest groups. A variety of groups are active in any community, including environmental groups, voluntary organizations, neighborhood and church organizations, and labor unions, to name a few. Their participation helps generate support among community members and their families. Conversely, their opposition can generate great resistance and even legal action that could delay or foreclose the implementation of mitigation actions. Cost. The cost of a mitigation action can impact the probability of its implementation. The best way to mitigate cost issues is to educate political leaders, the public, the business sector, and nonprofit and community groups of the expected benefits of the action and the expected reduction in casualties and property losses when the next disaster strikes. If a mitigation option has been analyzed accurately and has been chosen because its benefits clearly outweigh its costs, then selling it to these stakeholders is possible. Changing risk perceptions to match reality is the primary obstacle. Long-term versus short-term benefits. Political leaders and business executives are sensitive to the need to produce immediate results, either in their term of office or in the next business quarter. This may cause them to support short-term actions that will produce fast, identifiable results. The long-term, sustainable option is always the best, although convincing people may not be easy when cheaper, shorter term options exist. The STAPLEE Method of Assessing Mitigation Options There are many methods by which the hazards risk management team can assess the mitigation options that they have generated for each identified hazard risk. One method, or framework as it is often called, that has been developed by FEMA is the STAPLEE method. STAPLEE guides the disaster managers in their assessment by utilizing a systematic approach for addressing options. The term “STAPLEE” is an acronym that stands for the following evaluation criteria: l Social l Technical l Administrative l Political l Legal l Economic l Environmental Chapter 4 • Mitigation 243 Each of these terms represents an opportunity or constraint to implementing a particular mitigation option. Because communities are generally very different in their overall makeup, a single mitigation option analyzed according to the STAPLEE criteria may produce very different outcomes in different places. Each criterion considers a different aspect of the community and requires different methods of information collection and analysis. There is no definable or identifiable priority or weight assigned to any of these criteria—the order of the letters in the acronym was determined by the word they formed (which was meant to be easy to remember). The criteria include (adapted from FEMA, 2005): 1. Social. A mitigation option will only be viable if it is socially accepted within the community where it is implemented. The public is instrumental in guiding decisions such as these through their support or lack thereof. Even with public support, a proposed mitigation option might not work, but without public support, the taken action will almost certainly fail Disaster managers must have a clear understanding of how the mitigation option will affect the population. They must investigate several questions that will guide their interpretation of this criterion, including: • Will the proposed action adversely affect any one segment of the population? Will it give some disproportionate benefit to only one segment? • Will the action disrupt established neighborhoods; break up legal, political, or electoral districts; or cause the relocation of lower income people? • Is the proposed action compatible with present and future community values? • Will the actions adversely affect cultural values or resources? 2. Technical. If the proposed action is investigated and found to not be technically feasible, it is probably not a good option. Additionally, it is important to investigate, when looking ...
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