BOOK VIII
1
AFTER what we have said, a discussion of friendship would naturally follow, since it is a virtue
or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one
would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of
office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of
such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most
laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends?
The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men
think friends are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people
by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness;
those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions-'two going together'-for with friends men
are more able both to think and to act. Again, parent seems by nature to feel it for offspring and
offspring for parent, not only among men but among birds and among most animals; it is felt
mutually by members of the same race, and especially by men, whence we praise lovers of their
fellowmen. We may even in our travels how near and dear every man is to every other.
Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice;
for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel
faction as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when
they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly
quality.
But it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who love their friends, and it is
thought to be a fine thing to have many friends; and again we think it is the same people that are
good men and are friends.
Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some define it as a kind of likeness and
say like people are friends, whence come the sayings 'like to like', 'birds of a feather flock
together', and so on; others on the contrary say 'two of a trade never agree'. On this very question
they inquire for deeper and more physical causes, Euripides saying that 'parched earth loves the
rain, and stately heaven when filled with rain loves to fall to earth', and Heraclitus that 'it is what
opposes that helps' and 'from different tones comes the fairest tune' and 'all things are produced
through strife'; while Empedocles, as well as others, expresses the opposite view that like aims at
like. The physical problems we may leave alone (for they do not belong to the present inquiry);
let us examine those which are human and involve character and feeling, e.g. whether friendship
can arise between any two people or people cannot be friends if they are wicked, and whether
there is one species of friendship or more than one. Those who think there is only one because it
admits of degrees have relied on an inadequate indication; for even things different in species
admit of degree. We have discussed this matter previously.
2
The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the object of love.
For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful;
1
but it would seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced that is useful, so that it
is the good and the useful that are lovable as ends. Do men love, then, the good, or what is good
for them? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. Now it is thought that each
loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is
good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves not what is good for him but what
seems good. This however will make no difference; we shall just have to say that this is 'that
which seems lovable'. Now there are three grounds on which people love; of the love of lifeless
objects we do not use the word 'friendship'; for it is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of
good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for
it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself); but to a friend we say we ought to wish
what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish
is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship. Or must we add 'when it is
recognized'? For many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judge to be
good or useful; and one of these might return this feeling. These people seem to bear goodwill to
each other; but how could one call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings?
To be friends, then, the must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to
each other for one of the aforesaid reasons.
3
Now these reasons differ from each other in kind; so, therefore, do the corresponding forms of
love and friendship. There are therefore three kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things
that are lovable; for with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love, and those who
love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they love one another. Now those
who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some
good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it is
not for their character that men love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant.
Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves,
and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves,
and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant. And thus
these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is
loved, but as providing some good or pleasure. Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the
parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party is no longer pleasant or useful the other
ceases to love him.
Now the useful is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when the motive of the friendship
is done away, the friendship is dissolved, inasmuch as it existed only for the ends in question.
This kind of friendship seems to exist chiefly between old people (for at that age people pursue
not the pleasant but the useful) and, of those who are in their prime or young, between those who
pursue utility. And such people do not live much with each other either; for sometimes they do
not even find each other pleasant; therefore they do not need such companionship unless they are
useful to each other; for they are pleasant to each other only in so far as they rouse in each other
hopes of something good to come. Among such friendships people also class the friendship of a
host and guest. On the other hand the friendship of young people seems to aim at pleasure; for
they live under the guidance of emotion, and pursue above all what is pleasant to themselves and
what is immediately before them; but with increasing age their pleasures become different. This
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is why they quickly become friends and quickly cease to be so; their friendship changes with the
object that is found pleasant, and such pleasure alters quickly. Young people are amorous too;
for the greater part of the friendship of love depends on emotion and aims at pleasure; this is why
they fall in love and quickly fall out of love, changing often within a single day. But these people
do wish to spend their days and lives together; for it is thus that they attain the purpose of their
friendship.
Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well
alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves. Now those who wish well to their
friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of own nature and not
incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good-and goodness is an enduring
thing. And each is good without qualification and to his friend, for the good are both good
without qualification and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant
both without qualification and to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them
are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like. And such a friendship is as
might be expected permanent, since there meet in it all the qualities that friends should have. For
all friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure-good or pleasure either in the abstract or such
as will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling-and is based on a certain resemblance;
and to a friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong in virtue of the nature of
the friends themselves; for in the case of this kind of friendship the other qualities also are alike
in both friends, and that which is good without qualification is also without qualification
pleasant, and these are the most lovable qualities. Love and friendship therefore are found most
and in their best form between such men.
But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for such men are rare. Further, such
friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb says, men cannot know each other till
they have 'eaten salt together'; nor can they admit each other to friendship or be friends till each
has been found lovable and been trusted by each. Those who quickly show the marks of
friendship to each other wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they both are lovable and
know the fact; for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not.
4
This kind of friendship, then, is perfect both in respect of duration and in all other respects, and
in it each gets from each in all respects the same as, or something like what, he gives; which is
what ought to happen between friends. Friendship for the sake of pleasure bears a resemblance to
this kind; for good people too are pleasant to each other. So too does friendship for the sake of
utility; for the good are also useful to each other. Among men of these inferior sorts too,
friendships are most permanent when the friends get the same thing from each other (e.g.
pleasure), and not only that but also from the same source, as happens between readywitted
people, not as happens between lover and beloved. For these do not take pleasure in the same
things, but the one in seeing the beloved and the other in receiving attentions from his lover; and
when the bloom of youth is passing the friendship sometimes passes too (for the one finds no
pleasure in the sight of the other, and the other gets no attentions from the first); but many lovers
on the other hand are constant, if familiarity has led them to love each other's characters, these
being alike. But those who exchange not pleasure but utility in their amour are both less truly
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friends and less constant. Those who are friends for the sake of utility part when the advantage is
at an end; for they were lovers not of each other but of profit.
For the sake of pleasure or utility, then, even bad men may be friends of each other, or good men
of bad, or one who is neither good nor bad may be a friend to any sort of person, but for their
own sake clearly only good men can be friends; for bad men do not delight in each other unless
some advantage come of the relation.
The friendship of the good too and this alone is proof against slander; for it is not easy to trust
any one talk about a man who has long been tested by oneself; and it is among good men that
trust and the feeling that 'he would never wrong me' and all the other things that are demanded in
true friendship are found. In the other kinds of friendship, however, there is nothing to prevent
these evils arising. For men apply the name of friends even to those whose motive is utility, in
which sense states are said to be friendly (for the alliances of states seem to aim at advantage),
and to those who love each other for the sake of pleasure, in which sense children are called
friends. Therefore we too ought perhaps to call such people friends, and say that there are several
kinds of friendship-firstly and in the proper sense that of good men qua good, and by analogy the
other kinds; for it is in virtue of something good and something akin to what is found in true
friendship that they are friends, since even the pleasant is good for the lovers of pleasure. But
these two kinds of friendship are not often united, nor do the same people become friends for the
sake of utility and of pleasure; for things that are only incidentally connected are not often
coupled together.
Friendship being divided into these kinds, bad men will be friends for the sake of pleasure or of
utility, being in this respect like each other, but good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e.
in virtue of their goodness. These, then, are friends without qualification; the others are friends
incidentally and through a resemblance to these.
5
As in regard to the virtues some men are called good in respect of a state of character, others in
respect of an activity, so too in the case of friendship; for those who live together delight in each
other and confer benefits on each other, but those who are asleep or locally separated are not
performing, but are disposed to perform, the activities of friendship; distance does not break off
the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually
to make men forget their friendship; hence the saying 'out of sight, out of mind'. Neither old
people nor sour people seem to make friends easily; for there is little that is pleasant in them, and
no one can spend his days with one whose company is painful, or not pleasant, since nature
seems above all to avoid the painful and to aim at the pleasant. Those, however, who approve of
each other but do not live together seem to be well-disposed rather than actual friends. For there
is nothing so characteristic of friends as living together (since while it people who are in need
that desire benefits, even those who are supremely happy desire to spend their days together; for
solitude suits such people least of all); but people cannot live together if they are not pleasant and
do not enjoy the same things, as friends who are companions seem to do.
4
The truest friendship, then, is that of the good, as we have frequently said; for that which is
without qualification good or pleasant seems to be lovable and desirable, and for each person that
which is good or pleasant to him; and the good man is lovable and desirable to the good man for
both these reasons. Now it looks as if love were a feeling, friendship a state of character; for love
may be felt just as much towards lifeless things, but mutual love involves choice and choice
springs from a state of character; and men wish well to those whom they love, for their sake, not
as a result of feeling but as a result of a state of character. And in loving a friend men love what
is good for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend.
Each, then, both loves what is good for himself, and makes an equal return in goodwill and in
pleasantness; for friendship is said to be equality, and both of these are found most in the
friendship of the good.
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Between sour and elderly people friendship arises less readily, inasmuch as they are less goodtempered and enjoy companionship less; for these are thou to be the greatest marks of friendship
productive of it. This is why, while men become friends quickly, old men do not; it is because
men do not become friends with those in whom they do not delight; and similarly sour people do
not quickly make friends either. But such men may bear goodwill to each other; for they wish
one another well and aid one another in need; but they are hardly friends because they do not
spend their days together nor delight in each other, and these are thought the greatest marks of
friendship.
One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect type with
them, just as one cannot be in love with many people at once (for love is a sort of excess of
feeling, and it is the nature of such only to be felt towards one person); and it is not easy for
many people at the same time to please the same person very greatly, or perhaps even to be good
in his eyes. One must, too, acquire some experience of the other person and become familiar
with him, and that is very hard. But with a view to utility or pleasure it is possible that many
people should please one; for many people are useful or pleasant, and these services take little
time.
Of these two kinds that which is for the sake of pleasure is the more like friendship, when both
parties get the same things from each other and delight in each other or in the things, as in the
friendships of the young; for generosity is more found in such friendships. Friendship based on
utility is for the commercially minded. People who are supremely happy, too, have no need of
useful friends, but do need pleasant friends; for they wish to live with some one and, though they
can endure for a short time what is painful, no one could put up with it continuously, nor even
with the Good itself if it were painful to him; this is why they look out for friends who are
pleasant. Perhaps they should look out for friends who, being pleasant, are also good, and good
for them too; for so they will have all the characteristics that friends should have.
People in positions of authority seem to have friends who fall into distinct classes; some people
are useful to them and others are pleasant, but the same people are rarely both; for they seek
neither those whose pleasantness is accompanied by virtue nor those whose utility is with a view
to noble objects, but in their desire for pleasure they seek for ready-witted people, and their other
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friends they choose as being clever at doing what they are told, and these characteristics are
rarely combined. Now we have said that the good man is at the same time pleasant and useful;
but such a man does not become the friend of one who surpasses him in station, unless he is
surpassed also in virtue; if this is not so, he does not establish equality by being proportionally
exceeded in both respects. But people who surpass him in both respects are not so easy to find.
However that may be, the aforesaid friendships involve equality; for the friends get the same
things from one another and wish the same things for one another, or exchange one thing for
another, e.g. pleasure for utility; we have said, however, that they are both less truly friendships
and less permanent.
But it is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing that they are thought both to
be and not to be friendships. It is by their likeness to the friendship of virtue that they seem to be
friendships (for one of them involves pleasure and the other utility, and these characteristics
belong to the friendship of virtue as well); while it is because the friendship of virtue is proof
against slander and permanent, while these quickly change (besides differing from the former in
many other respects), that they appear not to be friendships; i.e. it is because of their unlikeness
to the friendship of virtue.
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But there is another kind of friendship, viz. that which involves an inequality between the parties,
e.g. that of father to son and in general of elder to younger, that of man to wife and in general
that of ruler to subject. And these friendships differ also from each other; for it is not the same
that exists between parents and children and between rulers and subjects, nor is even that of
father to son the same as that of son to father, nor that of husband to wife the same as that of wife
to husband. For the virtue and the function of each of these is different, and so are the reasons for
which they love; the love and the friendship are therefore different also. Each party, then, neither
gets the same from the other, nor ought to seek it; but when children render to parents what they
ought to render to those who brought them into the world, and parents render what they should to
their children, the friendship of such persons will be abiding and excellent. In all friendships
implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. the better should be more loved
than he loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each of the other cases; for when
the love is in proportion to the merit of the parties, then in a sense arises equality, which is
certainly held to be characteristic of friendship.
But equality does not seem to take the same form in acts of justice and in friendship; for in acts
of justice what is equal in the primary sense is that which is in proportion to merit, while
quantitative equality is secondary, but in friendship quantitative equality is primary and
proportion to merit secondary. This becomes clear if there is a great interval in respect of virtue
or vice or wealth or anything else between the parties; for then they are no longer friends, and do
not even expect to be so. And this is most manifest in the case of the gods; for they surpass us
most decisively in all good things. But it is clear also in the case of kings; for with them, too,
men who are much their inferiors do not expect to be friends; nor do men of no account expect to
be friends with the best or wisest men. In such cases it is not possible to define exactly up to
what point friends can remain friends; for much can be taken away and friendship remain, but
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when one party is removed to a great distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases.
This is in fact the origin of the question whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest
goods, e.g. that of being gods; since in that case their friends will no longer be friends to them,
and therefore will not be good things for them (for friends are good things). The answer is that if
we were right in saying that friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his friend must remain the
sort of being he is, whatever that may be; therefore it is for him oily so long as he remains a man
that he will wish the greatest goods. But perhaps not all the greatest goods; for it is for himself
most of all that each man wishes what is good.
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Most people seem, owing to ambition, to wish to be loved rather than to love; which is why most
men love flattery; for the flatterer is a friend in an inferior position, or pretends to be such and to
love more than he is loved; and being loved seems to be akin to being honoured, and this is what
most people aim at. But it seems to be not for its own sake that people choose honour, but
incidentally. For most people enjoy being honoured by those in positions of authority because of
their hopes (for they think that if they want anything they will get it from them; and therefore
they delight in honour as a token of favour to come); while those who desire honour from good
men, and men who know, are aiming at confirming their own opinion of themselves; they delight
in honour, therefore, because they believe in their own goodness on the strength of the
judgement of those who speak about them. In being loved, on the other hand, people delight for
its own sake; whence it would seem to be better than being honoured, and friendship to be
desirable in itself. But it seems to lie in loving rather than in being loved, as is indicated by the
delight mothers take in loving; for some mothers hand over their children to be brought up, and
so long as they know their fate they love them and do not seek to be loved in return (if they
cannot have both), but seem to be satisfied if they see them prospering; and they themselves love
their children even if these owing to their ignorance give them nothing of a mother's due. Now
since friendship depends more on loving, and it is those who love their friends that are praised,
loving seems to be the characteristic virtue of friends, so that it is only those in whom this is
found in due measure that are lasting friends, and only their friendship that endures.
It is in this way more than any other that even unequals can be friends; they can be equalized.
Now equality and likeness are friendship, and especially the likeness of those who are like in
virtue; for being steadfast in themselves they hold fast to each other, and neither ask nor give
base services, but (one may say) even prevent them; for it is characteristic of good men neither to
go wrong themselves nor to let their friends do so. But wicked men have no steadfastness (for
they do not remain even like to themselves), but become friends for a short time because they
delight in each other's wickedness. Friends who are useful or pleasant last longer; i.e. as long as
they provide each other with enjoyments or advantages. Friendship for utility's sake seems to be
that which most easily exists between contraries, e.g. between poor and rich, between ignorant
and learned; for what a man actually lacks he aims at, and one gives something else in return.
But under this head, too, might bring lover and beloved, beautiful and ugly. This is why lovers
sometimes seem ridiculous, when they demand to be loved as they love; if they are equally
lovable their claim can perhaps be justified, but when they have nothing lovable about them it is
ridiculous. Perhaps, however, contrary does not even aim at contrary by its own nature, but only
incidentally, the desire being for what is intermediate; for that is what is good, e.g. it is good for
7
the dry not to become wet but to come to the intermediate state, and similarly with the hot and in
all other cases. These subjects we may dismiss; for they are indeed somewhat foreign to our
inquiry.
9
Friendship and justice seem, as we have said at the outset of our discussion, to be concerned with
the same objects and exhibited between the same persons. For in every community there is
thought to be some form of justice, and friendship too; at least men address as friends their
fellow-voyagers and fellowsoldiers, and so too those associated with them in any other kind of
community. And the extent of their association is the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent
to which justice exists between them. And the proverb 'what friends have is common property'
expresses the truth; for friendship depends on community. Now brothers and comrades have all
things in common, but the others to whom we have referred have definite things in commonsome more things, others fewer; for of friendships, too, some are more and others less truly
friendships. And the claims of justice differ too; the duties of parents to children, and those of
brothers to each other are not the same, nor those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens, and
so, too, with the other kinds of friendship. There is a difference, therefore, also between the acts
that are unjust towards each of these classes of associates, and the injustice increases by being
exhibited towards those who are friends in a fuller sense; e.g. it is a more terrible thing to defraud
a comrade than a fellow-citizen, more terrible not to help a brother than a stranger, and more
terrible to wound a father than any one else. And the demands of justice also seem to increase
with the intensity of the friendship, which implies that friendship and justice exist between the
same persons and have an equal extension.
Now all forms of community are like parts of the political community; for men journey together
with a view to some particular advantage, and to provide something that they need for the
purposes of life; and it is for the sake of advantage that the political community too seems both
to have come together originally and to endure, for this is what legislators aim at, and they call
just that which is to the common advantage. Now the other communities aim at advantage bit by
bit, e.g. sailors at what is advantageous on a voyage with a view to making money or something
of the kind, fellow-soldiers at what is advantageous in war, whether it is wealth or victory or the
taking of a city that they seek, and members of tribes and demes act similarly (Some
communities seem to arise for the sake or pleasure, viz. religious guilds and social clubs; for
these exist respectively for the sake of offering sacrifice and of companionship. But all these
seem to fall under the political community; for it aims not at present advantage but at what is
advantageous for life as a whole), offering sacrifices and arranging gatherings for the purpose,
and assigning honours to the gods, and providing pleasant relaxations for themselves. For the
ancient sacrifices and gatherings seem to take place after the harvest as a sort of firstfruits,
because it was at these seasons that people had most leisure. All the communities, then, seem to
be parts of the political community; and the particular kinds friendship will correspond to the
particular kinds of community.
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the Lord, to acknowledge it with faith and charity
both in the sacramental signs and in the community; those who fail to do so eat and drink judgement against themselves (cf. v. 29). The celebration of the Eucharist thus becomes a constant
summons for everyone “to examine himself or
herself ” (v. 28), to open the doors of the family
to greater fellowship with the underprivileged,
and in this way to receive the sacrament of that
eucharistic love which makes us one body. We
must not forget that “the ‘mysticism’ of the sacrament has a social character”.207 When those
who receive it turn a blind eye to the poor and
suffering, or consent to various forms of division, contempt and inequality, the Eucharist is
received unworthily. On the other hand, families who are properly disposed and receive the
Eucharist regularly, reinforce their desire for fraternity, their social consciousness and their commitment to those in need.
Life in the wider family
187. The nuclear family needs to interact with
the wider family made up of parents, aunts
and uncles, cousins and even neighbours. This
greater family may have members who require
assistance, or at least companionship and affection, or consolation amid suffering.208 The
Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter Deus Caritas Est (25
December 2005), 14: AAS 98 (2006), 228.
208
Cf. Relatio Finalis 2015, 11.
207
142
individualism so prevalent today can lead to
creating small nests of security, where others
are perceived as bothersome or a threat. Such
isolation, however, cannot offer greater peace
or happiness; rather, it straitens the heart of a
family and makes its life all the more narrow.
Being sons and daughters
188. First, let us think of our parents. Jesus
told the Pharisees that abandoning one’s parents
is contrary to God’s law (cf. Mk 7:8-13). We
do well to remember that each of us is a son or
daughter. “Even if one becomes an adult, or an
elderly person, even if one becomes a parent, if
one occupies a position of responsibility, underneath all of this is still the identity of a child.
We are all sons and daughters. And this always
brings us back to the fact that we did not give
ourselves life but that we received it. The great
gift of life is the first gift that we received”.209
189. Hence, “the fourth commandment asks
children… to honour their father and mother
(cf. Ex 20:12). This commandment comes immediately after those dealing with God himself. Indeed, it has to do with something sacred,
something divine, something at the basis of
every other kind of human respect. The biblical formulation of the fourth commandment
Catechesis (18 March 2015): L’Osservatore Romano, 19
March 2015, p. 8.
209
143
goes on to say: ‘that your days may be long in
the land which the Lord your God gives you’.
The virtuous bond between generations is the
guarantee of the future, and is the guarantee of
a truly humane society. A society with children
who do not honour parents is a society without
honour… It is a society destined to be filled with
surly and greedy young people”.210
190. There is, however, another side to the
coin. As the word of God tells us, “a man leaves
his father and his mother” (Gen 2:24). This does
not always happen, and a marriage is hampered
by the failure to make this necessary sacrifice and
surrender. Parents must not be abandoned or ignored, but marriage itself demands that they be
“left”, so that the new home will be a true hearth,
a place of security, hope and future plans, and
the couple can truly become “one flesh” (ibid.).
In some marriages, one spouse keeps secrets
from the other, confiding them instead to his or
her parents. As a result, the opinions of their
parents become more important than the feelings and opinions of their spouse. This situation
cannot go on for long, and even if it takes time,
both spouses need to make the effort to grow in
trust and communication. Marriage challenges
husbands and wives to find new ways of being
sons and daughters.
Catechesis (11 February 2015): L’Osservatore Romano,
12 February 2015, p. 8.
210
144
The elderly
191. “Do not cast me off in the time of old
age; forsake me not when my strength is spent”
(Ps 71:9). This is the plea of the elderly, who
fear being forgotten and rejected. Just as God
asks us to be his means of hearing the cry of the
poor, so too he wants us to hear the cry of the
elderly.211 This represents a challenge to families and communities, since “the Church cannot
and does not want to conform to a mentality of
impatience, and much less of indifference and
contempt, towards old age. We must reawaken
the collective sense of gratitude, of appreciation,
of hospitality, which makes the elderly feel like
a living part of the community. Our elderly are
men and women, fathers and mothers, who came
before us on our own road, in our own house,
in our daily battle for a worthy life”.212 Indeed,
“how I would like a Church that challenges the
throw-away culture by the overflowing joy of a
new embrace between young and old!”213
192. Saint John Paul II asked us to be attentive
to the role of the elderly in our families, because
there are cultures which, “especially in the wake
of disordered industrial and urban development,
have both in the past and in the present set the
Cf. Relatio Finalis 2015, 17-18.
Catechesis (4 March 2015): L’Osservatore Romano, 5
March 2015, p. 8.
213
Catechesis (11 March 2015): L’Osservatore Romano, 12
March 2015, p. 8.
211
212
145
elderly aside in unacceptable ways”.214 The elderly help us to appreciate “the continuity of
the generations”, by their “charism of bridging
the gap”.215 Very often it is grandparents who
ensure that the most important values are passed
down to their grandchildren, and “many people
can testify that they owe their initiation into the
Christian life to their grandparents”.216 Their
words, their affection or simply their presence
help children to realize that history did not begin with them, that they are now part of an ageold pilgrimage and that they need to respect all
that came before them. Those who would break
all ties with the past will surely find it difficult
to build stable relationships and to realize that
reality is bigger than they are. “Attention to the
elderly makes the difference in a society. Does
a society show concern for the elderly? Does it
make room for the elderly? Such a society will
move forward if it respects the wisdom of the
elderly”.217
193. The lack of historical memory is a serious shortcoming in our society. A mentality that
can only say, “Then was then, now is now”, is
214
Apostolic Exhortation Familiaris Consortio, 27 (22
November 1981): AAS 74 (1982), 113.
215
Id., Address to Participants in the “International Forum on
Active Aging” (5 September 1980), 5: Insegnamenti III/2 (1980),
539.
216
Relatio Finalis 2015, 18.
217
Catechesis (4 March 2015): L’Osservatore Romano, 5
March 2015, p. 8.
146
ultimately immature. Knowing and judging past
events is the only way to build a meaningful future. Memory is necessary for growth: “Recall the
former days” (Heb 10:32). Listening to the elderly
tell their stories is good for children and young
people; it makes them feel connected to the living history of their families, their neighborhoods
and their country. A family that fails to respect
and cherish its grandparents, who are its living
memory, is already in decline, whereas a family
that remembers has a future. “A society that has
no room for the elderly or discards them because
they create problems, has a deadly virus”;218 “it is
torn from its roots”.219 Our contemporary experience of being orphans as a result of cultural
discontinuity, uprootedness and the collapse of
the certainties that shape our lives, challenges us
to make our families places where children can
sink roots in the rich soil of a collective history.
Being brothers and sisters
194. Relationships between brothers and sisters
deepen with the passing of time, and “the bond
of fraternity that forms in the family between
children, if consolidated by an educational atmosphere of openness to others, is a great school of
freedom and peace. In the family, we learn how to
live as one. Perhaps we do not always think about
Ibid.
Address at the Meeting with the Elderly (28 September
2014): L’Osservatore Romano, 29-30 September 2014, p. 7.
218
219
147
this, but the family itself introduces fraternity into
the world. From this initial experience of fraternity, nourished by affection and education at home,
the style of fraternity radiates like a promise upon
the whole of society”.220
195. Growing up with brothers and sisters makes
for a beautiful experience of caring for and helping
one another. For “fraternity in families is especially radiant when we see the care, the patience, the
affection that surround the little brother or sister
who is frail, sick or disabled”.221 It must be acknowledged that “having a brother or a sister who
loves you is a profound, precious and unique experience”.222 Children do need to be patiently taught
to treat one another as brothers and sisters. This
training, at times quite demanding, is a true school
of socialization. In some countries, where it has
become quite common to have only one child, the
experience of being a brother or sister is less and
less common. When it has been possible to have
only one child, ways have to be found to ensure that
he or she does not grow up alone or isolated.
A big heart
196. In addition to the small circle of the couple and their children, there is the larger family,
220
Catechesis (18 February 2015): L’Osservatore Romano,
19 February 2015, p. 8.
221
Ibid.
222
Ibid.
148
which cannot be overlooked. Indeed, “the love
between husband and wife and, in a derivative
and broader way, the love between members of
the same family – between parents and children,
brothers and sisters and relatives and members
of the household – is given life and sustenance
by an unceasing inner dynamism leading the family to ever deeper and more intense communion,
which is the foundation and soul of the community of marriage and the family”.223 Friends
and other families are part of this larger family,
as well as communities of families who support
one another in their difficulties, their social commitments and their faith.
197. This larger family should provide love
and support to teenage mothers, children without parents, single mothers left to raise children,
persons with disabilities needing particular affection and closeness, young people struggling
with addiction, the unmarried, separated or widowed who are alone, and the elderly and infirm
who lack the support of their children. It should
also embrace “even those who have made shipwreck of their lives”.224 This wider family can
help make up for the shortcomings of parents,
detect and report possible situations in which
children suffer violence and even abuse, and
223
John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation Familiaris
Consortio (22 November 1981), 18: AAS 74 (1982), 101.
224
Catechesis (7 October 2015): L’Osservatore Romano, 8
October 2015), p. 8.
149
provide wholesome love and family stability in
cases when parents prove incapable of this.
198. Finally, we cannot forget that this larger
family includes fathers-in-law, mothers-in-law
and all the relatives of the couple. One particularly delicate aspect of love is learning not to view
these relatives as somehow competitors, threats
or intruders. The conjugal union demands respect for their traditions and customs, an effort
to understand their language and to refrain from
criticism, caring for them and cherishing them
while maintaining the legitimate privacy and
independence of the couple. Being willing to
do so is also an exquisite expression of generous
love for one’s spouse.
150
CHAPTER SEVEN
TOWARDS A BETTER EDUCATION
OF CHILDREN
259. Parents always influence the moral development of their children, for better or for worse.
It follows that they should take up this essential
role and carry it out consciously, enthusiastically,
reasonably and appropriately. Since the educational role of families is so important, and increasingly complex, I would like to discuss it in
detail.
Where are our children?
260. Families cannot help but be places of support, guidance and direction, however much they
may have to rethink their methods and discover
new resources. Parents need to consider what
they want their children to be exposed to, and
this necessarily means being concerned about
who is providing their entertainment, who is entering their rooms through television and electronic devices, and with whom they are spending
their free time. Only if we devote time to our
children, speaking of important things with simplicity and concern, and finding healthy ways for
them to spend their time, will we be able to shield
them from harm. Vigilance is always necessary
197
and neglect is never beneficial. Parents have to
help prepare children and adolescents to confront the risk, for example, of aggression, abuse
or drug addiction.
261. Obsession, however, is not education. We
cannot control every situation that a child may
experience. Here it remains true that “time is
greater than space”.291 In other words, it is more
important to start processes than to dominate
spaces. If parents are obsessed with always
knowing where their children are and controlling
all their movements, they will seek only to
dominate space. But this is no way to educate,
strengthen and prepare their children to face
challenges. What is most important is the ability
lovingly to help them grow in freedom, maturity, overall discipline and real autonomy. Only
in this way will children come to possess the
wherewithal needed to fend for themselves and
to act intelligently and prudently whenever they
meet with difficulties. The real question, then, is
not where our children are physically, or whom
they are with at any given time, but rather where
they are existentially, where they stand in terms
of their convictions, goals, desires and dreams.
The questions I would put to parents are these:
“Do we seek to understand ‘where’ our children
really are in their journey? Where is their soul,
Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii
November 2013), 222: AAS 105 (2013), 1111.
291
198
Gaudium
(24
do we really know? And above all, do we want
to know?”.292
262. Were maturity merely the development of
something already present in our genetic code,
not much would have to be done. But prudence,
good judgement and common sense are dependent not on purely quantitative growth factors, but
rather on a whole series of things that come together deep within each person, or better, at the
very core of our freedom. Inevitably, each child
will surprise us with ideas and projects born of
that freedom, which challenge us to rethink our
own ideas. This is a good thing. Education includes encouraging the responsible use of freedom to face issues with good sense and intelligence. It involves forming persons who readily
understand that their own lives, and the life of
the community, are in their hands, and that freedom is itself a great gift.
The ethical formation of children
263. Parents rely on schools to ensure the
basic instruction of their children, but can
never completely delegate the moral formation
of their children to others. A person’s affective
and ethical development is ultimately grounded
in a particular experience, namely, that his or her
parents can be trusted. This means that parents,
Catechesis (20 May 2015): L’Osservatore Romano, 21
May 2015, p. 8.
292
199
as educators, are responsible, by their affection
and example, for instilling in their children trust
and loving respect. When children no longer
feel that, for all their faults, they are important to
their parents, or that their parents are sincerely
concerned about them, this causes deep hurt
and many difficulties along their path to maturity. This physical or emotional absence creates
greater hurt than any scolding which a child may
receive for doing something wrong.
264. Parents are also responsible for shaping
the will of their children, fostering good habits and a natural inclination to goodness. This
entails presenting certain ways of thinking and
acting as desirable and worthwhile, as part of a
gradual process of growth. The desire to fit into
society, or the habit of foregoing an immediate
pleasure for the sake of a better and more orderly life in common, is itself a value that can
then inspire openness to greater values. Moral
formation should always take place with active
methods and a dialogue that teaches through
sensitivity and by using a language children can
understand. It should also take place inductively,
so that children can learn for themselves the importance of certain values, principles and norms,
rather than by imposing these as absolute and
unquestionable truths.
265. Doing what is right means more than
“judging what seems best” or knowing clearly
what needs to be done, as important as this is.
200
Often we prove inconsistent in our own convictions, however firm they may be; even when
our conscience dictates a clear moral decision,
other factors sometimes prove more attractive
and powerful. We have to arrive at the point
where the good that the intellect grasps can take
root in us as a profound affective inclination, as
a thirst for the good that outweighs other attractions and helps us to realize that what we consider objectively good is also good “for us” here and
now. A good ethical education includes showing a person that it is in his own interest to do
what is right. Today, it is less and less effective
to demand something that calls for effort and
sacrifice, without clearly pointing to the benefits
which it can bring.
266. Good habits need to be developed. Even
childhood habits can help to translate important
interiorized values into sound and steady ways of
acting. A person may be sociable and open to
others, but if over a long period of time he has
not been trained by his elders to say “Please”,
“Thank you”, and “Sorry”, his good interior disposition will not easily come to the fore. The
strengthening of the will and the repetition of
specific actions are the building blocks of moral
conduct; without the conscious, free and valued
repetition of certain patterns of good behaviour, moral education does not take place. Mere
desire, or an attraction to a certain value, is not
201
enough to instil a virtue in the absence of those
properly motivated acts.
267. Freedom is something magnificent, yet
it can also be dissipated and lost. Moral education has to do with cultivating freedom through
ideas, incentives, practical applications, stimuli, rewards, examples, models, symbols, reflections, encouragement, dialogue and a constant
rethinking of our way of doing things; all these
can help develop those stable interior principles
that lead us spontaneously to do good. Virtue
is a conviction that has become a steadfast inner
principle of operation. The virtuous life thus
builds, strengthens and shapes freedom, lest we
become slaves of dehumanizing and antisocial
inclinations. For human dignity itself demands
that each of us “act out of conscious and free
choice, as moved and drawn in a personal way
from within”.293
The value of correction as an incentive
268. It is also essential to help children and
adolescents to realize that misbehaviour has
consequences. They need to be encouraged to
put themselves in other people’s shoes and to
acknowledge the hurt they have caused. Some
punishments – those for aggressive, antisocial
Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Pastoral
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et
Spes, 17.
293
202
conduct - can partially serve this purpose. It is
important to train children firmly to ask forgiveness and to repair the harm done to others. As
the educational process bears fruit in the growth
of personal freedom, children come to appreciate that it was good to grow up in a family and
even to put up with the demands that every process of formation makes.
269. Correction is also an incentive whenever
children’s efforts are appreciated and acknowledged, and they sense their parents’ constant, patient trust. Children who are lovingly corrected
feel cared for; they perceive that they are individuals whose potential is recognized. This does
not require parents to be perfect, but to be able
humbly to acknowledge their own limitations
and make efforts to improve. Still, one of the
things children need to learn from their parents
is not to get carried away by anger. A child who
does something wrong must be corrected, but
never treated as an enemy or an object on which
to take out one’s own frustrations. Adults also
need to realize that some kinds of misbehaviour
have to do with the frailty and limitations typical
of youth. An attitude constantly prone to punishment would be harmful and not help children
to realize that some actions are more serious
than others. It would lead to discouragement
and resentment: “Parents, do not provoke your
children” (Eph 6:4; cf. Col 3:21).
203
270. It is important that discipline not lead to
discouragement, but be instead a stimulus to further progress. How can discipline be best interiorized? How do we ensure that discipline is
a constructive limit placed on a child’s actions
and not a barrier standing in the way of his or
her growth? A balance has to be found between
two equally harmful extremes. One would be to
try to make everything revolve around the child’s
desires; such children will grow up with a sense
of their rights but not their responsibilities. The
other would be to deprive the child of an awareness of his or her dignity, personal identity and
rights; such children end up overwhelmed by
their duties and a need to carry out other people’s wishes.
Patient realism
271. Moral education entails asking of a child
or a young person only those things that do not
involve a disproportionate sacrifice, and demanding only a degree of effort that will not lead to
resentment or coercion. Ordinarily this is done
by proposing small steps that can be understood,
accepted and appreciated, while including a proportionate sacrifice. Otherwise, by demanding
too much, we gain nothing. Once the child is
free of our authority, he or she may possibly
cease to do good.
272. Ethical formation is at times frowned upon,
due to experiences of neglect, disappointment,
204
lack of affection or poor models of parenting.
Ethical values are associated with negative images
of parental figures or the shortcomings of adults.
For this reason, adolescents should be helped to
draw analogies: to appreciate that values are best
embodied in a few exemplary persons, but also realized imperfectly and to different degrees in others. At the same time, since their hesitation can
be tied to bad experiences, they need help in the
process of inner healing and in this way to grow
in the ability to understand and live in peace with
others and the larger community.
273. In proposing values, we have to proceed
slowly, taking into consideration the child’s age
and abilities, without presuming to apply rigid
and inflexible methods. The valuable contributions of psychology and the educational sciences
have shown that changing a child’s behaviour involves a gradual process, but also that freedom
needs to be channeled and stimulated, since by
itself it does not ensure growth in maturity. Situated freedom, real freedom, is limited and conditioned. It is not simply the ability to choose what
is good with complete spontaneity. A distinction
is not always adequately drawn between “voluntary” and “free” acts. A person may clearly
and willingly desire something evil, but do so
as the result of an irresistible passion or a poor
upbringing. In such cases, while the decision is
voluntary, inasmuch as it does not run counter to
the inclination of their desire, it is not free, since
205
it is practically impossible for them not to choose
that evil. We see this in the case of compulsive
drug addicts. When they want a fix, they want
it completely, yet they are so conditioned that at
that moment no other decision is possible. Their
decision is voluntary but not free. It makes no
sense to “let them freely choose”, since in fact
they cannot choose, and exposing them to drugs
only increases their addiction. They need the
help of others and a process of rehabilitation.
Family life as an educational setting
274. The family is the first school of human
values, where we learn the wise use of freedom. Certain inclinations develop in childhood
and become so deeply rooted that they remain
throughout life, either as attractions to a particular value or a natural repugnance to certain ways
of acting. Many people think and act in a certain
way because they deem it to be right on the basis
of what they learned, as if by osmosis, from their
earliest years: “That’s how I was taught”. “That’s
what I learned to do”. In the family we can also
learn to be critical about certain messages sent
by the various media. Sad to say, some television
programmes or forms of advertising often negatively influence and undercut the values inculcated
in family life.
275. In our own day, dominated by stress and
rapid technological advances, one of the most
important tasks of families is to provide an
206
education in hope. This does not mean preventing children from playing with electronic devices,
but rather finding ways to help them develop
their critical abilities and not to think that digital
speed can apply to everything in life. Postponing desires does not mean denying them but simply deferring their fulfilment. When children or
adolescents are not helped to realize that some
things have to be waited for, they can become
obsessed with satisfying their immediate needs
and develop the vice of “wanting it all now”.
This is a grand illusion which does not favour
freedom but weakens it. On the other hand,
when we are taught to postpone some things until the right moment, we learn self-mastery and
detachment from our impulses. When children
realize that they have to be responsible for themselves, their self-esteem is enriched. This in turn
teaches them to respect the freedom of others.
Obviously this does not mean expecting children to act like adults, but neither does it mean
underestimating their ability to grow in responsible freedom. In a healthy family, this learning
process usually takes place through the demands
made by life in common.
276. The family is the primary setting for socialization, since it is where we first learn to relate to others, to listen and share, to be patient
and show respect, to help one another and live as
one. The task of education is to make us sense
that the world and society are also our home;
207
it trains us how to live together in this greater
home. In the family, we learn closeness, care and
respect for others. We break out of our fatal selfabsorption and come to realize that we are living
with and alongside others who are worthy of our
concern, our kindness and our affection. There
is no social bond without this primary, everyday,
almost microscopic aspect of living side by side,
crossing paths at different times of the day, being
concerned about everything that affects us, helping one another with ordinary little things. Every
day the family has to come up with new ways of
appreciating and acknowledging its members.
277. In the family too, we can rethink our habits of consumption and join in caring for the environment as our common home. “The family
is the principal agent of an integral ecology, because it is the primary social subject which contains within it the two fundamental principles
of human civilization on earth: the principle of
communion and the principle of fruitfulness”.294
In the same way, times of difficulty and trouble
in the lives of family life can teach important lessons. This happens, for example, when illness
strikes, since “in the face of illness, even in families, difficulties arise due to human weakness. But
in general, times of illness enable family bonds
to grow stronger… An education that fails to
encourage sensitivity to human illness makes the
Catechesis (30 September 2015): L’Osservatore Romano,
1 October 2015, p. 8.
294
208
heart grow cold; it makes young people ‘anesthetized’ to the suffering of others, incapable of
facing suffering and of living the experience of
limitation”.295
278. The educational process that occurs between parents and children can be helped or
hindered by the increasing sophistication of
the communications and entertainment media.
When well used, these media can be helpful for
connecting family members who live apart from
one another. Frequent contacts help to overcome
difficulties.296 Still, it is clear that these media
cannot replace the need for more personal and
direct dialogue, which requires physical presence
or at least hearing the voice of the other person.
We know that sometimes they can keep people
apart rather than together, as when at dinnertime
everyone is surfing on a mobile phone, or when
one spouse falls asleep waiting for the other who
spends hours playing with an electronic device.
This is also something that families have to discuss and resolve in ways which encourage interaction without imposing unrealistic prohibitions.
In any event, we cannot ignore the risks that
these new forms of communication pose for
children and adolescents; at times they can foster
apathy and disconnect from the real world. This
“technological disconnect” exposes them more
Catechesis (10 June 2015): L’Osservatore Romano, 11
June 2015, p. 8.
296
Cf. Relatio Finalis 2015, 67.
295
209
easily to manipulation by those who would
invade their private space with selfish interests.
279. Nor is it good for parents to be domineering. When children are made to feel that
only their parents can be trusted, this hinders an
adequate process of socialization and growth in
affective maturity. To help expand the parental relationship to broader realities, “Christian
communities are called to offer support to the
educational mission of families”,297 particularly
through the catechesis associated with Christian
initiation. To foster an integral education, we
need to “renew the covenant between the family and the Christian community”.298 The Synod
wanted to emphasize the importance of Catholic schools which “play a vital role in assisting
parents in their duty to raise their children…
Catholic schools should be encouraged in their
mission to help pupils grow into mature adults
who can view the world with the love of Jesus
and who can understand life as a call to serve
God”.299 For this reason, “the Church strongly
affirms her freedom to set forth her teaching and
the right of conscientious objection on the part
of educators”.300
Catechesis (20 May 2015): L’Osservatore Romano, 21
May 2015, p. 8.
298
Catechesis (9 September 2015): L’Osservatore Romano,
10 September 2015, p. 8.
299
Relatio Finalis 2015, 68.
300
Ibid., 58
297
210
270 words
CORE 100: Sample Reading Summary
In this short passage we meet a young man. He has a conversation about love
with the desert, the winds, and the sun. While they each seem to know about love, there
is something lacking in each of their accounts. One can see this from the beginning with
the desert, which is upset that the falcon takes away what he has created. The boy points
out that there is something unifying about love, in that the prey becomes the falcon, the
falcon the man, and the man the desert. The desert's understanding is limited because it
focuses on individual parts without considering what connects them.
The opposite holds with the wind. The wind seems to have no limits because it
touches all things in the way that the desert does not. However, the wind does have one
limit of its own, which is that it cannot help the boy transform himself. The wind is
limited because it does not understand love. The author therefore suggests that the
seemingly limitless wind also has limitations.
Finally, we come to the sun, which claims that he learned how to love at his great
distance in the sky. He says that everything has its own specific function and destiny. In
reply, the boy asserts that the sun is wise, but does not know about love. Wisdom knows
things as they are, whereas love transforms each thing into something better than it is.
The boy's main point throughout the passage is that love is neither unchanging nor ever
changing nor known at a distance, but a force that makes us strive to become better than
we are and thereby improve the world.
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