Unformatted Attachment Preview
CRJ 330
Law and Courts
Spring Day 2018
Critical Analysis Activity 1
Submit to Canvas as an MS Word document or PDF by 11:59pm on Thursday, February 22. Comply with
all APA formatting and citation guidelines.
Question 1
For the following question, please use either the 2018 State of the Union address or journalist Dan
Lothian’s on campus talk: Identify 2 significant presentation points from the address/talk. Explain why
these points are significant and the persuasive strategy behind their use. 2 paragraphs (10 points)
Question 2
Explain what a court of limited jurisdiction is. In addition, explain how the value of property taken (in a
criminal case) affects the jurisdiction of the court. 1 paragraph (10 points)
Question 3
When a criminal defendant in a U.S. district court case is found guilty of a crime, explain where a
subsequent appeal will be directed (be specific). Further, explain the jurisdictional limits of the appellate
court you have indicated. 1 paragraph (10 points)
Question 4
How does procedural law differ from substantive law? What does each govern? Explain and be specific.
1 paragraph (10 points)
Question 5
Review The Criminalization of Pregnant Women. The article is posted in Canvas as a PDF. After reviewing
the article and conducting your own research, complete a 1 page analysis in which you: (a) Discuss the
issue of criminalizing pregnant drug-addicted mothers, generally; (b) Explain whether you agree with the
author’s position on the issues and why; and (c) Explain whether you feel this is an example of
sociological jurisprudence and why. (30 points)
Question 6
Review Midgett v. State. The case opinion is posted in Canvas as a PDF. Next, respond to the following:
(30 points)
(a) Discuss the facts, which gave rise to the criminal charges/prosecution;
(b) Discuss the issue(s) that were before the court; and
(c) Discuss the court’s decision and thoroughly explain their reasoning.
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
The Criminalization of
Pregnant Women and
the Illusion of MaternalFetal Conflict
Kylie Alexandra
Sociology 324
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Young Children: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Special Care
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1BSUJDVMBSJ[FE*NBHJOBUJPOBOE+VTUJDFGPS1SFHOBOU
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4PMPNPO 3FOFF*i'VUVSF'FBS1SFOBUBM%VUJFT
*NQPTFE#Z1SJWBUF1BSUJFTwAmerican Journal of Law &
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5PTDBOP 7JDLJi.JTHVJEFE3FUSJCVUJPO$SJNJOBMJ[BUJPO
PG1SFHOBOU8PNFO8IP5BLF%SVHTwSocial Legal Studies
$3"$,JTOPXLOPXOBTi1SPKFDU1SFWFOUJPOw
Ronnie MIDGETT, Sr. v. STATE of Arkansas
No. CR 86-215
Supreme Court of Arkansas
292 Ark. 278; 729 S.W.2d 410; 1987 Ark. LEXIS 2123
May 25, 1987, Opinion delivered
OPINION BY: NEWBERN
OPINION
[*281] [**411] This child abuse case resulted in the appellant's conviction of first degree
murder. The sole issue on appeal is whether the state's evidence was sufficient to sustain
the conviction. We hold there was no evidence of the ". . . premeditated and deliberated
purpose of causing the death of another person . . ." required for conviction of first
degree murder by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1502(1)(b) (Repl. 1977). However, we find the
evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of second [***6] degree murder,
described in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1503(1)(c) (Repl. 1977), as the appellant was shown to
have caused his son's death by delivering a blow to his abdomen or chest ". . . with the
purpose of causing serious physical injury. . . ." The conviction is thus modified from one
of first degree murder to one of second degree murder and affirmed.
The facts of this case are as heart-rending as any we are likely to see. The appellant is six
feet two inches tall and weighs 300 pounds. His son, Ronnie Midgett, Jr., was eight years
old and weighed between thirty-eight and forty-five pounds. The evidence showed that
Ronnie Jr. had been abused by brutal beating over a substantial period of time. Typically,
as in other child abuse cases, the bruises had been noticed by school personnel, and a
school counselor as well as a SCAN worker had gone to the Midgett home to inquire.
Ronnie Jr. would not say how he had obtained the bruises or why he was so lethargic at
school except to blame it all, vaguely, on a rough playing little brother. He did not even
complain to his siblings about the treatment he was receiving from the appellant. His
mother, the wife of the appellant, was not [***7] living in the home. The other children
apparently were not being physically abused by the appellant.
Ronnie Jr.'s sister, Sherry, aged ten, testified that on the Saturday preceding the
Wednesday of Ronnie Jr.'s death their father, the appellant, was drinking whiskey (two to
three quarts that day) and beating on Ronnie Jr. She testified that the appellant would
"bundle up his fist" and hit Ronnie Jr. in the stomach and in the back. On direct
examination she said that she had not previously seen the appellant beat Ronnie Jr., but
she had seen the appellant choke him for no particular reason on Sunday nights after she
and Ronnie Jr. returned from church. On cross-examination, Sherry testified that Ronnie
Jr. had lied and her father was, on that Saturday, trying to get him to tell the truth. [*282]
She said the bruises on Ronnie Jr.'s body noticed over the preceding six months had been
caused by the appellant. She said the beating administered on the Saturday in question
consisted of four blows, two to the stomach and two to the back.
On the Wednesday Ronnie Jr. died, the appellant appeared at a hospital carrying the
body. He told hospital personnel something was wrong with [***8] the child. An autopsy
was performed, and it showed Ronnie Jr. was a very poorly nourished and
underdeveloped eight-year-old. There were recently caused bruises on the lips, center of
the chest plate, and forehead as well as on the back part of the lateral chest wall, the soft
tissue near the spine, and the buttocks. There was discoloration of the abdominal wall
and prominent bruising on the palms of the hands. Older bruises were found on the right
temple, under the chin, and on the left mandible. Recent as well as older, healed, rib
fractures were found.
The conclusion of the medical examiner who performed the autopsy was that Ronnie Jr.
died as the result of intra-abdominal hemorrhage caused by a blunt force trauma
consistent with having been delivered by a human fist. The appellant argues that in spite
of all this evidence of child abuse, there is no evidence that he killed Ronnie Jr. having
premeditated and deliberated causing his death. We must agree.
[1, 2] It is true that premeditation and deliberation may be found on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. That was the holding in House v. State, 230 Ark. 622, 324 S.W.2d
112 (1959), where the evidence [***9] showed a twenty-four-year-old man killed a
nineteen-year-old [**412] woman with whom he was attempting to have sexual
intercourse. The evidence showed a protracted fight after which the appellant dumped
the body in a water-filled ditch not knowing, according to House's testimony, whether
she was dead or alive. Although it is not spelled out, presumably the rationale of the
opinion was that House had time to premeditate during the fight and there was
substantial evidence he intended the death of the victim when he left her in the water.
Our only citation of authority on the point of showing premeditation and deliberation by
circumstantial evidence in that case was Weldon v. State, 168 Ark. 534, 270 S.W. 968
(1925), where we said:
The very manner in which the deadly weapons were used [*283] was
sufficient to justify the jury in finding that whoever killed Jones used the
weapons with a deliberate purpose to kill. Jones' body was perforated
three times through the center with bullets from a pistol or rifle, and was
also horribly mutilated with a knife. The manner, therefore, in which these
deadly weapons were used tended to show that the death of Jones was
[***10] the result of premeditation and deliberation.
While a fist may be a deadly weapon, the evidence of the use of the fist in this case is not
comparable to the evidence in House v. State, supra, and Weldon v. State, supra, where
there was some substantial evidence consisting of other circumstances that the appellant
who dumped the apparently immobile body in the water and walked away and the
appellant who wielded the deadly weapons intended and premeditated that death occur.
Nor do we have in this case evidence of any remark made or other demonstration that
the appellant was abusing his son in the hope that he eventually would die.
The annotation at 89 A.L.R. 2d 396 (1963) deals with the subject of crimes resulting from
excessive punishment of children. While some of the cases cited are ones in which a
parent or step-parent flew into a one-time rage and killed the child, others are plain child
abuse syndrome cases like the one before us now. None of them, with one exception,
resulted in affirmance of a first degree murder conviction. Several were decisions in
which first degree murder convictions were set aside for lack of evidence of
premeditation and deliberation. [***11] See, e.g., People v. Ingraham, 232 N.Y. 245, 133
N.E. 575 (1921); Pannill v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 244, 38 S.W.2d 457 (1946). The case
cited in the annotation in which a first degree murder conviction was affirmed is Morris v.
State, 270 Ind. 245, 384 N.E.2d 1022 (1979). There the appellant was left alone for about
fifteen minutes with his five-month-old baby. When the child's mother returned to their
home she found the baby had been burned severely on one side. About a month later,
the appellant and his wife were engaged in an argument when the baby began to whine.
The appellant laid the baby on the floor, began hitting the baby in the face and then hit
the baby's head on the floor, causing the baby's death. At the time of the offense, the
Indiana law required malice, purpose, and premeditation to convict of first degree
murder. In discussing the [*284] premeditation requirement, the court said only:
Premeditation which also may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the killing, need not long be deliberated upon,
but may occur merely an instant before the act. [Citation omitted.] It is
clear from the facts adduced at [***12] trial regarding the burning and
beating of the child that the jury could well have inferred that his killing
was perpetrated purposely and with premeditated malice. [384 N.E.2d at
1024]
No explanation is given for the quantum leap from "the facts," horrible as they were, to
the inference of premeditation. We made the same error in Burnett v. State, 287 Ark.
158, 697 S.W.2d 95 (1985), another child abuse case in which the facts were particularly
repugnant, where we said:
Premeditation, deliberation and intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the
case, such as the weapon used and the nature, extent and location of the wounds
inflicted . . . . [T]he weapon used was a fist which struck the abdomen [**413] with such
force as to rupture the colon. The child sustained fingernail scratches, four broken ribs,
and other internal damage, as well as numerous bruises due to blows with a fist all over
his body. The required mental state for first degree murder can be inferred from the
evidence of abuse, which is substantial. [287 Ark. at 162-163, 697 S.W.2d at 98]
The problem with these cases is that they give no reason, like the reasons found [***13]
in House v. State, supra, and Weldon v. State, supra, to make the inference of
premeditation and deliberation.
In Simmons v. State, 227 Ark. 1109, 305 S.W.2d 119 (1957), the appellant was
antagonized more than once by his victims. After the first time he went home and got his
shotgun to use, he said, for hunting squirrels. We modified the conviction from first
degree murder to second degree murder, noting that the appellant had opportunities to
kill the victims after he had obtained his weapon but before he shot them. His having let
those opportunities pass negated premeditation and deliberation. We said:
HN1 There is no testimony of any witness, aside from the [*285] testimony
of appellant in open court and his written confession, from which the jury
could have found the existence of premeditation and deliberation. Neither
do we find any circumstance which amounts to substantial evidence upon
which a finding of premeditation and deliberation could be based.
Consequently we are led to conclude that the jury must have resorted to
speculation rather than substantial evidence in arriving at a verdict of
murder in the first degree. [227 Ark. at 110-111, [***14] 305 S.W.2d at
120]
The appellant argues, and we must agree, that in a case of child abuse of long duration
the jury could well infer that the perpetrator comes not to expect death of the child from
his action, but rather that the child will live so that the abuse may be administered again
and again. Had the appellant planned his son's death, he could have accomplished it in a
previous beating.
In this case the evidence might possibly support the inference that the blows which
proved fatal to Ronnie Jr. could have been struck with the intent to cause his death
developed in a drunken, misguided, and overheated attempt at disciplining him for not
having told the truth. Even if we were to conclude there was substantial evidence from
which the jury could fairly have found the appellant intended to cause Ronnie Jr.'s death
in a drunken disciplinary beating on that Saturday, there would still be no evidence
whatever of a premeditated and deliberated killing.
[3, 4] In Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3, cert. den. 459 U.S. 1022 (1980), we held
that HN2 to show the appellant acted with a premeditated and deliberated purpose, the
state must prove that he (1) [***15] had the conscious object to cause death, (2) formed
that intention before acting, and (3) weighed in his mind the consequences of a course of
conduct, as distinguished from acting upon sudden impulse without the exercise of
reasoning power. Viewing the evidence most favorable to the appellee, the
circumstances of this case are not substantial evidence the appellant did (2) and (3), as
opposed to acting on impulse or with no conscious object of causing death. The jury was
thus forced to resort to speculation on these important elements.
[5-8] A clear exposition of the premeditation and deliberation requirement which
separates first degree from second degree [*286] murder is found in 2 W. LaFave and A.
Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 7.7 (1986):
Almost all American jurisdictions which divide murder into degrees include
the following two murder situations in the category of first degree murder:
(1) intent-to-kill murder where there exists (in addition to the intent to kill)
the elements of premeditation and deliberation, and (2) felony murder
where the felony in question is one of five or six listed felonies, generally
including rape, robbery, kidnapping, [***16] arson and burglary. Some
states instead or in addition have other kinds of first degree murder.
[**414] (a) Premeditated, Deliberate, Intentional Killing. HN3 To be guilty
of this form of first degree murder the defendant must not only intend to
kill but in addition he must premeditate the killing and deliberate about it.
It is not easy to give a meaningful definition of the words "premeditate"
and "deliberate" as they are used in connection with first degree murder.
Perhaps the best that can be said of "deliberation" is that it requires a cool
mind that is capable of reflection, and of "premeditation" that it requires
that the one with the cool mind did in fact reflect, at least for a short
period of time before his act of killing.
It is often said that premeditation and deliberation require only a "brief
moment of thought" or a "matter of seconds," and convictions for first
degree murder have frequently been affirmed where such short periods of
time were involved. The better view, however, is that to "speak of HN4
premeditation and deliberation which are instantaneous, or which take no
appreciable time, . . . destroys the statutory distinction between first and
second degree murder," [***17] and (in much the same fashion that the
felonymurder rule is being increasingly limited) this view is growing in
popularity. This is not to say, however, that premeditation and
deliberation cannot exist when the act of killing follows immediately after
the formation of the intent. The intention may be finally formed only as a
conclusion of prior premeditation and deliberation, while in other cases
the intention may be formed without prior thought so that premeditation
and deliberation occurs only [*287] with the passage of additional time for
"further thought, and a turning over in the mind." [Footnotes omitted.]
The evidence in this case supports only the conclusion that the appellant intended not to
kill his son but to further abuse him or that his intent, if it was to kill the child, was
developed in a drunken, heated, rage while disciplining the child. Neither of those
supports a finding of premeditation or deliberation.
Perhaps because they wish to punish more severely child abusers who kill their children,
other states' legislatures have created laws permitting them to go beyond second degree
murder. For example, Illinois has made aggravated battery one of [***18] the felonies
qualifying for "felony murder," and a child abuser can be convicted of murder if the child
dies as a result of aggravated battery. See People v. Ray, 399 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. 1979).
Georgia makes "cruelty to children" a felony, and homicide in the course of cruelty to
children is "felony murder." See Bethea v. State, 304 S.E. 2d 713 (Ga. 1983). Idaho has
made murder by torture a first degree offense, regardless of intent of the perpetrator to
kill the victim, and the offense is punishable by the death penalty. See State v. Stuart, 715
P.2d 833 (Idaho 1985). California has also adopted a murder by torture statute making
the offense murder in the first degree without regard to the intent to kill. See People v.
Demond, 59 Cal. App. 3d 574, 130 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1976). Cf. People v. Steger, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 161, 546 P.2d 665 (1976), in which the California Supreme Court held that the
person accused of torture murder in the first degree must be shown to have had a
premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain in order to be convicted.
[9, 10] All of this goes to show that there remains a difference between first and [***19]
second degree murder, not only under our statute, but generally. Unless our law is
changed to permit conviction of first degree murder for something like child abuse or
torture resulting in death, our duty is to give those accused of first degree murder the
benefit of the requirement that they be shown by substantial evidence to have
premeditated and deliberated the killing, no matter how heinous the facts may otherwise
be. We understand and appreciate the state's citation of Burnett v. State, supra, but, to
the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion, we must overrule it.
[*288] [11, 12] The dissenting opinion begins by stating the majority concludes that one
who starves and beats a child to death cannot [**415] be convicted of murder. That is
not so, as we are affirming the conviction of murder; we are, however, reducing it to
second degree murder. The dissenting opinion's conclusion that the appellant starved
Ronnie Jr., must be based solely on the child's underdeveloped condition which could,
presumably, have been caused by any number of physical malfunctions. There is no
evidence the appellant starved the child. The dissenting opinion says it [***20] is for the
jury to determine the degree of murder of which the appellant is guilty. That is true so
long as there is substantial evidence to support the jury's choice. The point of this opinion
is to note that there was no evidence of premeditation or deliberation which are required
elements of the crime of first degree murder. The dissenting opinion cites two child
abuse cases in which first degree murder convictions have been affirmed. One is Morris v.
State, supra, with which we dealt earlier in this opinion. The other is Lindsey v. State, 501
S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), in which the opinion does not say the conviction was
for first degree murder. In fact, the issue there was whether the killing occurred with
"intent and malice" which are obviously not the same as premeditation and deliberation.
[13] In this case we have no difficulty with reducing the sentence to the maximum for
second degree murder. Dixon v. State, 260 Ark. 857, 545 S.W.2d 606 (1977). The jury
gave the appellant a sentence of forty years imprisonment which was the maximum for
first degree murder, and we reduce that to twenty years which is the maximum
imprisonment [***21] for second degree murder. Just as walking away from the victim in
the water-filled ditch in House v. State, supra, after a protracted fight, and the "overkill"
and mutilation of the body in Weldon v. State, supra, were circumstances creating
substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation, the obvious effect the beatings
were having on Ronnie Jr. and his emaciated condition when the final beating occurred
are circumstances constituting substantial evidence that the appellant's purpose was to
cause serious physical injury, and that he caused his death in the process. That is second
degree murder, § 41-1503(1)(c). Therefore, we reduce the appellant's sentence to
imprisonment for twenty years.
Affirmed as modified.
Learning Activity Rubric rev9-2017
Criteria
Ratings
Pts
0.0 pts
Critical
Thinking/Analysis
50.0 pts
Above Average.
Rich in content.
Extensive thought,
insight, and
analysis.
37.5 pts
Average.
Substantial.
Thought, insight,
and analysis have
taken place.
30.0 pts
Below Average.
Generally
competent.
Information is thin
or commonplace.
Unacceptable.
Rudimentary and
superficial. Limited
analysis or insight is
evident.
50.0 pts
Stylistics
0.0 pts
25.0 pts
Above
Average. No
obvious
grammatical or
stylistic errors.
18.75 pts
Average.
Very few
grammatical
or stylistic
15.0 pts
Below Average.
Obvious grammatical
or stylistic errors.
Errors interfere with
Unacceptable. Obvious
grammatical or stylistic
errors. Errors make
understanding and continuity
difficult.
25.0 pts
errors.
content.
Citation/Formatting
0.0 pts
25.0 pts
Above Average.
Proper format and
citations with no
obvious errors.
18.75 pts
Average. Proper
format and
citations with
very few errors.
15.0 pts
Below Average.
Proper format and
citations with errors
that are distracting.
Unacceptable. Little
or no attempt at
proper format
and/or citations.
25.0 pts
Total Points: 100.0